The Bombay Textile Mill Strike of 1982

 
The Bombay textile mill strike of 1982–1983 has few parallels in the trade union movements
in India. Such a general strike is rarely seen in the history of organized labour [52]. There had
been little violence of any kind in this strike. The strike stands out in history as an event for
reckoning, an incidence where the labour force showed that the unity was their strength and
that numbers did matter. The strike has been explained as ‘there was more of political
unionism rather than an economic bargaining on the part of the trade unions’ [53].
The Bombay textile mill strike began in January 1982 and the agitation continued for one
and a half years. Around two and a half lakh workers of 60 mills from all over Bombay
participated in the strike.
The cause of the agitation is attributed to the fact that the wages of the Bombay working
class in textile mills were disproportionately low. The textile workers in Bombay were
dissatisfied with their wages as well as with their trade union, who was not representing
their interests to the mill owner. During the years following the Second World War, wages
and other benefits in the cotton textile industry in Bombay became reasonably low as
compared with other industries in the city, and perhaps in the whole country. In the year
1947, through an award of the Industrial Court, the concept of ‘some minimum wage’ across
the industry emerged. The minimum wage was placed at `30 per month as basic. The
variable part of the wages, that is, DA was linked with the cost of living index. With the
increase in the cost of living index figures, the DA was proportionately increased. The unions
in other industries, in Bombay, through militant action and skilful collective bargaining,
succeeded in making substantial gains in their emoluments and other service conditions. But
the textile workers, represented by Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), accepted the
recommendations of the wage boards for which the workers had to be contented with
measly wage increases and stagnant DA formula for over 25 years. The RMMS did make up a
little in the years 1973 and 1978. But on both these occasions, the non-recognized unions,
who had been attempting to represent the workers, initiated the agitations for wage
increases. In 1973, due to prolonged work stoppage by the workers, the ministers had to
intervene. The wage agreement, however, was signed by RMMS on behalf of the workers.
One of the main reasons for the poor working conditions of the labour force was the
deteriorating conditions of the textile industry. In the 1980s, there were shifts in the
customer demand from cotton-based products to synthetic and mixed textiles. In addition,
the power loom outperformed the handloom both in productivity and the cost of
manufacturing, resulting in the downfall of various mills that were using handlooms [54].
Another main feature of this strike was the emergence of Datta Samant as a trade union
leader. RMMS was the sole bargaining agent for the textile mill workers of Bombay. But for
years, RMMS constantly overlooked the fundamental needs of the workers [52]. Some wage
increases on an ad hoc basis were negotiated in each case, but these were limited to only
those workers who were engaged in highly skilled areas involving technological
improvement. In course of time, when the whole range of the production processes and
equipment in several mills were modernized, the basic wage structure of the industry
remained unchanged. The textile workers felt quite neglected and as such were aggrieved in
the context of the functioning of their representing trade union. Indeed, that is the reason
why they turned to Datta Samant for leadership.
Datta Samant, with no experience of the textile industry, but with a reputation of being
dynamic and having an understanding of militant trade unionism, had staged a number of
extraordinarily long strikes in many factories in and outside Bombay. He was approached by
the workers for taking up their leadership. His quality of leadership was different. A number
of strikes called by Samant dragged on for extremely long periods, often six months or more.
Not all of them succeeded. Several strikes called upon by him resulted in bloodshed. All
these attributed to his militancy and his extraordinary ability to mobilize workers and hold
their loyalty through long struggles.
However, at the same time, he indicated a lack of essential bargaining skills and sensitivity to
understand the problems of IR. An ability to lead workers in strikes is not the only important
test of a trade unionist, but his/her real test is to solve the disputes and to secure acceptable
solutions of problems without resorting to extremely long strikes or bloodsheds.
The strike of 1982–1983 was a reaction to the inactive approach of RMMS, the legally
recognized union in the industry. The state government favoured the recognition of RMMS.
But the first challenge to this recognition came in 1950, over the issue of bonus for the
workers in the industry. A nine-week industry-wide strike was staged under the leadership of
the Mill Mazdoor Sabha. This was very much against the recognition of RMMS.
Subsequently, on several occasions, the recognition was challenged by workers through the
formation of rival organizations. On each occasion, RMMS was bailed out by the state
government. BIRA also supported this approach of the state government. Unlike in the past,
the state government initially had not intervened to settle the current dispute in spite of the
facts that the strike continued for a longer period, a large number of workers were involved
and the loss of production to the industry. Nor the mill owners requested the state
government for any such intervention. The reason in all can likely be attributed to the fact
that the industry was in recession.
For several reasons, there was much non-acceptance by the mill owners to discuss the issues
concerning the workers with Datta Samant. First, legally and technically, Samant’s union was
not the recognized union. Second, in a situation when RMMS was the recognized union,
there were technical problems. A wage settlement which was in force (signed for one year
only) was not permitting to open a fresh negotiation, before the expiry of the settlement
period. Finally, his personality, aggressive style and unending interventions to work had
already made him a legend.
The nature of the leadership would always be seen by the workers as a positive aspect for
achieving their organizational goals. Datta Samant was an icon, whose leadership was
trusted by people and was felt to generate effective results. On the contrary, towards the
whole issue, Datta Samant as a leader of the strike had quite a different view, initially. In his
own words, ‘I was never keen to enter into any confrontation concerning the textile
employers, rather the workers pressed me hard enough to call the strike’ [55]. Datta
Samant’s image was that of ‘a hot headed and sometimes a militant trade union goon’ [56].
Samant was always ready to walk the extra mile and organize workers from their slum
houses. Datta Samant’s upfront nature, his fearlessness and ability to face any situation were
some of the big reasons why he was chosen as the leader of the strike.
One of the positive aspects of Samant was the fact that he was not getting attracted towards
any political party even when both the Congress and the communist parties were bent on
getting him in the party. The militancy and the notoriety of Dr Datta Samant were favoured
by the working class, who saw him as someone who could win them anything they
demanded. His fame had outrun any union leader of his time.
Another strong reason to opt for Datta Samant was the failure of RMMS to crack a deal for
the mill workers with the mill owners. The RMMS was the Congress-supported union in the
textile industry which had exclusive bargaining rights under the Bombay BIRA 1946 (BIRA).
With BIRA norms in place, the Mill Owners Association was not ready to accept any other
trade union to be the bargaining agent on behalf of the workers. But even though at a macro
level Samant’s ways were not all that acceptable, these issues made him the ultimate choice
for the workers to represent their case before the industrialists [56].
To Samant, a win in this struggle would mean not only almost total dominance over the
labour scene in Bombay, but also the flowering of his political ambitions, for one could not
see any other labour organization blocking his path once he consolidated his control over
the textile workers. Defeat, on the other hand, would bring his entire labour empire into
jeopardy. To the government and the ruling party, a triumphant Samant was an even more
intractable challenge, administratively as well as politically, quite apart from the loss of face
and of representative status for its portage, the RMMS. For all three, the monetary stakes
must now be of secondary importance. But for the presence of Samant on the scene, some
compromise on the monetary issue would almost certainly have been found, as so often in
the past, and that without RMMS being displaced from its favoured position.
Thus, the power struggle came to dominate, although to begin with the workers were
concerned primarily with the wage issue and brought in Samant to lead them to gain that
goal. It turned out that in doing so they had unwittingly made themselves cannon fodder in
this battle for high stakes and would be the ultimate sufferers, whatever the outcome of the
fight. A victory would have no doubt brought sizeable monetary benefits to them, although
not of the order they had been led to hope. Besides for that uncertain gain, they had already
paid a very heavy price in form of current wages. They may also deem themselves winners in
the power struggle inside their mills. But a state of continuous tension and unrest in the
mills was unlikely to be of any benefit to workers in the long run. Any political gains Samant
made out of the present struggle would be his own and of hardly any benefit to the
generality of workers. The mill owners would undoubtedly recoup their strike losses by
screwing further concessions from government, manipulating cotton prices and finally
raising the prices to pass on to the consumer any additional costs that an eventual
settlement may involve. The whole established trade union movement would find itself at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis labour adventurists, thereby making workers in other industries suffer
the consequences of this strike too.
On the other hand, defeat for the strikers, needless to say, would be a serious disaster not
only for them but for labour as a whole. Either way, textile workers seemed to stand to gain
not much and to lose a great deal.
For the textile workers, the strike involved more than a demand for wage increases. It
reflected the total disillusionment with the institutional framework of the BIRA and with the
RMMS as the legally determined sole representative union in the industry. BIRA is unusual in
that unlike other IR laws in India, it has provisions for determining the sole representative
union in the industry. It requires that the claimant union has a membership of 25 per cent of
the industry’s workforce for the preceding six months.
When the strike began in the third week of January 1982, the mill owners could have been
happy since the industry was going through a recession. Indeed, it allowed the mills to get
rid of the piled up stocks. However, the mill owners were not expecting a long strike. The
continuance of the strike for few weeks resulted in the downswing of the raw material cost.
When the demand for the cotton textiles picked up and with the prices of inputs having
fallen, the Bombay mill owners had no option to start the production since the workers were
on strike.
Samant had no legal stand under BIRA but had the total support of the workers. The
government had taken a very legalistic stand by refusing to invite Datta Samant for the
negotiation with the Mill Owners Association. The government’s point was that Samant had
not applied for legal recognition of his union. The successful Bandh of 19 April 1982 proved
his strength. Datta Samant thereafter had the majority support of the textile workers, and
ultimately the government and the mill owners accepted his union as the negotiating union.
Mill owners believed that the workers were grossly misled by Datta Samant. Datta Samant
asked for wage hikes which would have incurred costs of nearly `115 crore per annum on
mill owners. He also demanded 239 per cent hike in DA. The strike resulted in massive
lay-offs and job losses of nearly 75,000 people. The strike caused the policy makers to come
up with laws which benefitted the mill owners. Many cases were filed against Samant’s
Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union [52]. Neither the government nor the industrialists did
anything to help the workers. The workers were all through at a loss—losing salary and
losing jobs. Workers who were part of the strike for one and half years knew that they had
not gained anything at the end.
Even though subsequent legal changes were made to the status of the unions, the strength
of the workers who were organized brought the grand textile industry of Bombay to its
knees.
Case Questions
1. Justify the statement that the ‘strike had (there was) more of political unionism
rather than an economic bargaining on the part of the trade unions’. Do you agree
with this statement? If yes, why?
2. What were the causes for which the workers of the Bombay textile mills went for a
strike?
3. What were the reasons for the emergence of Datta Samant as a leader of the
workers of the textile mills of Bombay
4. Why the qualities of militancy of Datta Samant were widely accepted by the workers
of the textile mills of Bombay? Please explain the context for such an acceptance
with logic.
5. What were the ultimate impacts of such a long strike on different actors of IR?
6. What was the role of the government from time to time?