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Elhawary, S. (2008) - Caminos Violentos Hacia La Paz. Nexo Entre Conflicto y Desarrollo en Colombia
Elhawary, S. (2008) - Caminos Violentos Hacia La Paz. Nexo Entre Conflicto y Desarrollo en Colombia
84 - 100
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
Abstract
International aid in conflict-affected countries is based on the liberal assumption that
an inverse relationship exists between violent conflict and development. This paper
contests this assumption through a study of the Colombian context that demonstrates
violent conflict and development can in fact be interconnected as part of the transition
to capitalist modes of production and in the process of state formation. It further
argues that a failure by aid agencies to comprehend the complex interaction between
conflict and development can result in distorted outcomes in their programming that
are detrimental to the stated objectives of achieving peace, development, and justice.
Resumen
La ayuda internacional para países en conflicto está basada en el supuesto liberal de que
existe una relación inversa entre conflicto violento y desarrollo. Este artículo refuta este
supuesto por medio de un estudio del contexto colombiano que demuestra que, de
hecho, el conflicto violento y el desarrollo pueden estar interconectados como parte
de la transición a formas de producción capitalistas y el proceso de formación del
Estado. También argumenta que la falta de comprensión de la compleja relación entre
conflicto y desarrollo por parte de las agencias de ayuda puede generar consecuencias
distorsionadas en su programación, que son perjudiciales para el objetivo de lograr la
paz, el desarrollo y la justicia.
* Samir Elhawary es MSc en Violencia, Conflicto y Desarrollo de la School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) de
la University of London. Ha sido investigador del Programa para Latinoamérica y el grupo ‘Business & Conflict’ de In-
ternational Alert (UK), y actualmente se desempeña como investigador del Overseas Devlopment Institute, UK. Correo
electrónico: s.elhawary@odi.org.uk
1 For an overview of this trend in international aid policy in conflict-affected countries see Duffield (2003).
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This discourse among aid agen- pment nexus has important implica-
cies on the nature of violent conflict tions for current aid interventions and
in developing countries is premi- that without a radical review of the
sed on a linear chain of cause and current discourse these interventions
effect, where the lack of economic are unlikely to achieve their peace-
development causes conflict and the- building objectives and possibly even
refore its resolution requires filling this further perpetuate the civilian insecu-
void through the promotion of more rity they attempt to alleviate.
development (see World Bank 2003a).
However, violent conflicts are com- 1. The conflict-development
plex phenomena that require complex nexus: violent paths to peace?
thought. In protracted conflict-related The transformation from pre-
emergencies, such as in Colombia, capitalist forms of societal organisa-
where violence is characterised by its tion towards capitalist development
multiplicity and interdependence over and prosperity, where goods and
both time and space, analytical boun- services are produced for market
daries that create neat categorisations exchange in order to make a pro-
between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ such as fit as opposed to consumption by
legal/illegal, strong/failed state, con- their producers, is often understood
flict/development or democracy/ as a linear process that is accelera-
authoritarianism, become increasingly ted when accompanied by a com-
difficult to make. In order to unders- bination of technical policies that
tand this fluidity and the implications consist of deregulating and libera-
for aid interventions that seek to pro- lising markets and improving good
mote development and build peace it governance. Furthermore, based on
is useful to view these processes, as Kantian thought, advanced capita-
Duffield suggests, as a ‘living system list development is seen to enhance
or organism’ characterised by inter- the propensity of peaceful relation-
connection, mutation and self-trans- ships, as the economic rationality
formation (2003: 10). This will enable of commercial exchange overco-
us to transgress some of the analytical mes the tendency to resort to force
boundaries that emerge from conven- in the production, distribution and
tional models of thought, particularly consumption of resources. Violent
the false dichotomy between violent conflict is thus understood as ‘deve-
conflict and development. lopment in reverse’ along the path
In fact, this article argues that in towards a state of social progress
Colombia, violent conflict and deve- that embraces liberal values in the
lopment do not lie at extreme oppo- political, economic and social fields
site poles along a linear continuum but (World Bank 2003a).
can often be interconnected by the Therefore, in countries where vio-
contradictions that emerge from the lent conflict interrupts the transition to
transition to capitalist modes of pro- development, aid agencies seek interven-
duction and the process of state for- tions that reverse this anomaly in order to
mation. It will further argue that this reassert the course towards development
understanding of the conflict-develo- and a liberal peace. This is evident in the
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
2 Also see Ortiz Sarmiento (1992) on how the opportunities created by the violence allowed middlemen to accumulate
substantial capital used to develop the coffee sector in Quindío.
3 Between 1945 and 1953 industry grew at an annual rate of 9.2% and agricultural production increased by 77% and 113%
in 1948 and 1949 respectively. These rates of growth occurred as most of the country’s departments were experiencing
outbreaks of violent conflict (see Medina 1992: 156).
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and peacefully channel these conflicts the Colombian Institute for Agra-
(Richani 2002). The state in Colombia rian Reform (INCORA) was created.
has traditionally been unable to centra- However, INCORA failed to achieve
lise power and as a result many regions its objectives, distributing less than 1%
in the country have been dominated of the land that was subject to expro-
by powerful elites that control popula- priation (Richani 2002: 28). At the
tions through patron-client networks same time, Law 1a of 1968 helped con-
in which they preserve their privi- vert latifundios, through the expulsion
leges and autonomy against those of of tenants and sharecroppers, into large
the central state. This regionalism has commercial agribusinesses, aimed
been an important factor in impeding at meeting the food needs of the
the ability of institutions to peacefu- growing urban population and gene-
lly resolve these agrarian conflicts and rating surplus for industrial expansion
define their development outcomes (Pearce 1990: 92).
as regional elites have often opposed The failure of reform led to
the reforms that stemmed from the a further increase in the expansion
centre (Gutiérrez, Viatela y Acevedo of the agricultural frontier by the
2007: 17). colonos which opened vast amounts
The López Pumarejo adminis- of land that were essentially outside
tration (1934-38) passed Law 200 of of the state’s presence. This emer-
1936 that sought to modernise the ging dynamic and the closure of the
agrarian sector and respond to the political system through the Natio-
growing protests from the peasan- nal Front after La Violencia created
try by redistributing non-productive the spaces for alternative actors to
land in the latifundios and compen- emerge and thrive. These took the
sating colonos for any improvements form of diverse guerrilla groups that
they had made to the land they had arose as a means for the peasantry
occupied. However, the implemen- and other social groups (i.e.: urban
tation of these reform measures was intellectuals, students and the wor-
fiercely resisted by landowners and king class) to influence the terms of
political elites (often the same), who accumulation and the distribution of
used their power to adjudicate land wealth and the system in which these
disputes in their favour. Meanwhile, terms are cast. The most notable
large areas of agricultural land were guerrilla insurgencies are the Armed
converted to pasture for less labour- Revolutionary Forces of Colombia
intensive cattle-grazing in order to (FARC), which had a strong land
avoid land claims by tenants and sha- reform agenda and were initially
recroppers (Richani 2002: 19-20). linked to the Communist party, and
Subsequent attempts at agra- the National Liberation Army (ELN),
rian reform also failed to resolve the composed of urban intellectuals and
conflicts between landowners and the students which opposed the con-
peasantry. Law 135 of 1961 is a case tractual and labour conditions that
in point. It was designed to assist the emerged through the exploitation of
minifundios and increase food pro- natural resources by foreign capital
ductivity after La Violencia, for which and were heavily influenced by the
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
4 For an analysis of the combination of forces that led to the emergence of the illegal drugs industry see Restrepo (2006).
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tes important social safety nets, such preneurial interests (both in legal and
as pension schemes and ensuring illegal markets) that conformed to the
minimum wage standards yet on the development of a rentier-based capitalist
other hand overlaps with the for- mode of production.
mal economy promoting capitalist The entrepreneurial interests
development through investments in in question are strongly tied to the
financial institutions, large commer- above mentioned agrarian conflicts.
cial businesses and the stock market The paramilitaries actively sought
(Rangel 2000). to expand their territorial control as
The guerrillas have in fact a means to accumulate capital and
become the de facto authority in some political power (Cubides 2001: 132).
areas in terms of both the monopoly This further exacerbated agrarian
of violence and their ability to control conflicts as they invested their drug
populations and raise revenue through money in large agricultural estates. It
taxation. As noted earlier, in response is estimated that, from the early 1980s
to the state’s inability to curtail the until 2000, paramilitaries acquired
guerrillas’ war and state making capa- 4.5 million hectares, representing
cities, landowners, particularly cattle around 50% of Colombia’s most fer-
ranchers and drug-traffickers res- tile and valuable land5. This process
ponded to this extortion by forming is often considered to constitute a
self-defence groups. These groups, ini- ‘counter agrarian reform’ reversing
tially legalised by the government and the frail gains achieved during the
supported by the armed forces, aimed reform process and aggravating the
to counter guerrilla influence, protect agrarian question further. The expan-
economic interests and ensure security. sion of territorial control allowed the
This often involved attacking the local paramilitaries to consolidate local
population and members of the poli- and regional power (often through
tical establishment who were deemed penetration of the state), engage in
supportive of the guerrillas (Gutiérrez productive economic activities and
& Barón 2006). control strategic areas for their war
These self-defence groups became effort and engagement in the illegal
progressively more influential across the drugs trade. Furthermore, the terri-
country as drug-traffickers increasingly torial control by paramilitary groups
supported their organisation and pro- is directly linked to the expulsion of
fessionalisation by using their financial peasants from their land. It is estima-
clout to provide training and better ted that the majority of the internally
armament.The growth of the paramilita- displaced are the result of parami-
ries deeply changed their nature and they litary expansion. In fact, there is a
went from protecting the interests of cer- correlation between areas of territo-
tain segments of society (cattle ranchers, rial expansion and land concentration
military officers and drug-traffickers) to and areas with the highest levels of
acquiring their own, particularly entre- displacement (Ibáñez 2004).
5 Figure from the Inspector General’s Office, cited in Valencia, L. (2006: 14).
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
6 This is not to say that these are the only factors that lead to the crisis, other factors such as the revaluation of the peso
and the effects of El Niño are also important.
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model (2006: 133). The expansion of with the government policy to pro-
African palm in the communities of mote commercial agricultural crops for
Jiguamiando and Curvarado in the export, with plans to expand the areas
department of Chocó provides an cultivated with African palm to 600,000
illustrative example of this process. hectares this year (Palau 2007: 9)
There has been a rapid expansion of Another example that empha-
the crops since the mid 1990s that has sises the often symbiotic nature
coincided with paramilitary influence between conflict and development
in the region. The paramilitaries forged relates to the extractive industry. The
alliances with private investors to invest government’s national development
in the crops for which they received agenda clearly envisions increasing
subsidies and incentives from the state outputs from the extraction of natural
as part of its rural development agenda. resources such as oil, coal and gold in
As one paramilitary leader Salvatore order to generate resources to foster
Mancuso openly admitted, “…we have national development (DNP 2006).
cultivations of African palm. I perso- However, both the guerrillas and the
nally got the entrepreneurs to invest paramilitaries also extract resources
in those projects that are both sus- from companies in order to finance
tainable and productive” (quoted in their war efforts (Guáqueta 2003).
Palau 2007: 5). A study by the Inter- Therefore, the surplus gained from
nal Displacement Monitoring Cen- these activities funds both violence
tre (IDMC) has highlighted how the and increases state resources for deve-
lands used for cultivation are commu- lopmental purposes. Furthermore, the
nal lands belonging to afro-Colombian extraction of these resources has been
communities and that many were for- at the centre of the contradicting
ced to sell or flee the lands. Further- modes of productions sought by gue-
more, due to the precarious situation of rrillas and paramilitaries. For exam-
the displaced many have had to return ple, paramilitaries have supported
and work as sharecroppers or day the violent expulsion of the peasan-
labourers on the plantations (2007: 21). try from their lands in order to cede
Therefore, rather than represent these territories to oil companies for
irrationality, breakdown and collapse, exploration (Richani 2005: 117). On
the violence and conflict outlined the other hand, guerrillas in some coal
above plays an important role in sha- mining areas have supported territo-
ping economic relations and structures rial invasions by peasant organisations
that can be embedded in the develop- that have later established themselves
ment process. This is not to say that the as production cooperatives (Rangel
whole development process is based on 2000: 590).
violence and that all forced displace- The above analysis has attemp-
ment is a means to secure wage labour, ted to highlight some of the inter-
but rather to indicate that violent con- connections between violent conflict
flict can shape the development pro- and development in the transition to
cess, in this case by facilitating the rapid capitalist development and the process
expansion of certain agricultural crops of state formation. It has shown that a
such as African palm, which is in line linear model of development on which
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
7 In this discussion of international aid, this section is concerned with the resources used to support peace-building and
development objectives and therefore excludes military aid under Plan Colombia.
8 This enthusiasm is particularly prominent within USAID and the World Bank. Other agencies, in interviews with the
author, have been more apprehensive of the nature of the demobilisation process with the paramilitaries. However, as
discussed further in this section the nature of aid policy does not substantially vary in its assumptions around the conflict-
development nexus.
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is not a failed state such as in other the above analysis of Colombia, the terms
humanitarian emergencies.”9 Further- of accumulation and wealth distribution
more, the government’s NDP is in line and the system in which these are cast
with donor and agency thinking on have been radically transformed, particu-
peace-building, in which recovery and larly in certain industries such as in the
development through increasing eco- agricultural sector. So although the para-
nomic growth and targeting resources militaries have demobilised, it is widely
at some of the most vulnerable is the understood that the JPL has been inade-
most effective means to achieve and quate in dismantling the social, economic
consolidate peace.The plan specifically and political power they have obtai-
seeks to increase growth by increasing ned through war. The law has been a
the productivity of export-oriented means in which to institutionalise a
crops such as rubber, African palm, radically changed development terrain
banana and cacao through so-called and also the very nature of the state,
‘productive projects’ that will facilitate particularly at the regional and local
Colombia’s insertion into internatio- levels but also at the national level, that
nal markets and support livelihoods serves particular interests10. A miscon-
for the displaced and ex-combatants ception of the current nature of the
(DNP 2006). state, the interests behind the policies
Thus, the peace-building objec- it develops and the power amassed by
tives of reintegrating ex-combatants the paramilitaries potentially leads to
and supporting the displaced are alig- distorted outcomes in aid program-
ned with the government’s broader mes. Particularly those that presume
development agenda, emphasising the the peace negotiation and subsequent
interrelation between the two -where demobilisation of the paramilitaries
development leads to peace whilst have ushered in a blank slate from
peace is synonymous with develop- which development can be resumed
ment. Therefore violent conflict is a in a democratic environment.
passing anomaly along the development In fact, some of the ‘productive
path that once removed provides the projects’ that have been developed in
enabling environment for development conjunction with international agen-
to be resumed. Perceiving this enabling cies that aim to support the displaced
environment as a tabula rasa that requi- and ex-combatants have assisted and
res the implementation of certain tech- consolidated some of the regressive
nical policies to foster development and structures that have emerged from
peace fails to understand the transfor- violence. The process of land con-
mations that are brought about by war centration described above, coupled
(Cramer 2006: 253-255). As shown in with the infiltration of INCODER11
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Violent Paths to Peace? • Samir Elhawary
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