Professional Documents
Culture Documents
It may turn out, then, that going back can be a way to go for-
ward: That remembering the modernisms of the nineteenth
century can give us the vision and courage to create the mod-
ernisms of the twenty-first. This act of remembering can help
us bring modernism back to its roots, so that it can nourish and
renew itself, to confront the adventures and dangers that lie
To this end, he proceeds to carry out an extensive analysis of part of the work of
Goethe and Marx as a key to understanding the spirit of modernity. This is the
context of his study of Faust and The Communist Manifesto. From there he goes
on to examine the literary representations of urban transformation as found in
part of the work of Baudelaire, Pushkin, Gogol, Chernyshevsky, Biely, and Man-
delstam, vis-a-vis Paris and St. Petersburg. Finally, in what I found one of the
most thought-provoking sections of the book, he takes a look at the engineering
career of Robert Moses and its destructive effects on New York City, ending with
a series of comments on contemporary urban blight and cultural renewal. I will
return to this issue later on.
Berman subdivides modernity into three phases: ... In the first phase, which goes
roughly from the start of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, peo-
ple are just beginning to experience modern life; they hardly know what has hit
them. (...) Our second phase begins with the great revolutionary wave of the
1790s. With the French Revolution and its reverberations, a great modern public
abruptly and dramatically comes to life. (...) In the twentieth century, our third
and final phase, the process of modernization expands to take in virtually the
whole world, and the developing world culture of modernism achieves spectacu-
lar triumphs in art and thought (16-17). At first glance, this has all the appearance
of being a very precise periodization. However, some of Berman’s analytical diffi-
culties are reflected even at this early stage of the book. For example, given that his
study is concentrated in an examination of the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, one would expect the demarcations between these two phases to be evident.
But, far from it: this distinction is not convincingly established.
On the one hand, his initial delimitation of the broad outlines and origins of the
second phase are more or less clear. This phase starts as an era of social revolutions
and tensions caused by the decline but stubborn persistence of the Ancient Re-
gimes and the fragile and uncertain emergence of capitalist political power and
socioeconomic transformation. Yet and on the other hand, when does Berman
think this phase ends? I.e., when does his twentieth century / third-final phase
begin? And why? Does the second phase end with the second wave of industriali-
zation, colonial expansion, economic crises, massive demographic dislocations,
and the socio-cultural explosion of the last quarter of the nineteenth century? Or
does the second phase end with the coming of the First World War? Or does it
end with the Great Depression and the rise of the welfare / corporate states during
the 1930s? Etc., etc.
This is no secondary issue in light of the current controversy over the nature of
modernity vis-a-vis the post-modern period. Berman’s effort here is, in part, an
attempt to debunk the post-modern theorists and the theorization of
post-modernism by providing what he considers to be a more solid and alterna-
tive viewpoint:
... Others believe that the really distinctive forms of contemporary art
and thought have made a quantum leap beyond all the diverse sensi-
bilities of modernism, and earned the right to call themselves
post-modern. I want to respond to these antithetical but complemen-
tary claims...(345).
In order to further this effort, Berman would have had to identify the twenti-
eth-century conjuncture or articulation of conjunctures that clearly distinguished
the second phase from the third. In that way he would have been able to make a
case for modernity as a never ending [twentieth-century] story that still presides
over the present. But he fails to do this. One could have argued with his choice of
conjunctures in this last case, had he gone so far as to clearly identify them. But
one cannot argue with what does not exist. If one were to employ the ironic tone
that Berman oftentimes uses throughout this book, one could go so far as to say
that what there is of a solid analysis in Berman’s interesting discussion of nine-
teenth-century modernity (Goethe and Marx) begins to melt into air when he
starts examining twentieth-century sociocultural phenomena.
Therefore and contrary to the initial appearance of having a clear grasp of the
demarcations that allow one to establish the coordinates of a historical process,
Berman apparently, and in the final analysis, conceives modernity as a linear pro-
cess of constant change of prolongation and extension that keeps on reproducing
itself: ... modernity... is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into
a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration, and renewal, of struggle and contradic-
tion, of ambiguity and anguish... (15) His view of the modernization process is
very much a part of this linear perspective: In the twentieth century, the social
process that brings this maelstrom into being and keep it in a state of perpetual
becoming have come to be called modernization. (16) The problem with this
view is that there is no frame of reference in terms of historical time and periodi-
From these, he goes on to point out that Berman’s approach even makes difficult
a precise understanding of the different aspects, concrete changes, and variations
that took place within the modern period. For one thing, Berman’s perspective
confuses the analysis of nineteenth-century modernism with its early twentieth
century analogues:
But Berman also confuses and makes difficult the analysis of the socio-cultural
changes that took place during the 60s and 70s:
In the midst of the socio-cultural and historical impasse of the present, Berman’s
main politico-analytical solution is the already mentioned attempt to go back to
the future:
In this context, how valid is Berman’s demarcation, in terms of the origins of his
second phase (which ... begins with the great revolutionary wave of the 1790s...),
if ... the Revolution expressly excluded women from its liberty, equality, and fra-
7
ternity ? How much of the creativity and novelty of Baudelaires heroism of mod-
ern life -which Berman celebrates (142-143)- was actually there for the bulk of
the women of Paris during the mid-nineteenth century? Could there have been
female counterparts of Robert Moses?
This is not to say that some of the demarcations established by Berman are not
valid. What I am pointing out here is that they are not sufficient. Furthermore and
assuming that this quantitative objection is correct, Berman’s demarcations would
also have to be re-examined and re-contextualized in light of the gender dimen-
sion that for the most part is missing in this book. In other words, one would also
have to raise qualitative objections to this aspect of Berman’s study, notwith-
standing his passing examination of the Gretchen character in Faust and of Janet
Tacob’s work regarding contemporary urban issues.
poetry of Nicolás Guillén and Luis Palés Matos, etc.). And please note, that I
have not even mentioned the Middle East and Asia. The list is very, very long.
Again, this does not deny the relevance of some of Berman’s demarcations and
examples. However, it does point to the limits of his characterizations as well as
call into question just how much the author himself crosses all boundaries of ge-
ography and ethnicity, of class and nationality in his analysis of modernity.
In Berman’s text, the urban development policies and the mega-expressway net-
works mainly appear as the abstract and aesthetic effects of the will to power of
Robert Moses and of white men such as him. I have not been able to find any
passage in this book in which Berman perceives these programs and public works
as also being one of the means through which capital and the state attempted to
disarticulate the social cohesion and resistances of these impoverished minorities,
while furthering their isolation / segregation with respect to the more well-off
portions of the city. Berman, in this sense, ignores the politico-coercive dimension
of the top-down transformation of urban space.
8
Mike Davis has already pointed this out:
True, Berman makes note of some instances of urban social resistance to particu-
lar aspects of these policies. Take, for example, his brief description of the suc-
cessful opposition in Manhattans Lower East Side to one specific Moses project
(.337). He fails to realize the extent to which these policies, taken as a whole and
in the context of the Second Postwar period, are themselves, per se, part of a po-
litical counter-resistance effort by city governments and big business interests.
Interestingly enough and as some of the new social-historical research has shown,
this type of policy or dimension is even present in some of the urban remodeling
11
efforts that were carried out in Europe during the nineteenth century. Again,
Berman’s treatment of Baudelaire’s Paris or Pushkin’s St. Petersburg completely
overlooks this possibility. For all his claims to dialectics and dynamism and de-
spite all his declarations in favor of freedom, justice, and the struggles in the
streets, Berman does not see the rich complexity and multi-leveled relationships
that lock together, in conflict, the bureaucratic and propertied forces promoting
these socioeconomic and political transformations and the diverse social groups
resisting them. In this sense, he oversimplifies, reduces, and underestimates the
depth and extension of these resistances.
This brings us to the irony of Berman’s assault on Foucault. As part of his broad-
side attack on post-modernist theorists and the theorists of post-modernity, Ber-
man makes the following observations about the work of Michel Foucault:
Just about the only writer of the past decade who has had anything sub-
stantial to say about modernity is Michel Foucault. And what he has to say
If Foucault in effect denied the possibility of any sort of freedom, either outside
these institutions or within their interstices, then how does Berman account for
Foucault’s analysis of the popular illegalities that constantly subvert this panopti-
12
cism in the case of the prison? If Berman is right, then how does he account for
Foucault’s resistance on the inevitability of resistance within any form of power
13
relationship? To my mind, the main discrepancy here is between: (a) Berman’s
defense of the abstract and ahistorical social subject of [bourgeois] juridical ideol-
ogy, namely, the essentialist view of the free individual, born as such with inalien-
able rights, relating to power as an external object in whose distribution each in-
dividual has or should have the right of participation, etc.; and (b) Foucault’s em-
phasis on the discontinuous historicity of this process of subjectification and of
the discursive and socioeconomic practices involved in the construction of such
subjects, their rights, the power relations in which they/we are all caught up, the
institutions that reproduce and regulate these power relations, and the corollary
and multiple resistances that occur in each and everyone of these institutions and
moments of domination.
If the possibility of freedom is the same thing as the possibility of social resistance,
then as I have tried to show Berman’s critique of Foucault is off the mark. If, on
the other hand, the possibility of freedom is the same thing as the rights of this
abstract and ahistorical social subject (the essentialists free individual), then Ber-
man is right when he says that ...there is no freedom in Foucault’s world..., but
not ...because his language forms a seamless web, a cage for more airtight than
anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break... Berman is right
because this is the freedom that was proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights
of Man and the Citizen. I.e., the freedom that excluded women, slaves, the prop-
ertyless, et al. This is the freedom of the liberal-bourgeois constitutions, of practi-
cally all existing governments that only recognize that which can be politically
guaranteed and legitimized by Nation-States, i.e., the freedom that ultimately ex-
cludes the everyday-life struggles of the plural and decentered subjectivities that as
resistances have no possibility of growing unchecked under such a juridical
framework (e.g., the homeless, the poor, gays and lesbians, various ethnic minori-
ties, women, etc.) and at best are at the mercy of the paternalist protection/charity
of such governments. This is the freedom whose abstraction started being materi-
ally dismantled by the social forces that superseded and have been substituting the
modernity that Berman wants to recall to life.
Endnotes
1. Perry Anderson, "Modernity and Revolution," New Left Review, no. 144
(March-April 1984): 96-113.
2. Ibid., 101.
3. Ibid., 102.
4. ibid.
5. ìbid., 103.
6. Joan Kelly, Women, History, and Theory. Chicago: The University of
Chicago press, 1968, 2-4.
7. Ibid., 3.
8. Mike Davis, "The Postmodernist City," New Left Review, no. 151
(May-June 1985): 106-113.
9. Ibid., 111.
10. Ibid.
11. Cf., E.J. Hobsbawm, "Cities and Insurrections," Architectural Design,
vol. 38 (December 1968): 579-588.
12. Cf., Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.
New York: Vintage Books, 1979, 271-293.
13. Michel Foucault, Historia de la sexualidad, vol. I. Mè·©co: Siglo XXI
Editores, S.A., 1977, 104-117; Power and Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings 1972-1977. Colin Gordon (Ed.) New York: Pantheon
Books, 1980, pp.59, 97-98, 118, 137-138, 142, 183-184, 188-190; "The
Subject and Power" in H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Be-
yond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1983, 212, 219.
References
Perry Anderson, Modernity and Revolution, New Left Review, no. 144
(March-April 1984): 96-113.
Joan Kelly, Women, History, and Theory. Chicago: The University of
Chicago press, 1968, 2-4.
Mike Davis, The Postmodernist City, New Left Review, no. 151 (May-June
1985): 106-113.
E.J. Hobsbawm, Cities and Insurrections, Architectural Design, vol. 38
(December 1968): 579-588.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York:
Vintage Books, 1979.
---------. Historia de la sexualidad, vol. I. México: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A.,
1977.
---------. Power and Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972-1977. Colin Gordon (Ed.) New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
----------. The Subject and Power in H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1983).
Citation Format