Feliciana Camara delivered a bank check in the amount of P2000 payable to herein petitioner Galvez,

who offered an exchange deal to the husband of the complainant in exchange of spouses’ car. The
amount represented the backpay for the car’s tax obligation, however the car did not respond to the
proper entry number in the Bureau of Customs files, hence Mrs. Camara demanded the return of her
money. Galvez then contended that the Pasay city branch of the court of the Court of the First Instance
of Rizal has no jurisdiction over the said matter he was denied the right to be heard when his denial for
postponement was rebuffed.

Jose T. Galvez, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines, respondents.

GR. No. L-122760

November 29, 1971

Castro, J.

DOCTRINE:

Estafa is a continuing crime and the receipt by the accused of the check in one place and his cashing of
the same shortly therefore in another place form part of the events that make up the body of the
offense.

FACTS:

In early 1959, herein petitioner Galvez offered the husband of the complainant Feliciana Camara an
exchange deal for the spouses’ car. Subsequently, the Camaras were shown a car to which they readily
liked. The Camara spouses then asked Galvez for an estimate of the customs and duties they would have
to pay upon the acquisition of the vehicle. With this, the latter volunteered to settle the tax liabilities by
the application of a mere backpay certificate to be purchased for an amount of P2,000.00.

Following the purchase of the car, Feliciana Camara delivered a bank check amounting to P2,000.00
payable to Galvez, representing the backpay for the car’s tax obligation. After a few months, it turned
out that the car did not correspond to the proper entry number in the Bureau of Customs files. Hence,
Mrs. Camara demanded Galvez to return her money. Galvez contended that the Pasay city branch of the
court of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal has no jurisdiction over the said matter and that he was
denied the right to be heard when his denial for postponement was rebuffed.

ISSUE/S:
W/n the Pasay city branch of the court of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction in
convicting Galvez guilty of Estafa and w/n the latter was denied the right to be heard.

RULING:

The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Galvez’s contention that since the check was received only in
Pasay and was later encashed in Manila, the action should have been commenced there. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the delivery by Camara of the check in Pasay City and Galvez’s acceptance
signified the transfer to the accused of the money belonging to the complainant and marked the
creation of a fiduciary relation between the parties which is an essential element of the crime of estafa.
Ergo, the territorial competence of the trial court was upheld.

As for Galvez’s contention of being deprived of his right to be heard, the Supreme Court upheld the
Court of Appeals decision that as in the nature of estafa, two-year worth of prosecution is more than
enough time for this purpose. As a rule, it is only in cases of clear arbitrariness that the court will
interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting or denying a motion for postponement.

Joaquin Guzman, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, respondent

G.R. No. L-9572

July 31, 1956

REYES, J.B.L.., J:

CASE DOCTRINE:

An agent, unlike a servant or messenger, has both the physical and judicial possession of the goods
received in agency, or the proceeds thereof, which takes the place of the goods after their sale by the
agent.

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Joaquin Guzman was a travelling sales agent of the New Life Commercial of Aparri,
Cagayan. Guzman left Manila with about 45 cases of different assortments of wine in a truck driven by
Andres Buenaventura and a helper namely Federico Cabacungan. Along their trip, Guzman made various
cash sales of wines and had in possession the amount of P4,873.62. Whilst still on their journey the next
morning, Guzman told the driver that he lost the amount of P2,840.50 and his firearm license. Upon the
former’s report to the police, Guzman entrusted the remaining cash to the driver who delivered the
same to Enrique Go, the company manager, upon their arrival in Appari. The said event then prompted
Go to report the said matter to the Philippine Constabulary. Later on, Guzman wrote to Go, requesting
him to defer the filing of a criminal complaint and promised to refund the amount lost. The Court of
Appeals found Guzman guilty of qualified theft.

ISSUE:

W/n Guzman is guilty of qualified theft or of estafa as the case herein.

HELD:

The Supreme Court debuffed the decision of the CA that Guzman is guilty of qualified theft as the latter
had only physical or material possession of the said merchandise or its proceeds because he was not the
owner thereof. The Supreme Court emphasized that an agent has both the physical and juridical
possession of the goods received in agency. As such, an agent can even assert, as against his own
principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of
the agency. Hence, as appellant converted to his own use proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to
him as agent, which he received in trust for and under obligation to deliver and turn over to his
principal, he is guilty of the crime of estafa as defined by Article 315, par. 1, subparagraph (e) of the RPC.

(C.) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EPIFANIO CARULASDULASAN and NICASIO BECAREL

G.R. No. L-6408. May 24, 1954.

a. Doctrine (in relation to criminal law)

Misappropriating personal propery received in trust or under the obligation to deliver or return the
same to the prejudice of another, shall constitute estafa.

b. Facts

Under the tenancy agreement, Epifanio Carulasdulasan and Nicasio Becarel had the obligation to share
one-half of whatever product they could harvest from Crisipin Almagro’s land. However, after selling 600
kilos of abaca, they did not turn-over the landlord’s share of 300 kilos. Despite repeated demands,
Carulasdulasan and Becarel refused to give it. They were accused of the crime of estafa.

c. Issues (in relation to criminal law)

WON the crime constituted estafa

d. Ruling

Yes, the accused are convicted of estafa for "any person who shall defraud or damage another by any
other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter” shall be punished under the first
paragraph of Article 318. In the case, the accused “with deliberate intent to defraud” their landlord, sold
and misappropriated the money for their own use and benefit to the damagae and prejudice of Almagro
in the amount of P330. Hence, Carulasdulasan and Becarel are guilty of estafa.

(D) US vs. Clarin

G.R. No. 5840. September 17, 1910.

CASE DOCTRINE:

The failure on the part of the industrial partners to return to the capitalist partner the capital brought
into the partnership by the latter is not an act constituting the crime of estafa,

FACTS:

Believing that he could make some money in buying and selling the mangoes, Pedro Larin after
delivering P172 to Pedro Tarug entered into a contract of partnership with the latter together with
Eusebio Clarin and Carlo de Guzman. The profits were to be equally divided between Larin and the
three.

After the three traded the mangoes and obtained P203 from the business, they defaulted on the terms
of the contract prompting Larin to charge them with the crime of estafa. The Fiscal filed an information
only against Eusebio Clarin subsequently the Trial court convicted the latter.

ISSUES: WON Clarin is guilty of Estafa

RULING: No. Clarin should be acquitted. According to No. 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code those who,
to the prejudice of another, shall appropriate or misapply any money, goods, or any kind of personal
property which they may have received as a deposit on commission for administration or in any other
character producing the obligation to deliver or return the same are guilty of estafa. This does not
include money received for a partnership.Furthermore the Supreme Court ruled that "the action that
lies with the capitalist partner for the recovery of his money is not a criminal action for estafa, but a civil
one arising from the partnership contract for a liquidation of the partnership and a levy on its assets, if
there should be any. C
(E) Esguerra vs. People

No. L-14313. July 26, 1960

CASE DOCTRINE:

an advance payment is subject to the disposal of the vendor. If the transaction fails, the liability arising
therefrom is of a civil and not of a criminal nature.

FACTS:

Dionisio Esguerra upon representation made with Yu Yek Huy & Co that he had copras ready for delivery
to it, took and received from the latter P2,400.00. The accused issued a receipt and was then required to
deliver to the company the equivalent worth of copras at its bodega. However, despite repeated
demands, the accused misappropriated the amount for his personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the Yu Yek Huy & Company. The lower court found the accused guilty as thus charged under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC. On appeal, the appellate court modified the decision of the trial
court and declared the appellant guilty of estafa under paragraph 3 (2-a) of Article 315.

ISSUES:

WON The crime of estafa was committed by the accused.

RULING:

The supreme court reversed the decision of the appellate court and acquitted the accused. On the
merits, there is reason to believe that the responsibility of herein appellant is only civil in nature. The
language of this receipt, together with the finding of the Court of Appeals that "Factually, the appellant
used to supply copra not only to the complainant, but also to other copra exporters, clearly indicate that
the transaction was that of sale of copra for future delivery. Obviously, an advance payment is subject to
the disposal of the vendor. If the transaction fails, the liability arising therefrom is of a civil and not of a
criminal nature.

(F) People vs. Benitez (G.R. No. L-15923, June 30, 1960)

Doctrine:

1. ESTAFA; FAILURE TO ACCOUNT UPON DEMAND FOR FUNDS HELD IN TRUST; CIRCUMSTANCES
SHOWING MISAPPROPRIATION.

2. CRIMINAL LIABILITY NOT AFFECTED BY COMPROMISE OR NOVATION OF CONTRACT AND NOT

WAIVABLE BY OFFENDED PARTY.

Facts:
Respondent Benjamin Benitez guilty of the crime estafa. Benitez was employed by Jose Cua as rent
collector of the house of the latter. In the months of July and August, 1956 respondent made collections
amounting to P540.00. Respondent failed to turn over the said amount to his employer, upon demand
by Cua the respondent offered to deduct P100.00 from his salary every month until the whole amount
of P540.00 is fully paid. The offer was accepted by Cua and reduced to writing.

Respondent after working for a few days in Cua’s establishment, he did not report or show up for work.
Having failed to report to work and pay his obligation a complaint for estafa was filed against him. He
was convicted.

Respondent appealed to CA, rendering a decision that accused has committed estafa.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the failure to account upon demand for funds held in trust, circumstances
showing misappropriation,

2. Whether or not the agreement with his employer converted his criminal liability into civil
obligation.

Ruling:

1. YES. Benitez has committed estafa and is criminally liable. The failure to account upon demand,
for funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.

Benitez

by him

2. NO. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract,

for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion
even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended
party.

The agreement of Benitez and Cua to deduct P100.00 from the monthly salary of Benitez until P540.00
until it is fully paid, after Benitez committed misappropriation does not obliterate the criminal liability
incurred.

(G) US vs. Sevilla (43 Phil. 130)

a. Doctrine (in relation to criminal law)

When an estafa takes the form of an actual appropriation and conversion of funds committed to the
care of the accused as treasurer of a corporation, the breach of trust involved in the conversion takes
the place of fraudulent intent and the act is none the less unlawful because of an intention on the part
of the accused to restore the funds.

b. Facts
The defendant is a treasurer and financial officer of Manila Railroad Company. The same took money for
his personal use amounting to P8,330 through his subordinate which is the cashier, from the corporate
funds entrusted upon him for safe-keeping on June 18, 1921. To substitute or in return, he gave his
personal check for the same amount drawn on the PNB or the Philippine National Bank. He also then
cashed a check in the amount of P1,670 and another P2,000 in the same manner. He admits that the
money was utilized for his own or personal and private use.

C. Issue

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of estafa.

D. Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant is guilty of estafa under the Revised Penal Code. As the
treasurer of the corporation, he was the responsible financial officer and had immediate control of the
current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. By taking
the entrusted to him for safekeeping and instead using it for personal use, he misappropriated and
diverted the funds for that period. Although argued that it was not the appellant’s intention to
misappropriate the funds entrusted to him, such intention is not a necessary element of the crime.
Lastly, the appellant’s act of misappropriation caused disturbance of property rights, which in itself is
sufficient to constitute injury to another. The breach of confidence involved in the conversion or
diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The Court finds all
of the necessary elements of estafa under paragraph 5 of Article 535 of the Penal Code, present.

(H) People vs. Jumawan

DOCTRINE: Where the complainant is not damaged or prejudiced by the accused’s act of retaining and
setting off what was due to him, with a balance still owing to him, besides the accused’s proven good
faith, the criminal action for estafa should be dismissed.

FACTS:

The accused is an agent for commission basis, who collected money from the business firm’s consumers.
Generally, these collections made by the agent were returned to the firms, however he refused to hand
over those collected in July and August 1965 to Montel Discount Center and rejected the company's
demand letter for payment of P55.00. He kept the amount of P65.00 due and owed to him for prior
collections which he had made over in full and the complainant had not been paid to him. His refusal to
hand over the said amount is because his commission has not been paid by Mr. Manuel Piamonte, his
original principal, a part owner and manager of the Montel Discount Center. Moreover, Mr. Piamonte
neglected to pay the accused of his earned commissions or allowances at the rate of P1.50 per day and
used business losses as his defense for non-payment.
ISSUE:

Whether the accused should be held liable for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.

RULING:

No. The trial court erred in convicting him of estafa when the undisputed facts of record clearly show
the absence of any criminal intent when appellant retained the collection last July and August 1965. The
prevailing circumstances shows that the unjustly exploited defendant is not legally accountable for his
act of keeping money that was even less than what was actually and honestly due and owing to him by
his principal. Even the trial court did not recognize his lack of criminal intent and lack of damage or
prejudice to his principal. It was not even proven that there was any kind of harm or discrimination as
necessary component of estafa. Mr. Piamonte could not claim such harm or prejudice because the
appellant had only withheld and put off a share of what was lawfully and long due to him, leaving a
balance payable to him. With all the considerations, together with the appellant’s proven good faith and
absolute lack of criminal intent on his part, entitle him to acquittal. Hence, the criminal action for estafa
should be dismissed because the complaint is not damaged or prejudiced by the accused’s act of
retaining and setting off what is due to him, and with the accused’s proven good faith.

(I) TUBB v. PEOPLE AND CA

Doctrine:

Criminal Law; Estafa; Misappropriation of funds held in trust distinguished from swindling through false
pretenses; Demand is not a condition precedent to the existence of the crime.

Facts: The complainant William Quasha agreed into investing in the rattan business with the accused,
George Tubb. Quasha delivered the sum of P 6,000.00 to Tubb on August 16, with the understanding
that the money shall be used exclusively by Tubb in the purchase of rattan for resale in Manila for P0.70
per piece from its P0.20 price per piece in Southern Luzon; that the rattan so bought shall be brought to
Manila within a few days; and, that the profit to be realized from the sale shall be divided equally
between them after the capital of P6,000.00 has been returned to Quash.

The parties had an exchange of telegrams regarding the procurement of licenses for the purchase of
forest products. On September 16, 1947, Quash did not receive a word from Tubb and was informed
that the latter was no longer residing in Calauag, Quezon Province.
Sometime in 1948, Quash met Tub at the Manila Hotel and asked what happened with his P6, 000.00
wherein Tubb replied that there was no use telling what happened, but he will try to pay back as he was
then working for one Gabino Angchuan of Cebu City and could get money from his said employer.
Thereafter, no communication from him was again received by Quash. Tubb misappropriated the
money. When Quasha heard that Tubb was in Cagayan de Oro, he wrote Tubb threatening him with
criminal action if he did not pay within a period of one month.

Issue: Is demand necessary for the accused to be guilty of estafa?

Ruling: There can be no estafa without a previous demand, which allegedly has not been made upon
herein petitioner, but the aforementioned query made in the Manila Hotel was tantamount to a
demand. Besides, the law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. Further, if there is evidence of misappropriation by the accused as in this case,
demand is not necessary. The accused is guilty of embezzlement under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC —

“ 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.

People vs. Fortuno

Doctrine: The issuance of a check with knowledge on the part of the drawer that he has no funds to
cover its amount and without informing the payee of such circumstance, does not constitute the crime
of estafa if the check was intended as payment of a pre-existing obligation.
FACTS:

- Fidel Fortuno rented from "El Hogar Filipino" a room in the Crystal Arcade : issued in favor of the
latter a check for P60 drawn against the Bank of the Commonwealth for his rental due

- upon presentation to the bank of the check for payment was dishonored for lack of funds

- An information for estafa was presented against the defendant in the municipal court of Manila

- upon a plea of guilty, he was sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay
an indemnity of P60 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency

- Defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance after entering a plea of not guilty and
thereafter substituting the same with the plea of guilty

- he was sentenced to the same penalty imposed by the municipal court.

ISSUE:

1. WON the acts of the accused are considered crimes of estafa

RULING:

- No.

- The issuance of a check with knowledge on the part of the drawer that he has no funds to cover its
amount and without informing the payee of such circumstance, does not constitute the crime of estafa
if the check was intended as payment of a pre-existing obligation, as in the instant case. The reason for
this rule is that deceit, to constitute estafa, should be the efficient cause of the defraudation and as such
should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of fraud

(K) ABELA vs. GOLEZ

G.R. No. L-32849 July 31, 1984

Doctrine: When postdated checks are issued and intended by the parties only as promissory notes, there
is no estafa even if there are no sufficient funds in the bank to cover the same.
Facts: In 1967, complainant Agustin Almabis entered into an agreement with respondent Virginia Anisco.
Almabis, being the owner and operator of fishing boats and fish ponds, sends fish to the latter to be sold
at the Divisoria Market. Respondent Anisco received four percent (4%) commission from the proceeds of
such sales and has the duty to remit the balance of the proceeds to the complainant.

The remittance of the proceeds were done by Anisco by sending her personal checks and when she had
been later in her remittances, complainant suggested to give him a check, each and every check of
which is presigned in blank. The four checks drawn on the Prudential Bank and Trust Company of Manila
as filled in by the complainant were all dishonored due to lack of funds. Hence, the complainant filed
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Roxas City a complaint for estafa against Anisco.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Anisco committed Estafa by giving, presigned blank checks to the
complainant which were later dishonored by the bank for insufficient funds.

Ruling: No. Respondent Anisco did not commit estafa by giving presigned blank checks to Agustin which
were dishonored by the bank.

Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds
in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.

The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.
In the case at bar, the arrangement can only be considered as an agreement for business convenience.
Deceit cannot be imputed to the respondent if the checks from the checkbook are controlled by the
complainant. The former had no time to prepare the same, giving her a chance to determine the
sufficiency of the necessary amount for replenishment of such deposit. The law contemplates, as ruled
in the case of People vs. Obieta, the checks were not intended as presentation and encashment but only
as promissory notes, and that he knew the risk he was running. Hence, Anisco did not commit the crime
of estafa.

(M) PEOPLE VS. VILLAPANDO

DOCTRINE: Issuing a postdated check in good faith cannot be held guilty of the crime of estafa

FACTS:

The defendant was charged with the crime of estafa in violation of Article 534, No.2., of the Penal Code,
as amended by Act No.3313. He pleaded not guilty during the arraignment but he was found guilty of
estafa and was sentenced to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor with accessory penalty to
pay the offended person in the sum of P200. The defendant appealed and contended that there is no
sufficient evidence to show that he is guilty of the crime charged.

Villapando is a physician, and at the time he issued the check in question he was engaged in the practice
of his profession in Lucena, Tayabas.

June 30, 1928

-> he issued said check in favor of Tan Chuaco for the sum of P200 to apply on his account with the latter

->he did not have sufficient funds in the bank, but he expected to collect from his clients sufficient
amount to pay said check on July 27, 1928

Villapando, foreseeing his inability to raise the amount of the check, the appellant went to see Tan
Chuaco and asked him not to present the check at the bank for collection on July 27, 1928, and at the
same time offered to pay the amount thereof in installments; Tan Chuanco agreed. He made several
payments to Tan Chuaco on account of said check, amounting to P90.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is liable for estafa by issuing a postdated check

RULING:

The court held that the appellant cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa. He issued a postdated
check, believing in good faith that he would be able to deposit in the bank sufficient funds to pay said
check when presented for collection. He was justified in expecting that he could raise the necessary
amount from his fees as a physician, before the check fell due. Then later, foreseeing his inability to pay
said check at maturity, he made an arrangement with his creditor to pay it little by little.

(N) LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

DOCTRINE: Gravamen of B.P, 22 is the issuance of a worthless check, not the non-payment of an
obligation

FACTS:
The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants
moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."

They question the constitutionality of BP 22 and insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal
protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is
flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting
amendments to a bill on Third Reading. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in
the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non- payment of a poll tax."

The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts except in G.R. No. 75789, wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. Because of this, the parties adversely
affected asked the court for relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 22 is constitutional?

RULING:

Yes. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.

O.) JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

G.R. NO. 129900 October 2, 2001

DOCTRINE: NOTICE OF DISHONOR IS REQUIRED: The absence of proof that the accused received any
notice informing her/him of the fact that her/his checks were dishonored and giving her/him the five (5)
days from receipt of notice of dishonor, which she/he need to make an arrangements for payment of
checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she/he had knowledge of the
insufficiency of her/his funds at the time of issuance.

FACTS:

Jane Caras, as accused, willfully and feloniously made or drew an issue to Atienza to apply on
account or for value PCI Bank which is payable to the order of cash. Despite receiving notice of such
dishonor by the drawee bank for Closed Account, the accused failed to pay according to Atienza the
amount of said check or to make arrangements for full payment of the same within five (5) business
days, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
issuance of payment of such check in full upon its presentment.

The accused was found guilty by the lower court of 15 counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Caras filed
a Motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court.

Caras claimed that she was not properly notified of such dishonor of her checks. Caras defended that on
the first demand letter as evidence there was no acknowledgment receipt, though at the second
demand letter there was a return card with no marking as evidence.

ISSUE:

WON The petitioner is liable for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22?

RULING:

NO. According to Batas Pambansa blg. 22, Caras is not liable for the criminal charges against her.
The evidence that can prove Caras already knew the dishonor of her checks and she was given five (5)
business days to make arrangements for the payment was not sufficient to be held liable. Convicting her
will not prosecute because it will violate the petitioner's right to due process. Therefore, When there
was no substantial evidence that can prove the presumption that the petitioner was given a requisite
notice of dishonor, clear ground for her discharge.

NOTE LANGS PERO DI KASAMA SA DIGEST: KAPAG WALA NG SUFFICIENT FUNDS IN OR CREDIT WITH
SUCH DRAWEE BANK, SUCH FACT SHALL ALWAYS BE EXPLICITLY STATED IN THE NOTICE OF DISHONOR
OR REFUSAL. IF NOT COMPLIED WITH, IT CANNOT BE PRESUMED AND WALA RIN ITONG CRIME.

G.R. No.122353, JUNE 6,2001

EVANGELINE DANAO VS COURT OF APPEALS

SANDOVAL-GUTTIERREZ, J;

DOCTRINE: IN ORDER TO CREATE A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION THAT THE ISSUER KNEW ABOUT THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE FUNDS, IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT THEY RECEIVED A NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND
WITHIN 5 BANKING DAYS, FAILED TO SATISFY THE AMOUNT OF CHECK.

FACTS: In need of funds, Petitioner Danao went to Arturo Estrada, the Branch Manager of Monte de
Piedad bank, to apply for a loan. However, due to her existing loan not yet fully liquidated, her loan
application was denied by Estrada. Petitioner was subsequently referred to Luviminda Macasieb, a
private lender who accepts post dated checks for security to a loan. After the referral, talks between
Petitioner and the private lender happened, upon agreement the private lender released to petitioner
the amount of Php. 29, 750.00. With this, the petitioner issued 2 checks to the private lender dated
January 24, 1992. Upon maturity of the checks, the private lender deposited the same to PCIB, only to
have both checks dishonored by the bank. The reason for the dishonoring of the check being the
petitioner's account had been closed. Private lender reached out to the petitioner to inform her about
the situation of her account, but to no response from the petitioner.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF VIOLATING ,BATAS PAMBANSA 22

RULING : NO. To hold a person liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it is not enough to establish that
a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the
check knew at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. Because this element involves a state of
mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge. Nonetheless, to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency
of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. The
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. In this case, no
proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the checks was ever presented during the
trial. Thus, the presumption or prima facie evidence of knowledge by the petitioner of the insufficiency
of funds or credit at the time she issued the checks did not arise.
PEOPLE VS. YABUT

DOCTRINE: By issuing a bad check is a continuing or transitory in nature. If all the necessary material
and essential to crime and requisite to its consummation occurred in one municipality, the court of that
place should have the jurisdiction of the case.

FACTS:

Two issues raised before the court for review;the rule on estafa for postdating or issuing a check with or
without sufficient funds and whether the new law on checks punishes the postdating or issuance
thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

Respondent Yabut with his wife Cecilia was accused of estafa bbefore the court of first instance of
Bulacan. Cecilia Que Yabut as the treasurer of the Yabut Transit Line was charged pretending to have
sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation in Caloocan City, checks are with a total of Php
6.568.94 payable to Freeway Tire Supply, which is owned by Alicia P. Andan. Despite the repeated
demands, the respondent company still failed to fund the account for the issued checks which prejudice
the Freeway Tire Supply.

Instead of Plea, Respondent applied for motion to quash, improperly laid in Malolos Bulacan
issued in the city of Caloocan where Yabut holds office. Judge Jesus de Vega then quashed the
information for the reason that the proper venue of the case is really in Caloocan City not Bulacan and
the facts recited do not constitute an offense because the checks were issued for a payment for a
preexisting obligation.

Likewise, the respondents husband, Geminiano Jr. also moved to quash as these checks were
issued in payment of pre-existing obligation.

On Oct 13, 1975 Judge Paras quashed the information because the elements took place in
Caloocan and it is within Caloocan’s Territorial Jurisdiction. Moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Hence, we find both petitions to be impressed with merits; Estafa by postdating checks may be a
transitory offense. However, Delivery is important as it signifies the possession and transfer from one
person to another or the receive. Therefore, the receiving of the check in Malolos leaves the Jurisdiction
in the court of Malolos. Even the tire and gas p. have is situated in Malolos. Therefore, the payment
should be made then in Malolos Bulacan as well.

ISSUE: WON Malolos courts is an improper jurisdiction as it is the venue of the delivery of checks

HELD: NO.

It was figured that respondents checks were written and signed in Caloocan City, but the
receiver and the initial place where the sale of tire and gas took place in Malolos Bulacan which is the
proper courts to have jurisdiction over the case.

Delivery of the check is the final act which renders the obligation consummated. Therefore, if
the check was undelivered then it is deemed inoperative. There also appears no contract of agency that
took place between the parties to bind the Andan for the acts of Yambao. For a contract of agency to
exist, the consent of both parties is essential, the principal should consent that the agent can and shall
act on his behalf, and the agent consents so to act.

The Venue of the offense still lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered.