Vivas v. Monetary Board (G.R. No.

 191424)

FACTS: Petitioner Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in Rural Bank Faire,
a bank whose corporate life has already expired. BSP authorized extending the banks’
corporate life and was later renamed to Euro Credit Community Bank (ECBI). Through a series
of examinations conducted by the BSP, the findings bore that ECBI was illiquid, insolvent, and
was performing transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices.
Consequently, ECBI was placed under receivership. Petitioner contends that the
implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith,
stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of
his and the bank’s right to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its being placed under
receivership.

HELD: YES. In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-
Valenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of “close now, hear later,” stating that it was
justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:

The “close now, hear later” doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection
of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is
in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against
distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to
the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank
depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.

In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that x x x due process does
not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be
subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank
runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may
be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.

The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation
of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken
against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public
faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.
OSCAR R. AMPIL vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.G.R. No. 192685,
July 31, 2013

FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO)entered into a
Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower."
wherein the latter shall provide the real property while former would construct and shoulder the
cost of construction and development of the condominium building. Due to financial difficulties,
ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO. Thus, MICO and ASB executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the
development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both
ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their investments.

On 11 March 2005, two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) were issued by
Espenes in for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces in Malayan Tower. The first was in the
name of MICO and the second in the name of ASB. The second set of CCTs was issued upon the
instruction of Serrano an officer of MICO. Ampil, unsecured creditor of the ASB charged Espenes
in with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack of probable
cause for the alleged commission of falsification. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court. And as already stated, the
appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine the existence of

probable cause may be assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with
the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding
to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through
certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, on several occasions, the court has interfered with the
Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is
sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;(e) Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by the lust for vengeance.
LAYGO vs. MUN. MAYOR OF SOLANO, N. V.
G.R. No. 188448 January 11, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:

FACTS: July 2005, Aniza Bandrang sent 2 letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor Santiago
Dickson and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the illegal
sublease she entered with petitioners Rodolfo and Willie Laygo over Public Market Stalls 77-A,
77-B, 78-A, and 78-B. The Laygos leased these stalls from the government Bandrang claimed
that the petitioners told her tp vacate the stalls which they then subleased to another. She
expressed her willingness to testify against them Aug 200S: Sangguniang Bayan endorsed
Bandrang's letter and copy of Resolution 183-2004 to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action.

Sanggunian informed Mayor Dickson that the matter is under his jurisdiction by virtue of
Resolution 183-2004 which authorized the mayor to enforce the provision against subleasing of
stalls in the public market n response, the mayor informed the Sanggunian that the stalls were
constructed under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the Laygos had
the right to keep their Stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He also asked the body if
there are provisions that Sanctioned lessees under the BOT schemne Bandrang wrote another
letter to the Sangguniang, praying for the cancellation of the lease contract between the Laygos
and Municipality as it violates the provision on subleasing.

Sanggunian once again sent the letter and copy of Resolution to Mayor Dickson.
However, mayor still didn't act on it, prompting Bandrang to file a petition for mandamus against
him with RTC Bayombong Mayor defended that Bandrang had no right to seek remedy as she
was also guilty in leasing the market stalls. Moreover, she had no cause of action since the
stalls were on a BOT scheme. Laygos denined that they were the lessees of the stalls, but
instead their mother. When they entered into their contract, parties agreed thatkhe contract was
subject to their mother's other heirs Since no consent was given, there was no subleasing to
speak of. Even if there was, prohibition wouldn't apply since it was under a BOT agreement
incumbent mayor Philip Dacayao became respondent|in the place of Mayor Dickson RTC ruled
in favor of Bandrang, stating that the contract between Laygos and Municipality was a lease
contract. Thus, Resolution applies. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is proper

HELD: NO. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of
law.
 As a rule, mandamus will lie if any of the following grounds is present: [a] that the
respondent court, officer, board, or person unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court,
officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which he is entitled. 

MALANA vs. TAPPA

G.R. No. 181303     September 17, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Re-ivindicacion, Quieting of Title,
and Damages against respondents. Alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a
parcel of land in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Petitioners inherited the subject property from
Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.

During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married
to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property.
Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that
Anastacio and his... heirs might need it.

Consuelo's family members continued to occupy the subject property even after her death,
already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned
that respondents were claiming... ownership over the subject property. petitioners demanded
that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners'
demand. The RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners' Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction

The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691. The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it
being a real action involving a real property with assessed value less than P20,000.00 and
hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.

He filed Motion for Reconsideration which they argued that their principal cause of action was
for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek
complete relief from... respondents. Petitioner's Complaint should not have been dismissed,
since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court[13] states that an action to quiet title falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC.

the RTC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title
is a real action.

ISSUE: whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners'
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with
those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require
that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" - that an
action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for... declaratory relief,
and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an... opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property... where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000.00

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration
No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to and possession
of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the

RTC.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has... already
been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property.

In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over
the... subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.

Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction

over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject
property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has... jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners' Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
jurisdiction

Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured
by the silence,... acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio.