Mass Graves, Stagnating Identification, and Violence: A Case Study in the Local Sources of

"The War" in Bosnia Hercegovina

Author(s): Mart Bax
Source: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 11-19
Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research
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 MASS GRAVES,STAGNATINGIDENTIFICATION,AND
VIOLENCE:A CASE STUDY IN THE LOCAL SOURCES
OF "THE WAR" IN BOSNIA HERCEGOVINA
MART BAX
Free University, Amsterdam

Bosnia Hercegovina is the site of a striking number of WorldWarII monumentserected on or

near mass graves. Unlike war monumentsand war graves elsewhere in Europe, these memori-
als are bones of contention and they generate violent inter-ethnic animosity. This article de-
scribes the trials and tribulations surroundingone of these war monumentsand the Serb and
Croat communitiesinvolved. It addresses an aspect of ethnic cleansing that has hitherto been
the focus of very little research, that is, the destruction of mass graves. It is hypothesizedthat
mass graves and the related commemorativeceremonies are a key to understandingthe stag-
nating ethnic identification and the recent revival of violence in rural Bosnia Hercegovina.
The article advocates a more systematic inquiry into the local sources of "the war" in this
part of the former Yugoslavia.[identity, violence, war, mass graves, Bosnia Hercogovina]

Far from simply serving to divert hostile impulses in a
harmlessdirection,humanritual is employed to exhort
people to war and violence... . [Als long as intergroup
hostilitieshave existed, ritualshave been used to express
them (Kertzer1988: 129).
... the conditionsthatlead to (large-scale)violencerequire
a microfoundationbasedupon social organizationin rural
and small town life... (Laitin1995: 19).
Bosnia-Herzegovinawas a mass-murderer's
dream come
true,a mightynecropolis
of emptymassgraves,highand
dry, waitingto be filled (Hall 1994:207).
Introduction
Late in the summer of 1992, just before nightfall, an
explosion resounded in Bijakovidi. Bijakovidi is one
of the hamlets of Medjugorje,the parish in western
Hercegovina that has expanded since the alleged
Marian apparitionsthere in the early eighties into a
pilgrimage centre of world-wide importance(cf. Bax
1995). I was just about to get up from the table and
see what happenedwhen the huge hands of my host,
Franjo B., pushed me back in my chair. "It is noth-
ing ... we'll stay inside," he said emphatically. In
bed that night, I thought it over. Apparently Franjo
did not want me asking any questions. For that mat-
ter, no one of the family in the room had paid any
attention to the explosion. It was as if everyone was
prepared for it, and then simply went about their
business.
We were working in the field the next morning
when I broughtit up again, but Franjo acted as if he
did not hear me. It was not until the lunch break,
11
when I said I would go have a look in the direction
of Surmanci, the hamlet I thought the sound of the
explosion had come from, that my landlord and
friend reacted. At the end of the afternoon, he said,
he would show me what had happened.
Without a word we drove toward Surmanci in
his old Volkswagen.I was familiar with part of what
barely deserved being called a road, for I had been
there a year before "the war." Since I was so insis-
tent, my previous host and I were to go see a war
monument. But before we had gotten very far, we
were startled by a volley of rifle shots--coming ac-
cording to my informantfrom Cetnik sentinels-and
we had no choice but to beat a hasty retreat.'
About half way we turned into a side road. Un-
like the first part, it was smooth. We made another
turn and a few kilometres further we stopped at
what looked like a huge parking lot in the middle of
nowhere. At the bottom of the ravine to the left the
Neretva River flowed past, and on the mountainside
to the right steps had been hacked out leading to a
shapeless mass of stone that was lit brightly in the
setting sun. We silently climbed the partly ravaged
staircase-68 steps, I remember.It stopped at a pla-
teau with the remains of a monument. "Comrades
blew up this blasted Cetnik thing," Franjo informed
me with a torrentof curses. In his school English he
added emotionally, "We killed the dead because
they kept them alive"--an ultimate form of ethnic
cleansing, I thought.2He spit with contempt on the
remains and turned away. He had barely given me
time to take pictures.3On our way back in the car I
felt the tension gather between us and did not say a
word. The road was so bad that the pipe of the cool-

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12 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
ing system of his old Polo broke, and when I started
asking questions while he repaired it, the "bomb"
burst. "Why, why, why ... you always want to
know why!" Hadn't I ever noticed that people didn't
want to answer my questions about Surmanci? (I
had.) Hadn't I ever noticed that no taxi, or anyone at
all, ever wanted to go to Surmanci?(I had.) Hadn't I
ever noticed that the people here all acted as if
Surmancididn't exist?
Lookat the road.It is almostimpossible
to drivedown
thatroad.Everyonefrom aroundhere tosses their garbage
theroad.Thereareno signstellingyoutheway
alongside
to Surmanci.At the church,all the hamletsare listed on
the big tablet-notSurmanci.
In all the guidebooks
for
tourists,the hamlets here are described-not Surmanci.
You can buy postcardsand slides of almost every spot
aroundhere-not of Surmanci.
Franjo concluded his tirade, alluding to my not be-
ing more perceptive, "To us here, Surmanci is dead
... we want to forget."
A few days later Father Leonard, one of the
Franciscanparish priests, revealed a bit more of the
secret. He told me people wanted to pretend
Surmancidid not exist because it reminded them of
oppression, humiliation, and forced labour. In the
Second World War, he explained, many Serbs from
the vicinity, especially from nearby Zitom, were
killed by local Ustagi, as the Serbs invariably call
the Croats, and tossed into the ravine at Surmanci.4
Since the establishment of the communist Tito re-
gime after the war their descendants and other rela-
tives have been taking every opportunity to remind
the Croats of what had happened.The monument at
Surmanciwas the largest and most painful reminder.
Father Leonard concluded, "Here almost every vil-
lage and neighbourhoodhas a painful reminder like
that."5
A few weeks later (I was gone by then)
Medjugorjewas startled by a few enormous explo-
sions. Villagers from Zitom who were said to be fa-
natic Serbs had blown up the most crucial part of
the bridge over the Neretva, destroying the most im-
portant connection between the Brotnjo Plateau and
Mostar. Pursued by a group of Croat rez'ervisti,the
people of Zitom fled with their families high into
the Vjelez Mountains,where they settled in a former
Muslim village now controlled by a Serb military
unit.6For the time being a long traditionof violence
and enmity between two rural communities in the
region had come to an end.
Since the outbreak of the war in Bosnia
Hercegovina in April 1992, a great deal of attention
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has been focussed on what the underlying causes
might have been. How is it possible, observers have
wondered, that people who lived side by side in
peace for decades suddenly developed such fierce
animosity? The answer is often sought in the recent
past: Tito's policy, aimed at the integrationof Yugo-
slavia's many peoples and nationalities, failed; and
the spectre of ethnonationalism was revived by ex-
tremist political leaders at the top (see, for example,
Glenny 1992; Slapgak 1993; Anstadt 1992; Irvine
1993; Ple'tina 1992; Schipflin 1993; Brey 1993;
Thompson 1992; Peternel 1993; Parin 1993; Denich
1994; Me'trovi6 1996; Feldman 1992; Hayden
1993b). Explanations of this kind certainly have
their merits, but in one importantrespect they fail:
they do not clarify why and how hostility was per-
petuated. Surmanci'smonument for the dead and the
related enmity between the people of Medjugorje
and Zitom provide an opportunityto shed more light
on this aspect. The case illustrates in detail that in
fact this animosity never ceased to exist, but has
been deliberately preserved and regularly nourished
by collective rituals. For decades the enmity was
concealed by political terror and hidden behind the
official communist rhetoric viewed in Western cir-
cles as the only truth. For a better understandingof
the war in Bosnia Hercegovina, more research is ur-
gently called for at the local level and focused upon
such ritual markers as war monuments cum mass
graves (see also Denich 1994).
Gatekeepersand Peasants
On the east bank of the Neretva River, where nu-
merous roads lead from the mountain villages to the
old trade route from Mostar to the Adriatic, there
are a couple of small towns. These vratari (gate-
keepers), as both the towns and their inhabitantsare
called locally, were founded in the early decades of
domination by the Ottoman Empire, between 1470
and 1550. They were small garrisons that oversaw
the communication between the mountain villages
and the marketcentres along the river. The predomi-
nantly Muslim population earned a living collecting
the tributes for the various authorities, maintaining
law and order in their area, and charging tolls on all
the traffic of passengers, goods, and animals be-
tween the market centres and the peasant communi-
ties (Balid 1992; Vego 1981). In view of their func-
tions it is no wonder the gatekeepers were unpopular
with the peasants and the merchantsfrom the towns.
They were regularly ambushed by gangs of revenge-
 MASS GRAVES
ful peasants, who were just as regularly disciplined
by the garrisons. Their wealth made the gatekeepers
attractiveto gangs of roving bandits (Koljevid 1980;
Balid 1992; Wilson 1970).
Zitom was one of these gatekeepers; it con-
trolled almost the entire Brotnjo Plateau. Zitom is
still associated with a winepress (presa za grozdje),
as the precious grape juice from the plateau was ap-
propriated there, and the worthless peels remained
behind.
When the Ottoman Empire began to waver in
the latter part of the nineteenth century, a group of
Serb rebels from Montenegro took advantage of the
opportunityto conquer the rich town of Zitom, ban-
ish or murder the local population, and occupy the
luxurious settlement themselves. However, the whole
area soon fell under Hapsburg rule. In their efforts
to pacify and incorporate the mainly Croat peasant
population, the Hapsburgs were only too happy to
use the militant Montenegrin Serbs (Soldo 1964;
Vego 1981). Since then, for the Croats of the
Brotnjo, Zitom has been a symbol of Serb oppres-
sion and exploitation.
In 1929, after the foundation of the Serb-
dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, hostilities esca-
lated and the region became the site of more and
more bloodshed. Groups of East Bosnian Cetniks,
originally a loosely organized auxiliary of the na-
tional police, began to terrorizethe populationof the
Brotnjo. With Zitom as their home base-and soon
with the support of mjesni cetni&i (local fighters),
they would pillage the plateau. They raped women,
stole cattle, destroyed vineyards and water cisterns,
burned houses and barns to the ground, and vi-
ciously penalized any resistance (Soldo n.d.). An
elderly informant from Medjugorje, a twelve-year-
old child at the time, compared those calamities to
the recent hostilities, "Nothing has really changed
... only the horses have become tanks and armoured
cars."
The officially authorizedreign of terror by the
Cetniks evoked a Croat counterpart: supported by
nationalistic political circles from Split and the sur-
rounding area, Brotnjo peasants organized vigilante
and resistance groups. Medjugorjebecame the centre
of the new Ustaa movement for the Brotnjo, bat-
tling a perpetual "mini-war" with Zitom (Soldo
1964, n.d.).
In the early years of World War II this regional
violence formation was incorporatedinto a war fig-
uration of national proportions.Backed by the Axis
powers the IndependentState of Croatia (NDH) was
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13
founded (1941), and Bosnia Hercegovina were to be
part of it. With the help of the paramilitaryUsta'a
organization and not infrequently the overt support
of Roman Catholic clergymen, the young state took
every opportunity to cleanse Croatia and Bosnia
Hercegovina of Serb elements. In addition to forced
conversions to Roman Catholicism, mass deporta-
tions and massacres were among the means to that
end (Alexander 1979; Ristid 1966; A. Djilas 1991;
Macek 1957; Tomasevich 1975; Jeli&-Butid1986).
In Medjugorje, the Usta'a headquartersof the
Brotnjo, "preparationswere made for action." Re-
portedly in conjunction with groups from Capljina,
Humac, and Siroki Brijeg, plans were made to
cleanse the peripheralregions of the Brotnjo. Zitom
was high on the list. "In the late summer of 1942,
the time had come," one of my most belligerent in-
formants told me. All the people of Zitom-insofar
as they were not in active battle somewhere else-
were taken prisoner and herded into a colossal
bunker built into a cliff by the Germans.The plan to
close off the entrance and leave them there was
abandoned, or so my informant told me, when a
"better" option came up. A column of lorries
packed with Serb prisoners and led by Germans
changed command near Zitom, and the Brotnjo
Ustagi were now in control. They added their "ship-
ment" from Zitom and headed toward Surmanci.
There, far from the inhabited world, the prisoners
were slaughteredand tossed into the ravine-nobody
knows exactly how many.
Like other hamlets involved in atrocities of this
kind, Medjugorje was severely punished. In the end
the outcome of the reprisals, later carried out by
Tito's Partizans, was that the parish of Medjugorje
lost about half its population and suffered considera-
ble material losses (Macek 1957; Craig 1988; Anon-
ymous 1986).7 This was not the end of it, for con-
cealed behind official communist rhetoric, after
World War II Medjugorje was to go through a
lengthy period of subjugationand humiliation.
Forced Labour and Humiliation
The liberation committees set up by Tito and his
Partizans in World War II to serve as local authori-
ties in the conquered territories were not averse to
the use of violence. In the post-war period as well,
as the new "civil society" was constructed, vio-
lence, intimidation, and terror continued to be inte-
gral policy components (Alexander 1979; Ristid
1966). Numerous newly created official positions on
14 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
the federal, national, and local levels were
"awarded" to "liberators of the people." Formally
expected to carry out party politics, in actuality they
ruled as potentateswhose main aim was to accumu-
late wealth and settle old accounts (Alexander 1979;
Soldo n.d.; M. Djilas 1975).
Former Partizan commander Stojan Stojanovih
was the first to visit the ghost town of itom after
World War II. Together with a few young men who
were members of the same clan, he had been able to
escape the heinous revenge the Usta'i took on his
native town. The men had joined a MontenegrinPar-
tizan unit. Their power and influence had
mushroomedin the course of the post-war cleansing
campaign in the region to eliminate the Ustaga
movement. In view of their success they were put in
charge-allegedly by the party--of the administra-
tive, economic, and demographic reconstruction of
Zitom.
Within little more than a decade, by the early
1960s, it was as if a miracle had taken place in the
ravaged town. Almost all the houses had been re-
built and were now occupied by relatives of the for-
mer residents, the bridge over the Neretva had been
repaired, the roads had been repaved, and a new
small Serbian Orthodoxchurch had even been built.
Whence this "miracle?" Some sources mention
considerable sums of government funding supple-
mented by special Soviet aid earmarked for their
sorely afflicted Serb brothers (Vego 1980; Soldo
1964). In another publication (Smilan 1977) refer-
ences are made to continual assistance from Serb
emigrantsand Gastarbeiter.Still another source em-
phasizes the energy and the Partizanmentality of the
local population(Dragan 1978).
In addition to these possibly correct and rele-
vant explanations, Soldo (n.d.) notes another point
that deserves attention here. After World War II, he
observes, the Brotnjo-like other regions in Bosnia
Hercegovina-was carved up into a number of unof-
ficial provinces (kolonije) "ruled" by local (Serb)
Partizanleaders-a power constellation that was still
in existence at the outbreak of the most recent
"war.")
Stojan Stojanovid and his fellow clan members
controlled Medjugorje and the adjacent
neighbourhoods of Bijakovii and Surmanci. The
villagers have greatly contributedto the reconstruc-
tion of Zitom and the prosperity of its inhabitants.
Until the late 1960s every household that had been
linked to the Ustaga movement (according to the au-
thorities, that included all the Croat households in
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the region) had to make "reparations" or pay off
"war debts" to the Partizan Fund, which was in ac-
tuality managed by the Serb establishment. Anyone
who refused to do so was accused of subversive na-
tionalistic conduct, invariably resulting in imprison-
ment (Soldo n.d.).9
By the end of the 1960s these policies made
way for a policy that in theory aimed at the promo-
tion of "brotherhoodand unity," but actually served
to reinforce ethnic animosity. The state government
in Sarajevo made funds available to "promote the
cultural legacy," and local authorities could submit
proposals in this connection.10 In Medjugorje the
population was confronted with this promotion in
the spring of 1970. It took quite a bit of proddingon
my part to get a few of the villagers to tell me about
it.
A vanof armedmencame--Cetniks from[Zitom].They
at thecrossingwherethelateDjureSivri6'shouse
stopped
usedto be.Furtherdowntheroad,theyblockedoff partof
themountain withlittleredflags.... Laterwe heardexplo-
sions, and that eveningwe saw partof the mountainhad
been blownup. Thenwe had to come and work,chopping
stonesand carryingthem away. But no one came. That is
why the policefromCitluktook the peoplefromtheir
homes.A lot of menfledto themountains,
butwhenthey
came back home at night, the police came and took them
away.
Bit by bit it became clear to the local people
that the "Cetniks" were building a monument for
their World War II comrades, and that the people
from the Brotnjo (alleged Ustagi) had to do the ac-
tual work." For almost three years the people of
Medjugorje, Bijakovidi, and Surmanci did all they
could to sabotage the work, but the authoritieskept
forcing them to do their share in building the monu-
ment. Without exception, obstruction led to arrests,
which meant either paying a fine or doing a few
days of forced labour.12 Soon the building site was
popularly referred to as Goli Otok, after the notori-
ous state prison off the Adriatic coast (Soldo n.d.).
After the unveiling ceremony on 27 April 1973,
the humiliation went on. The authorities had no
trouble finding a reason to punish someone, espe-
cially considering the way the villagers were apt to
act. Garbagediscarded alongside the road had to be
removed, potholes in the surface of the road had to
be repaired,there had to be more and better parking
spaces. There was an almost endless succession of
sabotage and punishment, with annual peaks around
27 April. That was when thousands of detested
"Cetniks" would gather from far and wide in their
automobiles to celebrate the past; Partizan heroism,
 MASS GRAVES 15

anti-fascism,andpartyloyaltywerethe mainthemes entertainmultipleand shiftingidentifications in con-

on theseoccasions.Theywereloud-mouthed, or so I centricand intersectingcircles.Wideridentifications,
have been told, and uncouth,and this evokedlocal the authorclaims, are re-enactedand intensifiedin
objections,whichin turnincitedthe authorities
to do the primary setting of family and peer groups.
theirbest to "get mattersback to normal,"for ex- Adoptinga historicalanddevelopmental perspective,
ample,by orderingvillagersto cleanthe streets. De Swaandescribeshow social identifications were
Towardthe mid-1980s,some yearsafterthe al- restrictedto kinshipgroupsuntil the adventof agri-
leged Marianapparitionswhich attractedmassesof culturalsociety and the emergenceof identifications
pilgrims,this complex of ethnic animosity,which basedon proximity.Only in the mass politicsof ur-
was whatit was, fadedinto the background. "It was ban-industrialsociety were social identificationsex-
thanksto the powerof the Motherof God,"saidFa- tendedto largerentities,such as class, race,and na-
therLeonard,thoughothersfelt it was thanksto the tion. Today,an identitywith humanityin its entirety
economicboom in Medjugorjethat the authorities is emerging.This ultimatelyencompassingidentifi-
benefitedfrom as well. Whateverthe case may be, cation, De Swaanobserves,lacks the dynamicsof
there were no furtherlarge-scaleceremonialevents inclusion/exclusionandrivalry,butmay yet be vital-
nearthe mass graveof Surmanci. ized by a sense of globalthreatandcommonhuman
In 1992, whenthe Serb-controlled statemonop- destiny.
oly over the organized means of violence dis- De Swaan'sapproachseems much more ade-
integrated, the monument near Surmanci "dis- quate not only for historicaland cross-culturalre-
integrated"as well. "But the memorylives on---on searchbut also for comingto gripswith the dynam-
both sides," lamentedthe parishpriest.
ics, ambivalencies, and ambiguities of cultural
categorization.However,the authorfails to explicitly
Discussion and Conclusion explorethe mechanismsand factorscausingstagna-
tion in or even reversalof the overallprocessof ex-
In the social sciences a Westernethno-theorystill panding identification (cf. also Mennell 1989).
seems to dominatethe studyof ethnicityand other Surmanici'smass grave monumentand the related
forms of collectiveidentity.It is basedon the pre- annualcommemorations, describedbefore,seem to
mise that culturalaffiliationsreflectblood ties and constitute such a stagnatingmechanism.Officially,
havea predetermined qualityof inevitability.It is as- in accordance with the government's policy,the cer-
sumedthat people are certainpersonsbecausethey emonieswere explicitlynon-ethnic:it was the "vic-
were bornto be so, andthatmembership in a group tims of fascism"who were commemorated, without
is given at birthandcan neverbe changed(Linnekin any referenceto theirethnicbackground. But since
and Poyer 1990; see also Bringa 1993). It will be the Serbs were locally in power,unofficiallythings
clear thatthis is only one of manypossiblemodels were different.Thus,by systematicallyenactingthe
for conceptualizing and experiencingculturaldiffer- past, the mutualidentificationsof Serbs and Croats
ences and similarities,for differentpeopleshavedif- were kept alive, which in turn virtuallyprecluded
ferentnotionsand ideas aboutwhatdetermineswho the possibilityof social identificationon a higher
they are and to which categoryof people they be- level of social inclusion, that is, as Bosnians or
In
long. peasant societies people locally define and Yugoslavs.
constructtheir identityaccordingto theirown per- Surmanci'smass grave monumentand the re-
ceptionsand experiences,in interactionwith other lated ceremoniesalso constituteda very powerful
local or neighbouring groups;this maybe in congru- reservoir,so to speak, of traumaticmemoriesand
ence or at odds with the official state forms of feelingsof hatred(cf. Kertzer1988).As long as the
categorization. state monopolyover the organizedmeans of vio-
In his importantarticle "Identificationin ex- lence was kept intact,these memoriesand feelings
pandingcircles" (1994) Abramde Swaan tries to remainedrelativelysuppressed.But when that mo-
breakaway from these rathernarrowand staticno- nopolycollapsedat the beginningof the recentwar,
tions by focusingon identification. Socialidentifica- they turnedinto viciouslyviolentbehaviour.Thus,it
tion, he argues,involvesa dialecticsof inclusionand may be hypothesizedthat mass graves and related
exclusion,and a dynamicsof competitionbetween ceremoniesprovidea key to understanding the stag-
groups;it is an ongoingprocesswhichtendsto ex- nating,ethnicidentification and the recentrevivalof
pand and includeever more people.Humanbeings violence in ruralBosnia Hercegovina(cf. Denich

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16 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
1994; Das 1990; Hayden 1992B, 1993; Volkan
1979).
Surmanci'swar monumentis not the only one
of its kind.Untilnow (the end of 1996)I have been
able to tracesixteensimilarritualcentres.In all the
cases they are a symbolicexpressionof the long-
termpowerand dependencyrelationsbetweenSerb
powercentresandthe Croatcommunitiesdominated
by them.In all the cases these emotionallycharged
sites were blown up by small militantgroups of
Croats shortly after the recent crumblingof the
power apparatus,thus destroyingthe last territorial
ties and claims of the opponent.The assumption
wouldthusseemjustifiedthatthereis evidencehere
of a more generalpattern,characteristic of western
and southernHercegovina, of ethnicallybasedantag-
onism between pairs or clusters of village
communities.
If this assumptionis well-founded,it can also
open new optionsfor a betterunderstanding of the
recentwar in this partof the formerYugoslavia.It
can then become clear that the bloodsheddid not
come out of the blue, nor was it the directresultof
some50-yearold spectresrevivedby extremistpolit-
ical leaders at the top (cf. Denich 1994; Hayden
1993b). Instead,it was a temporaryintensification
andexpansionof an ongoingprocessof maintaining
and reproducing extremelypassionateethnicantago-
nism-a processthat mainly unfoldedat the local
level and in which mass graves and relatedcom-
memorativeceremoniesplayeda key role (cf. also
Denich1994).It can also becomeclearthatthe term
"war" as it is used in Bosnia Hercegovinashould
not be taken to mean the same thing as in other
partsof the world.The generic term rat not only
pertainsto violentprocessesbetweenregulararmies
at the nationalor state level, but also to more pri-
vate feudsbetweenfamiliesandclans,as well as all
the moreflexibleandtemporary violentoperationsat
intermediary levels of societal Thus,any
integration.
discussionaboutthe recent"war"in the formerYu-
goslaviashouldpay due attentionto this conceptual
complexity and phenomenalinterconnectedness-
ratherthanto try to arriveat some tidy set of dis-
tinctionsanddefinitions(cf. also Meltrovid1996).
Thereis one intriguingquestionthat shouldbe
addressedhere: Why did Westerncircles until re-
cently know virtuallynothingaboutthis more gen-
eral patternof ethnicallybasedantagonism?A par-
tial explanation can be sought in the effective
concealmentstrategiesof the communistregime
underTito. Everyeffortto drawpublicattentionto
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nationalisticdifferenceswas relentlesslysuppressed
or depictedby the strictlycensoredYugoslavstate
press as "manipulation by capitalistpowers,""un-
derminingactivitieson the part of subversiveele-
ments,"or simplyas the workof "gangsters."Vir-
tuallywithouta wordof criticism,WesternEuropean
intellectualandpoliticalcirclesacceptedthis version
as the truth.Any criticalinquiryinto the recentpast
of Yugoslaviawas punishableby a lengthyprison
sentence(Balid 1992; Kideckel1993; Ramet1984).
In additionto Stalinistcommunists,the infamouspo-
litical prisonat Goli Otok, situatednear a popular
tourist island in the Adriatic, was almost solely
populatedby historians,journalists,andauthorswho
had shed a criticallight on the formerYugoslavia's
recentpast (Balid1992;Soldo n.d.).
This Westernunawareness was not alleviatedby
or
any anthropological ethnographicstudies at the
local level. On the contrary,in the impressivere-
view article they wrote in 1983, Halpern and
Kideckeldid not mentiona single publicationabout
local-levelpoliticalrelationsand processes,for the
simplereasonthattherewerenone.The studyof na-
tionalismin Yugoslaviawas politically dangerous
and thustabooin anthropological circles,and thatof
ethnicitylong remainedconfinedto analysesof the
cultural content of ethnic identity (for example,
Hammel1969; Lockwood1972, 1975, 1978, 1981)
or focusedon the politicallyrelativelyinnocuousin-
ter-statelevel (for example,Beck and Cole 1981;
Sugar1980).As late as 1991 in anthropological cir-
cles the phenomenonof ethnonationalism in former
Yugoslaviawas dismissedas "folk ideology" (cf.
Simid 1991).It was not until the recentoutbreakof
warfarethat anthropologistsfocused on the region
becamepainfullyawareof their selective attention
and of its consequencesfor their perceptionof the
local roots of "the war" (for example, Kideckel
1993; Halpern 1993; Simid 1993; Denich 1991,
1993, 1994;Hayden1993B;Dispalatovid1993;Bal-
linger 1994;Bowman1994).
NorbertEliasrepeatedlynotedthatsocialdevel-
opmentsare characterized by a combination of regu-
larity and randomness, explainability and pure
chance.On lower levels of integration,occurrences
thatmightbe regularand explainableat a high level
becomeerratic,unpredictable, anddependenton ran-
dom circumstancesand personalquirks.Since the
MiddleAges the processesof state formationand
statedevelopmentin WesternEuropehave exhibited
regularityand structure,developmentin a certaindi-
rection,and can be analyzedand interpreted as such
 MASS GRAVES
(Elias 1982, 1989; see also Wilterdink 1993). It is
from this perspective, characteristicof Western Eu-
rope, that the developments in former Yugoslavia in
general and in Bosnia Hercegovina in particularare
generally examined and evaluated, using terms such
as erratic, irrational,pointless, and inconsistent. The
case of Surmanci shows that what might seem ran-
dom and unpredictable on a higher societal level
NOTES
Acknowledgments This articleis basedon documentsexamined
and field workconductedintermittently between1983 and 1995.
The namesof almostall the peopleandsome of the placeshave
been changed.I wouldlike to expressmy gratitudeto my infor-
mantsin Bosnia Hercegovinaand elsewherein Europefor their
assistance,protection,and hospitality.Fortheircommentson ear-
lier versionsof this article,I would like to thankBill Christian,
Ger Duijzings,the late ErnestGellner,CarolineHanken,Dieter
Hanners,Daan Meijers, Ed Koster, Estellie Smith, Lev Orec,
FredSpier, Sjef Vissers,Alex Weingrod,the editorof this peri-
odical, and two anonymousreviewers.Of course,I alone bear
full responsibilityfor the contentsof the article.
'The termCetniksor Cetnicioriginallyreferredto the leg-
endaryandoften glamourizedSerbbuccaneersandgangsof ban-
dits from the era of the EarlyOttomanrule who, or so the story
goes, rose up at regularintervalsin an effortto cast off the de-
spised Turkishyoke. In both of the worldwars Cetnikswere a
paramilitaryorganizationof Serbs who saw it as their task to
supportthe regularSerb troopsand maintainlaw and orderin
the region.In practice,however,it was not unusualfor them to
operatein small independentunitsled by war lordsand terrorize
the Croatianand BosnianCroatcountryside.As such, they were
extremelydisliked by the Croatcommunity.After the Second
WorldWarthese mini-armiessoon fell into decline.Later,how-
ever, Cetnikresistancegroupswereknownto playan activerole,
especiallyin the easternBosniancountryside,where they were
the "strongarm" of regionalultra-nationalist Serb movements.
Up to this day Croatsand Muslimsin BosniaHercegovinacall
their Serb compatriotsIetniks. For more informationabout
Cetniks past and present,see Copid (1964), A. Djilas (1991),
Tomasevich(1975), and Malcolm(1994).
2Inthe Bosniancountrysidethe deceasedcontinueto be part
of theirkinshipgroup.Via them,theirprogenycan lay claim to
the use of land and waterand to the produceof fruitand olive
trees.It is not until all the tracesof theirlives have been wiped
out that these claimscease to exist.
'In the followingyear, afterI had collectedmoreextensive
visual materialaboutravagedwar monumentsand mass graves,
all that materialthat was so valuableto me was destroyedby a
war lordfromthe vicinity.He hadprobablybeen informedabout
my activities, which might have compromisedhim. Using the
threat of violence, he forced me to hand over my entire
collection.
'The Ustala movementis also said to have originatedin a
distantpast, when "intrepidCroat warriorstook arms against
alien rule." Accordingto authoritativehistoricalsources,how-
ever, the Ustahamovementemergedin responseto the hege-
monicaspirationsof the Serbsin the firstdecadesof the twenti-
eth century.At the startof the 1940s the movementbecamethe
official "strongarm"of the fascistIndependent Stateof Croatia
(NDH). In fact, many of the units operatedindependentlyand
cruellyterrorizedthe Serb people of BosniaHercegovina.After
This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 01:34:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
17
demonstratesmuch regularity and explainability at a
local level. The conclusion seems obvious that for a
better understandingof the recent problems in Bos-
nia Hercegovina-and possibly for the present
problems of violence in Europe in general (cf. Laitin
1995)--attention should be more intensely and sys-
tematically devoted to processes and developments
at lower levels of social integration.
WorldWarII, the movementwas largelyliquidatedby the new
communistgovernment.Nonetheless,a numberof cells contin-
ued underground, especiallyin westernBosniaand Hercegovina,
the birthplaceand traditionallythe centreof the movement.Up
until today Serbsfromthe regionstill call every Croata Ustala
(plural:Ustali). More informationon this movement'spast and
presentcan be foundin Jelid-Butid(1983), Ristid(1966), Banad
(1984), Hory and Broszat(1965), Krihman(1983), Paris(1961),
Startevid(1971), Tolstoy(1986) and Tomasevich(1975).
-Whenthe communistregimein the formerYugoslaviabe-
gan to disintegratein 1982, people startedto speak hesitantly
and sometimes even to write about the World War II mass
graves and monumentsand their background.Official, govern-
ment-propagatedviews always seemed to have an unofficial
counterpartsustainedby the less powerfulsegmentof the popu-
lation, and diametricallyopposed to the official version (cf.
Glenny 1992; Brey 1993; Rathfelder1992; Reissmfiller1992,
1993; Denich 1991;Soldo n.d.).It nonethelessremaineda highly
sensitivesubject,and when the "big war" brokeout in Bosnia
Hercegovinain April 1992, the opennessonce again becamea
thing of the past.
6Refervistirefers in popularusage to all the militias that
were active in the recentwar, includingthe independently oper-
ating war lordswith theirmen as well as the reservetroopsfrom
the old stateor federalarmy,the gangsof soldierswho had de-
serted and roved about the countrysideplundering,and the
"weekend militias," which were bands of relatives and
neighbourswho went out to pillageand raidin hostileterritory.
7ThePartizansheadedby Tito were the newestof the three
"resistance" movements active in Yugoslav territoryduring
WorldWarII. It was predominantly Serbswho joinedthis gener-
ally well-organizedcommunistmilitaryand political organiza-
tion. Very few Croatsfrom Bosnia Hercegovinaplayed a role.
After the war this organizationwas able to consolidateits power
and establisha federationof socialistrepublics,initiallyfollow-
ing the Russianexample.Almost all the importantgovernment
positions were occupied by ex-partizans.Especially in Bosnia
Hercegovina, it was not unusual for them to rule as local
potentates.Moreextensiveinformation can be foundin A. Djilas
(1991), M. Djilas (1977), Parin(1991), Maclean(1990), Roberts
(1983[1973]),and Tomasevich(1975).
8In 1992 I was informedaboutthe existence of extensive
documentationon these ethnic hostilities in the region. A re-
porterfromMostarskiList had accumulated a collectionof docu-
ments based on his own investigationsin the archivesof the
newspaper,and awaitedan appropriate momentto publishthem.
I was able to readand leaf throughsome of themand makecop-
ies of certainpartsI felt were extremelysalient.WhenI wanted
to continue my investigationin 1993, the newspaperbuilding
turnedout to have been completelydestroyed,as had almostall
the buildingsin the centreof Mostar.
9Almostall the young men of Medjugorjeat the time spent
18 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

some time for this reason in the jails of Mostar,Sarajevo,or
some othertown in the formerrepublicof BosniaHercegovina.
"'Cf.MostarskiList, 12 March1968.
"Accordingto some sources,at the beginningof the 1960s
a modestmonumenthad been built at the same spot. However,I
was unableto uncoverany furtherdetails.
'2FatherSiro, who was servingthe parishat the time, also
had to haul stones as punishmentfor giving a sermonin which
he comparedthe parishionersto the Jews who had to make
bricksfor the Egyptianoppressor.

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