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Abstract
We consider exotic spacetimes in the sense of differential geometry, and
then state genericity, undecidability and incompleteness results about gen-
eral relativity, with the nature of time and the existence of some kind of
“cosmic time” as central questions.
1
1 Introduction
Discussions on the nature of time are as old as philosophical inquiry itself, and
have always riddled scientists and philosophers alike with its many perplexities.
20th century physics, entertaining us with theoretically feasible and actual phe-
nomena such as temporal dilation, time travel, timeless singularities — and, as
we shall see in this article, the possibility that there is no global arrow of time
— has only deepened the mysteries surrounding the concept of time.
Progress has been made in the terrain of cognitive science, particularly in
the description of cognitive mechanisms involved in the conceptualization of
time [12]. Lakoff et al. suggest that it is “virtually impossible to conceptualize
time without metaphor.” Even Kant, who in the 18th century championed the
thesis that time was a pure a priori intuition that necessarily structured all our
subjective experience admitted that we reasoned about it in terms of an iterated
progression along a geometrical line (just like Galileo in the dawn of kinematics).
Contra Kant, Lakoff claims that there is no such thing as a “pure intuition” of
time: temporal concepts themselves have an internal structure that is largely
assembled by our prior experiences of motion in space. General relativity itself
conceptualizes time metaphorically as a space–akin dimension on the spacetime
manifold.
We take our cue from the fact that Einstein and Gödel were close friends,
and yet the only ground which they eventually shared in scientific terms were
Gödel’s papers on general relativity. No doubt those are landmark papers: they
show that general relativity allows for the existence of an universe with intrinsic
rotation; they suggest the possibility of a time machine — and they have a very
counterintuitive kind of time, as we do not have a “global” time coordinate in
the Gödel universes. It is meaningless to refer to a “beginning of time” in such
universes.
Is that an isolated phenomenon? Nonexistence of a global time coordinate
is just a property of Gödel’s and Gödel–like models of the universe? Or can it
be seen as the typical situation? This is the underlying question in the present
paper, and in order to deal with it we concoct a potion that mixes up ingredients
from differential geometry, from general relativity and from logic. We will argue
at the end that:
Nonexistence of a global time coordinate, from Big Bang to Big
Crunch may well be the typical, generic situation in general rela-
tivity.
We present a result whose interpretation may support that claim.
The idea that there is no universal direction of time may sound cognitively
abhorrent precisely because of the everyday metaphors involved in thinking
about time (see [12], entry on “The Moving Time Metaphor”). A theory being
counterintuitive may be a consequence of either taking as literal without suf-
ficient ground metaphorical aspects of a certain concept or as not having apt
conceptual metaphors for dealing with novel empirical phenomena.
2
Einstein, Gödel 3
so that there is a coordinate system where it has the form g00 dx0 + gij dxij ,
with coordinate 0 being that of R and i, j roaming over N .
• So, we can code each manifold (in many different ways) by a real number.
• We can therefore define a 1–1 function from the reals to the manifolds (see
[7] on that function).
• Use the Axiom of Replacement to define the set of all manifolds out of
that function.
2 Exoticisms
We are interested in 4–dimensional real differentiable manifolds as those are the
arena where the game of general relativity is played. The situation is, however,
extremely complicated due to the peculiarities of the geometry of 4–dimensional
manifolds.
• In that case, if there is some atlas that may be taken as a standard dif-
ferentiable structure (say, like the usual structures for R4 or S 7 ), we say
that the remaining differentiable structures are exotic [13].
The next summary comes from several sources [1, 10, 13]. Below there is a
list of concepts and results that we require here:
The intersection form arises out of elements (α∗ , β ∗ ) of the second DeRham
cohomology group H 2 (M ; R) for manifold M .
One usually says that the solutions for the Einstein equations “determine
the geometry of spacetime.” That’s not correct. The fact that one can
use DeRham cohomology to handle intersection forms [13], together with
the fact that mesonic and electromagnetic test fields over spacetime can
be used to characterize its DeRham cohomology provides another link
between the geometric structure of spacetime and the physics one does
over it [9].
α∗ and β ∗ as above are 2–forms over the manifold M , which can be in-
terpreted as mesonic test fields, or even electromagnetic test fields over
spacetime M . So, these fields are the ones whose classes determine the
global structure of a spacetime.
• Follows the very interesting result: the odd intersection form noted [+1]
(see the references) represents projective space CP2 . It must also represent
“fake CP2 ,” a nonsmoothable 4–manifold which is homotopy equivalent to
CP2 , as both share the same form [+1].
• Notice that this and similar partial results for indefinite forms give the
global topological structure of possible spacetimes, which can very pre-
cisely be said to arise out of the spacetime’s intersection form.
For the proof see [13], p. 250. It is one of the two main tools required to
prove Taubes’ Theorem:
h : R4 → ER4
then given an open ball D(ρ) ⊂ R4 of radius ρ, there is a value ρ0 so that for a
compact set C ⊂ ER4 , for no ρ > ρ0 does a smooth image h(D(ρ)) encloses C.
Proposition 3.1 No ER4 with the property spelled out in Proposition 2.1 has
a global time–coordinate.
Corollary 3.2 For the family ER4 (ρ), absence of a global time structure is
generic in the topological and measure–theoretic senses.
Proof : Immediate: from the map ρ ∈ (ρ0 , ∞) 7→ ER4 (ρ) one can induce the
corresponding concepts of genericity’ etc. in the space of all those manifolds.
Since there is just one standard R4 , the set of all such exotic 4–planes will be
generic in the (induced) senses.
That ER4 (ρ) is a set–theoretically generic exotic spacetime. There are other
examples of similar beasties. The next result is given rather loosely:
Proposition 3.4 Set theoretic genericity doens’t imply absence of global time
coordinate.
Proposition 3.5 If model MM A is such that it makes true the theory ZFC +
¬CH + MA then MM A makes true the formal version of the sentence “every
constructible subset of the reals is a first–category set and a zero–Lebesgue–
measure set.”
Proposition 3.6 For a reasonable topology and measure, there is a generic set
of spacetimes homeomorphic to a cylinder C × R which do not have a global time
coordinate.
Einstein and Gödel 9
A second, more general result, goes as follows. Consider the set of all con-
nected topological real 4–manifolds and pick up those that admit a smooth struc-
ture; factor them out by homeomorphisms. We then have a set of nonequivalent
(modulo homeomorphisms) topological real 4–manifolds which can be given a
smooth atlas.
Code them (via the function that maps spacetimes over some set of cardi-
nality 2ℵ0 onto, say, the binary irrationals.
Call that binary irrational λ; choose a particular smooth structure for it and
call the resulting differentiable manifold Xλ .
From the above quoted result (see the reference) we have that Xλ − {∗},
where {∗} is a point, has uncountably many nonequivalent differentiable struc-
tures. Then form the set of all pairs hXλ , Eµ (Xλ − {∗})i, where Eµ (. . .) rep-
resents the exotic structure denoted by µ; that set is coded by the λ, µ. In
the induced topology and measure the set of exotic spacetimes is both set–
theoretically and measure–theoretically generic.
We can picture that construction as follows: over each “point” Xλ there
is a “fiber” Eµ (Xλ − {∗}) to which we add (we code) all extra differentiable
structures for Xλ , if any.
If Y denotes that space:
Follows:
Proposition 3.8 Spacetimes without global time are set–theoretically and mea-
sure–theoretically generic in the above described topology and measure.
Proof : Follows from the fact that spacetimes with global time must have a
standard structure.
Proposition 3.9 Model MM A makes true the formal version of the sentence
“Given the above topologies and measures, the set of exotic set–theoretically
generic spacetimes has measure 1 and is of second category.”
10 Doria, Doria
2. The decision problem for that question may be as difficult as one wishes
in the arithmetic hierarchy.
Proposition 4.2 Given any axiomatization for general relativity within ZFC,
there is a metric tensor g over R4 with the usual differential structure so that:
3. To sum it up: for any model with standard arithmetic N for ZFC, N |=
g doesn’t have global time.
Proposition 4.3 Given any axiomatization for general relativity within ZFC,
there is a metric tensor g over R4 with the usual differential structure so that:
We can obtain an undecidability result as in the previous results. About the pre-
ceding result: there will be models with standard arithmetic for both sentences
in the undecidable pair we have considered.
Einstein, Gödel 11
5 Conclusion
We may summarize our conclusions as follows:
The question is: can we take our arguments here as arguments that give
a “natural” zero probability for the existence of global time? How are we to
interprete the preceding results? Does our result on the genericity of spacetimes
without a global time coordinate reflect the actual situation in the real world?
In the world of possible spacetimes? Is our probability evaluation a “physical
world” probability? Even if it includes a wide range of conceivable measure
attributions?
6 Acknowledgments
This paper collects some results from an ongoing research program with N. C.
A. da Costa, whom we heartily thank for criticisms and comments. We must
also thank C. M. Doria for his remarks on our results.
The ongoing research program that led to this text has been sponsored by the
Advanced Studies Group, Production Engineering Program, COPPE–UFRJ,
Rio, Brazil.
FAD wishes to thank the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of
São Paulo for partial support of this research project; we wish to acknowledge
support from the Brazilian Academy of Philosophy and its chairman Professor
J. R. Moderno. Both authors thank Professors R. Bartholo, C. A. Cosenza and
S. Fuks for their invitation to join the Fuzzy Sets Lab at COPPE–UFRJ and
the Philosophy of Science Program at the same institution.
FAD acknowledges partial support from CNPq, Philosophy Section.
12 Doria, Doria
References
[1] T. Asselmeyer–Maluga and C. H. Brans, Exotic Smoothness and Physics,
World Scientific (2007).
[2] W. A. Carnielli and F. A. Doria, “Is computer science logic–dependent?”
to appear in Festschrift in Honor of Prof. Shahid Rahman (2007).
[9] F. A. Doria and S. M. Abrahão, “Mesonic test fields and spacetime coho-
mology,” Journal of Mathematical Physics, 19, 1650–1653 (1978).
[10] R. E. Gompf and A. I. Stipsicz, 4–Manifolds and Kirby Calculus, AMS
(1999).
[11] K. Kunen, Set Theory, North–Holland (1983).
[12] G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind
and its Challenge to western Thought, Basic Books (1999).
[13] A. Scorpan, The Wild World of Four–Manifolds, AMS (2005).