North American Philosophical Publications

North American Philosophical Publications
Skepticism and Realism

Author(s): John Heil
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 57-72
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 35, Number 1, January 1998
SKEPTICISM AND REALISM
John Heil
Q
W-Jkepticism offers us a certain picture, a of premises about which we are indepen?
conception of the world and our relation dently certain.
to it familiar to each of us.1 On the one At this juncture, a skeptic might point out
hand, there is the mind with its contents, that my being certain that p does not im?
on the other hand, there is the world with ply p. If that is so, it is not clear that the
its contents. The mind entertains Cartesian strategy could deflect skepti?
thoughts,
mental cism. The Cartesian an
signs that express particular propo? strategy?involving
sitions. These in virtue of the a priori proof of a nondeceiving God?en?
thoughts,
are true or false. ables me to achieve certainty that, if I am
propositions they express,
on certain that p, then p. But this evidently
Whether they are true or false depends
conditions in the world. The trouble is, we leaves the original skeptical worry un?
are in no position to measure our thoughts touched. This suggests that it is misleading
to regard skepticism as a straightforward
against the world. We compare thoughts
to other demand for proof or certainty. A skeptic is
about the world only thoughts
not just someone with exacting epistemic
about the world, and never to the world
standards. Rather, skepticism makes salient
unmediated by thought. Whatever our de?
the consequences of our adopting a certain
gree of confidence concerning a particular
picture of the world and our place in it. If
belief about the world, we lack a capacity
that picture is inevitable, so is the skepti?
to determine whether that belief fits the
cal challenge.
facts, whether it is an apt likeness of what
A natural response to the Cartesian
it depicts. Appeal to other beliefs is beside
project is to insist that it is ill-conceived.
the point. Appreciating this, Descartes If we are restricted solely to the contents
sought to establish a belief-to-world cor?
of our own minds, we see immediately that
relation by means of an a prioriproof there is no of attaining
prospect certainty
founded on indubitable premises. Such a or even reasonable assurance concerning
proof, if successful, would afford assur?
the character of an external mind-indepen?
ance, indeed certainty, that many of our dent world. The feeling that this must be
empirical beliefs correspond to the facts.
so, that our circumstances are of necessity
This Cartesian strategy plays by the rules. has led
inscrutable, many philosophers
Appealing only to truths knowable priori, to lose interest in skepticism: skepticism
it leads to the conclusion that empirical is an aberration, a philosophical gimmick,
knowledge is within our grasp. That con? a tease.
clusion becomes certain for us because we this is a mistake. it is a
Perhaps Perhaps
recognize it to be a deductive consequence mistake, not because, despite past failures,
57
58 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
there is some reason to think that the skep? skepticism. An external world skeptic
tical challenge is after all answerable. raises doubts about our ordinary convic?
Perhaps the lesson to be learned from skep? tion that we have knowledge of the world
ticism is something different. around us, a world that is largely and in
altogether
Note, first, that the in some obvious sense mind-independent.
skeptic's picture,
common with pictures generally, presumes Although nonphilosophers regard skep?
a detached observation point. It invites us ticism of this sort as frivolous, it has tradi?
to ascend and look down on ourselves con? tionally been held in high esteem by
fronting the world. In so doing we notice philosophers. (Doubtless this is one rea?
that our thoughts could well fail to reflect son philosophy so often appears frivolous
external goings-on. We recognize, too, that to nonphilosophers.) Nowadays it is rare
if we are to establish a match between to find anyone willing to take up the project
and world, we must do so from of attempting a head-on refutation of skep
thought
within our worldly The Car? ticism. Among philosophers who take
perspective.
tesian response is to accept this picture, skepticism seriously, the prevailing attitude
descend from the heavens, and set about is one of gloom and resignation. Words like
constructing a proof from the inside out. "profound," "deep," and "momentous" ap?
Another response is to concede the picture, pear in characterizations of the skeptic's
but to argue that we are justified, perhaps insight into the human condition. Since we
on practical in repressing it. A cannot refute the skeptic, we must come
grounds,
third response is to go anti-realist, and re? to terms with our inherent limitations. To
ject the picture on the basis of the conviction some, this means abandoning the Enlight?
that we have no reason to grant its inclusion enment dream of objective knowledge, and
of an objective, world.2 accepting the idea that what we call knowl?
mind-independent
Recent has spawned a minor edge is culture-bound and historically fluid.3
philosophy
of attempts to "diagnose" I shall question some of these going plati?
industry consisting
The idea is that skepticism ex? tudes about skepticism. My aim, however,
skepticism.
presses, or at any rate points to or "shows," is neither to attempt a refutation of skepti?
deep, possibly unfathomable, truths about cism nor to argue that skepticism is trifling.
the human condition.
Although I am reluc? I shall be satisfied if I can make progress
tant to add to the literature on the topic, I toward clarifying what is and is not at stake
remain hopeful that it is possible to spell in a confrontation with the
skeptic. My
out the issues in a way that both makes suggestion is that the skeptical challenge
them clearer and demystifies them. I shall is often, even typically, misdescribed. Skep?
as others have suggested, that the ticism is taken to be an epistemological
suggest,
source of skepticism lies not in epistemol doctrine: an external world skeptic denies
ogy, but in our There is that the conditions on knowing that any
metaphysics.
nothing in the ordinary conception of empirical proposition is true are ever sat?
knowledge or rational belief that mandates isfied; or the skeptic doubts that we can
skepticism. The difficulty is to become ever have a satisfactory general and infor?
clear on what elements of our metaphys? mative account of our knowledge of any
ics lead to skeptical consequences and what empirical proposition. If we are careful, we
these consequences at bottom amount to. can make some progress toward allaying
My focus here is on skepticism about the these doubts. But even if we had defini?
"external world," what I shall call exter? tive answers to them, we know in advance
nal world skepticism or, more often, just that those answers would leave us with the
SKEPTICISMAND REALISM / 59
feeling that the skeptic's worries remain proposition that I am now sitting at my
unaddressed. From this it is easy to con? desk. What reason
might I have to think
clude that skeptical doubts are especially that I do in fact know pi If I am a philoso?
fathomless or elusive. I believe, however, pher, I may have beliefs about conditions
that we are better advised to see skepticism in order for me to have knowl?
required
as a reflection of realism, a metaphysical
edge of empirical propositions. Imight, for
doctrine according to which the external instance, accept some of the form
principle
world, the world on which our thoughts are
(A^)For any empirical proposition, p, an
directed, is mind-independent.
agent, S, knows that/? just in case
One response to skepticism, then, is to
abandon this metaphysical doctrine, to (Dp;
abandon realism. This is, however, easier
said than done; and, in any case, it is not a (2) S believes p;
course I intend to encourage.4 Rather, I think,
(3) S is justified in believing p.
we can maintain our ordinary realist out?
Our first question might concern what is
look while recognizing skepticism for what
it is, and we can do so in good conscience. required in order for condition (3) to be
satisfied. Here are some possibilities.5
Skepticism and Knowledge
S is justified in believing p just in case
(J{)
S has, and recognizes himself to have,
Before venturing further, it will be useful an epistemically reason for
compelling
to agree on two points. First, the moti?
believing p.
vation for skepticism, whatever itmay be,
is something that anyone can is justified in believing p just in case
easily appre? (J2) S
ciate. worries can be generated p is self-evident or p is derived by self
Skeptical
very little philosophy, as anyone evident steps from some proposition, q,
by doing
who has introduced students to that is itself self-evident.
first-year
Descartes's Meditations can attest. This is
in believing p just in case
an important feature of skepticism. Fail? (J3) S is justified
S's belief that p issues from a reliable
ure to appreciate it can lead to misleading
process that S has no rea?
belief-forming
views concerning what the skeptic is up to. son to think unreliable.6
It would, for
instance, be a mistake to
My first suggestion is that there is a
imagine that the skeptical challenge turns
on some arcane or extraordinary vast difference between the first of these
concep?
principles and the second two. Many phi?
tionof knowledge. Second, however, it
does not follow from the fact that skepti? losophers would disagree. Principles (J{)
cism is easily motivated that the skeptical and they would say, are 'internalist'
(J2),
in contrast,
problem can be fully grasped without do? principles; principle (J3) is,
a considerable amount of 'externalist'. The former take seriously
ing philosophy.
Comprehending the force of skepticism doxastic agents' own perspectives on their
and saying in somedetail what is respon? beliefs, the latter does not. Simply by attend?
sible for that force are very different ing myto own beliefs?by 'introspecting'?
things.
With these preliminaries in mind, let us I am in a position to ascertain whether I hold
consider one sort of argument that has led a belief on the basis of an epistemically
philosophers to regard skepticism as in? compelling reason, or whether a proposition

tractable. Suppose I claim to know some believed is self-evident or a self-evident
empirical proposition, p, for instance, the consequence of self-evident propositions.
In so doing I remain within myself. Prin? (J4) S is justified in believing p just in case
S's belief possesses/.
ciple (J3) is importantly different; it requires
that a certain 'external' condition obtain, Note be a complex or
that/might property
one the obtaining of which I am in no po? a disjunction of properties;/might be the
sition to discover solely by reflecting on mentioned in
for instance, the
property (J2),
my own doxastic condition.
Thus, suppose of being self-evident or being a
property
that perception is in fact reliable: perceptual consequence of a self-evident belief; or /
beliefs are generally and nonaccidentally might be the property of having been pro?
true. This is not something I could plausi? duced by a reliable belief-forming process.
bly 'read off a candidate perceptual belief What is crucial is that a principle of this
in the way Imight 'read off a belief that it kind could be satisfied by an agent who
for some
other belief or was utterly ignorant of/ and ignorant as
provides grounds
that it concerns a self-evident well of the fact that a belief's possession
proposition.
It is possible, however, to look at these of / provides grounds for regarding that
in a different belief true.
principles way. Consider prin?
This for its This way of looking at the matter makes
ciple (J2). principle requires,
satisfaction, that a certain condition
obtain; plain an important similarity between prin?
it does not require that an agent know or ciples (J2) and (J3). Neither principle
believe that the condition obtains. Given requires that an agent who satisfies it be in
a position to validate it or to recognize that
principle (J2), Imight know or justifiably
or believ? it has in fact been satisfied. In this respect,
believe that/?, without knowing,
at least, Descartes's classical foundation
ing justifiably, thatmy belief thatp satisfies
me a alism resembles latter day reliabilism.
or that its satisfying
(J2) (J2) gives But now a difficulty looms. Although an
reason for thinking the belief true. It is a
agent's belief might satisfy a principle of
principle of this sort that Descartes sets out
the form its merely satisfying that
to defend in the Meditations. His goal is to (J4),
principle not
wouldby itself give that agent
establish for certain that a principle like
a reason for the belief. In what sense, then,
is correct and satisfiableby sufficiently
(J2) could such a belief be justified and thus, if
diligent doxastic agents. But it is one thing an instance of knowledge?
true, constitute
for me to satisfy the principle?and thus
Surely the notion of epistemic justification
to have empirical knowledge?and another
incorporates the notion of believing for
thing for me to produce a cogent argu? reasons. But there being reasons for an
ment establishing that the principle is
agent's believing something?the agent's
epistemically laudable or that I do in fact
belief's satisfying a principle of the form
satisfy it.
for instance?differs from the agent's
(J4),
The point could be put more generally. sl reason for the belief, his believ?
having
Let us assume the traditional conception a reason.
ing/or
of knowledge as justified true belief, and Such considerations push us back in the
let us suppose that a belief that p is justi? direction of principle to
(J{) according
fied (for an agent, 5, at a time) only if, if/? which a reasonable belief is reasonable
is true, the belief that p is an instance of because it is backed some reason. A
by
knowledge: S knows that/?. Finally, let us of this sort appeals to our sense
principle
imagine that, if a belief is justified, it is that epistemically rational agents are those
in virtue of its possession of some
justified who hold beliefs only on the basis of rea?
characteristic,/. sons. And indeed we can imagine modifying
so as to yield principles that

(J2) and (73)
we thereby immediately rule out the pos?
conform to this requirement. The resulting sibility of knowledge or justified belief. If
principles would have the following form: this is skepticism, then we establish, not
S is justified in believing p just in case just that skepticism is true, but that it is
(J5)
S's belief possesses/, and 5 justifiably necessarily true. But now the question
believes both that his belief that p pos? arises: why should we
care about a skepti?
sesses / and that it is in virtue of its cism of this
sort? If the very concept of
possession of/that his belief that p is (or the concept of justified be?
knowledge
justified. lief) is characterized in such a way that it
This insures that every justified belief is is in principle unsatisfiable, then its being
itself held for a reason, that is, every unsatisfiable is scarcely cause for wonder
justi?
fied belief is justified in light of some or regret. Such a conception undoubtedly
deflates our pretensions to knowledge, but
justified belief.
it is hard to see how a it deflates skepticism as well. If the con?
Now, however,
principle like (Jx) or (J5) could ever be sat? cept of a square is the concept
circle of an
isfied. If holding a belief for a reason impossible object, the discovery that the
amounts to holding a belief on the basis of concept of a square circle is never satis?
some further justified belief, we seem fied, there are no square circles, is neither
doomed to an immediate and vicious re? grounds for puzzlement nor for despair.9
gress of reasons. my belief that/?

These remarks echo a point made earlier.
Suppose
is justified only if that belief is held on the If skepticism has bite, this is because it
basis of some reason, and suppose that does not presume some exotic or idiosyn?
holding/? on the basis of a reason amounts cratic conception of knowledge. Although

to basing that belief on some other justi? it is possible that our ordinary concept of
fied belief, q. Then my belief that q must knowledge is, like the concept of a square
be based on a reason, hence on some fur? circle, the concept of an impossible object,
ther justified belief, r, and so on.7 this appears unlikely. Were this the lesson
Abandoning a linear conception of epi of skepticism, we should regard the skep?

stemic justification and appealing to tic, not as posing a challenge, but as
coherence is of no help here. Coherence offering conceptual elucidation. It is clear,
theories are naturally expressed by prin? however, that skeptics see themselves dif?
ciples of the form coherence theorists ferently. The skeptical challenge concerns
(74);
hold that a belief is justified just in case it a satisfiable concept for which,owing to
possesses the property of cohering with a some feature of our circumstances, we are
range of other beliefs. A theorist who opts powerless satisfactorily to establish is ever
for a formulation of the coherence principle in fact satisfied.
mimicking comes face to A second moral of the line of argument I

(J5), immediately
face with the prospect of a regress. If my have been pursuing, then, is that a sensible
belief that /? is justified only if it coheres account of knowledge, an account that does
with other beliefs and I know or believe not turn knowledge into a kind of
impos?
justifiably both that it so coheres and that sible object, must incorporate a principle
it is justified in virtue of its so cohering, a of the form rather than a principle of
(J4)
regress ensues.8 the form (J5) or (Jx). That is, justification
One moral, perhaps, is that if we insist and knowledge must be taken to depend
that only beliefs held for reasons could be on the satisfaction of conditions that are,
justified or count as instances of knowledge, at bottom, in character.
nonepistemic
This requirement amounts to the require? With this terminology in mind, I offer a
ment that epistemic truths supervene on conjecture:
nonepistemic truths just as moral truths are
(C) Epistemic properties or truths supervene
sometimes taken to supervene on nonmoral on nonepistemic properties or truths.10
truths. Supervenience is standardly regarded
as a nonreductive relation Note, first, that (C) does not imply that
dependence
justified beliefs cannot themselves be held
holding among properties, or truths, or
for reasons or justified by relations they
predicates (or families or domains of prop?
bear to other beliefs; (C) implies only that
erties, truths, or predicates). My being a
this cannot be so for every justified belief:
good man, for instance, might be thought
some beliefs must be justified other than
to depend on my telling the truth, keeping
promises, helping others, and the like. I am

by relations they bear to distinct justified
beliefs, other than by being based on rea?
good in virtue of doing those things, even
if there is no prospect of defining or ana? sons. Second, (C) does not imply that we
could not, if challenged, discover or pro?
lyzing goodness in terms of
truthfulness,
and benevolence. We can vide reasons for any justified belief. Imight
promise-keeping,
that if as on ?>-s, be justified in believing /? because my be?
say, roughly, supervene
then something is an a in virtue of being a lief possesses property / This does not
b; in consequence, if two things are alike preclude my believing justifiably thatmy

in every ?-respect, must be alike in belief possesses/ or that it is in virtue of
they
every
its possession of /that my belief that /? is
a-respect.
In regarding truths as super? justified. The supervenience requirement
epistemic
we are that something as expressed in (C) merely makes explicit
venient, supposing
an (or satis? that my believing justifiably that my be?
possesses epistemic property
fies an epistemic in virtue of its lief that/? possesses/ or that it is in virtue
predicate)
possession of some nonepistemic property of its possession of/that my belief that /?
(its satisfying some nonepistemic predi? is justified is not required for my belief that
cate). This is what
(J4)
in effect tells us: /? to ?^justified. (C) strikes me as innocu?
the epistemic characteristic, being justi? ous, although I do not expect everyone to
fied, is held to depend or supervene on agree. In any case, I shall henceforth take
some nonepistemic characteristic, / An (C) for granted and follow out its implica?
agent is justified in believing p, for in? tions for skepticism.
stance, in virtue of his belief's possessing
like in contrast, is im? Justification and Truth
/ A principle (J5),
portantly different. According to the
(J5), the supervenience
Assuming principle
epistemic property of being justified depends
on the instantiation (C), we can exclude principle from our
for its instantiation (J^
an epistemic initial list. Principles and but not
of a property that includes (J2) (J3),
In to honor super?
component, indeed it depends on the (J{), satisfy (C). failing
same property, the venience, portends a regress that
instantiation of the very (J{)
renders (Jx)unsatisfiable by finite doxastic
property of being justified. Thus, if an
agent is justified in believing p, he is so agents. What considerations might bear on
a choice between and
justified in virtue of being justified in be? (J2) (73)?
q. I shall First consider principle that
lieving some distinct proposition, (J2). Suppose
describe like as we take self-evidence to be an intrinsic
principles (J4) satisfying
or honoring and principles property of beliefs or propositions be?
supervenience,
like as failing to honor supervenience. lieved, a property the possession of which
(J5)
by a belief or a proposition does not de? It is important, then, to distinguish a
pend on relations that belief or proposition notion of internal coherence, sub?

purely
bears to other beliefs or propositions. Sup? from a stronger notion
jective rationality,
pose, further, that a proposition, /?, is of justification associated with knowledge.
self-evident for an agent, S, just in case S I might be coherent and epis?
internally
clearly and distinctly.11 Can in
blameless
apprehends/? temically holding p, and p
we say that my believing a self-evident to
might be true, yet I could fail know that
proposition, together with that proposition's /? because the truth of my belief is fortu?
being true, yields knowledge? itous. This is why coherence by itself
Before I propose an answer to this ques? cannot sort
yield the of epistemic justifi?
tion, let us think for a moment about
cation required for knowledge.12 Coherence
attempts to characterize epistemic justifi? must be supplemented by some condition
cation or knowledge in terms of coherence.
that, in Robert Nozick's phrase, 'tracks the
Imagine that I accept some proposition, the
truth', some condition, the satisfaction of
proposition that I am now sitting at my
which connects
my believing /?'s /? with
desk, say, on the basis of its fitting the evi?
being the case.13 More precisely, my be?
dence in my possession; and imagine that
lief must be grounded in a belief-forming
my belief that I am now sitting at my desk
process the nature of which is such that it
does in fact cohere with my total belief
disposes me to form true beliefs.14 If my
system (whatever that might mean). Un?
belief that/? coheres with my other beliefs,
der the circumstances, if I believe that I
am now sitting at my desk and it is true then, and if its truth is nonaccidental, it is
a legitimate candidate for knowledge.
that I am now sitting at my
desk, do I know
These observations on coherence
help
that I am now sitting at my desk?
When we reflect on this possibility, all make it plain that self-evidence by itself
the usual doubts about coherence accounts need not amount to knowledge-level justi?
of epistemic warrant bubble to the surface. fication. Unless it is plausible to suppose
that I am mad, or that I am deluded that a beliefs (or proposition's) self

Imagine
a Cartesian but that I possess evidence and its truth are nonaccidentally
by demon,
an internally linked, it is possible to imagine an agent
coherent array of empirical
the belief that I am now whose belief that /? is both true and self
beliefs, including
at my desk. that these be? evident, hence satisfies to
sitting Suppose (J2), yet, owing
liefs were inme by a demon bent that belief's being only accidentally true,
implanted
on deception, or they were arrived at solely the agent lacks knowledge of/?. Recogniz?
on whim. Suppose, further, that the beliefs ing this, Descartes offered a proof of a
are largely false, although the belief that I nondeceiving God, a device calculated to
am now sitting at my desk, guarantee a link between self-evidence and
happens, purely
to be true: I am now sitting at truth: God creates and sustains agents for
by chance,
my desk. Do I know that I am now sitting whom self-evidence reliably yields true
at my desk? Few
philosophers, and fewer belief. Since, for Descartes, self-evidence
nonphilosophers, would imagine that I do. yields certainty, that proof, were it valid
It is more natural to suppose that I fail to and were its premises self-evident, would
know that I am now sitting at my desk, in produce certainty that self-evidence is
just the way a madman failsto know when, truth-linked. Does certainty of this sort
on the basis of a mad but coherent body of yield knowledge? If Descartes is right, I
evidence, he forms a belief that, by luck, can be certain that self-evident beliefs are
turns out to be true. nonaccidentally true. Suppose, now, I hold
/?, p is self-evident, and/? is true. Do I know is to relocate the skeptical worry and reas?
that /?? No, not unless it is true that self sess its force.
evidence is appropriately truth-linked. I Let us assume that a principle of the form
could, of course, be certain that /? and cer? of is correct, so that
(J3)
tain that I know that p. I could even be
(K') S knows that p (where p is some em?
certain that self-evidence 'tracks the truth'.
pirical proposition) just in case
Unless certainty were in fact truth-guaran?
teeing, however, it could still be false that (D/>;

I know that /?. (2) S believes p;
The upshot, I think, is that epistemic jus? (3) S"s belief that/? issues from a reli?
tification of the sort required for knowledge able belief-forming process that S
must be truth-linked. I could be scrupulously has no reason to think unreliable.15
rational, internally coherent, and eviden?
This means that I know some
empirical
tially faultless, yet lack knowledge?not
proposition, that I am now sitting at my
because my beliefs are false, but because
them is in no way owing to desk, for instance, provided certain condi?
my holding
on jus? tions are satisfied. I need know nothing of
their being true. This requirement
cannot these conditions, and, although Imay be, I
tification be avoided merely by
certainly need not be in a position to estab?
upping internal standards of epistemic
lish that these conditions are satisfied or that
rigor. Even indubitability, Cartesian style
leaves us of the What their satisfaction suffices for knowledge.
certainty, shy goal.
is needed is not more by way of certainty, A skeptic, note, can readily
grant that, if
or additional internal but a link the conditions on knowing are satisfied, I
scrutiny,
to the truth, something of the sort provided have knowledge. He may object, however,
More that this avails me nothing unless I am in a
by principle (J3). generally, recalling
where knowledge-level is position to provide a good reason for ac?
(J4), justification
concerned, the relevant property, / must cepting those conditions and for thinking
include a link to the truth of the kind men? that they are indeed satisfied. We can now
tioned in (J3). see that it would be a mistake to respond
to the skeptic's challenge here by scram?
Skepticism Again to condition
bling supplement (3), by
supposing, for instance, that to be justified,
We are now in a better position to com?
5" s belief that/? must not only be the result
prehend the nature of the skeptical challenge.
of a reliable process, but it must also be
I have suggested that it is a mistake to see
the case that S has good reasons both to
skepticism as issuing from a regress of rea?
think that his belief is reliably caused, and
sons. Such regresses depend on epistemic
to think that reliability suffices for justifi?
principles that violate the supervenience
cation. Thus supplemented, condition (3)
requirement and so generate implausible
on knowing. violates the supervenience requirement and
conditions Although skeptics
to re? insures a regress. More importantly, itmis
have sometimes helped themselves
locates the source of the skeptical problem.
gress arguments that apparently depend on
such ill-advised As we have seen already, the skeptic is not
principles, skepticism
need not be thought to turn on such argu? someone with
exacting standards for
or Nor does the
ments. Indeed, were these arguments behind knowledge justification.
the skeptical would skeptic contend that we chronically fail to
challenge, skepticism
lack philosophical interest. The task now know. Rather, the skeptic challenges us to
provide convincing grounds for thinking point is perhaps best appreciated by way
that we do in fact have knowledge.16 of an example.
What must I do, then, to assuage the Suppose that perception affords reliable
skeptic? It is not sufficient that I merely information about the world, perceptual
the conditions on knowing, an
satisfy (K'). processes reliably yield beliefs with
Perhaps Imust, in addition, know or at least appropriately high truth ratio. Suppose,
justifiably believe that I satisfy those con? that we have no reason to
further, good
ditions. Suppose, then, I form the belief doubt the reliability of our perceptual be?
that the conditions on knowing that I am liefs. Perceptual beliefs, then, satisfy
now sitting at my desk are satisfied; and condition (3), and true perceptual beliefs
suppose that this belief satisfies (Kf). I then constitute instances of knowledge. Now,
know that I know that I am now sitting at suppose I set out to quell the skeptic's
my desk. Assuming that the skeptic does
doubt by establishing that perception is
not dispute the conditions on knowing,
reliable. In so doing Imight appeal to vari?
(Kf), it looks as though I must have an?
ous tests the application of which revealed
swered the skeptic's challenge: I have
that perceptual processes were indeed re?
produced what amounts to a valid argument
liable. If these tests were themselves
with premises known to be true, the con?
reliable, then I would have established
clusion of which undercuts the
skeptic.
what I set out to establish. I would have
What more could anyone reasonably want?
done so, however, by appealing to premises
In addressing this question we at last
I could have reason to accept only if I had
reach the crux of the skeptical
challenge.
reason to accept the conclusion they are
Suppose the skeptic questions my claim to
advanced to support. My situation re?
know the premises of my argument. Once
can sembles one in which I endeavor to
again, the skeptic accept the conditional:
on convince myself that I am not dreaming by
//those premises satisfy the conditions
if my beliefs about what I know pinching myself, or seeking third party
knowing,
are justified and true, then I know what I corroboration. I am in the position of some?
to know. But what, he could ask, one who sets out to demonstrate the
purport
entitles me to assume that the premises? existence of God by appealing to passages
my beliefs about what I know?are true? in the Bible, the veracity of which turns on
Here, Imight produce a further argument, God's existence. His argument could be
one whose premises are true and imply that valid, and its premises true, yet the argument
the premises of my earlier argument are would fall short of providing anything like
indeed true, but
again, the skeptic could a convincing case for the existence of God.
question my appeal to these new premises. Now consider the claim,
In insisting at each step on some addi?
(R) Perceptual processes are reliable.
tional assurance, it might appear that the
a child On the face of it, there would seem to be
skeptic is merely doing what does
who treats every answer to a why-question no noncircular way of establishing or vali?
as an invitation to pose a further why dating (R). Any attempt to prove the
question. This appearance is deceptive. The reliability of perception would require an

is us to a appeal to evidence that itself depends on
skeptic challenging provide gen?
eral, noncircular?that is an epistemically the use of perceptual faculties, the reliabil?
noncircular?reason for thinking that we ity of which is precisely what the skeptic
ever have The challenges us to vindicate.
empirical knowledge.17
The difficulty we face can be made clear perception and crystal ball gazing, could
by considering a parallel claim: be self-validating or self-supporting in this
sense:
(Rf) Crystal ball gazing is reliable.18
(S-S) A belief-forming process, P, is self
Suppose I hold the belief that it is raining in case P yields the
inVienna on the basis of gazing into a crys? supporting just
belief that P is reliable.
tal ball. Then, if it is raining in Vienna, and
if (R') is true, I know that it is raining in If P is reliable, and I have no reason to
Vienna. that I am chal? doubt that P is reliable, then I should be

Suppose, next,
lenged by the skeptic: what reason do I justified in believing on the basis of P that
P is reliable. as the example
But, of crys?
have to think that I know that it is raining
in Vienna? In response, I gaze again into
tal ball gazing illustrates, there is no
guarantee that such procedures are genu?
my crystal ball and receive confirmation,
not only that my belief that it is inely reliable. The fact that a process, P, is
original
self-supporting, then, the mere fact that
raining in Vienna is true, but also that (/?')
applications of P yield the result that P is
holds: crystal ball gazing is reliable. If this
reliable, does not by itself afford non
is so, I have responded to the skeptic by
circular assurance that P is reliable.
providing what in effect is a valid argu?
To be sure, crystal ball gazing differs in
ment with true premises to the conclusion
at least one important respect from ordi?
doubted by the skeptic. Thus, if (Rr) is cor?
nary perception. In considering all the
rect, if crystal ball gazing is reliable, I am
evidence available to us, we have
little rea?
justified in accepting (/?') on the basis of son to trust the pronouncements of crystal
my gazing into a crystal ball, indeed I sat?
balls, and many reasons not to. Even when
isfy the condition on knowing that crystal
a crystal ball yields truths, we have excel?
ball gazing is reliable. But, again, what use
lent grounds to regard these as purely
is it to be told that if I satisfy certain con?
coincidental. Thus, although appeals to
ditions, I have knowledge or justified
crystal ball gazing might be self-support?
belief? Although can we
readily allow the
ing, in the context of all we believe we
conditional, no one would be impressed by should have little reason to regard this as
a defense of crystal ball gazing that turned
anything more than a curiosity. It is quite
on an appeal to evidence produced by gaz? otherwise in the case of perception. That
ing into a crystal ball. is, the reliability of perceptual processes
Granted, appeals to perceptual evidence
is broadly supported by our overall body
are prima facie less far-fetched that appeals a belief
of evidence. In this respect, in the
to crystal balls. But do we really have any of perception coheres with our
reliability
very good reason to think than perception a belief
other beliefs far better than does
is more reliable than crystal ball gazing? in crystal ball gazing.
We can support (R) by appealing to per? this is undoubtedly so, it is in
Although
ceptual evidence we all accept, but this one beside the point. We can cer?
respect
apparently gets us nowhere in attempting
tainly imagine cases in which the overall
to respond to the skeptic?just as it would evidential for crystal ball gazing
backing
get us nowhere to mount a defense of (Rr) matched or exceeded the support for ordi?
by appealing to our crystal ball. This might be
nary perceptual processes.
As William Alston has pointed out, there so for a relentlessly consistent madman, or
might be any number belief-forming pro? for someone under the spell of a Cartesian
cesses or procedures, all of which, like demon. Even were it not so, however, it
looks as though all we should be entitled It is beginning to look as though the skep?
to conclude is that an agent whose overall tic is right: any attempt to provide an
evidence his forming beliefs on the
licenses argument demonstrating the reliability of
basis of perception would be in a position to reasons for ac?
Pt, any attempt provide
to demonstrate that his accepting (R) is cepting P, is bound to be unsatisfying.
coherent. All we should be entitled to con? Suppose this is so. Suppose, as seems to
clude is that his belief that perception is be the case anyway, that any such attempt
reliable coheres with his other beliefs. But would perforce be epistemically circular.
as we have seen, coherence does not suf? What ought we to conclude? If the only
fice for strong, knowledge-level way to satisfy the skeptic is to show that
epistemic
justification. Thus, although an agent might
P is reliable via a noncircular argument,
be justified, and even know, that percep? and if it is true as well (as it certainly seems
tion is reliable, he would nevertheless lack to be) that such an argument is impossible
a convincing in principle, then it would appear that the
reply to the skeptic; he would
be in no position to provide a noncircular skeptic is asking us to do the impossible.
to the conclusion that We cannot do the impossible, nor is the
argument perception
is reliable that moved an inch beyond impossible is something to which we could
pure
coherence.19 reasonably aspire. As Ernest Sosa has ar?
To focus the
issue, let us consider, not gued, however, there is no reason to think
ourselves undone by our inability to pro?
just one or another belief-forming process,
but our total belief-forming process, Pt. Pt duce what is necessarily unproducible.20
includes perceptual Harking back to an earlier example, a
processes, reasoning,
memory, and whatever else generates be? square circle is an impossible object. Once
lief. Let us imagine that is in fact reliable: I recognize this, I should hardly regard my
Pt
beliefs that, when true, inability to track down a square circle as
Pt yields justified
constitute instances of knowledge. Now let the sign of a profound limitation on my
us ask: is there any epistemically non part. If I have invested considerable time
circular way for us to establish the reliabil? and energy in looking for them, Imight be
of not; although P is shocked or depressed to learn that there are
ity Pp. Evidently
the belief that no square circles. But my depression is of
self-supporting?Pt yields Pt
is reliable?any to demonstrate a sort that I might hope to cure solely by
attempt
rational reflection.
that
Pt
is reliable would require an appeal
to beliefs we are entitled to accept only on Even if we accept the idea that the
the assumption that P is reliable. Once skeptic's challenge to produce a non
again, the skeptic will grant that ifPt is re? circular proof for the reliability of is
Pt
liable, we have any number of justified unanswerable, not because we are limited
beliefs, and if these beliefs are true we creatures, but because no such is
proof
know many things about the world. The possible, the skeptical worry may linger.
skeptic's focuses on our inabil? After all, it would seem that if we are per?
challenge
ity, our chronic inability, to provide good, mitted to defend P by relying on beliefs
epistemically noncircular reasons to think whose veracity depends on the trustwor?
that is reliable. Lacking such reasons, it thiness of P9 it would surely be possible
Pt
would seem, we have no grounds for pre? for someone to defend P*9 an alternative
ferring Pt to self-supporting competitors, to one including crystal ball gazing per?
Pt,
including those that, by our own lights, haps, that is equally comprehensive and
appear mad. internally coherent. Such an agent would,
it appears, achieve a level of rational be? perfectly general, that is, does (K') apply
lief equal to ours. And this might be thought to itself? We are bound to say that it does:
to open the door to assorted forms of rela? if my belief that (K') is correct satisfies
tivism about justification and knowledge. (K')9 then I know that (Kf) is correct. Might
We have seen that it is important to I know or be justified in taking my belief
distinguish between internal coherence? that (K') is correct to satisfy (K')7 Cer?
purely subjective reasonableness?and that belief satisfies
tainly, provided (Kf).
genuine epistemic justification. The latter, This can be no objection to (K'), however;
not the former, is truth-linked. A it is precisely what we should
though require of
belief that internally coheres with other account of knowledge.
any fully general
beliefs, yet results from an unreliable be? This is not to suggest that any account that
lief forming process, fails to be justified; to itself in this way is correct. For
applies
such a belief, even if true, falls short of note: it is not in virtue of (K'Ys applying
knowledge. A defense of P against its com? to itself that we are entitled to accept (Kf);
petitors, then, must appeal to more than it is in virtue of the fact that our belief that
pure coherence of output. We require as (K') is correct satisfies conditions (l)-(3).21
well an account of P's reliability. To be
sure, any such explanation will appeal to Skepticism and Realism
beliefs the reliability of which depends on
the reliability of our total belief forming It should now be clear that the skeptical
line as discussed thus far is not founded
process, P, but that goes without saying.
the success of any explanation or on the identification of a plausible condi?
Further,
we offer depends on the truth tion on knowing that ordinary doxastic
argument
of our premises?and fail to satisfy. The skeptic grants,
that, too, goes with? agents
out saying. or ought to grant, that we may well have
Where do we stand vis-?-vis an appre? justified beliefs
about, perhaps even
ciation of our epistemic situation? We can knowledge of, the external world. What we
offer an account of that situation, one that cannot do is provide an epistemically
to beliefs we are justified in ac? noncircular defense of our conviction that
appeals
if our situation is such that we have such knowledge or justified be?
cepting only
lief. If such a defense is impossible in the
the processes by which we form those be?
liefs are reliable. So long as there is no way constructing a square circle is impos?
reason to think those processes are unreli? sible, however, it is not something about
able, there is no reason to doubt our which we could reasonably worry. Nor
for knowledge and thus no rea? does our inability to provide a satisfying
capacity
son to entertain particular answer to the skeptic give us the slightest
epistemological
reservations of the sort traditionally asso? reason to doubt that we have empirical
ciated with skepticism. We cannot do the knowledge. So long as we take skepticism
we cannot vindicate ourselves to be an epistemological thesis regarding
impossible,
without to beliefs a limitation on what we could know, we
epistemically appealing
whose warrant on our must regard the skeptic as telling us no
depends being epis?
vindicated, but that is scarcely more than what we recognize already: we
temically
cause for alarm?any more than our inabil? cannot reasonably expect to accomplish the
ity to locate a square circle should be cause impossible.

for alarm. Perhaps it is time to look more closely at
Consider again, (K1), the schematic ac? my earlier suggestion that skepticism is,
count of knowledge sketched earlier. Is (K') at bottom, best regarded as a meditation
on realism: skepticism is realism reflected realism as the view that the world is mind
in the mirror of epistemology. We can be? independent in this sense, then, we need
gin to understand what the skeptic is up to not regard realism as positing a mind
if we take him to be indicating (or draw? world bifurcation. Indeed, realism so
ing out the implications of) a metaphysical described is consistent with the possibility
picture rather than posing a diabolical epis that all that exists are minds and their
temological puzzle. Were this so, then from contents?or my mind and its contents.
the fact that skepticism generates little of This, however, is just as it should be. Re?
interest epistemologically, not fol?
it need alism as I am thinking of it is not a substantive
low that skepticism is trivial, or that it reveals metaphysical thesis, one
that implies the
nothing about our circumstances. existence of material bodies, for instance.
Earlier, I loosely characterized realism Realism is just the view that we must dis?
as a conception of the world?or of the the way things are?however
tinguish they
truths?as mind-independent. Although the are?from the way we take them to be?how?
relevant notion of mind-independence is ever we take them to be. This leaves the
tricky to make out, I shall suppose that it of how are entirely
question things open.
comes to something like this: objects or There is an connection be?
important
properties of objects are mind-independent tween this notion of realism and the intuitive
just in case they are what they are inde? notion of objectivity. Objective truths are
pendently of how we take them to be. truths. If it is true, in?
mind-independent
a truth, T, ismind-independent
Alternatively, dependently of my taking it to be true that
just in case T is logically (or conceptually) there are nine planets, then there being nine
independent of our believing (or more gen? planets is an objective truth. My being in a
erally, taking) 7 to be the case. This leaves particular subjective state, however, is as
open, as it should, the possibility that truths much an objective condition of the world
about the world could depend in some other as is the existence of the Milky Way; at
way on minds. God might form the inten? least this is so given that my being in that
tion to extinguish the universe when the state is logically or conceptu?
subjective
last conscious being expires. Were that so, of my to
ally independent taking myself
the world would be causally dependent on be in that state. It might be noted in pass?
nevertheless the world a
minds; (or sig? ing that if this is right, we apparently sever
nificant portion of it) would be mind the connection between and
objectivity
independent in the sense that there is no that is often as obvious:
publicity regarded
contradiction in supposing that the world an objective truth need notbe publicly
might continue to exist even in the absence accessible. This would be the case, for in?
of conscious observers. stance, were the world to include minds and
Another consequence of this notion of their contents, and were the contents of
mind-independence is that truths about each mind accessible to the mind to
only
minds and their contents are to count as which for my pur?
they belonged. Again,
mind-independent: there being a mind, M, poses, this is just as it should be. The notion
need not depend logically or conceptually of objectivity is, at bottom, a metaphysical
on anyone's taking it to be the case that notion; the concept of publicity is episte
there is a mind, M. Similarly, my thinking mological. To assume at the outset that
that p does not depend logically or con? these concepts are necessarily coextensive,
ceptually on my taking it to be the case that would be to run together epistemology and
I am thinking that p.22 If we conceive of in a potentially way.
metaphysics misleading
Many self-proclaimed realists would pre? pect to deduce how things are from how
fer a stronger, less modest brand of realism. we take them to be.23
I have no objection to such realisms, but I have urged that the skeptic is best under?
no enthusiasm for them either. In any case, stood, not as advancing an epistemological
the version of realism I have proposed conundrum, but as making salient the char?
leaves room both for a robust notion of acter of realism, the view that the world is
objective truth and for the skeptical chasm mind-independent. To
accept skepticism,
between the world, what is the case, and is just to accept what we all along sus?
our appreciation of it. Indeed, it is now pected: there are no a priori guarantees that
possible to see that this chasm is simply a our efforts to arrive at the truth will suc?
direct consequence of realism. If the world ceed. And in this the skeptic is surely right.
is mind-independent, then we cannot ex
Davidson College
Received July 10, 1997
NOTES
Work on this paper was supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Versions of
the paper were delivered at the University of Calgary, Duke University, the College of the Holy
Cross, the University of St. Andrews, Cambridge University, and the University of Leeds. I am
grateful for comments received on those occasions. I am indebted in particular to Robert Audi,
Tom Baldwin, Anthony Brueckner, John Divers, C. B. Martin, Alfred Mele, Mark Nelson, David
Sanford, Ernest Sosa, Barry Stroud, William Throop, and an anonymous APQ referee.
1. Skepticism is not a doctrine but a family of doctrines. Many philosophers with many different
axes to grind have called themselves skeptics. My target is Cartesian-style skepticism. I leave
aside Pyrrhonian skepticism, and indeed any version of skepticism with a practical agenda. The
picture I associate with skepticism is related to what Bernard Williams calls the 'absolute con?
ception'; see his Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978),
pp. 65-67. See also Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by J. Cottingham
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
2. These matters are discussed
by Barry Stroud in The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and by Thomas Nagel in The View from Nowhere (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), esp. chaps. 5 and 6. See also Paul Moser, Philosophy After Ob?
jectivity: Making Sense inPerspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). An importantly
different sort of response would be to argue that what the skeptic's picture purports to express is,
quite literally, and on its own terms, inexpressible. This might be put, albeit paradoxically, as
follows: were our circumstances as the skeptic's picture depicts, that picture could not depict
them. We should recognize that, inmoving in this direction, we are bound to find ourselves in the
odd position of apparently wanting to say things that, were we right, literally could not be said. It
may feel to us as though we grasp particular propositions, but that these propositions are ones
whose sense is, for us, inexpressible. It is not that the propositions are mystical or that they elude
linguistic expression. It is that, owing to special features of our circumstances, we are cut off
from them. But if we are cut off from them in this way, we cannot grasp that we are cut off from
them either, and we are deluding ourselves in a way open only to philosophers. See, e.g., P. F.
Strawson's Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959); and
Hilary Putnam's Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
3. A point made by Ernest Sosa in "Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity,"

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68 (1994): 263-90.
4. It is in general a bad idea to advance ametaphysical thesis on the grounds that the thesis solves
some epistemological problem. If I am right in regarding skepticism as a reflection of realism,
then we are obliged to evaluate realism on its own terms. To abandon realism on the grounds that
this would undo the skeptic would be to abandon realism because it is realism.
5. I do not pretend that any of these possibilities?or that the characterization of knowledge that
precedes them?is adequate. My aim is not to advance an analysis of knowledge, but to discuss
conceptions of knowledge and the skeptical response to them in a general way.
6. S"s having no reason to think a process unreliable is to be distinguished from the very different
requirement that S has some reason to think the process is reliable. Ernest Sosa has reminded me
of another complication. S might have reason to think some process unreliable, but, failing to
recognize that the process whereby he formed the belief that p is a process of that sort, S has no
reason to think that his belief that/? resulted from an unreliable process.
7. One strategy would be to attempt to block the regress by supposing that a belief can serve as a
justificatory reason without itself being justified. The strategy is unpromising. Suppose I form a
belief on whim, then form another belief on the basis of this first belief. The first belief supplies
me with a reason for holding the second belief, perhaps, but it scarcely justifies me in holding the
second belief.
8. A regress follows if we suppose that (1) every justified belief requires a distinct meta-belief
that the target belief is justified?that it coheres in the right way with the agent's other beliefs?
and (2) this meta-belief must itself be justified. The satisfaction of (2) requires a new
meta-meta-belief for its justification, a further meta-meta-meta-belief.. . and so on.
that, requires
9. See Sosa's "Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity." Square circles are strictly
impossible. The argument thus far shows at most that certain conceptions of justification are
unsatisfiable for finite doxastic agents, not that they are strictly unsatisfiable. These conceptions
are, however, strictly unsatisfiable for finite agents, and this is enough to support the analogy.
10. By 'epistemic truths' here I do not mean 'epistemic principles'. Imean only humble singular
truths of the form 'S's belief that p is justified', or '5 knows that/?'.
11. This provides a nonepistemic basis for the property of self-evidence, one that accords with
the Cartesian project from which the requirement is borrowed. In the Meditations, Descartes
suggests that, if I apprehend p clearly and distinctly, then p is self-evident and I believe p.
12.1 am not denying that coherence might constitute a necessary condition on the sort of episte?
mic justification required for knowledge, only that it is sufficient.
13. See Nozick's Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
14. Roughly (but only roughly): Iwould believe/? just in case/?. Note that the process in question
is best thought of as one that produces or sustains beliefs. The qualification is needed to accom?
modate cases in which I find myself with an epistemically dubious belief that subsequently comes
to be justified. In the interest of clarity and simplicity, I shall omit the qualification in what follows.
15. Again, and for the record, I do not offer (K') as an analysis of knowledge, nor as an
(J3)
explication of epistemically justified belief. I offer both as examples of plausible conditions on
knowledge and epistemic warrant en route to an evaluation of skeptical arguments. Nothing I
have to say about skepticism depends on details of (K') or
(J3).
16. This theme occupies William Alston in The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993). Some of the ideas discussed here are prefigured in Barry Stroud's
"Understanding Human Knowledge in General" (inM. Clay and K. Lehrer, eds., Knowledge and
Skepticism [Boulder: Westview, 1989]). Compare Sosa's "Philosophical Skepticism and Episte?
mic Circularity."
17. An argument is formally circular if its conclusion is contained in its premises. An argument is
epistemically circular if an appeal to its conclusion is presupposed in the supposition that its
premises are justified. See Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception, pp. 15-17. In discussing
circularity in what follows, Imean epistemic circularity, unless otherwise indicated.
18. The crystal ball example is borrowed from Alston.
19. A reminder: the claim is not that anyone not in a position to offer such an argument lacks
knowledge, only that he lacks an epistemically noncircular answer to the skeptic.
20. See "Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity."

21. (K') was offered as an account of empirical knowledge, and it is doubtful that beliefs about
the correctness of (K') are straightforwardly empirical beliefs. We can, however, imagine a ver?
sion of (Kf) that is both self-supporting and correct.
22. Nor, of course, does my taking it to be the case that I am thinking that/? depend conceptually
on my taking it to be the case that I am taking it to be the case that I am thinking that/?; and so on
for any thought at all.
23. An external world skeptic might be appeased were we to produce inferences of this sort based
solely on a priori considerations, though a skeptic who insisted as well on an epistemically
noncircular proof of the veracity of reason would not be moved. In any case, the possibility of
such inferences evidently presupposes the rejection of realism.

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Skepticism and Realism

SKEPTICISM AND REALISM

philosophers to regard skepticism as in? compelling reason, or whether a proposition

empirical proposition, p, for instance, the consequence of self-evident propositions.

so as to yield principles that

gress of reasons. my belief that/?

holding/? on the basis of a reason amounts cratic conception of knowledge. Although

Abandoning a linear conception of epi of skepticism, we should regard the skep?

mimicking comes face to A second moral of the line of argument I

promises, helping others, and the like. I am

b; in consequence, if two things are alike preclude my believing justifiably thatmy

by a belief or a proposition does not de? It is important, then, to distinguish a

pend on relations that belief or proposition notion of internal coherence, sub?

that I am mad, or that I am deluded that a beliefs (or proposition's) self

teeing, however, it could still be false that (D/>;

question. This appearance is deceptive. The reliability of perception would require an

Vienna. that I am chal? doubt that P is reliable, then I should be

ity to locate a square circle should be cause impossible.

3. A point made by Ernest Sosa in "Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity,"

18. The crystal ball example is borrowed from Alston.

20. See "Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity."

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