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Whitney Arnold

The Eighteenth Century, Volume 55, Number 1, Spring 2014, pp. 39-55
(Article)

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DOI: 10.1353/ecy.2014.0001

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Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity

Whitney Arnold
University of California–Los Angeles

In the mid-­1760s Jean-­Jacques Rousseau began corresponding with a M. La-


liaud of Nîmes, who wished to commission a marble bust of the author for his
library. Rousseau, one of Europe’s most visible authors and citizens, delight-
edly imagined M. Laliaud to be a man of similar principles and convinctions—­a
man who had carefully read Rousseau’s works and believed the author to pos-
sess a similar soul. However, after meeting M. Laliaud in person, Rousseau
recounts: “Je l’ai trouvé très zèlé pour me rendre beaucoup de petits services,
pour s’entremêler beaucoup dans mes petites affaires. Mais au reste je doute
qu’aucun de mes ecrits aient été du petit nombre de livres qu’il a lus en sa
vie” [I found him very zealous to do me many small services, to meddle very
much in my little affairs. But beyond that I doubt that any of my writings has
been in the small number of books he has read in his life].1 In this episode,
which appears in the Confessions (1782/1789), the gravely disappointed Rous-
seau realizes that M. Laliaud was only familiar with the public representation
of the famous author turned famous individual; instead of meeting a man who
celebrated him for his writings and principles, Rousseau met a man who cel-
ebrated him precisely because of his celebrity.
Late eighteenth-­century France witnessed the emergence of a modern sys-
tem for the production of literary celebrity, and Rousseau, with his autobio-
graphical texts, provides insight into the workings of this new phenomenon
from its most visible heights.2 This essay examines Rousseau’s changing ef-
forts to grapple with and respond to his particularly widespread celebrity
through each of his major autobiographical texts (the Confessions, the Dialogues
[1780/1782], and the Rêveries du promeneur solitaire [1782]). Whereas his efforts
to present his “authentic” self to the public in his autobiographical texts have
been much analyzed, this essay explores the author’s attempts to focus public
attention on the embodied self outside the text.3
In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida famously argues that Rousseau, in
“straining toward the reconstruction of presence,” creates a “supplement,” a

The Eighteenth Century, vol. 55, no. 1 Copyright © 2014 University of Pennsylvania Press. All rights reserved.

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40 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

sign that purports to be the thing (or positivity), but that can only be adjunct
to the thing.4 Julie Simon, in a study of Rousseau and Denis Diderot, thinks with
Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics to assert that the writing of the subject ne-
cessitates a “remainder,” as the immediacy of the subject cannot be represented
in writing.5 Derrida and Simon both point out the necessary slippages between
Rousseau (his embodied person) and the textual representation of Rousseau
(which purports to be Rousseau’s equivalent). However, as I argue with this essay,
another “remainder” also becomes apparent in the problematic correspondence
Rousseau seeks to establish between his person and his textual representation:
his celebrity, i.e., the public representation of Rousseau that is already implicated
in—­and serves as an impetus for—­the textual representation of Rousseau. Rous-
seau’s autobiographical texts cannot correspond exactly to his person (effectively
duplicating or doubling his person) because his texts assume previous knowl-
edge on the part of the reader—­excess knowledge, outside of the text, of Rous-
seau’s person. Rousseau’s autobiographical texts thus begin with a “remainder”;
they bring in—­and assume the reader will read with—­representations of his per-
son. His celebrity complicates his efforts to portray the “truth” of his person in
his autobiographical texts. As this essay will detail, after Rousseau attempts yet
fails to present his “authentic” self in the Confessions, he advocates a new model
of “public intimacy” with the Dialogues that emphasizes direct or almost direct
contact with the author’s embodied person outside the text. He constructs a new
model of intimacy that suggests his person (presence) must be read along with
his texts.6 Ultimately, though, he points to the untenability of this model as well,
and in the Rêveries he decries the realm of representation itself—­the very founda-
tion of literary celebrity—­as unnatural.

ROUSSEAU À LA MODE

Rousseau’s text Discours sur les sciences et les arts, which won the Académie de
Dijon essay prize in 1750, first catapulted him into the public eye, and his fame
increased steadily thereafter. He produced a comic opera, Le Devin du village
(1752); the Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755); Julie, ou
la Nouvelle Héloïse (1761); Émile, ou de l’éducation (1762); and Du contrat social,
ou principes du droit politique (1762) in the next dozen years. In 1762, when his
Émile and Du contrat social were condemned by Parisian authorities, he fled
to Switzerland. The political condemnation of Rousseau increased his notori-
ety; the Mémoires secrets (1784) declare: “On ne cesse de parler de Rousseau”
[People do not stop talking about Rousseau].7 Rousseau responded publicly to
all manner of public accusations against his character; he composed the Lettre
à Christophe de Beaumont, archevêque de Paris (1763), for instance, in response to
the condemnation of Émile. When the Lettre received little public notice, Rous-
seau requested that his publisher send copies to various individuals, and then
he personally mailed out copies for two months. After his works were also de-

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 41

nounced in Switzerland, he fled to Germany, Paris, and England before return-


ing to France (where, for a time, he lived in disguise). Describing his return to
Paris in 1770, the Correspondance littéraire documented the “foule prodigieuse”
[tremendous crowd] that gathered to watch him in the streets.8 He began his
first autobiographical project, the Confessions, in 1764, and he finished revising
the text around 1769.9 He followed the Confessions with his autobiographical
Rousseau Juge de Jean Jaques [sic]: Dialogues, which he began in 1772 and famously
attempted to deposit on the altar of the Cathédrale Notre Dame in Paris in 1776.
The same year, he began his autobiographical Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire,
and he continued to work on the Rêveries until his death two years later.
Each of Rousseau’s autobiographical texts reveals his struggles to compre-
hend and manage his unprecedented celebrity; he portrays celebrity as both
valuable (a sign of authorial merit) and unnatural (a corrupted representation
of the author’s “true” self). He notes in his Confessions that he has “un nom
déjà célèbre et connu dans toute l’Europe” [a name already famous and known
throughout Europe].10 Indeed, the French and British presses were replete with
observations about and analyses of Rousseau’s texts and person; the Gazette des
gazettes, ou Journal politique noted in 1766: “Tout le monde s’empresse à le voir”
[Everyone hastens to see him].11 As Rousseau’s celebrity increased, members
of the public experienced a constructed intimacy with the author through his
texts. Robert Darnton has documented the merchant Jean Ranson’s experience
of intimacy with Rousseau, whom he “knew” only through the author’s texts.
When Ranson learned a friend would visit Paris, for instance, he anxiously
wrote in a letter: “No doubt you will see l’Ami Jean-­Jacques. . . . I beg of you
especially to send me some word about his health before you return.”12
Though he achieved fame through his writings, Rousseau’s personal celeb-
rity took on a life of its own. Revealing the extent of his celebrity, he notes
that countless people visited him solely on account of his notoriety. During his
exile in Switzerland, he declares in the Confessions, he existed as a sort of public
curiosity: “C’étoient des officiers ou d’autres gens qui n’avoient aucun gout
pour la litterature, qui même, pour la pluspart n’avoient jamais lû mes ecrits, et
qui ne laissoient pas, à ce qu’ils disoient, d’avoir fait trente, quarante, soixante,
cent lieues pour venir voir et admirer l’homme illustre, celebre, très celebre, le
grand homme etc.” [It was officers or other people who had no taste for litera-
ture, who even for the most part had never read my writings, and who did not
fail, according to what they said, to have traveled thirty, forty, sixty, a hundred
leagues to come to see and admire the famous, celebrated, very celebrated man,
the great man, etc.]13 While insisting that he could not understand the reasons
for public interest in his private life, he also deliberately placed himself in front
of the public eye. Although he asserts in his Confessions that he was “fait pour
méditer à loisir dans la solitude” [made to meditate at leisure in solitude], he
declares in his earlier Mon Portrait (wr. 1750s–60s): “Si je laissois faire le public
qui en a tant parlé, il seroit fort à craindre qu’en peu de tems il n’en parlât

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42 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

plus” [If I let the public, which has spoken so much about me, act, it would be
much to be feared that soon it would no longer speak about me].14 Certain of
Rousseau’s contemporaries maintained that the author was preoccupied with
garnering public attention. David Hume, writing of his public rupture with
Rousseau, proclaimed the author’s “charlatanerie” due to his scheming efforts
to gain public recognition.15 Stéphanie Félicité Ducrest de St-­Albin, comtesse de
Genlis, described Rousseau’s extreme disapointment in not gaining enough at-
tention at the theater: “Dans l’espoir d’exciter une vive sensation, il avoit voulu
se montrer, et  . . . son humeur n’étoit causée que par le dépit de n’avoir pas
produit plus d’effet” [With the hope of producing a lively sensation, he desired
to show himself, and . . . his ill-­humour was excited by not finding his presence
produce more effect].16 Genlis claims that Rousseau continually worked to gain
public attention, despite his insistence to the contrary.

PRESENCE AND REPRESENTATION

The challenge for Rousseau in his Confessions, as critics have noted, lies in con-
vincing his readers that they can access an unobstructed, “authentic” self in his
autobiographical text.17 He memorably insists upon the text’s ability to reveal
“un homme dans toute la vérité de la nature” [a man in all the truth of na-
ture].18 He repeatedly declares his goals of authenticity to his readers: “Dans
l’entreprise que j’ai faite de me montrer tout entier au public, il faut que rien
de moi ne lui reste obscur ou caché” [In the undertaking I have made of show-
ing myself completely to the public, nothing of me must remain obscure or
hidden].19 Rousseau suggests that his text will reveal the “true” Rousseau—­
the authentic (and largely unknown) embodied person behind the constructed,
public representation of his person. As justification for this project, he asserts in
the Neuchâtel manuscript of the Confessions: “Parmi mes contemporains il est
peu d’hommes dont le nom soit plus connu dans l’Europe et dont l’individu
soit plus ignoré” [Among my contemporaries there are few men whose names
are more known in Europe and whose person is more unknown].20 His project,
then, is to challenge widespread representations of himself by revealing his
embodied person through his autobiographical text.21
In the new culture of celebrity, Rousseau’s embodied person—­for both Rous-
seau and the public—­comes to symbolize authenticity. The public, assuming fa-
miliarity with him, not only repeatedly scrutinizes his character, but throngs of
spectators often gathered around him simply to look at him. Rousseau insists:
“Dans l’orage qui m’a submergé, mes livres ont servi de prétexte, mais c’étoit à
ma personne qu’on en vouloit” [In the storm that has submerged me, my books
have served as a pretext, but it was my person they were after].22 The order for
the author’s arrest suggests public focus on his person; the physical presence of
Rousseau—­with his body having come to signify the malevolent traits publicly
ascribed to his representation—­was not to be tolerated.

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 43

With his Confessions, Rousseau claims to reveal his person through his text.
However, this equivalence of person and text remains an impossibility, as
Rousseau’s textual representation of himself necessarily remains a representa-
tion. Throughout the Confessions, he grapples with problems of representation.
While he claims that the text reveals his authentic self (attempting to erase the
difference between his person and the textual representation of his person), he
also assumes that his readers will read his autobiographical self along with his
well-­known public representation (the “remainder” resulting from his celeb-
rity). He declares of the Confessions: “Puisqu’enfin mon nom doit vivre, je dois
tâcher de transmettre avec lui le souvenir de l’homme infortuné qui le porta, tel
qu’il fut réellement, et non tel que d’injustes ennemis travaillent sans relâche à
le peindre” [Since in the end my name must live, I ought to try to transmit along
with it the remembrance of the unfortunate man who bore it, as it was really,
and not as unjust enemies work without respite to depict it].23 Rousseau’s text
accompanies his public representation; he establishes his textual representation
as a response to the preceding public representation. He references this pub-
lic representation in each of his autobiographical texts, appropriating it as he
attempts to reconstruct it. Rousseau’s autobiographical texts then, unlike his
embodied person, begin with a “remainder.”
Moreover, by the end of the Confessions, Rousseau points toward the new
model of public intimacy that he advocates with the Dialogues. He claims at the
end of the Confessions: “J’ai dit la vérité. Si quelqu’un sait des choses contraires
à ce que je viens d’exposer . . . il sait des mensonges et des impostures, et s’il
refuse de les approfondir et de les eclaircir avec moi tandis que je suis en vie
il n’aime ni la justice ni la vérité” [I have told the truth. If anyone knows some
things contrary to what I have just set forth . . . he knows lies and impostures,
and if he refuses to get to the bottom of them and clear them up with me while
I am alive he does not love either justice or truth].24 Rousseau suggests that
readers contact him in person in order to learn the ultimate truth of his charac-
ter. He exhorts anyone who believes untruths about his person to examine “par
ses propres yeux” [with his own eyes] Rousseau’s natural disposition, habits, and
character.25 Thus, by the end of the Confessions, Rousseau portrays his embod-
ied self—­even more than his textual, autobiographical self—­as his authentic
self. He finally undermines the equivalence of text and person that he attempts
to establish throughout the Confessions.

THE DIALOGUES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESENCE

Whereas in the Confessions Rousseau works to present his “authentic” self in the
text, with the Dialogues he attempts to establish his embodied person as the only
proper basis for interpretation of his texts and character. Rousseau’s Dialogues
serve as extended and detailed reflections on his public representation; with the
text he suggests that readers can only “know” him through direct knowledge of

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44 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

his person (as opposed to knowledge of his public representation). In the Dia-
logues, the character “Rousseau” argues for the existence of two “Jean-­Jaques”
[sic] entities: the Jean-­Jaques who wrote Émile and Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse
(which he asserts is the “true” Jean-­Jaques), and the publicly constructed Jean-­
Jaques author persona, who is accused of depravity. “Rousseau” points out to
“Le François,” the reader who initially deplores “Jean-­Jaques” due to his public
representation (but has never actually read the author’s texts):

Vous haïssiez dans J. J. non seulement le scelerat qu’on vous avoit peint, mais J. J.
lui-­même . . . cette haine excitée d’abord par ses vices en étoit devenue indépen-
dante, s’étoit attachée à sa personne, et . . . innocent ou coupable, il étoit devenu
sans que vous vous en aperçussiez vous-­même l’objet de votre aversion.

[In J. J. you hate not only the scoundrel who was depicted to you, but J. J. him-
self . . . this hate which was elicited at first by his vices had become independent
of them, had become attached to his person, and . . . whether he was innocent or
guilty, without your perceiving it he had become the object of your aversion.]26

“Le François,” through his experience of public intimacy with the construction
of “Jean-­Jaques,” harbors hatred for the person behind the construction, though
he is only familiar with the public representation of this person.
Rousseau constructs the Dialogues in three parts. In the first dialogue, “Rous-
seau” and “Le François” agree to investigate their differing assumptions concern-
ing the character and works of “Jean-­Jaques.” “Rousseau” will visit the author in
person, while “Le François” will read the author’s texts. They will then discuss
their findings. In the second dialogue, “Rousseau,” after having observed “Jean-­
Jaques” in person for an extended period of time, reports his observations to “Le
François.” “Le François” then details his own observations, after having read the
author’s texts, in the third dialogue.27 Unsurprisingly, both men ultimately find
the negative public representations of “Jean-­Jaques” and his works to be inac-
curate and biased. Moreover, while Rousseau, in the first dialogue, portrays the
same model of reading and knowing that he illustrates in the Confessions, in the
second and third dialogues he presents his new model of interpretation that em-
phasizes the author’s embodied presence. “Rousseau” and “Le François” finally
conclude that direct or almost direct contact with “Jean-­Jaques” in person is the
primary way to discern the author’s true character.
In the first dialogue, “Rousseau” encourages “Le François” to discover the
authentic character of “Jean-­Jaques” solely by reading the author’s writings
(echoing the interpretive model of the Confessions). While disregarding all public
representations of “Jean-­Jaques,” “Le François” should read the author’s texts
and then form an opinion of the author’s character. “Rousseau” explains: “Ne
songez point à l’Auteur en les lisant, et sans vous prevenir ni pour ni contre,
livrez votre ame aux impressions qu’elle en recevra. Vous vous assurerez ainsi

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 45

par vous-­même de l’intention dans laquelle ont été ecrits ces livres, et s’ils peu-
vent être l’ouvrage d’un scelerat qui couvoit de mauvais desseins” [Don’t even
think of the Author as you read, and without any bias either in favor or against,
let your soul experience the impressions it will receive. You will thus assure your-
self of the intention behind the writing of these books and of whether they can be
the work of a scoundrel who was harboring evil designs].28 In the first dialogue,
“Rousseau” suggests that the text reflects the author as he “truly” is, and that the
reader, in reading the text, sees the author as he is. The author’s presence—­or au-
thentic person—­is transmitted faithfully through the text to the reader. However,
Rousseau ultimately indicates the difficulty of this model, as the typical reader,
he declares, reads with an already-­established bias against Rousseau’s charac-
ter, due to a belief in the truth of his public representation. Though Rousseau
transmits his “authentic” person in the text, the reader reads the text along with
the already-­established public representation of Rousseau, the “remainder” thus
clouding his or her ability to see the “true” Rousseau.
A frustrated Rousseau then concentrates in the Dialogues on the difficulties
of revealing his authentic person to the public through his texts. He insists that
the “Messieurs” are continually conspiring against him, even altering his writ-
ings and producing injurious writings under his name in order to defame him.
In the Confessions, he writes of his efforts to create an authorized version of
his collected works (which was never realized) with his publisher Marc-­Michel
Rey: “Cette Edition me paroissoit necessaire pour constater ceux des livres por-
tans mon nom qui étoient véritablement de moi, et mettre le public en état de
les distinguer de ces Ecrits pseudonymes que mes ennemis me prêtoient pour
me décréditer et m’avilir” [This Edition appeared necessary to me to certify
which of the books bearing my name were genuinely by me, and to put the
public in a condition to distinguish them from those pseudonymous Writings
which my enemies attributed to me in order to discredit and demean me].29
Much as Rousseau uses his autobiographical texts to construct a coherent life
narrative, he also attempts to shape his oeuvre itself, as, in the absence of his
physical body after his death, his texts would become the material manifesta-
tion of his person.30 However, by the time he composes the Dialogues, he has
less faith in the possibility of transmitting his authentic self through his writ-
ings. Upon his return to Paris in 1770, Rousseau began giving readings of his
Confessions before select audiences, yet Louise d’Épinay succeeded in forcing
him to discontinue the readings in 1771 by contacting the police. He states in
the Dialogues that though he believed he revealed his soul through the Confes-
sions, his enemies nevertheless succeeded in vilifying him and corrupting his
writings. Due to these fears of textual corruption, he publicly proclaimed in a
1774 text he distributed on the streets:

[Rousseau] déclare tous les livres anciens ou nouveaux, qu’on imprime et im-
primera désormais sous son nom, en quelque lieu que ce soit, ou faux ou altérés,

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46 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

mutilés et falsifiés, avec la plus cruelle malignité, et les désavoue, les uns comme
n’étant plus son ouvrage, et les autres comme lui étant faussement attribués.

[(Rousseau) declares all the old or new books that are being printed and will be
printed henceforth under his name, in whatever place it might be, to be either
false, or altered, mutilated and falsified with the most cruel malignity, and dis-
avows them, some as no longer being his work, and the others as being falsely
attributed to him.]31

Whereas Antoine Lilti asserts that “the very possibility of authentic reading
seems to have been entirely abolished” in the Dialogues—­causing Rousseau to
look to future instead of current readers to “see” him correctly in his works—­I
suggest that Rousseau entertains an alternate possibility with regard to his cur-
rent celebrity.32 While admitting in the Dialogues that his “authentic” self cannot
be conveyed to the present-­day public solely through his texts, Rousseau (prob-
lematically) works to involve his embodied person—­or presence—­in readers’
interpretations of his texts and character. Rousseau suggests in the Dialogues
that the best way for readers to “know” him would be to step outside the realm
of representation and see him in person, in “la continuité de la vie privée” [the
continuity of private life].33 He illustrates this in the second dialogue, as “Rous-
seau” has visited “Jean-­Jaques” at home and determined, after prolonged and
unbiased observation of the author, that “Jean-­Jaques” is indeed the man he
proclaims to be in his texts. “Rousseau” declares: “La situation de J. J. à certains
égards est même trop incroyable pour pouvoir être bien dévoilée. . . . Pour le
bien connoitre il faudroit la connoitre à fond; il faudroit connoitre et ce qu’il en-
dure et ce qui le lui fait supporter. Or tout cela ne peut bien se dire; pour le croire
il faut l’avoir vu” [In certain respects J. J.’s situation is even too incredible for
it to be capable of being well unveiled. . . . To know him well, it is necessary to
know his situation to the bottom: it is necessary to know both what he endures
and what makes him bear it. Now all of that cannot be well stated; it has to be
seen to be believed].34 “Rousseau” realizes, for instance, that “Jean-­Jaques” does
in fact enjoy copying music—­that his hobby is not simply affectation. “Rous-
seau” is persuaded that the public representation of the author is indeed false,
and he insists on the importance of observing the author in person in order to
truly “know” him. Furthermore, “Rousseau” maintains that the opinion he has
formed of “Jean-­Jaques” after seeing the author is fixed and resolute, despite
any arguments that others may raise to the contrary. He explains his reasons
for his conviction: “[Je] vois moins d’intermediaires entre moi et le personnage
jugé, et . . . de tous les yeux auxquels il faut que je m’en rapporte, ceux dont
j’ai le moins à me defier sont les miens” [I see fewer intermediaries between
me and the person being judged, and . . . of all the eyes I must rely on, those I
have least reason to distrust are my own].35 Thus, by seeing “Jean-­Jaques” in
person, “Rousseau” has stepped further outside the realm of representation

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 47

(yet he notes he has “fewer” intermediaries instead of no intermediaries, al-


lowing for some degree of mediation between author and observer—­though
the observer can apparently still access the author’s “authentic” self). Whereas
Rousseau downplays the importance of others seeing him in the Confessions—­
declaring, “J’étois un homme sitôt vu qu’il n’y avoit rien à voir de nouveau
dès le lendemain” [I was a man with whom, as soon as he was seen, there was
nothing new to see as early as the next day]—­in the Dialogues he suggests that
seeing the author in person is the best way to ascertain the author’s true charac-
ter.36 Throughout the second and third dialogues, “Rousseau” remains entirely
convinced that he knows “Jean-­Jaques,” and the author’s public representation
becomes unimportant.
Furthermore, “Rousseau” insists in the second and third dialogues that “Le
François” must also see “Jean-­Jaques” in person in order to form an opinion
of the author’s character; however, curiously, this does not come to pass in the
text. “Rousseau” declares to “Le François”: “Ce que j’ai vu est meilleur à voir
qu’à dire. Ce que j’ai vu me suffit, à moi qui l’ai vu, pour déterminer mon juge-
ment, mais non pas à vous pour déterminer le votre sur mon rapport; car il a
besoin d’être vu pour être cru” [What I saw is better seen than said. What I saw
suffices for me, who saw it, to determine my judgment, but not for you to ar-
rive at yours on the basis of my report. For this has to be seen to be believed].
Seeing and studying “Jean-­Jaques” is “le seul moyen sûr de le connoitre” [the
only sure method to know him].37 “Le François,” in comparison, maintains
that he does not need to see “Jean-­Jaques” in person; he declares in the third
dialogue that by listening to “Rousseau” and carefully reading the works of
“Jean-­Jaques,” he has formed a concrete and lasting opinion of the author’s
character. Whereas James Swenson argues that the absence of a meeting be-
tween “Le François” and “Jean-­Jaques” highlights the constructed nature of
“Jean-­Jaques,” as the author might even be a fictional creation, I am arguing
that “Le François” does not meet “Jean-­Jaques” in person in order to provide
a model of reading and “knowing” for the general public.38 That is, Rousseau
suggests to the public that in the absence of the possibility of seeing him in
person (as the vast majority of the public would not have access to Rousseau in
person), the next best way to “know” him would be follow the example of “Le
François,” combining a careful reading of Rousseau’s texts with a close exami-
nation of the accounts of those who have had access to Rousseau’s person and
studied him in private life.
Through “Le François,” Rousseau illustrates an ideal model of transmitting
his “authentic” character to the general public, asking that the public study his
texts along with his person (i.e., accounts of his person in private life).39 Hence
while in the Confessions Rousseau indicates that his autobiographical text will
accompany his public representation—­appropriating and reconstructing this
representation—­in the Dialogues he suggests that his texts should accompany
authentic observations of his person (conducted without any regard to his pub-

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48 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

lic representation). The “remainder” (or excess) transmitted with the text then
becomes Rousseau’s person instead of his public representation; the “remain-
der” serves to strengthen the purported correspondence between Rousseau’s
person and autobiographical text. In the Dialogues, while “Le François” states
that by studying the works of “Jean-­Jaques,” he realized the necessary falseness
of the author’s negative public representation, he maintains that it is only by
comparing the works of “Jean-­Jaques” with the account of “Rousseau” that he
is absolutely convinced he has accessed the “true” character of “Jean-­Jaques.”
He insists in the third dialogue that “tout étoit bien d’accord” [everything fit
together], declaring to “Rousseau”: “Le rapport frappant de celui que vous
m’avez peint avec l’Auteur dont j’ai lu les livres ne me laisseroit pas douter que
l’un ne fut l’autre” [The striking relationship between the person you depicted
and the Author whose books I read would not leave me in any doubt that they
are one and the same person].40 His reading of the works of “Jean-­Jaques” cor-
roborates the account of “Jean-­Jaques” by “Rousseau.” The author’s texts and
the account of his person work together, and both are necessary to form a “true”
portrait of the author.
Rousseau also reveals hope that this method of “seeing” the author could
be transmitted to posterity; he ends the Dialogues with a mix of hope and hope-
lessness regarding possibilities of conveying his authentic person to his future
readers. On the one hand, he suggests a classical idea of posterity, hoping that
unbiased and just future generations will bestow on his memory “l’honneur
qu’elle mérite” [the honor it deserves].41 He declares that his innocence will be
revealed in due time, as heaven will not allow evil and injustice to reign. On
the other hand, he fears that others will alter and corrupt his texts. He suspects
that the “conspirators” are preparing false editions of his work to be published
immediately after his death; the public would then accept these editions as the
most authoritative editions, and future generations would never access his
own, uncorrupted writings. He also fears that members of the public will al-
ways view him “tel qu’ils le vouloient voir” [as they wished to see him]. Insist-
ing on the unwillingness of members of the public to think outside their own
viewpoints, desires, and preferences, “Rousseau” declares, concerning the pub-
lic representation of “Jean-­Jacques”: “Soit pour la sureté de leurs personnes,
soit pour le repos de leurs consciences, il leur importe trop de ne voir en lui
qu’un scelerat pour qu’eux et les leurs y voyent jamais autre chose” [Whether it
is for their personal safety or for the repose of their consciences, they have too
much at stake in seeing him only as a scoundrel for them and their allies ever
to see anything else].42
Rousseau reveals a similar mix of hope and skepticism in the “Histoire du
précedent ecrit” [History of the Preceding Writing] following the Dialogues. His
skepticism in this text presumably results in large part from events following
his composition of the Dialogues. In 1776, he notoriously attempted to deposit
the Dialogues on the altar of the Cathédrale Notre Dame in Paris, insisting he

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 49

could trust his manuscript only to God. After he could not reach the altar due
to a grate blocking his way, he gave the manuscript to Étienne Bonnot, the abbé
de Condillac, with instructions that it not be published until after the turn of
the century. Yet, declaring he was uncomfortable with entrusting the manu-
script to Condillac, he then gave part of the manuscript to Brooke Boothby, an
Englishman who visited him (and who published the 1780 Dialogues). How-
ever, Rousseau also soon suspected Boothby of having connections with the
“conspiracy”; he was acutely aware of being the celebrity object of Boothby’s
attentions. In the meantime, he began conspicuously handing out flyers detail-
ing his unjust persecution—­entitled “À tout François aimant encor la justice et
la vérité” [To all Frenchmen who still love justice and truth]—­to passers-­by on
the street. Although he then insists in the “Histoire” that he realized “la vanité
de l’opinion” [the vanity of opinion] and became “détaché de tout ce qui tient à
la terre et des insensés jugemens des hommes” [detached from everything per-
taining to the earth and the senseless judgments of men], he proceeded to read
another copy of the Dialogues to certain of his friends, and he gave a third copy
to Paul-­Claude Moultou.43 Rousseau clearly discloses his contradictory senti-
ments regarding possibilities of influencing his public representation when he
asserts in the “Histoire”: “Nul ne m’écoutera, l’expérience m’en avertit, mais
il n’est pas impossible qu’il s’en trouve un qui m’écoute” [No one will listen to
me, experience has warned me of that, but it isn’t impossible that there will be
found someone who listens to me].44
In the midst of this skepticism, Rousseau reveals a measured hope in his
model of accessing the author’s self; in both the Dialogues and the “Histoire,” he
suggests that authentic accounts of his person—­received from those who have
had direct access to his person—­might be imparted to future generations. At
the end of the third dialogue, “Le François” resolves, with “Rousseau,” to visit
“Jean-­Jaques” and collect his remaining papers in order that they may appear
“aux yeux du public” [for public viewing]. Yet while “Le François” insists that
he will maintain the papers exactly as he received them, he also paradoxically
adds that the papers will be “augmenté de toutes les observations [qu’il aura]
pu recueillir tendantes à dévoiler la vérité” [enlarged by all the observations (he
has) been able to amass that tend to unveil the truth].45 Thus “Le François” does
not simply present the author’s papers as he has received them but expands
them with his own observations; future readers of the papers would see not
only the author’s papers but also the personal account of the author by “Le
François.” (This account—­whether stemming from the Frenchman’s upcom-
ing visits to the author, or from knowledge already gained from “Rousseau”—­
would purportedly be based, ultimately, on close observation of “Jean-­Jaques”
in private life.) In the “Histoire,” Rousseau also hopes for a “dépositaire”—­a
trustee who would essentially fulfill the role he assigned to “Le François” in the
Dialogues. He notes that he originally entrusted the Dialogues to Condillac, and,
when he became disillusioned with Condillac, he asked him to pass the text on

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50 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

to an even younger trustee. Rousseau expresses doubt that a reliable trustee


for the text may be found, yet he also asserts that if only one person sees his
“true” self, then “la vérité perceroit aux yeux du public” [the truth would shine
through to the eyes of the public].46

UNNATURAL REPRESENTATION

The Rêveries, in comparison to the Dialogues, exhibits a more pronounced suspi-


cion of representation. Rousseau insists in the Rêveries that he has finally real-
ized the absurdity of attempting to affect his public image. Claiming that he
has lost all hope of revealing his authentic self to the public, he decries contem-
porary celebrity and the realm of representation itself as unnatural. In place of
this purportedly unnatural realm, he constructs a solipsistic realm of presence,
depicting himself as both subject and object. Instead of asserting that others can
access his authentic character through his texts (the model of the Confessions)
or through his embodied person (the model of the Dialogues), Rousseau argues
with the Rêveries that no one can truly “know” him. He declares that he alone
is his proper audience. Yet, in true Rousseauvian form, he also problematizes
these declarations: while detailing his indifference to the public and his literary
celebrity, he also continually reflects on the public and his literary celebrity.
Throughout the Rêveries, Rousseau laments his inability to alter his inac-
curate public representation. The public, he asserts, refuses to see him as any-
thing other than the “Rousseau” it has constructed, and his previous attempts
to alter his representation and to appeal to posterity only made him dependent
on the public, rendering him its “jouet” [plaything]. While he admits that he
wrote parts of the Confessions and the Dialogues with the specific hope of pre-
senting them to future generations, he declares that he writes the Rêveries only
for himself, proclaiming an “indiférence profonde” [profound indifference] to
the fate of his writings and reputation.47 Furthermore, Rousseau then attempts
to negate the realm of representation by insisting that his authentic self only
reveals itself in a solipsistic realm of presence. He proclaims, “Tout ce qui m’est
extérieur m’est étranger desormais” [Everything external is henceforth foreign
to me].48 He separates himself from the external world—­his presence from the
realm of representation—­and he then substitutes himself for the external world,
replacing the external with the internal by depicting himself as both subject
and object. Portraying a solipsistic world in which the self “sees” and evalu-
ates the self, Rousseau explains of the Rêveries: “Leur lecture me rappellera la
douceur que je goutte à les écrire, et faisant renaitre ainsi pour moi le tems
passé doublera pour ainsi dire mon existence. En depit des hommes je saurai
gouter encore le charme de la societé et je vivrai decrepit avec moi dans un
autre age, comme je vivrois avec un moins vieux ami” [Reading them will re-
call the delight I enjoy in writing them and causing the past to be born again
for me will, so to speak, double my existence. In spite of mankind, I will live

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 51

with myself in another age as if I were living with a younger friend].49 While
he had hoped for sympathetic readers who would effectively double as himself
(per his sympathetic reader model), in the Rêveries Rousseau circumvents the
public by simply doubling himself, making himself his sole, and presumably
utterly sympathetic, reader. He dismantles the dialectic of celebrity not only by
replacing the public with himself—­becoming his own subject and object—­but
also by removing possibilities of mediation and representation between subject
and object as they are one and the same, existing within his person in a realm
of presence.
Having established this solipsistic space of presence, Rousseau decries celeb-
rity and the realm of representation itself as unnatural. He examines celebrity
in the text using a society versus nature rubric—­a dichotomy that appears, as
critics have often noted, throughout his work.50 He insists that members of the
public who persecute him are “des êtres méchaniques” [automatons]. Though
he lives, he maintains, according to his “naturel” [natural temperament], his
persecutors, divorced from nature, portray him according to their own views
and beliefs, masking his “naturel” from the public and in effect denaturing him
in the public eye.51 This condemnation of celebrity as unnatural builds on the
dichotomy he began to establish between nature and representation in earlier
texts. In the flyer “À tout François aimant encor la justice et la vérité,” Rous-
seau describes his public persecution as a “criante violation de la loi naturelle”
[blatant violation of natural law], insisting that his persecutors work to strip
him “de son état d’homme” [of his human status]. In the Dialogues he suggests
that his “naturel” only becomes apparent “intùs et in cute” (inside and under
the skin); in the realm of public representation and celebrity, he is “defiguré”
[disfigured].52
Problematically, while proclaiming his utter indifference to celebrity and his
public representation throughout the Rêveries, Rousseau continually analyzes
celebrity and his public representation. A large portion of the Rêveries and the
majority of his notes for the Rêveries concern his purported enemies.53 While
maintaining that he has gained peace and tranquility by no longer thinking of
the public, he declares with satisfaction that by not thinking of the public—­and
by experiencing peace and tranquility despite the public—­he most effectively
punishes the public.54 He argues, in addition, than in order to persecute him,
his enemies are dependent on him: “En pensant à la dépendance où ils se sont
mis de moi pour me tenir dans la leur ils me font une pitié réelle. Si je ne suis
malheureux ils le sont eux-­mêmes” [In thinking about how they have made
themselves dependent on me in order to make me dependent on them, they
move me to real pity. If I am not unhappy, they are].55 In this passage of the
Rêveries, Rousseau echoes “Rousseau” in the Dialogues, who declares of “Jean-­
Jaques” and his enemies: “Tandis qu’il s’occupe avec lui-­même, eux s’occupent
aussi de lui. Il s’aime et ils le haïssent; voila l’occupation des uns et des autres;
il est tout pour lui-­même, il est aussi tout pour eux” [While he is occupied with

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52 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

himself, they are occupied with him too. He loves himself and they hate him.
That is the occupation of both. He is everything to himself; he is also everything
to them].56 Though he asserts an utter indifference to his literary celebrity, he
depicts a world in which the public continually thinks of him, effectively un-
dermining this proclamation of indifference.
Ultimately Rousseau both encourages and decries his celebrity throughout
his autobiographical texts, though he claims to reject celebrity most vehemently
in the Rêveries. He insists as early as the Confessions that he desires to be forgot-
ten by the public, yet already by 1768 he has drafted his text “Sentimens du
public sur mon compte dans les divers états qui le composent” [Sentiments of
the Public Toward Me in the Various Estates That Compose It], which reflects
on and presupposes in list form the opinions that various social groups might
have of him.57 Interestingly, while often condemning the inauthenticity of ce-
lebrity in his texts, in the Dialogues Rousseau portrays a fragile space in which
celebrity and authenticity might co-­exist. “Le François” finally indicates near
the end of the text that there was a period in which “Jean-­Jaques” possessed a
sort of “good” celebrity. Being now convinced of the author’s sincerity and good
nature, he asserts that he sees “Jean-­Jaques” similarly to “ce qu’il étoit aux yeux
du public lors de la publication de son prémier ouvrage” [what he was in the
eyes of the public at the time his first work was published].58 It seems that this
“Jean-­Jaques” was both in the public eye (i.e., gained a public image, or repre-
sentation) yet was also the “true” “Jean-­Jaques.” At this point in his celebrity,
having just published his first work and entered the public eye, “Jean-­Jaques”
was not yet decried and persecuted, and his authentic presence somehow ap-
peared through his public representation. If it is true, though, that Rousseau, as
a prominent figure, could never receive fair treatment from the public, or that
his public representation could not ultimately convey his presence (as he sug-
gests in the Rêveries), then this positive celebrity in the Dialogues appears to be
impossible to sustain. The celebrity to which “Le François” refers must be imma-
nently fleeting, appearing at a moment when the author is first in the public eye
and can control his representation—­before others quickly begin influencing and
shaping this representation. Thus, Rousseau presents an ideal model of celeb-
rity, yet due to its untenability he continues to struggle with his unprecedented
celebrity. He tries on different methods of revealing his “true” self to the pub-
lic with his autobiographical texts. From a more anthropological perspective,
Rousseau’s efforts delineate the recurring problematic of modern celebrity: the
impossibility of completely controlling the public interpretation of the self.

NOTES
1. Jean-­Jacques Rousseau, Confessions [1782/1789], in Oeuvres complètes, ed. Bernard
Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris, 1959), 1:1–656, 613; in The Collected Writings of
Rousseau, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, 1990), 5:1–550, 513. Un-
less otherwise indicated, I cite the French texts, by volume and page number, from Gag-

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 53

nebin and Raymond’s edition of the Oeuvres complètes, and all English translations, by
volume and page number, from Masters and Kelly’s edition of the Collected Writings.
Where translations in this essay are not cited, they are my own.
2. While the rise of literary celebrity has gained increased critical attention in recent
years, scholarship remains concentrated in large part on the British context. For recent
work on eighteenth-­century celebrity, see Felicity Nussbaum, Rival Queens: Actresses, Per-
formance, and the Eighteenth-­Century British Theater (Philadelphia, 2010); Tom Mole, ed.,
Romanticism and Celebrity Culture, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, 2009); Ghislaine McDayter, By-
romania and the Birth of Celebrity Culture (Albany, 2009); Claire Brock, The Feminization of
Fame, 1750–1830 (Basingstoke, 2006); and Mary Luckhurst and Jane Moody, eds., Theatre
and Celebrity in Britain, 1660–2000 (Basingstoke, 2005). Also of note is Leo Braudy’s earlier
study The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and Its History (New York, 1986).
3. Raymond Birn and Geoffrey Turnovsky have helpfully explored Rousseau’s efforts
to control the representation of his authorial self through his texts, and James Swenson,
John C. O’Neal, Christine Hammann, and Kelly and Masters have analyzed the author’s
efforts to manage readers’ perceptions of this self. This essay builds particularly on the
work of Sean Campbell Goodlett, who has documented Rousseau’s concerted pursuit of
public attention, and Antoine Lilti, who has examined Rousseau’s paranoid delusions as
reflections of his very real prominence in the public eye. I analyze the “self” in autobiogra-
phy as a constructed “I” that encompasses and unifies the text. See Birn, Forging Rousseau:
Print, Commerce and Cultural Manipulation in the Late Enlightenment (Oxford, 2001); Turn-
ovsky, “The Enlightenment Literary Market: Rousseau, Authorship, and the Book Trade,”
Eighteenth-­Century Studies 36, no. 3 (2003): 387–410, and The Literary Market: Authorship and
Modernity in the Old Regime (Philadelphia, 2010), esp. chap. 5; Swenson, On Jean-­Jacques
Rousseau: Considered as One of the First Authors of the Revolution (Stanford, 2000); O’Neal,
“Rousseau’s Narrative Strategies for Readers of His Autobiographical Works,” in Text, In-
terpretation, Theory (Lewisburg, 1985), 106–20; Hammann, Déplaire au public: Le cas Rousseau
(Paris, 2011); Kelly and Masters, “Rousseau on Reading ‘Jean-­Jacques’: The Dialogues,”
Interpretation 17, no. 2 (Winter 1989–1990): 239–53; Goodlett, “The Origins of Celebrity: The
Eighteenth-­Century Anglo-­French Press Reception of Jean-­Jacques Rousseau” (Ph.D. diss,
University of Oregon, 2000); and Lilti, “The Writing of Paranoia: Jean-­Jacques Rousseau
and the Paradoxes of Celebrity,” Representations 103 (Summer 2008): 53–83.
4. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore,
1976), 141.
5. Julie Simon argues, referencing Theodor Adorno, that the only possibility of repre-
senting the subject is in the act of writing, as the subject experiences his or her own imme-
diacy while writing (Mass Enlightenment: Critical Studies in Rousseau and Diderot [Albany,
1995], 70–94). See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York, 1973). See
also Jean Starobinski, Jean-­Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur
Goldhammer (Chicago, 1988), 139–69; and Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Lan-
guage in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven, 1979), chap. 12.
6. I am indebted to Joseph Roach’s study It (Ann Arbor, 2007) for the concept of
“public intimacy” (1–21). I employ Starobinski’s terms “presence” and “representation”
(77–78, 175–76).
7. Mémoires secrets pour servir à l’histoire de la république des lettres en France, depuis
M.DCC.LXII jusqu’a nos jours, vol. 1 (London, 1784), 94.
8. See Goodlett, 104–7, 193.
9. The Confessions exists in three primary manuscripts: the manuscripts of Neuchâtel,
Paris, and Geneva. For the history of these manuscripts, see Hermine de Saussure, Rous-
seau et les manuscrits des Confessions (Paris, 1958).
10. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:492; in Collected Writings, 5:442.
11. Gazette des gazettes, ou Journal politique (1766), 48.
12. Jean Ranson, quoted in Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes

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54 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

in French Cultural History (New York, 1984), 235–37, 241. Nicola J. Watson has also docu-
mented Lady Frances Shelley’s experience of intimacy with Rousseau and other celebrity
authors (“Fandom Mapped: Rousseau, Scott and Byron on the Itinerary of Lady Frances
Shelley,” Romantic Circles Praxis [April 2011], http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/fandom/
index.html).
13. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:611; in Collected Writings, 5:511.
14. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:650; in Collected Writings, 5:544; Mon
Portrait, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1120–29, 1123; in Collected Writings, 12:36–44, 39. Rousseau
most likely composed the autobiographical fragments Mon Portrait in the late 1750s and
early 1760s.
15. David Hume, Exposé succinct de la contestation qui s’est élévée entre M. Hume et M.
Rousseau, avec les pieces justificatives (London [i.e., Yverdon], 1766), 10–11.
16. Stéphanie Félicité Ducrest de St-­Albin, comtesse de Genlis, Mémoires inédits de
Madame la comtesse de Genlis, sur le dix-­huitième siècle et la révolution française, depuis 1756
jusqu’à nos jours (Paris, 1825), 2:12, 16–17. I cite the English translation from Memoirs of the
Countess de Genlis, Illustrative of the History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Writ-
ten by herself (New York, 1825), 1:225.
17. Starobinski famously examines Rousseau’s claims of authenticity as claims of
transparency.
18. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:5; in Collected Writings, 5:5.
19. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:59; in Collected Writings, 5:50. Critics
have argued that Rousseau often employs a sympathetic reader model that presupposes
the reader’s ability to identify with the “authentic” author conveyed through the text. On
this model, see Christie V. McDonald, “The Model of Reading in Rousseau’s Dialogues,”
MLN 93, no. 4 (May 1978): 723–32; Swenson, 125–33; and Darnton, 228–35.
20. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1151; in Collected Writings, 5:587.
21. Rousseau reveals a similar project, before the Confessions, in his 1762 letters to
Chrétien-­Guillaume de Lamoignon de Malesherbes. He claims to unveil his authentic self
in the letters: “Je me peindray sans fard. . . . Je me montrerai à vous tel que je me vois, et
tel que je suis, car passant ma vie avec moi je dois me connoître et je vois par la maniere
dont ceux qui pensent me connoître, interpretent mes actions, et ma conduite qu’ils n’y
connoissent rien. Personne au monde ne me connoit que moi seul” [I will depict myself
without disguise. . . . I will show myself to you as I see myself, and as I am, for since I
pass my life with myself I ought to know myself and, from the manner in which those
who think they know me interpret my actions and my behavior, I see that they do not
know anything about it. No one in the world knows me except myself alone] (“Lettres à
Malesherbes,” in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1130–47, 1133; in Collected Writings, 5:572–83, 574).
22. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:406; in Collected Writings, 5:341.
23. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:400, emphasis mine; in Collected Writ-
ings, 5:336, emphasis mine.
24. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:656; in Collected Writings, 5:549–50.
25. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:656, emphasis mine; in Collected Writ-
ings, 5:550, emphasis mine.
26. Rousseau, Dialogues [1780/1782], in Oeuvres complètes, 1:657–992, 881; in Collected
Writings, 1:1–257, 171.
27. For a detailed analysis of Rousseau’s complicated text, as well as the relationship
of the Dialogues to the Rêveries, see Jean-­François Perrin, Politique du renonçant: Le dernier
Rousseau (Paris, 2011).
28. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:699; in Collected Writings, 1:31.
29. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:622; in Collected Writings, 5:521.
30. He repeatedly refers to the locations of his papers in the Confessions and in the 1768
“De l’art de joüir” texts—­providing a handy guide to readers interested in discovering

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Arnold––Rousseau and Reformulating Celebrity 55

more about the “true” Rousseau. See “De l’art de joüir” in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1173–77,
1176–77; in Collected Writings, 12:57–61.
31. Rousseau, “Déclaration relative à différentes réimpressions de ses ouvrages” [1774],
in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1186–87, 1187; “Declaration Relative to Different Reprints of His
Works,” in Collected Writings, 12:67–68, 68.
32. Lilti, 66.
33. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:794; in Collected Writings, 1:103.
34. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:799; in Collected Writings, 1:107.
35. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:914; in Collected Writings, 1:197.
36. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:372; in Collected Writings, 5:312.
37. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:797, 938; in Collected Writings, 1:105,
215.
38. See Swenson, 122.
39. This model, of course, is still problematic, as the representation of Rousseau’s
person is nevertheless a representation; however, with this model, the representation is
purportedly based in large part on incontrovertible accounts of the author derived from
private observation.
40. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:932, 936; in Collected Writings, 1:211,
214.
41. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:976; in Collected Writings, 1:245.
42. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:763–64; in Collected Writings, 1:80–81.
43. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:985–86; in Collected Writings, 1:252.
44. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:987, emphasis mine; in Collected Writ-
ings, 1:254, emphasis mine.
45. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:975; in Collected Writings, 1:245.
46. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:987; in Collected Writings, 1:254.
47. Rousseau, Rêveries du promeneur solitaire [1782], in Oeuvres complètes, 1:993–1099,
998, 1001; in Collected Writings, 8:1–90, 5, 8.
48. Rousseau, Rêveries, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:999; in Collected Writings, 8:6.
49. Rousseau, Rêveries, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1001; in Collected Writings, 8:8.
50. While exploring the concept of natural man in Rousseau’s thought is outside the
scope of this essay—­and already an area of rich scholarship—­I examine Rousseau’s com-
ments on nature in order to suggest a preliminary link between his analysis of celebrity
and his larger analyses of society and nature.
51. Rousseau, Rêveries, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1078, 1033; in Collected Writings, 8:72, 35.
52. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:991, 905; in Collected Writings, 1:256,
1:190.
53. Barbara Carnevali usefully analyzes contradictions inherent in Rousseau’s pre-
sentation of radical individualism in his texts. With regard to the Rêveries, she notes that
Rousseau attributes his social concerns to external factors, and not to his “true” self (Ro-
mantisme et reconnaissance: Figures de la conscience chez Rousseau [Geneva, 2012], 303).
54. Rousseau, Rêveries, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1061, 1169. In a 1777 letter to Jean-­Louis
Bravard Deyssac, comte Duprat, Rousseau similarly reveals his preoccupation with so-
ciety despite claims of indifference. He suggests that he flees society and its harsh judg-
ments of him precisely because its judgments affect him greatly (Correspondance complète
de Jean Jacques Rousseau, ed. R. A. Leigh [Oxford, 1982], 40:184–85).
55. Rousseau, Rêveries, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:1056; in Collected Writings, 8:54.
56. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:860; in Collected Writings, 1:154–55.
57. Rousseau, Confessions, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:503.
58. Rousseau, Dialogues, in Oeuvres complètes, 1:942; in Collected Writings, 1:218–19.

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