Alawi v. Alauya – AM SDC-97-2-P.

February 24, 1997
Fact:
Complainant filed an Administrative case against the defendant for the following incident. 1.
Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith; 2. “Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation 3. Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage and Usurpation of the title
of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya
justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal”
or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:
Whether the respondent who passed the Shari’a Bar can use the Title Attorney?

Held:
No, that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
“counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
 Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall
be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor –
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does
In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
 In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to
the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled by
people who are calloused to our pleas for justice...”. He also expressed strong words as against
the judiciary like“justice... is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”. The petition rooted from
the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal
was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in
the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments,
he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in
trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen
himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in
speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has
already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is
sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were
cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed.
Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to
prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.
 IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
 

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title
of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title
of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations.  Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.  It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section 1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect.  The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of
the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who
can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare
it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner.  The same may
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
49 SCRA 22
FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years
from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration
and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar.  The
Court accepted all comments on the proposed integration.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to
the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar
(or unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the
State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s
constitutional authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of
speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court
thus levies a tax. The Court held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer
to become a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is
“to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not
compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the
payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a
member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the
lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule
otherwise would make every government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore,
the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

FACTS:
The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, to
which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
following advertisements:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes
practice of law and whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional
responsibility

RULING:
The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in
the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance
of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a limited representation in
behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore. Canon
3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return
for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The Canons of Professional Ethics,
before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule
prohibiting the advertisement of a lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration
the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondent’s defense
with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to the
prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not applicable
in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state.” The Court
Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
 Valencia vs. Cabanting, Antonio et al. (196 SCRA 302)
Facts:

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint
against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages.

On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in
favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo.

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction
before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution
concerning his house.

While the petition was pending, the trial court, on

March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already
become final and executory

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April 25, 1973.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the
New Civil Code.

Ruling:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:

(5)  xxx this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved.  It is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client.  Greed may get the better
of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness.  Any violation of... this prohibition would
constitute malpractice

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is
pending.
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality
of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding.  A thing is said to be in litigation not
only if there is some contest or litigation over it in... court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.  (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81).

Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the
petition.

Principles:

Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated
when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in
progress.  Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in... this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
AREOLA VS MENDOZA
FIRST DIVISION [ A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014 ]

EDGARDO AREOLA, COMPLAINANT,

VS.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Areola alleged that during Prisoners’ Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and
called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial Court where she was assigned,
to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:

“O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.”

 Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct or the code professional responsibility

Ruling:

 Yes, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of
Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she told her clients “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.” Atty. Mendoza made it appear
that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in
order for their cases to be dismissed.

 As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule
15.07 states that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.”