the Faron ta callout the armed forces to suppress lawless vilence, Petitioner seeks to nullify the order grounded on the fear that ‘once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. HELD: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such Power. Under Section 18, Article Vil of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the Sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out Power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three Powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or consiruction, be extended to other matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.¢., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Power to impose martial law, bath of which involve the curtailment and Suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not Fequired in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power fo call as compared to the two other powers. The President as Commander-in-Chief has. a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in 425emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power, if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny, could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straifjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, itis the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when, in his judgment, it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that violent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and camappings continue to occur in Metro Manila. We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utliies,’ and other public places. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power. (Integrated. Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, GR. 141284, August 15, 2000) 2, Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. ‘A writ of habeas corpus is an order from the court directed to a person detaining another commanding him to produce the body of the detained person in his custody at a designated date, time and place, and to explain the cause of detention. When the court receives an application for the writ and it finds the petition in proper form, it will issue the writ as a matter of course. If it is shown that the persons in custody who were apprehended and detained are found in areas where the privilege of the writ has been suspended, the court will suspend further proceedings in the action. should be noted that it is the privilege that is suspended and not the writ iteelt. Requisites for valid exercise: 1. There must be an invasion or rebellion , and 2. The public safety requires the suspension. 426Effects of the suspension of the privilege. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus applies only to persons “judicially charged! for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion or rebellion. The inclusion of the words “judicially charged” is not precise. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus contemplates a situation in which a person is being arrested and detained without yet being charged in court. The provision should refer only to those suspected of committing the offenses cited above. ‘Thergeneralrrulejis:that no person can’be arrested without a warrant ‘fiarrestiissued)by’aicourtof law, There are two exceptions: (1) If the arrest were made in connection with a crime committed in the presence of the detaining officer, or (2) if the privilege of the writ were suspended. Outside of the above exceptions, a public officer who arrests and detains a person without a warrant may become liable for arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. A petition for habeas corpus can be filed to seak the person's release. In the event of the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy available against such arrest. The emergency situation, particularly the difficulty and time element involved in applying for warrants, the big number of persons that may have to be arrested, and the need to move quickly to quell the invasion or rebellion, justify it. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released The public officer can detain a person without a warrant of arrest for only seventy-two (72) hours. Before the lapse of 72 hours, an information must have been filed in the proper court charging him of the offense for which he was arrested Under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the public officer can only detain a person for 12, 18 or 36 hours depending on the offense he is Suspected of committing, and within that period, he must be judicially charged or otherwise released. The suspension of the privilege extends the above periods for which a person can be detained without a warrant to 72 hours. If the person is not judicially charged or released after 72 hours, the Public officer may become liable under Article 126 for delay in the delivery of detained persons. The detainee or his representative may file a petition for habeas corpus. Even if the privilege is still suspended, it has an effectivity of only 72 hours. After that time, the suspension is lifted 2s to him, The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege cf the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Once the case is filed, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over the persons detained. Except if the offense is non-bailable and the evidence of guilt is strong, the court can grant them bail, Moreover, to deny the court this power is to diminish its jurisdiction * Article Ill, Section 13, Ibid 43. Proclaim Martial Law suspended. The relations between the citizen and his state are unchanged."* “Their legal effect goes no further than to warn citizens that the military powers have been called upon by the executive to assist him in Requisites: 1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and 2 public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof 3» Wills on Constitutional law, 449, [1936] 2327 US, 304 (1946) * Concurring opinion of Justice Fernando in Gumalia v. Espino, G.R, 36188, February 21, 1988 * Separate opinion of Justice Castro in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, [1974] 428State of rebellion “A state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time, Many of the facts and events recited in detail in the different "Whereases' of the proclamation are of common knowledge. The state of rebellion continues up to the present, The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. it does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers, recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature, are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context. (Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974) Effects of the proclamation of martial law. For reasons of expediency and national security, it is submitted that during a period of martial law, the President may legislate due to the exigency of the situation where Congress will find it difficult to convene and regularly perform its functions. He may order the arrest of people engaged in the rebellion or invasion. The operation of the Constitution cannot be suspended. The functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies cannot be supplanted. Usually, martial law is proclaimed because the courts and other civil institutions like Congress have been shut down or cannot function. Martial law can not be deciared to shut down the civil institutions. Military courts cannot try cases against civilians where the civil courts are open and functioning Case: A petition was filed questioning the jurisdiction of military courts to try cases against civilians while civil courts are open and functioning. HELD: As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in Section 18, Article Vil of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.” This provision 429in the fundamental law is just one of the many steps taken by the Filipino People towards the restoration of the vital role of the judiciary in a free country — that of the guardian of the Constitution and the dispenser of justice without fear or favor. No longer should military tribunals or commissions exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them when the civil courts are open and functioning. No longer may the exclusive judicial power of the civil courts, beginning with the Supreme Court down to the lower courts, be appropriated by any nilitary body or tribunal, or even diluted under the guise of a state of martial law, national security and other similar labels. (Olaguer v. Military Gommission No. 34, G.R. 54558, May 22, 1987) Case: Accused-appellant, a member of the Philippine Army, was charged with murder sometime in 1996 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. He moved to quash the information claiming that as an enlisted serviceman, the provincial prosecutor had no authority to file the Information against him but the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military pursuant to Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman. He asserts further that at the time of the incident he was a member of the AFP with the rank of staff sergeant. As such, he was subject to CA 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, which vests jurisdiction Over members of the AFP with the courts-martial. HELD: As early as 1938 Jurisdiction was already vested in courts-martial over any crime or offense punishable under CA 408 as amended, othewise known as the Articles of War, committed by soldiers belonging to the regular force of the Philippine Army. Thereafter, PD 1822 qualified the jurisdiction of courts-martial to include offenses committed in relation to the performance of their duties Subsequently, PD 1850 provided that a case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Art. 38 of CA 408, as amended, or court- mattial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law. Later, Sec. 1 of PD 1850 was amended by PD 1852 to include the situation where the President may in the interest of justice order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a case involving a military officer be tried by the appropriate civil court. In 1991, due to the several failed coups a etat, RA 7055 was enacted. It repealed PDs 1822, 1822-A, 1850 and 1852, and all other acts, general orders, presidential issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent therewith. It effectively placed upon the Civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the AFP and other members subject to military law. RA 7055 provides that when these individuals commit crimes or offenses penalized under The Revised Penal Code (RPC), other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, they shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected in which case it shall be tried by court-martial. Hence, under RA 7055, the jurisdiction to try 430members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts, The fact of accused-appellant's separation from the service is of no moment since from the outset, the civil courts have jurisdiction over his offense and his person. Accused-appellant also contends that under Art. 71 of CA 408, preliminary investigation should be conducted by an authorized military officer before any information could be filed against AFP members. We disagree. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on a military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving members of the AFP. It simply mentions an "investigating officer’ who shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused, without reference to his being a military officer. Given the foregoing, we cannot uphold the contention of accused-appeliant that the authority to file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. It's true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over complaints filed against members of the armed forces as they are deemed public officials of an instrumentality of the government within the contemplation of the law. However, under AO 08, the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants since all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. It is only in the prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoys exclusive control and supervision. (People v. Repiroga, G.R. No. 138451, May 17, 2001) The proclamation of martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President can still suspend the privilege even as he proclaims martial law, but he must so suspend it expressly and separately The Role of Congress. When the President proclaims martial taw or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, such proclamation or suspension shall be effective for a period of 60 days, unless sooner revoked by the Congress. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall convene at once. If itis not in session, it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 hours following the proclamation or suspension. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit a report, in person or in writing to the Congress, meeting in joint session, on the action he has taken. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority. It has two options: (1) To revoke such proclamation or suspension, and (2) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity. This is to be based obviously on a request or initiative from the President who has access to the facts needed to determine if the invasion or rebellion still persists and the public safety requires it The Role of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the su‘ficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of 431the writ, or the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.“° This reverses the ruling in Barcelon v. Baker’' that was affirmed in Montenegro v. Castaneda and revived in Garcia- Padilla v. Enrile* that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclamation of martial law is a political question to be resolved by the President alone. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must be invoked in a proper case. An example is a petition for habeas corpus. When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else on his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the detention. Before the Supreme Court decides on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or suspension. The test to be used by the Supreme Court in reviewing the act of the President in the proclamation or suspension or extension, as the case may be, is whether there is a sufficiency of the factual basis for the same. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but whether they acted arbitrarily as to amount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Case: President Marcos suspended the privilege of habeas corpus on August 23, 1971 after the Plaza Miranda bombing of the Liberal Party rally Several suspects were arrested. They filed petitions for habeas corpus stating that there was no basis for the questioned proclamation. HELD: The only criteria to guide the court in assessing the President's action is not whether the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. Indeed, the co- equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness. Considering the fact that the President based his decision on the Senate report on the conditions in Central Luzon, and a closed-door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, the President did not act arbitrarily. (Lansang v. Garcia 42 SCRA 448[1974]) Emergency powers In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period, and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, fo exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner “ article Vil, Section 18, par. 3, Ibid “\5 Phil 87 (1905) 91 Phil 882 (1952) 121 SCRA 472 (1985) 432withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. (Article Vi, Section23(2)) The grant of emergency powers to the President is one of the allowable exceptions to the rule on non-delegation of legislative powers Thus, this includes the grant of the power to issue rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. The conditions for a valid exercise by the President of emergency powers are as follows: a) There must be a war or other national emergency, b) The grant of emergency powers must be for a limited period. It ceases upon being withdrawn by resolution of Congress, or upon the next adjournment of Congress. ¢) The grant is subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe. 4) The grant must be for the purpose of carrying out a declared national policy The power to contract and guarantee foreign loans The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thiry days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of ‘increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. (Article VIl, Section 20) Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. (Article Xil, Section 21) All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debi, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments (Article Vi, Section 24). 433The President does not need prior approval by Congress when he Contracts or guarantees foreign loans that increase the public debt. This is Pecause the Constitution places the check on the President's power on the Monetary Board and not on Congress. Congress may, of course, provide guidelines for contracting foreign loans by way of a law to be enforced through the Monetary Board. The law in force on the matter is Republic Act No. 4880 or the Foreign Loans Act Power over Foreign Affairs Treaty-making power No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senato, (Article Vil, Section 24) In View of the President's unique position as head of state, he is the logical choice as the nation’s spokesman in foreign relations. This involves egotiating and entering into treaties and executive agreements. An essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. The President alone negotiates. He has his confidential sources of information. The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and success often depends upon Secrecy. For this reason, the President and his subaltems cannot be compelled to publicly reveal the official govemment position when it is stil in the process of negotiation The Constitution, however, provides for Senate concurrence for ail treaties entered into by the President. Treaties are formal documents involving political issues or questions of national policy which are of a more permanent character which require the ratification or approval of the Senate. On the other hand, executive agreements embody details carrying out well established policies and traditions, and involve agreements of a more or loss femporary nature that become binding through mere executive action Examples of treaties are agreements on taxes, extradition and alliances Examples of executive agreements are those relating to postal conventions. tariff rates, copyright and most-favored nation clauses. Case: The Court of Tax Appeals doubted the legality of an executive Gareement on the ground that the Senate had not concurred in the making of Said agreement. HELD: Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of 2 vote by the Senate or by Congress. Only treaties are to be approved by the 434Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, mostfavored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and. the settlement of claims. The validity ofthese has never been. seriously uestioned by our courts. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving intemational arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out welkestablished national policies and traditions and those. involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work on "The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts": "Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’, The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. 't would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate, They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade. marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific Congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts: while stil others, particularly those with respect fo the settlement of claime against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.” (89 Columbia Law Review, pp. 651, 755.) The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights provided for in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, Prior thereto, the subject of an executive agreement, made without the Concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United States (Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 [1961)) 435Case: The Bureau of Intemal Revenue questions the entitlement of the World Health Organization (WHO) to tax exemption, contending that the Host Agreement exempting it from certain taxes is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate as required by the Constitution HELD: While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of international agreements may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is @ valid and binding intemational agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The privileges and immunities granted to the WHO is legally binding on Philippine authorities. The Host Agreement, in specifically exempting the WHO from “indirect taxes," contemplates taxes which, although not imposed upon or paid by the Organization directly, form part of the price paid or to be paid by it. This is made clear in Section 12 of the Host Agreement which provides: "While the Organization will not, as a general rule, in the case of minor purchases, claim exemption from excise duties, and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form part of the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Organization is making important purchases for official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged or are chargeable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall make appropriate administrative arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax." (Emphasis supplied). “The above-quoted provision, although referring only to purchases made by the WHO, elucidates the clear intention of the Agreement to exempt the WHO from “indirect” taxation. The certification issued by the WHO, dated January 20, 1960, sought exemption of the contractor, Gotamco, from any taxes in connection with the construction of the WHO office building. The 3% contractor's tax would be within this category and should be viewed as a form of an “indirect tax" on the Organization, as the payment thereof or its inclusion in the bid price would have meant an increase in the construction cost of the building. (CIR vs. Gotamco and Sons, 148 SCRA 36 [1987]) Deportation of undesirable aliens. The power of the President to deport aliens is based on the right of every state to its existence and development and also the intefrity of its territory and exclusive and peaceful possession of its dominions which it may guard and defend by all possible means against any attack. The President is the sole judge of the facts and circumstances which require the deportation of the aliens and cannotbe required to show reasonable grounds for his belief to a court of justice.“ It is a police measure, having for its object the purging of the state of obnoxious foreigners. It is a preventive, not penal process and it cannot be substituted for criminal prosecution and punishment by judicial procedure. *® “In re Patterson, | Phil 23 [1901] “S Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 543 (1910) 436Imeigmmchdation of the Board of Commissioners, under section 37 of the Immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, supra). The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 .S- 849, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125) thet Power may be exercised by {he Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and Gomestic trangullty of the nation": Justice Johnecn Opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whoce continued presence in the exo 'S injurious to the public interest, "he may, even sy the absence of Boa ee a. deport them’. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco ang Crossfield, 16 Phil 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phit 41). "The right of @ country to &xttl or depor aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public felfare is absolute and unqualified” (Tiu Chan fiat and Go Tam vs. pommissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Pr 849, 956). Thus, [Was held that the fact that an alien has been ecduitted in criminal proceeding 0 the particular charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the ‘same charge. Such acquittal does not constinte es judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime ie not Necessary to warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743, note 40, citing Lewis vs Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L Ed. 967 and U.S. ex. rel. Mastoras vs MoCandless, 61 F. 2nd 368; Tama Miyake vs. US. 257 F. 732). (Go Tek vs Deportation Board, 73 SCRA 17[1976}) Power over Legislation Address Congress The President shall address the Congress at the Spening of its regular session. He may also appear before 1 at any other time. (Article Vil, Section 23) 437Every {ourteMlonday of July, the Presidentidelvers his’ State’ of the, NationeAddress; which ‘contains hisproposais forlegislation, Through this Speech, he can influence the course of legislation that Congress can take during the regular sassion, Prepare and Submit the budget The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days irom the opening of every regular session, as the basis of. the general appropriations bil, a budget of expencitures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Article Vil, Section 22) plan: indicating =the expenditures: of :government, and receipts from: revenue-raising measures, It is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to be passed by Congress. Through the budget, the President reveals the priorities of his government Veto power Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If ihe approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated... The President shall communicate his veto of any Dill to the House where it originated within 30 days after the date of receipts thereof, otherwise, it shail become a law as if he had signed it. The President shall have the power to velo eny Particular item or items in an appropriations, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items fo which ho oes not object (Article Vi, Section 27) As a general rule alliblisimustibeapproved by the’Presidentibefore they bbecomellawjexcept when the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote, ‘andsthesbillypassed isthe special law to elect the President and Vice. ‘“BresidentiThis gives the President an actual hand in legislation. However, ‘hisicourse:of actioniis only to approve it or vetoiit as'a whole: 2% 438,Fixing of tariff rates The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tanff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and warfare dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development of the Government. (Article VI, Section 28 (2)) The reason for the delegation is the highly technical nature of Intemational commerce and the need to constantly and with relative eace Adapt the rates to prevailing commercial standards. V immunity from suit. ‘The Presidents immune from liability f r damages ina ‘civil suit for any official act performed while the President is in office. There is t ‘sion;conferring:such:immunity. It is recognized as a Necessary incident of the powers of the President. In the matter of criminal suits, thereiswayprocedural reduirement= before “they President can” be: Subjected’ to: such suit, and that is, he must first be impeached. Under the Constitution; ‘theronly way to remove a President is by impeachment. If he were allowed to be the accused in a criminal case and he is convicted while sitting as President, he may suffer certain accessory penalties like disqualification from public office. This will go against the Constitution Case: The President charged petitioner with libel for writing in @ national seebaper that the President hid under her bed at the height of a coup attempt It was argued that because the President is immune from suit. she has a correlative disability to file suit. HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President ofthe privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions tree from any hindrance or cistracton, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office: not by any other person in the Presidents behelf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant ‘cannot raise the Presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding egainst such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would Prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit te Case: Private respondent questions his reassignment by petitioner Secretary of Education from School Division Superintendent of Quecon City 439to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST (Marikina) as violative of his security of tenure. Petitioner theorizes that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in Violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. HELD: Petitioner's contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioner and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petiticners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is Grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of Jurisdiction. (Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R, 119903, August 15, 2000) Gase: During the waning months of the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, respondent, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before a congressional Subcommittee about cost-overruns and unexpected technical difficulties concerning the development of a particular airplane. in January 1970, during the Presidency of petitioner Richard M. Nixon, respondent was dismissed from his job during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in which his job was eliminated. Respondent complained to the Civil Service Commission, alleging that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his congressional testimony. The Commission rejected this claim, but concluded that respondent's dismissal offended applicable regulations because it was motivated by "reasons purely personal: to" respondent Respondent thereafter filed suit for damages against the President after his term. HELD: Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of Powers and supported by our history. Justice Story's analysis remains Persuasive: "There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it, Among these, must necessarily be included the power to perform them. . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an offical inviolabilty." [J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1563, pp. 418-419 (1st ed. 1833)] The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article Il, 1, of the Constitution provides that "t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of [457 U.S. 731, 750] the United States . . . ." This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of feceral law - it is the President who is charged constitutionally to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'; the conduct of foreign affairs - a realm in whieh the Court has recognized that "Tit would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret’. and 440management of the Executive Branch - a task for which "imperative reasons requitfe] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Scheuer v, Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). We find these cases to be inapposite. The President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials, [457 U.S. 731, 751] Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges - [457 U.S. 731, 752] for whom absolute immunity now is established - a President must concem himself with matters likely to “arouse the most intense feelings.” Pierson v, Ray, 386 U.S., at 554. Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979). This concern is compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system. Nor can the sheer prominence of the President's (457 U.S. 731, 753] office be ignored. In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint. For example, while courts generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is ‘rooted in the separation of Powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 708. It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction [457 U.S. 731, 754] over the President of the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191, 196 (No. 14,894) (CC Va. 1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), But our cases also have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the Constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, at 703-713, When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests - as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. Nixon, supra - the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely Private suit for damages based on a President's official acts, we hold it is 441not. [457 U.S. 731, 755] In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S., at 508 -617; of. Imbler v, Pachtman, 424 U.S., at 430 7431. But the Court also has refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 181 U.S. at 498 (privilege extends to all matters "committed by law to [an officials) Control or supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1958) (fact "that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioners line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable [457 U.S. 731, 756] ..."); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 363., and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding’). In view of the special natute of the President's constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the "outer Perimeter" of his official responsibility. Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive: In many cases it would be difficult to determine Which of the President's innumerable “functions” encompassed a particular action. ‘In this case, for example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress - a violation of 5 U.S.C. 7211 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) and 18 U.S.C. 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the kind of "functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside the outer perimeter of his duties by ordering the cischarge of an employee who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 39, citing 5 U.S.C. 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within the outer perimeter of his duties of office, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed statutory proceedings. This construction would subject the President to ‘trial on virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect. [457 U.S. 731, 757] It clearly is within the President's constitutional and statutory authority to prescribe the manner in which the Secretary will conduct the business of the Air Force. See 10 U.S.C. 8012(b). Because this mandate of office must include the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, we conclude that petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive. There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 402In addition, there are formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not apply with equal force to other executive officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. [457 U.S. 731, 758]. The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President "above the law.” For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends. / (Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 [1982]) Case: Paula Jones sued President Clinton claiming she suffered several abhorrent sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton and that her continued rejection of Clinton resulted in punishment from state supervisors. Clinton moved for dismissal on immunity grounds or for a deferment of trial until after his Presidency. HELD: Petitioner's principal submission-that in all but the most exceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages tigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office~cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official acts~ie., to enable them to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 , 752, provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, The Court is also unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds ttle light on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by conflicting evidence that is itself consistent with both the doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine provides a self executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three co equal branches of Government at the expense of another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 4, 122.. But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Arlicle Ill jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here will curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers. The Court rejects petitioner's contention that this case--as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's 3judgment might spawn-—may place unacceptable burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. That assertion finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, see eg., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 679 , and may direct appropriate process to the President himself, see e.g., United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 . It must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The reasons for ‘ejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the President's term apply as well to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay “in all but the most exceptional cases." The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged risks that this decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has confidence in the abilty of federal judges to deal with both concerns, If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation. (Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct.1636 [1997]) Additional Readings: Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 (1963) Usaffee Veterans Association v. Treasurer, 105 Phil 1030 (1959) Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534 (1910) 444Xil. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT The Judiciary. In the Philippines, the judicial department plays major role in the structuring of the fundamental aspects of faw and justce. ite vita Participation in the legal and political life of the nation is institutionalized by the power of judicial review, whereby the courts, under the Supreme Court, leadership, measures governmental conduct against the provisions of the Constitution and invalidates that conduct if found to be inconsistent with the Thus, judgments of the Supreme Court are quite often durable and may have a dramatic impact on the course of legal and political events. Some of these fe nant and often highly controversial decisions have indeed shaped major features of the social and political history and culture of the country, These include decisions on the 1971 suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas compus', the ratification of the 1973 Constitution’ the 1986 snap Polls? and the legitimacy of the Aquino (1987)* and Arroyo (2001) governments.® The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law V Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine een @ grave abuse of discretion 9.{0 lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any oF instrumentality of the Governrient. (Article Vill, 1) Judicial Power. ides\the duty of the courts of justice tual ‘Ss which are legally demandai and_ enforceat ‘Glassic" definition of judicial power that contemplates a situation where a party plaintiff has a cause of action against @ party defendant anchored on a right of plaintiff violated by defendant, thereby resulting in injury. talsovincludes the power to determine whether om, Not there has'been/a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ‘of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When the judiciary performs its checking function on the political branches of ‘ Lansang v. Gareia, supra 5 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra {PBA v. Comnelee, supra ; Lawyers League fora Better Phils. V. Aquino, supra * Estrada v. Arroyo, supra 445government, it is merely performing a duty imposed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, it merely acts as a mechanism that implements the Supremacy of the Constitution. The extent to which it exercises this function, however, has been limited by the political question doctrine. As earlier defined, @ political question is one to be decided by the people in their Sovereign capacity, or one in respect to which full discretionary authority is given to the political branches of government. The second paragraph of the above definition of judicial power appears to have modified or abrogated the political question doctrine. However, in so many cases decided since 1987, the Supreme Court has continued to invoke it. The only exception is when the President suspends the privilege of habeas corpus or proclaims martial law. In these situations, the political question doctrine can no longer apply as Article Vil, Section 18 of the Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by a citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension or proclamation Case: A petition was filed assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No 8528 converting the. city of Santiago, Isabela from an. independent component city toa component city. Respondents oppose the petition, contending that it raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. HELD: The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article Vill of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Tafiada v. Cuenco, we held: xxx "The term ‘political question’ connotes what it means in’ ordinary pariance, namely, a question of policy. It refers ‘to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government: It is concemed with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." In Casibang v. Aquino, we defined a justiciable issue as follows:"A purely Justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right." Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced, It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political 446Question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation. (Miranda v. Aguirre, G.R. 133084, September 16, 1999) Creation. The Supreme Court is a constitutional creation and thus, it cannot be abolished by Congress. The lower courts (Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), on the other hand, are established by law and so they could be abolished, provided the security of tenure of the judges of these courts is not undermined Composition. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. (Article Vil, Section a1) Mode of sitting. It may sit en bane, or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. (Article VIII, Section 4 (1)) All cases involving théUconstitutionelity of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under th®Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who ectually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, (Article Vil, Section 4(2)) Cases or matters heard by a division shail be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en bane: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laicl down by the court in a decision rendered en bane or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en bano (Article Vill, Section 4(3) 447En Bane Cases. All cases to be heard en banc shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. The following cases shall be heard by the Supreme Court en bane: 1. Cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, executive orders, presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other Tegulations. © 2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty,” 3. Cases raising novel questions of law. ® 4. Cases involving ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. 5. Cases or matters heard by a division where the required number of votes io decide or resoive is not met." 8. Cases intended to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en bane or in division," 7. Administrative disciplinary cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or scther the suspension of them for a period of more than one(1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both, 2 8. Actions instituted by citizens to test the validity of a proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. "8 9. The court sitting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, “ 10. Cases assigned to a division which in the Opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court sitting en banc, and are ‘Article Vill, Section 4 (2), 1987 Constitution _ Fiestone Ceramics v, Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 465 (2000) ibid ° Ibid {Article Vill, Section 4 (3), 1987 Constitution "Ibid "Article VIIl, Section 11, 1987 Consitution; Firestone Ceramics v. CA, supra; People y. Judge Gecott, infra {, Atticle Vil, Section 18, 1987 Constitution "* article VII, Section 4, (7), Ibid 448acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court sitting en banc." 11. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of tis actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention," Case: Respondent judge questions the authority of a mere division of the Supreme Court to discipline him citing that the Constitution mandates that administrative disciplinary cases involving judges of lower courts should be decided en banc. HELD: Article Vill, Section 11 of the Constitution Provides: “... The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.” The very text of the present Section 11 of Article Vill clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en bano shall have the power to discipline judges of lower cours,” is a dectaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en bane. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a Vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself, Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary Power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No, 209. — In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia: For said purpose the following are considered en banc cases: . . . 6.) Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer, or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a petiod of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both, This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained. indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a Congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the Penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en bane. This would Suber the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the "Firestone Ceramics v, CA, supra "Ibid 49Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members. Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en ban, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of 10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division. [People v. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049. July 13, 1995.} Division Cases. The Constitution allows the Supreme Court to sit in division to enable it to cope more effectively with the backlog of cases in its docket. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en_banc, No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc."” A decision rendered by a division of the Supreme Court in violation of the above constitutional provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. "® One Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court sits in division, it does not violate the concept of "one Supreme Court” because the divisions of the Supreme Court do not diminish its authority. Although it sits in divisions, it remains and functions as one body. Hence, the decision of a division is a decision of the Supreme Court. Likewise, a decision of a division may not be appealed to the Supreme Court sitting en banc as it is already a decision of the Supreme Court. A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact that there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings.'® The majority of the Court's work is now performed by x x x divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that, while individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another, when the Court states what the law is, il speaks with only one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be as clear as possible. The Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the fina arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from ® Antcle Vil, Section 4 (3), 1987 Constitution 1 fp Re: Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court, G.R, No. 123780, September 24, 2002 Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 (1978) 2 Virjen Shipping v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-$8011 & L-S8012. November 18, 1983 450whose decisions all other courts should take their bearing. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.2" Consequently, a Division cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by another Division of this Court. It is only proper to allow the case to take its Test after having attained finality. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and Courts of First Instance are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in Consequence of which they are both trial courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one Court of First Instance, clothed with authority to discharge Said dual functions. A Court of First Instance, when performing the functions of a Probate Court or a Court of Land Registration, or a Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations, although with powers less broad than those of a Court of first Instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court? Lower Courts. The creation and composition of lower courts shall be provided by law. The law now in force is Batas Pambansa 129 as amended by Republic Act Nos. 7691 and 7902. Qualifications: Supreme Court. The Members of the Supreme Court must be naturalborn ctizens, at least 40 years of age, with at least fifteen (15) years of experience either as a judge of a lower court, or engaged in the practice of ‘aw in the Philippines and must be of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.* Lower Collegiate Courts (Court of Appeals). No person shall be appointed member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen, 7° The Congress shall prescribe the other qualifications of Court of Appeies # Miranda v, Court of Appeals, G.R. 59730, February 11, 1986 z, Nacuray v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 114924-27. March 18, 1997 2, Lopez v. Roxas, [G.R. No, L-25716. July 28, 1966 2, Atticle VIII, Section 7 (1), 1987 Constitution ® Article VINT, Section 7 (3), Ibid * Article Vill, Section 7 (1), Ibid 451justices” but the latter must be Persons of proven competence, integrity, robity, and indapendence 2° Lower Courts. The Congress shall prescribe Qualifications of judges of I but no person may be appointed judge thereof uniese he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine bar. ” Likewise, INdges of lower courts must be persons of proven competence, integrity, ee ctv ligation before him, be scrupulously careful to eeor such Beeon, 88 May reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that hie social or Pusiness relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his Kalcial course. He must not only render a just, correct ara impartial Estrella, A.M. No. No. 01-1608-RJT, January 16, 2001) Prohibition on non-judicial work The members of the Supreme Court and of other Courts established by law shall not be designated to any Daanch, Performing quasijudicial or administrative function (Article Vill, Section 12) As @ general rule, members of the judiciary shall only have judicial functions, inline with the separation of powers Principle of the Constitution. ———__ Article Vill, Section 7 (2), Ibid 2 Article VIII, Section 7 (3), Ibid 3, Atticle Vill, Section 7 (2) bid * Adticle VIII, Section 7 (3), Ibid 452Case: A petition was filed by the Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, as 2 Board of Arbitrators. It also prayed that the Board to fixed the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies. HELD: Justices of the Supreme Court Could not be constituted into a Board of Arbitrators to determine a reasonable compensation for the use of a bridge, for this is a non-judicial work. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in the Philippine Goverment. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power, or to perform any trust, or to assume any duty not Pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions (Meralco v. Pasay Transportations Co,, 67 Phil. 600 (1932) Case: An administrative complaint was filed against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged dishonésty, violation of his oath of office as judge and gross incompetence among others. The complaint accused him of continuing to work in the Department of Justice after taking his oath as a judge and by failing to submit reports of accomplishment as a judge. HELD: The Supreme Court does not look with favor at the long standing practice of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which Our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three depariments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more Paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental Conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of goverment that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst stil, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued (Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1974) 453Appointment. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of the Jower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. (Article Vil, Section 9, par. 1) The 1987 Constitution provides for a Judicial and Bar Council to screen all nominees to the judiciary, and recommend at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is no longer required. The provision also safeguards the independence of the judicial department and depoliticalizes appointments to the judiciary Vacancies: Supreme Court Any vacancy (in the Supreme Court) shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy. (Article Vill, Section 4 (1)) Lower Courts For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of the list (from the Judicial and Bar Council). (Article Vill, Section 9, par 2) Salary The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their selary shall not be decreased. (Article VIll, Section 10) Until the Congress provides otherwise the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of P240,000 and the Associate Justices shall receive P204,000 each. (Article XVIll, Section 17) The salary of Members of the Judiciary shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. However, it may be increased by legislation to take effect at once. This is not prohibited by the Constitution. The judiciary plays no part in the passage of the law on salary 454increase, unlike Congress and the Executive. Thus, there can be no conflict of interest. Moreover, it promotes the independence of the judiciary. The imposition of income tax on the salary of the justices and judges is not a diminution of their salary as prohibited by the Constitution. In the earlier case of Perfecto v. Meer,"" the Supreme Court had ruled that salaries of judges were not subject to income tax, for such would be a diminution of their salary. This was not to benefit the judges, but to attract good and Competent men to the Bench and to promote their independence of action and judgment. The case arose when Associate Justice Gregorio Perfecto of the Supreme Court refused to pay the assessment for income tax made upon him by the Collector. in reaction to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision on diminution of salaries of Members of the Judiciary should not be interpreted to mean an exemption from income tax. When Justice Pastor Endencia of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice Fernando Jugo of the Supreme Court refused to pay their taxes, it gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to rule on the validity of the law. In the case of Endencia v. David," the Supreme Court invalidated the Statute on the ground that the legislature had no power to interpret the Constitution, such power being lodged in the judicial branch. The framers of the 1973 Constitution clearly provided in Article XV, Section 6 that ‘no salary oF any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including Constitutional officers, shall be exempt from, payment of income tax.” This Provision, however, is not found in the 1987 Constitution, prompting some judges, including Nitafan, to contend that the old ruling in Perfecto and Endencia is thereby deemed revived. Case: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Juidges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 63, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, ali with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or Perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the Provision of Section 10, Article Vill of the 1987 Constitution mandating that ‘(@)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,’ even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution." HELD: The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the 386 Phil. 322 (1950) * 93 Phil. 695 (1953) 455inient ofthe framers of the organ law and of the People adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to arg rain and thereafter assure the realization of the Purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely maintaining the government and should Share the burden of general income taxation equitably. (Nitafan v, Commissioner of intemal Revenue, 182 SCRA 284 [1987)) Tenure The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until (i) they reach 70 years, or eartier “if (i) they become NNo law shail be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the secunlty of tenure of As Members. (Article Vil, Section 2, par. 2) cope aed in Article Vill, Section 2(2), itis to be noted that only the lower courts may be reorganized, as the Supreme Court, being a constitutional “ration, may not be created and ultimately reorganised by Congress. press cath does not violate’ security of tenure Security of tenure Presupposes the continued existence of the office from which one was * 51.0.6. 147 (1955) 456removed, not removal from an office that has been abolished in good faith and not for merely partisan political reasons. In De /a Liane v. Alba,** the Supreme Court upheld the Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. 129), on the ground that the abolition of an office is within the competence of the legistature if done in good faith. That there was good faith was shown by the fact that the Act was the product of careful study and deliberation by the Batasan Pambansa and the presidential study committee, the membership of which includes Supreme Court Justices. Furthermore, the law was intended as_a means to upgrade the administration of justice in the Philippines. The Supreme Court reiterated that there can be no claim for security of tenure where the office no longer exists, and that abolition of office is not removal, although their effects may be the same. Under the restriction found in the 1987 Constitution, Congress may still pass a reorganization law concerning the lower courts, but it should not undermine the security of tenure of the incumbent judges. Removal The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable Violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office es provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Article XI, Section 2) Members of the Supreme Court cannot be removed except by impeachment. A Supreme Court justice cannot be charged in a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding, because the ultimate effect of either is to Temove him from office, and thus, circumvent the provision on impeachment Case: The Tanodbayan seeks a comment regarding an alleged complaint against a Member of the Supreme Court filed before said office, HELD: It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved. This Principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who, under the Constitution, is required to be 2 Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him, and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such Public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty, of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. Members of the Supreme Court must, under *412 SCRA 294 (1982) 457Article Vili (7) (*) of the Constitution, be Members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article X! [2} Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent, and hence, to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article Xi [8] in relation to Article Xi (2), id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article XI {C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified pubiic accountants (Asticle X! [D] [1] [1], id), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar." It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members, or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts, or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, or other supposed misbehaviour. What the Court is saying is that, there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants, or their lawyers, or by other parties who, for any number of reasons, might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. [In Re Gonzales, All. Nos. 8-4-5433, April 15, 1988.] ‘Lower Courts The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to (a) discipline judges of lower courts, or (b) order their dismissal, by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Article Vill, Section 11) 458Jurisdiction The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. (Article Vill, Section1, par 1) The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. (Article Vil, Section 2) urisdictionyis\defined as the authority of a court to\hear‘and decidéts Except as provided in the Constitution, the jurisdiction of courts is a matter of legislative determination. The Constitution, however, sets certain limitations on this prerogative. It cannot decrease the constitutionally set jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Article Vill, Section 5.° It cannot increase the constitutionally set appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence.® It can increase the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to its general legislative power. It can make the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court concurrent with lower courts, again, pursuant to its general power. Under the Rules of Court, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and in the case of the special civil actions, with the Court of Appeals. It cannot pass a law reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members. *” Case: Petitioner was charged with the violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for entering into a contract alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. As per the audit report, COA found that there was malversation of public funds. it cited the purchase of certain supplies and equipment which was done through a negotiated contract and not through a compatitive public bidding, contrary to COA Circular No. 85-854. The circular requires public bidding in the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment in excess of P50,000, unless the law or agency charter provides otherwise. Petitioner seeks the reversal before the Supreme Court of the assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, which, according to him, erred in concluding that he was culpably liable for alleged overpricing of the questioned purchase of supplies and materials. HELD: There is a basic reason for dismissing the instant petition. This is an appeal under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We have declared Section 27 to be unconstitutional in Fabian v. °S Article Vili, Section 2, par 1, 1987 Constitution ® article VI, Section 30, Tbid 7 Article Vill, Section 2, par 2, bid 459Desierto for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as Provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent. Moreover, even if said provision had not been declared unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of appeal to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases as in fact said Section mentions only appeals from “all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.” (Tirol v. COA, G.R. No. 133954. August 3, 2000) Original jurisdiction 1) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. 2) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (Article Vill, Section 51) The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over declaratory relief cases, which must be filed with the Regional Trial Court. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the first class of cases above is concurrent with Regional Trial Courts. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the second group (special civil actions) is concurrent with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court Appellate jurisdiction The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm, on (i) ordinary appeal, or (i) pelition for review on certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final Judgments and orders of lower courts in the following cases: 1) Cases questioning the constitutionality or validity of any (s) treaty, (b) international and executive agreement, (c) law or statule, (d) presidential decree, (e) proclamation, (f) order, (g) instruction, (h) ordinance, or (i) regulation 2) Cases questioning the legality of any (a) tax, (b) impost, (c) assessment, or (d) toll, or (a) any penalty imposed in relation thereto. 3) Cases in which the jurisdiction of lower courts is in issue. 4604) Criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. 5) Cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Article Vill, Section 5(2)) If the Court of Appeals believes that in a case on appeal from a decision of a lower court, a higher penalty of death or reclusion perpetua should be imposed, it should proceed to render the proper decision and not simply certify the case to the Supreme Court for review. For indeed, unless the Court of Appeals renders judgment and imposes the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua, there would be no judgment for the Supreme Court to review, Case: Invoking Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the Court of ‘Appeals, after finding the acoused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape, refrained from rendering judgment and from imposing the appropriate Penalty and certified the case to the Supreme Court for final determination since the imposable penaity for the crime is reclusion perpetua (Art. 335 Revised Penal Code as amended by. RA Xill). HELD: The case is returned to the Court of Appeals for the latter to render judgment expressly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua, as the circumstances warrant. Should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (fe imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, shall render Judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review. (People v. Ramos, 88 SCRA 466 (1979) » Appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in two ways: 1. Ordinary appeal Ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court is allowed in criminal cases Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, including those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion. Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment tc the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, the Supreme Court is limited to the * Sec, 17, Judiciary Act of 1948 461Setermination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes in judgment.2? The other case is the automatic review by the Supreme Court of criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed. This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken when the penalty is reclusion prepetua, for in this case, the review is automatic. In the first case (reclusiori perpetua), the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the tral court to death, So that the convict must first waive his right against double jeopardy, Precisely by voluntarily making the appeal, before the Supreme Court can feopen the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on automatic appeal is that the Judgment is affirm 2. Petition for review on certiorari This is discretionary on the Supreme Court. It has the authority not to give due course to the petition if, on its face, the petition lacks merit. This mode, provided for in Rule 45, is limited to pure questions of law. The Constitution now provides that ‘no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor." The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, that is, constitutional {2x and jurisdictional questions, and pure questions of law, are appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. However, in cases involving constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, when the resolution of ihe main issue depends on a controverted question of fact, the case must fist be appealed to the Court of Appeals on both questions of fact and lavn, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is brought to the Supreme Court by Petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law, * P Certiorari (Rule 65) od . The certiorari referred to in Article Vill, Section (1) when the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction is ‘the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a “jurisdictional Chsstion, that is, (@) lack of jurisdiction, (b) excess of jurisdiction, or (c) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Cemtiorari referred to in Article VIII, Section 5(2) when the Supreme Court ee te eee ee 3 ® People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 128986. June 21, 1999 * Anticle Vill, Section 14, par 2, 1987 Constitution “' Sec. 17 of Judiciary Act of 1948 4624) Criminal cases in which the penally imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. | 5) Cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Article VIll, Section 5(2)) If the Court of Appeals believes that in a case on appeal from a decision of a lower court, a higher penalty of death or reclusion perpetua should be imposed, it should proceed to render the proper decision and not simply certify the case to the Supreme Court for review. For indeed, unless the Court of Appeals renders judgment and imposes the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua, there would be no judgment for the Supreme Court fo review. Case: Invoking Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals, after finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape, refrained from rendering judgment and from imposing the appropriate Penalty and certified the case to the Supreme Court for final determination since the imposable penalty for the crime is reciusion perpetua (Art. 335 Revised Penal Code as amended by. RA Xill). HELD: The case is returned to the Court of Appeals for the latter to render judgment expressly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua, as the circumstances warrant. Should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, shall render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review. (People v. Ramos, 88 SCRA 466 (1979) Appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in two ways: 41. Ordinary appeal ~ Ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court is allowed in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, including those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion. Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, the Supreme Court is limited to the *Sec. 17, Judiciary Act of 1948, 461Getermination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes in judgment.2? The other case is the automatic review by the Supreme Court of criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed. This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken when the penalty is reclusion prepetua, for in this case, the review is automatic. In the first case (reclusiori perpetua), the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the trial court to death, So that the convict must first waive his tight against double jeopardy, Precisely by voluntarily making the appeal, before the Supreme Court can feopen the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on automatic appeal is that the judgment is affirmd 2. Petition for review on certiorari This is discretionary on the Supreme Court. It has the authority not to give due course to the petition if, on its face, the petition lacks merit. This mode, provided for in Rule 45, is limited to pure questions of law. The Constitution now provides that "no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or Genied without stating the legal basis therefor." The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, that is, consiitutional ‘ax and jurisdictional questions, and pure questions of law, aré appealable to ‘he Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. However, in cases involving constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, when the resolution of ihe main issue depends on a controverted question of fact, the case must first be appealed to the Court of Appeals on both questions of fact and lavi and the decision of the Court of Appeals is brought to the Supreme Coufl by petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law. *! J Certiorari (Rule 65) The certiorari referred to in Article Vil, Section 1) when the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction is ‘the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a ‘jurisdictional question’, that is, (a) lack of jurisdiction, (b) excess of jurisdiction, or (c) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, The Centorari referred to in Article Vill, Section (2) when the Supreme Court eee 7 ® People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999 4 Article VILL, Section 14, par2, 1987 Constitution *' Sec. 17 of Judiciary Act of 1948 462exercises appellate jurisdiction is certiorari as an ordinary mode of appeal, where the issue raised is “error of judgment” or error of iaw Case: A Committee on the Ratings of Students for honors whose actions in proclaiming the honor students of a graduating class are questioned by way of a petition for certiorari. The case is sought to be dismissed for lack of cause of action. HELD: The Committee is not the triounal, board or officer exercising judicial functions against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65. Before a tribunal, board or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives tise to some specific rights of persons or property, under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer, clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is, and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. (Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 [1970}) Case: in an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the Board of five Judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the Court of First Instance of that province to reverse the award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen into error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the fitst place. Hence this special civil action challenging the decision. May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award, reversing the decision of the Board of Judges?. HELD: No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants for theirs is the mere privilege to Compete for the prize and that privilege did not ripen into demandable right, unless and until, they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters, or referees, or judges. Generally, the judiciary has no Power to reverse, on the ground of error, the award of the Board of Judges of an oratorical contest. (Felipe vs. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 [1952]) Lower Courts There is in effect a constitutional conferment of original jurisdiction on the lower courts in those five cases for which the Supreme Court is granted appellate jurisdiction in Article VIll, Section 5(2). Under the provision granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to “review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of lower courts’, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. Deliberations in the Supreme Court The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case ‘submitted to it for decision en bane cr in division, shall be 463reaciied in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certi‘ication to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. (Article Vill, Section 13) The reason for the requirement that the decision must be reached in consultation is to emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court is a collegial body so that the decision of the case is by the court itself and not the ponente. The writer of the opinion is merely the spokesman of the body. Case: the Supreme Court disbarred Respondent. Respondent claimed that the decision disbarring him violated the requirement of the Constitution that the Chief Justice certify that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned for the writing of the opinion of the Court. HELD: The challenge huried against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in jucicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be @ superfuity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an oversight. But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation The signatures of the members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required. No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court's Minute Resolution, dated January 12, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration “for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. ‘And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the, denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement, "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 48). (Prudential Bank vs. Castro, 158 SCRA 646 [1988]) 464Lower Courts The sare requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. (Article Vill, Section 13) Case: A case was decided by the Court of Appeals against petitioner. The decision did not contain a certification that the conclusions were reached in consultation for the case was assigned before writing of the opinion Petitioner contended that the decision was void for lack of this certification, HELD: The certification requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The decision is thus rendered by the court as a body and not merely by a member thereof [/ Record of the Constitutional Commission 498-500]. This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote. The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Seo. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor [See | Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such absence of certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision, (Consing vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 14 [1989]) ‘Voting The following are the votes required to render a decision or resolution: En banc. There must be a concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case, and voted thereon.” The lowest possible number of votes needed to render a decision is 5, since a quorum of 15 is 8, and majority of 8 is 5. This number may increase as the number of justices present increases; One who abstained is deemed to have voted for the purpose of computing the majority vote needed. An abstention is really a form of casting a vote with its own repercussions on the outcome of the case. One who was present but kept silent during the deliberations and did not vote is still included in the majority For it may happen that he has already made up his mind on how to decide “ article VIII, Sections 4 (2) & 11, 1987 Constitution 465and influence the outcome of the case. One who expressly inhibited or disqualified himsaif from taking part (usually, because of conflict of interest) {s not included. A quorum is needed before a valid decision can be made. in case the necessary majority cannot be mustered, then no decision may be rendered 'n division. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually {00k part in the celiberations on the issues in the case, and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of its members When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en Sane. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court siting en bane. In a division of 7 members, the majority, if all are Present, is 4. If only 6 are present, 4. If only 5 or 4, 3. If only three are Present, there is no quorum. In a division of 5 members, 3 votes are needed, regardless of whether 5, 4 or 3 are present. In a division of 3 members, 3 votes are needed. in any of these cases, when the votes cannot be mustered, the case must be raised to the court en banc. Rules on failure to get the necessary majority. If the necessary majority cannot be had, the case is again reheard. If upon rehearing, no majority is stil had, the following are the effects: 1. If a case is on appeal, the judgment appealed from is deemed affirmed, except in criminal cases where the judgment is that of convietion, in which case, the conviction is reversed, and the accused is acquitted.’ in cases where the lower court declares a law, etc. unconstitutional, the judgment is reversed, and the validity of the law is deemed sustained, Pursuant to the presumption of constitutionality. If the lower court declared the law as not unconstitutional, the judgment is deemed affirmed 2. If the case is an original Petition, then the case is deemed dismissed Case: Petitioners bring suit as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the Constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). Petitioners Contend, among others, that the law and regulations amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend that the all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and “ancestral lands" even include private lands found within said areas. HELD: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an 466Opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the chellenged provisions of RA. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition Justice Panganiban filed 2 separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the Necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, Pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. (Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000] Writing of the decision No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. (Article Vill, Section 14) In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, this rule is addressed to the one to whom the writing of the opinion’ was assigned after Consultation, that is, the ponente. In the case of the lower courts, this rule is addressed to the judge. This vital requirement is not only demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code“ whose Toots may also be traced to the Constitutional mandate. A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive Portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with feferences to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal's assessments and conclusions on the case This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate Consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision.“ Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law. 4, Section 14, Chapter IIT, Book VIT of the Administrative Code of 1987 “Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals and Pacific Cement Company Inc.,315 SCRA 296, [1999]. © People v. Valentin Baring, Jr, GR. No. 137933, January 28, 2002 467