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Precarious work and the commodification of the employment relationship:

the case of zero hours in the UK and mini jobs in Germany

Chapter · January 2016

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-12159-4_19

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 Precarious work and the commodification of the employment relationship:
the case of zero hours in the UK and mini jobs in Germany

Jill Rubery and Damian Grimshaw

Citation: Rubery, J. and Grimshaw, D. (2016) ‘Precarious work and the commodification of the employment
relationship: the case of zero hours in the UK and mini jobs in Germany’, in G. Bäcker, S. Lehndorff and
C. Weinkopf (eds.) Den Arbeitsmarkt verstehen, um ihn zu gestalten: Festschrift fur Gerhard Bosch,
Springer.

Typologies of the welfare state are concerned with the extent of the decommodification of labour
(Esping-Andersen 1990). However, the sustainability of decommodification by the state also
depends upon employer behaviour. Where employers treat labour as a disposable commodity to be
bought and sold without regard to its social reproduction, all the burden of decommodification is
placed on the state instead of it being a shared responsibility, with employers covering some of the
risks of income loss when work is not possible or desirable. The standard employment relationship
(SER), as Bosch (2004) argues, derives its primary social purpose from its role in decommodification –
‘[it] enables employees to plan for the long term. This applies not only to the planning of everyday
life, such as the use of leisure time, but also to workers’ investment, and that of family members, in
their own capacity for work, for example through education and training’ (2004, 619). However, if
instead all employers used spot contracts for labour without contributing to the cost of its social
reproduction, then the support needed from the state (as well as the family) would be
unsustainable. The core argument of Bosch’s plea for extending rather than abandoning the SER is
that the form (‘permanent full-time’) of the relationship needs to be distinguished from its
substance (de-commodification). While the form can change without erosion of the substance, if
employment, social protection and a welfare state are not provided then ‘it makes no sense to speak
of SER’ (Bosch 2009).

While the full-time and open- ended contract remains the most common employment form across
Europe, two developments are challenging the SER and its role in decommodification. The first is the
development of non standard employment contracts which do not provide the same extent of
protection as more standard contracts. The second is an erosion of decommodification within the
full-time open-ended contract itself. These two changes are undoubtedly interconnected (Cappelli et
al. 1997; Rubery 1998, 2007) as non standard employment is not primarily a protective buffer for
standard employment but instead provides a competitive challenge to terms and conditions within
standard contracts (Rubery 1998). These developments are known to vary across countries in form
and intensity, with high non standard employment anticipated where protection of the SER remains
strong. The UK is often cited as evidence for this, as its apparent low use of temporary work is said to
be because the limited protection attached to open-ended contracts , reduces the incentive to use
non standard contracts. The implication is that less regulated labour markets may be more inclusive
and stabilise around a single form of employment contract that provides a balance between
flexibility and security. However, the recent growth of zero hours contracts in the UK suggests a less
benign dynamic of change and indicates the risk of a vicious downwards circle. Employers, even in
countries with low employment protection legislation (EPL), are revealing an appetite for further
undermining employment and social protection by using insecure and commodified employment
contracts to further challenge even the hollowed out SER as found in the UK.

This chapter therefore focuses on the UK and specifically on the growth of zero hours contracts,
which have taken on almost iconic status to symbolise extreme flexibility and commodification in the
labour market. Comparison will also be made to Germany’s own iconic flexible form, the mini job, to

1
illustrate the continued importance of institutional structures and arrangements in shaping these
processes and thus the capacity for resistance and/or the reinvention of decommodified forms of
employment. The long term consequences for the SER in both countries of these ‘innovations’ in
employment contractual forms are not yet known but Germany appears to be engaged in some
regulatory innovation to limit the effects on decommodification while the UK is moving in the
opposite direction, towards a new social protection system which is risking an explosion in
decommodified employment contracts, to the detriment of the sustainability of the UK’s welfare
system.

Decommodification and the SER

Table 1 sets out the types of decommodification that might be expected to be associated with a
standard employment relationship. The respective roles of the state and the employer in
decommodification are identified and the consequences for the workers of gaps in protection briefly
described. The protections include regulations and practices that guarantee hours of work and rates
of pay (or at least minimum rates), that establish weekly pay at an adequate level (historically
associated with a family wage for men) and ensure upgrading of pay in line with the costs of living.
These combined factors provide some stability in standards of living, protected against market
trends or the whim of employers. The more this is backed by rights to stable employment and
compensation if redundancy does prove necessary, the more secure the worker and his or her
family. Rights to fair treatment at work may derive from employment law but also from established
norms within an SER system. Another form of decommodification is when income is guaranteed
(even if at often a lower level) for periods of non work including sickness, holiday, parental leave and
short term lay off (while retaining an employment relationship) and pensions and unemployment
benefit (when leaving an employment relationship). Whether these non work income streams are
paid by the state, by employers– through contributions or directly- and the extent of employer top
ups to mandated payments depends upon the specific characteristics of the welfare regime.

Decommodification also implies that workers should have control over some parts of their lives such
that work and non work time is clearly divided. This includes rights to prior notification about regular
and continuous scheduled work and limits to maximum hours, as well as minimum rest periods, shift
lengths and so on. Employer responsibilities also encompass skill development, including initial
training and upgrading of skills in line with changing conditions, and adjusting employment
arrangements to if workers needs and capacities change (due to illness, incapacity or care needs for
example). This should prevent their forced exit from employment which would potentially increase
their dependency on the state or the family.

Opportunities for voice and representation at the workplace are also required, whether through
joint employer-union voluntary actions or in response to statutory rules. Finally, employers need to
provide the stable pay and hours that workers require to access social protection schemes. This
applies where eligibility depends on contribution records alongside minimum thresholds of income,
hours and continuity. Without social protection employees may face very severe income insecurity
or may be obliged to work at times when this is neither productive nor desirable from a health
perspective. Moreover, they may be forced to spend a very high share of their week waiting for work
and therefore be unable to plan leisure activities or provide care. Weak protection may also force
workers into changing employers, possibly to the detriment of job quality and the chance to match

2
their skills with a new job and with an escalating risk of finding themselves excluded from forms of
social protection.

3
Table 1. Dimensions to decommodification associated with a standard employment relationship

Dimensions to Expectations of Potential role of the Consequences of gaps for employees

decommodification employer under SER state
Guaranteed wage income Guaranteed hours and Mainly employer Income insecurity- unable to plan or
hourly rate responsibility but may attain credit/housing
use in-work benefits to
top up wage rate or
short hours
Adequate pay and Historically associated Mainly employer Potential squeeze on living standards
maintenance of real pay with family wage model. responsibility except
Pay increases in line with for minimum wage.
cost of living. May provide in-work
benefits if wages are
below subsistence
needs
Stability of employment Open ended contract, May be in part Fear of loss of employment and of
and fair treatment expectation of stable mandated by EPL arbitrary procedures where no
employment, mandated rights
compensation for
redundancy and fair/non
arbitrary discipline and
dismissal procedures
Income during non work Holiday pay, pay for Main role is in sick pay, May take less holiday/sick leave/
periods unplanned variations in lay off pay, parental parental leave and work longer if
demand (employer leave, pensions- but limited pensions
responsibility) varies across countries
Sick pay, lay off pay,
parental leave, pensions
(responsibility varies but
employer often
contributes)
Division of work and non Employer sets regular, May regulate maximum Without regular scheduled hours and
work times continuous work periods hours, minimum rest under on call systems, no divide
with limited unpaid periods, minimum work between work time and own time
break; also limits use of periods, notice periods
on call requirements in etc.
days off/ unsocial hours
Skill upgrading/ Employer provides May mandate training Without access to training may not
maintenance of training to ensure skills to meet legal standards be able to progress or even maintain
employability and knowledge updated- position.
funded by employer
unless individual gains
major labour market
advantage
Adjustments to needs of Some adjustment to Adjustment may be Opportunities to continue in work
individual illness/incapacity, mandated by may depend on adjustment
pregnancy but also to legislation
care responsibilities
Opportunities for voice/ Workplace May be mandated. May be forced to exit if no
to avoid forced exit representation opportunities to voice problems
mechanisms
Access to social security Regular employment and Rules set by state. Regulations on contributions may
pay as basis for Some social protection lead to exclusion from those
membership of social may be independent of elements of social
protection schemes employment status protection/decommodification for
(e.g. health in UK) which the state is responsible.
Some thresholds on
pay/hours set by state

4
 may mean not all
employees eligible

Commodification through zero hours contracts

Zero hours contracts (zhcs) are not a new phenomenon in the UK. They have no specific legal status
so there is no one definition. Zero hours contracts occur when ‘people agree to be available for work
as and when required, but have no guaranteed hours or times of work’ (ACAS 2012). The only
purpose of zero hours is to provide employers with flexibility in the use of labour. Some employers
claim (CIPD 2013) these contracts suit their employees’ flexibility needs but they are not normally
initiated by employees. The extent of zero hours is unclear but they have been growing in incidence
(Rubery/Grimshaw 2014). Surveys of employers put the number between one and 1.5 million and a
further million or so contracts may be in existence although not utilised in the month preceding the
survey. Labour force survey estimates are lower but half a million are still in zhcs for their main job.
They are used most frequently in health and social care and in hospitality. Weekly hours of those on
zhcs average at around 21 per week. As such, this is far from marginal work (Resolution Foundation
2013).

Table 2 reviews the conditions under which zhc staff work, using the decommodification dimensions
set out in table 1. Due to the lack of guaranteed hours under zhcs, staff may remain on these
contracts indefinitely with absolutely no legal guarantee of a stable income. Sometimes staff are
unaware that their income is not guaranteed until an employer finds it necessary to reduce the
volume of hours offered, for example in anticipation of redundancy so as to reduce their liabilities.
Without guaranteed hours the wage income cannot be considered adequate to meet living
standards. Moreover, at present zhc staff are unlikely to be able to claim in-work tax credits as they
are not guaranteed the required minimum hours per week (16 hours or more1). As many zhc staff
are employed close to the national minimum wage (NMW), the regular upgrading of the NMW has
provided some protection- though not sufficient since the crisis to cover the increased cost of living.

When it comes to employment stability, while dismissal protection is weak in the UK and only
applies after two years continuous service, for zhc staff the situation is even worse. Hours can be
reduced to zero with no notice and even those who have been working regularly for many years may
be excluded from access to unfair dismissal rights and redundancy pay because of breaks in
continuity of employment., The Citizens Advice Bureau has provided examples of cases where
employers had deliberately reduced hours prior to maternity leave in order to restrict workers’
rights, or had reduced hours to zero rather than declaring someone redundant, leaving them in
limbo (CAB 2013).

Zhc staff should be entitled to holiday pay, which is a legal right for workers as well as employees.
However, a high share of employers and zhc staff are not aware that holiday pay should be paid;
only 59% of employers in a recent survey said their zhc staff were entitled to annual paid leave and
only 46% of zhc staff thought they were entitled to annual paid leave (CIPD 2013). Sick pay is more
complicated as there is both an income threshold and an employment continuity requirement for

1
Current eligibility rules require a minimum of 30 hours for claimants aged 25-59 reduced to 16 for a single person with
children, a disabled person or a person aged 60 years or over and 24 hours for a couple with children (with one person
working at least 16 hours)

5
statutory sick pay. Many zhc staff fail to meet these requirements even though their average income
and hours may qualify. It only takes a short period of low demand for the continuity to be broken.

Table 2. Dimensions to decommodification associated with zero hours contracts

Dimensions to Zero hours contracts Potential role of the Consequences of gaps for employees
decommodification state
Guaranteed wage income No guaranteed hours, In-work benefits may Income insecurity -unable to plan or
only hourly rate provide guarantees attain credit/housing
especially under new
Universal Credit system
Maintenance of real pay Rises in minimum wage Mainly employer Potential squeeze on living standards
rate affect many zhc staff responsibility except
for minimum wage
Stability of employment Tendency not to be In principle covered by Constant fear of loss of employment
and fair treatment covered by employment EPL but may not meet or hours, unlikely to have two years
protection/ redundancy the hours or continuity continuous employment for
pay as hours can be criteria protection against unfair dismissal;
reduced and/or fear of making complaints as may
continuity of lose work
employment interrupted
Income during non work Entitled to holiday pay Covered by working- May take less holiday if unaware of
periods but many unaware. time legislation. entitlements. May not be entitled to
Zhc used to reduce Hours/income sick pay/ parental leave (- hours may
employer liabilities for thresholds for sick pay, be reduced to limit entitlements).
pay when low demand. parental leave pay, May need to work longer for pension.
Sick pay, parental leave, pensions, may mean
pensions- etc. depends Zhc staff not eligible
on thresholds – income
and/or hours
Division of work and non Zhc to remove need to Maximum hours and Without regular scheduled hours and
work times provide continuous minimum rest periods under on call systems, no divide
scheduled work periods, set by working time between work time and own time
May cancel shift/ part directive but may not
shifts with immediate be observed. No
effect and/or require minimum work periods,
long/frequent unpaid notice periods for work
breaks. Extensive use of etc. although case law
on call requirements in could establish right to
days off/ unsocial hours pay if called in to work
Skill upgrading/ Zhc staff less likely to Only receive training if Without access to training may not
maintenance of receive training mandated – may be be able to progress or even maintain
employability unpaid. position.
Adjustments to needs of Any adjustments likely to Adjustment may be Opportunities to continue in work
individual involve loss of mandated by may depend on adjustment
income/hours and even legislation (e.g.
risk of loss of all work. disability needs) but
Limited adjustment to employer may reduce
care responsibilities hours to evade
requirement
Opportunities for voice/ Zhc reduces scope for Limited mandated May be forced to exit if no
to avoid forced exit voice particularly over rights opportunities to voice problems
work scheduling
Access to social security Zhc may result in falling Health and some Frequently excluded from social
below thresholds for residual means tested protection including sick pay,
continuity or earnings benefits not dependent unemployment benefit, in-work tax
required for a range of on employment status. credits (need >16 hours work).
benefits

6
Another major problem with zhcs is the lack of continuity in work periods and the time that workers
must spend waiting for work. Some zhc staff work under exclusivity clauses which require them to
be available at all times. Even when exclusivity is not specified, a worker may fear that unavailability
may lead to their subsequent exclusion from work (ACAS 2014). Consequently many spend much of
the week either working or waiting for work, with limited capacity to plan their lives outside of work.
There are no minimum work periods in the UK so employers call zhc staff in at short notice and then
decide they do not need them2, or cut short shifts without compensation. It is legal to do this
provided they are not required to wait at the place of work for the next period of paid work. There is
an ambiguity here in the case of domiciliary care workers who are mainly employed on zhcs and may
end up waiting unpaid in cars or cafes for their next paid visit. According to NMW regulations, time
spent travelling between clients should be paid working time but this regulation is more abused
than observed; a survey of Unison members found nearly three in five said they were not paid for
travel between visits (LPC 2015, 219).

Zhc staff are less likely to be included in training programmes and may even be expected to train in
their own time. The lack of scheduled hours also makes it arrange working time to fit with personal
and family needs; indeed, zhc workers may not be entitled to request flexible working as may not
have six months of continuous employment. Some employers, such as in the social care sector, do
claim to make adjustments but these are in the context of a starting point of highly flexible work. For
example, to avoid being asked to work in school holidays or weekends a mother may have to work
evenings up until 10pm even after starting work at 7am (Rubery et al. 2015). Opportunities for voice
are often limited in the UK and many employers may be using zhcs primarily to gain compliance with
management demands which reduces the likelihood that zhc workers feel able to negotiate their
working conditions. Workers’ fear is a key issue; the Low Pay Commission reported that many zhc
domiciliary care workers are ‘too scared’ to challenge instances of non-compliance because of the
risk of having their hours reduced (LPC 2015, 219).

A key issue is the interactions between zhcs and the social protection and social contribution
systems in the UK. Unlike the German system for mini-jobs (see below), employers do not face
specific benefits or costs when using zhcs as opposed to other types of employment contracts.
However, there are very strong incentives to employ people for short hours of work and/or at low
wages as employers are exempt from all social contributions up until the wage reaches around €210
per week, equivalent to 23.5 hours at the national minimum wage3. No contribution is paid on
earnings up to this threshold, so there are incentives to keep hours of work at a low level or to
replace full-time jobs with multiple short part-time jobs, even though employers only pay
contributions on marginal earnings above the threshold (at a 13.8% rate). The significance of
thresholds has recently increased as a new auto-enrolment occupational pensions system requires
matching contributions from employers if annual earnings are above €12,195 (or can be requested
by employees if they earn at least €7,000 annually).

2
Only one third of organisations using zhcs have a policy on notice periods for asking staff to come into work. Almost half
of zhc staff surveyed said they receive no notice or even find out at the start of a shift that the work is cancelled (CIPD
2013).
3
In 2014-15, both employers and employees only paid National Insurance contributions from a lower threshold of £153
(€210) per week, although employees are credited with contributions when weekly earnings exceedr £111 (€153). The
hourly national minimum wage from October 2014 was £6.50 (€8.94).

7
Zhc staff may find themselves ineligible for many core statutory benefits. For example, statutory sick
pay (paid after four days of sickness) can be claimed if earnings average at least €153 per week
(equivalent to 17.1 hours at the NMW during 2014-15) over the eight weeks prior to the period of
sickness and the person is treated as an employee not self-employed for national insurance
contributions. However, the week to week variability in earnings implied by zhcs means many will
not meet these requirements even if they earn above the threshold during some weeks. Eligibility
for redundancy pay, or higher level maternity pay, also requires continuity of employee status, but
this again may be deemed not to apply if employers treat zhc staff as employees when on shift but
then do not consider they have continuing obligations to provide work, which breaks the continuity
of their employment contract. In the UK, only employees are entitled to a written employment
contract and many people do not know their employment status. In practice this can only be decided
by taking a case to court. Finally, concerning rights to contribution-based unemployment benefits
zhc staff need to have earned more than the €153 lower weekly earnings threshold and paid
contributions for approximately half the weeks in the previous two tax years. These are tough
conditions for zhc staff to meet especially as many zhc staff are women many of whom will have
working partners, making them potentially ineligible for means-tested benefits. In addition to loss of
access to these core social benefits, many zhc staff also face difficulties as consumers, excluded from
access to consumer credit and unable to rent accommodation or to take out a mortgage4.

The extreme commodification implied by zhcs is currently recognised in the unemployment benefit
system in the sense that under current rules claimants are not required to take a zhc job as it cannot
guarantee the 16 to 30 hours a week of work needed to access in-work tax credits In practice, due to
the high share of zhc jobs among available jobs for the lower skilled, many are already being
pressured into taking these jobs even though it may cause them major problems with their benefits.5
However, all of this is scheduled to change with the introduction of the universal credit scheme
which integrates in-work and out-of-work benefits, enabling those whose hours of work vary from
week to week to claim a predictable and regular top up. This new scheme is much delayed due to IT
problems but the Conservative-led coalition government has confirmed that when implemented the
unemployed will be required to take zhc jobs. The focus is on getting the unemployed into work at
all costs. Less attention has been paid to the risk that more employers may choose to vary the hours
of more of their staff due to the apparent ease by which low paid workers will be able to receive
compensatory top ups. The new benefit system could therefore further accelerate the growth of
flexible employment, increasing the burden on the state to provide for decommodification while
employers change working hours from one week, or even one day, to the next. The universal credit
system would then prove too expensive for the state to sustain at current proposed levels of top
ups. The only protection against this development is that those claiming universal credit and earning
less than a weekly amount (35 times the NMW) will be required to engage in active job search to
seek either better paid or more work to bring their earnings up to this limit. This will involve them
doing the equivalent of 35 hours a week of work (job search hours plus actual working time).
Paradoxically, success in finding additional work may lead to loss of their main job as they may not
be available for shifts offered by their first employer. Thus the government is still building the notion

4
See, for example, evidence reported in The Guardian (‘Zero-hours contract workers turned away by some of UK’s biggest
landlords’, 31/10/14),
5
See, for example, the evidence reported in The Guardian newspaper at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/may/05/jobseekers-zero-hours-contracts

8
of a regular full-time working week into its programme design, albeit only for minimum wage
workers, while also endorsing the growth of zero hours jobs.

Commodification and mini jobs in Germany

Like zero hours contracts, the mini job in Germany is widely seen as symbolising the
commodification of employment, with even regular jobs being sometimes split into mini jobs to keep
down labour costs and mini-job workers excluded from many of the core standard employment
benefits. Unlike zhcs, mini jobs were crafted in Germany as part of specific government labour
market policy initiatives (including the major Hartz II reforms in 2003). They are also more pervasive
than zhcs in the UK, with around one in five (7.5 million) working Germans holding a mini-job in
2014, defined as earning up to a monthly wage of €450. Moreover, while mini job workers are
exempt from paying tax and social security, employers are not and must pay higher rates. Mini jobs
are therefore very much a coordinated, state-led innovation, rather than the result of decentralised
and chaotic employer strategies, as witnessed in the UK, to make labour a more flexible, cheaper
and disposable resource. Despite the institutional differences, mini jobs have nevertheless
generated strong commodifying effects in Germany’s labour market. The following brief assessment
draws out the main similarities and differences with respect to the dimensions to
decommodification outlined above. It draws for the most part on findings from IAQ research.

Studies of mini jobs do not suggest they involve the constant state of on-call alert associated with
zhcs and are instead more likely to offer a regular income. But while zhcs average more than 20
hours per week and usually represent the person’s main job, the evidence for mini jobs suggests
they average a far lower level of hours (around 11 per week, although higher in low-wage jobs at
around 13 hours –Brenke 2012) and for one in three mini job workers it is additional to their main
job (Weinkopf 2015). Indeed, regular workers may be encouraged to accept a mini job if their
employer wishes to avoid costly overtime arrangements.

While hours might be more regular than for zhcs, the wage level is more problematic. Prior to 2015,
mini jobs commanded extremely low, exploitative pay rates with around seven in ten mini job
workers estimated to be low paid in 2011 (less than two thirds the median wage) compared to 16%
for full-timers and 23% for insured part-time workers. In some cases rates of pay dropped very low
due to the lack of a wage floor (SOEP data cited in Weinkopf 2015). The government belatedly
responded by introducing a national minimum wage in 2015. At €8.50 this effectively sets a new
maximum working-time limit for mini jobs of 12 hours per week6 (assuming no change in the €450
threshold), which may restrict their practicality and attractiveness to some employers, or lead some
to reduce hours and demand increased work intensity. Moreover, it is unclear at this stage whether
the new minimum wage will be accompanied by sufficient mechanisms to enforce compliance in all
segments of the economy.

Mini-job workers are entitled to holiday pay, as with zhc workers in the UK, and also in principle to
sick pay and other employment rights without having to meet earnings/hours thresholds. In practice,
however, there is significant evidence that employers use mini jobs to leverage in greater
commodification, a type of ‘exit option’ from institutional rules (Voss-Dahm 2012). A survey of mini
jobs found that: more than four in ten workers said they were not granted paid holidays or paid for

6
Prior to the 2003 reforms mini jobs were limited to a maximum of 15 hours per week.

9
public holidays, more than one in three said they did not receive continued sick payments and
significant numbers did not answer the questions citing lack of awareness; and similar results
emerged from an employer survey, suggesting either a startling lack of awareness or admission of
non-compliance and/or discrimination (cited in Weinkopf 2015, 205-6).

A significant difference concerns the relationship with the social protection system. On the
contributions side, employers of mini job workers are required to pay 30% up to the monthly
earnings threshold (€450 in 2013 and 2014) towards tax and social security contributions (pensions,
health, long-term care and unemployment insurance). As such, unlike for zhc workers in Britain, the
German government is not directly subsidising low-wage employers out of a concern to level the
playing field with regular jobs. Indeed, the 30% rate is higher than the rate charged for regular jobs
above the earnings threshold (largely because they must pay a part of the worker’s pension
contributions). The advantage for employers would appear to have been flexibility in the hourly pay
rate rather than social security costs. Employers are able to offer a lower gross wage to workers
since mini job workers are not required to pay tax and social security contributions, whether as a
main or second job and this may be considered a wage subsidy. Moreover, research suggests many
employers of mini job workers find other cost savings, including the freedom to set pay outside of
collective bargaining agreements and, pre-2015, outside of any legally binding minimum wage rules,
as well as evasion of workers’ rights to sick pay, holiday pay and other benefits (Weinkopf 2015).

On the benefits side of the equation, mini jobs do significant damage to the decommodified
employment relationship as workers are not directly entitled to social security benefits, including
unemployment benefits and health insurance. In 2013, reforms extended statutory pensions to
those in ‘marginal employment’ but granted mini job workers the option to remain uncovered and
not pay pension contributions.7 However, many mini-job workers benefit from derived rights to
benefits, such as health insurance for example, via their partner’s contributions. As such, unlike zhcs
in the UK, mini jobs have a far stronger relationship with gender divisions in society, reflecting and
reinforcing Germany’s stronger male-breadwinner welfare state regime that assumes women’s
primary role is to care for the family (and remain committed to her spouse), particularly in the
former west Germany (Bosch/ Jansen 2010). This explains in part why women are over-represented
among mini jobs: one in four female workers (28%) hold a mini job as their main job, compared to
nearly one in six male workers (11%) and women account for around two thirds of all mini job
workers (2005 data cited in Weinkopf 2014, table 11.2). Indeed, a recent Commission for gender
equality called mini jobs ‘disastrous’ for gender equality (cited in Weinkopf 2015); women are far
more likely than men to retire without a company pension, to experience lifelong financial
dependence and, for those without a high-earning spouse, there is a high risk of poverty. Moreover,
the income splitting system means there is a very large marginal tax on second earners who wish to
expand their job (whether through higher pay or hours) beyond the mini jobs earnings threshold of
€450, considerably limiting incentives to improve job position.

Finally, the government’s encouragement of mini jobs has been pursued, as is becoming apparent
with zhcs in the UK, as an active measure in forcing the unemployed into paid work. The long-term
unemployed are required to accept mini jobs and can work up to 15 hours per week alongside

7
http://www.bmas.de/EN/Our-Topics/Social-Security/450-euro-mini-jobs-marginal-employment.html (accessed
01/04/2015).

10
receiving benefits. Among the 7.5 million people with mini jobs, 500,000 are long-term unemployed
with supplementary unemployment benefit II (Weinkopf 2015).

The way forward: how to reverse trends

Both the UK and Germany have been experimenting with expanding forms of highly commodified
employment. While commodified employment arrangements are far from a new phenomenon and
still represent a minority employment form within both the UK and Germany, their increasing
presence is fuelling the calls, from both the left and the right, to abandon the concept of the
standard employment relationship. Our discussion of these two employment forms does provide
support for more universal social protection, independent of employment status and not subject to
thresholds related to continuity of employment, hours of work or earnings. However, in contrast to
other accounts (e.g. Vosko 2010; Stone/ Arthurs 2013), we have also identified the problems with
the employment forms related to employer failings to provide the protections associated with the
SER. Universal social protection would be helpful but insufficient. More needs to be done instead to
re-establish obligations on employers to contribute to the decommodification of employment
required for stable and cohesive societies, but also for the development of productive firms and
economies.

Offloading responsibilities onto the state is not a solution as the recent austerity crisis in Europe has
underlined. For example in the UK one of the first cuts was to in-work benefits, which had been
introduced in the UK to compensate for the low wages paid by employers. The worrying
development in the UK is that the move to universal credit may lead to further commodification as
employers of low wage workers may see the new system as an easy way to pass the risk of variable
demand onto both the workforce and the state. Reform of zero hours in the UK, as Adams and
Deakin (2014) identify, requires an integrated programme spanning both employment law and the
tax and benefit system but this is not on the policy agenda.

Developments in Germany appear to be moving in the opposite direction with the introduction of
the new NMW, which should reduce the appeal of the mini job to employers as they already incur
high social protection costs which cannot in future be offset by paying low hourly wages to mini
jobseekers. The problem in Germany now is to make mini jobs less attractive to the largely female
labour supply. This would require a reform of the tax system so that women entering standard
instead of mini jobs would be able to use their own independent tax allowance to reduce the
deductions out of wages. A harmonisation of tax and social contribution regimes across the mini and
the standard jobs would limit the benefits to women of working in a mini job just as the NMW is
reducing the benefits to employers. However, these changes in tax arrangements are not on the
policy agenda, suggesting that both countries need to develop new coherent policies across both
labour market and welfare systems to establish the new more comprehensive and more flexible
form of the standard employment relationship as called for in Bosch’s seminal article.

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