POLI REV

DISCUSSION ON ART. 17

Majority of the house vs Majority of all the members of the house (majority of all its members)

Quorum – 12 of 23 is a quorum because sen sotto is included him being within the PH at that time but
the other sen (?) is not included because outside of the PH. Sotto can be ordered arrested to constitute
the quorum (Jurisprudence)

Amicus curiae – if nakapag propose na congress thru a consti convention or has already convened as
such, the congress should avoid directly proposing amendments na and leave it all to the consti
convention.

Consti conven/constituent assembly – 2/3 of the all its members with ascent of the ppl thru plebiscite
and not approval of the pres

Congress cannot convert itself to a consti conven because it is an office. Once a member of congress,
they cannot join any other office. But congress can act as a constituent assembly or it can call a consti
convention.

Sec 4 art 17 – the “proper submission doctrine”

 Piece-meal submission is expressly prohibited by the Constitution – election (singular)
Consti prohibits submission of more than 1 election of plebiscite
 Piece-meal ratification – “can the people say yes to 1-6 but no to 7-10? QUALIFY THIS. It
depends if the proposal is amendment or revision.
 Only congress can submit the proposal to the people for ratification
 Only the congress can pass a special law calling a plebiscite.

Sanidad – any defect in the proposal is cured once the proposal has already been ratified by the people.
That is the essence of the right of the people to ratify any proposed amendment or revision of the
Constitution so the court cannot later on declare that the amendment/revision is unconstitutional.

READING ASS:

CONCEPT OF THE STATE

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THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Article XVI
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

NOTES:
o It is based on on a practical and logical ground that there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends. - Justice Holmes
o Jurisprudence - “The Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty”- it is called as such because of the
privilege it grants the State to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its
non-suability.
o The two concepts of sovereign immunity:
1. Classical or Absolute Theory – A sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
2. Restrictive Theory – The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public act or acts jure imperii of a state but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.

Sanders vs. Veridiano [G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988]

Facts:
➔ Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City,
while Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said
station.
➔ Private respondents Rossi and Wyer are American citizens with permanent residence in the
Philippines. They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of
the NAVSTA.
➔ On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations
of the U.S. Department of Defense. They requested to be reinstated to permanent full-time status
plus backwages. Sanders disagreed with the protest. Hence, this case for damage.
➔ The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or
personal capacity.
➔ The petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity.

Issue: WON they are covered by the Immunity against Suit principle.

Ruling: Yes. Both Sanders and Moreau were acting in their official capacity; thus, they are covered by
the Immunity of the State doctrine.

As for Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.

As for Moreau, the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the

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grievance proceedings had even commenced is clearly official in nature. It involves the special
services department of NAVSTA.

In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained
recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There
was nothing personal or private about it. Given the official character of the letter, the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the
petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Therefore, the case must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction under the doctrine of state immunity (the principle of sovereign equality of
states).

Republic vs. Sandoval [G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993]

Facts:
➔ The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine
agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and
demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by
landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.
➔ There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the
intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated
and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent.
➔ As a result, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were
thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of said victim. 39 were
wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
➔ President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation for the disorders, death, and casualties
that took place.
➔ The most significant recommendation of the commission was for the deceased and other victims
of Mendiola Incident to be compensated by the Government.
➔ Due to the recommendation, petitioners filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from
the government to which the latter did not take heed.
➔ The group then instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines together
with military officers and personnel involved in the Mendiola Incident.
➔ Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on
the basis that there was no waiver by the state.

Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit.

Ruling: No. This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the
deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. A.O. 11 that the purpose of creating the Commission was to
have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took
place." In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our
discussion reads: Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any
offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules

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on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper
court. In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the
Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever
recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not
having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same
are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining
the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any
liability. In fact, to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the
government with the people". The speech of President Aquino that the government would address
the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any
liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
➔When the Republic is sued by name.
➔ When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency.
➔ When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

The Republic in this case may be sued by its name; however, the ultimate liability does not pertain to
the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official
the moment they exceeded their authority.

Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use
of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a
prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
marchers. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state
and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it
cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs
and victims to demand indemnification from the government.

The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded
by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge
of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or
agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its
agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government
does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another."

Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in
Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the
public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every

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citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government.

Festejo vs. Fernando [G.R. No. L-5156, Marzo 11, 1954]

Facts:
➔ Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action against defendant Isaias Fernando, Director of Bureau of
Public Works for unlawfully taking possession of a portion of her three parcels of land and causing
the construction of an irrigation canal without obtaining right of way and without her consent or
knowledge.
➔ The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff Festejo.
➔ On appeal, defendant Fernando invoked his being a public officer of the government of the
Philippines and thus, enjoys immunity from suit and should be absolved from liability for damages.

Issue: WON defendant Fernando may invoke immunity from suit.

Ruling: No. The evidence and conceded facts found that, in the trespass on plaintiff's land, the
defendant committed an act outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the
boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition
and usefulness, he designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.

Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable and may be sued as any
other citizen and be held answerable for whatever injury. If an officer, even while acting under color
of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea
that he is a public agent.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise

who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render
himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by
law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office,
and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

United States vs. Guinto [G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]
Facts:
➔ These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on
the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented but for the purposes
of this topic will discuss GR No. 76607 with regard barber service in the US Base Airforce in Clair Air
Base.
➔ In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US Airforce Stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in
the base.
➔ The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said
base.
➔ The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents.
➔ The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) that Dizon was
already operating this concession.

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➔ On June 30,1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX
and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions.
➔ From the pleadings the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the
US Government in that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding contract
between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government.
➔ By virtue of said contract of concession, it is the Court’s understanding that neither the US
Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the employer/s of the plaintiffs but
that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the plaintiffs
herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of commissions to the Philippine Area Exchange.
➔ The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover
such kind of services falling under the concessionaire ship, such as a barber shop concession.

Issue: WON the Doctrine of State Immunity applicable in the case at bar.

Ruling: No. The barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the United States government are
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States
Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen.
These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic
haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo,
massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee.

Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to
improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if
not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to
remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive
concessions granted to them in their respective areas.

This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the
private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the
conclusion reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.

Veterans Manpower & Protective Services, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 91359 September 25, 1992]
Facts:
➔ A suit was filed against the Philippine Constabulary Chief (PC Chief) for failure to act on the
request by petitioner seeking to set aside the findings of PADPAO expelling it from PADPAO and
considering its application for renewal of its license even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO.
➔ VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati, Metro Manila, praying the court to:
"Declare null and void the amendment of Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting
organizations like PADPAO from the prohibition that no person shall organize or have an interest in
more than one agency.
➔ Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day.
➔ VMPSI wrote the PC Chief requesting him to consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its
license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO.
➔ As the PC Chief did not reply. On the same date, the court issued a restraining order enjoining the

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PC Chief and PC SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisor Unit for Security and Investigation
Agencies) "from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s
license"

Issue: WON VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without
its consent.

Ruling: Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of
the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization
and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief)
and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent.

Especially in this case because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages. Even if its action
prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent
to appropriate the necessary funds for that "While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suit against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded."

A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since
the acts for which the PC Chief and PCSUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by
them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be
had against them in their private capacities.

"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC Chief in relation to
the exercise of a function sovereign in nature.”

The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State
but the legal nature of the act. This was clearly enunciated in the case of USA v. Ruiz where the Hon.
Supreme Court held: "The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.”

Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred,
but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424).

The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative
act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the public respondents.

Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands [G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]
Doctrine: Express waiver of immunity from a special law – only applicable to a specific person or

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group of persons specified in the law, just like in this case. (Act No. 2457)

Facts:
➔ E. Merritt, while riding his motorcycle, was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General
Hospital. A driver employed by the hospital drove it.
➔ In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine
Legislature authorizing Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
➔ A claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital
➔ The trial court ruled that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
➔ Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and
defendant in rendering the amount against the government.

Issue:
1. WON the defendant, the Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit. YES
2. Does it mean that the Government conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No.
2457. NO

Ruling:
1. YES. There is an express waiver of immunity from suit from a special law which is the Act. No.
2457 specifically enacted to apply to Merritt to allow him to file an action/suit against the
State.

As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause
of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in that:
 By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
 It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
 It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the state

Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]

Doctrine: If there is no other relief possible but for the Government to make due compensation, the
Doctrine of State Immunity shall not ensue. In other words, the Government cannot hide behind the
cloak of immunity if it acted against the Constitution.

Facts:
➔ Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the Government used a portion of Amigable’s lot
in Banilad Estate in Cebu for the construction of Mango and Gorodo Avenues.
➔ It appears that the said avenues were already existing in 1921 although they were in bad condition
as they were very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues they are now.
➔ Amigable’s counsel, thus, requested payment for the portion appropriated to the President of the

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Philippines. The claim was later indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it.
➔ Thus, Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
6,167 square meters of land traversed by the avenues.
➔ However, the Republic (and Cuenca) denied the allegations of Amigable on the following grounds:
o The action was premature as it was not filed first with the Office of the Auditor General.
o That the right of action for recovery has already prescribed.
o That it had no valid basis, being a suit against the Government, especially since the latter did
not give consent.
o That Amigable had no cause of action against the Government.

➔ During the hearings, nobody appeared for the Government. However, the Court decided that they
had no jurisdiction over the cause of action on the ground that the Government cannot be sued
without its consent.
➔ Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, and
subsequently to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON Amigable can sue the Government.

Ruling: YES. According to the previous case of Ministerio vs. CFI, if the Government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party claimed that they may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity. However,
the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of governmental immunity cannot serve as an instrument
for perpetrating injustice on a citizen.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title
and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. Here, Amigable, as the owner, could bring an action to
recover possession of the portion of the land in question anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership.

However, in this case, since restoration is neither convenient nor feasible , because it has been and is
now being used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991]

Doctrine: Suability vs. Liability
o Suability – Depends on the consent of the State to be sued.
o Liability – The applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a State is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable. It can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the State has allowed itself to be sued.
When the State does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that such is liable. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it
first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.

Facts:

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➔ The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages against private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco and Dominador Santiago,
et al.
➔ Private respondents jointly moved “to strike out some portions of the complaint and for Bill of
Particulars of other portions”, which motion was opposed by the PCGG.
➔ The Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific
allegations. Private respondents then presented a “Motion to leave to file interrogatories under Rule
25 of the Rules of Court”.
➔ The Sandiganbayan denied private respondents’ motions.
➔ Private respondents filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.
➔ In response, the PCGG presented a “Reply to Counterclaim with Motion to Dismiss compulsory
counterclaim.”
➔ Private respondents filed a pleading denominated “Interrogatories to Plaintiff”, and “Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as well as a motion for production and inspection of documents.
➔ The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production
and inspection of documents respectively. The PCGG moved for reconsideration, arguing that the
documents are privileged in character since they are intended to be used against the PCGG and/or its
Commission in violation of Sec. 4 of E.O. No.1, V12:
a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order.
b) No member or staff by the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings concerning

➔ The Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions. The first, denying reconsideration of the
Resolution allowing production of the documents, and the second, reiterating, by implication the
permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff.

Issue: WON the PCGG immune from suit.

Ruling: NO. The state is of course immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued
without its consent. But in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its
immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior
or preferred status to the State, even while assuming an act for the State.

The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing a suit except when in
doing so it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is
unacceptable. It attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent.

On the contrary, “the consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly.” Express
consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given
when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract.

The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants.
In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant.

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The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defenses he might have against the state.

It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus
imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been
held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being
paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by
the owner.

China National Machinery & Equipment vs. Santamaria [G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012]
Doctrine: The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to
commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis) The Philippines adheres to the restrictive
theory.
Facts:
➔ On September 14, 2002 - China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG) entered into a
Memorandum of Undertaking with North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail) to conduct a
feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union.
➔ On August 30, 2003 - the Export Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and Department of Finance (DOF)
entered into a MOU wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to PH. The Chinese
government agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400M payable in 20 years, a 5year grace
period and at a rate of 3% per annum.
➔ On October 01, 2003 - the Chinese Ambassador to PH, Wang Chungui wrote a letter to the DOF
secretary informing him of CNMEG’S designation as the Prime Contractor.
➔ On December 30, 2003 - CNMEG and Northrail executed a Contract Agreement for the
Construction of the project.
➔ On February 26, 2004- the PH government and EXIM bank executed a Counterpart financial
agreement - buyer credit loan agreement (“the loan agreement”).
➔ On February 13, 2006 - respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction
with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing. Respondents alleged that the Contract and loan
agreement is VOID for being contrary to : (1) the constitution; (2) RA 9184 - Government
Procurement Reform Act; (3) PD No. 1445 - Government Auditing Code and (4) EO No. 292 -
Administrative Code.
➔ CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that the trial court has no jurisdiction over its person
as it is an agent of the Chinese Government, making it immune from suit and the subject matter is a
product of an executive agreement.
➔ RTC denied CNMEG’s motion. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied.
➔ CNMEG filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of TRO with the CA, but it was
dismissed. Hence, it filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
➔ Hence this Petition for Review

Issues:
1) Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
2) Whether the Contract Agreement is an executive agreement, such that it cannot be questioned
by or before a local court.

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Ruling:
1. No. Although CNMEG claims to be a GOCC, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court's ruling in Deutsche
Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
GOCC without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under
Section 36 of the Corporation Code. The use of the term "state corporation" to refer to
CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a GOCC and its assignment as the Primary
Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the
latter's sovereign functions. To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which
all Chinese corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as
performing governmental activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or
proprietary pursuit

2. No. CNMEG is neither a government nor a government agency. It is engaged in a proprietary

activity. The Contract Agreement was not concluded between the Philippines and China, but
between Northrail and CNMEG. Thus, both Northrail and CNMEG entered into the Contract
Agreement as entities with personalities distinct and separate from the Philippine and
Chinese governments, respectively. Hence, the contract is merely an ordinary commercial
contract that can be questioned before the local courts.

The Contract Agreement must not be read in isolation. Instead, it must be construed in
conjunction with three other documents executed in relation to the Northrail Project, namely:
(a) the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002 between Northrail and
CNMEG; 30 (b) the letter of Amb. Wang dated 1 October 2003 addressed to Sec. Camacho; 31
and (c) the Loan Agreement.

a) The MOU dated 14 September 2002 - shows that CNMEG sought the construction of
Luzon Railways as a proprietary venture. It was CNMEG that initiated the
undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was conducted
not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the
Chinese government, but was plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a
view to securing this commercial enterprise.
b) Letter dated 01 October 2003 - shows that CNMEG, and not the Chinese government,
initiated the Northrail Project was confirmed by Amb. Wang in his letter. The desire
of CNMEG to secure the Northrail Project was in the ordinary or regular course of its
business as a global construction company. The implementation of the Northrail
Project was intended to generate profit for CNMEG.
c) Loan Agreement - it was clear from the provisions that it was a purely commercial
transaction and there was also an express waiver of immunity. Admittedly, the Loan
Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the
Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of the
transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable
part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the
Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character.

Republic vs. Feliciano [G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987]

FALQUEZA
Doctrine: Failure to allege the existence of the consent of the State in a suit against it is a fatal defect.
On this basis alone, the complaint may be dismissed.
Facts:
➔ November 1, 1954 – President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90, reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma
Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started
subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers.
➔ Herein respondent, then petitioner, Pablo Feliciano, alleged that he had bought the property in
question, evidenced by an informacion possessoria, and upon purchase he took possession of the
property and introduced various improvements therein.
➔ Thus, Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property despite it
being located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90.
➔ The Land Authority asserted that Feliciano lacked sufficient cause of action and that his action has
already prescribed.
➔ However, the trial court rendered a decision stating that Feliciano is the rightful and true owner of
the property in question, and thus, excluded from the NARRA settlement.
➔ Later, 86 settlers filed a motion to intervene alleging that they have been in possession of their
lands for 20 years.
➔ The Court a quo reopened the case and directed the intervenors to show evidence. However, later
on, the intervenors did not appear. They simply just submitted a motion for postponement resetting
of hearing, which was later denied by the trial court.
➔ After numerous attempts for reconsideration despite being continuously denied by the trial court,
the intervenors decided to elevate their matter to the IAC on a petition for certiorari, but it was also
denied.
➔ Thus, they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be
sued without its consent; thus, the action cannot prosper. This motion was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue: WON Feliciano may sue the Republic.

Ruling: NO. Feliciano has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to Court just like any
private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.

A suit for recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action
directed against a specific party or parties, and judgment therein binds only such party or parties.

Under settled jurisprudence, suit against the State is not permitted except upon showing that the State
has consented to which, in this case, Feliciano failed to allege. The failure of Feliciano to assert the
defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by the private
respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings.

Feliciano further asserted that the implied consent of suability may be read from the proclamation
itself when it established the reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be.” However, that is
not it. No consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing
private rights from the reservation established cannot be construed as an implied waiver of

FALQUEZA
immunity. A proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State must stem from statutory
authority. Waiver of State Immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

United States vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985]
Facts:
➔ The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement.
➔ In May 1972, the US invited submission of bids for the following projects: (a) Repair Fender
System; (b) Repair Typhoon damage.
➔ Eligio de Guzman & Co. (EDGC) responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
➔ Thereafter, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm
its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the
requests
➔ In June 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director,
Contracts Division. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea
wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the
projects had been awarded to third parties.
➔ Subsequently, EDGC sued the US and Messrs. James Galloway, William Colins and all members of
the engineering command to allow them to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages.
➔ Defendants filed a motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter and the persons of the defendants and that the subject matter of the complaint are acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as AGENTS of USA, a foreign sovereign which has not given
her consent to this suit.
➔ The trial court denied the motion.
➔ The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition.

Issue: WON USA may be sued.

Ruling: NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii -
sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and
can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both
the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act.

The Holy See vs. Rosario [G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994]
Facts:

FALQUEZA
➔ Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
➔ Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business.
➔ This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
➔ The said lot is contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). These three lots were sold through an agent Msgr. Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon
Licup. Licup assigned his rights to private respondent Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI).
➔ A dispute arose due to the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots.
➔ SSEI insisted that it should be petitioner who should clear the property but petitioner refused and
proposed that either SSEI undertake the eviction of that the earnest money amounting to Php
100,000 will just be returned to the former.
➔ Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it
seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash.
➔ However, on March 30, 1989, without notice to SSEI, the petitioner sold the lots to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
➔ SSEI demanded rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots but to no
avail. ➔ Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party.
➔ The trial court denied the motion to dismiss after finding that the petitioner “shed off” its
immunity by entering into the business contract in question.
➔ A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this special civil action.
➔ On December 19, 1991- Motion for Intervention was filed by the DFA, claiming its legal interest in
the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of the Holy See that it "adopts by
reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments
relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit"

Issue: WON the Holy See properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability.

Ruling: YES. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial
activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide
For State Immunity In Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular
transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a
"commercial character." In the case at bench, if the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure

FALQUEZA
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

Republic vs. Villasor [G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973]

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993]

PNB vs. Pabalan [G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978]

Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan [G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981]

Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass. [G.R. No. L-15751,January, 28, 1961]

Mobil Phils. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service [G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966]

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA [G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988]

Air Transportation Administration vs. Spouses David [G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011

Mun. of San Fernando vs. Firme [G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]

Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez [G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984]

Mun. of Makati vs. CA [G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990]

City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde [G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003]

ARTICLE II – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1
Villavicencio vs. Lukban [G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919]
Section 2
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]
Agustin vs. Edu [G.R. No. L49112, February 2, 1979]
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957] Gonzales vs. Hechanova [G.R. No. L-21897,
October 22, 1963] In Re: Garcia [2 SCRA 984, August 15, 1961]
Section 4
People vs. Lagman [G.R. No. 45892, July 13, 1938]

FALQUEZA
Section 6
Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]
Garces vs. Estenzo [G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981]
Taruc vs. De la Cruz [G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005]
Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]

Section 10
Calalang vs. Williams [G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940]
Almeda vs. CA [G.R. No. L-43800, July 29, 1977]
Ondoy vs. Ignacio [G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980]
Salonga vs. Farrales [G.R. No. L-47088, July 10, 1981]
Section 11
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,October 7, 2008
Section 12
Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
SPARK vs. Quezon City [G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017]
Virtouso vs. Municipal Judge [G.R. No. L-47841, March 21, 1978]
Obergefell vs. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015), June 26, 2015

Falsis vs. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019

Facts: On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to
“declare article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles
46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”

Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v.
Executive Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
(Associate Justice Brion) in Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion’s separate opinion, he claims
that this Court should follow a “‘fresh’ approach to this Court’s judicial power” and find that his Petition
pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere
passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion, and that the issues he raised were of such transcendental importance as to warrant the
setting aside of procedural niceties.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an actual case or controversy
reviewable by this Court;

2. Whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the
LGBTQI+ community gives him standing to challenge the Family Code;

3. Whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural defects of the Petition;

4. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is warranted;

5. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right

FALQUEZA
to life and liberty;

Held: 1. No. Parties coming to court must show that the assailed act had a direct adverse effect on
them. In Lozano v. Nograles:

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness”. In the United States,
courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the
twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship
to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is
generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been
accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in. (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

2. No. Legal standing or locus standi is the “right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” To possess legal standing, parties must show “a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.” The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures “that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”

The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both
“built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.” In
addition, economic reasons justify the rule. Thus:

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate
constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of
courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately
open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their
dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil
that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest, interest being “material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case[,] [ not just] mere curiosity about the question involved.” Whether a suit is public
or private, the parties must have “a present substantial interest,” not a “mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.” Those who bring the suit must possess their own
right to the relief sought. (Citations omitted)

Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is not the direct injury contemplated
by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a “law’s normative
impact”; “impairment” of his “ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships”; as well as injury to his “plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved
country”; or influence over his “decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country” cannot be

FALQUEZA
recognized by this as sufficient interest. Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter into long-term
monogamous same-sex relationships” and “to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved
country” does not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court
will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted inability to find a
partner.

Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to
him. His assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause,
the existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive cause of his
inability to find a partner is plainly non sequitur.

Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Petitioner fails to show how the Family
Code is the proximate cause of his alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that this injury comes from
“the law’s normative impact” is insufficient to establish the connection between the Family Code and
his alleged injury.

3. No. Intervention requires: (1) a movant’s legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) a showing
that the intervention will not delay the proceedings; and (3) a claim by the intervenor that is incapable
of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. Here, while petitioners-intervenors have legal
interest in the issues, their claims are more adequately decided in a separate proceeding, seeking relief
independently from the Petition.

The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from confusion as to its real purpose. A discerning reading of it
reveals that the ultimate remedy to what petitioners-intervenors have averred is a directive that
marriage licenses be issued to them. Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not seek this,
and it does not identify itself as a petition for mandamus ( or an action for mandatory injunction).
Rather, it couches itself as a petition of the same nature and seeking the same relief as the original
Petition. It takes pains to make itself appear inextricable from the original Petition, at the expense of
specifying what would make it viable.

4. No. Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of

hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional
rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this Court
emphasized that transcendental importance-originally cited to relax rules on legal standing and not as
an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts-applies only to cases with purely legal issues. We
explained that the decisive factor in whether this Court should permit the invocation of transcendental
importance is not merely the presence of “special and important reasons[,]” but the nature of the
question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the
issues raised should only be questions of law:

[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the
resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or
invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case.
Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially
equipped to try and resolve factual questions.

5. Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state
recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise:

FALQUEZA
Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to
legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional
right to marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of
the law. Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to
marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.
(Emphasis supplied)

In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all
intimate relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to
marital relationships.

For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of persons to the
rather restrictive nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point
is to constrain the relationships of those persons who did not even take part or join in this Petition to
what our laws may forbiddingly define as the norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of
loving freely, which petitioner himself consistently raised:

The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic.
That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as
romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the
sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties
creates.

In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple.
It is that which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as
possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring. (Emphasis
supplied)

Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community.
Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It
may unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community’s capacity to create a strong movement that ensures
lasting recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.

The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a static
anthropological fact. The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing
roles undertaken by men and women, especially under the present economic conditions.

To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the
sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do
not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile
couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family
organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.

Section 16

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Oposa vs. Factoran [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]

Facts: Civil suit was filed by minors praying to cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in
the country; and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs based on the right of the present generation and generations yet unborn to a balanced and
healthful ecology.

Issue: WON the petitioners have cause of action to prevent the impairment of the Philippine
rainforests.

Ruling: YES. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology necessarily implies the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. Thus, every generation has a responsibility
(intergenerational responsibility) to the next generation to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a natural right which is existence is assumed from the
inception of mankind hence, it is self-executing and does not need an enabling legislation to become
operative.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA [G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994]

Facts:
LLDA issued a cease and desist order ordering Caloocan to completely halt, stop, and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

LLDA issued another cease and desist order enjoining Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations
at Camarin area. The LLDA, with the PNP, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the
entry of all garbage dump trucks into Tala Estate.

Issue: W/N the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA 4850.

Ruling: YES. LLDA is mandated to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon, and
Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration, and pollution.

Doctrine: The recognition of health as a fundamental human right is a generally accepted principle of
international law. Thus, even if it is not expressly stated in an administrative charter, our
Constitution and the treaties (Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978), which the Philippines is a signatory, allows protection of the right to health and
healthful ecology.

Section 17
Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991

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Facts: The Foreign Borrowing Act authorized the automatic appropriation for debt service. The
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation is then assailed by petitioners alleging that the
Constitution mandates the Congress to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.

Issue: WON the Foreign Borrowing Act is unconstitutional.

Ruling: NO. Highest budgetary priority does not mean highest budgetary allocation. As long as
education is prioritized, there is no constitutional violation for allowing automatic appropriation for
debt service to respect the international commitments made by the State.

Section 19
Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
Secretary Navarro of DTI representing the Government of the Philippines signed the Final Act. The
signed Act by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the World Trade Organization Agreement (and its
integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

Issue: WON the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is
unconstitutional.

Ruling: NO. Although the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, the State allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair.

The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. While the Constitution indeed
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair.

Garcia vs. Board of Investments [G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990]

Section 21
Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. vs. Sec. of DAR [G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989]
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, [G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011]
Section 25
Basco vs PAGCOR [G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991]
Limbona vs. Mangelin [G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989] Section 26
Pamatong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]
Section 28
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
Valmonte vs. Belmonte [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato [G.R. No. 92541, November 13, 1991]
SEPARATION OF POWERS

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In re: Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]

RTC judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Commission on Justice. He asked
for the authorization of the SC before he can accept the designation.

Issue: WON the SC should approve Judge Manzano’s designation.

Ruling: NO. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.

Furthermore, these City/Provincial Committees on Justice are under the direct supervision of the
Secretary of DOJ. Therefore, the SC should not approve the letter of Judge Manzano because his
membership in the Committee constitutes as a violation of the principle of SOPs.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]

Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the
wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people"

The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as
an express prohibition in the constitution.

Facts: Ynsua

Issue: WON the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission. -YES.

Ruling: The court ruled that the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of
the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

Casibang vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979]

Tañada vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957] Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640,
October 12, 1976]
Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

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Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 Ongsiako-Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207264, October 22, 2013
DELEGATION OF POWER
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992] ABAKADA Guro vs. Ermita, G.R. No.
168056, September 1, 2006

Araneta vs. Dinglasan [G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]

Rodriguez vs. Gella [G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953]
People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA [G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988] United States vs. Ang Tang Ho
(43 PHIL 1 [1922])
Ynot vs. IAC [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]
Pelaez vs. Auditor General [G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965]

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

GAB NOTES:
o Repatriation law – natural-born citizen of the Philippines – if he became a naturalized US
citizen and became a Filipino citizen again, this sufficiently complies with the requirement.
o Term of office – interruption
o If interruption is voluntary e.g. he resigns, counted as 1 term
o If not voluntary, not counted as 1 term
o 3 groups of members of the HOR: ???
1. Sectoral
2. District (80%)
3. Party-list (20%)
o Legislative districts:
1. Province
2. City
3. Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila area (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
o Gerrymandering (Mariano v. COMELEC) - It is the formation of one legislative district out of
separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.
o To prevent this, the Constitution provides that legislative districts must have a compact,
contiguous, and adjacent territory.
o 250 members of the HOR “unless otherwise fixed by law” – the number of the members of the
HOR may be adjusted by the Congress. This may either be done through:
1. A general reapportionment law
2. A special law enacted by the Congress creating new cities etc. (Mariano vs. COMELEC)
o A special law converting a municipality into a highly urbanized city is valid and
constitutional which as a natural consequence thereof, increases the composition
of the HOR. (Abalos and Mariano case doctrine)
o Ra 7941 – party-list system
o 1st party – the one who obtained the highest number of votes
o If obtained at least 6% - 2 additional seats
o If more than 4 but less than 6% - 1 additional seat

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 o If less than 4% - no additional seat
o New formula (votes obtained by the concerned party/votes of the 1 st party x additional
seats of the 1st party) – wisdom – the other parties cannot equal or exceed the seat of the
1st party
o If this is not followed and will constitute 51 seats up, it will be mathematically
impossible to give the party-list system only the 20% seats that should be allocated
to them.
o BANAT COMPUTATION : only those who obtained 2% are entitled to the guaranteed seats.
Those non-2 percenters will be entitled only to the additional seats. (Get the remaining
seats available for distribution by subtracting the guaranteed seats to 2 percenters from
the 20% seats allocated to them. (20%-guaranteed seats)

Section 1

SECTION 1 - The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.

R.A. No. 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum)

SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by
the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

Section 3

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Pimentel. Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008

Additional requirement of drug testing is unconstitutional. The qualifications of a Senator is provided

under the Constitution which cannot be increased or decreased.

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Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 5

SECTION 5.
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

CASES
Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

Doctrine: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]

Doctrine: The Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law. To hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or

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province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty.

Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.

Montejo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995]

Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010]

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000 BANAT vs. COMELEC [G.R.
No. 179271, APRIL 21, 2009]
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001]
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]

What are the New Parameters (Guidelines for Screening PartyList Applicants) for Party-List Elections as
set by the Atong Paglaum Case?

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

a. National parties or organizations;
b. Regional parties or organizations; and
c. Sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.

A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be:

a. "marginalized and underrepresented" or
b. lacking in "well defined political constituencies."
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.

The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.

The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

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 Note: the enumeration of sectoral groups which “lack well-defined constituencies” is not
exhaustive. The crucial element is whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent.

6. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must:
a. Belong to their respective sectors, or
b. Must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.

The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations.

7. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010] Palparan v. HRET [G.R. No.
189506, February 11, 2010]
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010]
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007]
R.A. No. 7941 (Party List System)

RECIT QUESTION & ANSWERS:

1. Can we say that the grant of legislative powers to the legislations is unrestrained?
 NO. Case of Pimentel.
2. Under the constitution, particularly section 3. What are the qualifications of the members of
the Senate?
 No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural- born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
3. Among the 5 qualifications. 2 of these qualifications have specific periods.
 Age and residency.
4. When should the other 3 qualifications be possessed?
 3 conditions: Upon Valid proclamation, assumption of office, taken oath of
office. FRIVALDO VS COMELEC ruling
NEXT

5. Is it possible for a person who is a not a natural born citizen of the PH before noon of 30 TH of
June be qualified? Yes. Through repatriation because it is retroactive.
6. How about literacy?
7. Supposing the senator is just able to read and write in Mandarin. Can he qualify?

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  N0. Altho no express provision on this, it would be difficult if he cannot
communicate in the official language.
8. Congress cannot create additional qualification. Does it matter whether the additional
qualification is imposed prior to the election or after the election?
 NO. Bawal at all
9. How about the term of office of the senator?
 6 yrs
10. The phrase unless otherwise a different day is provided by law, does it pertain to the term of
office?
 No commencement of term lang.
11. How many terms?
 2 consecutive
12. A and B run as. Senators in 2007. A was proclaimed as the 12 th senator. B 13th. B filed an
electoral protest against A. Supposing in 2012 the senate electoral tribunal proclaiming B as
the duly elected senator. B assumed the office and served the unexpired term. 2013 both of
them run again both were proclaimed. In 2019 BOTH of them run again. Can both of them
assume office?
 Abunda vs Comelec doctrine.
NEXT
13. How many members of the House Of Rep are there? Fixed?
14. Is 250 the maximum or minimum?
 MAX
15. 3 groups of HOR.
 Legislative, Party-list and Sectoral. Extinct na yung sectoral.
16. HOR is composed of 80% legislative. How is this apportioned?
17. May it be apportioned to a province? To a city? To a municipality? Barangay?
 Yes except barangay.
18. Is there a population requirement for a city to be considered a legislative district?
 Atleast 250k. Sa province wala.
19. For a municipality?
 Within metro Manila. Uniform and progressive ration.
 Outside Metro Manila, they should comply with the 3rd paragraph. Atleast
250k.
20. Objective of Section 5 -Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
 Prevent gerrymandering. Practice of constituting a leg district to favor a
candidate or political party.
21. Do you know what is the origin of the word gerrymandering?
 Used in 18th century in BOSTON. Last part – Salamander. GERRY – Governor of Massachusetts.
22. You mentioned earlier that the 250 members may be adjusted. Can it be adjusted down?
 No. Progressive ratio.
23. What does progressive mean?
 Upward and forward.
24. How often can congress reconfigure the leg district?
 3 yrs every census.
25. Supposing the congress fail to reconfigure. Wouldn’t that make it unconstitutional?

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  NO. Not mandatory for the congress.
NEXT
26. Adjustment of reapportionment of HOR. Can it be done thru a special law?
 YES.
27. What is the reason in the case of Mariano allowing a special law…
28. Mariano Comelec question- nagcr me huhu
29. How about provinces. Can they be divided into several leg district provided they meet 250k
population?
No requirement of 250k Population. Aquino vs Comelec
30. Under the ordinance appended to the constitution, congress can make minor adjustments to
leg district. Does minor include transferring one leg district to another?
 NO.
31. In Montejo vs Comelec. Leyte have 5 leg district then nagkaron daw imbalance sabi ni
Petitioner. What is in Tolosa that they do not want it?
 Kasi daw tatakbo si Imelda. Ayaw nila political battle.
NEXT
32. WHAT IS A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM UNDER 7149
 The Party-List System is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the HoR from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations, or
coalitions thereof, registered with the COMELEC.
33. In the case OF ang bagong bayani, may a political party run under a party list system?
 YES.
34. What are the qualifications? 8 rules.
35. Under the first rule are those sectors exclusive?
 NO. Other sectors may be included except religious sectors.
36. Based on these rules may major political parties not registered along sectoral lines allowed to
participate?
 NO. In the old rules bawal. New rules ata pwede na.
37. In atong paglaum it was reduced to 6. Under the first rule there are 3 groups. What are
these?
38. What are the 2 groups of parties?
 Political or sectoral
39. Difference between a political party and a sectoral party?
40. Sectoral is referred to as?
41. May the political party participating in a leg district participate directly in party list system?
 NO
42. How will they participate then?
 Through sectoral wings
43. What are the 2 groups under sectoral
44. Lack of well defined constituencies include?
 4 sectors
45. In the case of atong paglaum, not all sectors are considered marginalized and under
represented. Should these terms mean to be a minority group?
 NO.
46. Why? – di nasagot
47. In our society who comprises the minority group?
 Rich. Mas konti mayaman. Majority and minority would pertain to the number.

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 48. In our economic sht who comprises the majority?
 Poor
49. In marginalize and underrepresented. Is it required that the person wallow in poverty?
 NO.
50. To what level should an individual belong to be considered marginalized and
underrepresented?
 Low income and below
Next – 6 new rules
51. To qualify under the party list system for sectoral parties. Is there a requirement for their
membership?
52. Qualification to become a nominee?
53. Under ra 7941, there is no period of membership to become a nominee to qualify?
 Atleast 90 days before election
54. Can we say that the period is the same in manifesting their intention
55. Section 5 of ra 7941, are the list exclusive?
56. May a party or org wishing to participate on party list election be disqualified on the ground
of religion?
 No. ang ladllad case
57. Who are disqualified to participate?

58. In the case of Ph Guardian Brotherhood, petitioner failed to participate in the party list
election. Subsequently nagparticipate but di naobtain 2%. Is the failure to participate in the
election a failure to obtain 2% of the votes cast?
 NO.
59. In banat vs Comelec. What is the interpretation of the failure to obtain 2% of the votes cast
in the 2 preceding elections?
 Disqualified but disqualification should be interpreted to mean that there is failure to obtain 1
seat.
Next
60. 4 inviolable rules in the party list system
61. Is there a reserved seating in the party list system?
62. What do we mean by reserved seating?
 Reserved for a specific sector.
63. Basis of 20% allocation?
 Constitution
64. What is the Formula?
65. Wisdom behind the 2% threshold?
 Ensure sufficient representation.
66. 2% threshold is party valid and partly unconstitutional. What part is valid and what part is
unconst.
 Valid for the first round. Not valid for the 2nd round
67. Wisdom behind the 3 seat limit?
 Ensure multiple representation.
68. Panganiban Formula in the veteran’s case. Who are entitled to distribution in the party list
system?
Obtained more than 2%. If 2% entitled to 1 seat.
69. Who is the first party in the party list election?

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 70. Rule when it comes to the additional seat of the 1st party.
71. Other parties, what is the formula? Panganiban formula
Votes obtained by the concerned party/ votes of the first party * additional seats of the 1 st
party.
72. Wisdom behind the formula?
73. RESULT IF WE ADOPT THAT FORMULA?
74. First part of the second round?
Allocate seat depending on whole integer number
75. Second step in the 2nd
76. Does that mean that the 20% allocation mandatory?
 No.
endddd

Section 6
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
- Residence actually pertains to domicile in election law
- Domicile of origin and domicile of choice
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995]

Facts: Imelda Marcos filed her COC for the position of the 1st District of Leyte. Montejo, the
incumbent Representative filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification of Imelda’s COC for
the alleged failure to comply with the residency requirement that she must have been the resident of
1st district for at least 1 year imm preceding the election.

She won the election but COMELEC suspended her proclamation and later on issued a Resolution
stating that she is DISQUALIFIED to run for Congressional seat of 1 st district of Leyte.

Issue: WON Imelda is qualified to run as Representative of Tacloban Leyte.

Ruling: YES, she is qualified. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "for the exercise of civil rights
and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence."

The concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home," "a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in
the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of
"the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.
It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.

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The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
of another domicile of choice.

Residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. A minor follows the domicile of
his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. Domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1.) An actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; (2.) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3.) Acts which correspond with the purpose. Marriage is
not a cause for loss of domicile.
Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995]

Aquino is not qualified.

We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established
not just residence but domicile of choice."

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a
resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the
elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

The term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile."

While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City, it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially
since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that
his intention was really for only one (1) year because he has other “residences” in Manila or QC.

Therefore, he is not qualified because proof shows that his intention was merely to reside and not
establish a domicile in Makati City.

Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991]

Issue: WON Jose Ong was a Filipino Citizen on the day of election.

Ruling: Yes. Election of citizenship becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973,
if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.

Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the

FALQUEZA
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being
a Filipino when he turned twenty-one.

Doctrine: Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996]

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by:

1. Direct act of Congress;
2. Naturalization; or
3. Repatriation.

The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least 25 years of age on election day).

Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 — the very day the term of office of
governor and other elective officials began — he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to
hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at
that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation
that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for
which such law was enacted.

The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

Note:
- These are qualifications pertaining already to an elective official such as a provincial governor and
not of candidates.
- such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence —
should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term — in this case, on June 30, 1995 and not at the time of
the filing of the COC.

Doctrine: Lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run
for and hold public office. The citizenship requirement is to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected

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Section 7.
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Dimaporo vs. Mitra [G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991]

Dimaporo – incumbent Rep of the 2 nd Legislative District of Lanao del Sur. Later, he filed his COC for
the position of Regional Governor resulting to his exclusion from the Roll of Members of the HORs
pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

Dimaporo alleged that his running for the elective position of Governor is not one of the grounds to
shorten his term of office as a member of the HOR under the Constitution and that it was not the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to incorporate such provision of the OEC in the 1987
Constitution which he further alleged to be a simple thing to do.

Issue: WON Dimaporo’s contention is correct.

Ruling: NO. Sec. 67 Art. 9 of the OEC does not cut short the “term” of office under the Constitution
but ensures that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running
for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail
in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position.

“Term” is different from “tenure” of office.

Term – cannot be extended or shortened by the legislature
Tenure – the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

Republic Act No. 6645

Republic Act No. 6645 December 28, 1987

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the

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Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall
hold a special election to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an official communication on the
existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired
term.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however,
that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with such general election.

Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for
due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city
concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies
thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the
polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
newspapers of general circulation.

CHECK: (Page 10, Kapoli Art. VI, Secs. 6-17)

Section 9 and 10 – In case of vacancies; salaries of S and M of HORs.

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase.

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang [G.R. No. 15905, August 3, 1966]

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES Art VI, Sec 11.

To avail of the privilege of speech and debate, remarks should be made (1) while in session and (2) in

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the discharge of official duties.

"Speech or debate therein" refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the
acts in question.

The publication of libelous letter involved in this case does not belong to this category. The guarantee
for Senators not to be questioned is for any speech he delivered inside Congress. Since he published
in in a newspaper, that is already outside of Congress. Thus, he has no more protection.

Osmeña vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]

General Rule: It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall.

Exception to the Rule: But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.

Therefore, for unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress could be censured, committed to
prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago, [A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009]

Senator Miriam delivered a speech which stated: “I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.”
Issue: WON Senator Miriam was clothed with parliamentary immunity.

YES. This legislative privilege of speech is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.

Without parliamentary immunity, the parliament would become a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value
if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion
of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge's speculation as to
the motives.

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Section 13
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.

Zandueta vs. De la Costa [G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938]

Judge Zundueta accepted his ad interim appointment as CFI judge with the authority to preside over
both the CFI of Manila and Palawan pursuant to the Judicial Reorganization Law.

His appointment was not approved by the COA. He wants to continue to occupy his previous office as
judge of CFI manila before his ad interim appointment.

Issue: WON Judge Zanueta is entitled to repossess his old office.

Ruling: NO. When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or
reorganized by a law—which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him—
qualifies for the discharge of his old office or duty. He will be considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment and he could no longer question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed. However, he may be excepted
from said rule only when his nonacceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or
when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the
petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the
Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so.

Section 14
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Puyat vs. De Guzman [G.R. No. 51122, March 25, 1982]

Section 16
SECTION 16.
1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote
of all its respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and

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 under such penalties, as such House may provide.

3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

LECTURE:
o
o MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS VS. MAJORITY OF THE HOUSE TO CONSTITUTE QOURUM
 Majority of its respective Members to elect the Senate President/Speaker means majority of
24 and 311 (the basis of the computation of majority is a fixed number – the number of seats
in each Houses)
 Majority of the House to constitute quorum to conduct a business means majority of a
variable number or majority of those members of the House which are within the Philippines
(the basis is the number of senators or members of HORs that are within the Philippines.
o RULES OF PROCEEDINGS – mere internal rules
 The rule is that courts cannot interfere with the implementation or non-implementation of
the procedural rules of the Houses
 xpt that which are violative of the Constitution or prejudicial or affects the rights of private
individuals who are not members of the Congress.
o LEGISLATIVE RECORDS AND JOURNAL
 The rule is that the Legislative record shall prevail over the legislative journal
 xpt matters required to be entered in the journal
 the yeas and nays in the voting of the bill on the last reading;
 veto message of the Pres;
 yeas and nays of any question etc. those provided under sec. 26 art. VI)
 The entries in the journal are conclusive upon the courts. Courts cannot go beyond what is
stated in the journal.
 Enrolled bill doctrine – the paper signed by the Senate president and the Speaker of the HoR
and certified by their respective secretaries and approved by the President.

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. [G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]
Baguilat vs. Alvarez [G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017]
Avelino vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949]
Arroyo vs. De Venecia [G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997]
Osmeña vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001]
Paredes,Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 118354, August 8, 1995]

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De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002]
U.S. vs. Pons [G.R. No. 11530, August 12, 1916]
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963]
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]

Section 17
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

NOTES:
o The decisions of ET are final and unappealable, but this is subject to judicial review of the SC to
determine the issue of WON there is GADALEJ.
o The ET is independent body from the Congress. The grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the ET is
expressly granted by the Constitution under Sec. 17 Art. VI.

Robles v. HRET – the jurisdiction of the HRET remains until the resolution of the electoral protest and
the mere filing of motion does not divest the HRET is its jurisdiction over the electoral protest.

Lazatin v. HRET – The omnibus election code and the rules promulgated by the HRET provides for the
period of filing of electoral protests. Between the OEC and the rules promulgated by the HRET, the
latter prevails because it is given the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its members.

Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC – petition to cancel COC is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC whicg
continues until the assailed officer becomes a member of a Congress and he only becomes a member
of the Congress, when the following requirements concur: there must be a valid proclamation, oath
of office, assumption of office.

Proclamation – must be valid

Oath of office – must be made while the Congress is in session
Assumption of office – sec. 4 and 7 – noon 30 th day of June following the year of the election

Pre-proclamation controversies are no longer allowed.

Pimentel v. HOR –

Section 18
COA
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,

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elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Section 19
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

NOTES:
o Rounding up is not allowed in the House of Senate but allowed in the HoR. It is not possible in
Senate because .5 lang so if rounded up to 10, he will get the .5 vote of another which is
unreasonable unlike in the HoR, it is possible because it may be .8, .9 and may be rounded up to 10
then he will get the .2 or .1 vote from another party which is reasonable.
o Formal coalition is not required to support 1 candidate – they can nominate without formal
coalition as long as the nomination is exclusive to 1 candidate
o The veto power of each member of COA does not violate the rule on majority vote of members of
the COA.

Section. 20. Records of congress are open to the public.

SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to
the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each
Member.

o The congress cannot enact a law prohibiting access to such records

Section 20. inquiries in aid of legislation

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

NOTES:
o Inquiries in aid of legislation
 This is allowed in Arnault v. Nazareno even in the absence of constitutional grant or pending
legislation because this is inherent in power to legislate.
 Even in the absence of a pending legislation as long as the matter of inquiry is a proper subject
of inquiry in aid of legislation. This is limited to proper subject of legislation.
 The power to determine WON a person violated a law is not a legislative power. (Bengzon v.
Senate) the matter of inquiry is WON the relatives of the President violated RA 3019 and is a
judicial power. This is not a proper matter of inquiry in aid of legislation.

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  Filing of criminal or civil cases will not automatically exempt them to attend or appear in
inquiries in aid of legislation as long as the inquiry is not determinative of their guilt in the
criminal or civil case. It will unduly pre-empt the authority of the congress to conduct the
inquiry in aid of legislation. (di ko narinig anong case)
 Balag and Arnault case – the Court did not allow them to invoke the right against self-
incrimination. Rule is this right is available to persons attending or appearing in inquiries in
aid of legislation. The court, however, did not allow in the case of Arnault because sabi nya
yung act nya did not constitute any violation of the law. In another case, the question is WON
he is the President of the fraternity. He did not answer the question invoking the right
against self-incrimination, the court considered it as a yes or admitting that he is a
member/President of the fraternity. In fact, answering the question will not constitute any
act violative of the law.
 Arnault case – the senate is a continuing body and may order the arrest of a resource person
but the HoR, only 3 years imprisonment which is the maximum penalty that can be imposed
by the HoR. Di na yan applicable ---- CONTROLLING DOCTRINE IS IN BALAG ALREADY –
contempt cases. Once each house of congress finally adjourns, the penalty of imprisonment
automatically ceases. The imprisonment shall be coterminous with the inquiry in aid of
legislation. Once the house adjourns, the authority to commit the person to prison also
ceases.
 May a law be enacted to exempt the attendance of a person in the aid of legislation such as
PCGG officials as provided in the case of In re Petition Sabio? No, it is unconstitutional.
 Senate v. Ermita – executive privilege refers to the President. And by extension, executive
secretary. Those pertains to information and not to the person except the President and exec
secretary.
 The inquiry extends to opinions in the discharge of non-delegable powers of the President –
case of Neri v. Senate –
 Gudani v. senga – invoked commander in chief power of Art. VII and not executive privilege.
 Garcillano v. HoR –

Section 22
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

NOTES:
QUESTION HOUR OR QS PERIOD
- The attendance is optional. Heads of exec depts may be required by the President to obtain
first his consent before they can attend.
- But in inquiries in aid of legislation, the President cannot require heads of exec depts to ask for
his consent before they can attend such inquiries because their attendance is mandatory.

Section 23

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SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Section 24
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]

WHAT IS NEEDED TO ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS ONLY THE BILL AND NOT
THE LAW.

Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point
out that although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two
respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively"
and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them,
that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence
of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which
is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third
version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note
is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to
the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in
order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its
powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We
are dealing here with the legislative power, which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives." The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is
the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is therefore, no justification for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such non-legislative

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power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of
as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems . On the
other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems
from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on
March 1, 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the
Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had
received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with
the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the
Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority
in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT
law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129
was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Alvarez vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996] Section 25

INTRODUCTION OF A BILL OF LOCAL APPLICATION IN THE SENATE IN ANTICIPATION OF THE BILL TO

BE PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No.
1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed
in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners
themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while
SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the
said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the
legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section
24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant
controversy.

Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third
Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on
December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month
thereafter or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public
hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it

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received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House
bill.

Section 25
SECTION 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Prohibits RIDER in an
appropriation bill (Garcia v. Mata)

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations
bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall
be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress. Failure to pass a GAB for the ensuing fiscal year = the GAL for the
preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and in force until a GAB is passed by the Congress

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of DBM [G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012]

Garcia vs. Mata [G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975]

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RIDER IN AN APPROPRIATION BILL.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of
paragraph 11 itself, which reads,

"After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two
years during any period of five consecutive years:"

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the
fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire
paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was a non-appropriation item inserted in an

appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against 'riders' to the general
appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the
Appropriation Act.

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly
connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and
every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the
legislative enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the
subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus, in
Sumulong vs. Comelec, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general
subject." The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a
rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation
of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this
restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision
in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the
policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such
provision is inoperative and of no effect.

Demetria vs. Alba [G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987]

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REALLIGNMENT OF BUDGET MAY ONLY BE DONE WHEN THERE ARE SAVINGS FROM THE
APPROPRIATIONS OF A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT AND THE SAME IS TO BE DONE TO AUGMENT
OTHER ITEMS IN THEIR OWN APPROPRIATIONS.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5].

It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to
be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made.

It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the
judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the
executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitutional and which power this Court has exercised in many instances.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208560, November 11, 2013 Syjuco vs. Abad, G.R. No. 209135, July 1, 2014

Section 26

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.

SECTION 26
 Reason of 1 subject of the bill
 To fairly apprise the people of the subject matter of the legislation

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 Hodge fudge – several unrelated subject matter
 Log rolling legislation – several subject matter to get the support of several interest
 It is the subject matter and not the effect of the bill that is reflected in the bill
 2 subject matter si embraced in the bill but only one is expressed in the title – not completely
unconstitutional
o Only the part of the law that is not germane to the title of the bill
 If 2 unrelated subject matter is in the title of the bill – the entire bill/law is unconstitutional because
both subject matter is expressed in the title


Philconsa vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965]

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987]
o The creation of an administrative body carries with it the powers and functions which does not
need to be expressed in the title.
o The powers and functions are germane to the creation of VRB

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]
o The certification of secretaries of both houses is conclusive with compliance with sec. 26 of art. 6
o Conclusive upon the courts
o Enrolled bill doctrine

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]
o Except clause should apply to the entire unless clause
o If certified by the President, the 3 readings on separate day and the printing and distribution of the
bill in its final form is dispensed with.

Tan vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994]

Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005]
o No amendment on the 3rd reading – pertains only to the readings in respective houses but not the
reading in the bicameral conference to change conflicting versions of the bills.
o Bicameral conference committee may adopt a 3rd version as long as germane to the
o Not covered by the no amendment rule
o Not
o
Section 27

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by

FALQUEZA
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House,
it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object

NOTES:
o Veto power of the president:
1. General veto power
2. Item veto – veto of particular item
o If general veto is used, the entire bill is vetoed
o Item veto is used in appropriations and tariff bills
o Provisions in an item cannot be vetoed unless they are considered as riders – those which do not
relate to particular items in the appropriation, revenue or tariff bills.
o Riders are considered as items so that the president may veto them

Gonzales vs. Macaraig [G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990]

o The president vetoed items in the GAA
o the exercise of veto power was questioned and a case was filed with the SC.
o This is not the proper remedy. The right remedy is to override the veto of the President.
o Also, the provision is considered a rider and considered an item. The item veto of the president
therefore is valid.

Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]

o A law was passed allowing the automatic adjustment of retirement benefits of the members of the
judiciary. A PD is issued to amend the above law.
o A petition was filed in the SC to declared the Presidential Decree amending the law as
unconstitutional.
o the president cannot exercise the general veto that will result to a repeal of a previous law

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

Section 28

SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development

FALQUEZA
 program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan [G.R. No. L- 81311, June 30, 1988]
Lung Center vs. Quezon City [G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004]
Province of Abra vs. Hernando [G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981]
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
Section 29
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960]
Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937] Guingona vs. Carague [G.R. No. 94571, April 22,
1991] Osmeña vs. Orbos [G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993] Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105,
August 19, 1994]
Section 30
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]
Diaz vs. CA [G.R. No. 109698, December 5, 1994]

Section 32

LECTURE

 Simultaneous filing of same bill is not prohibited under the constitution

 Amendment by substitution – valid

SEC. 25
 Appropriations bill – budget
 STAGES OF BUDGET CYCLE
 Budget prep
 Budget approp or budget legislation – where the congress passes the GAB
o GAB or SAB
o Comply with sec 26 and 27
o Sec. 25 is only special requirements for the passing of a GAB
 Doctrine of inappropriate provision
o Entire item should be vetoed by the president and not only a provisions
o Item veto power of the president (Philconsa v. Enriquez)

Par. 5 sec. 25
 Prohibition of transfer of the budget

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  Rules is that transfer of funds to one appropriation to another is prohibited – technical
malversation which is a crime. XPT the authorization of the Pres, SP, speaker etc. to transfer
savings to other items of appropriation for augmentation. (Demetria vs. Mata)
o Transfer is only allowed within the department
o There must be savings meaning surplus or excess
o Cross-border transfer is not allowed
 Syjuco vs. abad, belgica vs. ochoa
o savings cannot be declared by the DBM as unobligated – there is particular activity, but no
contract yet entered into by the government. Savings cannot be declared until the activity is
already completed, abandoned. The abandonment may be declared only by the head of the
executing agency. The act of DBM of declaring savings form unobligated activity before the
declaration of the final completion or final abandonment is unconstitutional.
o There can be no transfer in any activity not included in the GAA because this will amount to
appropriation which is a legislative function and violates the separation of power.
o There must be savings and can be declared only when finally completed or abandoned.
o Transfer must be for augmentation of an activity included in the GAA

Par. 7 sec. 25
 Deemed reenacted if Congress fail to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year
 Those already implemented are not included
 SAB for procurement of medical supply, it shall be supported by funds actually available or there
must be a corresponding revenue proposal to fund the same

Par. 6.
 Discretionary funds – lump sum appropriation – for intelligence fund. It is not enumerated in the
GAA. Should be for public purpose and supported by vouchers.

SECTION 26
 Reason of 1 subject of the bill
1. To fairly apprise the people of the subject matter of the legislation
2. Hodge fudge – several unrelated subject matter
3. Log rolling legislation – several subject matter to get the support of several interest


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