CRIMINAL REVIEW
delinquency.
POINTERS FOR PRELIMS
1. RECIDIVISM
Par. 9. - THAT THE ACCUSED IS A RECIDIVIST.
- A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for
one crime, shall have been previously convicted
by final judgment of another crime embraced in
the same title of the RPC.
Requisites:
a. That the offender is on trial for an offense;
b. That he was previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime;
c. That both the first and the second offenses are
embraced in the same title of the Code;
d. That the offender is convicted of the new offense.
• In recidivism, the number of intervening years between
that conviction and his subsequent convictions is
immaterial, provided that the accused was convicted by
final judgment.
• Even if the accused was granted pardon for the first
offense, but he commits another felony embraced in
the same title of the Code, the first conviction is still
counted to make him a recidivist since pardon does not
obliterate the fact of his prior conviction.
• If the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is alleged
and proved against an accused, who upon said
conviction is also a habitual delinquent, the imposable
penalty must consider both the circumstances of
recidivism and habitual delinquency.
People v. Bernal
G.R. No. L-44988, 31 October 1936
Issue: Whether or not in instances where the
accused turns out to be a habitual delinquent, the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism, when
alleged and proved, should also be taken into
account in fixing the penalty applicable for the
commission of the principal offense, independently
of the additional penalty provided by law for habitual
Held: Yes. Recidivism as an aggravating circumstance
that modifies criminal liability is not inherent or
integral to habitual delinquency, which the Revised
Penal Code considers as an extraordinary and special
aggravating circumstance. For recidivism to exist, it
is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his trial,
shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of the RPC. For the existence of habitual
delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall
have been convicted of any of the crimes specified,
and that the last conviction shall have taken place
ten (10) years before the commission of the last
offense. It is necessary that the crimes previously
committed be prior to the commission of the offense
with which the accused is charged a third time or
oftener.
• What is controlling is the time of trial, not the time of
the commission of the crime.
• There is no recidivism if the subsequent conviction is
for an offense committed before the offense involved
in the prior conviction.
• Section 7 of Rule 120 , Rules of Court, provides that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final:
(1) after the lapse of the [period for perfecting
an appeal, or
(2) when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or
(3) the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal, or
(4) the accused has applied for probation.
• There is recidivism even if the lapse of time between
two felonies is more than 10 years.
• Recidivism must be taken into account no mater how
many years have intervened between the 1st and 2nd
felonies.
• Pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused
was a recidivist ; but amnesty extinguishes the
penalty and its effects.
People v. Molina
 336 SCRA 400 (2000)
FACTS: Brothers Joseph and Angelito, along with their
cousin, Danny were on their way home when they
heard somebody shout “kuba”, referring to Joseph, a
hunchback. They asked who said that but no one
admitted. As the 3 were about to go, Molina delivered
a strong stabbing blow at the back of Joseph. Angelito
came to aid his brother but Molina also stabbed him
at the back. Joseph was dead on arrival at the clinic.
HELD: To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the
same in the information and to attach thereto certified
copies of the sentences rendered against the accused.
Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such AC
credence if the accused does not object to the
presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.
In this case, the accused never voiced out any
objection when confronted with the fact of his
previous conviction for attempted homicide.
People v. Dacillo
427 SCRA 528 (2004)
FACTS: Pacot stabbed and strangled Rosemarie
leading to the latter’s death. Dacillo for his part, hold
down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from struggling.
The two men stopped only when they were sure that
the victim was already dead. Dacillo then encase her
corpse in a cement. The trial court imposed the death
penalty on the ground that Dacillo admitted during re-
cross examination that he had a prior conviction for
the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that
Dacillo was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial
court as a generic aggravating circumstance which
increased the imposable penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death.
HELD: The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was
not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be
appreciated against appellant.
In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the
information and to attach certified true copies of the
sentences previously meted out to the accused. This is
in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states that: The
complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
2. QUASI-RECIDIVISM
- a special aggravating circumstance defined and
penalized under Art. 160 of the RPC which
provides:
“Commission of another crime during service of penalty
imposed for another offense; Penalty. — Besides the
provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony.”
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is
not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of
seventy years if he shall have already served out his
original sentence, or when he shall complete it after
reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or
other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such
clemency.
People v. Gaorana
289 SCRA 652 (1998)
FACTS: Marivel, upon instruction of Rowena
(common-law wife of the accused) went to the house
of Gaorana and saw the couple lying down. Marivel
was asked to come and Rowena stood up to urinate.
Gaorana covered her mouth and pointed a hunting
knife to her neck and raped her. The second incident
of rape occurred while Marivel was sleeping in the sala
with her brother and sister. Marivel did not shout
because she was afraid of the accused who was a
prisoner and had already killed somebody.
HELD: The 2 Information alleged that both instances of
rape were attended by the aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism. The trial court made no express
ruling that the appellant was a quasi-recidivist, and
rightly so. During the trial, the prosecution manifested
that appellant had been convicted by the RTC and was
serving sentence for the crime of homicide. However,
the prosecution failed or neglected to present in
evidence the record of appellant’s previous
conviction. Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism and
reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a
certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused.
 The fact that appellant was an inmate of DAPECOL
does not prove that final judgment had been rendered
against him.
3. REITERACION
Par. 10. - THAT THE OFFENDER HAS BEEN
PREVIOUSLY PUNISHED BY AN OFFENSE TO WHICH
THE LAW ATTACHES AN EQUAL OR GREATER
PENALTY, OR FOR TWO OR MORE CRIMES TO
WHICH IT ATTACHES A LIGHTER PENALTY.
(Otherwise known as habituality or reiteracion)
Requisites for reiteracion:
a. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
b. That he previously served sentence for another
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty, or for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches
lighter penalty than that for the new offense; and
c. That he is convicted of the new offense.
• This differs from recidivism because reiteracion
requires that the offender be punished for the previous
offenses of which he was convicted, and the penalties
imposed for the previous offenses are determinative,
i.e., either: (a) an offense to which the law attaches an
equal or greater penalty; or (b) two (2) or more
offenses to which the law attaches lighter penalties.
DISCUSSION: as a special aggravating circumstance is a
situation where the offender, while about to serve his
sentence or while serving his sentence, commits another
crime. A subsequent crime is committed, and the penalty
for such is actually imposed in its maximum period.
People v. Cajara
341 SCRA 192 (2000)
FACTS: Accused Cajara raped 16-year old Marita in
front of his common-law wife who is the half-sister of
the victim and his two small children. The trial court
convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death.
HELD: The records show that the crime was
aggravated by reiteracion under Article 14, par. 10, of
The RPC, the accused having been convicted of
frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated
homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of
firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his
sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for
23 years and a fine of P200,000. He was granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines
on 8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under
Article 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the
accused has been previously punished for an offense
to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty
than that attached by law to the second offense or for
two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter
penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be
convicted only of simple rape and the imposable
penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the
instant case.
4. HABITUAL DELINQUENCY
- When a person, within a period of 10 years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, is found
guilty of any of said crimes a third time or
oftener. In habitual delinquency, the offender is
either a recidivist or one who has been
previously punished for two or more of fenses
(habituality). He shall suffer an additional
penalty for being a habitual delinquent.
• When the culprit is HABITUAL DELINQUENT, he is not
entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the new
favorable statute.
• A person shall be deemed to be a HABITUAL
DELINQUENT if within a period of 10 years from the
date of his release of last conviction of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft,
estafa or falsification, he is found guilt of an said crimes
a third time or oftener.
Article 62, par. 5.
Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and of habitual
delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken
into account for the purpose of diminishing or
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following
rules:
 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following
effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit
shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total
of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender,
in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30
years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be
deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period
of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he
is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or
oftener.
DISCUSSION: The provision answers the question of who
a habitual delinquent is.
Note the limitation: that the principal penalty plus the
additional penalty brought about by the habitual
delinquency cannot exceed 30 years.
Under Article 27, the penalty of reclusion perpetua has a
duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. In the
graduation of penalties, there is no penalty, except
reclusion perpetua, where 30 years is included.
However, note how the provision is rendered under
Article 62 par 5: “The total of the penalty cannot exceed
30 years”.
So, the principal penalty, for instance is reclusion
perpetua, and then the accused is guilty a third time or
oftener. The penalty to be imposed is a nightmare to
compute.
Q: How can you compute reclusion perpetua?
A: There is nothing said in Article 62 par 5. What the
article tells us is that both penalties, the principal penalty
and the additional penalty brought about by the habitual
delinquency cannot exceed 30 years.
In short, the additional penalty shall be computed from
20 years minimum supposedly, but take note that
reclusion perpetua is not a divisible penalty. It should be
imposed as it is. There is no period to speak of even if
there is a duration. Maybe we should look into that when
we tackle computation of penalties.
IMPORTANT: the five crimes mentioned: robo, hurto
(theft), falsification, estafa, serious physical injuries or
less serious physical injuries. (There are actually six
crimes.)
Q: Is a habitual delinquent necessarily a recidivist?
A: You have to know what recidivism is. There is a
reference where the crimes committed must be
embraced within the same title of the Code. Habitual
delinquency only has six crimes. You must first look at the
title where those six crimes fall.
Physical injuries fall under crime against persons.
Falsification is crimes against public interest. Robbery,
estafa and theft are crimes against property.
So the proposition that a habitual delinquent is
necessarily a recidivist will only hold if the crime
committed by the habitual delinquent posed against
the same title of the Code at least for 2 offenses. Never
mind the third offense.
Hence, if the accused was previously convicted of
robbery, and then there was a conviction for theft, and
then eventually he was again convicted of estafa, the
accused is a recividist because the two crimes (robbery
and theft) fall under the same title (crimes against
property).
However, if the first crime is serious physical injuries, and
the second crime is falsification and the third is theft,
these crimes DO NOT FALL under the same title. The
accused is a habitual delinquent, but he is not a recidivist.
BE CAREFUL IN ANSWERING THIS. I usually ask this:
what are the four forms of criminal repetition:
recidivism, reiteracion, habitual delinquency and quasi-
recidivism.
(8 percent; 2 percent each). My additional question: Is
a habitual delinquent necessarily a recidivist? (5
percent).
5. GOOD CONDUCT TIME ALLOWANCE
Article 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. - Criminal
liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may
earn while he is serving his sentence.
The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this
Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any
other local jail shall entitle him to the following
deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of
twenty-three days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year,
inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each
month of good behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of thirty days for each month of good behavior
during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment,
he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen
days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof,
for each month of study, teaching or mentoring
service time rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of
entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct.
GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCES OF A PRISONER IN A
PENAL INSTITUTION:
1. First 2 years
- 5 days per month of good behavior
2. 3rd to 5th year
- 8 days
3. Following years to 10th year
- 10 days
4. 11th year and successive years
- 15 days
✓ These allowances are granted by the Director of
Prisons and once given cannot be revoked.
SPECIAL TIME ALLOWANCE FOR LOYALTY
- A deduction of one fifth of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who,
having evaded his preventive imprisonment or
the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this
Code, gives himself up to the authorities within
48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing away of
the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said
article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of
his sentence shall be granted in case said
prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a
calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article
158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving
sentence.
✓ This article does not apply to prisoners who did not
escape.
✓ The deduction of ⅕ is based on the original sentence.
✓ Under Article 158, a convict who evaded service of his
sentence by leaving the penal institution on the occasion
of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake,
explosion or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny in
which he did not participate, is liable to an increased
penalty (1/5 of the time still remaining to be served – not
to exceed 6 months) if he fails to give himself up within
48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the
President announcing the passing away of the calamity.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances.
- Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology and/or the
Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city
jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such
allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
6. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE THOSE INELIGIBLE
✓ The indeterminate sentence is composed of:
1. a MAXIMUM taken from the penalty
imposable under the penal code
2. a MINIMUM taken from the penalty next
lower to that fixed in the code.
• In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense (Sec. 1, Act No. 4103).
• If the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same (Sec. 1, Act No. 4103).
THE LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO CERTAIN OFFENDERS:
1. Persons convicted of offense punished with death
penalty or life imprisonment.
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason.
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage.
4. Those convicted of piracy.
5. Those who are habitual delinquents.
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence.
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon
granted to them by the Chief Executive.
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed 1 year.
9. Those who, upon the approval of the law, had been
sentenced by final judgment.
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or
suspension.
11. Use of trafficked victim
✓ Purpose of the law: to uplift and redeem valuable
human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and economic usefulness
- It is necessary to consider the criminal first as an
individual, and second as a member of the society.
- The law is intended to favor the defendant, particularly
to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his
behavior and his physical, mental and moral record as a
prisoner, to be determined by the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence.
✓ The settled practice is to give the accused the benefit
of the law even in crimes punishable with death or life
imprisonment provided the resulting penalty, after
considering the attending circumstances, is reclusion
temporal or less.
✓ ISL does not apply to destierro. ISL is expressly granted
to those who are sentenced to imprisonment exceeding
1 year.
PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING THE MAXIMUM AND
MINIMUM SENTENCE
✓ ISL consists of a maximum and a minimum instead of a
single fixed penalty.
✓ Prisoner must serve the minimum before he is eligible
for parole.
✓ The period between the minimum and maximum is
indeterminate in the sense that the prisoner may be
exempted from serving said indeterminate period in
whole or in part.
✓ The maximum is determined in any case punishable
under the RPC in accordance with the rules and
provisions of said code exactly as if the ISL had never
been enacted.
✓ Apply first the effect of privileged mitigating
circumstances then consider the effects of aggravating
and ordinary mitigating circumstances.
✓ The minimum depends upon the court’s discretion
with the limitation that it must be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense committed.
NOTE: A minor who escaped from confinement in the
reformatory is entitled to the benefits of the ISL
because his confinement is not considered
imprisonment.
People v. Mantalaba (2011)
FACTS: Allen Mantalaba was arrested by the
authorities in an entrapment operation. Allen was 17
years old when he was arrested. He was found guilty
and was imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
HELD: Minority must be recognized or appreciated in
fixing the penalty. Since minority is a special mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be one degree
lower. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
proper penalty should be prision mayor as minimum
and reclusion temporal as maximum.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can
now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should
be imposed. Applying the rules, the proper penalty
should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua,
which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated.
Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from
the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being
no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating
circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present
case because the penalty which has been originally an
indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death),
where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible
penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, would be the proper
imposable penalty.
ATTY. ESGUERRA: This alone will be able to tell you and
somehow clarify for your understanding how the
indeterminate sentence law works but you see this
emanates from a situation under special penal law which
is RA 9165, a minor offender sentenced to life
imprisonment to death but which becomes under
Section 98 reclusion perpetua to death and in fixing that
penalty applying what the rules under the Revised Penal
Code tells us.
The penalty one degree lower than reclusion perpetua is
reclusion temporal and as I said because of the privilege
mitigating circumstance of minority so it becomes
reclusion temporal.
So, you apply the indeterminate sentence law and
because this is a divisible penalty now no longer reclusion
perpetua which is not entitled to the benefits of the
indeterminate sentence law, reclusion temporal being
divisible you have to take the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence law from the penalty next lower.
What is the penalty next lower than reclusion temporal
in the scale of penalties it will be prision mayor. You have
to, more or less, know the duration of the sentence,
reclusion temporal has a duration of 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years, prision mayor has a duration of 6 years and
1 day to 12 years, so by degrees they are different, higher
of course and reclusion temporal but the penalty next
lower in the graduate scale of penalties under Art. 71 is
prision mayor, so you can take therefore the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence law from any of the periods
within the prision mayor duration, the range that is 6
years and 1 day to 12 years.
So, if that is the case if the penalty imposed is 6 years and
1 day as minimum prision mayor, that is still prision
mayor to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, reclusion temporal 12 years and 1 day to 20
years so 14 years and 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Why? No other mitigating or aggravating circumstance
so you apply the medium eh kung may mitigating
circumstance you apply the minimum okay kung may
aggravating circumstance walang mitigating you apply
the maximum kung neither is present you apply the
medium, this is the case here in Mantalaba.
This is a very important case, put an asterisk there not
only insofar as the limited applicability of the Revised
Penal Code but even the computation of the
indeterminate sentence law, diba.
Magandang pang midterms itong kaso na ito, ewan ko
lang kung nakikinig kayo.
7. CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE (Sec 21 RA 9165 as
amended)
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, (Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165,
as amended by Sec. 1, R.A. No. 10640)
o The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof:
o That the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
o That noncompliance of these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures and custody over said items.
o Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
o A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
immediately upon the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial
laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued
immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification;
ATTY. ESGUERRA: Important thing here is really the
corpus delicti which is the drug confiscated or seized
from the accused and that’s where Section 21 on the
chain of custody rule insofar as preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs will
come into play.
So, see, corpus delicti must be the very drug that was
seized from the accused that was the subject of an
investigation by the police itself transferred to the
Forensic Chemist and eventually presented to court, so
there must have been no contamination whatsoever, the
drug must not have been compromised whatsoever,
that’s why remember the phrase or the words integrity
and evidentiary value must be preserved. Yun yung
minimum, if there were lapses and not observing the
procedure in the conduct of the inventory as explained
later when we took up Section 21 those lapsed must be
explained if there justifiable reasons, if there are no
justifiable reasons we will see, you know, they are not
believable the court throw out the evidence and will
acquit the accused.
8. PEOPLE v. ROMY LIM
Facts:
A buy bust operation was conducted for the
apprehension of the accused allegedly with illegal
possession of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), Evident, however, is the absence of an
elected public official and representatives of the DOJ
and the media to witness the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items. In fact, their
signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
Issue: Whether the accused is liable for the crime of
sale of dangerous drugs, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride despite the absence of witness
required under R.A. No. 9165.
Held: No, accused cannot be held liable for the sale of
dangerous drugs. In this case, a police officer testified
that the witnesses did not arrive at the crime scene
because it was late at night and it was raining, making
it unsafe for them.
Another police officer testified that the inventory was
made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in
the evening and the media representative and
barangay officials are unavailable despite their effort
to contact them. He admitted that there are times
when they do not inform the barangay officials prior
to their operation as they might leak the confidential
information.
The links in the chain of custody that must be
established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover
of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the
illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the
turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the
forensic chemist to the court.
The Supreme Court ruled that so as to “weed out early
on from the courts’ already congested docket any
orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases,”
the following should be enforced as a mandatory
policy in connection with arrests and seizures related
to illegal drugs:
•(1) In the sworn statements/affidavits, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1)
of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR);
• (2) In case of non-observance of the provision, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the
steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized/confiscated items;
• (3) If there is no justification or explanation
expressly declared in the sworn statements or
affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not
immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he
or she must refer the case for further preliminary
investigation in order to determine the (non) existence
of probable cause; and
• (4) If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite
such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to
either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant
of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of
probable cause in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
ATTY. ESGUERRA:
The chain of custody, so from No. 1 to No. 4, from seizure
to the turn over by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer and turnover of the seized drug from
the investigating officer to the Forensic Chemist and then
from there the turn over and even submission of the
illegal in court.
That’s why it is important to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value because if the seized drug has been
compromised, one way or the other, it has been exposed
to possible contamination or possible switching then
there is issue about the corpus delicti, the accused
cannot be convicted. Remember that 4 links in the chain
of custody.
The case of People versus Romy Lim summarizes for us
what should be done in case of a buy bust operation in
terms of the conduct of the inventory. So, we have seen
who must be present, the accused or his counsel or his
representative; 2) the presence of an elected public
official plus either a representative from the National
Prosecution Service, that would be the Department of
Justice or a representative from the media then you have
establish the link the same seized drug that reached the
court at the appropriate time when it is presented for
evidence. Okay, remember the links 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The essence of the chain of custody, the purpose is very
clear – preserve the integrity and evidentiary value, if
there is a breach, a lapse as in this case where no
representative, no elective public official is present, no
media representative or representative from the
national Prosecution Service the Supreme Court
invalidated the judgment of acquittal because there is an
issue about the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug, the corpus delicte itself. Look at the steps
there, the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court, very
important.
If the affidavit of arrest must contain the circumstances,
how the accused was arrested and how the drug in
questioned was seized from his person. Then the
inventory conducted must be in the presence of those
personalities that I have already discussed and in case of
the absence in the affidavit of arrest there must be a
statement about the justification or explanation why
there was no presence of those personalities and if there
is nothing in the affidavit of arrest about the justification
then the Prosecutor who is inquest Prosecutor, kasi
warrantless arrest eto eh, more often than not, buy bust
eh, must conduct a regular preliminary investigation,
since this is inquest, you have taken up your criminal
procedure, if you have taken up your criminal procedure
remember the inquest, when the person arrested is
brought to the Inquest Prosecutor, the inquest
prosecutor in the absence of any request for the conduct
of a regular preliminary investigation finding the validity
and legality of the warrantless arrest and the basis
thereof will simply file the information in court, diba
ganon ang nangyayari, pero ngayn dito sabi ng Supreme
Court, teka muna kung walang explanation kung walang
justification in the affidavit of arrest conduct a regular
preliminary investigation, do not file the information yet
in court.
Alright, but assuming lumampas, the inquest prosecutor
files the information notwithstanding the absence of
explanation or justification in the affidavit of arrest for
the absence of the personalities that we have
mentioned, DOJ elected official, media, what will happen
the court will not issue a warrant of arrest here or a
commitment order, yung commitment order is issued
remember if the person is already in custody, yung
warrant of arrest if the person is not yet in custody but
be that as it may, the court is given the authority to
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause. See,
so the absence of any justification or explanation in the
affidavit of arrest insofar as the presence of the
personalities required to be there meaning an elected
public officials plus a DOJ representative or a media
representative will possibly lead and here was certainly
to the dismissal of the case outright for lack of probable
cause. See, how important this case is, so you better pay
attention to this case.
9. QUALIFIED CARNAPPING
PEOPLE v. LAGAT
FACTS: The victim left home to “pasada” his tricycle.
The next morning, his wife was informed that her
husband was killed and that his tricycle was used to
steal palay.
HELD: The accused committed qualified carnapping.
There is carnapping when there was a taking of a
vehicle which belongs to another, without the consent
of the owner with use of violence, intimidation or
force, with intent to gain. It is qualified when the
driver, passenger was killed during the taking or
carnapping. Motor vehicle is defined as any vehicle
propelled by any power other than muscle power
using public highways. In this case, the tricycle was a
motor vehicle taken by force from the owner who was
killed during the carnapping.
ATTY. ESGUERRA:
Sa carnapping there was supposedly a question,
supposedly because it was not asked anymore but I knew
that the examiner was intending to ask it, the question
was what is qualified carnapping or otherwise known as
aggravated carnapping and here in Lagat, although this
is a 2011 case, the carnapping is said to be qualified if the
owner, what does it say, is it Lagat or the other case,
where the owner was the driver or the passenger was
killed, nakalagay lang ditto sa Lagat, when the driver
passenger was killed including the owner under the new
anti-carnapping act that is what you call aggravated or
qualified carnapping.
Now, the intriguing question will be – if there is
carnapping if a bicycle is mounted a motor engine and
then the one using it, driver, was held up and killed
during the taking of the motorized bicycle so question is
– will that constitute carnapping or qualified
aggravated carnapping? Very very peculiar situation so
you have to argue from the point of view of whether or
not it is a vehicle and therefore justify that it is a vehicle
because the motor is no longer propelled by mere human
power but you see it was simply a bicycle where a motor
engine was mounted and, you know, it was the motor
engine that propelled the bicycle so that may be a good
case to ask of you during your midterms, tingnan natin,
at the very least I’m saying if it is not carnapping is
robbery with violence against robbery with homicide
because if the owner was killed, the driver of that bicycle
turned motor bicycle is killed it can be robbery with
homicide, there is taking with force and violence and
attended by the killing of the owner so it robbery with
homicide within the contemplation of Art. 294 or anyway
just thinking aloud of what a possibly be asked with some
excitement insofar as carnapping is concerned but more
or less it will, you know, to be fair the question maybe on
aggravated or qualified carnapping.
10. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF LOOSE FIREARMS PLUS
ANOTHER CRIME
PUNISHABLE ACTS
1. Unlawful acquisition or possession of firearms
and ammunition (Sec. 28, R.A. No. 10591);
Aggravating Circumstances:
a. Loaded with ammunition or inserted
with a loaded magazine;
b. Fitted or mounted with laser or any
gadget used to guide the shooter to
hit the target such as thermal weapon
sight and the like;
c. Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes,
firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
d. Accompanied with an extra barrel;
e. Converted to be capable of firing full
automatic bursts.
2. Use of Loose Firearm in the commission of a
crime – considered as an aggravating
circumstance (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 10591);
3. Carriage of registered firearm outside of
residence by a license person without any
legal authority therefor (Sec. 31, R.A. No.
10591);
4. Unlawful Manufacture, sale, importation,
acquisition, disposition or possession of
firearms or ammunition or instruments (Sec.
32(a), R.A. No. 10591);
5. Unlawful taking, sale or disposition by any
laborer, worker or employee of a licensed
firearms dealer of parts of firearms or
ammunition which the company
manufactures and sells, and other materials
used by the company in the manufacture or
sale of firearms or ammunition (Sec. 32(b),
R.A. No. 10591);
6. Arms smuggling (Sec. 33, R.A. No. 10591);
7. Unlawful tampering, obliteration or alteration
of firearm’s identification (Sec. 34, R.A. No.
10591);
8. Planting evidence or the willful and malicious
insertion, placing and/or attachment or parts
thereof in the person, house, effects or in the
immediate vicinity of an innocent individual
for the purpose of implicating or incriminating
the person, or imputing the commission of any
violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 10591 to
said individual (Sec. 38, R.A. No. 10591);
9. Failure to notify lost or stolen firearm or light
weapon to the Firearms and Explosives Office
(FEO) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
within 30 days from discovery (Sec. 40(a), R.A.
No. 10591);
10. Failure to notify the FEO of the PNP of a
licensed person’s change of residence or
office address, other than that indicated in the
license card, within 30 days from transfer (Sec.
40(b), R.A. No. 10591); and
11. Illegal transfer or registration of firearms to
any person who has not yet be obtained or
secured the necessary license or permit
thereof (Sec. 41, R.A. No. 10591).
ATTY. ESGUERRA:
Okay, take note, the situations are these, the former law
says before the new firearms law came into effect is that
the use of a licensed firearms is aggravating in two
crimes: that is homicide and murder and the condition is
that no other crime was committed, meaning the use of
a licensed firearm it is punishable and the person so
apprehended with unlicensed firearm may be so held
liable provided no other crime was committed because if
there is any other committed, with or without the use of
the unlicensed firearm, a possession of unlicensed
forearm is deemed absorbed by the other crime so the
prosecution is for the other crime as noted in the first
disticntion, but that is no longer the case, now it is only
aggravating if the use of unlicensed firearm is inherent to
the commission of the crime, when you say inherent so
indispensably the use of unlicensed firearm must be an
element somehow of the crime.
Now, if on the other hand, the accused commits another
crime without using the firearm and this is the change,
where the change also lies, without using the firearm
then he will be prosecuted for 2 crimes, one will be for
the crime he committed and the other will be for illegal
possession or violation of the comprehensive firearms
and ammunitions regulation act, illegal possession of
loose firearms, hindi na unlicensed firearms ang tawag
eh, loose firearms. Okay, take note, kung inherent it is an
aggravating circumstance, if the accused commits
another crime without using the loose firearm, he may
be prosecuted or he should be prosecuted for 2 crimes,
for the crime he committed and for illegal possession of
loose firearms.
The doctrine of absorption, you remember in complex
crimes one of the exceptions in the application or
applicability of Art. 48 on complex crimes is one – you
cannot complex a grave or less grave felony punished or
defined under the Revised Penal Code with an offense
punished under special penal law because this offense
under the special penal law is not, technically a felony
under the Revised Penal Code so Art . 48 cannot apply
but the other exception in the application or applicability
of Art. 48 is a situation where there is what we call
absorption of a crime or crimes by other crimes, so one
will be rebellion as we have seen in the case of People v.
Hernandez and even Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
where common crimes committed to achieve the
purposes of the rebellion such as murder, homicide,
robbery and even arson are deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, that is actually the application of the
doctrine of absorption vis a vis Art. 48, so art. 48 will not
apply.
Now here there is also doctrine of absorption, what is the
crime being absorbed, well in the crimes of rebellion
insurrection or coup d’etat, attempted coup d’etat, mali
yang attempted eh, coup d’etat, attempted coup d’etet
kasi yung nature ng coup d’etat always attempted, I think
I have shared this with you, always attempted yan
because if it’s succeed who will prosecute, if they hold
the range of government, the coup d’etat succeeds who
will prosecute them, no one because they are in power
so coup d’etat should be coup d’etat not attempted, mali
na naman yung ating mambabatas diyan eh.
Anyway, in these crimes if there is use or even possession
of illegal unlicensed firearms or loose firearms the use or
carrying of these loose firearms or unlicensed firearms
are deemed absorbed in crimes for rebellion,
insurrection or coup d’etat, so that is the doctrine of
absorption here in this particular special penal law.
People v. Ladjaalam (2000)
FACTS:
Four informations were filed against Ladjaalam in the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, three of which
he was found guilty, to wit: (1) maintaining a drug den;
(2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition; and
(30 direct assault with multiple attempted homicide.
ISSUE:
Can the use of an unlicensed firearm be considered as
an aggravating circumstance?
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that
any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm
or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other
crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the
crime committed was direct assault and not homicide
or murder, illegal possession of firearm cannot be
deemed an aggravating circumstance.
Agote v. Lorenzo (2005)
FACTS:
Agote was charged to have violated Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Posssession of Firearms) and
a COMELEC resolution (gun ban). He carried a .38
caliber revolver with four (4) live bullets in a public
place during election. During the pendency of the
case, R.A. No. 8294 was approved into law. The trial
court found Agote liable of the charges against. Agote
assails that the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms had already been reduced pursuant to R.A.
No. 8294.
HELD:
Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a
felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms depending on the class of
firearm possessed. The lighter penalty may be
imposed to a person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm or ammunition, “unless no other crime was
committed”.
But as violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or
the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner at
the same time, the Court cannot but set aside
petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of
firearm.
 Evangelista v. People (2010)
FACTS:
Teofilo Evangelista was an OFW from Angola on his
way back to the Philippines. While he was in Dubai
Airport, the authorities discovered that Evangelista
was carrying an Israeli submachine gun with
ammunition without license. This was reported to the
PAL Officers in Dubai and the gun was handed to the
pilot. Upon arriving at NAIA, he was arrested by the
Customs police and was made to sign a Customs
Declaration Form. In his defense, Evangelista claims
that he had no actual possession of the firearms as it
was with the plane pilot
HELD:
To be guilty of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, one does not have to be in actual
possession thereof. The law does not punish physical
possession alone but possession on general including
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing
to the owner’s control. It is a state of mind but the real
intent could be determined based on his prior or
contemporaneous acts and surrounding
circumstances explaining how he came into
possession. The Customs declaration form and
admissions during trial were used as basis for showing
he owned and possessed the items.
11. SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
(voluntary surrender plus voluntary confession
of guilt)
This is special mitigating circumstance, and not privileged
mitigating circumstance per se based on Article 68 (2)
and Article 69.
1. Two or more mitigating circumstances with NO
aggravating circumstances
2. Only applicable to penalties which contain three
periods – reclusion temporal and lower. It cannot be
applied to reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible
penalty.
Article 64 par. 5 – special mitigating circumstances
Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties
which contain three periods. – In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of
three different penalties, each one of which forms a
period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76
and 77, the court shall observe for the application of
the penalty the following rules, according to whether
there are or are not mitigating or aggravating
circumstances:
5. When there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature
of such circumstances.
It tells that when two or more mitigating circumstances
are present, no aggravating circumstance the court may
apply a penalty next lower in degree. This is referred to
as special mitigating circumstance. Special because it is
provided by law. When it talks about the next lower in
degree, you again refer to the graduated scale.
EXAMPLE:
A 17 year old, Boy, killed his friend named Boyet, the
killing was not attended by any qualifying circumstances
so the killing is plain and simple homicide.
Boy after killing Boyet actually voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities and when he was arraigned, the
information was read to him, the allegations. He pleaded
guilty.
Voluntary plead of guilt – mitigating circumstance under
Art. 13
Minority – mitigating circumstance
Applying Art. 64, par. 5, the penalty should be prision
correccional
Minority – one degree lower
Special mitigating circumstance (2 mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating) – one degree lower
Therefore:
The penalty will be two degrees lower than
that prescribed by law
12. SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT (ART. 39 RPC)
Article 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no
property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the
paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of
1 day for each P8, subject to the following rules:
 1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision
correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed ⅓ of the term of the sentence, and in
no case shall it continue for more than 1 year, and no
fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the
prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine,
the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 6
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a
grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed 15
days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision
correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be
executed by confinement in a penal institution, but
such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during
the period of time established in the preceding rules,
shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those
of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict
may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not
relieve him, from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve (as amended by R.A.
No. 5465, April 21, 1969).
There is substitution of deprivation of liberty (subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 10159) for pecuniary
penalties in case of insolvency of the accused, and the
penalty imposed is not higher than prision correccional.
N.B. Subsidiary imprisonment is computed at the rate of
one day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the
time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the
trial court (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 10159).
People v. Alapan
G.R. No. 199527 (10 January 2018)
FACTS: In an Information dated 26 May 2006,
respondent Salvador Alapan (Alapan) and his wife
Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
Blg. 22). They were convicted. They filed a petition
seeking the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
non-payment of fine in eight (8) cases of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).
ISSUE: Whether Alapan may undergo subsidiary
imprisonment for failure to pay the fine.
HELD: No. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
provides that "should only a fine be imposed and the
accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the
Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment for the same must still
comply with the law. Here, the judgment of conviction
did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of
failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary
imprisonment may not be imposed without violating
the RPC and the constitutional provision on due
process.
13. PROXIMATE CAUSE
- the cause, which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
• One who commits an intentional felony is responsible
for all the consequences which may naturally and
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not.
• Rationale: el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado
“He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused”
• When a person has not committed a felony, he is not
criminally liable for the result which is not intended.
When death is presumed to be the natural consequence
of physical injuries inflicted:
1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries
were inflicted was in normal health.
2. That the death may be expected from the
physical injuries inflicted.
3. That death ensued within a reasonable time.
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:
1. There is an active force that intervened between
the felony committed and the resulting injury,
 and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
2. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act
of the victim.
The causes which may produce a result different from
that which the offender intended are:
ERROR IN PERSONAE – mistake in the identity of the
victim; injuring one person mistaken for another (this is
a complex crime under Art. 49)
ABERRATIO ICTUS – mistake in the blow, that is, when
the offender intending to do an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another; and
PRAETER INTENTIONEM – the act exceeds the intent,
that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended.
ATTY. ESGUERRA:
You cannot afford not to understand the this concepts so
the resulting, I mean what results from all of these, error
in personae, abratio ictus, praeter intentionem, is that
the person who performed the act is liable one way of
the other whether or not he says that –no I did not intend
to kill him but I intend to kill another or no I did not
intend to harm him that way I only intended to do a
lesser harm, that will not detract from his criminal
liability. So, better remember these 3 concepts.
Article 49 of RPC. Penalty to be imposed upon the
principals when the crime committed is different
from that intended. — In cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender
intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed
be higher than that corresponding to the offense
which the accused intended to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed
be lower than that corresponding to the one which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty for the
former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding
paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an
attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law
prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter
offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the
attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
So the consequence may still result into a mitigating
circumstance, the wrongful act may be different from
that intended and a mitigating circumstance may be
appreciated in favor of the accused over and above the
consequences in terms of the penalty imposable under
Art. 49.
WACOY v. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 213792 and 213886, 22 June 2015
FACTS: A was sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, B kicked A's stomach twice, after which, B
picked up a rock to throw at A but was restrained from
doing so. As A stood up, C punched him on the
stomach, causing him to collapse. Thereafter, A was
taken to the hospital where he suffered cardiac arrest,
lapsed into a coma and later died.
ISSUE: Were B and C’s act the proximate cause of A’s
death?
HELD: Yes. B's contention that their intent was
only to inflict slight physical injuries on A, and should
only be meted a lesser penalty, pursuant to Article 49
of the RPC is unmeritorious. Article 49 of the RPC
applies only where the crime committed is different
from that intended and where the felony committed
befalls a different person (error in personae); and not
to cases where more serious consequences not
intended by the offender result from his felonious act
(praeter intentionem), as in this case. If the victim dies
because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because
with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal
law looks particularly to the material results following
the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible
for all the consequences thereof.
Nacino v. Ombudsman
G.R. 234789-91, 3 September 2019
Facts: Former President Benigno Aquino III, former
PNP Chief Purisima and PNP-Special Action Force
(PNP-SAF) Chief General Napenas were charged with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide for the
death of 44 PNP-SAF members of tin January 2015
(“SAF 44”). According to the complaints, Aquino
should be criminally liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide because: (a) he
approved the recommendation of Purisima and
Napeñas on the dates on which the operation shall be
conducted; (b) he had full participation in Oplan
Exodus; and (c) he allowed then suspended PNP Chief
Purisima to participate not only in the planning of
Oplan Exodus but also in the running of the operation,
and even in giving information and intelligence while
the operation was ongoing.
Purisima should be held criminally liable because
despite being already barred from om performing the
functions of the PNP Chief due to his suspension, he:
(a) himself present when Napeñas gave a briefing and
mission update on Oplan Exodus to the President; (b)
gave instructions to Napenas to not inform the DILG
Secretary and the OIC of the PNP regarding Oplan
Exodus until the morning of January 25, 2015; (c)
continued to involve himself in Oplan Exodus by
exchanging messages with Napeñas before and during
the operation; and (d) provided updates to Aquino on
the progress of the operation.
Napenas should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide because as
head of the PNP-SAF, he had direct participation in the
planning and execution of Oplan Exodus which
resulted in the death of the SAF 44.
Issue: Whether the acts of Aquino, Purisima and
Napenas are the proximate cause of the death of the
SAF 44, and are bases to hold them criminally liable.
Ruling: No. Proximate cause is defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Aquino’s actions are not the proximate cause of the
death of the SAF 44 because: (a) since December 2010,
it was the SAF, at most times supervised by Napeñas,
that conceptualized and implemented operations to
capture international terrorist Marwan. The earliest
indication of Aquino's knowledge of these operations
to capture high-value targets is dated April 2014; (b)
with respect to Aquino's alleged approval of the
"secondary date" of the execution of Oplan Exodus,
records show that following the briefing on January 9,
2015, Purisima informed Aquino of Napeñas'
preference for the "secondary date" through a text
message, to which Aquino replied with a simple
"Okay."1Aside from the fact that this date was
recommended by Napeñas himself, Aquino's cursory
reply was a mere formality, an acknowledgment of a
preference made by the leader of the operating
troops; (c) Aquino's suggestions during the briefing to
increase the number of troops and coordinate with
the AFP appear to be spontaneous remarks to a
completed operation plan presented to him for his
information; and (d) nothing on record shows that
Aquino gave orders to Purisima during the conduct of
Oplan Exodus. The latter merely forwarded to Aquino
the messages sent by Napeñas on the outcome and
incidents of the operation, and Aquino, at some
points, merely asked for clarification.
Purisima’s actions are not the proximate cause of the
death of the SAF 44 because during the conduct of the
operation, there is no indication that he gave orders to
Napeñas. The record bears that he merely gave
guidance on the result of his coordination with the AFP
and other persons, and asked for updates which he
forwarded to the President. Looking at the big picture,
Purisima's main role in the entire undertaking
appeared merely to connect the SAF to the President.
Oplan Exodus was admittedly the brainchild of the
SAF, led by Napeñas. The fact that Purisima worked on
the sidelines is an internal recognition of his lack of
authority to act because of his suspension from office.
There was negligence on the part of Napeñas in the
planning and execution of Oplan Exodus, but the
confluence of other factors contributing to its tragic
ending, i.e., problems with the Global Positioning
System (GPS) devices, difficulty of the troops in
negotiating the terrain at night resulting in delay for
the troops to reach their respective positions, and
failure in communication between the PNP and the
AFP, prevents the court from finding probable cause
to charge him with reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide.
RSE: Article 4 paragraph 2, according to the provision,
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrong act be different
from that which he intended. This is actually the basis of
proximate cause. The obvious implication of the
provision is that whatever the consequences of the act,
which is wrongful, one should be held responsible for
such consequences.
Okay, now I don't know if you have memorized or if you
will dare to memorize the Latin phrase about proximate
cause. El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado, He who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused. Kaya ba? Pag yan cinite niyo
pagtinanong ko proximate cause, 5 agad kayo. Plus 5.
Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina
102 Phil 181 (1957)
FACTS: A bus traveling from Cavite to Pasay
overturned to the side of the highway because its front
tire burst. Three of the passengers were stuck behind
the driver seat. During this time, oil spilled out of the
bus. The people living near the area responded to the
calls for help. They carried torches because it was dark
as it was already past midnight.
Unfortunately, the bus was set ablaze because the
torches ignited the gasoline which leaked and spread
around the bus. The bus company claims that the
proximate cause of the death of the victims was the
torch which triggered the fire and not their negligence.
HELD: A definition of proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pp.695-696 of American jurisprudence,
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as
follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
In this case, the proximate cause of the death is the
carrier’s negligence in transporting their passengers.
The tires of the bus were not replaced and during the
incident, the driver and the conductor did not do
anything to prevent the people with the torches from
approaching the overturned bus.
People v. Iligan
G.R. No. 75369 (26 November 1990)
FACTS: Before the incident, Quinones and 2 others got
into an altercation with Ilagan. They were able to run
away from Ilagan. Later on, while the three were
walking to Quinones’ house, Ilagan suddenly emerged
and hacked Quinones in the head with a bolo. The
blow caused Quinones to fall on the highway where he
was ran over by a vehicle causing his death.
HELD: Under these circumstances, we hold that while
Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have
been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of
the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as
"that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom." In
other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s
assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over
by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time
between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having
triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
Urbano v. IAC 157 SCRA 1 (1998)
FACTS: One morning, Urbano found his palay flooded.
Javier admitted to opening the irrigation canal which
angered Urbano. This led to a heated argument which
ended with Urbano hitting Javier on the palm with a
bolo. The wound was treated but Javier died a month
later due to tetanus.
HELD: The proximate cause of the death of Marcelo
Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after 2 weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
 elements like tetanus germs. The medical findings lead
us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime.
RSE: It was the negligence here of the victim. After having
been treated he went back to the farm and tended his
Tobacco plants where he incurred the germ for the
tetanus. That’s an efficient intervening cause.
Q: What is Error in Personae, Aberratio Ictus and
Praeter Intentionem?
A: The causes which may produce a result different from
that which the offender intended.
Error in Personae is a mistake in the identity of the victim
injuring one person mistaken for another. The legal
effect here is a complex crime under article 49.
Aberratio Ictus is a mistake in the blow that is when the
offender intending to do an injury to one person actually
inflicts it on another.
NOTE: Take note of the distinction between Error in
Personae and Aberratio Ictus. That may simply also be
the question, What is Aberratio Ictus? Distinguish it from
Error in Personae.
Praeter Intentionem, a more understandable concept is
when the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious
result is greater than that indented.
SITUATION:
If Pedro has been dismissed from his employment by the
company by reason of the pandemic. There have been
several forces not really resignation. They've been
dismissed because businesses have been losing. So
anyway, Pedro was dismissed from employment and
took a bus coming from Makati going North to Quezon,
City and his thoughts were on his family: how he will be
able to support his family, provide for them specially with
children who are all of school age in terms of providing
them education.
Then so many things you know crossed his mind and then
suddenly he shouted “Papatayin ko kayo!” and took from
his bag you, a backpack, a caliber 22 pistol and started
firing in the air. This frightened two of the passengers
who were seated some rows away from Pedro.
Passenger B and C jumped while the bus was running.
They fell on the road and died.
Q: May you hold Pedro liable for the death of B and C,
taking into consideration the doctrine of proximate
cause?
A: YES. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused. If Pedro did not somehow go berserk and
started shooting, even if it was shooting in the air, it
would not have frightened or it would have not caused
fright on B and C. B and C would not have escaped or
jumped out of the window of the bus. You can still argue
that Pedro was the cause. His going berserk, no matter
how we can sympathize with what happened to him, the
fact of the matter is that he did something wrong. What
was that wrong? He got his pistol, he got his caliber 22,
fired it in the air and that frightened the two victims. It's
a question of logical connection of the causal relationship
about the drawing of the gun, the firing of it, causing the
fear on two passengers and the two passengers jumping
out of the window out of fear and died.
That’s why it's called El que es causa de la causa es causa
del mal causado. He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused.
Q: For instance, one of you actually hates your professor
because he failed you in your subject. Then assuming
that we're still doing classes on site. You waited for him
at the gate or at the entrance or at the back of the Main
Building. As the professor was getting out, you actually
tripped him using your right leg and then he fell on the
pavement, headfirst and then his cranium broke, his skull
broke that cause severe hemorrhage in his head and then
he died.
A: Proximate cause pa rin yan. What was the wrong that
he did? Mantak mo naman, pinatid mo yung professor.
That was wrong though you did not intend to kill, that
will be Praeter Intentionem.
ERROR IN PERSONAE (Mistake in Identity)
People v. Oanis (supra) 74 Phil 257 (1943)
FACTS: Police Officer Oanis and other officers were
instructed to arrest Balagtas, an escaped convict. On
the day of the operation, the police officers were given
tips on where to find the convict. When they arrived
at a house where Balagtas was believed to be at, Oanis
and Galanta saw a man sleeping with his back towards
the door. They shot simultaneously or successively at
him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. As it was
found later, the man killed was an innocent citizen
named Tecson. In their defense, the accused claims
that there was a mistake in identity.
 HELD: The crime committed by appellants is not
merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful
act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence, and where such unlawful act is wilfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence to
support a plea of mitigated liability. As the deceased
was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
RSE: People v. Oanis is a case that likewise gives us an
instance of the privilege incomplete privilege mitigating
circumstance of fulfillment of a duty. They were carrying
out actually an order. They got a tip but instead of
ascertaining the identity of the victim, they immediately
shot him while the victim was asleep and that of course
did not _____ for them. While they were charged with
murder.
Supposedly death or now Reclusion Perpetua to death.
They were given a privilege mitigating. What was
appreciated was the privileged mitigating circumstance
of incomplete fulfillment of a duty. See the facts of the
case. So why they were held liable but afforded or
accorded the incomplete privilege mitigating
circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
People v. Gona 54 Phil 605 (1930)
FACTS: A celebration with liberal supply of alcohol was
taking place at a house. The Gona and Dunca got into
a quarrel. Later on, Dunca left the house with several
people. Gona took a bolo and followed the group with
the intent to kill Dunca. He hacked someone in the
neck which caused the person’s death. It turns out that
the person hacked was Mapudul. Gona’s defense was
that there was error in personae as he really intended
to kill Dunca and not Mapundul.
HELD: Mistake in killing one man instead of another
cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance when
it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully.
ABERRATIO ICTUS (Miscarriage in the Blow)
People v. Sabalones 294 SCRA 751 (1988)
FACTS: 2 vehicles proceeded to the house of Stephen
Lim when Sabalones et. al. fired towards the vehicles
killing 2 of the passengers and seriously injuring 3
others. The lower court convicted the accused.
Appellants accuse the trial court of engaging in
conjecture in ruling that there was aberratio ictus in
this case.
HELD: The allegation does not advance the cause of
the appellants. It must be stressed that the trial court
relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why
the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that
appellants did in fact commit the crimes. In any event,
the lower court was not engaging in conjecture
because the conclusion that the appellants killed the
wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial
statement of appellant Beronga and the testimony of
one witness. Nonetheless, the fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. Mistake
in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.
People v. Esteban 103 SCRA 520 (1981)
FACTS: Earlier in the day, Maravilla and Lulu went to
the house of Camaya to collect the balance from a
compromise agreement in the killing of Lulu’s
husband. Camaya said that Esteban would pay the
balance. Later that evening, Maravilla went to the
house of Maria Pascua where there was a drinking
session. At around 11 in the evening, gunshots were
fired at Maravilla and his companions. The owner of
the house Maria was found dead while Maravilla was
fatally wounded but survived due to timely medical
intervention.
HELD: The fact that Esteban intended to kill Maravilla
and in the course of the assault incidentally killed
Maria Pascua makes him liable for murder just the
same because a person committing a felony is
criminally liable although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended (Article 4, RPC).
This rule covers aberratio ictus or mistake as to victim.
Esteban is guilty of murder of Maria Pascual and
frustrated murder of Maravilla.
G.R. No. 205228 (15 July 2015)
FACTS: One morning, a Toyota Corolla drove
alongside a Honda CRV and the passenger of the
Corolla shot the CRV causing it to swerve and fall into
a canal. Four men alighted the Corolla and started
shooting at the driver. A bystander was also killed by a
stray bullet. The accused were convicted of 2 counts
of murder.
HELD: Although the bystander’s death was by no
means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where
the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in
aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of
2 separate counts of murder: for the killing of 2
victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The
material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar.
Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
People v. Cagoco 58 Phil 524 (1933)
FACTS: Father and son Yu were standing on the
sidewalk in Manila. While they were talking, Cagoco
was moving back and forth behind Yu Lon before
hitting him at the back of the head with his fist. Yu died
later that night. Cagoco claims that he should be
convicted only for slight physical injuries instead of
murder.
HELD: Since the accused struck the deceased from
behind and without warning, he acted with treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." Article 4(1) of the RPC
provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally
liable for a felony different from that which he
proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two
following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a
felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to
the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the offender. We have seen that
under the circumstances of this case the defendant is
liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was
the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of
striking him on the head. If the defendant had not
committed the assault in a treacherous manner. he
would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide,
although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and
since the defendant did commit the crime with
treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
People v. Gonzales G.R. No. 217022 (3 June 2019)
FACTS: Using a hanger, accused hit Ronald several
times until it snapped. Still, she did not stop. She got
hold of the broom and using its wooden handle, hit
Ronald's head and body. The next day, she got hold of
the broom again, and using its wooden handle, hit
Ronald's head and body. Accused was convicted of
parricide. On appeal, accused faulted the trial court for
finding her guilty of parricide. She also argued that
even assuming she killed Ronald, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong must be appreciated in her favor.
HELD: Accused was sufficiently shown to have used
brute force on Ronald so much so that the hanger she
initially used snapped. Even then, accused did not
stop; she got hold of the broom and using its wooden
handle hit Ronald in the head and all over his body.
The following morning, accused saw Ronald's critical
condition. There was vomit on his bed and on the
floor. His jogging pants were wet with urine. He was so
weak he could neither get up, nor hold a spoon. He
later fell to the ground. But accused still did not take
pity on her young child. Again, she got the broom and
pushed its handle inside Ronald's mouth. Accused,
therefore, cannot be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong.
RSE: People v. Gonzales is a 2019 case, take note of that,
not only of the Child Abuse but in so far as the crime or
felony of Parricide is concern.
14. IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. – Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or an account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Impossible Crime: requisites
1. That the act performed would be an offense
against persons (Title VIII, RPC) or property (Title
X, RPC). Felonies against persons: Parricide,
Murder, Homicide, Infanticide, Abortion, Duel,
Physical Injuries, Rape
Felonies against property: Robbery, Brigandage, Theft,
Usurpation, Culpable Insolvency, Swindling and other
deceits, Removal, Sale or Pledge of Mortgaged Property,
Arson and other crimes involving destruction, Malicious
Mischief
 2. That the act was done with evil intent. • However, where the means employed is adequate
- The offender must have intent to do injury to and the result expected is not produced, it is not an
another. impossible crime, but a frustrated felony.
• Why is an impossible crime punishable? - It is
3. That its accomplishment is inherently punishable in order to suppress criminal tendencies.
impossible, or that the means employed is either Objectively, the offender has not committed a felony,
inadequate or ineffectual. but subjectively, he is a criminal.

• “That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or

that the means employed is either inadequate or ATTEMPTED OR IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
ineffectual.” FRUSTRATED

A. The commission of the offense is inherently The evil intent of the offender is not accomplished
impossible of accomplishment
• The act intended by the offender is by its nature
The evil intent of the The evil intent of the
one of impossible accomplishment.
offender is possible of offender cannot be
• There must be either: (a) LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY,
accomplishment accomplished
or (b) PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY.
Examples:
1. when one tries to kill another by putting
in his drink a substance which he The evil intent cannot The evil intent of the
believes to be arsenic when in fact it is be accomplished offender cannot be
common salt; because of the accomplished because it is
2. when one tries to murder a corpse. intervention of certain inherently impossible of
cause or accident in accomplishment or
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even which the offender had because the means
if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal no part employed by the offender is
impossibility would apply to those circumstances where inadequate or ineffectual
(1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an
act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to
perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of
the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead
falls in this category.
Intod v. CA 215 SCRA 52 (1992)
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
FACTS: Intod went to Palangpangan’s house, all armed
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
with firearms. They went to the bedroom and began
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
firing their weapons. However, Palangpangan was in
intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
another city and her home was occupied by her son-
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
in-law and his family. No one was in the room when
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
the accused fired their weapons. RTC convicted the
empty. (Intod v. Court of Appeals, 21 October 1992)
accused of attempted murder.
B. The means employed is either inadequate or
HELD: The accused is guilty of an impossible crime. The
ineffectual
factual situation in the case presents a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime
Example: when one tries to poison another but the
impossible of performance.
quantity of arsenic added in his substance was not
sufficient to kill a person.
• Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the
crime because the means employed or the aims sought
are inadequate or ineffectual

• When the person intending to commit an offense has
already performed the acts for the execution of the
same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its
nature one of impossible accomplishment or because
the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the
court, having in mind the social danger and the degree
of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon
him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to
500 pesos (Article 59).
Quinto v. Andres (supra)
FACTS: Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil,
and his playmate, Wilson Quinto (about 11 years old)
saw Andres and Pacheco who invited them to go
fishing inside a drainage culvert. Wilson assented but
Garcia seeing that it was dark inside opted to remain
seated in a grassy area about 2 meters from the
entrance of the drainage system. Pacheco, Andres
and Quinto, entered the drainage system which was
covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and
a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. After a
while, Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of
the drainage system and left without saying a word.
Andres also came out, went back inside, and
emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was
already dead. Andres laid the boy's lifeless body
down in the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn
of events, Garcia fled from the scene. For his part,
Andres went to the house of Melba Quinto, Wilson's
mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while
Andres followed her.
HELD: The Court ruled that respondents cannot be
held criminally nor civilly liable for the death of
Wilson. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce
proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the
petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to
go to their house and play with her son before the
latter's death. When petitioner's son died inside the
drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who
brought out the deceased. He then informed the
petitioner of her son's death. Even after informing
the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent
Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the
grassy area where the deceased was.
Jacinto v. People
592 SCRA 426 (2009)
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts
to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is
a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not
for the fact that the check bounced, she would have
received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time,
that prevented the crime from being produced. The
thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received
the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check.
There can be no question that as of the time
that petitioner took possession of the check meant
for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00
cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored
check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give
cash as replacement for the check was hatched only
after the check had been dishonored by the drawee
bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing
offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money
was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.
15. ALEVOSIA
Par. 16. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH
TREACHERY (ALEVOSIA).
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might take.
 A treacherous attack is one in which the victim
was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or
resist the attack. The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears
that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the
execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated
against the accused (People v. Labiaga, G.R. No. 202867,
15 July 2013).
The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving
the victim of any chance to defend himself. (People v.
Bosito, G.R. No. 209346, 12 January 2015)
For treachery to be appreciated, circumstances
must be present at the inception of the attack, and if
absent and the attack is continuous, treachery, even if
present at a subsequent stage is not to be considered
(People v. Loterono, G.R. No. 146100, 13 November 2002,
391 SCRA 593).
Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment, or those that were
preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the
accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of
attack (People v. Caratao, G.R. No. 126281, 10 June 2003,
403 SCRA 482).
For treachery to be considered, two elements
must concur:
(1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves
or retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. (Fantastico, et al. v. People, G.R.
No. 190912, 12 January 2015)
The mere suddenness of an attack should not be
the sole basis in finding treachery. There must be
evidence to show that the accused deliberately or
consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its
success. (People v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, 18 March
2015)
Rules regarding treachery:
• Treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.
However, in several cases of robbery with
homicide, treachery was appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance (People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No.
140756, 4 April 2003).
• The means, methods or forms used by the perpetrator
need not insure accomplishment of crime.
• The mode of attack must be consciously adopted.
Attacks which show intention to eliminate risk:
• Victim asleep (People v. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722
27 July 1943).
• Victim half-awake or just awakened.
• Victim grappling or being held.
• Victim was a child of tender age (U.S. v. Antonio,
G.R. No. L-10562, 3 August 1915)
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant,
whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such
mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by
him, with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance
to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the sudden attack was not preconceived
and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the
sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of
the provocative act of the victim, or where their meeting
was purely accidental (People v. Monte, G.R. No. 125332,
2 March 2000).
Additional rules:
a. When the aggression is CONTINUOUS, treachery must
be present in the BEGINNING of the assault (U.S. v.
Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6432, 22 March 1911).
b. When the assault WAS NOT CONTINUOUS, in that
there was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery
was present AT THE MOMENT THE FATAL BLOW WAS
GIVEN (U.S. v. Baluyot, G.R. No. L-14476, 6 November
1919).
Cirera v. People
G.R. No. 181843, 14 July 2014
Facts: Miguel arrived at a wake where Austria was
playing a game of lucky nine, and asked for money
from the latter. In response, Austria asked Miguel to
keep quiet. Naval arrived and asked Austria to go
home. There was an exchange of words between
Naval and Miguel. Austria stood up and felt that he
was stabbed. As he ran home, he noticed Miguel
armed with a knife, this time chasing Naval. Austria
was hospitalized and was confined for more than a
month.
Issue: Whether treachery may be appreciated in this
case
Ruling: No. The attack might have been done on
impulse or as a reaction to an actual or imagined
provocation offered by the victim. In this case,
petitioner was not only dismissed by Austria when he
approached him for money. There was also an
altercation between him and Naval. The provocation
might have been enough to entice Cirera to action and
attack private complainants.
Therefore, the manner of attack might not have been
motivated by a determination to ensure success in
committing the crime. What was more likely the case
was that Cirera’s action was an impulsive reaction to
being dismissed by Austria, his altercation with Naval,
and Naval’s attempt to summon Austria home.
Generally, this type of provocation negates the
existence of treachery. This is the type of provocation
that does not lend itself to premeditation. The
provocation in this case is of the kind which triggers
impulsive reactions left unchecked by the accused and
caused him to commit the crime.
People v. Vega y Ramil
G.R. No. 216018, 27 March 2019
Facts:
Accused-appellant Don was charged with the crime of
Murder after allegedly repeatedly stabbing the
Manuel Isip on different parts of his body with a
bladed weapon, which caused his immediate death.
The accused-appellant pleaded self-defense, alleging
that while they were attending a birthday party, the
victim punched him and charged towards him with a
bladed weapon, so he stabbed the victim. The RTC
convicted Don, which Decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
May the aggravating circumstance of treachery be
appreciated in this case?
Ruling: No. The following circumstances negate the
presence of treachery: (a) the stabbing incident
happened during a drinking spree in which Don was
already a part of; (b) in killing Manuel, Don merely
picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was
no mention in the records as to who owned the said
weapon. In a similar case, the Court held that
treachery cannot be presumed merely from the fact
that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an
attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of
alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's
helpless position was accidental.
People v. Lumahang y Talisay
G.R. No. 218581, 27 March 2019
Facts: Lumahang, Velitario and Pornelos were
attending a wake when Lumahang appeared fuming
mad. Suddenly, Lumahang approached Pornelos from
behind and stabbed him in a hook motion with knife in
his left hand. Pornelos, who was hit on the buttocks,
quickly ran towards an alley. Without warning,
appellant then turned his ire on Velitario and stabbed
him repeatedly on different parts of his body.
The RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder
and Less Serious Physical Injuries. While the CA upheld
Lumahang's conviction for Murder for the killing of
Velitario, it did, however, downgrade Lumahang's
conviction for the stabbing of Pornelos and convicted
him of only Slight Physical Injuries.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Ruling: Yes. Treachery undoubtedly exists on the
attack against Pornelos because (1) the parties were
attending a wake, and were thus not expecting an
attack from happening; (2) the attack was made
suddenly and from behind. The attack on Pornelos was
therefore clearly attended by treachery.
The same is not true, however, for the attack on
Velitario. Lumahang had already made an attack
against Pornelos who, after being stabbed on the
buttocks, was able to successfully run away towards
safety. Velitario was already apprised that there was
danger nearby as he saw the commotion between
Pornelos and Lumahang. It is true that Velitario was
unable to defend himself from Lumahang's attacks not
because he was not given an opportunity to do so, but
simply because he was not able to react in time from
the initial attack on Pornelos. With the removal of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime
committed by Lumahang against Velitario is therefore
Homicide and not Murder.
People v. Aseniero
G.R. No. 218209, 10 April 2019
Facts: Romeo found guilty of Murder under Art 248.
The prosecution presented the testimony of the friend
of the victim, and saw the accused hack the victim with
a bolo. The victim, Dominador had started a
relationship with Analyn, one month after the break-
up with accused. The defense presented testimony
that they Analyn and the accused were still
sweethearts at that time but were quarelling. When
the accused approached Analyn, he was kicked by
Dominador, the victim. The victim unsheathed his
knife while the accused unsheathe his bolo, and there
was a bloody fight. Romeo was found guilty of Murder
under Art 248 for killing Dominador.
Issue: Whether treachery was present and was
correctly considered in qualifying the crime to murder
Ruling: No. Romeo was only guilty of Homicide.
Treachery was not established beyond a reasonable
doubt. The attack was preceded by an altercation.
Each one of them is forewarned of an impending
attack by either of them. Also, it was the victim who
first assaulted the accused. The attack made by the
accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the
victim who first attacked the former. (See also: People
v. Noellito Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, 16 October
2019)
People v. Reyes, et al.
G.R. No. 227013, 17 June 2019
Facts: The victim, Jun Balmores, appellants Sahagun
and Aries Reyes, and accused Argie Reyes and Hilario
were all vendors who sold their wares along the
stretch of Hidalgo Street, Quiapo, Manila. On 5 August
2007, the police apprehended the illegal vendors in
the area. On that afternoon, when Aries, Demetrio,
Arthur, and Argie saw Jun, they pursued him. As Jun
tried to run away, Demetrio hit him with a plastic chair
in the head, causing the former to fall to the ground.
Arthur and Aries then alternately hit him with
broomsticks. Jun, nonetheless, managed to get back
on his feet and run toward Villalobos Street. But when
he reached the corner of Villalobos Street, Argie was
there waiting. Argie stabbed Jun in the left side of his
body. Shortly after, Argie caught up with him and
stabbed him a second time, hitting him in the arm. All
accused were charged with murder, qualified by
treachery.
Issue: Is treachery attendant in this case?
Ruling: No. The essence of treachery is the swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner by which the
offense was committed, affording the victim no
opportunity to resist, escape, much less, defend
himself or herself. The offender must have planned
the mode of attack to ensure its execution without
exposing himself to any danger which may come from
the victim's act of retaliation or self-defense.
There is no showing that appellants and their co-
accused knew Jun was going back to the area at that
late time of the day and that they had planned to
attack Jun there and then. On the contrary, appellants
and their co-accused appeared to have spontaneously
acted as soon as they saw Jun back in the area. Even
after Jun fell to the ground and appellants alternately
hit him with broomstick handles, he still managed to
get back on his feet and run for his life. And although
Argie subsequently waylaid and stabbed him in the left
side of his body, he did not stop running. The only time
he did was when Argie caught up and stabbed him
another time. Evidently, although Jun did not expect
the sudden and concerted attack of his assailants who
were each armed with either a chair, broomstick
handles, or a knife, he was not rendered totally
defenseless or prevented from escaping his assailants.
In fact, he was able to get back on his feet and run for
his life, albeit in the end, he still lost his life due to the
stab wound he sustained in his trunk.
DISCUSSION:
GR: Treachery is only applicable to crimes against
persons.
Q: Why is it that in robbery with homicide which is a
crime against property, treachery may be appreciated
as indicated in People v. Escote?
A: Homicide is a component/constituent crime of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and
homicide is a crime against persons. It is only for that
reason that treachery may be appreciated in robbery
with homicide.
People v. Bugarin
G.R. No. 224900, 15 March 2017
The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia
does not even require that the perpetrator attack his
victim from behind. Even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed
victim who would be in no position to repel the attack
or avoid it. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape the sudden blow.
People v. Gayon
G.R. No. 230221, 10 April 2019
Facts: Accused Edgar entered Rodolfo Gayon’ house.
Accused Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora and suddenly
stabbed Leonora several times. She even saw
 accused’s knife embedded on Leonora's right
shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged Leonora inside
the house. Leyden claimed that Leonora uttered to her
that she was dying and Leyden likewise heard accused
Edgar told Rodolfo "Papay we have no more problem
because I killed your sister."
Issue: Whether treachery and evident premeditation
were present in the crime committed.
Ruling: No, treachery and evident premeditation were
not present. Mere suddenness of the attack is not
sufficient to hold that treachery is present. For
treachery to exist there must be a showing that the
means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing
the act without risk to the aggressor.
Treachery is absent due to the following
circumstances: (1) There is no showing in this case that
accused Edgar carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and
success; (2) Leonora was attacked at the place familiar
to her and in the presence of other people who are
related to the victim; (3) the attack against Leonora
was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not
negate the existence of treachery, when the same is
considered along with the other circumstances as
previously discussed, it already creates a reasonable
doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance.
There is likewise no evident premeditation. There is
evident premeditation when the following elements
concur: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused had clung to his determination to commit
the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of
time between the determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
16. Sec. 98 RA 9165 in rel. to Art 68(2) RPC, minor
offenders;
- Section 98 on the penalty imposable upon a
minor who has been sentenced, under this law,
to life imprisonment to death it becomes
reclusion perpetua to death
Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code;
Applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
• Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the
contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall
not apply to the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 except in
the case of minor offenders (Article II, Sec. 98, R.A. No.
9165).
• Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in
R.A. No. 9165 shall be reclusion perpetua to death
(Article II, Sec. 98, R.A. No. 9165).
• If the offense is punished by a special law (e.g. R.A. No.
9165), the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same (Section 1, Indeterminate
Sentence Law).
DISCUSSION:
Now, going back to what I told you earlier about Section
98, it’s here, so if a minor is found to have committed an
offense under RA 9165 that is punishable by life
imprisonment to death, that is Section 98.
According to the law it shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. I hope you remember when we are navigating the
provisions of Book 1 Arts. 1 to 113 apart of what I recall
we discussed is the provisions of Art. 10 of the Revised
Penal Code and there the rule is the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code do not apply to special penal laws,
they may apply, however, only in a suppletory character
unless the special penal law itself proscribes or prohibits
the application of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code and this is one provision falling in the latter
category where there is prohibition on the application of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code except in the
case of a minor offender.
See, only in the case of a minor offender may the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code apply and very
clearly in this provision itself, the law says that a minor
so found to be liable and sentenced to life imprisonment
to death will be liable only and be sentenced to life
imprisonment to death. Do you see the significance? I
think we have explained this before, the significance is
this, because the nomenclature of the penalties is that
under the Revised Penal Code that means that the minor
is entitled to all the benefits that he can avail of under
the Revised Penal Code, for instance.
Being a minor, assuming that he acted with discernment,
of course, is he not entitled to a privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority that we have taken up under
Art. 68, par. 2? You see, so in short, if he is punished with
the reclusion perpetua to death, he is a minor, the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion perpetua to
death is reclusion temporal, if it is reclusion temporal,
that’s a penalty next lower in degree because of the
privilege mitigating circumstance of minority.
Alright, and we will see in the case of Mantalaba(see p.7)
that will follow why this is so because in the graduation
of the penalties somehow we have taken this up under
Art. 71, one penalty next lower in degree after death
reclusion perpetua is reclusion temporal, so that should
be the penalty that should be imposed without, of
course, prejudice still to the application of the
indeterminate sentence law, wala pa yung indeterminate
sentence law dyan. Okay, remember Section 98,
Remember Sections
11 and 15.
R.A. No. 9165 is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. Any person convicted under the said law,
regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the
graduations under Article 65 of the RPC as R.A. No. 9165
is a special law. Further, Section 98 of the same law
provides: “the provisions of the RPC (Act No. 3814), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act,
except in the case of minor offenders. “Where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by
life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.”
We have taken this up in connection with RA 9165. The
penalties in RA 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act) are not borrowed exactly from the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code. It is life imprisonment, not
reclusion perpetua, in RA 9165. The nomenclature of
penalties does not follow what the nomenclature under
the RPC is. There is no room for applying the provisions
of the RPC on attendant circumstances because this is a
special penal law.
GR: Provisions of the RPC applies suppletorily to special
penal laws (Article 10, RPC)
XPN: When the special penal law specifically prohibits
the application of the RPC even in suppletory character.
RA 9165 specifically states, under Section 98, that the
provisions of the RPC does not apply insofar as the
violations or offenses thereunder are concerned.
Therefore, there is no application for the rules on the
attendant circumstances. However, the only exception
mentioned in the law itself is about the minor offender
who has been sentenced with life imprisonment to
death, for which the law mentions that the penalty
should be reclusion perpetua to death. This is somehow
favorable to the minor offender and therefore may be
applied in his case.
17. PRINCIPLE OF GENERALITY
Criminal law has three main characteristics: 1) general, 2)
territorial, and 3) prospective.
GENERALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW 1987 Constitution,
Article VI Section 1. The legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
Civil Code, Article 14 Penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all those
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject
to the principles of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.
The criminal law of the country governs and applies to all
persons in Philippine Territory, regardless of
nationality, age, gender or other personal
circumstances.
Example: An American who visits the Philippines in order
to kill his Filipina girlfriend because of extreme jealousy
is still liable for murder although he is a foreigner.
GENERAL RULE: The jurisdiction of the civil courts is not
affected by the military character of the accused.
✓ Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with general
court-martial over soldiers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines even in times of war, provided that in the
place of the commission of the crime no hostilities are in
progress and civil courts are functioning.
✓ When the military court takes cognizance of the case
involving a person subject to military law, the Articles of
War apply, not the RPC or other penal laws.
✓ The prosecution of an accused before a court-martial
is a bar to another prosecution of the accused for the
same offense.
✓ Offenders accused of war crimes are triable by military
commission. A military commission has jurisdiction even
if actual hostilities have ceased as long as a technical
state of war continues.
Exceptions to the general application of criminal law
- Article 2, RPC, “Except as provided in the treaties
or laws of preferential application…”
- Article 14, Civil Code, “… subject to the principles
of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.”
i. Treaty Stipulations
An example of a treaty or treaty stipulation is the Bases
Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the US on
March 14, 1947 and expired on September 16, 1991.
Another example would be the VFA signed on February
10, 1998 where the Philippines agreed:
a. US military authorities shall have the right to
exercise within the Philippines all criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the US over US personnel in RP;
b. US authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over US personnel with respect to offenses, including
offenses relating to the security of the US punishable
under the law of the US, but not under the laws of RP;
c. US military authorities shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over US personnel subject to
the military law of the US in relation to: (1) offenses
solely against the property or security of the US or
offenses solely against the property or person of US
personnel; and (2) offenses arising out of any act or
omission done in performance of official duty.
ii. Laws of Preferential Application
Parliamentary Immunity under Section 11, Article VI of
the Constitution - Members of Congress are immune
from arrest for all offenses punishable by not more than
6 years imprisonment while Congress is in session.
An example of a law of preferential application would be
R.A. No. 75, which penalizes acts which would impair the
proper observance by the Republic and inhabitants of the
Philippines of the immunities, rights, and privileges of
duly accredited foreign diplomatic representatives in the
Philippines.
R.A. No. 75 exempts from arrest and imprisonment, as
well as from distrain, seizure or attachment of property,
Public Ministers, Ambassadors and Domestic Servants of
Ambassadors and Public Ministers except (a) when such
person is a citizen or an inhabitant of the Philippines and
the writ issued against him is founded upon a debt
contracted before he entered such service; or (b) when
said domestic servant is not registered with the DFA.
Warship Rule — a foreign country’s warship is
considered an extension of the territory of the country
that it represents. Similar with an embassy, it cannot be
subject to the laws of another country. (Reyes, p.30)
iii. Principles of Public International Law
Persons exempt from the operation of our criminal laws
by virtue of the principles of public international law:
(1) Sovereigns and other chiefs of state.
(2) Ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary,
ministers resident, and charges d’affaires.
• a consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister
(Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil 250).
• under the Constitution, members of Congress
are not liable for libel or slander in connection with any
speech delivered on the floor of the house during regular
or special session.
US v. Sweet 1 Phil 18 (1901)
FACTS: Sweet was an employee of the US army in the
Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war for which
he was charged with the crime of physical injuries.
Sweet interposed the defense that the fact that he was
an employee of the US military authorities deprived
the court of the jurisdiction to try and punish him.
HELD: The case is open to the application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial,
unless controlled by express legislation to the
contrary.
Liang v. People 355 SCRA 125
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working at the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with 2
counts of oral defamation for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against his colleague. Thereafter,
petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant. After
fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC judge received an
office of protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner
is covered by immunity from legal processes under
Section 45 of the Agreement between ADB and the
Philippine Government. As a result, the MeTC judge
dismissed the criminal case without notice to the
prosecution.
 HELD: Petitioner is not covered by the immunity.
Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication
from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court
needs to protect the right to due process not only of
the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the
immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts
must be done in “official capacity.” Slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement as the same was not committed in the
performance of petitioner’s official duty.
18. RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT IN REL. TO
VIOLATION OF SEC 5 RA 7610 AND ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS;
Child prostitution and other sexual abuse
(section 5[a], R.A. no. 7610)
Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce
child prostitution, which includes any of the following:
• Acting as procurer of child prostitute;
• Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute;
• Taking advantage or influence to procure a child as
prostitute;
• Threatening or using violence towards a child to
engage him as a prostitute; or
• Giving monetary consideration goods or other
pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage
such child in prostitution.
MALTO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Malto was a philosophy professor at an
exclusive school for girls. He had carnal relations with
one of his students who was 17 years old. Malto
argues that they are a couple.
HELD: Malto violated R.A. 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act. There was lascivious conduct and
intercourse as a result of coercion or influence of the
professor and the victim was under 18 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime.
Sweetheart Theory
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness
and rape, felonies committed against or without the
consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that
the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that
the accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
LAVIDES v. CA
FACTS:
Lavides was charged with violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 for luring a sixteen (16)-year old girl into a
hotel to have carnal knowledge. Subsequently, 12
informations for the same violation was filed against
him.
HELD:
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act
with a child under the circumstances mentioned in
Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and
distinct offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which
each act of rape or lascivious conduct should be the
subject of a separate information.
NOTE: For every act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct committed against the child, under the
circumstances of Sec 5 of Child Abuse Law, there is a
separate and distinct offense so you will have to file
separate informations per act. Hindi siya continuing.
VARIANCE PRINCIPLE
People v. Quimvel
G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017
FACTS:
The victim, a seven (7) year-old girl, was
awakened when accused laid on top of her and
inserted his hand in the victim’s panty. Accused was
charged for Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether accused may be held liable for the crime of
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
in view of the supposed failure of the Information to
allege all elements necessary in committing said
crime.
RULING:
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, the requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as
penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC must be met in
 addition to the requisites of sexual abuse under May accused be held criminally liable for acts of
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to wit: lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC or “Lascivious
• The accused commits the act of sexual conduct” under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.
intercourse or lascivious conduct.
• The said act is performed with a child RULING:
exploited in prostitution or subjected to Accused may be convicted for the crime of lascivious
other sexual abuse. conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 which is
• That child, whether male or female, is below subsumed in the crime of rape by sexual intercourse.
18 years of age
Acts of Sexual Abuse /
Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts Lasciviousness Lascivious
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution Conduct
wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the
other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse Basis
or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected
to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation Elements of the
where a child is abused for profit but also one in which crime:
a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Punishable act: Lewdness Sexual
Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution intercourse or
but also other forms of sexual abuse against children. lascivious
conduct
NOTE: The SC made a distinction between Sec. 5(a) and
5(b). And another distinction that you should remember Offended party: Under 12 years A child
is Sec. 10 (a) which is other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty old, whether exploited in
or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the male or female prostitution or
child’s development. Any person under Sec 10, what is subjected to
being punished is any person who commits other act of other sexual
child abuse, cruelty, exploitation or responsible, other abuse aged
than sexual abuse or lascivious conduct. So ito yung below 18 years
catch-fall phrase. But if you are alleging Sec 10, you must old, whether
be able to prove that it is prejudicial to the child’s male or female
development. The act was committed to debase the
development of the child.
NOTE: Before an accused can be convicted through
Child Abuse (Section 5[b], R.A. No. 7610) lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, it
must be established that the elements of acts of
Children are deemed to be exploited in prostitution and lasciviousness under Art. 336 of RPC are met in addition
other sexual abuse under the following circumstances: to the requisites for sexual abuse of Sec. 5 of RA 7610.
1. Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child; and Guidelines for determination of proper charge and
2. The victim is under twelve (12) years of age. penalty

PEOPLE V. CAOILI • The age of the victim is into consideration in

G.R. NO. 196342, 8 August 2017
FACTS:
Accused was charged with rape by sexual intercourse
for having committed the following acts unto his 14
years 1 month and 10 days old daughter: (1) kissed her
lips; (2) touched and mashed her breast; and (3)
inserted finger into her vagina.
ISSUE:
designating or charging the offense, and in
determining the imposable penalty.
• If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
nomenclature of the crime should be “Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.”
Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A.
 No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
in its medium period.
• If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or
more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years
of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is
unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
Child prostitution and other sexual abuse
(section 5[c], R.A. no. 7610)
Those who derive profit or advantage, whether as
manager or owner of the establishment, where
prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar,
resort or establishment serving as cover or which
engages in prostitution.
People v. Montinola
G.R. No. 178061, 9 July 2011
FACTS:
Accused was charged with six counts of rape. On one
charge, the RTC and CA convicted the accused for
violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
HELD: Accused should be punished under Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610. Said provision covers acts of
lasciviousness while Section 10(a) covers other acts of
abuse.
19. SELF-DEFENSE, ART 11, RPC, ALSO RELATE TO
ART.69
Justifying circumstances. – The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate,
natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in
case the revocation was given by the person attacked,
that the one making defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of
a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are
present and that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
Self-defense includes not only the defense of the
person or body of the one assaulted but also that of his
rights, that is, those rights the enjoyment of which is
protected by law.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and
offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if
satisfactorily proved… Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence
is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. (People v. Bugarin, G.R. No.
224900, 15 March 2017)
Requisites:
1. There must be unlawful aggression. - This is an
indispensable requisite.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault
or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon
a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is
offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.
At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the
presence of an unlawful aggression committed against
appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will
not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if
the other elements are present. Unlawful aggression
refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-
defense. (Velasquez v. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15
March 2017)
There must be peril to one’s life which may
either be:
a. actual – that the danger must be present, that
is, actually in existence, or
b. imminent- that the danger is on the point of
happening. It is not required that the attack already
begins, for it may be too late.
Retaliation is different from an act of self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured
party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked
him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing
when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the
person making a defense.
In self-defense, the person must have no time nor
occasion for deliberation and cool thinking.
The unlawful aggression must come from the person
who was attacked by the accused.
There is no unlawful aggression when there is agreement
to fight because where the fight has been agreed upon,
each of the protagonists is at once assailant and
assaulted. But when the aggression is ahead of the
stipulated time and place, it is unlawful.
The rule now is STAND GROUND WHEN IN THE RIGHT.
So, where the accused is where he has the right to be,
the law does not require him to retreat when his
assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly
weapon.
• The belief of the person may be considered in
determining the existence of unlawful
aggression.
Ex. If the aggressor used a toy pistol but the accused
believed it was a real gun, he may claim self-defense.
N.B. A slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression
since the face represents a person and his dignity.
Slapping it is a serious personal attack.
Test: Does the person invoking the defense believe, in
due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger?
(Senoja v. People, 2004)
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it
The reasonableness of the necessity depends
upon the circumstances particularly the time and
location where the aggression took place.
The means employed by the person making a
defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel
an unlawful aggression.
The reasonableness of the means adopted is not
one of mathematical calculation or "material
commensurability” between the means of attack and
defense but the imminent danger against the subject of
the attack as perceived by the defender and the instinct
more than reason that moves the defender to repel the
attack.
The reasonableness of the means used will
depend upon the NATURE and QUALITY of the weapon
used by the aggressor, his PHYSICAL CONDITION, SIZE
and other circumstances, and those of the person
defending himself, and also the place and occasion of the
assault. (People v. Rabanal, G.R. No. 146687, 22 August
2002.)
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Requisite is complied with when:
a. When no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor by the person defending himself; or
b. When, even if a provocation was given, it was
not sufficient; or
c. When, even if the provocation was sufficient,
it was not given by the person defending himself; or
d. When, even if provocation was given by the
person defending himself, it was not proximate and
immediate to the act of aggression.
People v. Manzano
G.R. No. 217974, 5 March 2018
Facts: Accused Rezor Juanillo Manzano (“Rezor”) and
Resurrecion Juanillo Manzano (“Resurrecion”) were
charged before the trial court with the crime of
murder. While Resurrecion remained to be at-large,
the trial proceeded against Rezor. Considering that
Rezor raised an affirmative of self-defense, the parties
agreed to have a reverse trial. However, the trial and
appellate courts ruled that Rezor failed to establish
self-defense and found him guilty of the crime of
murder.
Issue: Whether accused have the burden of evidence
to establish the elements of self-defense.
Ruling: The burden of evidence shifts to accused. An
accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code admits to the
commission of acts, which would otherwise engender
criminal liability. When the accused admit that they
are the authors of the death of the victim, and their
defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes
incumbent upon them to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. With this
admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused to prove that all the essential elements of self-
defense are present.
Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the
person invoking it. Conviction follows if the evidence
for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying
circumstances.
The absence of unlawful aggression on the part of
Lucio in this case unmistakably belies the accused’s
claim of self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. Accused’s plea of self-defense is even
controverted by the nature, number, and location of
the wounds inflicted on the victim, since the gravity of
said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill
and not just to defend.
People v. Olarbe
G.R. No. 227421, 23 July 2018
Facts: Olarbe and his wife Juliet were sleeping in their
house. Suddenly they were awakened by the sound of
a gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to be
drunk. Arca was holding a rifle (an airgun converted to
a calibre .22) and shouted "mga putang ina ninyo,
pagpapatayin ko kayo." Then, Arca forcibly entered
their house and aimed the gun at them. Olarbe
immediately grabbed the gun from him and they
grappled for its possession. Olarbe managed to wrest
the gun away from Arca. In a jiff, Olarbe shot Arca
causing the latter to lean sideward ("napahilig").
Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo from his
waist and continued to attack them. Olarbe grabbed
the bolo and in their struggle for its possession, they
reached the outer portion of the house. Olarbe was
able to wrestle the bolo and instantly, he hacked Arca.
After the killing incident, Olarbe voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities.
Issue: Whether accused may invoke the justifying
circumstance of self-defense and defense of stranger.
Held: Yes. In order for Olarbe to exonerate himself on
the ground of self-defense, he must establish the
following facts, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense.
In order for him to be exonerated on the ground of
defense of stranger, he must prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, the following: (1) unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the 'means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or
other evil motive.
In this case, Olarbe's account of what did happen on
that fateful night was highly plausible. At the
minimum, the details and sequence of the events
therein described conformed to human experience
and the natural course of things. Armed with both the
gun and the bolo, Arca not only disturbed Olarbe's
peace but physically invaded the sanctity of latter's
home at midnight. Given that the aggression by Arca
was unprovoked on the part of Olarbe, and with no
other person disputing the latter's account, we should
easily see and understand why Olarbe would feel that
his and his common-law spouse's lives had been put in
extreme peril.
People v. Casas y Vintulan
G.R. No. 212565, 25 February 2015
A went to a Taho Factory where B is an
employee. Therein, A invited B to a fist fight which,
eventually ensued between the two. During the fist
fight A was able to grab a knife while B fled until he
reached C for help. For his part, C tried to help B with
the use of a bamboo pole. However, C slipped, fell face
first on the floor, and was prostrate. There and then,
A stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his back
and exiting at the front of his torso, and the second
blow hitting the left side of his abdomen.
A claims self-defense for the death of C, is it a valid
defense?
No. The elements of self-defense are as follows: (a)
unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. These requirements are absent in
this case.
A failed to prove any unlawful aggression on
the part of either B or C, which is a condition sine qua
non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to
obtain.
There can be no self-defense unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to self-defense. Being the party
initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly
weapon, A cannot successfully claim that there was
unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to
be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as
against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the
contrary happened in this case.
Miranda v. People
G.R. No. 234528, 23 January 2019
Petitioner was charged with Frustrated Homicide for
repeatedly hacking the victim, Winardo Pilo, inflicting
mortal wounds on his body. The latter was only saved
by timely medical assistance. Petitioner claimed self-
defense, alleging that the victim threw stones at his
house, hitting his left cheek, and that he hacked Pilo to
stop his attack.
Issue:
Whether petitioner validly invoked self-defense.
RULING:
No. The most important element of self-defense is
unlawful aggression. This is a condition sine qua non
for upholding self-defense. Significantly, the accused
must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely: (i) there must have been
a physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the attack
or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(iii) the attack or assault must be unlawful. To be sure,
the accused must show that the aggression caused by
the victim in fact put his life or personal safety in real
and grave peril. This danger must not be a mere
imagined threat.
Here, it becomes apparent that the evidence on
record does not support Miranda's contention that
Pilo employed unlawful aggression against him. Pilo
was merely throwing stones at the house of Miranda.
Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo did
not throw stones at him, much less, utter any
invectives, or threatening words against him.
People v. Vega y Ramil
G.R. No. 216018, 27 March 2019
Facts:
Accused-appellant Don was charged with the crime of
Murder after allegedly repeatedly stabbing the
Manuel Isip on different parts of his body with a
bladed weapon, which caused his immediate death.
The accused-appellant pleaded self-defense, alleging
that while they were attending a birthday party, the
victim punched him and charged towards him with a
bladed weapon, so he stabbed the victim. The RTC
convicted Don, which Decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
May accused validly invoke self-defense?
Ruling: No. First, there is no unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Aside from Don's self-serving
statement that it was Manuel who punched and
attacked him, not one of the persons present at the
incident corroborated his account. Second, even
assuming that there was unlawful aggression, the
means employed by Don in repelling the alleged attack
by Manuel was not reasonably necessary. Manuel was
unarmed and had his back turned while Don used a
bladed weapon to "repel the attack" and stab Manuel
repeatedly. Lastly, the third requisite requires the
person mounting a defense to be reasonably
blameless. In this case, Don was not entirely blameless
as the reason why Manuel scolded him was because
he was breaking things and making unnecessary
disturbance. It was also Don who suddenly rushed to
the victim and stabbed the latter several times in the
chest.
Velasquez v. People
G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017
Facts: The victim, Jesus, arrived at his nipa hut and
discovered accused Ampong who was in the premises
without Jesus’ knowledge. Jesus shouted invectives at
 Ampong. Ampong left the nipa hut, but was chased by
Jesus. Failing to catch Ampong, Jesus made his way
back to his house. He was then met by Ampong and
the other accused who hit him with a stone, at least
three times, struck his back with a bamboo stick and
punched him on his left cheek. Accused invoked self-
defense.
Ruling: Accused failed to establish the elements of
self-defense and defense of relative.
(1) There’s no unlawful aggression: Accused’s entire
defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated
an assault by barging into the premises of the nipa hut.
However, accused presented nothing more than a self-
serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out
of nowhere to go berserk therein.
(2) The element of reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the aggression is absent:
Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial
aggressor, the beating dealt to him by the accused was
still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary
means to repel his supposed aggression.
(3) Aside from their self-serving and uncorroborated
claim, accused failed to present proof third requisite,
i.e., lack of sufficient provocation.
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
RELATIVES THAT CAN BE DEFENDED:
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and
sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same degrees.
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree.
Relatives by affinity, are those who, because of
marriage, are parents-in-law, son or daughter-in-law,
and brothers or sisters-in-law.
Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers
and sisters are within the second civil degree; uncle and
niece or aunt and nephew are within the third civil
degree; and first cousins are within the fourth civil
degree.
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression;
Unlawful aggression may not exist as a matter of
fact, it can be made to depend upon the honest belief of
the one making a defense.
Ex. The sons of A honestly believed that their father was
the victim of an unlawful aggression when in fact it was
their father who attacked B. If they killed B under such
circumstance, they are justified.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
The gauge of reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the aggression as against one’s self or
in defense of a relative is to be found in the situation as
IT APPEARS TO THE PERSON REPELLING THE
AGGRESSION (the defender).
3. In case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein.
There is still legitimate defense of relative even
if the relative being defended has given provocation,
provided that the one defending such relative has no part
in the provocation.
N.B. Like in self-defense, the motive of the person
defending himself or his relative is immaterial.
• Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are
the parents-in-law, son or daughter-in-law, and
brothers or sisters-in-law.
• Death of the spouse terminates the relationship
by affinity; unless the marriage has resulted in
issue who is still living, in which case the
relationship of affinity continues.
• Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers
and sisters are within the second civil degree;
uncle and niece or aunt and nephew are within
the third civil degree; and first cousins are within
the fourth civil degree.
DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
3. The person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment or other evil motive.

N.B. Unlike in self-defense where motive of the person
defending himself is immaterial, in defense of strangers,
the person defending must not be motivated by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
Who are deemed strangers?
Any person not included in the enumeration of
relatives mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, is
considered stranger for the purpose of paragraph 3.
BASIS: What one may do in his defense, another may do
for him. The ordinary man would not stand idly by and
see his companion killed without attempting to save his
life.
Mariano v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224102, 26 July 2017
Facts:
Accused Mariano saw Natividad arguing with Yuki
because Yuki refused to buy marijuana for Natividad.
Natividad went berserk slapped Yuki, and kicked
Pamela’s daughter, Pia, who was nearby. Mariano
reported to Pamela that Natividad kicked Pia. Pamela
confronted Natividad, who then punched Pamela on
the face and shoulder. Mariano pushed Natividad to
the ground. Natividad stood back up and got a piece of
wood and kept hitting Mariano. Mariano evaded
Natividad's blows because Natividad was drunk and
staggering. Mariano picked up a knife and stabbed
Natividad on his buttocks. Due to Natividad's
continuous hitting, Mariano stabbed Natividad again,
this time on the right side of his body.
Issue:
Whether Mariano may invoke defense of stranger
Ruling:
Yes. An attack showing the aggressor's intention is
enough to consider that unlawful aggression was
committed. Thus, the attack on Pamela should have
been considered as unlawful aggression for purposes
of invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a
stranger. Here, although the offended party was
drunk, and therefore, was not able to land his blows,
his attacks were incessant. He had already attacked
three (3) other persons—two (2) minors as well as
petitioner's common-law wife—and was still
belligerent. While it may be true that Pamela, Pia, and
Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of
the stabbing, it then appeared to the petitioner that
there was no other reasonable means to protect his
family except to commit the acts alleged. It is
unreasonable for courts to demand conduct that could
only have been discovered with hindsight and absent
the stress caused by the threats that the petitioner
actually faced
STATE NECESSITY
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or
injury, does an act which causes damage to another.
N.B. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER covers injury to persons and
damage to property.
Requisites:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists;
The evil must actually exist and not merely
expected or anticipated or may happen in the future.
2. That the injury feared be greater than that
done to avoid it;
The greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more
so, the willful inaction of the actor. The evil which
brought about the greater evil must not result from a
violation of law by the actor. (Ty v. People, G.R. No.
149275, 27 September 2004)
3. That there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
Under Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so
that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may
be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the
least possible prejudice to another. If there is another
way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury
to another or, if there is no such other way but the
damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an
evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be
taken. (People v. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, 10
December 2012).
General rule: No liability in justifying circumstances
because there is no crime.
Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this paragraph.
It is borne by the persons benefited by the act. They shall
be liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have been received (Art. 101, par. 4, RPC).
N.B. Euthanasia is not a defense, thus, the accused may
be held liable for murder or parricide. However,
assistance to suicide is a felony.
Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil, Co. (1952)
Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong
materials. On May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil
Company ordered the delivery to the garage of Rural
Transit Company 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a
gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by
Sto. Domingo, who was helped by Igmidio Rico. While
the gasoline was being discharged to the underground
tank, it caught fire, whereupon Sto. Domingo drove
the truck across the road and upon reaching the
middle of the street he abandoned the truck which
continued moving to the opposite side of the first
street causing the buildings on that side to be burned
and destroyed. The house of Anita Tan was among
those destroyed and for its repair she spent P12,000.
Issue: Who may be held civilly liable?
Held: Considering the above quoted law and facts, the
cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can
hardly be disputed, it appearing that the damage
caused to Anita Tan was brought about mainly
because of the desire of driver Sto. Domingo to avoid
greater evil or harm, which would have been the case
had he not brought the tank-truck trailer to the middle
of the street, for then the fire would have caused the
explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company
which would have resulted in a conflagration of much
greater proportion and consequences to the houses
nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this
company is one of those for whose benefit a greater
harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within
the purview of said penal provision.
Ty v. People
439 SCRA 220 (2004)
FACTS: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at
the Manila Doctors' Hospital from October 1990 until
June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty signed the
"Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in
the Contract of Admission. Ty's sister, Judy Chua, was
also confined at the same hospital. The total hospital
bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95.
Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed
payment of the obligation in installments. To assure
payment of the obligation, she drew 7 postdated
checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital
which were all dishonored by the drawee bank and
returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of
funds.
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks
because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.”
She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to
obtain release for her mother who was being
inhumanely and harshly treated by the hospital. She
alleged that her mother has contemplated suicide if
she would not be discharged from the hospital.
Ty was found guilty by the lower courts of 7 counts of
violation of BP22.
HELD: The Court sustained the findings of the lower
courts. The evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, the defense of an uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury” is not applicable. Ty could have
taken advantage of an available option to avoid
committing a crime. By her own admission, she had
the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security
instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be
availing, the greater injury feared should not have
been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case,
the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about
by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when
the crime committed is not wholly
excusable. - A penalty lower by one or two degrees
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the
deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required to justify the same or
to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present. The courts
shall impose the penalty in the period which may be
deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of
the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
Incomplete Justifying or Exempting circumstance
When majority of the elements of the crime are present,
it can be justified or exempted.
So it talks about 3 elements because there is no majority
with only 2 elements. Therefore, if there is an incomplete
justifying or mitigating circumstance, there must be an
indispensable element.
In the case of defense of relative, self-defense and
defense of strangers, it is unlawful aggression. So, the
element of unlawful aggression should be present in
cases of complete and incomplete self-defense.
3 elements in self-defense:
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable means of the necessity
3. There is no sufficient provocation
Q: Now, there are 3 elements and unlawful aggression
is indispensable, what if there is only 1 element? And
that element present is unlawful aggression, may the
accused in this case may claim incomplete selfdefense?
A: Yes. While Art. 69 requires the presence of 2 elements
of the majority of the requisites for a justifying
circumstance, the jurisprudence states that the presence
of unlawful aggression alone can justify the appreciation
of an incomplete self-defense.
Yung unlawful aggression, kahit na 1 out of 3, sabi ng
Supreme Court, pwede to lower it at least one degree.
When we navigated Book 1, we have taken complete and
incomplete justifying circumstances—its consequences,
effect, we have seen this in Article 69. The issue has
been, under Article 69 preference is made on the
majority of the requisites present. If unlawful aggression
is indispensable, unlawful aggression must be present,
plus ANY of the 2 requisites.
What if there is only unlawful aggression?
That’s only 1 out of 3. That will still be majority. There is
already a number of cases holding that the presence of
unlawful aggression will entitle the accused to the
Privilege Mitigating Circumstance under Article 69; and
that will entitle him not with 2 degrees lower because
Article 69 mentioned a penalty lowered by one or two
degrees. But the case holding that unlawful aggression
will entitle the accused to a PMC at least 1 degree or one
penalty next lower in degree.
We have gone to Article 71 on graduation of penalties –
we should understand how it operates: one, two or three
degrees lower. We have seen the interplay of the stages
of commission under Article 6 and the participation of
the accused in the commission of the crime – principal,
accomplice or accessory under Articles 17 to 19. Vis-à-vis
Articles 50 to 57. You should be able to appreciate the
importance of understanding what a Privilege Mitigating
Circumstance is and Special Mitigating Circumstance
under Article 64, par. 5. Even Special Aggravating
Circumstances requiring the imposition of the penalty on
the maximum period.
So here, unlawful aggression being present, the accused
must be given an PMC of Incomplete Self-defense.
20. INSANITY
Exempting circumstances (non-imputability) are those
grounds for exemption from punishment because there
is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the condition
which make the act voluntary or negligent. While the act
is criminal, the actor is not liable. There is, however, civil
liability.
The exemption from punishment is based on the
COMPLETE ABSENCE of intelligence, freedom of action,
or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of
the accused.
An Imbecile or Insane Person: An imbecile or an insane
person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval
(Art. 12, par.1).
Insanity
There is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act but capable of having lucid intervals.
During a lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence,
and thus, not exempt from criminal liability.
Mental retardation includes the following: (a)
idiot, whose mental age is equivalent to the average two-
year old child; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is is
equivalent to the average seven-year old child; (c) moron
or feebleminded, whose mental age is equivalent to the
average twelve-year old child; and (d) “borderline”
intelligence, whose IQ is between 70 to 89.
In exempting circumstance, there is a difference
between actual age and mental age. In exempting
circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the
mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is
2 years, and imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old
are exempt from criminal liability. (People v. Butiong,
G.R. No. 168932, 19 October 2011)
PROCEDURE WHEN AN IMBECILE OR INSANE
COMMITTED A FELONY
1. The court shall order his confinement in one of
the hospitals or asylums established for persons afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the court. The court must
obtain the opinion of the Director of Health before
permitting his release (Art. 12, (1) par. 2).
2. When the person is sane at the time of the
commission of the crime, but he becomes insane at the
time of the trial, he is criminally liable. The trial, however,
shall be suspended until mental capacity of the accused
be restored to afford him a fair trial.
People v. Haloc
G.R. No. 227312, 5 September 2018
Facts: Accused Haloc was apprehended by barangay
officials after he hacked Allan and his brother, Amel.
As a result, Amel died while Allan sustained injuries on
his upper arm. In his defense, accused invokes the
exempting circumstance of insanity, and alleged that
he was prescribed medicines administered to a patient
suffering psychosis.
Issue: Whether accused is entitled to the exempting
circumstance of insanity.
Ruling: No, accused is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of insanity. The defense of insanity rests
on the test of cognition on the part of the accused.
Insanity, to be exempting, requires the complete
deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in
committing the criminal act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The accused must be so insane
as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He
must be deprived of reason, and must be shown to
have acted without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern or
a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
The accused-appellant did not establish the exempting
circumstance of insanity. His mental condition at the
time of the commission of the felonies he was charged
with and found guilty of was not shown to be so severe
that it had completely deprived him of reason or
intelligence when he committed the felonies charged.
Based on the records, he had been administered
medication to cure his mental illness, but there was no
showing that he suffered from complete deprivation
of intelligence. On the contrary, the medical
professionals presented during the trial conceded that
he had been treated only to control his mental
condition.
Insanity must be pleaded so that it may be appreciated
as an exempting circumstance. The reckoning insofar as
insanity is concerned is at the time of the commission of
the crime. Insanity occurring after the commission of the
crime, especially during trial, may only suspend the
proceedings against the accused.
Insanity during the service of the sentence will only cause
the accused to be committed to a mental institution.
The presumption is that of SANITY. We are
all presumed to be sane.
People v. Roy
G.R. No. 225604, 23 July 2018
Facts: Accused was charged before the court for raping
AAA. Defense argues that accused is an imbecile, thus
completely deprived of reason. Accused invokes said
exempting circumstance.
Issue: Whether accused may invoke imbecility as an
exempting circumstance.
Held: No, imbecility requires a complete deprivation of
rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused
be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness
of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern.
The law presumes that every person is sane. Anyone
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden to prove that he was completely
deprived of reason when he committed the crime
charged. Note that the proof of an accused's insanity
must "relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged." Here, the defense failed to
overcome the presumption of sanity.
Doctor’s report could not positively and certainly
conclude that accused’s state of imbecility afflicted
him at the time he raped AAA. Moreover, the trial
court’s observation of the actions of accused negated
complete destruction of intelligence at the time the
rape was committed.

Verdadero v. People
G.R. No. 216021, 2 March 2016
Facts: A was charged with the killing of B. A raised the
defense of insanity. Acting on the Order of the RTC, Dr.
C conducted a mental examination on A. Dr. C
confirmed that: (i) A was already brought to Cagayan
Valley Medical Center; and (ii) A was diagnosed with
schizophrenia. Dr. C agreed with Dr. D that A had
suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident.
Issue: Whether A is exempt from criminal liability.
Ruling: Yes. A was officially diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse of schizophrenia. Generally,
evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime
is immaterial.
It, however, may be appreciated and given weight if
there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or
simultaneous to the crime. In exonerating A on the
ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him
from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts.
Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen
an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony, the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court."
Instead of incarceration, A is to be confined in an
institution where his mental condition may be
addressed so that he may again function as a member
of society. He shall remain confined therein until his
attending physicians give a favorable
recommendation for his release.
The statements made by the accused, on the basis of the
testimony of the witnesses, will show that the accused
really thought of what he was about to do or what he has
done. Such statements evoke the observation that he
was in full control of his mental faculties.
There is one case where the SC also disregarded the
defense of insanity invoked by the accused, who
committed the crime of homicide. After killing the victim
he took off his bloodied shirt, wrapped the knife he used
in the shirt and threw it in the garbage bin. He, then,
went to nearby province where he hid for a year or two.
SC said that the claim
of insanity cannot prosper because the acts he
did immediately after he committed the offense showed
that he was actually in full control of his faculties. The
insanity plea was not given credit in this case.
People v. Junie
G.R. No. 223566, 27 June 2018
The courts have established a clearer and more
stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern, or that there is a total
deprivation of the will. Accused-appellant's claim that
he allegedly failed to remember what had happened
on 11 February 2011, neither qualifies him as insane
nor negates the truth that he was fully aware that he
had killed his victims. Accused-appellant's statement
right after he surrendered— "If I want to kill a lot of
people, I could but I only killed my family" —
persuasively disproves his claim of not knowingly or
voluntarily killing his victims.
Article 79. Suspension of the execution and service of
the penalties in case of insanity. — When a convict
shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence
has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence
shall be suspended only with regard to the personal
penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of
circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in
the corresponding cases. If at any time the convict
shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be
executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. The
respective provisions of this section shall also be
observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the
convict is serving his sentence.
✓ Only execution of personal penalty is suspended: civil
liability may be executed even in case of insanity of
convict.
✓ An accused may become insane:
- a. at the time of commission of the crime -
exempt from criminal liability.
- b. at the time of the trial - court shall suspend
hearings and order his confinement in a hospital
until he recovers his reason.
- c. at the time of final judgment or while serving
sentence - execution suspended with regard to
the personal penalty only.
✓ See Exempting Circumstance of Minority for P.D. No.
603 and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with Law.
 21. COMPLEX CRIMES ART 48,RPC
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
TWO KINDS OF COMPLEX CRIMES
1. COMPOUND CRIME - When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies
2. COMPLEX CRIME PROPER - When an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.
COMPLEX CRIME PROPER
REQUISITES (Reyes, p. 659) :
1. That at least two offenses are committed;
2. That one or some of the offenses must be
necessary to commit the other; and
3. That both or all the offenses must be punished
under the same statute.
• The phrase “necessary means” does not mean
“indispensable means.”
• In complex crimes, when the offender executes
various acts, he must have a single purpose.
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
Special complex crimes are those which are
treated as single indivisible offenses, although
comprising more than one specific crime and with
specific penalty.
Examples:
1. Robbery with Homicide [Art. 294 (1)]
2. Robbery with Rape [Art. 294 (2)]
3. Kidnapping with serious physical injuries
[Art.267 (3)]
4. Rape with Homicide (Art. 335)
DISCUSSION:
When you talk of Complex Crimes under Article 48, there
are two or more grave or less grave felonies. It can be a
combination of:
1. Two or more grave felonies
2. Two or more less grave felonies
3. Or a mix of both, as long as there are at least two.
Distinction between compound crimes, in which is a
single act actually produces two or more grave or less
grave felonies, and complex crime proper where an act is
a means to commit another act or crime:
For the latter, examples are:
1. Estafa through falsification
Special Compex Crimes - Excepted, meaning not
including, under Article 48. The law in those offenses
already provide a single penalty for the two crimes
committed.
1. Robbery with Homicide
2. Rape with Homicide or Kidnapping or Ransom, etc
Light Felonies – Also excepted under Article 48. The
article talks of grave and less grave felonies only.
Crimes Offenses Punishable under Special
Penal Laws – Also excluded when you talk of felonies in
the definition of complex crimes, because they are not
strictly and technically felonies. They are offenses under
Special Penal Laws.
Doctrine of Absorption – when a particular crime are
absorbed in another crime. The crime absorbing the
other is the crime that will be charged.
In Rebellion, as in the cases of Hernandez vs People,
Gumabon vs People, and Enrile vs Salazar, common
crimes such as murder, robbery and arson are deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. There is no rebellion
complexed with such crimes.
The only crime that may be charged is rebellion to the
extent that those common crimes absorbed in rebellion
are committed or were committed to achieve the
purpose of purposes of rebellion. That must be shown. If
there are circumstances showing that those other crimes
are committed not to attain the purposes of rebellion,
then the doctrine of absorption will not apply.
However, there are jurisprudence starting with
Hernandez affirmed in Gumabon and in Enrile that there
is no complex crime complexed with murder, but rather
murder, if at all, committed in the context of attaining
the purposes of rebellion, which is deemed absorbed in
therein.
Also in illegal possession of firearms, in so far as rebellion
is concerned, there is no separate prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms or use, or even manufacture of
illegal firearms or ammunition if the use or manufacture
of firearms or ammunitions if it is committed to attain
the purpose of rebellion. They are deemed absorbed as
well.
Doctrine of common elements – It has been settled that
there is no crime of estafa through falsification of private
document because both have a common element and
that is damage.
In estafa, the basis of the penalty is the fraud or the
amount of the defraudation. In falsification of private
document, there is also damage. Therefore, damage is a
common element of these two crimes, so much so that
when you use damage as an element in favor of one, you
cannot use it in favor of the other.
What crime should you charge the accused?
It depends on the circumstances of the case. The facts of
the case will tell you whether the crime that was really
intended to be committed was estafa or was it simply
falsification, but you cannot complex the two.
People v. Valdez
G.R. No. 216007-09, 8 December 2015
(Cf. Section 40 of R.A. No. 10951, amending Section
217 of the Revised Penal Code: if misappropriation of
public funds or property exceeds P8.8 Million, the
penalty is reclusion perpetua and non-bailable)
FACTS: Luzviminda S. Valdez, a former mayor of
Bacolod City was charged with 4 counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, and 4 counts of the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents under
Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
RPC. State Auditors of the Commission on Audit
Region VI conducted a post-audit of the disbursement
vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City government.
Based on the verification conducted in the
establishments that issued the official receipts, it was
alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to
enable Valdez to receive reimbursement from the
government in the total amount of P279,150.00.
The Ombudsman charged accused with the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents, and
recommended “no bail”.
While Valdez was still at-large, she filed a “Motion to
Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the
Amount of Bail.” Thereafter, a warrant of arrest was
issued against Valdez, causing her to subsequently file
an “Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set
Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount
of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of
Arrest.”
Valdez was granted bail in the amount of P200,000.00
for each offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether an accused who is charged with the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds Php22,000.00 is entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
HELD: The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter
of right to an accused who is charged with a complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such
crime be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, the "imposable penalty" is
reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that
the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its
maximum.
The falsification, which is the means used to commit
the crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic
aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall
impose," found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of
the RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be
imposed" found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64
refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering
the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally,
the "penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion
perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no application
as the penalty is indivisible.
To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does
not change the nature of the constituent offenses; it
only requires the imposition of the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed by law. When committed
through falsification of official/public documents, the
RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a
 capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly
included in R.A. No. 7659. If truly a non-bailable
offense, the law should have already considered it as
a special complex crime like robbery with rape,
robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, and
kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but
the aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at
least P50,000,000.00. In contrast, an accused who is
alleged to have committed malversation of public
funds thru falsification of official/public documents,
which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to
bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds
P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.00. Such distinction
is glaringly unfair and could not have been
contemplated by the law.
The crime committed in this case is malversation of
public funds through falsification of documents. This case
was decided in 2015 before a RA10951.
The only issue here is that there is a complex crime.
Remember, insofar as malversation is concerned what
will be the determinative factor? It is the amount of
misappropriated funds or property. For falsification of
public documents, under article 171, the penalty is
steady. The issue here is whether or not malversation
station is non-bailable.
At a certain point, if you go by the computation of
penalties, it may reach reclusion perpetua.
The disquisition of the Supreme Court in this case is that
never has it been the intention of the Congress to make
malversation a heinous crime, nor to deprive one who is
charged of malversation with his entitlement to bail.
Therefore, malversation is bailable. Republic Act No.
10951 – This is a new law which affects the crime of
malversation. It has a simpler approach because, now, if
the value all of misappropriation, insofar as the
government funds or property is concerned, is more than
P8.8M, it becomes punishable by reclusion perpetua and
therefore nonbailable.
Anything less than P8.8M is bailable. Anything more than
P8.8M is nonbailable because it is punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
22. STAGES OF COMMISSION, ART. 6
• A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present.
• It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
• There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous desistance.
OVERT ACT – some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its
complete termination following its natural curse,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense (Rait v. People,
G.R. No. 180425, 31 July 2008).
INDETERMINATE OFFENSE – It is one where the purpose
of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its
nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous (Reyes, p.
97; see People v. Lamahang, G.R. No. L-43530, 3 August
1935).
SUBJECTIVE PHASE
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which
begins the commission of the crime and the last act
performed by the offender which, with the prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime.
OBJECTIVE PHASE
• Period after the performance of all the acts
which would produce the crime
• the result of the acts of execution, that is, the
accomplishment of the crime.
• If the subjective and objective phases are
present, there is consummated felony. (U.S. v.
Eduave, 2 February 1917)
ATTEMPTED FELONY
Elements:
1. The offender commences the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act is not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance; and
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution
was due to cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
FRUSTRATED FELONY
Elements:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony
as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator.
In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the
acts of execution. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime.
FRUSTRATED FELONY v. ATTEMPTED FELONY
1. In frustrated felony, the offender has performed
all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony as a consequence; whereas in
attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2. In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on
the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance. (Cervantes v. People, 5
July 2010)
CONSUMMATED FELONY
Elements:
1. All the acts of execution are present; and
2. The result is achieved.
Every crime has its own elements which must all be
present to constitute a culpable violation of a precept of
law.
DISCUSSION: In arson, there is jurisprudence to the
effect that even the mere discoloration, as a
consequence of the burning, when there is no really
burning to speak of, will already consummate the crime
of arson. In theft, the ability of the accused to dispose of
the property unlawfully taken which belongs to another
consummates the crime. His ability to dispose of it is not
an element of the crime.
HOW TO DETERMINE THE STAGE OF COMMISSION OF
THE FELONY
1. the nature of the offense
Example: In arson, it is not necessary
that the property is totally destroyed by fire. The crime
of arson is consummated even if only a portion of the
wall or any other part of the house is burned.
2. the elements constituting the felony
Example: In theft, the mere removal of
the personal property belonging to another with intent
to gain is sufficient to consummate the offense.
In estafa, the offended party must
actually be prejudiced or damaged.
3. the manner of committing the crime
i. formal crimes – those which are consummated by a
single act (ex. slander, adultery)
N.B. There can be no ATTEMPT in a formal crime.
Formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated. (Disini v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 20335,
11 February 2014)
ii. crimes consummated by mere attempt
ex. Attempt to flee to an enemy country,
treason, crimes enumerated under Section 26, R.A. No.
9165,
N.B. There is no ATTEMPTED crime because the
overt act in itself consummates the crime.
DISCUSSION: In slander, there, there is no attempted
stage when a person does not completely utter the
slanderous word, as when he merely says “taran!” But
once the slanderous word has been said, the offense is
consummated. In libel, once it is written, it is
consummated.
iii. felonies by omission
There can be no attempted stage
because the offender does not execute acts. He omits to
perform an act which the law requires him to do. (ex:
failure of accountable officer to render accounts (Art.
218); failure to make delivery of public funds or property
(Art. 221))
iv. crimes committed by mere agreement
The offer made by one of the parties to
the other constitutes attempted felony, if the offer is
rejected.
v. material crimes
There are three stages of
consummation: attempted, frustrated and
consummated.
People v. Lamahang (1935)
In case of robbery, in order that the simple act
of entering by means of force or violence another
person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to
commit this offense, it must be shown that the
offender clearly intended to take possession, for the
purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging
to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the
record from which such purpose of the accused may
reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and
stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in
question was making an opening by means of an iron
bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be
inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident
intention was to enter by means of force said store
against the will of its owner. That his final objective,
once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob,
to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit
any other offense, there is nothing in the record to
justify a concrete finding.
People v. Barra (2013)
Accused is guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide only when he commenced the commission
of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce robbery
by reason of some causes or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
People v. Labiaga (2013)
If the evidence failed to convince the court
that the wound sustained would have caused the
victim’s death without timely medical attention,
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and
not frustrated murder.
People v. Aca-ac (2001)
Rape is either attempted or
consummated. There can be no frustrated rape.
People v. Campuhan (2000)
Rape is consummated “by the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis.”
Valenzuela v. People (2007)
There is no crime of frustrated theft. Theft is
already “produced” upon the “taking of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.”
There was no need for permanency in the taking or in
its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the
offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the
owner already constituted apoderamiento.
People v. Valledor (2002)
The settled rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death.
Epifanio v. People (2007)
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the
death of the victim barring medical intervention or
attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another
but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted
homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if
the offender intends to kill the victim.
People v. Benito Lababo Alias "Ben," et al.
G.R. No. 234651, 6 June 2018
FACTS: The accused were convicted of the crimes of
Murder and Frustrated Murder for the death of AAA
and the fatal wounding of BBB who would have died
had he not received a timely medical attendance. The
accused allegedly conspired with each other to kill
AAA and BBB. It was established that only Benito shot
the victims while his co-accused were only present at
the scene of the crime. Each holding a bolo.
HELD: The act of killing becomes frustrated when an
offender performs all the acts of execution which
could produce the crime but did not produce it for
 reasons independent of his or her will. Here, BBB's
survival was independent of the perpetrator's will.
While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, without actively
participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to
prove that the accused conspired to commit the crime,
Wenefredo and FFF' s act of standing near the victims
and Benito, while wielding bolos, does not partake of
this nature. The Court is sufficiently convinced that
their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged
Benito and increased the odds against the victims,
especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons.
Marasigan v. Fuentes
G.R. No. 201310, 11 January 2016
Facts: Fuentes threw an object at Marasigan from
behind. Thereafter, Fuentes reappeared with his
respondents and punched Marasigan on the face.
Fuentes picked up a stone and attempted to hit
Marasigan's head with it. Marasigan parried the stone
with his hand. Lindo and Calilan took hold of each of
Marasigan's arms. The DOJ ruled that the crime was
less serious physical injuries, and not attempted
murder supposedly because the evidence
is equivocal on whether respondents had any
homicidal intent. Specifically, Secretary Devanadera
pointed out that the medico-legal findings indicated
that petitioner sustained nothing more than
contusions and abrasions; and that while he suffered a
fracture on the metacarpal bone on the second digit
of his right hand, it was found that his injuries would
take less than 30 days to heal.
Issue: Whether accused should be held liable for less
serious physical injuries or attempted murder.
Ruling: Accused should be held liable for attempted
murder. The fact that Marasigan was successful in
blocking the blow with his hand does not, in and of
itself, mean that respondents could not have possibly
killed him. It does not negate any homicidal intent. It
remains that respondent Fuentes attempted to hit
petitioner on the head with a hollow block while
Calilan and Lindo made efforts to restrain petitioner.
There is also reasonable basis for appreciating how the
attack on petitioner was made with respondents
taking advantage of their numerical superiority.
DISCUSSION:
Article 6 providing for stages of commission
– if this can be memorized, will help a lot for the purposes
of the bar.
Formal Crimes – always consummated. The mere fact of
having done it consummates the crime, such as in:
1. Slander
2. Adultery
3. Libel
Importance of Stages of Commission – As we have seen
in Articles 50-57, and when we took up degree of the
participation of the accused, it will give you an idea of
what the criminal responsibility of the accused is:
1. Was the crime consummated?
2. Was he a principal?
3. Was the crime simply frustrated?
4. Was he an accomplice?
5. Was the crime attempted?
6. Was he an accessory?
It could be a combination of all these, and the graduation
of penalties will depend, under Article 50-57, on how you
will arrive at the appropriate penalty that will be imposed
on the accused based on degree of participation and
stage of commission.
MURDER AND HOMICIDE – Article 249 gives you plain
killing – no other attendant circumstances such as
relationship or other qualifying circumstances.
Insofar as murder is concerned, remember the qualifying
aggravating circumstances that you find under Article
248. Presence of one of them will be enough to qualify
the killing to murder.
Attempted or Frustrated Homicide or Murder? – How
will we determine:
1. Determine if there is a qualifying circumstance to make
it murder
2. Determine if it is homicide or murder either in the
frustrated or attempted stage based on the nature of
wounds inflicted upon the victim.
Would it have caused the death of the victim?
a. Yes – Frustrated homicide or frustrated murder as the
case may be depending on the presence or absence of
qualifying aggravating circumstances
b. No – only attempted homicide or murder as the case
may be. If the wounds are superficial, albeit there is
intent to kill, it will only be attempted homicide or
murder.
RAPE – The old case of Iriña saying that there can be
frustrated rape is abandoned in Orita. In the latter, the
slightest penetration in the labia majora is enough to
consummate the crime of rape by sexual intercourse.
In Campuan, there was only an attempted rape because
the evidence did not show that there was any
penetration. There is no longer frustrated rape.
THEFT – In the case of Valenzuela, in which the accused,
after stealing, ran but was caught. He was contending
that he cannot be liable for consummated theft because
he was not able to dispose the thing that was stolen.
The SC said that the mere unlawful taking of personal
property belonging to another consummates the crime
of theft. The ability of the accused to dispose the thing
stolen is not an element of the crime of theft. There can
be no frustrated theft. It can ONLY be attempted on
consummated.
BRIBERY – Here, the accused attempts to offer a reward,
promise, gift, or consideration so that the public officer
will perform an act that is contrary to law.
What if the public officer receives the thing offered and
eventually returns it? Is it attempted or frustrated
bribery?
NO. It will be attempted corruption of a public official.
ROBBERY – there can be attempted frustrated robbery
under Article 297. There is a special complex crime of
attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide, which
shows that the law recognizes the possibility of
attempted or frustrated robbery.
23. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE ARTS 17-19.
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The
following are criminally liable for grave and less grave
felonies:
a. Principals.
b. Accomplices.
c. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
a. Principals
b. Accomplices.
N.B. The treble division of persons criminally responsible
for an offense rests upon the very nature of their
participation in the commission of the crime.
The ACCESSORIES are not liable for light felonies because
in the commission of light felonies, the social wrong as
well as the individual prejudice is so small that penal
sanction is deemed not necessary for accessories
RULES RELATIVE TO LIGHT FELONIES
1. Light felonies are punishable only when they have
been consummated.
2. But when light felonies are committed against persons
or property, the are punishable even if they are only in
the attempted or frustrated stage of the execution.
3. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light
felonies.
4. Accessories are not liable for light felonies, even if they
are committed against persons or property.
N.B. Only natural persons can be the active subject of
crime because of the highly personal nature of the
criminal responsibility.
Only a natural person can be the offender because:
1. The RPC requires that the culprit should have acted
with personal malice or negligence. An artificial or
juridical person cannot act with malice or negligence.
2. A juridical person, like a corporation, cannot commit a
crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent is
required.
There is substitution of deprivation of liberty
(subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 10159) for pecuniary
penalties in case of insolvency of the accused, and the
penalty imposed is not higher than prision correccional.
N.B. Subsidiary imprisonment is computed at the rate of
one day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the
time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the
trial court (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 10159).
Other penalties consisting in imprisonment and other
deprivation of liberty like destierro, can be executed only
against individuals.

• Officers, not the corporation, are criminally liable.
• Juridical persons are criminally liable under certain
special laws.
• In all crimes there are always 2 parties: ACTIVE (the
criminal) and PASSIVE (the injured party).
PRINCIPALS
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered
principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the
act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit
it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense
by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
KINDS OF PRINCIPALS
1. Principals by Direct Participation
2. Principals by Inducement
3. Principals by Indispensable Cooperation
PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
The principal by direct participation PERSONALLY TAKES
PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACT constituting the
crime.
Two or more persons who took part in the commission
of the crime are principals by direct participation, when
the following requisites are present:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution; and
2. That they carried out their plan and personally took
part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the
same end.
First requisite – Participation in the criminal resolution
Two or more persons are said to have
participated in the criminal resolution when they were in
conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime.
It is well settled that a person may be convicted
for the criminal act of another where, between them,
there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of the crime charged.
Second requisite – that the culprits “carried out their
plan and personally took part in its execution, by acts
which directly tended to the same end.”
• The principals by direct participation must be at the
scene of the crime, personally taking part in its
execution.
• The acts of each offender must directly tend to the
same end.
• One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a
principal by direct participation.
• When the second requisite is lacking, there is only
conspiracy.
People v. Dacillo
G.R. No. 149368, 14 April 2004
FACTS: Pacot stabbed and strangled
Rosemarie leading to the latter’s death. Dacillo for his
part, hold down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from
struggling. The two men stopped only when they were
sure that the victim was already dead. Dacillo then
encase her corpse in cement.
HELD: Two or more persons taking part in the
commission of a crime are considered principals by
direct participation if the following requisites are
present:
1. they participated in the criminal resolution and
2. they carried out their plan and personally took part
in its execution by acts which directly tended to the
same end. Both requisites were met in this case.
Further Dacillo’s admission that he participated in the
commission of the crime by holding Rosemarie’s legs
made him a principal by direct participation.
Benito v. People
G.R. No. 204644, 11 February 2015
Facts: Agbulos is a jeweler. She entered into several
transactions for the sale of jewelry with Abadilla.
Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla and
agreed that Agbulos would return the pieces of
jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell
them. During all these transactions, Agbulos was
accompanied by Benito. On their third transaction,
Agbulos failed to sell the jewelry. Abadilla deposited
the checks issued by Agbulos to her, which were all
dishonored. Upon investigation, Abadilla learned that
the jewelry she gave to Agbulos were delivered by
Benito to a pawnshop under the name “Linda Chua.”
Agbulos and Benito were charged with estafa.
Ruling: Benito is neither a principal by direct
participation or a conspirator to the crime of estafa
 committed by Agbulos. Only Agbulos received the 2. That such inducement be the determining
pieces of jewelry from Abadilla, and Benito was merely cause of the commission of the crime by the material
"present during the negotiation." Even assuming that executor.
Benito accompanied Agbulos, this does not prove that
Benito received any jewelry from Abadilla. Moreover, PROPOSAL TO COMMIT A
when Agbulos failed to return the jewelry in the PRINCIPAL BY FELONY
afternoon she received on June 9, 14, and 16, 1994, INDUCEMENT
she was already presumed to have misappropriated
the jewelry, for which there is no more need to There is an inducement to commit a crime.
present any act to prove the misappropriation.
Consequently, the estafa had already been The principal by The mere proposal to
consummated when "Linda Chua" allegedly pawned inducement becomes commit a felony is
the jewelry on June 17, 1994. Benito, who was liable only when the punishable in treason and
allegedly "Linda Chua," cannot be held criminally liable crime is committed by rebellion. The person to
with Agbulos. "There can be no ex post the principal by direct whom the proposal is made
facto conspiracy to do that which has already been participation. should not commit the
done and consummated." crime; otherwise, the
proponent becomes a
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT principal by inducement.
“Those who directly force or induce others to commit a
crime.”

The principal by induction becomes liable only when the

principal by direct participation committed the act
The inducement The proposal, to be
induced.
involves any crime. punishable, must involve
only treason (Art. 115, RPC)
Modes of incurring criminal liability as principal by
or rebellion (Art. 136, RPC).
inducement:

1. BY DIRECTLY FORCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME

a. By using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
b. By causing UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
2. BY DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A
CRIME.
a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise.
b. By using words of command.
Requisites:
1. That the inducement be made directly with
the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
and
a. A thoughtless expression without intention to
produce the result is not an inducement to
commit a crime.
b. The inducement may be by acts of command,
advice, or through influence, or agreement for
consideration.
RSE: Those are the two crimes in the RPC
consisting of proposal:
(a) proposal to commit treason and
(b) proposal to commit rebellion.
There is no other felony of this nature under the RPC.
Proposal, under Art. 8, is not really punishable unless
there is a specific legal provision providing definition on
punishment of penalty for such conspiracy and proposal.
e.g.
Under the RPC, there is conspiracy to commit:
• Treason
• Rebellion
• Coup d’ etat
• Sedition
• Under Art. 187 (Combination in Restraint of Trade)
Other conspiracies punished under SPL – conspiracy to
commit:
• Terrorism
• Sale, distribution, and transportation of dangerous
drugs
• Arson
EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION UPON THE LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL BY
INDUCEMENT
• Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of co-
defendant.
• One cannot be held guilty of having instigated
the commission of a crime without first being
shown that the crime has been actually
committed by another.
Ambagan v. People
G.R. Nos. 204481-82, 13 November 2015
Facts: Two persons were killed during the July 5, 2004
shooting incident supposedly induced by accused
Ambagan. According to one prosecution witness,
Ambagan allegedly uttered the sentence, "Sige, yan
pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo
yan!" which impelled his bodyguards to open fire at
Santos and Bawalan. However, this testimony was not
corroborated by the second prosecution witness who
was supposedly nearer the accused at the time of the
incident.
Issue:
Whether Ambagan should be held criminally liable as
a principal by inducement.
HELD: No, Ambagan cannot be held criminally liable as
a principal by inducement. The conviction of a person
as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the
inducement be made with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime; and (2) that such
inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor.
As applied, the Sandiganbayan would have been
correct in holding Ambagan criminally liable if he
indeed made the utterance immediately before the
shooting incident.
However, this Court is not inclined to believe
that Ambagan indeed made the declaration that
started the fray. The court a quo failed to take note of
substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star
prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan.
These contradictions refer not only to minor details
but even to the facts constituting important aspects of
the case, seriously eroding the weight of the evidence
of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on
the culpability of Ambagan.
RSE: You have seen that without a principal by direct
participation who committed the crime, the criminal
liability of one who purportedly induced the principal by
direct participation to commit the crime cannot be
established.
So it will depend first on the commission of the crime and
the criminal liability of the principal by direct
participation to the extent that there is an evidence
shown that the principal by inducement forced the
principal by direct participation to commit the crime
then both of them should be held criminally liable. The
inducement consists of simply,
Q: Under exempting circumstances, if the principal by
direct participation has no option but to follow the
instruction of somebody who has exerted force upon
him, compelled him with a threat to his life then the
principal by direct participation commit the crime, will
the principal by direct participation be held liable?
A: No. Remember it is an exempting circumstance on the
part of the principal by direct participation. The one who
should be held liable is the principal by inducement who
actually exerted force.
“But Sir, we discussed that the principal by direct
participation should commit the crime and unless he
does so, he is not liable”
A: Yes. However, in the case that I mentioned, the
principal by direct participation is exempt from criminal
liability but not the principal by inducement.
ART. 12, PAR.5
Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -
the following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of
irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
xxx
Hence, the principal by direct participation in our
problem is exempt from criminal liability. But the
exemption does not apply to the principal by
inducement.
e.g. LEADER OF A GROUP
Q: Sometimes the inducement may come from a leader
of a group in the case of US vs. Indianan (?) wherein the
chieftain of the tribe simply told his men to attack a
group of Christians and kill them and the principal by
direct participation committed the killing and the
question is W/N Indianan himself may be held liable?
A: Yes. He is liable. It’s like a esprit de corps to follow their
leader. So there is moral ascendancy towards his men to
follow and kill his victims.
e.g. PRIZE, PROMISE OR REWARD
The other situation is if there is a prize promised or
reward or somehow induced the principal by direct
participation.
CASE: For example, gun for hires. They are hired actually
to kill and there is somebody who paid for their services.
If they are caught and they rat on the principal by
inducement who gave them the money…
Do you remember the case of a businessman in Subic
wherein the triggerman admitted that the principal by
inducement is the younger brother? In this case, the
evidence was established that the latter gave
instructions and he really is a principal by inducement.
EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION UPON THE LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL BY
INDUCEMENT
• Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of co-defendant.
• One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the
commission of a crime without first being shown that the
crime has been actually committed by another.
PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION
“Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense
by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.”
Requisites:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is,
there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; and
2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense
by performing another act, without which it would not
have been accomplished.
• To be liable as principals, the offender must fall under
any of the three concepts defined in Article 17.
• There is collective criminal responsibility when the
offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and
to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be
the same for all.
• Principals by direct participation have collective
criminal responsibility. Principal by induction, except
the one who directly forced another to commit a crime,
and principal by direct participation have collective
criminal responsibility. Principal by indispensable
cooperation has collective criminal responsibility with
the principal by direct participation.
People v. Montealegre
161 SCRA 700 (1988)
FACTS: Abadilla was eating at a restaurant when he
detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a
nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he went
outside and saw a police and reported the matter. The
police approached the table and held Montealegre
and Capalad. Capalad suddenly pulled out his knife
and started stabbing the police at the back. The police
released the 2 in order to draw his gun but
Montealegre restrained the police so that Capalad
may continue stabbing. The 3 grappled and the police
was able to draw his gun and fired at the 2 assailants.
A chase ensued. Capalad was shot which resulted to
his death. The police also died because of the wounds
inflicted by Capalad.
HELD: The accused was correctly considered a co-
principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the
killing of the police officer. The 2 acted in concert. Even
if the accused did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he is nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented the police from resisting the attack
against him. The accused was a principal by
indispensable cooperation.
RSE: Here very clearly, there was conspiracy even if they
did not actually discuss that they will kill the police. What
Montealegre did here, and ultimately he was the only
one convicted here because his co-conspirator died, the
issue is W/N he can be held criminally liable.
What was his participation? Montealegre was a principal
by direct participation because without him helping, the
police would not have died.
Remember that Capalad was killed by the police likewise.
PROBLEM: You have to think of another situation
wherein the victim, X, were actually killed by A with the
help of B and C. B by holding his arms and C holding his
legs.
In this case, there is no doubt that A, B and C acted in
concert. A who stabbed the victim is a principal by direct
participation, and B and C who held the arms and legs
are principals by indispensable cooperation.
But there is conspiracy that the act of one is the act of
all.
People v. Fronda
222 SCRA 71 (1993)
FACTS: The Balaan brothers were abducted and killed
by members of the New People’s Army. Fronda and
Padwa accompanied the rebels to the victims’ house.
They were the ones who tied the hands of the victims
and supplied the spade and crowbar for digging the
graves. The trial court convicted Fronda and Padwa as
principals by indispensable cooperation.
HELD: The accused are only accomplices for the crime
can be committed even without their participation. An
accomplice is one who cooperates by previous or
simultaneous acts and his participation is of a minor
character. He must be aware of the criminal intent and
participates by supplying material and moral aid for its
execution.
RSE: The accused were only liable as accomplices but you
could say at first glance should have been held as
principals by indispensable cooperation.
You have to look at it at the point of view of W/N the
participation of the accused indeed shows that they
cooperated in the criminal design of the co-accuse.
There must be a showing that their acts tended towards
the same end that is the accomplishment of the crime
intents to do.
If the participation is somehow ambiguous, the acts
cannot be pinpointed to accomplish the criminal design.
The rule is this, REMEMBER: ambiguous situation should
be resolved in lesser criminal liablity. The lesser liability
in this situation is that they should be treated simply as
accomplices. That’s where the thin line lies.
Q: For instance, A commissions B to kill X. There was a
reward or consideration. B without the knowledge of A
borrowed a gun from a friend C of his unsure of how B
will use the gun. B kills X. Can you hold the friend C
liable as principal by indispensable cooperation?
A: Definitely not. First, he did not know the criminal
intention of B. Second, B could have borrowed a gun
elsewhere and not necessarily from C. That does not
make it “indispensable.”
Q: In one case, where a band of robbers/kidnappers
rented a motorized banca from X. The band of the
accused went to an island used the banca and
eventually killed their victim. What is the liability of X
who owned the banca?
A: The owner of the banca cannot be held to be a
principal by direct participation. The band could have
rented another motorized banca not rented by X.
Therefore, there is no indispensable cooperation on the
part of the owner.
ACCOMPLICES (ARTICLE 18, RPC)
Accomplices are those persons who, not being included
in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.
• In quasi-collective criminal responsibility, some
of the offenders in the crime are principals and
the others are accomplices.
• The participation of an accomplice presupposes
the commission of the crime by the principal by
direct participation.
• When there is no conspiracy between or among
the defendants but they were animated by one
and the same purpose to accomplish the criminal
objective, those who cooperated by previous or
simultaneous act but cannot be held liable as
principals are accomplices.
• An accomplice does not have a previous
agreement or understanding or is not in
conspiracy with the principal by direct
participation.
ACCOMPLICE
CONSPIRATOR
They know and agree with the criminal design.
 Conspirators know Accomplices know about the
the criminal criminal intention only after
intention because the principals have reached
they have decided on the decision to commit a
said course of action. crime. Accomplices only agree
to cooperate in its execution.
Conspirators decide Accomplices merely assent to
that a crime should the plan and cooperate in its
be committed. accomplishment.
Conspirators are the Accomplices are merely
authors of a crime. instruments who perform acts
not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
REQUISITES
1. There is a community of design; that is, knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose;
2. he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention
of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and
3. there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
• The community of design need not be to commit the
crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a
common purpose to commit a particular crime and that
the crime actually committed was a natural or probable
consequence of the intended crime.
• The cooperation of an accomplice is not due to a
conspiracy.
• When the acts of the accused are not indispensable in
the killing, they are merely accomplices.
• The accomplice merely supplies the principal with
material or moral aid without conspiracy with the
latter.
• The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in crimes against
persons should not have caused the death of the victim.
RULES:
• The one who had the original criminal design is
the person who committed the resulting crime.
• The accomplice, after concurring in the criminal
purpose of the principal, cooperates by previous
or simultaneous acts.
• When the cooperation is by simultaneous act,
the accomplice takes part while the crime is
being committed by the principal by direct
participation or immediately thereafter.
• The accomplice in crimes against persons does
not inflict the more or most serious wounds.
ACCOMPLICE
PRINCIPAL by
COOPERATION
Cooperation is Cooperation is not
indispensable in the indispensable in the
commission of the act. commission of the act.
People v. Gambao
G.R. No. 172707, 1 October 2013
FACTS: Lucia Chan was abducted and brought to a
resort in Laguna. The abductors demanded
Php20,000,000.00 as ransom. The police eventually
rescued Chan and arrested the perpetrators. Among
those arrested was Perpenian, who was 17 years old
at the time of the commission of the crime. She
chatted with the abductors and claimed that she
thought that there was only a swimming party.
HELD: An accomplice cooperates in the execution by
supplying material and moral aid in relation to the acts
done by the principal. In this case, her presence gave
moral support to the abductors as she kept quiet and
did not tell the police even when there was obviously
a crime being committed. She is an accomplice to the
kidnapping.
Santiago v. People
G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015
 FACTS: Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974, asked Santiago to marry him.
Santiago, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her
brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted
to remarry, she should choose someone who was
“without responsibility.” Santiago was convicted as
principal to the crime of bigamy.
HELD: Her punishment as a principal to the crime is
wrong. People v. Archilla holds that the second spouse,
if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes,
an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a
person, whether man or woman, who knowingly
consents or agrees to be married to another already
bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of bigamy." Therefore, her conviction should
only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
RSE: That is an important case. Take note of that in
bigamy, the other party whom the other married party
which is the subsequent marriage is not liable to the
crime of bigamy but only an accomplice.
ACCESSORIES (ARTICLE 19, RPC)
Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in
any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to
profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or
the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
An accessory does not participate in the criminal
design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony,
but with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he
subsequently takes part in 3 ways:
a. by profiting from the effects of the crime;
b. by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the
crime in order to prevent its discovery; and
c. by assisting in the escape or concealment of the
principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his
public functions or the principal is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.
“knowledge of the commission of the crime”
• Mere possession of stolen property does not
make the accused an accessory where the thief
was already convicted.
• Entertaining suspicion that a crime has been
committed is not enough.
• Knowledge of the commission of the crime may
be established by circumstantial evidence
RSE: Read Article 58, RPC. Take note of this in connection
with Art. 19 who acted with abuse of public functions are
concerned. There is additional penalty provided for
under Article 58.
ARTICLE 58, RPC. Additional penalty to be imposed
upon certain accessories. - Those accessories falling
within the terms of paragraph 3 of article 19 of this
Code who should act with abuse of their public
functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of
absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal
offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of
absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty
of a less grave felony.
“commission of the crime”
• the crime committed by the principal must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
“without having participated therein either as
principals or accomplices”
“take part subsequent to its commission”
• The accessory takes part AFTER the crime has
been committed.
Modes of incurring criminal liability as an accessory:
1. BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR ASSISTING THE
OFFENDER TO PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIME
• The accessory must receive the property from
the principal. He should not take it without the
consent of the principal, or else, he is not an
accessory but a principal in the crime of theft.
• When is profiting by the effect of the crime
punished as the act of principal, and not the act
of accessory?
 • When a person knowingly acquired or received
property taken by the brigands.
2. BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE BODY OF THE
CRIME TO PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY.
BODY OF THE CRIME –“corpus delicti” which means that
a specific offense was in fact committed by someone
3. BY HARBORING, CONCEALING OR ASSISTING IN THE
ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME
3(A): Public officers who harbor conceal or assist in the
escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with
abuse of his public functions
Requisites:
1. The accessory is a public officer;
2. He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of
the principal;
3. The public officer acts with abuse of his public
functions; and
4. The crime committed by the principal is any
crime, provided it is not a light felony.
3(B) Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the
escape of the author of the crime – guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt against the life of the
President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.
Requisites:
1. The accessory is a private person;
2. He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of
the author of the crime; and
3. The crime committed by the principal is either:
(i) treason, (ii) parricide, (iii) murder, (iv) attempt
against the life of the president, or (v) that the
principal is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
An accessory is exempt from criminal liability, when the
principal to the crime is his:
1. spouse,
2. ascendant,
3. descendant,
4. legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or
relative by affinity within the same degree.
• Even if only two of the principals guilty of murder
are the brothers of the accessory, and the others
are not related to him, such accessory is exempt
from criminal liability.
• However, an accessary is not exempt from
criminal liability if the principal is his nephew or
niece.
An accessory is NOT EXEMPT from criminal
liability even if the principal is related to him, if such
accessory:
(a) PROFITED by the effects of the crime, or
(b) assisted the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
People v. Talingdan
84 SCRA 19 (1978)
FACTS: Bernardo and Teresa lived together but their
relationship has gotten bitter. Bernardo knew that
Teresa had an illicit relationship with Talingdan.
During the testimony of Bernardo and Teresa’s child,
she testified that on the day of Bernardo’s killing,
there were four men inside their house while
Bernardo was in the field. Later, when Bernardo went
to the kitchen, Talingdan and Tobias fired at Bernardo
and thereafter climbed the stairs. Seeing that
Bernardo was alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him
again. Teresa then went out of her room, and
threatened her child that she will kill her if she would
reveal the incident.
HELD: One who conceals or assists in the escape of the
principal in the crime can be held guilty as accessory.
There is morally convincing proof that Teresa is an
accessory to the offense. She was inside the room
when her husband was shot. As she came out after the
shooting, she inquired from the child if she was able to
recognize the assailants and when the latter identified
the 4 accused as the culprits, Teresa did not only
enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to
anyone but she went to the extent of warning her not
to tell anyone or else she would kill her. Later when
the police came, she claimed she had no suspects in
mind. She, thus, became active in her cooperation
with the 4 accused.
RSE: About accessories, you have to consider PD 1829 on
Obstruction of Justice in connection with Article 19 on
accessories.
Take note also of PD 1612 which is the decree that
defines and penalizes fencing.
There is also a case applying Article 20 where the
principal accused killed her kasambahay and she was
helped by her sister to put into the car the corpse of the
victim and help the principal accused to dump the body
somewhere else. There was a prosecution for both of
them for having acted in conspiracy with one another.

The SC affirming the conviction of the accused as

principal by direct participation exempted the sister to
help the principal accused in dumping the body by
applying Article 20.