Vergara v.

Suelto 

Facts:
Petitioner Vergara commenced in the MTC of Davao City an action for illegal detainer
against the respondents Montebon and Casabe for defaulting in their lease payments.

The defendants wrote Vergara another letter acknowledging the latter's ownership of the
building and their status as lessees. They announced their refusal to vacate the premises
on the ground that the lot on which the building stands, though titled in Vergara's name,
was part of a tract of land Identified as Lot 508 which had been ordered reverted to the
public domain by the Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV) in a decision rendered in
another civil case for cancellation of titles and reversion.

March 7, 1986 Vergara filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that neither he
nor the defendants were parties in Civil Case No. 16192 and consequently could not be
bound by any judgment or order therein promulgated.

Defendants filed an Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to

Dismiss. They argued that (1) a genuine issue exists which cannot be resolved by mere
resort to summary judgment as that issue having arisen from defendants' controversion of
Vergara's claim of possession and ownership over the commercial building and the land
on which the same is constructed; (2) their answered tendered a genuine issue does not
only consist of a mere general denial since it specifically denied the material averment of
facts in the complaint setting forth the substance of the matters in support of their denial;
and (3) that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case because the real issue involved is
title and/or ownership of the property and not physical possession and the case should not
be by accion interdictal but accion de reivendicacion.

The MTC denied motions of both defendant and petitioner. The issues involved are
included in the instant special civil action of mandamus.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the appropriateness of a summary judgment may ever be so self- evident
in a case as to make it a duty on the part of the Trial Judge to grant the plaintiff's motion.

2. Whether or not it is proper to file directly with the Supreme Court an application for a
writ of mandamus against the MTC, considering that jurisdiction to issue this
extraordinary writ is also possessed by the CA as well as the RTC of the district.

Held: 
1. Yes, it is proper. Even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a judgment on the
pleadings is not proper, a summary judgment may still be rendered on the plaintiff's
motion if he can show to the Court's satisfaction that "except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," that is to say, the issues thus
tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad
faith, patently unsubstantial. The determination may be made by the Court on the basis of
the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and affidavits that the movant may
submit, as well as those which the defendant may present in his turn.

They are moreover estopped to dispute the plaintiff's title. "The tenant is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them."

2. No, it is not proper. The remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises,
however, is not the writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that mandamus issues only
to compel performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty.

Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for
the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in
this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
respondent Judge is hereby commanded forthwith to render a summary judgment in favor
of the petitioner 
Ago v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In 1957, petitioner Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipment from respondent
Grace Park Engineering and executed a chattel mortgage over said machineries to secure
the balance of P32,000. The machineries were taken to Lianga, Surigao and installed in
the building of Golden Pacific. Petitioner agreed to pay on installment basis but later on
defaulted twice.

Grace Park instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. Petitioner

continued to defaulted. Respondent filed for execution of the machineries which was
granted. The writ of execution followed. Sheriff of Surigao levied the sawmill
machineries in question in public auction but his levy did not have notice of sale.

Petitioner then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the writ of execution with respondent CA, alleging that respondent Surigao
sheriff acted illegally by acting on a void writ of execution.

CA issued writ of preliminary injunction but the respondent sheriff already sold the
machineries at public auction. Grace Park was the only bidder at P15,000. CA instructed
to suspend the issuance of certificate of sale until final decision. CA ruled in favor of
lower court stating that there was no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution
of judgment.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding the sale of the sawmill machineries and
equipment at the public auction without a notice of sale.
2. Whether or not the machineries were immovables or movables.

Held:
1. Yes, the writ of execution in this case against the sawmill machinery and equipment
purchased by petitioner Pastor D. Ago from the Grace Park Engineering, Inc., as well as
the sale of the same by the Sheriff of Surigao, are null and void.

The Rules expressly require that final orders or judgments be served personally or by
registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 27 provides as follows:

SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. — Final orders or judgments shall be served
either personally or by registered mail.

In accordance with this provision, a party is not considered as having been served with
the judgment merely because he heard the judgment dictating the said judgment in open
court; it is necessary that he be served with a copy of the signed judgment that has been
filed with the clerk in order that he may legally be considered as having been served with
the judgment.

2. They are immovables as they are tended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.

Under the Rules of Court Rule 39, Sec. 16, the sale of real property requires the notice of
sale of property on execution. When petitioner purchased the machineries, he assigned
them to respondent as payment for his stock subscription. They were installed in a
building and permanently attached to the ground as defined under Article 415 (5) of New
Civil Code.
Valentin v. Sta. Maria

Facts:
Petitioner Lorenzo G. Valentin was the defendant in a civil case of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan with private respondent Yolanda Matias as plaintiff. A decision was
rendered on December 20, 1963 in favor of the private respondent as plaintiff declaring
null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32568 in the name of the defendant, now
petitioner, who was likewise considered as a possessor in bad faith and thus must account
for the fruits of the property, in addition to paying private respondent as plaintiff the
amount of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of the proceedings. The Register of
Deeds of Bulacan was likewise thereby ordered to cancel the TCT of his office, reinstate
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15329 in the name of Petra Gatmaytan and thereafter
cancel it and issue a new one in favor of private respondent after the payment of the
corresponding fees.

It was duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on May 13, 1968.
There was a motion for reconsideration by petitioner, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals on July 19, 1968. Subsequently, on October 26, 1968, upon discovering that
when Judge Samuel F. Reyes promulgated the decision dated December 20, 1963, he had
already assumed office as District Judge for the Province of Rizal and the Cities of Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan, Branch X, and in view of the ruling in People of the Philippines
vs. Simpliciano Soria, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan with
respondent Judge Santa Maria a "Motion to Disregard Judgment of December 20, 1963
and to Render judgment Anew." There was on October 29, 1968, a pleading of private
respondent in opposition. Respondent Judge, on December 12, 1968, denied said motion.
After a denial of a motion for reconsideration, petitioner came to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Can a judge who had qualified and assumed office in one district can validly issue an
order of dismissal in a criminal case formerly heard by him while holding such office in
another?

Held:
The judge can validly issue an order of dismissal even if he had assumed and qualified
office in one district if the criminal case was formerly heard by him in the formerly held
office. The previous principle held in Soria is abandoned that the same permanently
transferred judge may not decide cases totally heard by him and that it is only where he
has been temporarily transferred or assigned to another court of equal jurisdiction that he
is authorized to decide such cases totally heard by him.

Under Soria, the Court previously interpreted the law to mean that "the signing or writing
of judgments outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases are pending,
is allowed when the judge leaves the province 'by transfer or assignment to another court
of equal jurisdiction 'or 'by expiration of his temporary assignment.'  In other words, the
rule contemplates of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left or
of the one he is going to assume," reiterating that "in similar cases, decisions
promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed and has qualified
to another court were declared not valid and without any effect."

Soria recognized, however, that where the case was not yet submitted for decision but
was heard only in part by the same permanently transferred judge, he could be duly
authorized by this Court upon proper petition of any of the parties to the case and the
recommendation of the district judge, under the proviso in the cited law, "to continue
hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his [permanent] transfer or appointment
to another court of equal jurisdiction." 

The Court now therefore over turns Soria in its ruling that the
same permanently transferred judge may not decide cases totally heard by him and that it
is only where he has been temporarily transferred or assigned to another court of equal
jurisdiction that he is authorized to decide such cases totally heard by him.
As was stressed in Donesa, there seems to be no valid reason to authorize a permanently
transferred judge who has heard the case only in part to continue hearing and to decide
said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal
jurisdiction but to withhold such authorization to decide the case from the same
permanently transferred judge who has totally heard the case.

Only when there exist countervailing circumstances and compelling considerations

against the rendition of decision by such transferred judge who has totally heard the case
- which must be submitted by him by proper petition to and approved by the Supreme
Court - will such transferred judge be relieved from the obligation of preparing and
rendering the decision in the case, which the Supreme Court may then assign to his
successor in the court vacated or left by him.

The transferred judge who totally heard the case or his successor if assigned by the
Supreme Court shall be bound by the same ninety-day period from (submitted in the case
of the former and from notice of assignment in the case of the latter) within which to
render the decision.
Nazareno v. CA

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Nazareno and his wife, Elisa Nazareno, were charged with Serious
Physical Injuries in the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite and that upon arraignment,
both pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.

After trial on the merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment but the same
was postponed due to petitioner's filing of a motion to re-open the case on the ground of
non-presentation of a vital witness who could not be produced during the trial proper.
The motion was opposed by the prosecution.

After Presiding Judge Diosomito was suspended, acting MTC Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr.
issued a resolution denying the motion to re-open. Petitioner questioned the same with
the CA. In the meantime, Acting MTC Judge Icasiano, Jr. set the promulgation of
judgment.

Acting MTC Judge Icasiano, Jr. promulgated the Decision of Judge Manuel C. Diosomito
acquitting Elisa Nazareno but convicting the petitioner as charged. However, on the same
date, the CA... issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Icasiano, Jr. from
proceeding with the promulgation of said judgment.

Petitioner thereafter filed in the Court of Appeals a supplemental petition to declare the
nullity of judgment, on the ground that the decision, having been signed by Judge
Diosomito, should have also been promulgated by him, and not by Acting Judge Icasiano,
Jr.

Petitioner also alleged that the decision is void since at the time of the promulgation of
the decision by Judge Icasiano, Jr., Judge Diosomito who signed the subject decision has
already retired from office.

Said supplemental petition, however, was denied by the CA. Petitioner interposed a
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court but the same failed for having
been filed out of time. The records of the case were forwarded to the RTC of Naic,
Cavite. It was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may validly give due course to the petition to declare
the decision of the lower court void as the trial judge who penned the decision had long
retired from the service at the time the judgment was promulgated on April 15, 1988.

Held:
No. A judgment promulgated after the judge who signed the decision has ceased to hold
office is not valid and binding.

As stated in the case of People v. Labao, the Court held that for a judgment to be valid, it
must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.
Thus, a decision penned by a judge after his retirement cannot be validly promulgated; it
cannot acquire a binding effect as it is null and void. In like manner, a decision penned by
a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly promulgated after his retirement. When
a judge retired all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the
decision thereon also "retired" with him. He had lost entirely his power and authority to
act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.

In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr. could not validly promulgate the
decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who has long retired from service. The
decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito, as promulgated by Judge Icasiano,
Jr., is a void judgment. A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly,
the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the
MTC, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. The void decision is
deemed nonexistent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from.
DBP v. Guariña

Facts:

In July 1976, Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP to finance the
development of its resort complex. The loan, in the amount of P3,387,000.00, was
approved on August 5, 1976. Guariña Corporation executed a promissory note that would
be due on November 3, 1988. On October 5, 1976, Guariña Corporation executed a real
estate mortgage over several real properties in favor of DBP as security for the repayment
of the loan. On May 17, 1977, Guariña Corporation executed a chattel mortgage over the
personal properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to be acquired out of the
proceeds of the loan, also to secure the performance of the obligation. Prior to the release
of the loan, DBP required Guariña Corporation to put up a cash equity of P1,470,951.00
for the construction of the buildings and other improvements on the resort complex.

The loan was released in several installments, and Guariña Corporation used the proceeds
to defray the cost of additional improvements in the resort complex. In all, the amount
released totaled P3,003,617.49, from which DBP withheld P148,102.98 as interest.

Guariña Corporation demanded the release of the balance of the loan, but DBP refused.
Instead, DBP directly paid some suppliers of Guariña Corporation over the latter’s
objection. DBP found upon inspection of the resort project, its developments and
improvements that Guariña Corporation had not completed the construction works. In a
letter dated February 27, 1978, and a telegram dated June 9, 1978, DBP thus demanded
that Guariña Corporation expedite the completion of the project, and warned that it would
initiate foreclosure proceedings should Guariña Corporation not do so.

Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña Corporation, DBP initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings

Issue:
1. Whether or not DBP’s action to foreclose the mortgage is proper.
2. Whether or not the CA adhered to the usual course of judicial proceedings in deciding the
case and is therefore in accordance with the law of the case doctrine.

Held:
1. No. The Court held that the foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor’s default on
the principal obligation is premature, and should be undone for being void and
ineffectual. The mortgagee who has been meanwhile given possession of the mortgaged
property by virtue of a writ of possession issued to it as the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale may be required to restore the possession of the property to the mortgagor and to pay
reasonable rent for the use of the property during the intervening period.

The agreement between DBP and Guariña Corporation was a loan. Under the law, a loan
requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to another
who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or quality shall
be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one party
is the creditor, and the other the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal
obligation is dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should
ideally be simultaneous. In a loan, the creditor should release the full loan amount and the
debtor repays it when it becomes due and demandable.

The loan agreement between the parties is a reciprocal obligation. Appellant in the instant
case bound itself to grant appellee the loan amount of P3,387,000.00 condition on
appellee’s payment of the amount when it falls due. The appellant did not release the total
amount of the approved loan. Appellant therefore could not have made a demand for
payment of the loan since it had yet to fulfil its own obligation. Moreover, the fact that
appellee was not yet in default rendered the foreclosure proceedings premature and
improper.
 By its failure to release the proceeds of the loan in their entirety, DBP had no right yet to
exact on Guariña Corporation the latter’s compliance with its own obligation under the
loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its obligation,
the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of it while the other’s
obligation remains unfulfilled. In other words, the latter party does not incur delay.

Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the Court is
bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court's factual findings as
affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of facts.

By its failure to release the proceeds of the loan in their entirety, DBP had no right yet to
exact on Guariña Corporation the latter's compliance with its own obligation under the
loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its obligation,
the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of it while the other's
obligation remains unfulfilled. In other words, the latter party does not incur delay.

2. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means,
more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has
once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even
on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been
reversed in other cases.

For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement
on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded
to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should
not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like
damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or
issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.

Having found and pronounced that the extrajudicial foreclosure by DBP was premature,
and that the ensuing foreclosure sale was void and ineffectual, the Court affirms the order
for the restoration of possession to Guarifia Corporation.