United States Supreme Court

KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK(1907)

No. 273

Argued:Decided: April 8, 1907

Mr. Sidney M. Ballou for appellants.

[205 U.S. 349, 351]   Messrs. Aldis B. Browne, Alexander Britton, and E. A. Douthitt for
appellees. [205 U.S. 349, 352]  

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage
executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants
(appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the
mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of
Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but
the territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was
argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure
was made, the appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the
land conveyed to the territory, and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the
proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92.

The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the
mortgage land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the
mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of
Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its
statutes, which does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia
(Metr- [205 U.S. 349, 353]   opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 231,
10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before this
court (Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v.
Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248).

The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed.
1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it
could have done so. See act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in
the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to
yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign
power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since
before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se
donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure
Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna
Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.

As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are
sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual
administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which
persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are
subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is
not the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain
from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case
of a state, the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the
rights that exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354]   Congress or the Constitution, except
to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because
there the body of private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature
of the District. But for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April
30, 1900, chap. 339, 6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478.
See, further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v.
Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598.

However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the
land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is
not thereby deprived of ability to proceed.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.

Republic v. Sandoval

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It
is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim
reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most
Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history
books. For those however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they
would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be
brought back to life again.

Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted
this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent Judge
Sandoval,1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of
herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.

Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No.
84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case
No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."

The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:

With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are
being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would
not result in financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can
not conveniently and correspondingly be applied to them.

WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby
dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is denied. They are
given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective
pleadings.

On the other hand, the Order 3 , dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both
parties, for a reconsideration of the above cited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent
reason to disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by
members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now
Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building
along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.

The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine
agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their
problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero
retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.

The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The two
days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on
January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only
to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January 20,
1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the
minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for
his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President
Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.

Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment,
barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices.
They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag.

At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his
leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just
allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however,
countered by saying that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform
cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued
between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a
negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day.

On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacañang to air their
demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery
words, the most telling of which were:
". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin
din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang
dugo . . . ."4

The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacañang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00
a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students
(LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).

At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief
program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post
Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined
the march to Malacañang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue.

In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional
Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police
lines and rush towards Malacañang, CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montaño
inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending
attacks.

OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of
Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacañang. The civil disturbance
control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were
also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA
elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were
also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly occupied.

In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the
facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot
forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the following
manner:

(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10
and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as ground
commander of the CDC first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the
intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were ordered to move forward from
the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in khaki uniform and carried the standard
CDC equipment — aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks.

(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD policemen were the
elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from
the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried also the standard CDC equipment —
truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field Force was under the command of Police
Major Demetrio dela Cruz.

(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the
first and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines
were all equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their
backs, under the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was
positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force.

At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire width of
Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of the street
and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire
District I of Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to
the two water cannons.

Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each
composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the
team leader.

In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacañang stood the VOLVO Mobile
Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E.
Montaño. At this command post, after General Montaño had conferred with TF Nazareno
Commander, Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it
was agreed that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres and Police Major Conrado Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police General
Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola
bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the
latter would negotiate with the marchers.5 (Emphasis supplied)

The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto
Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the
marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing
the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its
findings, to wit:

. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars,
wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police fought back with their
shields and truncheons. The police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The
demonstrators disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto
Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the government forces.

After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt. Laonglaan
Goce sped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still grouped
in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two
WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montaño to disperse
the rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the
WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands, who were armed with long
firearms.6 (Emphasis ours)

After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to
Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of
said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor
injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.

Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20)
suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like.

In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative
Order No. 11,7 (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens'
Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente
Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U.
Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the
"purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place
in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila , in
the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted its
findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was
moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was
unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in
accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.

In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:

(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral
groups, was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the
Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under
paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.

(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38
and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph
4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
880.

(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and
supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders
were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.

(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in
dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable
under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.

(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes,
and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under
paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were
determined to march to Malacañang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and
incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo — "bubutasin namin ang barikada . .
Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . .

(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon
approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the
police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent.

(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the
CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started
the firing.

(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put
into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.

(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no
order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of
the marchers.

(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the
crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the
police and the military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal
operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the
remnants of the marchers.

(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its
absence.8

From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended9 the criminal prosecution of four
unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction
of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the
identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the
victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of
both the Western Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident,
be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the
Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the
prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities
have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be
prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for
holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised
Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E.
Montaño; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj.
Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to
make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in
Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed.

The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased
and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was
this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the
government.

Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by

the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of
demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the
office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on
August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988,
recommended the expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11

After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to
institute an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the
military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.

On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16,
1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of
the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human
Rights.

Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as
against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the State.
Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and
her co-petitioners filed the instant petition.

On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and
personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari.

Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the
two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this
Decision.

The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State
has waived its immunity from suit.

Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by
the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola
incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the
killings, the State has consented to be sued.

Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly
provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty,
and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy — that
public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could
be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the
uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the
government. 13

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs
of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way
mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O.
11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will
conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the
exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion
reads:

1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense
and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on
preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the
proper court. 15

In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the
Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever
recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such
recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it
being a fact-finding body.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the
same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's
act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an
admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao
group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover,
petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address
the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted
any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such
consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there
was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover,
the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited
act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
marchers. 19

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea
that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without
authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that
immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police
forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to
guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the
facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the
latter.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its
political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it
cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the
heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state
immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit
requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of
any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or
agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and
as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in
the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that
followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower
court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public
officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held
liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by

respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-9990             September 30, 1957

RUIZ vs.CABAHUG

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiffs' amended
complaint.

The facts upon which plaintiffs' first cause of action are based are allowed as follows:

On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the Allied
Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering services in the construction of
the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700. The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed
drawings and other architectural requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through
thereof its architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were
approved by the United States Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of the
technical objection to the capacity of the Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and
upon the advice of the Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. by E.J.L. Ruiz as President and P.D. Panlilio as Architect. When the
defendants-officials paid the Allied Technologists the contract price for the architectural
engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the sum due, for the reason that defendant
Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the
exclusion of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez.
Unless defendants are prevented from recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole architect of
the contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs will be deprived of the
monetary value of their professional services and their professional prestige and standing
would be seriously impaired.

Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title II of the contract
entered into between plaintiffs and the Secretary of National Defense, at any time prior to six
months after completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may direct
the Allied Technologists, Inc. to perform the services specified in said Title II. But
notwithstanding such completion or acceptance, the Government has refused to direct the
plaintiffs to perform the work, entrusting such work to a group of inexperienced and
unqualified engineers.

The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from recognizing
Panlilio as the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital and from paying him 15 per
cent retained as above indicated, and that after hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be
recognized as the architects of the Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action it is
prayed that the defendants be directed to turn over the supervision called for by Title II of the
contract.

The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is one against
the Government, which may not sued without its consent. It is held that as the majority of the
stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc. have not joined in the action, the minority suit
does not lie. It dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that the optional services
under Title II have already been performed.

On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE VALIDLY ENTERTAINED BECAUSE
THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3038, AS
AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE; IT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE
AUDITOR GENERAL.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS UNTENABLE.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INJUNCTION.

Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the second cause of
action. So, the appeal has relation to the first cause of action only.

A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses the following
facts and circumstances: The contract price for the architectural engineering services
rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc. and the plaintiffs is P231,600. All of that sum has
been set aside for payment to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except the sum
of P34,740, representing 15 per cent of the total costs, which has been retained by the
defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of the Philippines is concerned, the full
amount of the contract price has been set aside and said full amount authorized to be paid.
The Government does not any longer have any interest in the amount, which the defendants-
officials have retained and have refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to
which it should be paid. And the plaintiffs do not seek to sue the Government to require it to
pay the amount or involve it in the litigation. The defendant Jimenez is claimed to have "aided
and abetted defendant Panlilio in depriving the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its two architects
(Ruiz and Herrera) of the honor and benefit due to them under the contract Annex `C`
thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs that the defendant-officials are about to recognize
Panlilio as the sole architect and are about to pay him the 15 per cent which they had
retained, and thus deprive plaintiffs of their right to share therein and in the honor consequent
to the recognition of their right. The suit, therefore, is properly directed against the officials
and against them alone, not against the Government, which does nor have any interest in the
outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio on the other. The
suit is between these alone, to determine who is entitled to the amount retained by the
officials; and if the latter did aid and abet Panlilio in his pretense, to the exclusion and
prejudice of plaintiffs, it is natural that they alone, and not the Government, should be the
subject of the suit. He said officials chosen not to take sides in the controversy between the
architects, and had disclaimed interest in said controversy, the suit would have been
converted into one of interpleader. But they have acted to favor one side, and have abetted
him in his effort to obtain payment to him of the sum remaining unpaid and credit for the work,
to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit.1âwphïl.nêt

We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not be a party in this
and parallel cases.

There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign
state and its political subdivision cannot be sued in the courts except upon the statutory
consent of the state. Numerous decisions of this court to that effect may be cited; but it is
enough to note that this court, in banc in a recent case, State vs. Woodruff (Miss.), 150 So.
760, Hasso held; and therein overruled a previous decision which had adjudicated that such
consent could be worked out of a statute by implication, when express consent was absent
from the terms of that statute.

But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually made a party upon the
record, or is actually necessary to be made a party in order to furnish the relief demanded by
the suit. It does not apply when the suit is against an officer or agent of the state, and the
relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs
to the state in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made
defendants disclaim any personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to act only by
virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.

Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said, that nearly all the cases
wherein the rule of immunity from suit against the state or a subdivision thereof, has been
applied and upheld, are those which demanded a money judgment, and wherein the
discharge of the judgment, if obtained, would require the appropriation or an expenditure
therefrom, which being legislative in its character is a province exclusively of the political
departments of the state. And in the less frequent number of cases where no money
judgment is demanded, and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it will be found in them that the
relief demanded would be, nevertheless, to require of the state or its political subdivision the
affirmative performance of some asserted obligation, belong to the state in its political
capacity.

When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting officially and not as
individuals, seize the private property of a citizen, the state having no valid right or title
thereto, or trespass upon that property or damage it, the jurisdiction of the courts to eject the
officers or agents, is as well settled in the jurisprudence of this country as is the general rule
first above mentioned; for in such a suit no relief is demanded which requires any affirmative
action on the part of the state. Such a suit is only to the end that the officers and agents of the
state stay off the property of the citizen and cease to damage that property, the state having
no right or title thereto." (State Mineral Lease Commission vs. Lawrence [1934], 157 So. 897,
898-899.).

We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amendment complaint, which
should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim
against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to
be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and
interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. The order of dismissal is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court  a quo for further
proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.1âwphïl.nêt