Logic Dialogical A4

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Dialogical Logic
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Stanford Encyclopedia Dialogical logic is a dialogue-based approach to logic and argumentation

rooted in a research tradition that goes back to dialectics in Greek
of Philosophy Antiquity, when problems were approached through dialogues in which
opposing parties discussed a thesis through questions and answers. The
dialogical framework was first worked out in its modern form by Paul
Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz in the context of constructive mathematics and
logic, and inspired many “dialogical logics” that follow more or less the
initial program, thus creating what can be called traditions in dialogical
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman
logic. This entry focuses on the developments of dialogical logic in the
Principal Editor Senior Editor
Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition, which developed in the 1990s and 2000s
Colin Allen Hannah Kim Paul Oppenheimer
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various non-classical systems, giving rise to what has been called
Editorial Board: https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html dialogical pluralism. References to the other traditions will nonetheless be
Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054 provided.
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- In the Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition, dialogical logic uses concepts of
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the other’s statements or defend their own statements in such a way that
one player wins and the other loses after a finite number of moves. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
meaning of the logical constants is provided by a set of interaction rules
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Dialogical Logic
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the dialogical meaning of the logical constants and the dialogical
Nicolas Clerbout and Zoe McConaughey conception of demonstration are constituted by interaction.
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1
Dialogical Logic Nicolas Clerbout and Zoe McConaughey
1. A Brief Overview of Dialogical Logic argumentation games. Various traditions can be distinguished in the game-
2. The Standard Dialogical Framework of the Lorenzen and Lorenz theoretical approach:
Tradition
2.1 Intuitionistic logic in the standard dialogical framework 1. The constructivist tradition of Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz.
2.1.1 The rules of the game: the play level
This is the main tradition of dialogical logic and the present entry will
2.1.2 The strategy level
focus on it and its recent developments. Dialogical logic is
2.1.3 Formality
considered (especially by Lorenz) as a semantic project, and was
2.2 Other logics in the dialogical framework: dialogical
initially developed in order to overcome the limitations of operative
pluralism
logic (Lorenzen 1955; see also Schroeder-Heister 2008). Dialogues
2.2.1 Dialogues for classical first-order logic
are finitary games about an initial formula, which is said to be valid
2.2.2 Dialogues for basic modal logic
if, and only if, the proponent has a winning strategy for it (see
2.2.3 Literature on other logics in the dialogical framework
Section 2.1.2). Expanding this tradition, Shahid Rahman and
3. Variations on the Standard Dialogical Framework
collaborators have made dialogical logic a framework for expressing
3.1 Objections against the standard dialogical framework
various logics other than the initial intuitionistic logic, as presented in
3.2 Immanent Reasoning
Section 2.2 (see in particular Rahman 1993, Rahman and Rückert
3.2.1 Making everything explicit using local reasons
2001, Rahman and Keiff 2005).
3.2.2 Local rules and an example
3.2.3 Formation dialogues Walter Felscher (1985) follows a common method for writing
3.2.4 Material dialogues winning strategies (Lorenzen & Lorenz 1978; Lorenz 1981) that uses
3.3 The Built-In Opponent the semantic tableaux of Beth (1955), and his technical achievements
Bibliography have strongly influenced some logicians when working with the
Academic Tools dialogical framework or some variation of it, notably Sørensen and
Other Internet Resources Urzyczyn (2007); Alama et al. (2011); Uckelman et al. (2014); Dutilh
Related Entries Novaes (2015; 2020); Dutilh Novaes and French (2018); French
(2021). Another author which had considerable influence for these
works is Christian Fermüller, for example Fermüller (2003).
1. A Brief Overview of Dialogical Logic
2. The game-theoretical tradition of Jaako Hintikka (1968), called GTS
In the dialogical framework the meaning of an expression is explained in (see the entry on independence friendly logic).
game-theoretic terms, as opposed to the main-stream model-theoretic
semantics. In this fashion, the meaning of the logical constants is This tradition shares the game-theoretical tenets of dialogical logic
explained by means of rules prescribing how to use these constants in for logical constants, but switches to standard model theory at the
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Summer 2022 Edition 3

level of elementary statements, for which standard truth-functional These traditions sometimes share common features, sometimes challenge
formal semantics comes into play. features of other traditions, sometimes try to make links with other
traditions. Thus, traditions 1 and 3 share an epistemic and proof-
3. The argumentation theory tradition of Else Barth and Erick Krabbe theoretical background. Traditions 2 and 3 challenge the dialogical
(1982; see also Gethmann 1979). conception of logic of tradition 1 in order to bring about a framework in
which meaning is not reduced to a formal approach, but is understood as
This tradition links dialogical logic with informal logic (or critical
setting out content. Recent works claim to answer this kind of challenge
reasoning), which originated in the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-
while still staying within tradition 1 (see Section 3.2). Other recent efforts
Tyteca (1958), and studies the underlying logical regularities of
have tried to link traditions 1 and 3: Prakken (2005), for example, focuses
concrete dialogues. In this tradition figures Toulmin’s argumentation
on logical analysis in the context of legal reasoning and non-monotonic
theory (Toulmin 1958), Barth and Krabbe’s theory of dialogue (Barth
reasoning; more recent and quite different perspectives explore
& Krabbe 1982), Douglas Walton (1984), Ralph Johnson (1999),
substructural approaches to paradoxes in terms of natural argumentation
Woods’ argumentation theory (Woods 1989; Woods et al. 2000), and
and its treatment in a game-theoretical setting inspired by tradition 1
critical thinking (Anand Jayprakash Vaidya 2013, among others).
(French 2015; Dutilh Novaes & French 2018; Dutilh Novaes 2020). The
4. The ludics tradition of Jean-Yves Girard (2001). present entry focuses on the original work of Lorenzen and Lorenz
(tradition 1) with its developments during the last decades. Historical
This tradition provides an overall theory of proof-theoretical meaning remarks on the relations between logic and dialogues can be found in the
based on interactive computation. Andreas Blass (1992) proposed a entry on logic and games, and in Lorenz (2001).
dialogical semantics (in the sense of tradition 1) for linear logics, to
which ludics is often associated. Section 2 presents the essential features of the standard dialogical
framework, and how it can accommodate various logics. Section 3
5. The recent developments of dialogical logic in constructive presents two variations on the standard framework: a first that endeavors
mathematics. to stay within tradition 1; a second that emancipates itself from tradition 1
while stressing the merits of such a dialogical approach for dealing with
New developments in this field are becoming more and more
problems of philosophy of logic.
important and it can safely be called a full-fledged tradition.
Nowadays, these developments are deeply related to the links
2. The Standard Dialogical Framework of the
between dialogical logic and constructive type theory, and have even
started to make interesting connections with new programs in
Lorenzen and Lorenz Tradition
Philosophy of Mathematics such as Homotopy Theory. Prominent
As hinted by its name, the dialogical framework studies dialogues; but it
works related to this field are for instance Coquand (1995) and
also takes the form of dialogues. In a dialogue, two parties (players) argue
Sterling (2021).
on a thesis (a certain statement that is the subject of the whole argument)

and follow certain fixed rules in their argument. The player who states the dialogical framework. We are thus far from the metalinguistic perspective
thesis is the proponent, called P, and his rival, the player who challenges constitutive of the model-theoretic conceptions of meaning (see Lorenz
the thesis, is the opponent, called O. In challenging the proponent’s thesis, 1970: 109; Sundholm 1997; 2001).
the opponent is requiring that the proponent defends his statement.
2.1 Intuitionistic logic in the standard dialogical framework
The two players are thus rivals during the play, they have opposing goals,
but the opposition does not necessarily have to go any further. Indeed, as This section presents the general features of what may be called the
spelled out by Marion (2006; 2009; 2010) and Keiff (2007), the dialogues “standard” dialogical framework (as opposed to the more recent
are a kind of “game of giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom 1994, see developments presented in Section 3.2).
also Sellars 1997), and this kind of game can be for a common goal (e.g.,
figuring out the truth). There does not seem to be a consensus on whether The word “standard” here does not mean that the presentation below
the framework does allow cooperation or not. Some, like Dutilh Novaes strictly follows in all its details the initial presentation of dialogical logic
(2015; 2020), have argued that the original dialogical framework is only as introduced by Lorenzen and Lorenz. As a matter of fact, there has been
adversarial and does not consider cooperation games. However, others a lot of variations on terminology and presentation throughout the years
have argued on the contrary that even the original framework is actually (in the works of Felscher, Krabbe, Rahman, Fermüller to mention but a
not entirely adversarial: Hodges (2001), for example, considers that some few). Still, despite all the different variations in the literature, there are
attacks in these games actually amount to helping the adversary. some fundamental features which this Section presents.
Actions in a dialogue are called moves; they are often understood as As mentioned above, the two players in a dialogue argue on a thesis (the
speech-acts involving declarative utterances (statements) and interrogative statement that is the subject of the whole argument). They challenge and
utterances (requests). The rules for dialogues thus never deal with defend statements according to rules, which spell out the play’s progress
expressions isolated from the act of uttering them; by defining the and the meaning of statements in terms of possible interaction between
appropriate interactions in a dialogue, these rules define the meaning of players. There are two kinds of game rules that need to be distinguished:
the expressions. Such an approach to meaning finds its roots in particle rules (Partikelregeln) and structural rules (Rahmenregeln).
Wittgenstein’s observation that in language, there is no exterior Particle rules determine what kind of move each player is allowed to make
perspective that would allow one to determine the meaning of something during a play, whereas the structural rules determine the structure of the
and how it links to syntax. In other words, language is unavoidable, one play: how it starts, ends, and what special rules apply to players. The game
cannot go beyond it (this is Wittgenstein’s “Unhintergehbarkeit der rules are detailed in Section 2.1.1.
Sprache”). Accordingly, language is studied with and through language-
The game rules (particle rules and structural rules) constitute what is
games; these language-games need to acknowledge the fact that they are
called the play level of the dialogical approach—constituting the backbone
part of their object of study. In this respect, all the speech-acts pertaining
of dialogical logic in the Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition—which should be
to the meaning and “formation” of an expression are made explicit in the

distinguished from the strategy level, the dialogical counterpart to no decidable provability or unprovability predicate for arbitrary
demonstration (see Section 2.1.2). The play level is constituted by propositions.
individual plays developed according to the game rules, whereas the
strategy level consists in a certain perspective on all the possible plays Winning and losing a play (play level) yields propositional content,
regarding the same initial thesis. Validity belongs to the strategy level, but without saying anything about the truth or falsity of the proposition. An
the meaning of statements and determining what logic is currently being immediate consequence is that the dialogical notion of validity (strategy
used both belong to the play level through the game rules. Most non- level) will not be defined truth-functionally (see Section 2.1.2). The
dialogical frameworks focus on the level dealing with validity, and some dialogical perspective on propositions is that of the perspective of the
dialogical ones also, following in this regard Felscher. inside (“local”) view of the development of a play.
The constitutive role of the play level for developing a meaning 2.1.1 The rules of the game: the play level
explanation has been stressed by Kuno Lorenz’s definition of a proposition
(Lorenz 2001: 258): For the remainder of this section,  is a first-order language built as usual
upon the propositional connectives, the quantifiers, a denumerable set of
for an entity to be a proposition there must exist a dialogue game
individual variables, a denumerable set of individual constants and a
associated with this entity, i.e., the proposition A, such that an
denumerable set of predicate symbols (each with a fixed arity). This first-
individual play of the game where A occupies the initial position,
order language is then extended with two labels O and P, standing for the
i.e., a dialogue D(A) about A, reaches a final position with either
players of the game, and the two symbols “!” and “?” standing
win or loss after a finite number of moves according to definite
respectively for statements and requests.
rules: the dialogue game is defined as a finitary open two-person
zero-sum game. Thus, propositions will in general be dialogue- As mentioned above, in the standard dialogical framework, there are two
definite, and only in special cases be either proof-definite or kinds of rules called the particle rules and the structural rules, which will
refutation-definite or even both which implies their being value- now be introduced. The rules of the game determine which sequences of
definite. moves are plays—i.e., which sequences are legal. Hence the name “play
level” for the level governed by these rules. First, the particle rules will be
Here, “definite” refers to Lorenzen’s search for a concept which is both
presented and an example will be provided. Then, the structural rules will
characteristic of propositions and decidable, which is one of the main
be presented and three examples will be commented.
reasons why he abandoned his operative logic and introduced dialogical
logic (see Lorenz, 2001: 257–258). That a proposition is always
“dialogue-definite” means that there is always a finite dialogue for this
proposition ending with victory or loss for a player. On the other hand, a
proposition is not in general “proof-” or “refutation-definite” since there is

Particle rules the variables X and Y . Recall that the symbols “!” and “?” are used for
statements and requests, respectively.
Particle rules (Partikelregeln), or rules for logical constants, determine the
legal moves in a play and regulate interaction by establishing the relevant For the benefit of those who are new to the dialogical framework, let us
moves constituting challenges and defences, depending on the main start with two particle rules, conjunction and implication.
logical constant in the expression at stake. The appropriate challenges and
defences (interaction) are the appropriate ways of asking for reasons and The particle rules for a conjunction are the following: when a player X
of giving them, and are specific to each kind of statement. (either P or O) states a conjunction, the other player Y may challenge the
conjunction by choosing one of the conjuncts (the left one L∧ or the right
For instance, if the statement is a conjunction, there are two appropriate one R∧ ) and requesting it (? in front of the chosen conjunct). The first
challenges, one for each conjunct, which consist in requesting that the player X defends the conjunction by stating the requested conjunct.
other player states the chosen conjunct. There is one appropriate defence
for each challenge, which consists in stating the requested conjunct. The Statement Challenge Defence
particle rules define both the meaning of connectives and the statement X !φ ∧ ψ Y ? L∧ or Y ? R∧ X ! φ respectively X ! ψ
based on its form. These particle rules explicit the meaning of statements
in terms of the players’ various commitments and entitlements regarding The particle rules for the implication are the following: when X states an
each statement—i.e., what moves are allowed. implication, Y may challenge it by stating the antecedent, and X defends
it by stating the consequent.
These rules govern what is called the local level of meaning (distinguished
from the global level provided by the structural rules): each kind of Statement Challenge Defence
statement (e.g., conjunction, disjunction, universal quantification) receive X !φ ⊃ ψ Y !φ X !ψ
its meaning through the appropriate challenges and defences, which are
Here is an example, which uses the structural rules that will be presented
spelled out by the particle rules. Thus, the meaning of the statements are
below. Let us consider propositional logic in this case. In order to build a
constituted in a dynamic way through the appropriate interaction during a
play for ((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) , one must first set up a table which will record the
dialogical game.
moves (utterances) of each player, P and O, in their respective columns.
Accordingly, the meaning of the statements in a dialogue does not lie in
some external semantic, but is immanent to the dialogue itself, i.e., in the O P
specific and appropriate way the players interact. (This is linked to the
Wittgensteinian conception of meaning as use.) The rules are the same for Add an outer column (A) in which the number of the move will be
the two players and the meaning of the connectives is therefore recorded, and an inner column (B) in which the number of the challenged
independent of who uses them. This is why the rules are formulated using move will be recorded.

O P on the same line as its challenge. This move 2 is a challenge on move 1

A B B A (inner column), and is a request (question mark before what is requested).
Next, write the thesis, here ((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) , as the first statement of the play,
It is now O’s turn. She must defend her conjunction (there is no other
available move left) and state the requested conjunct. It is move 3 and she
marked “!” and made by P. It is move 0, so 0 is written in the outer
states p , written on the same line as the challenge.
column on P’s side.
O P
O P
!((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) 0
!((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) 0
1 !(p ∧ q) (0)
It is now O’s turn to play. She challenges the implication. She must state 3 !p (1) ? L∧ 2
the antecedent, here (p ∧ q) . It is move 1 (outer column), and she
It is now P’s turn. He must defend his implication (there is no other
challenges move 0 (inner column).
available move left) and state the consequent. It is move 4 and he states p,
O P written on the same line as the challenge.
!((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) 0
1 !(p ∧ q) (0)
O P
!((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) 0
It is now P’s turn. He can either defend the challenge on the implication, 1 !(p ∧ q) (0) !p 4
or challenge O’s statement (move 1). If he defends the implication, he 3 !p (1) ?L ∧ 2
must state the consequent (here p). If he challenges the conjunction, he
It is now O’s turn to play. She has no available move, so she loses the
must choose one of the conjuncts and request it.
play. P wins.
P challenges the conjunction (see below the Formal Rule SR2 which
compels him to do so). He requests the left conjunct. O P
!((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) 0
O P 1 !(p ∧ q) (0) !p 4
!((p ∧ q) ⊃ p) 0 3 !p (1) ?L ∧ 2
1 !(p ∧ q) (0) P wins the play.
(1) ? L∧ 2
Note: Each challenge is written on a new line (with the number of the
challenged move written in the inner column), and each defence is written

The particle rules for  Structural rules
Going back to our first-order language , here are the particle rules for Structural rules (Rahmenregeln) determine the general course of a
conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation, universal quantification dialogue game, such as how it is initiated, how to play it, how it ends, and
and existential quantification. In the rules for quantifiers, individual so on. The point of these rules is not to spell out the meaning of the logical
constants are numbered with an index i from the positive integers. See constants by specifying how to act in an appropriate way (this is the role
below for examples of plays using these rules. of the particle rules); it is rather to specify the structure according to which
interactions take place. It is one thing to determine the meaning of the
Statement Challenge Defence logical constants as a set of appropriate challenges and defences (as
Y ? L∧ X ! φ (resp.)
X!φ ∧ ψ
or above), it is another to define whose turn it is to play and when a player is
Y ? R∧ X!ψ
Conjunction
allowed to play a move. One could indeed have the same local meaning
Disjunction X!φ ∨ ψ Y ?∨ X ! φ or X ! ψ (i.e., particle rules) and change a structural rule, saying for instance that
Implication X!φ ⊃ ψ Y!φ X!ψ one of the players is allowed to play two moves at a time instead of simply
Negation X ! ¬φ Y!φ −− one: this would considerably change the game without changing the local
Universal quantification X ! ∀xφ(x) Y ?[x/ai ] X ! φ(x/ai ) meaning of what is said. This is actually one of the main ways the
dialogical framework can be used in order to deal with other logical
X ! ∃xφ(x) Y ?∃ X ! φ(x/ai )
Existential
systems, and some examples are discussed in Section 2.2.
quantification
It should be noted that in some works—e.g., Sørensen and Urzyczyn
The choices involved in the rules defining logical constants are important.
(2006); Dutilh Novaes and French (2018); Dutilh Novaes (2020); French
The difference between a conjunction and a disjunction for instance is that
(2021)—game rules come from another framework such as sequent
in the case of a conjunction, it is the challenger who may choose the
calculus or a “sequent perspective on natural deduction” (Dutilh Novaes &
conjunct that will be defended, whereas in the case of a disjunction, it is
French 2018: 135). What is called “structural rules” then refers to rules
the defender who may choose the disjunct. The notion of choice has a
like weakening or contraction. In this regard, these are rather variations on
similar importance for the meaning of the quantifiers. The meaning of
the standard dialogical framework. See Section 3.3 for an example of this
logical constants, therefore, is not captured only in terms of which
kind.
propositions are stated or requested: choices are an essential part of the
interaction process as they determine the local meaning of expressions. There are four basic structural rules in the standard dialogical framework,
defining which conditions must be respected for a given sequence of
moves to constitute a legitimate play.
SR0: Starting Rule A play starts with the proponent stating a proposition

called the thesis. After the thesis has been stated, the opponent defines individual plays as finite. It should be noted that, because of how
chooses a positive integer which will be her repetition rank during the Winning Rule SR3 below defines victory, the fact that plays are always
the play. Then the proponent chooses his own repetition rank. finite means that victory in a play is decidable. However, it is well-known
that first-order logic is undecidable. This immediately shows that the
Notice that the identity of the players is established by this rule: P is the notion of victory in a play is not the dialogical counterpart of validity.
player who states the thesis, whereas O is the one who chooses her Section 2.1.2 goes into further details on that topic.
repetition rank first. According to a generalized version of this rule, a play
may begin with the opponent stating initial concessions before the thesis is It is worth noticing that the relation between repetition ranks and victory is
stated. This generalized version will be used in Section 3.2 whereas, for not as liberal as one may think at first. That is, victory will not in general
the sake of simplicity, Section 2 only considers the rule just presented. be ensured simply by choosing a large repetition rank in order to
overcome the adversary with more repetitions. In the case of challenges, a
SR1i: Intuitionistic Game-playing Rule After the repetition ranks have large repetition rank does little since the repetition rank of the adversary
been chosen, each move is a challenge or a defence in reaction to a applies to his defences against each particular challenge. So if player Y is
previous move, in accordance with the particle rules shown able to answer a specific challenge once, he will also be able to answer
previously. Each player can challenge the same previous move at repetitions of that same challenge. In the case of defences, a large
most 𝚗 times—where 𝚗 is the player’s repetition rank—or defend repetition ranks also does little because players have to answer to the last
against the adversary’s last unanswered challenge. unanswered challenge. While there may be some special cases where the
repetition rank has a slightly more significant influence on victory, they are
The repetition rank of the player applies to the number of challenges he is
not the main factor. Clerbout (2014b) discusses the relations between
able to make against a given statement of the adversary. As for the number
repetition ranks, victory, validity, and decidability.
of defences he is able to make, the constraint is actually stronger: each
challenge can be answered at most once, and only if it is the last SR2: Formal Rule (also known as Copy-Cat Rule) P can play an atomic
unanswered challenge. This constraint is called the Last Duty First rule. formula (e.g., Pa ) only if O has stated it previously in the play.
See example 3, on the law of Excluded Third. SR3: Winning Rule The play ends when it is a player’s turn to make a
move but he has no available move left. That player loses and the
Repetition ranks ensure that plays are finite. This allows defining a simple
other player wins.
winning condition for plays (see the Winning Rule). Different
presentations of the framework have had different approaches of finiteness The Formal Rule is often described as an essential aspect of the dialogical
of plays. Some like Krabbe (1985) have introduced other means to ensure framework, and rightly so. It is, for example, one of the most salient
it, while others like Felscher (1985) decided to allow infinite plays (see differences between the dialogical approach and Hintikka’s Game-
also Hodges 2001 [2019 with Väänänen]), often for the sake of generality. Theoretical Semantics. Contrary to the other rules, the Formal Rule is not
But it is clear from Lorenz’s quote above that the framework originally “anonymous”: it does not apply equally to both players since it puts a

restriction on the moves the proponent is allowed to play. Thus, the embracing the idea that this predicate is a logical constant of the
opponent is not concerned by exactly the same rules as the proponent. vocabulary? or should there be special clauses in the Formal Rule for this
predicate because it is the rule that deals with elementary statements?
The Formal Rule accounts for analyticity: the proponent, who brings the Either way, the rules have the effect of capturing the reflexivity,
thesis forward, will have to defend it without bringing any elementary transitivity, and symmetry of the Identity predicate as well as the principle
statement (i.e., without introducing any new atomic formula) of his own in of substitution of identicals.
the play. His defence of the thesis will have to rely only on the elementary
statements of the opponent. What is more, everything the opponent states Here is an example that liberalizes the Formal Rule so as to give special
comes only from her challenges of the proponent’s statements (especially permissions to players when elementary statements involve the Id
the thesis), so that the opponent’s statements proceed from the meaning of predicate. Each player is allowed to play Id(ci , ci). Moreover, each player
the thesis (or, in some cases, her own initial concessions—see Section 3.2 is allowed to state Id(cj , ci) if Id(ci , cj) has been stated previously, as well
for examples of dialogues with concessions). as Id(ci , ck ) if both Id(ci , cj) and Id(cj , ck ) have been stated previously.
Finally, if Id(ci , cj) and φ(ci ) have been stated previously, they are allowed
This rule is also importantly connected to the topic of the dialogical to state φ(cj ) .
account of formality (Section 2.1.3) and, for that reason, to some critics
against the framework on the relation between formality and content As a side note, the Immanent Reasoning framework presented in Section 3
which are discussed in Section 3. In the standard dialogical framework, provides the means for delving into the meaning of the Identity predicate
the only elements whose meaning is left unspecified in formal plays are and distinguish it from other forms of equalities. It is not possible to give
the elementary statements. The Formal Rule ensures that, in order to back all the details in this entry, but some basic explanations will be given
the thesis, the proponent is not bringing in any elementary statement that together with the relevant bibliography.
the opponent might not agree with: the proponent can only back his thesis
with elementary statements that the opponent herself has already stated. Three examples
Recent developments of the framework, as discussed in Section 3.2, allow
Three simple examples of plays will allow to see how the rules operate.
the opponent to challenge elementary statements; the proponent then
needs to specify on what ground he makes this statement, thus giving rise Example 1.
to material dialogues where the meaning of elementary statements is
analysed more deeply than in the standard, formal dialogues. Play for (Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa))
Note. It is possible to add rules for the Identity predicate, but in general Moves 0–2: in accordance with the Starting Rule SR0, the play starts with
these are not included in works on the standard dialogical framework. The the proponent stating the thesis at move 0. Then the opponent
reason for this is that no consensus on the appropriate kind of rule can chooses her repetition rank (in this case she chooses 𝟷 as her rank) at
seem to be reached: should there be special particle rules, thus fully move 1, and the proponent chooses his at move 2.

O P Move 6: in order to answer O’s challenge at move 5, the proponent needs

!(Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa)) 0 to choose a disjunct and state it. Because of the Formal Rule SR2, he
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 is not allowed to choose Qa because the opponent has not previously
stated it. However, P is allowed to choose Pa because O stated it at
Move 3: applying the particle rule for material implication, the opponent move 3.
O challenges the thesis by stating the antecedent. Accordingly, the
number of the challenged move is indicated in the inner column. O P
!(Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa)) 0
O P 1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2
!(Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa)) 0 3 ! Pa (0) !(Pa ∨ Qa) 4
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 5 ?∨ (4) ! Pa 6
3 ! Pa (0) P wins the play.
Move 4: also applying the particle rule for material implication, the The opponent has no further possible move. Because her repetition rank is
proponent P states the consequent in order to answer O’s challenge. 𝟷 , she cannot challenge again the proponent’s move, as established in the
In this case, the consequent is a disjunction. Game-playing Rule SR1i. Notice that moves 3 to 6 follow the rule SR1i:
after the repetition ranks have been chosen, each move is a challenge or a
O P defence in reaction to a previous move. Since O cannot make any move
!(Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa)) 0 after move 6, the proponent wins the play according to the Winning Rule
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 SR3.
3 ! Pa (0) !(Pa ∨ Qa) 4
Example 2.
Move 5: the opponent O challenges P’s last statement, in accordance with
the particle rule for disjunction. The next example involves a quantifier: (∀xPx ⊃ Pa)
O P This example illustrates the importance of keeping track of the order of the
!(Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa)) 0

moves (outer columns).
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 Moves 0–3: similarly to the previous example, the play starts with P
3 ! Pa (0) !(Pa ∨ Qa) 4 stating the thesis and both players choosing their repetition ranks, in
5 ?∨ (4) accordance with SR0. Then O challenges the thesis at move 3 by
stating the antecedent while applying the particle rule for the material
implication.

O P O P
!(∀xPx ⊃ Pa) 0 !(∀xPx ⊃ Pa) 0
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2
3 ! ∀xPx (0) 3 ! ∀xPx (0) ! Pa 6
5 ! Pa (3) ?[x/a] 4
Move 4: in order to defend himself, the proponent would need to play an P wins the play.
elementary statement which has not yet been stated by the opponent.
Because of the Formal Rule, this is not allowed. But there is
Example 3.
something else the proponent can do: he can challenge the statement The third example illustrates the Last Duty First restriction of the
O made at move 3. Intuitionistic Game-playing Rule: (Pa ∨ ¬Pa)
O P Moves 0–3: the play starts with P stating the thesis and both players
!(∀xPx ⊃ Pa) 0 choosing their repetition ranks, in accordance with SR0. Then O
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 challenges the thesis at move 3 by applying the particle rule for
3 ! ∀xPx (0) disjunction (request).
(3) ?[x/a] 4
O P
Note that move 4 does not appear in front of move 3 since it is not a ! Pa ∨ ¬Pa 0
defence against that move: it is a new challenge. With his challenge, 1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2
the proponent applies the particle rule for universal quantification 3 ?∨ (0)
and chooses the individual constant a.
Move 4: in order to defend himself, the proponent must choose one of the
Moves 5–6: O defends her universal quantification by instanciating her components of the disjunction. But one is an elementary statement
statement with P’s choice of instance (see the particle rule). By doing which has not yet been played by the opponent. So the proponent’s
so, she states the elementary statement that the proponent needed in only choice is to choose the other disjunct and state ¬Pa.
order to answer to move 3: he does so with move 6, which is written
in front of the corresponding challenge. With this the proponent wins O P
the play. ! Pa ∨ ¬Pa 0
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2
3 ?∨ (0) ! ¬Pa 4

Move 5: the opponent challenges this statement by stating Pa, in 2.1.2 The strategy level
accordance with the particle rule for negation.
The level of strategies is the level at which one can study games in terms
According to the particle rule for negation, there is no move that the of collections of plays rather than staying at the level of individual plays.
proponent may play to defend himself against the opponent’s last There may be various reasons to do so. The main reason is that one may
challenge. There is nothing P can challenge, since O’s only statement thus determine whether a player can win no matter how his adversary
is elementary. He loses the play. would play, and not just whether that player happens to win a particular
play. This distinction is important for validity. To understand the
O P
distinction, consider first the following play:
! Pa ∨ ¬Pa 0
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 O P
3 ?∨ (0) ! ¬Pa 4 !(Pa ∧ (Pa ⊃ Pa)) 0
5 ! Pa (4) 1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2
O wins the play. 3 ?R ∧ (0) !(Pa ⊃ Pa) 4
What about answering a second time to the opponent’s move 3? Even 5 ! Pa (4) ! Pa 6
though his repetition rank is 𝟸 and the opponent stated Pa at move 5, the P wins the play.
proponent cannot answer a second time to move 3 by choosing the first Explanations
disjunct. This is because move 3 is no longer the last unanswered
challenge made by the opponent: at this point, move 5 is the last one. Moves 0–3: P states the thesis and the players choose their repetition rank.
Thus, the proponent has no further possible move and he loses the play. O challenges the thesis, which is a conjunction, by requesting the
Notice that, unlike the proof-theoretic account of intuitionistic logic, the right conjunct.
meaning of the Excluded Third does not amount to knowing what could
count as having a proof of it but to the fact that it can constitute the thesis Moves 4–6: P states the right conjunct, it is an implication. O challenges
of a play that ends with one of the players winning or losing. The proof- it by stating the antecedent, and P defends it by stating the
theoretic account of knowing what counts as having a proof manifests consequent.
itself, in a dialogical setting, in terms of having a winning strategy. See
The proponent wins this play. But one may wonder if there is not
Section 2.2.1 for classical dialogical games which have rules that allow P
something that the opponent could do in order to win. In fact, this question
to win.
arises quite naturally if one is curious about the relationship between
winning a play and proving the validity of a thesis in a dialogical setting.
In the play above, the proponent happens to win a play for a formula that

is clearly not valid. Now, it is quite easy to see that, in fact, the opponent O P
had a way to win by making another choice at move 3: !((Pa ∧ Qa) ∨ (Pa ⊃ Pa)) 0
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2
?∨ !(Pa ⊃ Pa)
O P
3 (0) 4
!(Pa ∧ (Pa ⊃ Pa)) 0 5 ! Pa (4) ! Pa 6
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 P wins the play.
3 ? L∧ (0)
O wins the play. In order to reason about a collection of plays and consider questions such
as “what would happen if player X had made another choice?”, game-
In this play, the opponent chooses the left part of the conjunction when theoretical settings have the key concept of strategies. There are various
challenging the thesis. In order to defend, the proponent must bring equivalent ways to define strategies, though in the Lorenzen and Lorenz
forward an elementary statement. But since the opponent has not stated it tradition, winning strategies can be built from plays through a procedure
previously, the Formal Rule prevents the proponent from defending the that allows to check if every possible choice of P has been taken into
thesis. Since the proponent has no other available move, he loses the play, account. However, in the context of results connecting the dialogical
as established by the Winning Rule (SR3). framework with other frameworks, it is useful and quite common to
identify strategies with their extensive forms. Here are the relevant
Thus, it is possible for the proponent to win merely because the opponent
definitions.
has played poorly. Conversely, it is also possible for the proponent to lose
for having made the wrong choice: Simply put, a strategy for player X in a dialogical game is a complete
conditional plan of action. It is conditional in the sense that the strategy
O P
informs how X plays depending on the moves of the adversary. It is
!((Pa ∧ Qa) ∨ (Pa ⊃ Pa)) 0 complete in the sense that it must inform how X plays for every possible
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟷 2 choice of move by the adversary. Given a formula φ , a strategy for X in
3 ?∨ (0) !(Pa ∧ Qa) 4 the game for φ can be described as a function that assigns an X -move M
5 ?L ∧ (4) to every non-terminal play Δ ending with a Y-move such that extending
O wins the play. Δ with M results in a play for φ . Such a strategy is winning if all terminal
After move 5, there is nothing the proponent can do: he cannot answer to plays resulting from it are X-terminal (i.e., won by X ). In other words, a
move 5 because of the Formal Rule. But at move 4 the proponent was able winning strategy for a player is a complete conditional plan of action
to choose which disjunct to state in order to defend. Had he chosen the leading to the player’s victory no matter how the adversary plays.
The extensive form of a dialogical game (φ) for φ is simply the tree
other disjunct, he would have been able to win:
representation of the game, where each path represents a play and

branches represent terminal plays. Thus, the extensive form 𝔈φ of (φ) is Determinacy. There is a winning X strategy in the game for φ if and
the tree (T , ℓ , S) such that: only if there is no winning Y strategy in this game.
Every node t ∈ T is labelled with a move M in (φ) Soundness/Completeness of Tableaux. Felscher (1985) showed that
ℓ:T⟶ℕ there is a tableau proof for φ if and only if there is a winning P
S ⊆ T 2 such that: strategy in the intuitionistic dialogical game for φ . This being the first
There is a unique t0 ∈ T labelled with the thesis of (φ) and correct and complete proof, it is very influential in some dialogical
such that ℓ(t0 ) = 0, traditions, despite the fact that Felscher’s rules do not guarantee
For every t ≠ t0 there is a unique t ′ such that t ′ St, finiteness of plays.
For every t, t ′ ∈ T , if tSt ′ then ℓ(t ′ ) = ℓ(t) + 1,
For every play Δ ∈ (φ), if move M ′ immediately follows Clerbout (2014a) showed that tableaux for classical logic (Smullyan
move M in Δ then there are nodes t and t ′ in T such that 1968) are sound and complete for classical dialogical games as
ℓ(t ′ ) = ℓ(t) + 1, t is labelled with M and t ′ is labelled with M ′ . defined in Section 2.2.1, i.e., with repetition ranks. By soundness and
completeness of the tableau method with respect to model-theoretic
Being identified with its extensive form, a strategy for player X in (φ) is semantics, it follows that existence of a winning P strategy coincides
the fragment Sx of 𝔈φ such that each path in Sx represents a play resulting with validity: There is a winning P strategy in the game for φ if and
from the X strategy. In other words: (i) for every node t in 𝔈φ labelled only if φ is valid.
with an X move, every successor of t in 𝔈φ appears in Sx whenever t is in
Sx ; and (ii) for every node t in 𝔈φ labelled with a Y move, if there is at The correspondence between the dialogical approach and other
least a successor for t in 𝔈φ then there is a unique t ′ labelled with an X frameworks such as tableaux is to be found at the level of strategies,
move such that t ′ is the successor of t in Sx and t ′ is the move prescribed and more precisely of strategies for the proponent. So, from the
by the strategy. Thus, in an X strategy the ramifications corresponding to dialogical point of view, tableaux rules are limited to how (particle)
X having multiple choices are not kept (since a given strategy selects one rules are applied in the context of a P-strategy; they are thus
X move) but the ones corresponding to Y’s choices are kept (since the insensitive to the play level (where semantics is defined in terms of
strategy must consider all possible moves of Y ). interaction). In fact, in the demonstration of the equivalence it is
made clear how transforming a winning P-strategy into a tableau
Here are some examples of results which pertain to the level of strategies. proof supposes getting rid of most elements constitutive of
For details on the proofs of most of these results, see Clerbout (2014a): interaction (such as most challenges) until the player labels O and P
become nothing more than an alternative way of writing the usual
Winning P strategies and leaves. Let Sp be a winning P strategy in tableau signatures T and F.
the game for φ . Then every leaf in Sp is labelled with a P elementary
statement.

2.1.3 Formality In the case of the Formal Rule seen in Section 2.1.1, point 1 is clearly
accounted for. Point 2, however, is maybe less obvious and some
As pointed out when presenting the structural rule in Section 2.1.1, the objections against the dialogical framework are directly related to the topic
Formal Rule is one of the most salient features of the dialogical on content. These objections are sometimes collectively referred to as “the
framework. With this rule the dialogical approach comes with an internal content challenge” (see Section 3.1). Indeed, in the standard dialogical
account of elementary propositions in terms of interaction only, without framework there is no way of asking for reasons for elementary statements
depending on metalogical meaning explanations for the non-logical and giving them: in this sense, the form of interaction differs notably from
vocabulary. More prominently, this means that the dialogical account does the one defined for statements having logical constants. As a consequence,
not rely—contrary to Hintikka’s GTS games—on the model-theoretic some interpretations of standard dialogical logic did understand plays in a
approach to meaning for elementary propositions. Hence, just as Lorenz purely syntactic manner. Thus, the standard formulation seems particularly
(2001) clearly stated, the dialogical notion of proposition does not assume prone to the frequent criticism against formal reasoning and logic
truth-conditional semantics. according to which they are reduced to syntactic manipulation devoid of
content. Various answers have been provided, see Section 3.
Just like the particle rules for logical constants, the Formal Rule sets the
meaning of elementary statements purely in terms of dialogical 2.2 Other logics in the dialogical framework: dialogical
interaction. This has clear roots in the Ancient Greek tradition of logic, pluralism
most particularly in Plato and Aristotle. Lorenzen alluded to Greek
dialectics in his 1960 paper. On this matter, Marion and Rückert (2016) In the 1990s and the 2000s, the original ideas of the dialogical approach
discuss how the dialogical framework can directly be related with this were developed by Shahid Rahman and collaborators into a conceptual
Platonist and Aristotelian conception. Plato’s Gorgias (472b–c), for framework that proved useful for studying, comparing and even
example, expresses an idea which can be freely summed up with the combining non-classical logics (Rückert 2011). These developments led to
following statement: dialogical pluralism (see in particular Rahman & Keiff 2005 and Keiff
2007). In a nutshell, this pluralism studies the semantic and logical
there is no better grounding of an assertion within an argument
consequences of modifying the structural rules or extending the set of
than indicating that it has already been conceded by the opponent
logical constants. The general idea is that different logics involve different
or that it follows from these concessions.
ways to deal with information in (sub)plays (a subplay is simply a
The dialogical account of formality is rooted in this idea. Indeed: sequence of moves within a play; this notion is particularly useful when
comparing plays which have a common initial segment but differ in two
1. formality is understood as a kind of interaction; and different subplays resulting from a player’s choice). The task is then to
2. formal reasoning should not be understood as devoid of content and determine what information gets transferred from one play to another and
reduced to purely syntactic moves. how this transfer operates. Two general cases may be distinguished:

A. The information-transfer is regulated by means of specific structural although these procedural rules may have an effect on how the local
rules (global level); in some cases, however, these additional rules meaning of logical constants is implemented in the course of a play, this
can be prompted by operators. does not amount to a change in the local meaning of the logical constants.
In other words, the development of a play, for both intuitionistic and
Example 1: in classical logic the specific structural rule is not related classical logic, assumes that the interaction follows the same particle rules
to special additional operators. Example 2: modal logics are a case (local meaning) for the logical constants.
where the specific structural rules are related to the modal operators
whose local meaning gets defined by particle rules. For Classical dialogical games, the following structural rule SR1c replaces
SR1i provided in Section 2.1.1.
B. The information-transfer is already regulated with the particle rules
for special operators (local level). SR1c: Classical Game-playing Rule After repetition ranks have been
chosen, each move is a challenge or a defence in reaction to a
Example: the dialogical approach to linear logic. This is Girard’s previous move, in accordance with the particle rules shown
point in distinguishing additives from multiplicatives, as they should previously. Each player can challenge the same previous move, or
not (as in the standard approach to modal logic) be defined through defend against the same previous challenge, at most n times, where n
structural rules (global level) but through particle rules (local level) is that player’s repetition rank.
as two different connectives (or operators) of interaction.
This rule is a liberalized version of the Intuitionistic Game-Playing Rule
This section presents with more details the examples of classical and basic insofar as the Last Duty First constraint disappears. The rest of the rule is
modal logics within the dialogical framework. The section ends with some identical to the rule from the previous Section. As a result of the
literature relevant to the dialogical approaches of various logics and to liberalization, information that would maybe not be available to players in
dialogical pluralism. some subplays in intuitionistic dialogical games (due to the intuitionistic
constraint) becomes available. Thus, classical logic results from allowing
2.2.1 Dialogues for classical first-order logic more information to be available between different parts of a play. Notice
that this availability of information does not suppose changing to a truth-
Section 2.1 presented the dialogical framework for intuitionistic logic. functional concept of proposition: the dialogical definition of proposition
Classical logic results when a structural rule is modified: the Game- remains unchanged since availability of elementary statements in an
playing Rule SR1. In the dialogical setting, the logical constants have the argumentative debate does not commit to their being true.
same local meaning, which manifests itself by the fact that the particle
rules are the same. The difference between classical and intuitionistic logic To see the difference with intuitionistic dialogical games, consider the
appears as a difference in the structural rules (namely in SR1). Structural following example. This is a play for a thesis we have seen at the end of
rules are mainly procedural rules for the development of a dialogue and,

Section 2.1.1, but played this time with the Classical Game-Playing Rule The case of modal logics is probably one in which the process of
(SR1c). distinguishing between subplays is made the most explicit. The idea of the
dialogical approach to modal logics is to add a further element to the
O P information about moves: in addition to the player who performs the
! Pa ∨ ¬Pa 0 move, and the nature of the move (statement or request), each move comes
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 with a label indicating in which dialogical context it is performed. The
3 ?∨ (0) ! ¬Pa 4 particle rules for modal operators define how changes of dialogical
5 ! Pa (4) contexts are triggered. The result is the generation of different subplays
! Pa 6 which are distinguished by the dialogical contexts assigned to them.
P wins the play. Accordingly, and given the usual definition of the basic modal language,
the particle rules are:
Explanations
Statement Challenge Defence
Moves 0–5: the play develops exactly as in the intuitionistic dialogical
Y ? L∧− ci or X ! A − ci (resp.)
X ! A ∧ B − ci
Y ? R∧ − ci X ! B − ci
game for the same thesis. Conjunction
X ! A − ci or
X ! A ∨ B − ci Y ?∨ −ci
X ! B − ci
Move 6: This time, the proponent is not restricted by the Last Duty First Disjunction
SR1i rule. Since his repetition rank is 𝟸 , he is allowed to answer a
Implication X ! A ⊃ B − ci Y ! A − ci X ! B − ci
second time to the opponent’s challenge made at move 3. And since
O played the elementary statement Pa at move 5, P is able to choose Negation X ! ¬A − ci Y ! A − ci −−
X ! ◻A − ci Y ?[cj /ci ] X ! A − cj
it and play it at move 6. The opponent has no other possible move Necessity
and the proponent wins this play. operator
X ! ◊A − ci Y ?◊ X ! A − cj
Possibility
2.2.2 Dialogues for basic modal logic operator
In the case of modal logic, the information transfer between subplays is The particle rules for propositional connectives are like those in Section
regulated by structural rules which are related to the modal operators, 2.1.1, with an additional indication concerning the dialogical context
introduced in the object-language, which get their local meaning through (denoted ci ), which, however, does not modify the current context.
corresponding particle rules. This is the general dialogical tenet on modal Propositional connectives are thus unlike unary connectives such as modal
logic. The differences between distinct normal modal systems (such as K, operators, which provoke a dialogical context change according to the
T, B, etc.) manifest as differences in the dedicated structural rules while particle rules. In this regard, the only difference between the possibility
the local meaning of the operators remains unchanged. operator and the necessity operator pertains to which player may choose

the new context (in the rule for the necessity operator, “cj /ci ” is read as the SR1: Game-playing Rule After repetition ranks have been chosen, each
request to substitute cj for ci ). This point illustrates once again the key role move is a challenge or a defence in reaction to a previous move, in
of choice in the dialogical approach to meaning built through the game accordance with the particle rules. Each player can challenge the
rules. same previous move, or defend against the same previous challenge,
at most n times, where n is that player’s repetition rank.
This integration of the “local” perspective of the players into the
framework is an important proposal. Dialogical contexts are labels used to Notice that it is possible to play with the intuitionistic version of this rule
identify different parts (subplays) of a given dialogue and thus keep track and, thus, to combine aspects from intuitionistic dialogical logic and
of the information flow between these parts. This can be seen as a step modal dialogical logic.
towards hybridation (having syntactical tools to name states or worlds).
Patrick Blackburn (2001) argued, however, that a thorough discussion of SR2: Formal Rule (also known as Copy-Cat Rule) P can state an
the benefits of such an integration advocates for a complete hybridation elementary statement at some context ci only if O stated it beforehand
and that the idea behind dialogical modal logics should be pursued to its in the play at this context ci.
fullest. Thus, from a model-theoretic perspective, dialogical contexts will
This relativization of the Formal Rule to contexts is an essential part of the
correspond to (names of) possible worlds. But one important difference is
dialogical approach to modal logic. Close attention should be paid to how
that in the dialogical framework the contexts are explicitly part of the
information is transferred between subplays: it is crucial to know clearly
players’ interaction through particle rules and through the special
what elementary statements P is allowed to make at any given context.
structural rule introduced below.
SR3: Winning Rule The play ends when it is a player’s turn to make a
The way information is transferred from one subplay to another is
move but he has no available move left. That player loses and the
managed at the level of structural rules, which need to be updated in order
other player wins.
to account for the presence of dialogical contexts in the moves. The rules
seen in Section 2.1.1 remain, although relativized to dialogical contexts. In addition to these familiar rules, an extra rule is needed to give an
An additional special rule is added about context changes. account of how new contexts may be generated by means of the particle
rules for modal operators. This, combined with the Formal Rule
SR0: Starting Rule A play starts with the proponent P stating a
relativized to dialogical contexts, is the way in which the transfer of
proposition, called the thesis, at context c1 .
information is regulated in dialogical games for modal logics.
After the thesis has been stated, the opponent O chooses a positive
Different constraints on the transfer of information (that is to say,
integer which will be her repetition rank during the play. Then the
ultimately, on the generation of new contexts) mean different possible
proponent P chooses his own repetition rank. Repetition ranks are
versions of a rule regulating it. A first example is the following one:
chosen at context c1.

SRK: K-availability of contexts Whenever he is to choose a context SRT: T-availability of contexts Whenever he is to choose a context when
when applying the particle rule of a modal operator, P can choose applying the particle rule of a modal operator, P can choose context
context cj at ci only if O chose cj at ci beforehand. cj at ci only if O chose cj at ci beforehand, or ci = cj .
Like the Formal Rule, this rule is asymmetrical: it puts restrictions on the Example:
proponent’s ability to choose new contexts. Both rules specify how
information—about elementary statements or contexts—becomes O P
available to P only if O has previously provided it. ! ◻p ⊃ p c1 0
1 c1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 c1 2
This structural rule SRK embodies the dialogical definition of the modal 3 c1 ! ◻p (0) !p c1 6
system K. Various versions of this rule can be used to account for other 5 c1 !p (3) ?[c1 /c1 ] c1 4
(normal) modal systems. In this fashion, the (normal) modal systems’ P wins the play.
differences are manifested in the dialogical approach through different
SRKB: KB-availability of contexts Whenever he is to choose a context
constraints on context information available to P (Rahman & Keiff 2005).
when applying the particle rule of a modal operator, P can choose
Here is an example of a play resulting from the rules seen so far (i.e., with
context cj at ci only if O chose cj at ci beforehand, or O chose ci at cj
SRK):
beforehand.
O P
Example:
! ◻(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (◻p ⊃ ◻q) c1 0
1 c1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 c1 2 O P
3 c1 ! ◻(p ⊃ q) (0) ! ◻p ⊃ ◻q c1 4 ! p ⊃ ◻◊p c1 0
5 c1 ! ◻p (4) ! ◻q c1 6 1 c1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 c1 2
7 c1 ?[c2 /c1 ] (6) !q c2 14 3 c1 !p (0) ! ◻◊p c1 4
c2 !p ⊃ q ?[c2 /c1 ] c1
5 c1 ?[c2 /c1 ] (4) ! ◊p
9 (3) 8
c2 6
c2 !p ?[c2 /c1 ] c1
?◊ !p
11 (5) 10
7 c2 c1
!q !p
(6) 8
13 c2 (9) c2 12
P wins the play.
P wins the play.
SRB: B-availability of contexts Whenever he is to choose a context when
The constraints on contexts available to P can be made stronger or weaker, applying the particle rule of a modal operator, P can choose context
as the following rules for other well-known modal systems illustrate. In cj at ci only if O chose cj at ci beforehand, or O chose ci at cj
some cases an example is added to illustrate the rule and in each example beforehand, or ci = cj.
the move where the corresponding rule is applied is indicated. SRS4: S4-availability of contexts Whenever he is to choose a context

when applying the particle rule of a modal operator, P can choose approach to belief revision. The framework has been used to propose
context cj at ci only if O chose cj at ci beforehand, or ci = cj , or there fruitful reconstructions of various logical traditions such as, among others,
is a context ck such that P can choose ck at ci, and cj at ck . medieval obligationes (Dutilh Novaes 2007; Popek 2012), Jain logic
SRS5: S5-availability of contexts Whenever he is to choose a context (Clerbout et al. 2011), or Aristotle’s syllogistic (Crubellier et al. 2019).
when applying the particle rule of a modal operator, P can choose Redmond (2011) developed a dialogical approach to fiction, building on
context cj at ci only if O chose cj at ci beforehand, or ci = cj , or O previous works on free logics. The book of Fontaine (2013) deals with
chose ci at cj beforehand, or there is a context ck such that P can intentionality, fiction and dialogues, the book of Magnier (2013) deals
choose ck at ci and cj at ck . with dynamic epistemic logic and legal reasoning in a dialogical
framework, while the work of Shafiei (2018) gives dialogical foundations
Example: to the phenomenological approach to meaning, intentionality, and
reasoning.
O P
! ◊p ⊃ ◻◊p c1 0 A different take on dialogical pluralism is hinted at by Dutilh Novaes and
1 c1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 c1 2 French (2018), Dutilh Novaes (2020), and French (2021), in which
3 c1 ! ◊p (0) ! ◻◊p c1 4 pluralism stems from the dialogical reading of the structural rules of
5 c1 ?[c2 /c1 ] (4) ! ◊p c2 6 sequent calculus or natural deduction. An important recent work on the
7 c2 ?◊ (6) !p c3 10 relations between sequent calculus and the dialogical approach is
9 c3 !p (3) ?◊ c1 8 Fermüller (2021).
P wins the play.

3. Variations on the Standard Dialogical Framework
2.2.3 Literature on other logics in the dialogical framework The previous section presented the standard dialogical framework in the
Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition. Different logics can be expressed within
A detailed account of recent developments on, among others, relevant this framework, they can thus also be compared (e.g., classical and
logic, linear logic and paraconsistent logic can be found in Rahman and intuitionistic logic, and modal logics). Different objections have been
Keiff (2005), Rückert (2011) and Rahman (2012). Helge Rückert’s book raised against the standard framework, as the three objections presented
includes a dialogical approach to multivalued logics, which is a topic that below attest; various answers have been given by logicians interested in
has been studied in a different way by Fermüller (2008) and Fermüller and the dialogical perspective, often abandoning the Lorenzen and Lorenz
Roschger (2014). An important development on the relations between tradition 1 in order to build a framework most appropriate to their own
dialogical logic and constructive mathematics was made in Coquand purposes.
(1995). Keiff (2004) and Keiff (2007) are other works on the dialogical
approach to modal logic. Fiutek et al. (2010) studied the dialogical

In this section two variations of the standard framework are briefly further points out that the standard dialogical framework developed
considered, with their answers to objections made to the standard thereafter did not focus on the material dialogues; he interprets this fact as
framework: the Immanent Reasoning framework maintains itself in the a sign that formal dialogues had, after all, priority over material dialogues
initial tradition, whereas the Built-In Opponent (BIO) framework in the dialogical framework.
distances itself from the standard approach.
The reasons are not explicit in the standard dialogical framework. It
3.1 Objections against the standard dialogical framework may be objected to the standard dialogical framework that it claims to be a
“game of giving and asking for reasons”, but that these reasons are
The standard dialogical framework is too formal. A recurrent objection implicit. One way to answer this challenge is proposed in the Immanent
made to the standard dialogical framework is that it is too formal, in the Reasoning framework which provides “local” and “strategic” reasons to
sense that the dialogues in this “dialogical” logic are not real dialogues, answer this objection.
with actual content, they only deal with the logical constants. See for
The standard dialogical framework is not completely dialogical. The
instance Hintikka (1973: 77–82), Peregrin (2014: 100, 106), Trafford
original project of the dialogical framework was to have language games
(2017: 86–88), and Dutilh Novaes and French (2018: 131).
that link meaning and use so tightly together that no extra theoretic
At least two options adopted provide an answer to this objection: one, construction would be required for these games (Lorenz 1970: 109):
which is not in the Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition, consists in linking syntax and meaning are dealt with at the level of the language games,
dialogues with empirical social interaction in line with argumentation without necessitating any metalogical approach (which would deprive the
theory (Barth & Krabbe 1982; Gethmann 1979, for example); the other signs from their meaning). But could this project be carried out? The
intends to stay in the Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition and go all the way standard dialogical framework does not require any metalogical reasoning
with dialogues, which supposes providing content through dialogical at the level, say, of the particle rules, but it does presuppose for example
means. The Immanent Reasoning framework’s material dialogues is a that the players use well-formed formulas (wff) for statements. The well
proposal to deal with this contentual aspect, especially regarding formation can be checked at will, but only with the usual meta reasoning
elementary propositions. Such a project is consistent with the work of by which one checks that the expression does indeed observe the
Lorenz (1970; 2009; 2010; 2011), which deals with predication from a definition of a wff.
dialogical perspective, discussing the interaction between perceptual and
So can the dialogical framework be entirely based on language games,
conceptual knowledge.
without any metalogical recourses? Or does it need at some point to call
Material dialogues have in fact been included in the dialogical framework on devices outside dialogues themselves? A typology of dialogical
from the start, as Krabbe (1985: 297) points out. Material dialogues indeed approaches to logic can be sketched according to their degree of
had priority over formal dialogues in Lorenzen and Lorenz’s work dependency on non-dialogical frameworks:
(Kamlah & Lorenzen 1967 [1972]; Lorenz 1961, 1968). However, Krabbe

complete dependency (exits the Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition): e.g., 3.2.1 Making everything explicit using local reasons
the Built-In Opponent conception of deduction, which depends on
another framework, usually Natural Deduction (Dutilh Novaes & Dialogues are games of giving and asking for reasons; yet, in the standard
French 2018; French 2021); dialogical framework, the reasons for each statement are left implicit and
limited dependency: the standard dialogical framework, which do not appear in the notation of the statement. Statements of the form
depends on metalogical considerations for checking that the
statements are syntactically well formed; X!A
no dependency: the Immanent Reasoning framework, in which 1. the
where A is an elementary proposition, are to be read as
meaning of the logical constants, 2. the syntactic formation of the
statements, and 3. the content of the elementary statements, are all X states A.
taken in charge through dialogues and their rules.
These statements do not give any information on the reasons backing this
3.2 Immanent Reasoning statement.
An outline of the Immanent Reasoning framework will here be sketched, The Immanent Reasoning framework imports Martin-Löf’s 1984
with an emphasis on the elements answering to the three objections Constructive Type Theory (CTT) form of a judgement in order to make
mentioned above (Section 3.1), and which constitute major amendments to these reasons explicit. Fully developed, statements thus have the following
the standard dialogical framework. The framework is extensively form:
Xa:B
presented and discussed in Rahman et al. (2018).
First, the local reasons will be introduced, which answer the second
where B is a proposition and a its local reason, i.e., the particular,
objection that the reasons are not explicit in the standard framework. Then
circumstantial reason that entitles one to state B, which is read as
the synthesis and analysis of local reasons, and the structural rules are
briefly mentioned, which replace the particle and structural rules of the X states that a provides evidence for B.
standard framework. A detailed example follows, illustrating how
dialogues in the Immanent Reasoning framework are carried out. The In this fashion, the reasons one has for making a statement are specified at
formation dialogues are then introduced (answering the third objection), the object-language level. The Immanent Reasoning framework
and finally the material dialogues, which can deal with content at the distinguishes local reasons and strategic reasons. Local reasons are
elementary level, and with empirical propositions (answering the first brought forth in particular plays, whereas strategic reasons are a
objection). recapitulation of all the possible plays: local reasons provide relevant and
sufficient means for winning a play, but in general a local reason does not
provide the appropriate ground for constituting a winning strategy.

Strategic reasons entitle to make assertions, i.e., provide relevant and approaches to CTT for constructive mathematics, inspired by Coquand
sufficient means for constituting a winning strategy justifying an assertion. (1995); see for instance Sterling (2021).
The word “statement” is used for the posits that have not yet reached the
level of a justified assertion. 3.2.2 Local rules and an example
When the reason is not explicit, the exclamation mark “!” marks the
The particle rules determining the possible interaction of logically
presence of an implicit reason. Thus, in the standard dialogical framework,
constant terms and modal operators in the standard framework (see
each statement has an implicit reason backing it: X ! A. This implicit
Section 2) are replaced in the Immanent Reasoning framework by
reason may be made explicit in the Immanent Reasoning framework (but
synthesis and analysis rules in order to take the local reasons into account.
it does not have to). To make this point more palatable, take for instance
The rules for the logical constants presented here will determine
the statement
interaction for producing local reasons appropriate to the logical constant
X ! Bachir Diagne is from Senegal. at stake (synthesis rules), or for extracting local reasons embedded in more
complex local reasons in a way that is characteristic of the constant at
This statement has an implicit reason, which is the piece of evidence for stake (analysis rules).
stating the proposition that Bachir Diagne is from Senegal. This piece of
evidence can be a passport, for instance. By expliciting the (empirical) Synthesis and analysis of local reasons (equivalent of particle
local reason, the statement becomes: rules)
Rules that prescribe how to explicitly bring forward local reasons are
X passport : Bachir Diagne is from Senegal.
called the synthesis rules for local reasons. They are player-independent
Taking inspiration in Martin-Löf’s CTT goes with adopting an enriched rules. A statement with an implicit reason (“!”) is challenged, and through
language which aims at making everything explicit within the language this interaction the implicit local reasons are made explicit. For instance,
itself. For example, quantification is always restricted to a particular the synthesis of local reasons for an implication (φ ⊃ ψ) is a challenge on
specified set, so that the formula (∀x : A)Px [A : set] reads For all x in A the implication with implicit reason, where the challenger (Y) states the
Px , where A is a set. Expressions such as A : set are added to the antecedent (φ ) with an explicit reason of his choice (p1 ), and the defender
elementary statements. Importantly, this does not mean that set-theoretic (X) states the consequent (ψ) with an explicit reason of his choice (p2 ):
semantics is suddenly introduced in the framework: CTT is in fact based
on the proposition-as-type principle or Curry-Howard correspondence (see Statement Challenge Defence
the entry on Intuitionistic Type Theory). Other works about the relation X ! φ ⊃ ψ Y p1 : φ X p2 : ψ
between game-based approaches to logic and Martin-Löf’s CTT have been
The synthesis of local reasons for universal quantification requires that the
made with different perspectives and aims, starting with Ranta (1994).
challenger provides an element of the set (an instance, which is also a
Recent works have provided important results on the use of game-based

local reason), the one he wishes (here p1 ), and the defender provides a provides a proper local reason, as showcased in moves 6 and 9 of the
local reason (p2 ) for the quantified proposition, in which the variable (x ) is example below.
replaced by the challenger’s instance (p1 ):
The analysis and synthesis of local reasons replace the particle rules of the
Statement Challenge Defence standard framework and enable to deal with explicit local reasons.
X ! (∀x : A)φ(x) Y p1 : A X p2 : φ(x)
Structural rules for Immanent Reasoning
The complete and precise definition of the synthesis of local reasons is
The structural rules in the Immanent Reasoning framework are modified to
given by rules for the statements depending on their form (like the two
allow for the explicit mention of reasons, for the use of initial concessions,
examples above). The complete table of synthesis rules can be found in
for inserting formation dialogues, for the resolution of instructions, for
Rahman et al. (2018).
challenging and defending elementary statements, and for making explicit
Once the local reasons are explicit, statements can be further challenged the equalities that are used in the standard framework’s Formal Rule (“my
and defended in accordance to another set of rules called the analysis rules reasons for stating A are the same as yours”). The latter two points (about
for local reasons which prescribe how to decompose the local reason elementary statements and equalities) are defined by the Socratic Rule
associated with a statement in such a way that the component(s) render the which replaces the Formal Rule of the standard framework. Instead of
local reasons prescribed by the synthesis rules. They require instructions, providing all the rules for this framework in details, we will illustrate them
which are procedures that need to be carried out (the resolution of in a commented example below. But let us give some basic information
instructions), and the successive application of this process will eventually about the Socratic Rule:
An elementary statement is a move of the form X ! φ(ci ) or

yield local reasons for elementary statements. For example, in the case of
X a : φ(ci), where φ(ci ) is an atomic formula;

an implication, the local reason is actually a complex “local” reason: there
is a reason for the antecedent, and a reason for the consequent. The
instructions are procedures that isolate these parts of a complex reason: the There is a synthesis rule for elementary statements: from a move
left instruction (here L⊃ (p) ) takes the reason for the antecedent, and the X ! φ(ci ) , player Y can request X to make the local reason for the
right instruction (here R⊃ (p) ) takes the reason for the consequent: atomic formula explicit;
Statement Challenge Defence There are analysis rules for elementary statements: players can
Xp:φ⊃ψ Y L⊃ (p) :φ X R⊃ (p) :ψ challenge moves of the form a : φ(ci ). The defences involve tracking
the origin of local reasons in a play in terms of equalities between
The resolution of instructions is defined by a structural rule. Both players local reasons or, in the case of resolution of instructions, between
are entitled to request that the other player resolves his instructions and local reasons and instructions. For the precise formulation of these
rules, see Rahman et al. (2018).

Example: play for (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)), with explanations O P

!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) 0
𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸
Moves 0–4: the proponent states the thesis, the players choose their
1 2
p1 : A p2 : B(p1 ) ⊃ B(p1 ) 4
repetition ranks. The opponent challenges the thesis using the
3 (0)
5 L (p2 ) : B(p1 ) (4)
synthesis rule for universal quantification and the proponent defends ⊃
p2.1 : B(p1 ) ? … /L⊃ (p2 )

by instantiating his universal claim.
7 (3) 6
O P
Moves 8–9: the proponent answers the pending challenge on the
!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) 0 implication by using an instruction that selects the right part of the
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 local reason for the implication, thus backing the consequent. The
3 p1 : A (0) p2 : B(p1 ) ⊃ B(p1 ) 4 opponent requests the resolution of that instruction.
Move 5: the opponent challenges the implication with local reason

O P
!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x))
(analysis rule). A local reason for an implication is complex: it has a
0
𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸
left part for the antecedent, and a right part for the consequent. She
1 2
thus uses an instruction to take only the left part of p2 as the reason
3 p1 : A (0) p2 : B(p1 ) ⊃ B(p1 ) 4
5 L⊃ (p2 ) : B(p1 ) (4) R⊃ (p2 ) : B(p1 )
for the antecedent.
8
O P 7 p2.1 : B(p1 ) (3) ? … /L⊃ (p2 ) 6
9 ? … /R (p2 ) (8)
⊃
!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) 0
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 Moves 10–11: the proponent resolves the instruction by providing a
3 p1 : A (0) p2 : B(p1 ) ⊃ B(p1 ) 4 proper local reason, p2.1. He is entitled to this elementary statement
5 L (p2 ) : B(p1 ) (4)
⊃
since the opponent has already stated it (move 7). The opponent
however requests that the link with her own statements be made
Moves 6–7: before answering the opponent’s challenge, the proponent
explicit, she asks that the local reason be justified by an equality with
requests that she resolves the instruction in move 5, i.e., that she
her own local reasons (structural Socratic Rule).
gives a proper local reason instead of an instruction (structural rule,
resolution of instructions). The opponent resolves the instruction of
move 5 and provides a proper local reason for her statement. Note
that “? … /L⊃ (p2 ) ” can be read as requesting what local reasons stand
for L⊃ (p2 ), thus asking the adversary to fill in the dots.

O P statement and giving them. Accordingly, additional dialogical rules

!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) 0 explain the formation of statements involving logical constants. The
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 formation of elementary propositions is governed by the Socratic Rule
3 p1 : A (0) p2 : B(p1 ) ⊃ B(p1 ) 4 (like the use of elementary statements was governed by the Formal Rule in
5 L (p2 ) : B(p1 )
⊃ (4) R⊃ (p2 ) : B(p1 ) 8 the standard framework).
7 p2.1 : B(p1 ) (3) ? … /L⊃ (p2 ) 6
9 ? … /R⊃ (p2 ) p2.1 : B(p1 )
In this way, the opponent may (but does not have to) examine the well
formation of the thesis with the challenge “?prop ” before starting to ask for
(8) 10
11 ? = p2.1 (10)
reasons. The formation rules for logical constants and for falsum are given
Move 12: the proponent uses the Socratic Rule in order to explicit where in the following table. Notice that a statement “⊥ : prop ” (which reads ⊥
his local reason comes from: it is exactly the same reason that the is a proposition) cannot be challenged; this is the dialogical account for
opponent used in order to resolve the instruction L⊃ (p2 ). In other falsum “⊥ ” being by definition a proposition.
words, in this case, the reason for stating the consequent (i.e., the
resolution of R⊃ (p2 )) is exactly the same as the reason for stating the
Statement Challenge Defence
Y ? F∧1 or X A : prop (resp.)
X A ∧ B : prop
Y ? F∧2 X B : prop
antecedent of the implication. Conjunction
Y ? F∨1 or X A : prop (resp.)
X A ∨ B : prop
Y ? F∨2 X B : prop
O P Disjunction
!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x))
Y ? F⊃1 X A : prop (resp.)
0
𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 X A ⊃ B : prop
or Y ? F⊃2 X B : prop
1 2 Implication
p1 : A p2 : B(p1 ) ⊃ B(p1 )
Y ? F∀1 or X A : set (resp.)
3 (0) 4
X (∀x : A)B(x) : prop
Universal
5 L⊃ (p2 ) : B(p1 ) (4) R⊃ (p2 ) : B(p1 ) 8 quantification Y ? F∀2 X B(x) : prop[x : A]
7 p2.1 : B(p1 ) (3) ? … /L⊃ (p2 ) 6
Y ? F∃1 or X A : set (resp.)
? … /R⊃ (p2 ) (8) p2.1 : B(p1 ) X (∃x : A)B(x) : prop
Existential
Y ? F∃2 X B(x) : prop[x : A]
9 10
? = p2.1 L (p2 ) = p2.1 : B(p1 )
⊃ quantification
11 (10) 12
P wins the play. Falsum X ⊥ : prop −− −−
Example of a formation dialogue
3.2.3 Formation dialogues
The thesis is (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)). Before applying the synthesis rule for
The enriched framework of Immanent Reasoning allows the players to universal quantification and initializing a play about reasons, the opponent
first enquire on the formation of the components of a statement within a opens a formation dialogue by requesting (move 3) that the proponent
play, before carrying out the play asking for the reasons backing a states that his thesis is a proposition (move 4).

O P O P
!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) 0 0.1 A : set !(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x))
𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 0.2 B(x) : prop[x : A] [A : set; B(x) : prop[x : A]]
0
1 2
3 ?prop (0) (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) : prop 4 1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2
3 ?prop (0) (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) : prop 4
Move 5: the opponent can challenge this statement by applying the 5 ?∀1 (4)
formation rule for universal quantification given in the table above,
and chooses one of the possible challenges: she asks for the first part Moves 6–7: the proponent is entitled to the elementary statement
of the expression with “?∀1 ”. A : set, since the opponent has already stated it (concession 0.1).
Since the opponent’s repetition rank is 𝟷 , she cannot attack anymore,
O P the formation dialogue is over and she challenges the universal
!(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) 0 quantifier of the thesis. The rest of the play is, except for the move
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 labels, the same as above.
3 ?prop (0) (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) : prop 4
5 ?∀1 (4) O P
0.1 A : set (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x))
0.2 B(x) : prop[x : A] [A : set; B(x) : prop[x : A]]
The proponent wants to answer that A is a set, which would trigger 0
material considerations (is A a set or not?). See below for material 1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2
dialogues (Section 3.2.4). In order to avoid (for whatever reason) these 3 ?prop (0) (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) : prop 4
material considerations, initial concessions may be added to the thesis in 5 ?∀1 (4) A : set 6
square brackets, for instance A : set. When accepting to play, the opponent 7 p1 : A (0)
also accepts these concessions for the sake of the argument.
Note: if the opponent wants to challenge both sides of the formation
Example of a formation dialogue with initial concessions of the universal quantification in the same play, she must choose
repetition rank 2.
The thesis is the same as the previous one, with the added initial
concessions A : set and B(x) : prop [x : A].
3.2.4 Material dialogues
(∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)) [A : set ; B(x) : prop [x : A]]
As pointed out by Krabbe (1985: 297) and mentioned above, material
The proponent states the thesis (move 0), the opponent starts playing: she dialogues—that is, dialogues in which propositions have content—
accepts the concessions (0.1 and 0.2) and chooses her repetition rank receive, in the writings of Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz, priority over
(move 1). The play is then the same as above up to move 5.

formal dialogues: material dialogues constitute the locus where the logical so on. Rahman et al. (2018) introduce some examples, including the
constants are introduced. However, in the standard dialogical framework, rules for elementary statements involving the identity predicate.
both material and formal dialogues have a purely syntactic notion of the
Formal Rule, through which logical validity is defined (because of how it 3. Only when the previous step has been accomplished can P take over
accounts for analyticity and formality, as explained in the previous in order to fulfill his duty of defending the same elementary
sections). The original intention of having content is thus bypassed in the statement.
standard framework, with the consequence that Krabbe and others after
Example: natural numbers
him considered that formal dialogues have, all in all, priority over material
ones. In the context of the Immanent Reasoning framework, this is Take for instance the statements about natural numbers, e.g.,
explained as stemming from shortcomings of the standard approach, and it
is argued that this can be overcome when local reasons are expressed. The X 0 : ℕ (X states that 0 is a natural number)
X s(0) : ℕ (X states that the successor of 0 is a natural number)

claim is then that by doing so it is possible to fulfill this original intention
of the dialogical framework.
X n : ℕ (X states that n is a natural number)
The point of material dialogues is that each elementary sentence involving
a set such as a : A —where A : set—requires a special adaptation of the These are all elementary statements. The rules for elementary statements
Socratic Rule (i.e., the rule about elementary sentences which replaces the concerning natural numbers are the following: if a player X states that n is
standard Formal Rule). This special Socratic Rule prescribes, for each a natural number, Y may request that X states that s(n) is a natural
elementary statement, what a player is committing to when making that number.
statement. Note that these rules are not player independent, they belong to
the structural rules. This amounts to the following general points. Statement Challenge Defence
Xn:ℕ Y ? s(n) X s(n) : ℕ
1. Material dialogues must include synthesis rules for elementary
statements. The special Socratic Rule for natural numbers establishes a set of nominal
definitions (defiendum ≡df definiens):
2. When O states an elementary statement, she can be asked to produce
the local reason specific to that elementary statement, according to 1 ≡df s(0)
the suitable synthesis rule or equality rule. The specific rules depend 2 ≡df s(s(0))
⋮
on the elementary statements at stake: for example, the rules for
statements about some object being a natural number will be different n ≡df s(s(… s(0) …)).
from the ones for statements about some individual being French, and

What is more, O may challenge a statement P n : ℕ by requesting (O ? n) thus justifying his thesis that 2 is a natural number. O has no
that P provides one of the accepted nominal definitions above (P available move left, so she loses.
s(s(… s(0) …)) ≡df n : ℕ). However, P may provide such a nominal
definition only if O has previously stated the definiens (here 3.3 The Built-In Opponent
s(s(… s(0) …))).
As mentioned in Section 1, the present entry focuses on the Lorenzen and
Example of material play for the thesis 2 : ℕ [0 : ℕ]. Lorenz tradition of dialogical logic (tradition 1). It may however be of use
O P to outline the general ideas of the Built-In Opponent (BIO) conception of
0.1 0:ℕ 2 : ℕ [0 : ℕ] 0 deduction, even though Catarina Dutilh Novaes stresses in her work that
1 𝚗 := 𝟷 𝚖 := 𝟸 2 this approach is distinct from the Lorenzen and Lorenz dialogical tradition
3 ?2 (0) 2 ≡df s(s(0)) : ℕ 8 (e.g., Dutilh Novaes 2015: 600; 2020: 37; Dutilh Novaes & French 2018:
5 s(0) : ℕ (0.1) ? s(0) 4 135).
7 s(s(0)) : ℕ (5) ? s(s(0)) 6
The BIO conception of deduction is a rational reconstruction of deductive
P wins the play.
reasoning inspired by certain historical considerations (see for example
Explanations Dutilh Novaes, 2016). In this regard, it claims neither historical nor factual
accuracy, but it is a rational reconstruction of deductive reasoning,
Move 0: P states the thesis: 2 is a natural number, provided that 0 is a historically inspired. The purpose of this framework is to provide a
natural number. dialogical interface—in the sense of a junction point—between actual
reasoning (deduction understood as a social practice, not as a logical
Moves 0.1–3: O states the initial concession, that 0 is a natural number;
norm) and formal logic. The BIO interface deals mostly with people’s
the players choose their repetition ranks and O challenges P’s thesis
actual reasoning patterns (Dutilh Novaes 2013) and informal logic (Dutilh
by requesting that he justifies his claim that 2 is a natural number.
Novaes & French 2018: 131), bringing the general features of logic and
Moves 4–5: before answering O’s challenge, P challenges O’s concession argumentation to the fore. Thus,
(move 0.1), and requests that O states that the successor of 0 is a
the main claim is that, rather than comprising the canons for
natural number. O complies.
correct thinking, the traditional principles of deduction reflect rules
Moves 6–7: P proceeds in the same way for the successor of 0, O for engaging in certain kinds of dialogical practices. (Dutilh
complies. Thus, O has stated the required definiens for P’s thesis. Novaes 2015: 599)
Move 8: P is able to answer O’s pending challenge (move 3) by stating This interface thus allows to approach empirical studies concerning the
the nominal definition that 2 is the successor of the successor of 0, way people actually reason with a dialogical model in mind, and thus

explain the greater or lesser magnitude (across cultures and within a The BIO interface mostly takes the form of Prover-Skeptic games inspired
culture) with which people’s reasoning patterns diverge from the norms of from Sørensen and Urzyczyn (2006), which developed a dialogical
classical logic, by the greater or lesser familiarity these people have with framework motivated by questions in the study of computation. In the
certain types of dialogues they engage in. Thus, for instance, familiarity BIO, the Prover (or proponent) is the player who proves that the
with testing situations common in school would greatly help people conclusion of the deduction follows from the premises, and the Skeptic (or
understand what is expected of them during the questioning process the opponent) is the player who doubts each step of the proof and who will
empirical studies use for obtaining their data (Dutilh Novaes 2013). raise objections if he can. The game starts with Prover asking Skeptic to
grant the premises, which Skeptic accepts for the sake of the argument.
But this BIO interface also allows to approach logical considerations from Then Prover states what necessarily follows from these premises, and
a dialogical perspective, either by considering deduction as a very Skeptic’s role is to make sure that each new statement made by Prover
specialized social practice, or by putting Gentzen’s Natural Deduction or clearly follows from the previous statements. Prover can thus provide
Sequent Calculus into a dialogical setting (French 2015; Dutilh Novaes & counter-examples to a statement or ask clarifications (“why does this
French 2018; French 2021). Deduction in itself is considered as an follow?”). Skeptic’s role is thus to check that the proof is compelling. The
essentially dialogical matter (Dutilh Novaes 2013; 2015; 2016; 2020), play is asymmetric, since Prover defends and Skeptic attacks.
where the role of the interlocutor (the Opponent or Skeptic) has been
“internalized” over time, in the sense that the deductive method has From this informal structure, the BIO interface can import traditional
integrated its role, which is not apparent anymore (Dutilh Novaes 2015: Natural Deduction, with the introduction and elimination rules, or even a
600). In this regard, when a mathematician or a logician spells out a proof, “‘structurally explicit’ sequent to sequent style” version (French 2021:
they adopt both roles, the proponent’s and the opponent’s. This is the idea section 3.1) in the fashion of Dummett (1977). Prover then brings forth
behind the “Built-In Opponent” expression which was inspired by Göran sequents for Skeptic to accept, and Prover is entitled to state sequents that
Sundholm’s lectures and talks on assertion, by the year 2000, when follow in virtue of the introduction and elimination rules or in virtue of
suggesting the idea that elimination rules can be read as the moves of an “structural” rules.
opponent aimed at testing the thesis. Another work dealing with the
connexion between Natural Deduction and the dialogical approach in the As mentioned above, “structural rules” may refer to two things: either to
sense of tradition 1 is Rahman et al. (2009) which was also directly the standard dialogical structural rules presented in Section 2, or, as it is
influenced by Sundholm’s suggestion, and where the branches in the here the case, to rules imported from another framework (which would be
inference rules are said to incarnate the choices of the players as they called “strategic” rules in the standard framework). In the BIO approach,
appear in the extensive form of a strategy. The BIO conception shares this Prover can thus produce sequents that follow from others in virtue of rules
inspiration but developed in its own, proper dialogical conception and its such as contraction or weakening. The aim of this kind of dialogical
proper objectives. approach is to understand the “structural” properties of deduction.

When concerned with formal logic, the BIO interface thus has purely London: College Publications.
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Dialogical Logic
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Stanford Encyclopedia Dialogical logic is a dialogue-based approach to logic and argumentation

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O P on the same line as its challenge. This move 2 is a challenge on move 1

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The particle rules for  Structural rules

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O P Move 6: in order to answer O’s challenge at move 5, the proponent needs

!(Pa ⊃ (Pa ∨ Qa)) 0

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P wins the play.

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An elementary statement is a move of the form X ! φ(ci ) or

X a : φ(ci), where φ(ci ) is an atomic formula;

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Example: play for (∀x : A)(B(x) ⊃ B(x)), with explanations O P

p2.1 : B(p1 ) ? … /L⊃ (p2 )

Move 5: the opponent challenges the implication with local reason

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O P statement and giving them. Accordingly, additional dialogical rules

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X s(0) : ℕ (X states that the successor of 0 is a natural number)

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Marion, Mathieu and Helge Rückert, 2016, “Aristotle on Universal 007-1923-1_12

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