Angela Corinth S.

Arong

Title of the case: Laude vs. Ginez- Jabalde, G. R. No. L- 68379- 81, September 22, 1986;
Facts of the case: According to reports, US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton, 19, killed Jeffrey
"Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) on October 11, 2014, inside the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive
in Olongapo City (Pemberton). Marilou S. Laude, the sister of Jennifer, filed a complaint for murder
against Pemberton with the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor on October 15, 2014. Pemberton
was taken into custody on October 22, 2014, at Camp Aguinaldo, the general command center of the
Philippine Armed Forces.
The Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City received an information for murder against Pemberton on
December 15, 2014, from the Public Prosecutor. The case was assigned to Branch 74 and docketed as
Case No. 865-14. On December 16, 2014, Pemberton was the subject of an arrest warrant. On December
19, 2014, Pemberton personally turned himself in to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-
Jabalde), after which he was charged.
Marilou S. Laude filed a motion to allow media coverage and an urgent motion to compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to turn over custody of the accused to the Olongapo City Jail on the same day.
Petitioners claim that they were only able to serve Pemberton's legal counsel with the Motion through
registered mail on the day of the hearing, which was set for December 22, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. They assert
that they "personally furnished a copy of the Motion at the hearing of the Motion" as well, whatever that
may mean.
The petitioners' urgent motion was rejected by Judge Ginez-Jabalde on December 23, 2014, due to lack of
merit.
Constitutional Issue/s: Whether or not, the failure of petitioners to comply with the three- day notice rule
is unjustified.
Supreme Court Rulings: Yes, Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule
that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. In accordance
with safeguarding the opposing party's right to procedural due process, failure to adhere to this
notification requirement renders the motion invalid.
The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to allow him to properly prepare and
engage the arguments of the movant. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the
requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper.
In this case, the General Rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study
petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process. Petitioners admit that
they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing.
They attempt to avoid the consequences of this late notice by asserting that they also served a copy of the
Motion by registered mail on Pemberton's counsel. The shortcomings of the Motion are not resolved by
these conditions together. It cannot be stated that Pemberton was able to research and prepare for his
counterarguments to the concerns raised in the Motion, even granted that Pemberton's counsel was able to
remark on the motion verbally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another occurrence.
Based on noncompliance of procedural rules, Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail. Any alternative decision would be detrimental to Pemberton's rights as an accused person.
The Petition for Certiorari is THEREFORE DISMISSED for Lack of Grave Abuse of discretion Leading
to Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction, premises considered. The request for a writ of obligatory injunction is
also DENIED due to its lack of merit.
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Title of the case: David vs. Macapagal- Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006;
Facts of the case: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of
the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor
at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila
and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued
PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Seven (7) certiorari petitions
were submitted to the Supreme Court, and three (3) of them named President Arroyo as the respondent. In
these petitions, the petitioners questioned the legality of the proclamation and claimed that it infringed on
Congress's authority to declare an emergency and violated the rights to free speech, the press, and
assembly that are guaranteed by the constitution.
Constitutional Issue/s: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
Supreme Court Rulings: No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it involves a call by the President to the
extent that it requests the AFP to prevent or stop violent crime if it becomes necessary, in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that in the absence of
parliamentary action, Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution prohibits the President from seizing
control of privately owned public utilities or private firms that are impacted by the public interest. In light
of this, the PP No. 1017 is only partially unconstitutional. However, there were extraneous provisions
giving the President express or implied power.
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Title of the case: Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Facts of the case: Atty. Macalintal filed an undesignated petition questions challenging the constitution
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article
VII of the Constitution. Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the
former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or
Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Constitutional Issue/s: Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Supreme Court Rulings: Yes, the Court held that PET is constitutional. Even though the aforementioned
provision is found in Art. VII, a closer look at the framers' discussions reveals that the exclusive authority
granted to the SC in deciding cases involving the elections of the President and Vice-President does not
interfere with the purported separation of power between the judiciary and the executive departments.
VII.
Election-related concerns, according to the Court, are essentially justiciable questions that are the subject
of adversarial and judicial processes.