Rome and The Third Macedonian War

RO M E A N D T H E T H I R D
M A C E D O N I A N WA R
This is the first full-length study of the final war between Rome and
the ancient Macedonian monarchy and its last king, Perseus. The
Roman victory at the Battle of Pydna in June 168 bc was followed
by the abolition of the kingdom of Macedon – the cradle of Philip
II, Alexander the Great, and the Antigonid monarchs who followed.
The first historian of Rome’s rise to world power, and a contemporary
of the war, Polybius of Megalopolis, recognized the significance of
these events in making Rome an almost global power beyond com-
pare – a sole superpower, in other words. Yet Roman authority did
not lack challenges from lesser states and insurgents in the decades
that followed. The book’s meticulous documentation, close analysis,
and engagement in scholarly controversy will appeal to academics
and students, while general readers will appreciate its brisk narrative
style and pacing.
paul j. burton is a senior lecturer in Roman History in the Centre

for Classical Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.
He is the author of Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and
Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC) (2011) and the editor
of Culture, Identity and Politics: Papers from a Conference in Honour of
Erich Gruen (Antichthon 37 (2013)). He has written numerous articles
and chapters on Roman foreign policy, diplomacy and imperialism,
ancient international law, and the classical tradition.
RO M E A N D T H E T H I R D
M A C E D O N I A N WA R
PAU L J . B U RTO N
Australian National University, Canberra
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DOI: 10.1017/9781316221631
© Paul J. Burton 2017
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A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Burton, Paul J., 1969– author.
Title: Rome and the Third Macedonian War / Paul J. Burton,
Australian National University, Canberra.
Description: Cambridge ; New York : University Printing House, 2017. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017033142 | ISBN 9781107104440 (hardback)
Subjects: LCSH: Macedonian War, 3rd, 171–168 B.C. |
Rome–History–Republic, 510–30 B.C. | Macedonia–History.
Classification: LCC DG251.6 .B87 2017 | DDC 938/.08–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017033142
ISBN 978-1-107-10444-0 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
For Harper and Eliot
Contents
List of Figures page viii
1 Introduction 1
2 Rome and Macedon 18
3 The Last Years of Philip V 39
4 The Reign of Perseus 56
5 The Causes of the Third Macedonian War 78
6 The Third Macedonian War 124
7 Aftermath 173
Conclusion 193
Appendix A: The Embassy of Cn. Servilius Caepio, Ap. Claudius

Centho, and T. Annius Luscus to Macedon (Livy 42.25) 197
Appendix B: The Chronology of 172-171 and the Timing of the
Dispatch of Cn. Sicinius (pr. 172) to Epirus 202
Appendix C: Three Senatus Consulta 207
Appendix D: Two Failed Roman Assaults on Uscana in 170? 210
Appendix E: The Roman and Macedonian Positions near
Lake Ascuris and the Route of Marcius Philippus through the
Lower Olympus Range in 169 212
Appendix F: The ἐπιστόλιον of Scipio Nasica and the Battle of
Pydna in 168 214
Bibliography 219
Index 228
vii
Figures
6.1 Camp Sites on Mt. Metamorphosis (© W.K. Pritchett) page 150

6.2 Lower Olympos Range (© W.K. Pritchett) 152
6.3 The Turning Movement by Scipio Nasica (from N.G.L.
Hammond, “The Battle of Pydna,” Journal of Hellenic
Studies 104, p. 32 (slightly modified), reproduced with the
permission of the Hellenic Society) 164
6.4 The Roman and Macedonian First Positions before Pydna
(© Oxford University Press) 166
viii
Map 1 Illyria, Epirus, and Macedonia
Map 2 Thessaly
Map 3 Macedonia and Chalcidice (with merides)
1
Introduction
Polybius of Megalopolis, the second-century Greek historian,1 begins

his account of the rise of Rome to great-power status with a rhetorical
question: “is there anyone so worthless and lazy,” he writes, in his typical
combative fashion, “who would not wish to know how and under what
system of government nearly the entire world in less than fifty-three years
has fallen under the sole rule of the Romans – something that has never
happened before?” Perhaps less well known is his follow-up question: “or
again, is there anyone so passionately consumed by other spectacles or stud-
ies that he regards anything of greater importance than this knowledge?”2
The end point of this fifty-three year period, and the point at which the
Mediterranean world was changed forever, in his view, under the unipolar
control of Rome, was the destruction of the kingdom of Macedon in 168–
167 at the end of the so-called Third Macedonian War
The modern world indeed seems to have been “consumed by other …
studies.” As the final stage on Rome’s journey to becoming the Mediterra-
nean’s sole remaining superpower,3 the Third Macedonian War certainly
deserves wider currency than it presently enjoys among students of history.
Not only did it witness the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom – a
going concern since the seventh century, the cradle of the ruling houses
of the Temenids and Antigonids, birthplace of Philip II and Alexander
the Great, and the crucible for Greco-Macedonian empires stretching east
from the Balkans to the borders of modern Pakistan, and south to the
Nile’s first cataract. The war also altered a de facto Mediterranean balance of
1
All dates are bc unless otherwise stated.
2
τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥᾴθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι
γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα
καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός, τίς
δὲ πάλιν οὕτως ἐκπαθὴς πρός τι τῶν ἄλλων θεαμάτων ἢ μαθημάτων ὃς προυργιαίτερον ἄν τι
ποιήσαιτο τῆσδε τῆς ἐμπειρίας; (Polyb. 1.1.5–6).
3
Eckstein 2013: 89.
1
2 Rome and the Third Macedonian War
power that had existed, more or less unchanged, since the death of Alexander.
As Polybius recognized, what had been a Greco-Macedonian world for over
150 years had become, by 168, a Roman world. From this point on, he writes,
“the growth and progress of Roman domination was now complete, and in
addition, this was now the universal and inescapable fact of life – that from
now on all had to listen to the Romans and obey their orders.”4
Despite having rethought the structure of his Histories as writing pro-
gressed, adding a further ten books to his original plan of thirty, in order
to allow his readers to reflect and pass judgment on Roman rule between
167 and 146,5 Polybius never changed his mind about the world-historical
significance of Rome’s final victory over Macedon. One might, of course,
quibble with his view for a number of reasons, not least of which is his per-
sonal investment in the war and its outcome, having been an apparently
reluctant participant while it was taking place, and then a political victim
of its result. In 169, as Achaean League hipparchos (cavalry commander,
second in command to the annually elected Achaean commander-in-chief,
the stratēgos), Polybius tried to walk a fine line between actively supporting
the Roman war effort, and keeping League troops (and resources) out of
it.6 After the war was over, he was among the thousand Achaean “unrelia-
bles” who are said to have been rounded up and deported to exile in Italy.7
There, he was allowed to live in Rome, where he had access to eyewitnesses
to and participants in the recent war. As will be seen later, his own personal
experiences and those of his informants – to say nothing of his contempt
for the Antigonid kings of Macedon, especially the last one, Perseus –
may have clouded his historical judgment at times. On the other hand,
the historical reliability and integrity of Polybius’ account of the Third
Macedonian War can only be assessed on the basis of the few fragments of
it that remain. The lion’s share of what he originally wrote must be inferred
from our main surviving historical source for the war, the lacunose and
4
ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος ὁ πεντηκοντακαιτριετὴς εἰς ταῦτ᾽ ἔληγεν, ἥ τ᾽ αὔξησις καὶ προκοπὴ τῆς Ῥωμαίων
δυναστείας ἐτετελείωτο· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενον ἐδόκει τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ κατηναγκασμένον
ἅπασιν ὅτι λοιπόν ἐστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων
(Polyb. 3.4.2–3). Cf. Walbank 1974: 21: after Pydna, “Rome enjoyed virtual supremacy, and the bal-
ance of power was dead (as indeed Polybius wrote his Histories to demonstrate).”
5
Polyb. 3.4–5.6.
6
Rather than deliver Achaean League troops to Q. Marcius Philippus, the consul of 169, he merely
showed him a copy of the League decree authorizing the full muster. Polybius also secured the
authorization of Marcius (backed up by a senatus consultum of the previous year) to deny League
troops to Ap. Claudius Centho in Epirus (Polyb. 28.12–13; below, Chapter 6). For Polybius’ advo-
cacy of a “soft balancing” policy vis-à-vis Rome during the Third Macedonian War, see now Burton
2011: 183–4 and 213–16.
7
Paus. 7.10.7–12.
Introduction 3
deeply corrupted text of the ninth and final extant pentad of Livy’s Ab
Urbe Condita, which happens to survive in only a single manuscript.
The story of Rome’s rise from a regional Italian power to an international
power of the first rank has often been told and needs no extensive reca-
pitulation here.8 Her victories over Carthage in the First and Second Punic
Wars (264–241 and 218–201, respectively) upset the western Mediterranean
de facto balance of power in Rome’s favor. Some of the spoils from those
wars that fell to Rome included the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica,
as well as two Spanish provinces. Through a series of on-again, off-again
wars with her perennial Celtic foes in northern Italy, Rome had also come
into possession of most of the rich and fertile Po Valley across Italy’s north-
ern tier. The Romans’ attention had also been drawn eastward, toward
Illyria and Greece beyond. They fought and won two short wars in 229
and 219 against the Ardiaean rulers of Illyria on Macedon’s western flank.
As a result, and in contrast to the provincialization of the West, a group
of hyper-vigilant Roman friends, amici, dotted the western shoreline of
the Balkan peninsula, keeping the Roman senate abreast of developments
there, especially those that threatened to endanger their own, and, by
extension, Rome’s security and position.9
Internally, Rome remained an imperial Republic, as she had been for
centuries before her transmarine expansion. The traditional rule of the
mixed patricio-plebeian aristocracy had been affirmed and strengthened in
the crisis of the Second Punic War. In that conflict, Hannibal had brought
Rome to the edge of extinction, in Italy itself, but was kept at bay, and
finally defeated, by Rome’s aristocratic, senatorial generals. The enormous
manpower resources at their command in Italy helped immeasurably, of
course, but the conservative, tradition-minded citizen-soldiers did not see
it that way. For them, it was leaders like the brilliant tactician P. Cornelius
Scipio Africanus who had brought them through the crisis – and conferred
on them great spoils. The result was the popular cession of the major-
ity of foreign policy decision-making to senatorial control. Declarations
of war remained the people’s sovereign right, of course, and, as will be
seen shortly, the people still could deny a consul’s first attempt to have
an overseas war declared. But the day-to-day business of international
relations – the dispatching of envoys and commissioners, the sanctioning
of their activities and decisions, and the implementation of their advice
8
See, most recently (and brilliantly), Rosenstein 2012.
9
On international amicitia generally, see Burton 2003 and 2011. On Rome’s Illyrian amici in particu-
lar, see now Burton 2011: 136–41.
during the crucial escalation phase on the road to major wars – was now
in the hands of a relatively tiny group of 300 senators. The rise of the pro-
magistracy, designed to cope with the ever-increasing number of prouin-
ciae (assignments, or commands, rather than concrete geographical zones
of administration),10 made the traditional senatorial allotment of magis-
terial responsibilities a much higher-stakes procedure than before. Unlike
the magistrates with imperium – the consuls, the praetors – the proconsuls
and propraetors (to say nothing of the homines priuati cum imperio, such
as Scipio Africanus had been when he was assigned the Spanish command
in 210) were largely unaccountable to the people (as deputies of the senate
or the consuls, they did not have to render an account of their conduct
in office before the people at the end of their terms),11 and could dispense
favors to their friends, hangers-on, and subordinates, and deliver punish-
ments to their political rivals and enemies, at will. The stage had been set
by the victory of Scipio Africanus over Hannibal. The competition for
major war-time commands, through which one could achieve victory and
glory, and of course, vast wealth through spoliation and plunder, intensi-
fied, with predictably dire consequences, in the view of the ancient literary
sources, for Roman character and behavior.
The story of late Antigonid Macedon is more opaque. This is not
solely a function of our surviving literary sources’ hostility to Rome’s
Macedonian antagonists, and their lack of interest in Macedonian insti-
tutions,12 but also owes something to the minefield that comprises the
modern debate over Macedonian identity politics. In recent years, a
significant scholarly by-product of this debate, the “new Macedonian
history” movement, has revolutionized the study of the Macedonian
kingdom in antiquity.13 One area of research in particular has raised
important (and controversial) questions about the relationship of the
Macedonian king to the disparate parts of his kingdom, its various
administrative units/districts, and its cities. The traditional scenario
of a unified kingdom under the firm control of a strong, centralized
10
Richardson 2008.
11
Accountability of promagistrates to senate or consuls: Lintott 1999: 113–15; accountability of consuls
to the people: Polyb. 6.15.10.
12
Hatzopoulos 1996: 265.
13
Ma 2011: 524, describing Hatzopoulos 1996 and, more briefly, 2015. The main virtue of Hatzopoulos’
study is that it moves the discussion forward from the somewhat sterile debate over the nature of
the Macedonian monarchy – whether it was “constitutional,” and thus limited, or “autocratic,” and
therefore absolutist. For a recap, see Borza 1990: 231–52 and 1993: 31–5; Anson 2010: 9–10; King
2010: 374–5, 390–1 (all fairly partisan in favor of the autocratic position).
Introduction 5
monarchy has been complicated by more nuanced readings of the well-
known ancient literary and numismatic evidence in the light of recent
epigraphic discoveries. The corpus of Macedonian inscriptions, some of
them only recently published, may indeed point to a kind of two-tiered
Macedonian “commonwealth.” From at least the time of Antigonus
Gonatas (r. 277–239), these texts consistently refer to “the king and the
[community/land of the] Macedonians.”14 This has compelled schol-
ars to revisit the traditional dates assigned to coins struck by regional,
apparently autonomous mints in Macedonia. These can no longer be
assigned to the last days of Perseus’ reign, just before the Roman post-
war settlement, but clearly belong to as early as the reign of Philip V –
ca. 187, and perhaps even earlier.15 This, in turn, means that the division
of Macedonia into four self-governing, semi-autonomous administra-
tive units (merides) in 167 was not carried out by the Romans ex nihilo,
but in fact reflects regional divisions within the kingdom going back to
the reign of Philip II (Map 3).16 The people of the diverse Macedonian
poleis (in the Old Kingdom and Chalcidice),17 sympoliteiai (groups of
villages – komai – administratively joined to a metropolis, mostly in the
“New Lands” west of the Axius River),18 and ethnē (politeiai, “regional
groupings of rural communities,” mostly in Upper Macedonia),19
14
IG XI 4.1097 (from Antigonus [Doson] and the Macedones); IG XI 4.1102 (from “the commu-
nity of the Macedones,” τὸ κοινὸν Μ̣[ακε]δ̣ό̣ν̣[ων], to king Philip [V] ); SEG 29.795 (from Philip
[V] and the Macedones); SEG 12.373 ll. 35–55 (Antigonus [Gonatas] and “the other Greeks and
Macedonians,” τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ Μακεδόνας); SEG 12.373 ll. 18–34 (Antigonus [Gonatas]
and the Macedonians); SEG 12.373 ll. 1–17 (“Antigonus [Gonatas], the city of the Cassandreans,
and all the other Macedonians,” τὸν βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὴν Κασσανδρέων πόλιν καὶ
πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς Μακεδόνας πάντας; τὸν βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν καὶ
Μακεδόνας πάντας); SEG 12.374 (“Antigonus [Gonatas], the people of Pella, and the rest of the
land of the Macedonians,” τὸν βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ πρὸς Πελλαίους καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν χώραν
τὴν Μακεδόνων; τὸν βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ πρὸς Μακεδόνας). Discussion: Papazoglou 1983;
Hatzopoulos 1996: 219–20.
15
Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 1981: 240; Hammond 1989: 384–5, 388; Hatzopoulos 1996: 231–2, 245–7,
250–62 (dating Philip V’s minting reforms to 188/7 (260 n. 7)), and 2015: 337; Kremydi-Sicilianou
2007 and 2009; Dahmen 2010: 49 and n. 33. Meloni 1953: 75 n. 2 believed that Philip V tolerated
local minting “to increase circulation and the income from the mines.”
16
Hatzopoulos 1996: 42, 231–60, 473–86, and 2015: 321, 337. The traditional scholarly description of
the Roman merides (called regiones and partes by Livy) as “Republics” is misleading (Hatzopoulos
1996: 229).
17
18
Hatzopoulos 1996: 51–75 (the example of Gazoros and nearby komai, based on the testimony of SEG
45.763, dated to either 216/15 (or 215/14) or 174/3).
19
These were not tribal states, but “federations of self-governing villages and townships organized not
on a ‘gentilic’ but on a local, geographical, basis”; see Hatzopoulos 1996: 77–104 (quotation from
103); cf. 220 (whence the quotation in the main text).
enjoyed self-government at the local level, each with its own magistrates
(epistatēs, politarchēs, etc.), council (boulē), and assembly (ekklēsia).20
Polybius’ suggestion, that the Macedonians “were freed by the Romans
from significant civil strife and partisan massacres” that prevailed under
the kings, incidentally confirms this picture of local political disputes,
and thus, political self-determination beyond the complete control
or concern of the kings.21 These communities were by no means fully
autonomous – they had no independent foreign policy, for example,22
and the land they occupied was entirely subject to the king’s discre-
tion as “spear-won land”23 – but the king, so far as we can tell, did not
suppress their freedom of political expression.24 This stands to reason,
for the king was answerable and, in traditional Macedonian fashion,
accessible to his people. Twice a year, at Pella or Aegae (at the panegyreis
marking the vernal and autumnal equinoxes), the king, together with
“the leading men” (protoi, that is, his closest companions, Friends, and
commanders), sitting formally as a probouleutic Council (synedrion),
20
On the epistatēs/politarchēs as a local civic official, as opposed to a royal functionary (per Walbank
1984: 228; Hammond 1989: 391–5; Errington 1990: 230, 232–4), see Hatzopoulos 1996: 78–9 n. 2,
149–65, 372–429, 489, and 2015: 339. Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 1981 is agnostic on this point, but the
inscription she discusses (SEG 31.614) proves Holleaux’s (1897: 452–55) hunch that such officials
were not introduced by the Romans after Pydna (cf. also Hatzopoulos 1996: 134–38). On the local
boulai and ekklēsiai, see Hatzopoulos 1996: 129–49 and 2015: 321–2. A good summary of the struc-
ture and function of local government is Hatzopoulos 2015: 332–7.
21
Μακεδόνες … κατὰ πόλεις ἐκλυθέντες ἐκ μεγάλων στάσεων καὶ φόνων ἐμφυλίων διὰ τῆς [χάριτος,
ὠφέλειας, uel sim.] Ῥωμαίων (Polyb. 36.17.13). As far as I can tell, no scholar has invoked this evi-
dence in the debate over the pre-167 existence of the merides and the regional power structures
within them.
22
Hatzopoulos 1996: 365–9. For his powers see Arist. Pol. 1285b (who was, of course, in a good posi-
tion to know); Dem. 1.4; cf. 18.235 (who was motivated to exaggerate, but fundamentally agrees with
Aristotle).
23
Hammond 1989: 389, 1993: 19–21, and 2000: 157–8, with sources there cited. An inscription, SEG
13.403, records Philip V’s transfer of land in Greia (in Elimia or Eordaea) from a certain metoikos
Corragus to Nicanor the tetrarchēs and his men. This demonstrates as well as anything that all
Macedonian lands were entirely at the disposal of the Macedonian king. Discussion: Rostovtzeff
1941: 1471 n. 39; cf. Hatzopoulos 1996: 95–101, 435 n. 7, who, however, denies royal ownership
of all but the so-called “royal estates” (99–100 n. 4 and 2015: 333), and believes, despite the kings’
well-documented assertions to the contrary (mei regni, meae dicionis: Livy 42.41.13 [Philip V];
τὰ βασιλικά: Plut. Alex. 15.4 [Alexander the Great]), that the monarch was a mere caretaker of
Macedonian communal property – a mere “administrator of Crown property [but] not its real
owner” (433).
24
There is no evidence for the king interfering in the internal political affairs of the communities,
unless the political leaders and their families that Philip V deported from the cities to the barbarian
wilds of Emathia, discussed at Polyb. 23.10.1-11, is an oblique reference to stasis-correction. But it
seems clear from the passage that the king was less worried about internal disputes than the poten-
tial defection of the cities and their leaders during his upcoming war against Rome. This is, once
again (and incidentally), good evidence for the politarchs and epistatai being locally chosen officials
rather than royal functionaries (above, n. 20; the passage is oddly overlooked by Hatzopoulos).
Introduction 7
consulted the will of the people in plenary sessions of the common
assembly (koinē ekklēsia) of the Macedonians, in the first instance a
civilian (as opposed to a military) organ of state.25
This reinterpretation of the organization and power structures in the
kingdom of Macedon has forced a reconsideration of passages in the lit-
erary sources that have conventionally been overlooked and/or deliber-
ately misinterpreted/emended to fit preconceived notions about the
nature of the Macedonian state, and the level of innovation achieved by
the Romans in the settlement of Macedonia in 167. The preamble to the
treaty between Carthage and Philip V, struck in 215, and copied verba-
tim by Polybius, refers to the Macedonian side of the agreement as “king
Philip, the Macedonians, and the allies.”26 The Isthmian decree, declaring
the freedom of the Greeks in 196, refers to the Roman conquest of “king
Philip and the Macedonians.”27 Closer to the concerns of this study is a
passage in which Livy happens to mention delegations of the Macedonian
cities (legationes ciuitatium Macedoniae) arriving at Citium in 171, where
Perseus was busy assembling his forces on the eve of the Third Macedonian
War. The ambassadors offered the king as much money and grain as they
could supply for the war effort; the king duly thanked them, but refused
the cities’ offers, instead requisitioning from them wagons to transport his
vast war materiel.28
Taken together, and in light of the epigraphic and numismatic mater-
ial, the evidence paints a far more complex picture of the nature of the
Macedonian state than was apparent less than a half-century ago. The
kingdom of Macedon was neither a fully integrated, unified state subject
to the absolutist rule of a powerful king, nor a republican federation, such
25
Hatzopoulos 1996: 261–322 (assembly), 323–59, 491–2 (council); cf. Hatzopoulos 2015: 331.
Errington 1990: 220 doubts that the assembly had a political function, but this is probably due
to gaps in our evidence (per Hatzopoulos). It is clear from Hatzopoulos’ discussion that outside
the twice-yearly scheduled assemblies, the council carried on the day-to-day business of the king-
dom, and when major crises supervened requiring popular consultation (e.g. when a king died),
an assembly of available and accessible (i.e. nearby) Macedonians had to be hastily convened. If
the crisis occurred on campaign far away from Macedonia (as when Alexander the Great died at
Babylon in 323), then the assembly would consist largely of Macedonian soldiers, lending it the
appearance of an exclusively military character. But it is equally clear that, if the crisis hit within
the kingdom itself (as when Alexander succeeded to the throne upon the assassination of his father
Philip II), the assembly would be summoned from among whatever Macedonians were nearby,
whether under arms or not.
26
Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς … καὶ Μακεδόν[ες] καὶ τῶν σύμμαχ[οι] (Polyb. 7.9.1).
27
βασιλέα Φίλιππον καὶ Μακεδόνας (Polyb. 18.46.5). Many other passages from Polybius, Livy, and
Diodorus are cited in the notes at Hatzopoulos 1996: 219–20, 261–2 n. 3; cf. Walbank 1984: 226;
Hammond 1989: 382, 1993: 15, and 2000: 146.
28
Livy 42.53.2–4.
as the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, but an amalgam of the two nestled
within a bifurcated state framework:
The kingdom of Macedon was constitutional and national as regards the
relations between the king and the “Macedones,” in his realm, and …
the rule of the king over the subject peoples of the spear-won lands was
absolute.29
The epistatai and politarchai were no less civic magistrates than the may-
ors of modern France or Greece … [T]hey were answerable to the cen-
tral authorities and even to their regional representatives … This situation
results from the “federal” character of the Macedonian state and is inde-
pendent of the monarchical … form of the central government.30
The royal versus the republican form of government is quite another ques-
tion or criterion of constitutional distinction than that of the unitary versus
the federal form of state. Both the King and the ethnos, the Makedones, rep-
resented the central authorities as against the particular cities and the other
territorial units which constituted the Macedonian communities.31
None of this necessarily means, however, that the late Antigonids were sig-
nificantly less powerful than Philip II had been in the first half of his reign,
nor was Macedon a mere rump state, lacking in resources or real power
in the Hellenistic East.32 True, the Antigonid kings could not possibly call
upon state resources as enormous as the Ptolemies in Egypt could,33 nor was
the kingdom of Macedon capable of fielding as many men as the polyglot
armies of the Seleucids at their height.34 Nevertheless, as we will see, thanks
to his father Philip V ’s and his own careful husbanding of Macedonia’s
resources over the course of twenty-five years, Perseus had access to stock-
piles of arms, money, and men, including eight million bushels of grain,
and enough money to employ ten thousand mercenaries for ten years. By
171, the king was able to field an army of 43,000 men – perhaps larger than
Alexander the Great himself ever commanded.35 L. Aemilius Paullus, the
victor of Pydna, captured 6,000 talents of gold and silver from the royal
Macedonian treasury, and displayed several hundred million sesterces in
29
Hammond 2000: 159.
30
31
Hatzopoulos 1996: 491 (emphasis in the original); cf. Hatzopoulos 2015: 326.
32
“A busted flush,” as one of the referees put it in his/her report on my original proposal for this study.
33
Walbank 1984: 225, 228. According to Plutarch (Aem. 20.6), Perseus’ annual income was 200 tal-
ents. However, this was derived from land taxes, exclusive of revenues from the mines, port duties,
the sale of timber and pitch, etc. Errington 1990: 223. According to Diodorus (16.8.6), the mines
accounted for an annual revenue stream of a thousand talents under Philip II.
34
Antiochus III fielded an army of 68,000 at Raphia in 217 (Polyb. 79.13), and perhaps as many as
70,000 at Magnesia in 190 (Livy 37.40, 44).
35
See below, Chapter 5, p. 126.
Introduction 9
his triumph over Perseus.36 This also means, incidentally, that for all the
emphasis the “new Macedonian history” places on institutions, regional
units, local autonomy, and wider social forces, it remains the case that
individual kings significantly influenced the shape and destiny of their
kingdom, its resources, and its ends.
The late Antigonids’ ace in the pack – the Macedonian phalanx –
deserves more than a passing mention, for this is what the Seleucids and
the Ptolemies lacked, and, by his own admission, gave Paullus the fright
of his life at Pydna.37 For its initial impact, the Macedonian field army in
this period still relied on the Macedonian cavalry – Alexander the Great’s
weapon of choice – consisting of the elite sacred squadrons (sacrae alae)
and the royal cavalry (regii equites), which, along with the regular cav-
alry, numbered around 3,000 in total.38 In set-piece battles, as at Pydna in
168, the Macedonian cavalry were deployed on the right, while Macedon’s
allies, usually Thessalians or Thracians, held the left. The phalanx itself
typically consisted of 16,000 men (although at Pydna, Perseus at first
deployed a double phalanx of 12,000 men each), all native Macedonians.
They carried the deadly sarissa, the long pike, which measured 16 feet or
more and weighed up to 14 pounds, and round shields 30 inches in diam-
eter by means of a strap, which allowed them to wield the sarissa with
both hands. Well-trained and lightly armed, the phalangites could move
fast against opposing armies, their long sarissae nullifying the enemy’s
attempts to fight at close range. Deployed defensively, the phalanx was
almost invincible; no soldier or horse wanted to go near the bristling wall
of pikes. Meanwhile, the enemy would be steadily ground down by waves
of attacks by the Macedonian cavalry, mixed units of skirmishers and arch-
ers, and the peltasts, an elite light-armed infantry unit of around 5,000
Macedonians which included the agēma, a hardened, older elite group,
all armed with sarissae and smaller round shields 24 inches in diameter.
36
Polyb. 18.35.4 (gold and silver). Vell. Pat. 1.9.6 records HS 200m, Livy 45.40.1 (from Valerius Antias),
120m, and Plin, NH 33.56, 300m (see now Briscoe 2012: 747–8). Paullus’ triumph, which took three
days to complete, displayed the massive resources of the kingdom to the astonishment of all (Diod.
Sic. 31.8.10–12; Livy 45.40.1–8; Plut. Aem. 32.2–34.8). Rostovtzeff 1941: 252 recognized that the king-
dom “was certainly prosperous in the reigns of Antigonus Gonatas and his successors,” and (623)
“the resources of Macedonia during the reigns both of Philip [V] and Perseus were still large. Both
rulers did their best to develop them and derived an ample revenue from the [kingdom].” See also
Gruen 1982: 259 (“the state had evidently accumulated staggering wealth in a mere thirty years”).
For what it is worth, Polybius says (31.22.3) that Paullus died in (relative) poverty, even though he
had access to the “massive treasure” (μεγίστων θησαυρῶν) of Macedon.
37
Polyb. 29.17.1; Plut. Aem. 19.2. Their lack of access to a reliable supply of native Macedonian troops
always put the Seleucids and Ptolemies at a disadvantage.
38
Livy 42.51.9 (3,000), 58.8–9 (regii equites, sacrae alae).
In attack mode, the phalanx was equally formidable, the relatively light
weight of the phalangite panoply contributing to its momentum, which
intensified its impact during the initial clash with the opposing, typic-
ally more heavily armed enemy infantry. That initial success could only
be sustained, however, provided the ground was smooth enough and the
men kept their tight formation, one of the keys to the phalanx’s success. If
the formation broke up, opposing soldiers could insinuate themselves into
the gaps, where the phalangites’ light armour, wicker shields, and daggers
were no match for the heavily armed legionaries or hoplites armed with
broad swords. As will be seen later – spoiler alert – at Pydna, unfortunately
for Perseus, despite a fortuitous beginning, when the Macedonians almost
effortlessly held off the Romans by standing their ground, the phalanx
soon lost its formation by pursuing their advantage and advancing across
uneven terrain, leading to disaster.39
Thus far the circumstances of the major protagonists. Something should
also be said about the supporting cast in the story that follows. Ptolemaic
Egypt and the Seleucid empire (often referred to, in overly reductionist
fashion, as “Syria,” or “the Syrian kingdom” after its urbanized, Hellenized
heartland) emerged, alongside Macedon, as two of the three major post-
Alexander Hellenistic kingdoms. These three major powers, differently
resourced and strategically positioned in such a way that none was ever
able to undermine one or both of the others completely, lived in a state of
grudging de facto balance of power, and were in an almost constant state
of war with each other.40 In the period covered by this study, Ptolemaic
Egypt, in addition to having to deal with periods of native revolt, expe-
rienced unfortunate periods of weakness at the royal center, with child-
kings, feuding siblings, and powerful regents and advisors undermining
the kingdom’s ability to grapple with its perennial enemies the Seleucids,
particularly over possession of Coele-Syria (roughly modern Lebanon,
Israel, and Palestine). The Seleucids, by contrast, enjoyed a resurgence in
its fortunes after a long period of instability, beginning with the ascension
to the throne of Antiochus III (r. 223–187). This vigorous 20-year-old went
on to reconquer Alexander the Great’s empire to the borders of India and
reclaim his ancestral possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace. His defeat by
Rome in the Syrian War (192–188), discussed later, was a minor setback
by comparison to the restored fortunes of the Seleucid house for which
39
On the Antigonid army see now Sekunda 2010: 459–64.
40
In the 163 years between Alexander’s death and 160, there were only around five years in which none
of the major kingdoms was involved in war: Eckstein 2006: 83.
Introduction 11
he bears responsibility. His son and eventual successor, Antiochus IV, was
equally energetic in expanding Seleucid power and, as will be seen, may
have played a major role in causing Rome significant consternation about
developments in the eastern Mediterranean in the mid-170s.
One area of Asia Minor the Seleucids were unable to restore to their
control was the territorially small kingdom centered on the citadel of
Pergamum in northwestern Anatolia. The dynasts of Pergamum had bro-
ken away from the Seleucid empire during the period of chaos before
Antiochus III’s accession to the throne, but even Antiochus was unable
to bring the ruling Attalid house to heel. In the fourth decade of his rule,
Attalus I made a bold and fateful move, aligning his kingdom with an
interloper in eastern affairs, the western state of Rome, currently fighting
for its life against Hannibal of Carthage. In winter 209/8, Attalus became a
Roman amicus, “friend,” and joined Rome’s fight against the Macedonian
king Philip V, who had joined Hannibal in his war against Rome. The
Pergamene kingdom was subsequently able to use its relationship with
Rome as leverage in regional conflicts against local second-tier competitors,
against the Seleucid empire, and against Macedon itself, of course. After
receiving significant territorial gains in Thrace and Asia Minor from Rome
in the settlement following the Syrian War, Pergamum, under Eumenes II,
the son of Attalus I, made extensive territorial gains against regional rivals
Bithynia and Pontus.
In addition to Pergamum, Asia Minor was dominated by its main rival
kingdom of Bithynia, located on the western end of the south coast of
the Black Sea. It, too, was a kingdom that broke away from the control
of the major Hellenistic powers, and in this period opposed Rome’s allies,
especially Pergamum, rather than Rome directly. Other minor Anatolian
states drift in and out of the story. The Galatians were eastern Celts who
invaded Greece and Asia Minor in the 280s and 270s and eventually settled
in central northern Anatolia at the invitation of Nicomedes I of Bithynia.
Attalus I famously fended off a Galatian attack, declared himself king of
Pergamum, and commemorated his achievement in the famous statue
group featuring “the Dying Gaul.” The Galatians remained a good source
of mercenaries for many states down to the period covered here. The island
republic of Rhodes, off the southwest coast of Asia Minor, enjoyed diplo-
matic relations with Rome, according to one source, from ca. 306. During
the Hellenistic period, the Rhodians fiercely protected their independ-
ence from the major Hellenistic powers but remained steadfastly loyal to
Ptolemaic Egypt. The citadel and harbor of Rhodes famously survived an
attempt to end Rhodian autonomy and the Ptolemaic connection once
and for all when Demetrius, the son of Antiogonus the One-Eyed, unsuc-
cessfully besieged them for a year, earning the ironic nickname Poliorcetes,
“the Besieger.” The famous Colossus of Rhodes, a giant statue of Helios
built to commemorate the victory, bestrode the harbor of Rhodes until it
collapsed in an earthquake in 227/6. The Rhodians instinctively sided with
Rome in its wars against Philip V and the Syrian War, earning significant
gains in southern Asia Minor as a reward for their services in the latter war.
Mainland Greece in this period was dominated by federal leagues, con-
federations of several states (city-states as well as rural groupings, ethnē)
bound together by ethnicity, custom, religion, as well as geography, poli-
tics, and for the purposes of defensive advantage or geostrategic balanc-
ing. The Aetolian League had emerged from its heartland in northwest
Greece on the north coast of Gulf of Corinth as a political force to be
reckoned with after confronting Celtic invaders in Greece in the 270s and
defending the sacred shrine of Delphi against their attacks. The Delphic
Amphictyony, a religious league of twelve states of varying member-
ship that managed the sanctuary (including the regions of Malis, Locris,
Phocis, and Phthiotic Achaea in central Greece), enrolled the Aetolians as
its most powerful member shortly thereafter. Aetolian influence expanded
to Phocis and Locris and into the Peloponnese as well. This set the stage
for their major rivalry, especially visible in the period covered here, with
the Achaean League. The Aetolians, like Attalus I in 209/8, made a fate-
ful decision in late 211 and became Rome’s first overseas ally, signing a
treaty agreeing to participate in Rome’s war against Philip V. The Aetolians
and their allies were traditional rivals of the Macedonians for various rea-
sons, not least of which in this period because of the Macedonian alli-
ance with Aetolia’s regional rival the Achaean League. As will be seen later,
the Aetolians felt that the Romans left them in the lurch during the war
against Philip, and made peace with him in 206 without consulting Rome,
which caused the Romans deep resentment. Subsequent relations between
Rome and the League were very rocky, with mutual accusations of bad
faith made often and in public, until the Aetolians invited Antiochus III to
liberate Greece – from Roman oppression, it was understood. The Romans
defeated the Aetolians in the war that followed and their power was much
reduced.
The contemporary affairs of the Aetolians’ rival, the Achaean League,
are particularly well documented thanks to the survival of the history
written by one of its major second-century politicians, Polybius of
Megalopolis. The League was transformed in the late 280s from a small
confederacy of twelve cities in the northern Peloponnese to a significant
Introduction 13
power after the collapse of Demetrius the Besieger’s power in Greece.
The League expanded its power throughout the Peloponnese under
the formidable statesman Aratus of Sicyon. After a long period of
opposing Macedonian power in the Peloponnese, the Achaeans allied
with Antigonus III Doson in 224, and went on to side with Philip V
against Rome in the First Macedonian War. Under great pressure from
the Romans, the League abandoned the Macedonian alliance in 198.
Throughout the period that followed, the Achaeans completed their
conquest of the Peloponnese while the Romans looked the other way.
A significant bone of contention that caused endless irritation to the
Roman senate was the issue of the status within the League of Sparta, its
most reluctant member. During this time, according to Polybius, there
emerged different factions of Achaean statesmen divided on the issue
of the appropriate stance for the Greek states to adopt toward Rome,
ranging from independence to subservience. These divisions seemed to
intensify in all the major Greek states and federations for which any evi-
dence survives during the 170s in the run-up to the Third Macedonian
War.
Other mainland Greek states that make an appearance in what follows
include the Boeotians, who were united in a federated league under the
dominance of Thebes in this period. The cities were apparently riven by
factionalism and weighed down by a significant debt crisis in the 170s.
North-central Greece was dominated by the Thessalians (Map 2), whose
rich, fertile plains were, to their great misfortune, an object of envy and
plunder, and often the scene of battle, but which also allowed them to
become great horsemen. Organized as a league in the fifth century, all of
Thessaly fell under Macedonian control, where it remained until it was
lost to Philip V in the Roman settlement ending the Second Macedonian
War. Also lost to Philip in that war were the Perrhaebians, located on
Thessaly’s western border with Macedonia (Map 2), and previously sub-
ject to Macedon since the time of Philip II. In this period, they were an
independent federated state, but were suffering from a severe debt cri-
sis. To the southwest of Thessaly were the Dolopians (Map 2), a tribal
people under the contested control of Macedon and the Aetolian League
in the period covered here. As will be seen, they played a crucial role in
the list of pretexts for the war against Perseus provided to the Romans.
To the Dolopians’ east were the Athamanians (Map 1), who had broken
away from Epirote control in the mid-third century, and reached their
zenith in the period covered here under their greatest king, Amynander.
Sandwiched between Thessaly and Boeotia south of the Malian Gulf were
Phocis and Locris, in this period both federated states under the domin-
ance of the Aetolian League.
Turning to the west coast of the Balkan peninsula (Map 1), the north-
ern areas were dominated by the Illyrian Ardiaei, who were just one among
many tribal peoples identified as Illyrians who lived around the east coast
of the Adriatic. The Ardiaei provided the proximate causes for Rome’s first
direct military interventions in mainland Greece in 229 and 219. They were
semi-Hellenized peoples to lesser or greater degrees, much like the inhabit-
ants of the wild country of Upper Macedonia to their southeast. The Romans
established relations of informal amicitia, “friendship,” with several key cit-
ies and tribal groups along the Adriatic coast as a result of the Illyrian wars,
not setting up a Roman protectorate as such, as is usually assumed, but a
string of friendly states who could keep Rome apprised of events transpiring
across from Italy’s eastern shores. South of Illyria was the region of Epirus,
one of whose tribal groupings, the Molossians, established a monarchy in
the early fourth century. They tied their fortunes to the Macedonian ruling
house in 357 when Philip II married Olympias, a niece of the Molossian king
Arrybas; the most famous issue of the marriage was Alexander the Great. Later
Molossian kings, Alexander, brother of Olympias, and Pyrrhus, grandson of
Alexander, both launched unsuccessful campaigns of western conquest, in
Italy and Sicily, in 334–330 and 280–275, respectively. Alexander apparently
entered diplomatic relations with Rome while Pyrrhus defeated the Romans
several times in battle, but these victories were “Pyrrhic,” that is, too costly to
his expeditionary army when balanced against the staunchly loyal pan-Italian
Roman alliance system and the nearly inexhaustible supply of troops for the
Roman legions that resulted from it. At the beginning of the period covered
here, the Molossian monarchy had just been deposed and a federal league
established, which went on to support Macedon in its wars with Rome, dur-
ing which it fell victim to Aetolian expansion. Epirus’ southern neighbors the
Acarnanians were also deeply affected by the fall of the Molossian monarchy,
setting up a new federal league centered on the capital Leucas. In the period
covered here, the Acarnanian League fell afoul of Rome by siding with Teuta
in the First Illyrian War and attacking Corcyra, and thereafter siding with
Macedon against Rome’s ally Aetolia, Acarnania’s neighbor and perennial
enemy. By the 170s, the League, as in Boeotia and elsewhere, was riven by
pro- and anti-Roman factions.
Finally, the peripheral peoples of the Greek world play a significant role
in what follows. The territory of the Thracians extended in an arc from the
Hellespontine region of the northern Aegean coast up around the northern
reaches of Macedonia to the Danube and west to the Axius (Vardar) river
Introduction 15
(Map 3).41 Significant numbers of Thracian tribes had been conquered and
loosely controlled by Philip II and Alexander the Great, and in the division
of the Hellenistic kingdoms that followed Alexander’s death, Thrace fell
to Lysimachus, one of the great king’s generals. After Lysimachus’ death
in 281, several Thracian dynasts established minor kingdoms, and despite
Antiochus III’s attempt, ultimately frustrated by the Romans, to reassert
Seleucid ancestral claims in European Thrace in the 190s, the Thracian
interior remained firmly in the orbit of Antigonid Macedon as a source of
allies, manpower, and plunder. Across the Danube from Thracian lands lay
the territory of the south-eastern Germanic tribe, the Bastarnae. They were
virtually unknown until the period covered here, when they entered dip-
lomatic relations with Philip V and Perseus, who attempted to use them
against the Dardani and perhaps Rome. The Dardani, an Illyrian people
on Macedonia’s north-western tier (Map 1), were involved in a perennial
struggle for independence from Antigonid control. Right at the beginning
of our period, in 229, they had soundly defeated Demetrius II, who died
shortly afterward.
* * *
Finally, a word about the format of this study and the scholarship upon
which it is based. A book on the Third Macedonian War hardly requires
extensive recapitulation of Roman–Macedonian relations, or a full
account of Rome’s interventions in the East prior to the 170s. It neverthe-
less seemed appropriate, for context, to provide a summary of these events
in the second and third chapters, as well as a final chapter and conclusion
describing the consequences of the war with Perseus. These are compara-
tively brief and largely devoid of reviews of points of controversy and cita-
tions of earlier scholarship, for which I refer readers to the standard works.
The heart of the book is contained in Chapters 4 through 6, which, along
with their associated appendices, contain the kind of exhaustive scholarly
apparatus one would expect in an academic monograph. This is not, how-
ever, due only to their containing the subject matter proper of the book,
but also because this is the first study of its kind in English to attempt a full
narrative and analysis of the Third Macedonian War, and, by extension,
the reign of Perseus.
41
Abrupolis, who figures prominently among the pretexts for the war against Perseus, was king of
the Sapaei, a Thracian tribe inhabiting the northern Aegean coastal region near the Greek city of
Abdera.
The last comparable work appeared in 1953 in Italian – Piero Meloni’s
masterful and deeply learned Perseo e la fine della monarchia Macedone. I
cannot pretend to have done as skillful and painstaking a job as Meloni
did, and not just for reasons of narrative economy and the constraints of
modern publishers’ budgets, although these have inevitably played a role in
shaping the book. In any case, I think enough time has gone by since Perseo,
and enough new discoveries, scholarly reinterpretations, and advances in
the field of Macedonian studies generally have taken place, to justify a fresh
look in a reasonably similar level of detail. Also, unlike Meloni, the world
has only recently lived through a phase of history incomparably rich in
parallels with the period of the Third Macedonian War and its aftermath, in
which a single great power (Rome/the United States) experienced its “uni-
polar moment” of geopolitical passivity (188–171/ad 1990s–2001), before
being shocked into action by threats perceived or made to seem existen-
tial (the resurgence of Macedonian power/9-11), and then yielded to the
“hegemon’s temptation” to intervene with force (Third Macedonian War/
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars), and without restraint (Roman atrocities during
171–170, reprisals during 168–167/torture at Guantánamo Bay, CIA “black
sites,” Abu Ghraib Prison, the extensive use of drones).42 As will be seen in
the final chapter and conclusion to this study, Polybius identified the period
that followed the Roman victory over Perseus and withdrawal from the
East as a time of “trouble and disturbance,”43 when the Mediterranean was
destabilized by micro-imperialisms, and Rome was compelled to fight a ser-
ies of wars to reassert its authority. This has an eerie resonance with the situ-
ation that followed the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in ad 2011, when
the “threshold of asymmetry” had seemingly been firmly established, but
ISIL-ISIS-Da’esh emerged to challenge it.44 The latter, like the pretender
Andriscus conquering all of Macedon within four or five months after years
of trying, scored a huge, unlikely success (sweeping away the Iraqi defense
forces, and seizing a huge swathe of northern Iraq), but only after slow,
mostly secretive beginnings (in the mid-2000s ad), and only seizing inter-
national attention in ad 2012 as a side-show to the Syrian civil war. These
events prompted fresh superpower interventions, the “Fourth Macedonian
War” in the Roman case, airstrikes, and the re-entry of “military advisors
and support staff” in Iraq, in the case of the US.
42
On Rome’s “unipolar moment,” see Eckstein 2006: 1–2, 306, 314, and 2008: 1, 25–7, 336–81. On the
“hegemon’s temptation,” see Eckstein 2010: 242–3, and 2013: 90, following Layne 1993: 28.
43
ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις (Polyb. 3.4.12).
44
On the “threshold of asymmetry,” see Eckstein 2013: 91.
Introduction 17
In addition to Meloni’s work, I am, of course, also indebted to those
shorter and specialized accounts of the reign of Perseus and the Third
Macedonian War that appeared before and after Meloni’s monograph.
The seminal works of Niese, De Sanctis, and Pareti remain particularly
important to the study of the period, as do the more specialized studies
of Kromayer, Heiland, Helly, and Pritchett, among others. The accounts
of Benecke and Derow in CAH1 and CAH2, respectively, are distinguished
by their erudition and readability, and the final chapters of Hammond’s
History of Macedonia III (1988) provide the most up-to-date and informa-
tive account available in English. More recently, in fact as the first draft of
this book was nearing completion, Robin Waterfield’s Taken at the Flood,
a popularizing history of Roman intervention in the East between 229 and
146, appeared, containing several chapters relevant to the topic.45 But the
“without which this book could not have been written” laurel must go
to John Briscoe’s recent monumental Commentary on Livy, Books 41–45
(2012). This tome, by far the single most cited work in the pages that fol-
low, has made the study of the Third Macedonian War and the reign of
Perseus infinitely less perilous than it has hitherto been. I hope that this
book marks only the beginning of a post-Briscoe resurgence of scholarly
interest in its subject matter.
45
Waterfield 2014. Its utility, for the present study, is reduced by its dependence on older scholarship
and rather unsophisticated treatment of the primary sources; for a review, see Burton 2015a.
2
Rome and Macedon
It is sometimes easy to forget that the Romans and Macedonians were part
of a vast, interconnected world, united by proximity to the Mediterranean
Sea. The two states did not develop in isolation, but had a long history
of interaction well before their first conflict in the late third century.
In the early months of 323, Arrian reports, a Roman embassy appeared
before Alexander the Great at Babylon.1 This unlikely tale alleges that the
Macedonian conqueror, struck by their orderly appearance and straight-
forward manner of speaking, and learning about their republican political
institutions, sagely predicted greatness for the Romans.2 There also exists
a report that Alexander, and later Demetrius the Besieger, demanded that
the Romans rein in some pirates from Etruscan Antium, who regularly
harassed the western coastline of Greece.3 Alexander’s uncle on his moth-
er’s side, Alexander I of Epirus (“the Molossian”), invaded southern Italy
in 334 and struck a treaty with Rome in 332, while engaged in operations
against the Lucanians and Bruttians on behalf of the Tarentines. Livy, our
main source for these events, is deeply skeptical that Alexander would
1
Arr. Anab. 7.15.5.
2
This torch-passing story seems too good to be true. Arrian refused to vouch for it, saying he could
find no trace of it in his best sources, Aristobulus and Ptolemy, nor, even more astonishingly if it
were true, in any Roman source. Arrian also thought it unlikely that the Romans would have sent
a delegation to a foreign and distant king from whom they had nothing to gain or fear (Anab.
7.15.6). Arrian’s authorities for the story, Aristus and Asclepiades, are little more than names to us
now and probably lived long after Rome was well known to the Greeks. On the other hand, the tale
apparently appeared in Cleitarchus (cf. Plin. NH 3.57), who was perhaps writing early enough (i.e.
before Rome’s involvement in the wider Mediterranean world) that he lacked a motive to make it up
(unless, of course, POxy LXXI.4808 proves that Cleitarchus was writing in the late third/early second
century; discussion: Prandi 2012). But it is in any case hard to explain why the story does not appear
in the extant sources that used Cleitarchus’ lost account (Justin and Diodorus Siculus). Bosworth
1988: 83–93 (with other literature cited at 83 n. 96) believes the tradition of a Roman embassy to
Alexander is based on fact, reported by Cleitarchus, but that the reaction of Alexander, and his pre-
diction of future Roman greatness, were later elaborations by Aristus and Asclepiades.
3
Strab. 5.3.5 (C232).
18
Rome and Macedon 19
have adhered to the pact: had he not been killed in action against the
Lucanians, the historian repeatedly notes, the Epirote king would eventu-
ally have turned his arms against Rome as well.4 Livy is of course looking
ahead to the famous Italian invasion of Alexander’s nephew and successor,
Pyrrhus of Epirus, himself a cousin of Alexander the Great. The man for
whom the term “Pyrrhic Victory” is named – he won many battles against
the Romans, but lost too many men in the process – introduced Rome
to war elephants and the Macedonian phalanx, as well as to Hellenistic
diplomatic protocols.5 Word of the Roman victory over the Epirote king
soon reached the courts of the great Hellenistic kings, and in 273, the
Egyptian pharaoh Ptolemy II Philadelphus sought, and was granted,
amicitia, “friendship,” with the Romans.6
“The Storm Clouds Appearing from the West”

In 229 and again in 219, the Romans fought two short campaigns in Illyria,
just across the Adriatic Sea from Italy on the northwest coast of the Balkan
peninsula. Polybius marked the significance of the first Roman crossing of
the Adriatic in arms with an editorial comment: “this event should not be
passed over in silence, but must be studied with great care by those wish-
ing to grasp accurately both the purpose of this work and the formation
and growth of Roman dominion.”7 The first war was directed against the
Illyrian Ardiaei and their queen, Teuta, as a consequence of their state-
sponsored piratical activities against Italian shipping in the Adriatic.8 The
second was provoked by the aggression of Demetrius of Pharos, who had
been given a portion of the Ardiaean kingdom as a reward for his friend-
ship with and loyalty to Rome during the first war.9 According to Polybius,
4
Livy 8.3.6, 17.9–10, 24; cf. Just. Epit. 12.2; Gell. NA 17.21.33.
5
Plut. Pyrrh. 15.1–26.2; Livy Per. 13, 14; Dion. Hal. 20.1–12.
6
Dio fr. 41; Zon. 8.6.11; Dion. Hal. 20.14.1–2; Val. Max. 4.3.9; Just. Epit. 18.2.9; App. Sic. 1; Eutrop.
2.15; Livy Per. 14. On the many problems surrounding the embassy, see Heuss 1933: 28–9; Holleaux
1935: 60–83; Dahlheim 1968: 141–46; Errington 1971: 8–9; Gruen 1984: 62–3, 673–5; Grainger 2002:
5–8; Eckstein 2008: 201–2; Burton 2011: 107–8. On Roman contacts with the East and eastern inter-
est in Rome before the late third century, see Walbank 1963: 2–3.
7
ἅπερ οὐ παρέργως, ἀλλὰ μετ᾿ ἐπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀληθινῶς τήν τε πρόθεσιν
τὴν ἡμετέραν συνθεάσασθαι καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ κατασκευὴν τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας (Polyb.
2.2.2).
8
Polyb. 2.2–12; App. Ill. 7; Dio 12.49; Zon. 8.19. The causes of the war are discussed in Harris
1979: 195–7; Gruen 1984: 17, 56–7, 360–8 (esp. 365–6); Eckstein 2008: 29–60; Waterfield 2014: 13
(bizarrely concluding that the Romans, because they were preoccupied with the Gallic War, “were
almost looking for a casus belli” against the Illyrians). On the ancient Illyrians, see now Dzino 2010.
9
Polyb. 3.16, 18–19; App. Ill. 8; Dio 12.53; Zon. 8.20. The causes of the war are discussed in Gruen
1984: 368–73; Eckstein 2008: 60–76; Burton 2011: 262–7.
the Romans’ decision to take action against Demetrius in 219, even though
he had been technically in breach of the treaty ending the first war for
several years by then, was motivated not just by the need to secure Italy’s
eastern flank before the impending war with Hannibal and Carthage, but
also as a hedge against the increasingly prosperous Macedonian kingdom
under its vigorous and dashing new teenage king, Philip V. Demetrius had
fought alongside Philip V’s predecessor and cousin, Antigonus III Doson,
at the Battle of Sellasia in 222.10 That smashing victory, which resulted in
the downfall of Cleomenes III of Sparta, was, according to Polybius, the
reason that Demetrius was “pinning all of his hopes on the royal house
of Macedon” in his upcoming conflict with the Romans.11 In this he was
to be disappointed. Philip was far too preoccupied with his war against
the Aetolian League (the so-called “Social War”), and then the siege of
Ambracus in Acarnania, to be of any help in Demetrius’ war.12 Following
his defeat at the hands of the Roman legions, Demetrius nevertheless fled
to Macedon where he spent the remainder of his life at Philip’s court.13
Although, according to Polybius, Rome had given some thought to
Macedon in launching the war against Demetrius,14 this was probably the
first time that Philip had given any thought to Rome. As a 9- or 10-year-
old, in 229, he may have overheard discussions at court of Rome’s recent
victory over Illyrian Ardiaei, kin to the inland Illyrians, with whom the
Macedonians waged perpetual warfare on their northwestern borderlands.
He may even have heard stories or read about Rome’s epic twenty-three-
year struggle with and victory over the Carthaginians in the First Punic
War (264–241), which catapulted Rome into the exclusive club of first-
tier powers in the Mediterranean. The presence of Demetrius at his court,
smarting from his recent brush with Roman power, no doubt deepened
Philip’s knowledge of and perhaps interest in Rome.
10
For the Sellasia campaign, see Polyb. 2.65–70 (with Demetrius’ presence noted at 2.65.4); cf. Plut.
Cleom. 27–9, Philop. 6.
11
Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον … πάσας δ᾿ ἔχοντα τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν τῇ Μακεδόνων οἰκίᾳ (Polyb. 3.16.2–3).
Discussion: Burton 2011: 263.
12
Polyb. 4.61.1–8.
13
Polyb. 3.19.8.
14
Supra and Polyb. 4.29.7: Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ θεωροῦντες ἀνθοῦσαν τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἔσπευδον
ἀσφαλίσασθαι τὰ πρὸς ἕω τῆς Ἰταλίας (“The Romans, seeing that the royal house of the
Macedonians was flourishing, were hastening to secure the eastern flank of Italy”). Because the
Romans did not punish Scerdilaidas, a formal ally of Macedon, unlike Demetrius (cf. Polyb.
4.29.7), for committing essentially the same treaty violations as Demetrius (raiding south of the
Lissus line, etc.), Eckstein 2008: 66 takes this to mean that the Romans did not feel threatened by
Macedon. But this could just as easily mean that the Romans did not want to provoke Philip into
joining in the Illyrian war by attacking his ally Scerdilaidas.
Rome and Macedon 21
When news of the Roman military disaster at Lake Trasimene reached
Philip at Nemea in late summer, 217, Demetrius saw his chance for revenge
on Rome and his restoration to power in Illyria.15 He urged Philip to put
an end to the Social War, and instead turn his attention to the conquest
of Illyria and an invasion of Italy. This would be the first step, Demetrius
argued, on the road to Philip’s conquest of the entire world. Demetrius
recognized (and Polybius agrees with him) that the young king was par-
ticularly susceptible to such advice, being personally ambitious and
“descended from a house that, more than any other, was always covetous
of conquering the entire world.”16
Reinforcement came a few weeks later in the form of a speech delivered
by the Aetolian League statesman Agelaus of Naupactus. Agelaus argued
that Greeks should not continually wear themselves out in endless interne-
cine conflicts, but present a united front against barbarian invaders – espe-
cially at the present moment,
in view of the vastness of the armies and the greatness of the war taking
place in the West. For it is obvious even now to all who pay even a little
attention to politics that whether the Carthaginians defeat the Romans or
the Romans the Carthaginians in this war, it is highly unlikely they will
remain content ruling over their Italian and Sicilian subjects, but will surely
come here and expand their designs and power beyond what is just and rea-
sonable. Therefore I beg you all, and especially Philip, to secure yourselves
at this particularly dangerous moment … If Philip yearns for action, let him
consider it worthwhile looking to the West and focus on the war going on
in Italy, so that when the time is right he might compete for mastery of the
entire world … [In the meantime], I call upon you to defer your differences
with the Greeks and your wars here until you have rested enough, and give
special attention to this matter above all, so that you might have the power
make war or peace with others whenever you wish. For if once you wait for
these storm clouds appearing from the west to settle over Greek lands, I am
indeed very worried that these truces and wars and in general the games
which we now play with each other will turn out to be over for all of us,
so that we will pray to the gods to grant us still the power of fighting and
making peace with each other whenever we wish, and in general to have the
power of disputing among ourselves.17
15
On Demetrius’ motives, see Polyb. 5.108.5–6.
16
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐξ οἰκίας ὁρμώμενον τοιαύτης, ἣ μάλιστά πως ἀεὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδος ἐφίεται
(Polyb. 5.102.1). For Philip’s ambitions and sincere (though false) belief that he was descended from
both the Temenid and Antigonid ruling houses, see Walbank 1993.
17
Polyb. 5.104.2–11. On the speech, see Mørkholm 1967; Deininger 1973; Mørkholm 1974; Champion
1997; Champion 2004: 55–6; Eckstein 2008: 79, 83; Waterfield 2014: 1–2. I accept Champion’s
point that the speech is for the most part authentic, especially on the issue that matters here – the
storm cloud metaphor. It was apparently memorable enough to be reprised at Sparta in 210: Polyb.
All parties responded positively to the speech – especially Philip, who
was now very eager for peace. Of course, Polybius notes, Agelaus’ words
converged with Philip’s own impulse, the groundwork for which had been
laid by Demetrius of Pharos.18
For Polybius, Philip’s shift in focus from East to West marks the crit-
ical moment in world history when the symplokē, “the intertwining,” first
occurred: from this point forward, the affairs of Greece, Italy, and Africa
became intertmingled, and embassies went back and forth between the
eastern and western Mediterranean. This vast, interconnected world, in
contact for centuries through trade, piracy, and warfare, was now, and for
the duration of world history, intertwined politically.
Philip Joins the Fray

Encouraged by Demetrius and Agelaus, Philip soon began laying
the groundwork for a western expedition. His first task, de rigueur for
Macedonian kings about to undertake wide-ranging major wars of con-
quest, was to secure the frontiers of the homeland. The Illyrian warlord
Scerdilaidas, former ally of both Demetrius of Pharos and Philip (and now
a Roman international amicus19), had been causing trouble on Macedonia’s
northwestern frontier and made deep inroads into the kingdom itself.20
After driving Scerdilaidas from Macedonia during autumn 217, over the
course of the following winter Philip began constructing a fleet of one hun-
dred light galleys (lemboi) for the planned invasion of Italy. He launched
the fleet in summer 216, but as he approached the territory of Rome’s ami-
cus Apollonia on the Illyrian coast, it was reported to him that a Roman
war-fleet was on its way from Rhegium to assist Scerdilaidas. Philip, not
rating the chances of his little lemboi against Roman war-ships, reversed
course and retreated into Macedonia. In the event, only ten Roman ships
appeared off the Illyrian coast. It was an embarrassing debacle for Philip,
but, as Polybius notes, he escaped with no losses – except for his dignity.21
9.37.10. Mørkholm 1967: 244–6 (cf. Waterfield 2014: 1) is sceptical that the speech is authentic since,
among other reasons, it is suspiciously similar to Polybius’ symplokē scheme (on which, see below).
Champion 1997 stresses that Polybius’s scheme (however exaggerated or premature) cannot on its
own prove the speech inauthentic.
18
Polyb. 5.105.1.
19
On this status, see now Burton 2011. On Scerdilaidas, see above, n. 14.
20
Polyb. 5.108.1–4, 8–10.
21
Polyb. 5.109–10; Livy 24.40; Vitr. Arch. 10.16.9–10; Plut. Arat. 51.2; Zon. 9.4.3. Polybius (5.110.9–10)
interprets Philip’s retreat as panicked rather than strategic, and criticizes the king for letting slip the
opportunity to become master of Illyria by giving in to irrational fear; after all, the Romans were
Rome and Macedon 23
But Philip’s haste to break off Illyrian operations may also be explained by
another bit of intelligence that probably arrived at the same time as the report
of the mobilization of the Roman fleet. The Romans had been spectacularly
beaten by Hannibal’s Carthaginians at the Battle of Cannae in southern Italy
in late summer, 216.22 It was time to redouble his efforts to invade Italy, to
become a second Pyrrhus. To do this he would have to make contact with the
victorious Hannibal.
Travel was notoriously slow in the ancient world; as the incident of
the lemboi demonstrates, false rumor often outran reliable intelligence. It
is perhaps not surprising, then, that the first contacts and negotiations
between Hannibal and Philip took place over a matter of months rather
than weeks. The only reason we know of their secret negotiations is because
Philip’s chief negotiator, Xenophanes of Athens, was intercepted by the
Roman fleet on his return journey to Macedon in the company of the
Carthaginian legates Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago.23 The Roman authorities
seized the treaty document, which Polybius later accessed in the Roman
archives, and reproduced in full in his Histories. The treaty was both a
mutual assistance and a mutual defense pact, but its terms slightly favored
Hannibal, who was envisioned as the only party entitled to decide mat-
ters of war (in Italy, at least) and peace. The treaty was in part designed to
keep Philip out of Italy rather than invite him in; with Rome within an
ace of being defeated, Hannibal was serving notice that Italy would soon
be his patch, and that it was with himself as its master that Philip would
have to deal in future.24 All the treaty promised Philip was protection from
future Roman aggression by means of a clause in the eventual peace settle-
ment between Carthage and Rome.25 Given the set of hypotheticals upon
preoccupied with the aftermath of Cannae. But the Roman ships were a manifestation of that preoc-
cupation – and Rome’s determination to dig in and mobilize her allies and friends rather than sur-
render to Hannibal. Hence, as Walbank 1940: 70 recognized, the need for Philip to restrategize and
make contact with Hannibal, without whose help (especially at sea) Philip could not hope to succeed
in his grand plan. Discussion: Badian 1952: 90; Hammond 1968: 16–17; Errington 1971: 111–12; Gruen
1984: 375–7; Eckstein 2008: 86; Burton 2011: 235–6; Waterfield 2014: 45 (who argues that Polybius’
antipathy toward Philip has turned an orderly strategic withdrawal into a panicked retreat).
22
According to Polybius, 70,000 Roman and allied troops were lost, 10,000 were captured, and only 370
of 6,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry survived (Polyb. 3.117.2–4), while Livy states that 91,000 infantry
and 5,400 cavalry perished, and 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry were captured (Livy 22.49.15–18).
23
Livy 23.34.1–5; cf. App. Mac. 1. Livy (23.33.6) has Xenophanes intercepted on his way to Italy as well,
but this may be an error.
24
Rosenstein 2012: 145–6. The possibility of Philip coming to Italy was at least vaguely kept open by
the clause mandating Philip’s help during the war with Rome if agreed upon (Polyb. 7.9.10–11).
25
Polyb. 7.9.13. Demetrius of Pharos was promised more by the terms of the alliance: the return of
some of his friends, evidently in custody in Italy since 219 (cf. Badian 1952: 87; Walbank 1967: 56),
and the Roman renunciation of their interests and friendships in Illyria (Polyb. 7.9.13–14).
which the treaty was founded, its terms were perforce left vague, its com-
mitments loose: a vague promise of mutual friendship here, another of
mutual protection there, with the usual escape clauses and provisos (“if
necessary,” “if agreed upon,” “if required”), in addition to the formulaic
ban on betraying the agreement, and the commitment to having the same
friends and enemies.26 This vagueness, plus the fact that things did not, in
the event, conform to Hannibal’s expectations, perhaps explains why no
clear evidence of joint Carthaginian–Macedonian operations survives in
the historical record.27
The so-called “First Macedonian War” was a mostly desultory affair.
Without a decent fleet (and help from the Carthaginians frustratingly
remote), Philip could not realistically hope to cross to Italy. His options in
Illyria were limited by the presence of a Roman naval contingent of fifty
ships stationed at Brundisium, a mere 75 miles away across the Adriatic as
the crow flies. For their part, the Romans’ involvement in the eastern front
of the war with Hannibal could never amount to anything more than a
defensive holding action.28 In 211, Roman envoys cast about for allies in the
East, and ended up securing a treaty of alliance with the Aetolian League,
perennial enemy of Macedon, with the option of other, non-aligned states
joining in later.29 With these proxies thus engaged, the Romans could
devote almost their full attention to the western front (encompassing
Italy, Spain, and lately Sicily as well), and restrict their military activities
in Greece to patrolling the Adriatic coastline with the fleet. On land, the
“First Macedonian War” would come to resemble nothing more or less
than a reignition of the Social War – or, as the Greeks themselves appar-
ently called it at the time, “The Aetolian War.”30
A brief review of events is necessary. In late summer, 214, Philip
raided the Illyrian coast with 120 lemboi, attacking and taking Oricum
26
Polyb. 7.9.4 (friendship), 5–7 (protection), 8 (ban on betrayal), 8–9 (same friends and enemies),
11, 15 (provisos). Additional sources for the treaty: Livy 23.33.9–12; App. Mac. 1; Zon. 9.4.2–3.
Discussion: Walbank 1967: 42–56; Coppola 1993: 169–94; Bederman 2001: 185–9; Pfeilschifter
2005: 73–4; Eckstein 2008: 83–5; Scherberich 2009: 158–60 (with others listed at 159 n. 10);
Waterfield 2014: 45–6.
27
The “Macedonian Legion” that was said to have fought alongside Hannibal at Zama in 202 (Livy
30.33.5, 42.7) is an invention. A Carthaginian fleet appeared in Greek waters in 208, but retreated
before it could make contact with Philip – if that was its purpose (Livy 28.7.17–18, 8.8).
28
Few scholars follow Harris 1979: 205–8 or Rich 1984, the former arguing that Rome was eager to
assert greater control in Greece during the war, the latter that Roman campaigning in the East was
not as sporadic or half-hearted as Livy’s surviving account seems to indicate. For a critique of these
theories, see now Burton 2011: 84 n. 24, and of Rich in particular, below, n. 42.
29
Livy 26.24.8–14. A fragment of the treaty also survives on an inscription: SEG 13.382 = IG IX 12, 241.
30
Eckstein 2008: 77, 102.
Rome and Macedon 25
and laying siege to Apollonia. The Roman propraetor in charge of the
fleet, M. Valerius Laevinus, quickly recovered Oricum and sent a detach-
ment of troops to Apollonia, which easily slipped into the city by night.
Another night attack, this time on the Macedonian camp near Apollonia,
followed. Thanks to the lassitude of the Macedonian sentries, over a thou-
sand Roman troops were in the camp before being detected, and in the
rout that ensued, the king was roused from his bed and forced to flee for
his life, half-dressed and disheveled – an indecent state barely worthy of
a common soldier, much less a king, Livy caustically remarks.31 Valerius
dispatched the Roman fleet to the mouth of the Aous River to prevent the
Macedonians escaping by sea. Philip, still not fancying his chances against
Roman war-ships, hauled his light galleys ashore, set fire to them, and
retreated overland back to Macedonia.32
The loss of Polybius’ original account of the subsequent eastern cam-
paigns, and the inadequacy of Livy’s intermittent summaries of it, obscure
the course of the war for the next few years. With the Roman fleet now
in full control of the Illyrian coastline, Philip turned to land operations,
first in Messenia in the western Peloponnese, and then on the western
fringes of the inland Illyrian states. Rome remained passive until Philip
once again pushed through to the Illyrian coast by subduing Lissus in 213/
12.33 Roman negotiations with the Aetolian League soon followed, but it
was a long time before the aforementioned treaty was finally struck in late
211. Some individual and joint Roman–Aetolian operations followed in
Acarnania and on the island of Zacynthus, but Philip was by now consid-
ered sufficiently entangled in the war with his neighbors that the Romans
could safely withdraw from the fight for the remainder of the campaigning
season.34
In 210, the Aetolians and the Romans under their new Roman com-
mander Sulpicius Galba captured the important coastal town of Anticyra
on the north shore of the Corinthian Gulf in Phocis.35 The Romans then
turned their attention to diplomacy in the Peloponnese, successfully
bringing Elis, Sparta, and Messenia into the anti-Macedonian coalition as
Roman amici.36 After thus reigniting internecine warfare across Greece, the
31
Livy 24.40.2–13.
32
Livy 24.40.16–17.
33
Polyb. 8.13–14.
34
Livy 26.24.15–16.
35
Livy 26.26.1–3.
36
Provision was made for the inclusion of Elis and Sparta in the Aetolian treaty of 211 (Livy 26.24.9).
No positive evidence for these informal alliances exists, but all states concerned were active against
Romans were now content to withdraw to a defensive posture, guarding
the Adriatic coast with the fleet, and leaving the land war in the hands of
their Peloponnesian and Aetolian friends. The following year, the senate
evacuated all Roman land forces from Greece.37
Philip then set to work securing a marching route along the Thessalian
coastline in order to link up with his Peloponnesian allies. He was shad-
owed by the Roman fleet, lately joined by the fleet of a new Roman amicus,
Attalus I of Pergamum.38 The joint Roman–Pergamene fleet tried to slow
Philip’s advance southward, but to little effect.39 The king soon reached the
Peloponnese, where his Achaean League allies drew him into conflict with
its arch-enemy Sparta. The Roman fleet tried to distract Philip by raiding
the Peloponnesian coast, but again achieved very little.40
Meanwhile, in 209, 208, and 207, several attempts by neutral powers
to mediate between Philip and Aetolia failed.41 The war dragged on as
Philip became increasingly bogged down in Peloponnesian military and
political disputes. Finally, in 207/6, in the face of Philip’s considerable suc-
cesses on land, and Rome’s apparent indifference even to naval operations
in Greece,42 the Aetolians agreed to terms with the king. This “separate
peace,” struck without the Roman senate’s knowledge or approval, would
become a serious bone of contention between Aetolia and Rome in the
years to come.43 The Romans, after one last-ditch attempt to reverse the
result of the separate peace in summer, 205,44 decided to cut their losses
and negotiate with Philip. They could do little else: pursuing the war in
Greece without a major ally, especially now that the final showdown with
Philip during the war and appear as adscripti on the Roman side in the Peace of Phoenice in 205.
On the amicus status of the adscripti, see now Burton 2013: 213 n. 26.
37
Livy 26.28.3, 9.
38
On the establishment of the Roman–Pergamene friendship, see now Burton 2011: 84–7.
39
E.g. in 210 at Echinus across the Malian Gulf from Thermopylae (Polyb. 9.41), and in 209 at nearby
Lamia (Livy 27.30.1–2). Philip was victorious in both encounters.
40
The Romans raided the Peloponnesian coastline between Sicyon and Corinth in 208, but Philip
soon drove them off (Livy 27.31.1–3, 33.2). The Romans managed to install a garrison at Cyllene in
Elis and fend off a Macedonian attack (during which Philip was thrown from his horse, but recov-
ered and fought on foot “with great courage,” according to Livy), but the king escaped laden with
massive spoils and in possession of the Elean fort of Phyrcus (Livy 27.32).
41
On these initiatives, see now Eckstein 2002 and 2008: 91–116.
42
Livy states explicitly that the Romans paid little attention to Greek affairs for two years (Livy
29.12.1), and there is no record of any activity by the Roman fleet in eastern waters for 207 or 206.
Rich 1984: esp. 137–43 denies a two-year gap existed, but this requires acceptance of his arbitrarily
revised chronology, which flatly contradicts Livy’s statement and his account.
43
See now Burton 2011: 270–8, with earlier discussions there cited.
44
The proconsul P. Sempronius Tuditanus was despatched to Greece with 35 ships, 10,000 infantry,
and 1,000 cavalry in spring, 205 (Livy 29.12.2).
Rome and Macedon 27
Hannibal was looming, would have been a dangerous division of their
resources. The Peace of Phoenice was signed and ratified before the year
was out.45
Despite the failure of his plan to reconquer all Illyria and invade Italy,
and the ineffectiveness of his alliance with the Carthaginians, Philip
emerged from the conflict relatively unscathed, and in a better position
than before. He gained Atintania, former Roman amici, kept the parts of
Illyria (including, perhaps, Lissus) he conquered in 213, and was confirmed
in possession of the Dessaretian lands he seized from Scerdilaidas in 217.46
For the Romans, who, as the war with Hannibal showed, were culturally
predisposed to accept nothing less than total victory, this was a disappoint-
ing result – and would require correction.
A War of Revenge?
Within two years of the signing of the Peace of Phoenice, disturbing intel-
ligence about Philip’s activities in the eastern Aegean began to make their
way to Rome. In winter 203/2, Philip and the king of the Seleucid empire,
Antiochus III, signed a secret pact to carve up the Ptolemaic empire,
including Egypt itself, whose throne had recently been occupied by a
5-year-old boy, Ptolemy V Epiphanes.47 The pact was perhaps the worst-
kept secret in the Mediterranean world at that time, since most other states
in the East soon knew about it, and were quick to inform the Romans of
its existence.48
Soon Rome’s eastern friends began appearing before the senate to com-
plain about Philip, who had been ravaging Asia Minor since 204. In 202,
delegates from the Aetolian League arrived in Rome decrying the king’s
attacks on Aetolian dependencies in Thrace and Asia Minor. The ambas-
sadors were sternly rebuffed by the senate, still angry over the Aetolians’
separate peace with Philip.49 By late summer or autumn 201, ambassadors
from Rome’s friends, the beleaguered states of Rhodes, Pergamum, Egypt,
45
Terms: Livy 29.12.13–14; cf. App. Mac. 3.2.
46
See Walbank 1940: 103 (with earlier sources there cited); Badian 1958a: 61; Eckstein 2008: 113;
Waterfield 2014: 56.
47
On the pact, its scope, and effects, see now Eckstein 2008: 124–229; cf. Eckstein 2006: 271–5.
48
Polyb. 14.1a.4 on the leaking of intelligence about the pact.
49
App. Mac. 4.2; cf. Livy 31.29.4. Pace Badian 1958b: 208–11 (followed by Ferrary 1988: 51 and n. 26),
this embassy appears to be authentic: Dahlheim 1968: 196 n. 45; Briscoe 1973: 130; Gruen 1984: 396–
7 n. 214 (the latter two citing older literature); cf. 79, 441; Twyman 1999: 1284 (dating the embassy to
201; cf. Briscoe 1973: 130 (with older literature there cited); Derow 1979: 7–8; Waterfield 2014: 62–3);
Eckstein 2008: 211–17 (dating it to autumn 202, following Holleaux 1935: 293–7); Burton 2011: 270.
and Athens, all came before the senate to complain of the pact and the
violence of the kings.50
This Mediterranean “diplomatic revolution,” as Arthur Eckstein has
rightly labeled it,51 made it harder for the Romans to ignore Philip’s activities
in Asia Minor any longer. The consul P. Sulpicius Galba proposed to the
citizen assembly a declaration of war on Philip, but the people, exhausted
by their recent war with Carthage, flatly and unanimously rejected it at the
instigation of a tribune, Q. Baebius. The latter was from a prominent con-
sular family, which indicates that the senate, too, was divided over whether
to support Rome’s friends against Macedon. Sulpicius then delivered a
persuasive speech, warning the people not to wait for Philip to attack Italy,
like another Pyrrhus or Hannibal, or to abandon their friends in their
hour of need, lest it lead to another Saguntum, the ill-fated Spanish ally
of Rome whose cries for help were ignored when the city was under siege
by Hannibal in 219. The words of Sulpicius had their intended effect. The
people voted in favor of the proposal, and envoys were dispatched to the
East armed with a conditional declaration of war on Philip.52 One group of
envoys soon appeared in Athens, currently under attack by Philip’s general
Nicanor, demanding that Philip make war on no Greek state and submit
his differences with Attalus of Pergamum to arbitration. Another embassy,
headed by M. Aemilius Lepidus, met with the king himself while he was
in the midst of besieging Abydus on the Hellespont. Aemilius demanded
that Philip not wage war on any Greek state, nor interfere with Ptolemy’s
possessions, and that he submit his differences with Rhodes and Attalus to
arbitration. Philip, in turn, warned the Romans not to violate the Peace
of Phoenice by siding with those who had already done so. The discussion
was at an end, and a state of war came into being.53
50
Livy 31.1.9–2.2; Just. Epit. 30.3.5 (Athens, Pergamum, and Rhodes; cf. Paus. 1.36.5–6, 7.7.7–8; Flor.
1.23.4–5; Fest. 7.2 (Athens)); Just. Epit. 30.2.8 (Egypt); App. Mac. 4.2 (Rhodes and Athens). Egypt had
been a Roman amicus since 273 (above, n. 6), and Athens since 209 or 208 (Burton 2013). Rhodes may
also have been a Roman friend at this time since Polybius (30.5.6) records an amicitia dated to around
306, but some have regarded this as improbably early; discussion: Burton 2003: 356–7.
51
Eckstein 2008: 181–270. It was revolutionary in the sense that the Hellenistic states behaved unchar-
acteristically by calling upon an outsider (i.e. Rome) to assist them, and witnessing traditional rivals,
such as Rhodes and Pergamum, working together. The Roman decision to intervene was also revo-
lutionary in that it contributed to a system in which great powers grew increasingly more powerful
at the expense of second-tier powers, and the Polybian symplokē, the “intertwining” of eastern and
western Mediterranean affairs, intensified.
52
Livy 31.6.1–8.4; conditional declaration of war: Polyb. 16.34.4, with Walbank 1967: 543–4; Rich
1976: 76–87; Eckstein 2008: 277.
53
Polyb. 16.27.1–2, 34.1–4; Livy 31.18.1–5; Diod. Sic. 28.6 (Romans at Athens); Polyb. 16.34.1–7; Livy
31.18.1–4; cf. App. Mac. 4 (parley at Abydus). Philip’s reference to treaty-breakers is probably an allu-
sion to the Athenians, whom Aemilius also mentions, and who had had two Acarnanians (allies of
Rome and Macedon 29
The impasse between Rome and Macedon marked the beginning of the
war, but its causes had been bubbling under the surface for some time.
The causes of the Second Macedonian War are a source of great schol-
arly controversy, bound up as they are with such insoluble problems as
the nature of Roman imperialism and Roman ambitions in Greece in this
period – to say nothing of the loss of most of Polybius’ account of the run-
up to the war.54 Roman greed was probably not a significant motivating
factor: Sulpicius does not mention opportunities for plunder in his speech
to the people, where one would expect to see an appeal to baser instincts.
In fact, the consul builds his case on a moral argument: one should, if
possible, help and protect one’s friends, demonstrating fides, “good faith.”55
Sulpicius also plays on Roman fears and paranoia, beginning his speech
by raising the specter of Philip becoming another Pyrrhus or Hannibal,
attacking Italy by land and sea.56 Although he does not mention the
revenge motive explicitly, his reference to Philip’s pact with Hannibal was
surely designed to inspire such feelings in his audience. The revenge motive
appears repeatedly in the sources, all of which ultimately descend from
Polybius, and is bound up with the idea that the Second Macedonian War
was a continuation of the First, a war that, for the Romans, was interrupted
by a period of inconvenient but necessary peace.57 It was simply unaccept-
able that Philip’s predatory, opportunistic behavior during Rome’s darkest
hour had resulted in net gains for the king.58 There can be little doubt that
many Romans felt this way, although it is only natural that the bulk of the
Macedon) executed for violating the Eleusinian mysteries in mid-September, 201. See Burton 2013:
210–11.
54
For Polybius’ famous division of causation into aitiai (“causes”), prophaseis (“pretexts”), and archai
(“beginnings”), see his analysis of the outbreak of the Second Punic War at 3.6–30 (with Pearson
1952; Pédech 1964: 80–8; Walbank 1972: 157–60). Whether he subjected the outbreak of the Second
Macedonian War to such formal analysis is difficult to know since no trace of it exists among the
extant fragments or the post-Polybian historiographical tradition. See Bickermann 1945: 148; Pédech
1964: 118–19; Walbank 1963: 12; Derow 1979: 10–11.
55
On fides in Sulpicius’ speech, see Burton 2011: 241 (ignored by Waterfield 2014: 68). On fides gener-
ally, see Burton 2011: 40–5 (in friendship between individuals) and 114–58 (in international friend-
ships), with earlier scholarship there cited.
56
Livy 31.8.4–10; cf. Zon. 9.15.2.
57
Revenge: Livy 31.1.9, 11.9; 34.22.8; 45.22.7; Flor. 1.23.4. Contra Gruen 1984: 385, the fact that the spe-
cific grounds for revenge – that Philip provided financial and military assistance to Hannibal – are
untrue does not mean that feelings of revenge for Philip kicking the Romans when they were down,
and without provocation from Rome, did not exist. As Polybius says (3.32.7), “I regard [the war]
with Philip … as resulting from that with Hannibal” (θεωροῦμεν … τὸν δὲ Φιλιππικὸν [πόλεμον
τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότα] ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾿ Ἀννίβαν). The second war as a continuation of the first: Livy
31.1.8–10; App. Mac. 3.2; Just. Epit. 29.4.11; Zon. 9.15.1.
58
This is why his Illyrian gains, recognized in the Peace of Phoenice, would be demanded back at the
Nicaea conference in November 198 (Polyb. 18.1.14; Livy 32.33.3; below, p. 34).
war-weary citizenry hesitated at undertaking a major war so soon after a
particularly crippling and exhausting one had just ended.
Rather than wait until the following summer, the senate dispatched
the Roman fleet in September 200, under the command of the consul
Sulpicius. Most of the fleet was docked at Corcyra for the winter,59 but a
detachment of twenty ships under the command of C. Claudius Centho
sailed around the Peloponnese, making for Athens.60 From his base in
Demetrias, Philip heard that Claudius had also raided Chalcis, and so
countered by marching against Athens. The Athenians, receiving advance
intelligence about the king’s attack, barred the gates and firmed up their
garrison. His plans upset, the king set about ravaging the Attic country-
side and attacking Eleusis. Macedonian reinforcements soon arrived, but
Philip’s plan to attack Athens was frustrated again when word reached him
that the Roman ships had arrived in Piraeus.61 After a brief visit to the
Achaean League, where he failed to secure any significant support,62 Philip
returned to Attica and began ravaging the countryside again, sparing noth-
ing, sacred or profane, from fire and sword.63 The king then returned to
Macedonia to plan the following summer’s campaign.
During this same winter, Sulpicius tried to bring the Aetolian League
on side in time for his spring offensive.64 The consul’s strategy was to
invade Macedonia from the west while the Dardanians and Illyrians did so
from the northwest; the Aetolians were needed to invade from the south
via Thessaly, while the Roman fleet would patrol the eastern coastline of
Greece.65 The Aetolians, no doubt smarting from the senate’s rebuff of their
pleas for help against Philip in 202, postponed a response until their next
scheduled assembly meeting. Sulpicius proceeded with his plan anyway,
entering Lyncestis in Macedonia in late spring. Here the first contact with
Philip’s forces took place: a cavalry skirmish that ended in defeat for the
Macedonians. Another skirmish, and another Macedonian defeat, soon
followed.66 Sulpicius continued pushing east toward the Macedonian cap-
ital at Pella. He was met by Philip’s forces at Pluinna, in a narrow, rocky,
and densely wooded pass (the modern Kirli-Derbend pass in northern
59
Livy 31.22.5.
60
Livy 31.14.3, 22.5–8; Zon. 9.15.2–3.
61
Livy 31.23; cf. Zon. 9.15.3 (Roman raid on Chalcis), Livy 31.24.1–25.2; cf. Diod. Sic. 28.7; Zon. 9.15.3
(Philip’s invasion of Attica).
62
Livy 31.25.2–11.
63
Livy 31.26.4–13.
64
Livy 31.28.3, 29–32.
65
Walbank 1940: 141.
66
Livy 31.33.4–11; 36.7–37.12; cf. Dio fr. 58.1–3; Zon. 9.15.5–6; Plut. Flam. 3.1; Flor. 1.23.9; Ampel. 16.3.
Rome and Macedon 31
Greece). The king would have preferred to deploy his phalanx on level
ground, but the consul, with his more agile legionary force, forced the
issue. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Roman forces won the fight and
took the pass. Sulpicius then turned south, where he was joined by an
Aetolian contingent, and headed back toward Apollonia for the winter.67
Meanwhile, the Roman fleet took Oreus on the north coast of Euboea,
denying Philip naval access to points south of Macedonia.68 Philip went
on to achieve some successes against the Aetolians and Amynander and
his Athamanians in Thessaly, while his general Athenagoras defeated the
Dardanians on Macedonia’s northern tier.69
In early spring, 198, Philip decided to take the fight to the Romans, leav-
ing Macedonia behind and entering the Aous River gorge in Epirus (Map
1), which he reckoned – correctly, as it turned out – the Romans would use
to re-enter central Greece from the Illyrian coast.70 The Romans, under the
command of one of the consuls of the previous year, P. Villius Tappulus,
arrived in the Aous valley by early May, and set up camp opposite Philip.
While Tappulus was debating whether to try to force his way through
Philip’s defenses, his replacement, T. Quinctius Flamininus, consul of 198,
arrived.71 Forty days of indecisive skirmishing followed before the neutral
Epirotes (on whose land this skirmishing was taking place) convinced the
leaders to sit down for talks.72 These quickly broke down after Flamininus
demanded that Philip liberate Thessaly in addition to his other Greek
possessions.73 The next day, the skirmishing continued, but the Romans
soon gained the upper hand and forced the Macedonian phalanx to retreat
via Thessaly. There Philip set about laying waste the towns and fields of
his own subjects, probably in order to deprive the Romans of plunder
and supplies.74 The Romans soon followed, but Philip stayed put in the
Tempe pass north of Larissa in eastern Thessaly and refused to engage the
enemy.75 Flamininus sacked and burned Phaloria, attacked some outposts
of Aeginium, and laid siege to Atrax (Map 2). The latter, however, was
67
Livy 31.39.4–40.6; cf. Dio fr. 58; Zon. 9.15.5–6.
68
Livy 31.46.6–16.
69
Livy 31.40.7–43.7; cf. Diod. Sic. 28.2.
70
Livy 32.5.8–13.
71
Livy 32.6, 9.8; Plut. Flam. 3.3–4; cf. Zon. 9.16.1–2. Livy (32.6.5–8) implicitly rejects the story in one
of his sources, Valerius Antias, that Villius defeated Philip and forced the pass before the arrival of
Flamininus.
72
Livy 32.10.1; Plut. Flam. 4–5 (a detailed account of the skirmishing).
73
Livy 32.10.2–8; cf. App. Mac. 5; Diod. Sic. 28.11.
74
Livy 32.10.9–13.9; Plut. Flam. 4–5.2; cf. App. Mac. 6; Zon. 9.16.1–2; Frontin. Str. 2.13.8; Flor. 1.23.10.
75
Livy 32.15.9.
stoutly defended by its Macedonian garrison, and the consul was forced
to raise the siege before winter set in.76 Toward the end of the regular
campaigning season, the consul scored a major diplomatic coup, convin-
cing the Achaean League to abandon their Macedonian alliance and join
Rome. He also took Elataea, as well as other places in Phocis. Both moves
effectively deprived Philip of valuable footholds in central and southern
Greece.77
While Flamininus was trying to force his way into Opus in eastern
Locris (November 198), the king sought another parley. The two sides came
to Nicaea on the Malian Gulf where Philip at first conducted talks from
his ship, alleging that he feared for his life because of the presence of the
Aetolians. The Romans demanded that the king evacuate Greece, return
all the gains he had made in Illyria during the First Macedonian War,
and return to Ptolemy all his Asia Minor possessions, which Philip had
conquered between 204 and 200. Philip asked leave to send an embassy
to Rome. Flamininus agreed to the delay, since he was still waiting to hear
whether he would be reassigned the Macedonian command (and the glory
of ending the war) for 197. With his agents skillfully working behind the
scenes at Rome, Flamininus secured his reassignment, and when the time
came for their senatorial audience, Philip’s ambassadors were surprised by
the senate’s blunt question: would Philip evacuate the “Three Fetters of
Greece” – the garrison points of Demetrias, Chalcis, and the citadel of
Corinth? The envoys confessed they had no specific instructions on how to
respond on this particular point, and so were dismissed.78 Over the course
of the following winter, Philip levied troops throughout his exhausted and
depopulated kingdom,79 while the Romans stripped him of all his remain-
ing bases of potential support. The Spartan king Nabis, recently put in
possession of Argos for the duration of the war as the price of an alli-
ance with Philip, now blithely threw over his new ally and joined Rome.80
76
Livy 32.15, 17.4–18.3, 24; Plut. Flam. 5.3–4.
77
Livy 32.19–23.3; Polyb. 18.13.8–10; App. Mac. 7; Plut. Flam. 5.3; Zon. 9.16.3; Paus. 7.8.2 (Achaean
League sides with Rome); Livy 32.18.6–9, 24 (Phocis, Elataea). On the defection of the Achaean
League, see Holleaux 1935: 230; Larsen 1968: 230, 392, 394; Errington 1969: 41, 43, 72, 87; Briscoe
1973: 200–12; Eckstein 1976: 138–4, 1987a: 278, 1987b, 1995: 200–2, and 2008: 281, 283–4; Gruen
1984: 442–7; Derow 2003: 60; Burton 2011: 102–5; Waterfield 2014: 86–7.
78
Livy 32.32–7; Polyb. 18.1–12; Plut. Flam. 5.6, 7.1–2; App. Mac. 8; Zon. 9.16.4–5; Just. Epit. 30.3.8;
Plut. Mor. 197A.
79
Livy 33.3.1–5. By this point, he had been at war continuously since his accession twenty-four years
earlier.
80
Livy 32.38.2–40.4, 10–11 (cf. 34.31.5–32.19 (retrospective)); Zon. 9.16.5; cf. Polyb. 18.17; Just. Epit.
30.4.5. On Nabis, see now Burton 2015b.
Rome and Macedon 33
Thebes also joined the Roman cause.81 All Greece south of Thessaly was
now solidly Roman.
Philip realized that the only way he could maintain a hold on his
remaining non-Macedonian possessions (and to keep the war away
from his kingdom) was to march south and confront the Romans in
Thessaly. Flamininus marched north along the east coast of Greece on the
Thermopylae route. A minor cavalry skirmish broke out between the two
armies around Pherae before Philip set off toward Scotussa to look for a
suitable spot for a pitched battle where he could (finally) deploy the pha-
lanx in its ideal setting. Both armies began to march west, separated only
by the hills of Cynoscephalae (“Dog’s Heads”) (Map 2). Philip was forced
by bad weather to make camp before he could reach the Roman camp,
established at the Shrine of Thetis near the Pharsalus–Larissa road west of
Cynoscephalae.82 The king then sent forward a detachment of men to seize
the heights, but these were enveloped in a thick mist. Unable to see in the
fog, Philip’s men blundered into a detachment of Roman troops on the
ridge, which had been sent ahead by the proconsul to reconnoiter Philip’s
position. The early skirmishing soon evolved into a battle, both command-
ers in the meantime drawing up their infantry ranks as best they could near
level ground in front of Cynoscephalae. The Roman left soon drove Philip’s
mercenaries on the right from the battlefield back toward the ridge, but
the king had just arrived with half his phalanx. He arranged these in ranks
sixteen men deep, with the remnants of his light-armed troops deployed
to protect his right flank. Taking personal command at the front, the king
charged down the hill and clashed with the Roman left, which soon broke
under the weight of the Macedonian phalanx. Flamininus moved quickly
to take charge of the right wing, and led it toward the ridge, where, thanks
mostly to his elephants, he crushed the remainder of Philip’s forces. The
coup de grâce came from an unnamed Roman military tribune on the right
wing, who wheeled around from the pursuit of the Macedonian remnants
and attacked the victorious Macedonian phalanx in the rear and left flank.
Unable to cope with the hand-to-hand fighting, for which they were ill-
equipped, and overburdened by their long pikes, the Macedonians began
throwing down their shields and retreating, while Philip withdrew toward
Tempe. The king now sued for peace.83
81
Livy 33.1–2; Plut. Flam. 6; Zon. 9.16.8.
82
Here I follow the reconstruction of Hammond 1988: 437–40.
83
Polyb. 18.18–27; Livy 33.3.11–10; Strab. 9.5.20; Plut. Flam. 7.2–8; Paus. 7.8.7; Dio fr. 60; Just. Epit.
30.4.5–16; [Euseb.] Chron. 243b; Oros. 4.20.5–9; Zon. 9.16.8–10.
The terms laid down by the Roman commander were harsh, but not
unduly so. The king was deprived of his fleet (which, in fact, was so insub-
stantial that it had not been a factor in the war at all), he was to set all his
Greek possessions free, and was to pay an indemnity of a thousand tal-
ents.84 The implicit loss of Thessaly (through the declaration of Greek free-
dom) and Illyria (now firmly under the control of Rome’s friend Pleuratus
III, son of Scerdilaidas) was a serious blow to the king, but his kingdom
was left intact, and the indemnity was not large.85 The Aetolians accused
Flamininus of accepting a bribe from Philip, so lenient did they consider
the settlement.86 But he had good reason to go easy on the king at this
time. Even before the war was over, the Seleucid king, Antiochus III, was
trying to conquer Ptolemy V ’s possessions in Asia Minor, and had already
attacked the territory of Rome’s amicus, Pergamum.87 If a showdown far-
ther east against the formidable Antiochus was necessary (as it indeed
turned out to be), there must be no risk of Philip rejoining his erstwhile
ally. Humiliating him or angering him into thoughts of revenge would be
highly imprudent at this moment.88
At the Isthmian Games in July 196, Flamininus declared “the Freedom
of the Greeks.” All Greeks would be free, independent, and subject to their
own laws henceforward. The Romans would leave no garrisons behind or
demand any tribute.89 This did not mean that the Greek states would not
be subject to Roman influence. As the guarantors of their freedom, and
thus the superior partner in the relationship, the Romans naturally expected
the Greeks to conform to Rome’s foreign policy agenda. Collective secur-
ity, and especially Rome’s, was paramount. The Greeks surely understood
this.90 They had been given their “freedom” in the same sense and for the
same purposes as they had been granted it by Macedonian monarchs for well
over a century before the Roman declaration.91 The difference was that Rome
84
The terms are contained in a later senatorial decree, which does not include all the details of the
peace: Polyb. 18.44; Livy 33.30; App. Mac. 9.3; Plut. Flam. 10.1; Plut. Arat. 54.5; Paus. 7.8.7–8; Just.
Epit. 30.4.17; Eutrop. 4.2.1; Zon. 9.16.10–11.
85
Polyb. 18.47.7; Livy 33.34.7 (Thessaly); Polyb. 18.47.12; Livy 33.34.10–11 (Pleuratus).
86
Polyb. 18.34.7–8; Plut. Flam. 9.4. On the Roman disputes with Aetolia during the negotiations, see
now Burton 2011: 271–4.
87
Livy 33.19.11 (Ptolemy); Livy 32.8.10, 37.1 (Pergamum).
88
Flamininus apparently did not realize that alienating the Aetolians posed an even greater risk of
bringing on a clash with Antiochus; as will be seen shortly, they invited him to Greece in 193, upset-
ting Roman arrangements there. Polybius identifies the anger of the Aetolians as the main cause of
Rome’s war with Antiochus (Polyb. 3.3.3–4, 7.1); see below.
89
Sources: Polyb. 18.46; Livy 33.32; Val. Max. 4.8.5; Plut. Flam. 10; Plut. Mor. 197B; App. Mac. 9.4;
[Euseb.] Chron. 241c. Bibliography: Burton 2011: 224 n. 107.
90
Burton 2011: 226.
91
Gruen 1984: 132–57 gathers the evidence.
Rome and Macedon 35
would give the Greeks the genuine responsibility for safeguarding that free-
dom, while the Romans themselves would withdraw entirely across the
Adriatic. To avoid any potential misunderstanding, Flamininus spelled out
exactly what their freedom meant as he took his leave of the Greeks along
with the last remaining Roman troops in 194:
Use your freedom with moderation since it is a good thing when slightly
restrained for individuals and states alike, but dangerous in excess. Let the
leaders and the other social orders maintain harmony within their com-
munities, and let all states take counsel together. Against men united by
consensus no king or tyrant will be strong enough to do damage; but dis-
harmony and sedition will furnish every opportunity for plotters, since a
party that is worsted in domestic strife prefers to side with a foreigner than
yield to his fellow-citizens. Defend and preserve in your care the freedom
gained for you by force of foreign arms and returned to you by the good
faith of an outsider; thus the Roman people will know that freedom was
gained for men worthy of it, and their gift was well bestowed.92
By usurping the kingdom of Macedon’s traditional role as guarantor of
Greek freedom, the Romans had significantly altered the de facto bal-
ance of power that had prevailed in Greece since the days of Philip II and
Alexander the Great, and, along with that, the political calculus of every
Greek statesman. Most seemed to understand this; others would need to
be reminded.
The Syrian War
Tension and unease marked Rome’s relationship with Antiochus III from
the outset.93 Their first recorded diplomatic interaction, in 200, which likely
resulted in the establishment of amicitia, was an attempt by Rome to rec-
oncile Antiochus and Ptolemy, that is, to reverse the effects of Antiochus’
pact with Philip to destroy Ptolemy and carve up his kingdom and pos-
sessions.94 Roman embassies were sent east throughout the 190s to urge
Antiochus to end his wars against Pergamum and Ptolemy, to relinquish
cities belonging to Philip and Ptolemy, to respect the autonomy of the
free Greek cities of Asia Minor, and to evacuate European Thrace. Despite
occasional short-term conciliatory adjustments to his expansionary pol-
icies, Antiochus aggressively pursued what he regarded as his ancestral
92
Livy 34.49.8–11; cf. Diod. Sic. 28.13; Zon. 9.18.4.
93
Grainger 2002 is the most comprehensive account in English, although one need not agree with his
analysis, especially regarding Antiochus’ willingness to compromise in the run-up to the war.
94
Burton 2011: 106; Polyb. 16.27.5.
prerogatives in Asia and in European Thrace, and sought acknowledg-
ment from Rome of his unfettered right to do as he pleased there by, for
example, requesting a Roman treaty of alliance on equal terms.95
In Polybius’ judgment, none of these disputes has the explanatory force
of the anger of the Aetolians in bringing about the Syrian War.96 Still
smarting from what they regarded as the Romans’ failure to credit suffi-
ciently the role they played in defeating Philip in the Second Macedonian
War, and to reward them appropriately when the war was over,97 after the
departure of the Romans from Greece in late 194, they saw an opportunity
for revenge in the increasingly antagonistic Roman–Seleucid relationship.
After several preliminary diplomatic overtures to Antiochus, in spring, 192,
the Aetolians passed a decree declaring the king liberator of the Greeks
and arbitrator of their differences with the Romans. The king crossed
the Aegean and occupied Demetrias (earlier taken by the Aetolians) with
10,000 men in autumn, 192, and he was made League stratēgos for 192/191.98
What followed was a complete disaster for the Roman position in Greece:
most of Thessaly, Boeotia, Euboean Chalcis, Elis, the major Acarnanian
cities, and King Amynander of Athamania all went over to Antiochus.99
Around the same time, a detachment of Roman troops enjoying asylum at
the shrine of Apollo at Delium near Tanagra in Boeotia was surprised and
massacred by some of Antiochus’ men.100 The Roman declaration of war
on the Aetolians and Antiochus soon followed; the official reasons cited by
the Roman fetial priests were that the Aetolians had attacked Chalcis and
Demetrias, an allied city, and invited the king to come to Europe for the
purpose of making war on Rome.101
In mid-191, the consul M’. Acilius Glabrio crossed to Greece with his
forces. In a coordinated campaign with M. Baebius Tamphilus the praetor
and Rome’s new ally Philip V of Macedon, he recovered some of the cities
in Thessaly. Acilius then moved toward Antiochus’ new position, which
he had taken up in the pass at Thermopylae. The Romans dislodged the
Aetolians guarding the flanking path west of Thermopylae that Xerxes had
95
On the diplomacy of the 190s, see now Eckstein 2008: 308–19; Burton 2011: 339–45.
96
Polyb. 3.3.3–4, 7.1.
97
On the escalating tensions between the Romans (and Flamininus personally) and the Aetolians, see
now Burton 2011: 271–4.
98
Livy 35.33.8 (decree); Livy 35.43; App. Syr. 12; Zon. 9.19.3 (crossing to Demetrias); Polyb. 20.1.1;
Livy 34.45.9 (stratēgos).
99
Gruen 1984: 476–8 (with sources); Eckstein 2008: 325–6.
100
Livy 35.51.1–5.
101
Livy 36.3.10–12. The war declaration was made before the Romans knew that Antiochus landed at
Demetrias (Eckstein 2008: 327) or about the massacre at Delium.
Rome and Macedon 37
used to devastating effect against the Spartans in 480, and the legions soon
broke through the phalanx guarding the pass. Antiochus and his small
force were compelled to retreat to Asia.102
The new consul in charge of the war for 190, L. Cornelius Scipio (with
his brother Africanus on staff as an advisor), decided on an amphibious
assault on Antiochus’ Asia Minor possessions. Philip provided a military
escort and supplies for the bulk of the Roman army, which marched over-
land through Macedonia and Thrace along newly purpose-built roads
and bridges.103 Meanwhile, the combined Roman–Pergamene–Rhodian
fleet confronted and defeated the formidable Seleucid navy (a portion of
which was under the command of Hannibal of Carthage), in two battles at
Side and Myonessus.104 With Roman supremacy at sea established, Lucius
Scipio’s forces finally began crossing into Asia Minor in late summer.
Antiochus attempted to negotiate a solution to the conflict, but the king’s
offer to surrender a few places in Asia Minor and pay half the Romans’ war
expenses was deemed most inadequate: the Romans stood firm that the
king, as the one responsible for starting the war, must pay for it in full, and
withdraw permanently from all lands subject to him west of the Taurus
mountains.105 Negotiations failed and the war ground on. The final battle
took place at Magnesia-ad-Sipylum in Lydia in December 190 or January
189. Antiochus at the head of the Persian cavalry managed to defeat the
Roman left, but failed to wheel about to support his center and crumbling
left, which Eumenes, in command of the cavalry massed on the Roman
right, successfully turned, thus exposing the phalanx sufficiently for the
legions to break it up. After suffering casualties numbering in the tens of
thousands, Antiochus sued for peace.106
In the peace negotiations that followed, the Romans redrew the map of
the Hellenistic East by senatus consultum, foedus, and senatorial commis-
sion. The Peace of Apamea, finalized in spring, 188, stipulated, among other
things, that Antiochus must withdraw from all lands west of the Taurus
Mountains and Halys River; pay 15,000 talents, 500 immediately, 2,500
102
Livy 36.13–14; App. Syr. 17; Zon. 9.19.5 (operations in Thessaly); Livy 36.17–19; Frontin. Str. 2.4.4;
Plut. Cat. Mai. 13.1–14.2; App. Syr. 18–20; Oros. 4.20.20–1; Zon. 9.19.7–8 (Thermopylae).
103
Livy 37.7.11–15; cf. App. Mac. 9.5.
104
Livy 37.22–4; App. Syr. 22; Just. Epit. 31.6.9; Zon. 9.20.2 (Side); Livy 37.26–30; App. Syr. 27
(Myonessus).
105
Polyb. 21.13–15; Diod. Sic. 29.7–8; Livy 37.34–6; App. Syr. 29–30; Dio fr. 62.2; Just. Epit. 31.7.4-9;
Zon. 9.20.3.
106
Livy 37.38–44.2; App. Syr. 30–7; Just. Epit. 31.8.5–8; Eutrop. 4.4.2; Zon. 9.20.4–7. The Aetolians,
deprived of the support of their liberator, soon followed suit. They were eventually forced to sign
a treaty pledging “to preserve the power and majesty of the Roman people without fraud” (Polyb.
21.32.2; Livy 38.11.2). Discussion and earlier scholarship: Burton 2011: 274–5.
upon ratification of the peace, and 1,000 each year over twelve years; hand
over Hannibal and other advisors, as well as twenty hostages; and give up
all war-elephants, and retain no more than twelve war-ships. Antiochus’
former Asia Minor possessions were partitioned between Pergamum and
Rhodes, with Rome acting as guarantor of the freedom of the remainder
of the Greek cities of the region.107
* * *
At this stage, the Polybian symplokē, the “intertwining” of the events of

the eastern and western Mediterranean, which, as was seen earlier, began
with Philip of Macedon’s attention and ambitions being drawn westward
in 217, while by no means complete, had at least passed the point of no
return. Rome was now deeply enmeshed in the political life of not only
Greece but also Asia Minor. Given the Romans’ positive response to the
calls of their friends and allies when they were under pressure from the
great Hellenistic kings in 201–200 and in the 190s, they could expect no
end to the flow of embassies from the East whenever trouble arose in the
coming decades. Indifference would not be an option. Rome’s major wars
against the great Hellenistic powers over, at least for the moment, it was
now time to manage the peace. Achieved with great violence and with
enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, Rome’s unipolar hegemony
had replaced the long-standing formal anarchy and never-ending interstate
violence of the Hellenistic state system in fairly short order.108 Care and
attention would be required for its maintenance over the long term. The
remainder of this study is concerned with how the kingdom of Macedon
adjusted, or rather failed to adjust, to this new reality.
107
Polyb. 21.24.6–8; Livy 37.55.5–6, 56.1–4 (senatus consultum); Polyb. 21.42; Livy 38.38–39.1; Diod.
Sic. 29.11; App. Syr. 39; Zon. 9.20.8–9 (Peace of Apamea); Polyb. 21.45; Diod. Sic. 29.11; Livy
38.39.5–13 (senatorial commission).
108
On unipolar hegemony and its effects, see now Eckstein 2006: 1–2, 306, 314, and 2008: 1, 25–7,
336–81.
3
The Last Years of Philip V
Philip Bounces Back
As far as can be determined from his known actions, Philip V was a loyal
Roman amicus for the remainder of his reign.1 He provided active logis-
tical and material support to Rome during her wars against Nabis, tyrant
of Sparta (195), and, as was seen at the end of the previous chapter, against
Antiochus III and the Aetolian League.2 During the run-up to the latter
war, the disgruntled Aetolians dispatched envoys to Philip to see if they
could convince him to join them against Rome. They were met with com-
plete indifference.3 Livy, probably reporting a fact that stood in Polybius’
original, now lost account, says that the Aetolian envoys to Antiochus told
the king “a gratuitous lie” when they said that Philip was itching to get
revenge for his defeat by Rome in the Second Macedonian War.4 Indeed,
years later Philip recalled before Roman commissioners that Antiochus
offered him 3,000 talents, forty ships, and the recovery of the Greek cities
he had lost in 196 if he would side with the Seleucid king against Rome.5
The story may or may not be true, but that Philip could credibly retail
it before Roman senatorial commissioners – and make a considerable
impression on them as a result – speaks volumes about the level of trust
that had developed between Philip and the Romans. Indeed, as a reward
for his loyal service, in 190 he was granted a remission of what remained
1
Gruen 1984: 399–402. As will be seen here and in the next two chapters, Polybius detected a pattern
of hostility on Philip’s part – to the extent that he believed the king was secretly preparing for war
against Rome since at least the 180s.
2
War with Nabis: Livy 34.26.10; war with Antiochus III: Zon. 9.20; cf. Livy 36.8.6 (provision of intel-
ligence); Livy 37.39.12 (provision of troops); Livy 37.7.11–15; cf. App. Mac. 9.5 (provision of escorts
and supplies, building roads and bridges). Discussion: Burton 2011: 190–1. Philip also conducted
joint operations with the Romans in Greece against the Aetolians: Livy 36.10.10–14, 13–14, 25; Plut.
Flam. 15.3–4.
3
Livy 35.12.1, 6, 10–14, 13.1.
4
Livy 35.12.17; 36.7.12–13 (retrospective).
5
Livy 39.28.6; App. Mac. 9.6.
39
of his 1,000-talent indemnity (amounting to perhaps 250 talents), and the
return of his younger son, Demetrius, who had been a hostage in Rome
since 196.6
Over the fifteen years between the end of the Second Macedonian
War and his death in 179, Philip restored his kingdom’s fortunes – and
increased its subject territory. After the war with Antiochus was over, and
in gratitude for his collaboration during that war, the Romans allowed
Philip to keep some of his wartime conquests, including the important
city of Demetrias, the entire Magnesian coastline of Thessaly, Athenaeum
and Poetnetum in Athamania, portions of Dolopia and Perrhaebia, and
several towns around the Malian Gulf, including Larisa Cremaste, Alope,
Antron, and Pteleum (Map 2).7 Of course, he was denied the richer prizes
of the strategically important Thessalian town of Lamia, as well as the
Greek cities of Aenus and Maronea on the Thracian coast (Map 3).8 This
was the natural consequence of having been a two-time aggressor against
Rome and her allies, and of subsequently being the junior partner in an
unequal friendship with Rome.9 He would not be allowed to harm Greek
cities liberated at the Isthmia in 196, nor would the Romans allow him to
interfere any longer in Greek affairs beyond his possessions in Thessaly.
Cut off from expansion toward the east, west, and south by Roman
power, Philip naturally turned to restoring his exhausted kingdom,
replenishing his coffers by raising taxes on agriculture and port duties,
and expanding silver mining. He also tried to rebuild the Macedonian
population, devastated by more than a generation of constant warfare and
his own recent losses against the Romans and their allies. He encouraged
procreation among the native population and transferred entire communi-
ties from his Thracian possessions to Macedonia.10 To secure money and
manpower, he also expanded eastward into Thrace,11 and tried, through
skillful diplomacy with the Bastarnae, to neutralize the Dardanian threat
to his kingdom’s northwestern frontier.12 Plutarch says that Philip stocked
6
Polyb. 21.3, 11.9; Livy 35.31.5; 36.35.13; 37.25.12; Diod. Sic. 28.15.1; App. Mac. 9.5.
7
Livy 38.1.11, 2.2 (Athenaeum); 39.25.17 (Athenaeum and Poetnetum); 36.33.7 (Perrhaebia and
Dolopia); 42.42.1, 56.7, 67.9–10 (Malian towns in Perseus’ hands during the next war with Rome).
Livy 39.23.10–13 is a retrospective summary of Philip’s gains, some temporary, during the war against
the Aetolians and Antiochus.
8
Polyb. 20.11.3; Livy 36.25 (Lamia); Livy 39.33.4, 34; cf. Zon. 9.21.
9
On unequal friendship, see now Burton 2011: 31, 63–75 and passim.
10
Livy 39.24.1–4. On the depopulation of the Macedonian kingdom, see Livy 33.3.1–5 (and above,
Chapter 2, p. 32 and n. 79).
11
Polyb. 22.14.12; Livy 39.35.4 (184); cf. Plut. Aem. 8.4.
12
Livy 40.57.4–9 (180); 41.23.12; 42.11.4 (retrospective). The plan involved encouraging the Bastarnae
to migrate westward to the Dardanian lands and subdue its inhabitants. On Philip’s northern policy
The Last Years of Philip V 41
the cities and fortresses of the Macedonian interior with arms, money,
and men, amassing eight million bushels of grain, enough arms to equip
30,000 men, and enough money to employ 10,000 mercenaries for ten
years.13
The ever-pragmatic historian Polybius praises Philip for his vigor after
196 since the king “adapted himself to the reverses of fortune and faced
the circumstances he found himself in with the greatest prudence.”14 Sheer
pragmatism is not the whole story, however. In a later context, the histo-
rian further remarks on the king’s policy following his defeat in 196:
When King Philip grew great and was powerful in Greece, he had the least
regard of all men for good faith and law, but when the wind of good fortune
changed, he was the most moderate of all men. For when he came entirely
to grief in all his affairs, adapting himself to all contingencies, he attempted
by every means to restore his kingdom to health.15
Philip’s behavior, in other words, was both morally and pragmatically com-
mendable: vigorous, adaptable, and above all, moderate. He also main-
tained, as far as he could, given the circumstances, his independence. Far
from being a Roman lackey, Philip rebuilt the power of the Macedonian
kingdom after his defeat, attempting to balance the Republic’s increasing
power in the region, regardless of what the Romans’ strategic preferences
might have been.
The Seeds of Future Conflict

Independent behavior, however, can often be misconstrued as disloyalty,
if not downright enmity. Like all nominally sovereign powers which are,
in reality, locked in a hierarchical relationship imposed on them, Philip
tested the boundaries of his freedom of action, kicking against the limita-
tions established by Rome. This, of course, prompted the Macedonian
kingdom’s natural enemies – its subjects and rivals (king Eumenes II of
generally (including the foundation of the city of Perseis, and the marriage of his eldest son to a
Bastarnian princess), see Meloni 1953: 34–41; Walbank 1940: 237–8, 246.
13
Plut. Aem. 8.4–5. Plutarch, following Polybius, attributes this activity to Philip’s alleged plan for a
war against Rome; see below, Chapter 5, pp. 91–6.
14
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρὴ καὶ τὴν μετάνοιαν αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι καὶ τὴν εὐστοχίαν, καθ᾽ ἣν μεταθέμενος
τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἐλαττώμασιν εὐλογιστότατα δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν καιροῖς (Polyb.
18.33.7).
15
ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεύς, ὅτε μὲν ηὐξήθη καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξουσίαν ἔλαβε, πάντων ἦν
ἀπιστότατος καὶ παρανομώτατος, ὅτε δὲ πάλιν τὰ τῆς τύχης ἀντέπνευσε, πάντων μετριώτατος.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν ἔπταισε, πρὸς πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἁρμοζόμενος ἐπειρᾶτο κατὰ πάντα
τρόπον σωματοποιεῖν τὴν αὑτοῦ βασιλείαν (Polyb. 25.3.9–10).
Pergamum, in particular) – to flood the senate with complaints about the
Macedonian king. The Romans, for their part, responded according to
circumstances, and to their own diplomatic and strategic priorities of the
moment, sometimes insulting and humiliating Philip, but at others turn-
ing a blind eye to his activities.
Some tension in the relationship is detectable as early as mid-191,
when Philip was collaborating with Rome in the war against the Aetolian
League and Antiochus III. The Macedonian king and the Roman con-
sul, M’. Acilius Glabrio, were undertaking joint operations around the
Malian Gulf, Philip besieging Lamia and Acilius, Heraclea (Map 2). After
Heraclea fell to the consul, he instructed the king to break off his siege
of Lamia. According to Livy, Acilius wanted the glory of receiving the
now inevitable capitulation of Lamia, informing Philip that “it was fairer
that Roman soldiers, who had fought with the Aetolians in battle, should
have the spoils of victory.”16 The gratuitously insulting reference to Philip’s
absence (due to illness) from the crucial Roman victory over the joint
Aetolian–Seleucid forces at Thermopylae in 191 must have rankled, but the
king complied with the consul’s command and kept quiet for the moment.
Roman wariness about Philip was reinforced shortly afterward, when
Flamininus, Philip’s vanquisher at Cynoscephalae six years before, advised
Acilius to stop wasting his time besieging cities while Philip was running
amok, conquering entire nations and peoples. Displaying his usual acuity
and flair for Realpolitik, Flamininus declared that “it is not so much in our
interest to diminish the power and strength of the Aetolians as to ensure
that Philip’s does not grow beyond measure.”17
Mistrust of Philip by the Roman high command is seen again in a
strange anecdote from the following year. In 190, Philip was given the
delicate task of providing for the Roman legions a secure marching route
through Macedonia and Thrace toward the Hellespont for their final
showdown with Antiochus III in Asia Minor. Scipio Africanus, accompa-
nying his brother and consul for 190, Lucius Scipio, advised him to test
Philip’s loyalty before entrusting the security of the Roman army to the
king. Africanus’ friend Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was dispatched to Pella at
lightning speed to surprise Philip and see whether he was planning some
16
Livy 36.25.5–8, with the quotation at §7 (aequius esse Romanos milites, qui acie dimicassent cum
Aetolis, praemia uictoriae habere); 39.23.8–24.1 (where Livy, following Polybius, explicitly cites the
incident as a cause of Philip’s anger, and thus, his preparations for war with Rome; see below,
Chapter 5, p. 94); cf. Plut. Flam. 15.4.
17
Atqui non tantum interest nostra Aetolorum opes ac uires minui, quantum non supra modum Philippum
crescere (Livy 36.34.10). On Flamininus’ Realpolitik, see Badian 1970.
treachery. In the event, all was well: Gracchus found the king quite relaxed
(drunk, in fact), radiating nothing but goodwill toward the Romans. The
next morning, Philip detailed to Gracchus everything he was preparing for
the Romans’ journey. In the end, the king did all he promised – and then
some: the legions marched through Macedonia and Thrace in safety and,
thanks to Philip’s logistical arrangements, on smooth roads, over newly
built bridges, and on full stomachs. Africanus soon rendezvous-ed with
his brother across the Hellespont, clearly impressed by the king’s capability
and natural charm.18
Despite Philip’s solicitude on this occasion, once the Romans’ focus
turned to fighting Antiochus in Asia, they failed to provide him any
support in mainland Greece. When the Aetolians and their allies, the
Athamanians, began their spring offensive in 190, the remaining Roman
troops in the area stayed put in their garrisons, leaving Philip to face his
enemies alone. The Athamanians, tiring of Philip’s harsh rule, rose up
against their Macedonian garrisons and drove them from the country.
The combined forces of the Aetolians and Athamanians then defeated
Philip and a Macedonian infantry force of 6,000 men, driving them back
to Macedonia. Philip was then systematically stripped of all his acquisi-
tions of the year before, as the Aetolians and Athamanians took control
of Aperantia, Amphilochia, and Dolopia.19 Meanwhile, Amynander of
Athamania began laying accusations against Philip before the Scipios in
Asia.20
The Roman settlement with Aetolia in the following year was deeply
disappointing to Philip. The king sent letters to the leading men in Rome,
complaining that the Aetolians had unjustly taken Athamania and Dolopia
from him, and asking them to speak against the Aetolian peace proposals
in the senate.21 Evidently the patres were less circumspect about the king’s
loyalty than the commanders in the field: Philip’s letters succeeded in hard-
ening their hearts and minds against the Aetolians. Their resolve was tem-
porary, however, and peace was soon struck.22
After the war with Antiochus was over, the booty-laden Roman army
was marching back from Asia Minor through Thrace when it was sud-
denly ambushed. According to Livy, “it was thought that this was done
18
Livy 37.7.8–16.
19
Polyb. 21.25.3–7; Livy 38.1.1–3.6.
20
Polyb. 21.25.2; cf. Livy 38.3.2.
21
Polyb. 21.31.3–4; cf. Livy 38.10.3 (who, however, embellishes Polybius by adding a Macedonian
embassy to the senate, and Aetolian Amphilochia to Philip’s list of lands stolen from him).
22
Polyb. 21.32; cf. Livy 38.11.
not without the treachery of Philip.” Livy’s distancing of himself from the
allegation (through the use of an impersonal construction) may reflect his
– or perhaps his source’s – reluctance to vouch for the story.23 But the
opinio probably resonated with those who were prepared to believe the
worst of Philip. One of these was Eumenes of Pergamum. The Pergamene
king benefitted handsomely from Rome’s victory over Antiochus, having
been given sovereignty over the lion’s share of the Seleucid king’s former
Asia Minor possessions, as well as control of the Thracian Chersonese, thus
providing him with a toe-hold in Europe. This only exacerbated the long-
standing Pergamene–Macedonian rivalry. Two bones of contention in par-
ticular – the Greek cities of Aenus and Maronea on the Thracian coastline
– would prove to be one of the driving factors behind Philip’s growing
resentment toward Rome. In their arrangements following the war with
Antiochus, the Romans expelled the Seleucid garrisons from these cities,
declared them free, and established as the frontier of Philip’s kingdom
an inland road that ran through southern Thrace just behind Aenus and
Maronea.24 Philip, however, clearly thought the cities belonged to him; his
ambassadors would later allege that Acilius Glabrio handed them over to
him when he was busy besieging Aetolian cities.25 Shortly after the inland
road had been established as the southern boundary of his kingdom, Philip
simply rerouted the road further south to the coastline in order to stake
his claim to Aenus and Maronea and their fertile territories.26 This roused
the ire of Eumenes, who thought that if anyone should possess these
places, it was he. After all, he had been the main victim of the aggressions
of Antiochus, and was rewarded by Rome with suzerainty over former
Seleucid possessions in the Thracian Chersonese.27 To make matters worse,
the populations of both cities were split between pro-Pergamene and pro-
Macedonian factions, the latter perhaps encouraged by Philip.28
23
Opinio erat non sine Philippi Macedonum regis fraude id factum (Livy 38.40.8). By contrast, Appian
(Mac. 9.5) says that the ambush demonstrated how great a service Philip had provided the Romans
when they marched toward the Hellespont. Errington 1971: 196, 197 argues that Philip believed
the incident demonstrated how precarious the safety of the coastal cities, particularly Aenus and
Maronea, would be if they were set free.
24
Livy 37.60.7 (liberation of Aenus and Maronea), 39.27.10 (establishment of frontier).
25
Livy 39.24.12 (eas ciuitates here probably refers to all the places mentioned, including Aenus and
Maronea, in §§7–11); cf. Polyb. 22.6.1–3.
26
Livy 39.27.10.
27
Polyb. 21.48.9; Livy 38.39.14 (the assignment of Antiochus’ former Thracian possessions to
Eumenes); Polyb. 22.6.1–3; Livy 39.24.6 (envoys of Eumenes before the senate); Livy 39.27.2–6
(Eumenes’ claims).
28
Polyb. 22.6.2, 6–7; Livy 39.24.8–9; cf. Plut. Aem. 8.4 (who speaks of Philip weakening the coastal
cities, which may be an allusion to stasis between pro-Pergamene and pro-Macedonian factions
there).
Such were the complaints of ambassadors from Pergamum and Maronea,
who arrived before the senate in winter 186/5, along with some Athamanian,
Thessalian, and Perrhaebian envoys, who wanted to recover cities taken
from them by Philip during the recent war with Antiochus. Envoys from
Philip also appeared to defend the king against the Pergamene accusations.
The senate empowered a commission of three to visit Macedon, to provide
safe-conduct to those accusing Philip of wrongdoing, and to adjudicate
the disputes.29
Arriving at Tempe by early spring, the three commissioners (Q. Caecilius
Metellus, M. Baebius Tamphilus, and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus)30 set up
shop to hear the accusations against Philip. Thessalian and Perrhaebian
envoys complained that Philip’s acquisitions in their lands rested on illegit-
imate foundations since the king’s agreement with the Roman command-
ers during the Aetolian War, that he was to keep any Aetolian conquests
he made, covered only those towns that were originally Aetolian, not
Thessalian towns lately conquered by them.31 Philip responded to these
obviously trivial and sophistic allegations in kind, but also uttered an
ominous-sounding phrase (quoting Theocritus): “the sun of all my days
has not yet set.”32 The commissioners decreed that Philip was to with-
draw his garrisons from the Thessalian towns mentioned by the envoys
(Philippopolis (Gomphi), Tricca, Phaloria, Eurymenae, and the cities
nearby that had been conquered by the Aetolians), and to restrict his
kingdom to its ancient boundaries.33 This was, at best, a paradoxical rul-
ing: the first clause evidently left Philip in charge of Thessalian Demetrias,
29
Polyb. 22.6.1–6; Zon. 9.21.5; Livy 39.24.5–14. Livy’s account suffers from some embellishment; thus
he has the Athamanian envoys complain that their entire kingdom has been taken over by Philip,
but unless we posit a second Macedonian reconquest after 189, this conflicts with the fact that
Philip lost most of his Athamanian gains of 191 in 189 (Livy 38.1 with above, p. 43). In contrast,
Polybius’ Athamanians merely complain that they should get back the towns taken by Philip. This
is surely a reference to Athenaeum and Poetnetum, still held by Philip after 189 (above, p. 40
and n. 7). Polybius’ account is to be preferred, especially since Livy (following Polybius) has the
Athamanians refer only to Athenaeum and Poetnetum before the commissioners at Tempe later on
(Livy 39.25.17).
30
Mistakenly identified as “Tiberius Claudius” by Polybius’ epitomator (22.6.6); Livy 39.24.13 has the
correct name, which must have stood in the Polybian original.
31
Livy 39.23.10 (the agreement); Livy 39.25.4–5 (the Thessalian and Perrhaebian complaint). This bit
of sophistry is strikingly reminiscent of Flamininus’ deliberate fudging of the terms of Rome’s 211
treaty with the Aetolian League. The treaty stated that the Aetolians could keep any towns captured
from Philip, but Flamininus later alleged that it stated that the Aetolians could keep only those
towns taken by force, and not those that surrendered to the Romans voluntarily. Inscriptional
evidence proves that Flamininus was lying (sources and discussion: Burton 2011: 91 n. 38, 269–70).
Could the Thessalian envoys’ position at Tempe in 185 be a stalking horse for the Romans’ own?
32
Nondum omnium dierum solem occidisse (Livy 39.26.9).
33
Livy 39.25–6; cf. Diod. Sic. 29.16.
Magnesia, and Dolopia, in addition to his other gains around the Malian
Gulf (Larisa Cremaste, Alope, Antron, and Pteleum), while the second
seemed to imply that he should vacate all these as well. The decree’s opacity
was probably deliberate – a stop-gap solution to an escalating, and increas-
ingly delicate diplomatic situation. It was designed to appease Eumenes
and the Thessalians by giving the impression of hostility to Philip without
actually depriving him of anything of great significance.34
The commission, with Philip in tow, moved on to Thessalonica to hear
complaints related to Philip’s activities in Thrace, particularly around
Aenus and Maronea. The Pergamene envoys spoke first, saying that the
Romans should ensure that these cities were truly rather than nominally
free, or if that was not possible, to grant the cities to Eumenes, who was
more deserving of them. The Maronean exiles then spoke, alleging that
Philip had diverted the east–west Thracian inland road south to the coast,
and that their city was now full of Macedonians and Philip’s lackeys, who
controlled access to political office. Rather than defending himself on the
specific charges, as he had done at Tempe, Philip now turned to a list
of his grievances with the Romans. He lamented the Romans’ unfairness
to himself, citing their protection of Macedonian cities that had defected
from his rule during the Second Macedonian War, the interrupted siege of
Lamia. during the war with Aetolia and Antiochus, and their questioning
of his loyalty. It was at this point that Philip told the story of Antiochus’
failed bid to get him to side with him in his war with Rome. “If you insist
on persecuting me as a personal enemy and a threat to your state,” the
king concluded, “continue to act as you have done. But if some respect is
owed me as an allied and friendly king, I beg you not to judge me worthy
of such an injury.”35
Livy says that Philip’s words made a considerable impression on the
commissioners, who once again took the soft, diplomatic option: the sta-
tus of Aenus and Maronea would have to await a senatorial decision, but in
the meantime, Philip must vacate those places.36 The following year, once
again prompted by embassies sent to Rome by Eumenes and the Thracian
exiles, the senate decreed that Philip was to vacate Aenus and Maronea, and
34
Errington 1971: 198.
35
Livy 39.27–8, with the quotation at 28.12–13 (si tamquam inimicum et hostem insectari propositum est,
pergite ut coepistis facere: sin aliquis respectus est mei ut socii atque amici regis, deprecor, ne me tanta ini-
uria dignum iudicetis). The stricture against punishing disloyal Macedonian cities, alleged by Philip
at 39.28.2–3, is otherwise unreported in the extant texts. Philip’s resentment over being ordered to
withdraw from the siege of Lamia is first reported here.
36
Livy 39.29.1–2.
that the entire Thracian coastline was to be set free.37 Philip then prompted
the massacre of the partisans of Eumenes in Maronea, but disclaimed any
responsibility for it before the newly arrived Roman commissioners in
Greece. The latter flatly rejected the king’s claims, and demanded that he
send the perpetrators to Rome to answer for their crimes.38 “And so Philip
was therefore eager to resist and attack [the Romans] in every possible
way,” Polybius concludes, “but because he lacked the forces to carry out
some of the things he had in mind, he considered how he might engineer
some delay and take time for his preparations for war.” The king decided
to play his diplomatic trump card, dispatching his younger son Demetrius
to Rome to clear him of the charges laid against him, and to placate the
anger of the senate.39
A Domestic Tragedy
Polybian scholar Frank W. Walbank famously described as “tragic” the
surviving accounts, all of them derived ultimately from Polybius, of the
last years of Philip V.40 Despite Polybius’ aversion to “tragic” history in
his fellow historians, his own account of the end of Philip’s reign is suf-
fused with “tragic paraphernalia,” as Walbank describes it: the gods, the
furies, all-seeing Justice, and avenging Fortune (Tychē).41 For Polybius,
all of these conspired to avenge the atrocities of the king’s early years by
provoking him in his later years into irrational decision-making, includ-
ing a secret plan to make war on Rome, and the murder of his younger
37
Livy 39.33.1–5.
38
In the event, Philip successfully sought a reprieve for the architect of the massacre, his Thracian
governor Onomastus, while the man responsible for implementing it, a certain Cassander, was
conveniently done away with before he could reach Rome (Polyb. 22.14.5; cf. Livy 39.34.9–10).
39
Polyb. 22.13–14, with the quotation at 14.8 (καθόλου μὲν οὖν πρόθυμος ἦν εἰς τὸ κατὰ πάντα
τρόπον ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μετελθεῖν αὐτούς· πρὸς ἔνια δὲ τῶν ἐπινοουμένων ἀπόχειρος ὢν
ἐπεβάλετο πῶς ἂν ἔτι γένοιτό τις ἀναστροφὴ καὶ λάβοι χρόνον πρὸς τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον
παρασκευάς); Livy 39.34.1–35.3. Cf. Walbank 1938: 66, who, however, tries to play down the clear
implication of the passage that Philip was simultaneously aggressive and defensive vis-à-vis Rome
(recognized by Gruen 1974: 232 n. 36).
40
Walbank 1938. He did not mean that Polybius’ largely lost account (and the surviving Livian
account, which demonstrably depends on it) is tragic in the formal sense, or based on tragic or nov-
elistic accounts of Philip’s last years, but that he adopted the rhetoric and supernatural machinery
of tragedy in order to make a moral point about Philip’s character and behavior.
41
Walbank 1938: 64 (based on Polyb. 23.10). Walbank argues that Polybius’s account is not “tragic” in
the sense for which he condemns others (see previous n.), since he avoids the chief vices of tragic
history-writers – inaccuracy, excessive sensationalizing, and melodrama. Polybius’ account, how-
ever, does share another significant flaw of “tragic” historians: excessive reliance on the divine to
account for the causes of events.
son Demetrius at the behest of the elder, Perseus, which ultimately
doomed the Macedonian kingdom in the next generation.42 In so con-
structing his account, Polybius demonstrated a considerable (but rare)
lapse in historical judgment, according to Walbank: “Polybius’ account
of [the] last years of Philip [is] one of the least satisfying in his whole
work.”43
Whether Walbank was justified in this view will be discussed in
Chapter 5; for the moment, a presentation of the facts is necessary.
Unfortunately, we have no idea how the rift between Philip’s sons,
Demetrius and Perseus, began or developed. Perseus first appears on the
historical stage during the Second Macedonian War: at 12 or 13 years of
age, he was sent by his father, accompanied by various high-level Friends
of the king, to occupy the passes of Pelagonia.44 He also saw action in
his late teens in the war against the Aetolian League and Antiochus.45
Perseus’ younger brother Demetrius was handed over at 10 years of age as
a hostage to the Romans following the Second Macedonian War.46 It was
as a hostage, so Polybius asserts, that Demetrius became influential with
the senate,47 which is why his father sent him to Rome in 184 to respond
to complaints against him by Eumenes, various Thessalian cities, the
Perrhaebians, Athamanians, Epirotes, and Illyrians. The young prince
was given ample time to respond to the barrage of complaints, but was
clearly out of his depth, and so the senators allowed him to consult his
notes. Demetrius produced “a little notebook” (τι βυβλίδιον οὐ μέγα,
a small scroll), but rather than having him read it, the senators asked
him to summarize its contents. Demetrius reported Philip’s responses to
each of the charges laid by the others and reiterated the king’s complaint
about his treatment by the Romans. The senate responded, once again,
diplomatically: they accepted Philip’s word, as reported by Demetrius,
that the king had acted or would act justly, but would also send yet
another commission to check on his compliance with their wishes. The
latter was a sop to Eumenes, who was no doubt frustrated by the sen-
ate’s generous treatment of Demetrius and, by extension, his father. To
42
Polyb. 23.10.
43
Walbank 1938: 67 and 1979: 205–9; cf. Meloni 1953: 70–2; Errington 1971: 207–8, 288–9 n. 30, 1990:
210; Harris 1979: 227; Gruen 1984: 402, 408; Hammond 1988: 490; Green 1990: 426; Rosenstein
2012: 216; Briscoe 2012: 13, 15. The origin of the allegation of Philip’s secret war-plans is the speech
of Callicrates of Leontium in 175/4; see below, Chapter 5, pp. 91–6.
44
Livy 31.28.5, 34.6; discussion: Meloni 1953: 16–23.
45
Livy 38.5.10, 7.1, 10.3; discussion: Meloni 1953: 23–9.
46
Polyb. 18.39.5; Livy 34.52.9, 35.31.5, 36.35.13.
47
Polyb. 22.14.10.
placate the Pergamene king further, the senate spelled out the reasons
for its decision: it was because of their regard for Demetrius that they
had done him the favor of trusting Philip – and not, by implication,
because they trusted Philip himself.48
The consequences of the conspicuous favoritism shown by the senate
towards Demetrius were no doubt devastating to his relationship with his
brother,49 who perhaps may have already been troubled by his father con-
ferring such an important diplomatic assignment on his younger sibling.
Scholars have argued that this was precisely the senate’s intention; it was all
part of their divide and rule policy in the East, applied to ruling families as
well as states.50 As Gruen has observed, however, this is to confuse results with
intentions, and besides, Philip got exactly what he wanted from his son’s mis-
sion – a favorable response.51 Note, too, that it was not the senate’s idea to send
Demetrius on this mission. The senators’ expressions of favor for Demetrius
contain no reference (implicit or overt) to Perseus, and their back-handed
disparagement of Philip was designed to appease Eumenes, not to undermine
the ruling house of Macedon.
But what of another incident reported by Polybius, that Flamininus
took Demetrius aside while he was in Rome and secretly intimated to
him that the Macedonian throne was his for the taking? Flamininus also
sent a letter to Philip, asking him to send Demetrius back to Rome with
as many of his most useful Friends as possible. The letter, Polybius says,
became the ground upon which Perseus convinced his father to have
Demetrius executed later on.52 Unfortunately, Polybius’ account of the
final tragedy of the house of Philip is no longer extant, but Livy, most
likely following Polybius, reveals that another letter from Flamininus
was procured by Philip’s Friends Philocles and Apelles in 181. It
requested that the king forgive Demetrius for discussing with himself
his desire for the Macedonian throne, and that Flamininus would never
have advised the young man to do anything against his own family. This
letter, if authentic (which Livy denies), is significant for what it does not
say. It does not warn Philip to watch his back because his younger son
is plotting a coup; it does not advise the king to replace Perseus with his
younger brother in his succession plan. In fact, the letter was designed,
48
Polyb. 23.1–2; cf. Livy 39.46–7; App. Mac. 9.6; Just. Epit. 32.2.3; discussion: Meloni 1953: 30–1.
49
As Polyb. 23.3.4–9; cf. Livy 39.48.1.
50
E.g. Edson 1935: 193; Walbank 1940: 239, 241; Errington 1971: 199; Waterfield 2014: 162 (“Demetrius
would be the Macedonian equivalent of Callicrates in Achaea”); contra Gruen 1984: 402.
51
Gruen 1974: 234; cf. Green 1990: 425–6.
52
Polyb. 23.3.7–9; discussion: Meloni 1953: 32–3.
precisely, to allay such rumors, which had probably been making the
rounds for years by then.53
This is to anticipate, however. When Demetrius returned from Rome
early in 182, having had his head turned by the Romans’ solicitude and
attention, his popularity among ordinary Macedonians increased signif-
icantly since he had successfully deflected Roman suspicions of Philip’s
intentions, and thus ensured that peace with Rome would continue. Some
also began talking about Demetrius as a possible heir to Philip since this
would be a choice that would meet with Roman approval. Despite being
younger than Perseus, it was said, Demetrius was at least a legitimate son
of Philip, born of a legal wife, while Perseus was the bastard son of a con-
cubine. Such talk made Perseus fear for his position as successor; indeed,
Philip was heard to say that Demetrius was now a burden to him since his
popularity with the Romans would leave him little choice but to make him
his heir.54
Perseus began to play on his father’s suspicion of his younger son,
his popularity, and his good relations with the Romans. By branding
Demetrius a Roman stooge, Perseus stoked his father’s anger and resent-
ment. Court politics then took their inevitable course: the king’s Friends,
sensing the way the wind was blowing (and looking toward their own
future security), began abandoning the (perceived) pro-Roman Demetrius
in droves. They stoked the king’s anger and urged him to war with Rome,
meanwhile engaging Demetrius in conversation about the Romans, hop-
ing to catch him out in some treasonous statement. They attacked Roman
customs, institutions, leadership, and even the appearance of the city,
luring Demetrius into a defense of these. Soon he was shut out of his
father’s counsels altogether, which gave Perseus exclusive access to Philip,
with whom he discussed his Roman war-plans day and night, all the while
filling the sick and enfeebled king’s paranoid mind with allegations that
Demetrius was a Roman spy.55
53
Gruen 1974: 244. For a defence of the letter’s authenticity, perhaps in attenuated form, see Walbank
1940: 251 (followed by Meloni 1953: 51–2); cf. Heiland 1913: 12. Edson 1935: 200 does not think the
letter is out of place in the context of Roman–Macedonian relations in the late 180s. Errington
1971: 200, 288 n. 28 reserves judgment. Pareti 1952: 742; Green 1990: 426; Waterfield 2014: 164
believe it is a forgery. Pareti also doubts (along with Benecke 1930: 252) that Flamininus had a secret
conversation with Demetrius in Rome. Adams 1982: 243 n. 44 rightly points out that, regardless of
Flamininus’ intentions, the effect on Demetrius’ paranoid brother and father was probably as Livy
says it was.
54
Livy 39.53.2–6. Perseus is variously said to have been born of a courtesan, an Argive seamstress
called Gnathaenion, and Polycratea, daughter of Aratus of Sicyon. Sources and discussion: Heiland
1913: 9; Meloni 1953: 10–15; Ogden 2010: 234–5, 242 nn. 96–7; Waterfield 2014: 163.
55
Livy 40.5.2–14; cf. Zon. 9.22.1; discussion: Meloni 1953: 32–3.
Soon, the antipathy between the two brothers was manifested publicly,
and violently, during the ceremonial purification of the Macedonian army
in 182. The festivities traditionally culminated in a mock battle between con-
tingents of the Macedonian army armed with wooden stakes. On this occa-
sion, Perseus and Demetrius commanded the rival contingents. Soon the
mock battle turned deadly serious, says Livy, as though the prize of the vic-
tory was the Macedonian throne itself. Demetrius had the best of it, but the
king’s Friends reassured the aggrieved Perseus that this result could only help
Perseus’ cause.56
Later that day, the princes each hosted rival banquets for their con-
tingents since Perseus refused to dine with his brother. Heavy drink-
ing soon led the men to recount their exploits of earlier in the day, in
addition to some light-hearted mockery of their adversaries and their
leaders. Perseus dispatched a spy to listen in on the conversation at
Demetrius’ banquet. The spy was caught, however, and roughed up
by some of Demetrius’ men. Demetrius apparently knew nothing of
this, for he later suggested to his men that they should all head over
to Perseus’ place to bury the hatchet. The men set off, those who had
beaten up Perseus’ spy, fearing retaliation, carrying concealed swords.
An informant told Perseus that the men were on their way, some of
them with arms. Although the informant told Perseus the reason the
men were carrying weapons, the prince decided to manufacture a scan-
dal out of it anyway, ostentatiously locking his front door, barricading
himself in an upper story of his house, and refusing entry to his broth-
er’s men, claiming that they had been sent to kill him. Demetrius, in a
drunken stupor, complained about being shut out, and returned to his
own party, completely unaware that he had been tricked, or indeed that
some of his retinue carried arms.57
The next day, Perseus told his father of the alleged assassination attempt.
Livy’s account of what follows (probably based on Polybius’ original, now
lost, version) resembles nothing so much as the middle act of a Greek tra-
gedy. Philip summoned Demetrius to respond to the charges, and while
he was waiting, with Perseus standing at a distance (downstage, as it were),
the old king paced up and down in deep, brooding contemplation. When
Demetrius arrived, Philip began his lament in tragic fashion: how miser-
able for him, in the autumn of his years, to have to adjudicate between
his sons, one charging fratricide, the other accused of it. By the time he
56
Livy 40.6.
57
Livy 40.7.
finished speaking, all present were in tears.58 Perseus then delivered his
indictment, carefully prefacing it with the (vaguely Oedipal) claim that
despite his total and unconditional love for his father, his father felt no
affection for him as a son. In addition to citing the previous day’s activities,
Perseus based his claims against Demetrius on the letter of Flamininus to
Philip: the Roman had summoned Demetrius to Rome to further corrupt
him, and asked him to bring leading Macedonians along so the prince
would have more supporters in his plot to dethrone Philip.59 When Perseus
finished speaking, all looked toward Demetrius, but he could barely speak,
his voice choked with tearful sobs. Ordered to speak, he protested his
innocence, insisting that he was isolated and alone; he was the underdog
and victim here, not Perseus. He lamented that the support of the Romans
was more bane than boon, placing him under a dark cloud of suspicion.
But if treason lurked behind his dealings with Flamininus, Demetrius con-
tinued, why did Perseus wait until the night before to create an elabor-
ate farce to bring him down? And why should he be reproached with his
friendship with the Romans? Did he ask to be sent as hostage, and later,
ambassador to Rome? His relationship with Rome may not have done him
credit, but it should not have been held against him. If it came to all-out
war, he would be Rome’s deadliest enemy.60 Demetrius finished his speech,
overcome by tears and loss of voice and breath. Philip deferred a decision
for the moment, pledging to investigate the lifestyle and character of his
sons.61
Following up on his vow to investigate matters further, Philip dispatched
Philocles and Apelles to Rome, where they were to sound out any infor-
mation they could on Demetrius’ conversations with the Romans, and
especially whether Flamininus had discussed with him his ambitions for
the Macedonian throne.62 Meanwhile, Demetrius lived in fear of Perseus’
machinations, and so watched carefully what he said and did. He did not
58
Livy 40.8. A fragment of Philip’s speech survives from Polybius’ account (23.11); its close resem-
blance to the analogous passage in Livy makes the Polybian derivation of Livy 40.8.1–16.3 a virtual
certainty.
59
Livy 40.9–11.
60
Livy 40.12–15.
61
Livy 40.16.1–3. Whether this confrontation took place is, of course, impossible to verify. Polybius’
informants may have been the Macedonian courtiers who were exiled to Italy, along with Polybius
himself, in 168–167 (on these, see below, Chapter 5, pp. 81, 93). The speeches are almost certainly
inauthentic. See Edson 1935: 196; Meloni 1953: 45; Gruen 1974: 240–1; Hammond 1988: 471–2 and
1989: 361–2; Hatzopoulos 1996: 311.
62
Livy 40.20.3–4. Walbank 1940: 247 n. 4 (followed by Meloni 1953: 46–7; Adams 1982: 244
n. 52) rightly rejects Livy’s assertion (40.20.4) that Philocles and Apelles were Perseus’ agents in the
plan to bring down Demetrius.
dare mention or consort with the Romans, even refusing to accept corre-
spondence from them, so as not to stoke his father’s anger further.63
Demetrius then accompanied Philip and Perseus on a family expedi-
tion to Mt. Haemus in Thrace. This project apparently had its origins in
Philip’s restless energy for conquest – in Livy’s Latin version, his cupido.
In Polybius’ original Greek version, the adjective used was likely pothos –
that quality of yearning, of longing for something out of reach, which the
ancients associated with Alexander the Great, from whom Philip believed
himself descended.64 But Livy (no doubt following Polybius) once again
puts the worst possible construction on the king’s actions: Philip wanted
to keep his troops in good shape (for the coming war against Rome, it is
implied), but also thought the expedition would allay any suspicion that
he was preparing for war with Rome.65 He also believed, incorrectly, that
from the peak of Mt. Haemus, one could see both the Adriatic and Black
Seas, the Hister River, and the Alps; this would prove useful for plotting
his invasion route to Italy.66
Before Philip began his ascent, however, he sent Demetrius home, osten-
sibly so that, if the expedition came to grief, the entire royal family would
not be wiped out at a stroke, but in reality, says Livy, in order to exclude
him from the king’s discussions of the invasion route to Italy and strategy
for the war.67 Demetrius knew why he was being sent back, but could
not object without further stoking his father’s suspicions. He was accom-
panied by Didas, one of Philip’s generals, and a fellow-conspirator with
Perseus against Demetrius’ life. Perseus had instructed Didas to insinuate
himself into his brother’s confidences so as to obtain more incriminating
information.68
The plan worked. Didas flattered Demetrius, expressed sympathy for his
plight, and offered to help him in any way he could. Demetrius revealed
that he was planning to flee to Rome, and that his route would be through
Paeonia, whose governor Didas happened to be. Didas reported back to
63
Livy 40.20.5–6.
64
Livy 40.21–2; cf. Polyb. 24.4 (Mt. Haemus expedition; discussion: Heiland 1913: 24–7); Arr. Anab.
1.3.5, etc. (Alexander’s pothos); Dreyer 2013: 206 (Philip’s pothos); Walbank 1993, and above, Chapter
2, n. 16 (Philip’s beliefs about his origins).
65
Skepticism about this motive: Meloni 1953: 47. Meloni also believes that this expedition was of a
piece with Philip’s northern policy of recent years, to reduce the tribes on his northernmost frontier
to obedience. He also suggests that the king was simply curious to see whether the rumors about
what could be seen from the peak of Mt. Haemus were true.
66
Livy 40.21.2, 7.
67
Livy 40.21.5–9.
68
Livy 40.21.9–11.
Perseus, who then informed Philip. Demetrius’ friend Herodorus was
arrested while Demetrius himself was placed under heavy surveillance.
Philip awaited the return of Philocles and Apelles from Rome before tak-
ing any action, however. Upon their return, they produced the letter from
Flamininus to Philip mentioned earlier – a forgery, according to Livy –
urging him to free Demetrius from suspicion.69
In the end, the intent of the letter yielded the opposite result: the king
was now even more suspicious of his younger son. Perseus then revealed his
brother’s plot to escape to Rome through Paeonia, and the fact that he had
bribed some of his associates to accompany him. Philip sent Demetrius
in Didas’ company to Astraeum in Paeonia, ordering his general to kill
his son during the trip. The hapless young man was poisoned by Didas,
and then finished off by a certain Thyrsis of Stuberra and a Beroean called
Alexander, who smothered Demetrius in his coverlets.70
The denouement to this domestic tragedy came a short time later.
Antigonus, son of Antigonus Doson’s brother Echecrates (and Philip’s
second cousin, once removed), revealed (or alleged) that Philocles and
Apelles had forged the letter that Perseus had used to convince his father
to condemn Demetrius to death. A certain Xychus, who knew the truth
about Perseus’ plot, was arrested by Antigonus and brought before Philip.
Threatened with torture, Xychus revealed his own role in the plot to bring
down Demetrius. Apelles, getting wind of Xychus’ revelations, fled to Italy;
Philocles’ fate is unknown.71 Perseus, his crimes fully revealed, exiled him-
self from Macedon. Philip did not live long enough, however, to secure the
throne for his newly chosen successor, the informer Antigonus. The king
died a broken-hearted, anxiety-ridden insomniac, his sick mind haunted
by the ghost of Demetrius and racked with guilt over his lifetime of cru-
elty. Perseus, summoned by Philip’s doctor before the king breathed his
last, surprised everyone by arriving in Macedon from Thrace so soon after
his death. The throne was his by August or September 179. Livy concludes,
laconically, “Perseus seized the kingdom, secured for him by a crime.”72
69
Livy 40.23.1–8.
70
Livy 40.23.9-24; cf. Zon. 9.22.1.
71
Diod. Sic. 29.25 claims that Philip had both men put to death.
72
Livy 40.54–57.1; cf. Polyb. 23.10.13; Plut. Aem. 8.6; Arat. 54.3; Diod. Sic. 29.25; Zon. 9.22.1. The
date: Meloni 1953: 460–1. The denouement is largely fictional, based on rumor and gossip: Heiland
1913: 12–13; Edson 1935: 199–200; Walbank 1940: 253; Meloni 1953: 55–9; Derow 1989: 295 n. 12
(against e.g. Benecke 1930: 254–5); Hatzopoulos 1996: 310–12. Meloni (57) has the best, albeit specu-
lative, argument against authenticity: why would Philip, who had carefully nurtured his kingdom’s
resources since 196, perhaps with a view to further foreign conquests, have left behind a situation
that virtually guaranteed those same resources would all be squandered in civil war between two
rival contenders for the throne? This does not necessarily invalidate the episode’s depiction of the
Conclusion
The decade and a half separating Philip’s second war with Rome from his
death was marked by a transformation in Roman foreign policy, largely as
a result of their success against Philip and his erstwhile ally Antiochus III.
Rome’s intrusion into the Hellenistic world and the affairs of the Greeks
was, by 180, irreversible. Philip accommodated himself to these drastically
changed circumstances by pressing his independence of action as far as
it could go without provoking Roman military reprisals. During Rome’s
wars with Nabis, and with Antiochus III and the Aetolian League, he was
a valuable collaborator and was duly rewarded with modest gains. But he
was also frustrated by the limitations imposed on his freedom of action by
Roman commanders, and by Roman arrangements in the East. His hands
were also increasingly tied by a plethora of Roman allies who needed lit-
tle prompting to complain to the senate of the king’s activities. When a
senatorial commission invited complaints against Philip by all and sundry
in the mid-180s, his reaction is as would be expected of a proud and vig-
orous self-proclaimed descendant of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and
Antigonus the One-Eyed: proclaiming “the sun of all my days has not yet
set,” he delayed the ordered surrender of Aenus and Maronea for two years,
and when he could do so no longer without inviting reprisals, instituted
a massacre on a portion of the population of Maronea as he withdrew,
before dispatching a placatory embassy to Rome led by his son Demetrius.
Philip, in other words, in the post-Cynoscephalae era tried to walk a
fine line between independence and appeasement, defiance and deference,
coolness and collaboration. It was the only option available to a proud,
independent-minded Hellenistic monarch caught in an unequal friend-
ship with a victorious former enemy. Philip’s son and successor would
attempt to do the same, but with very different results.
operation of court politics, especially as regards how Apelles’ exile from Philip’s presence and down-
fall play out (Ma 2011: 522–3).
4
The Reign of Perseus
Introduction
This chapter and the next are primarily concerned with Macedonian affairs
before the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War and are, therefore,
focused on the activities of Macedon’s new king Perseus throughout most
of the 170s. A great deal of what he achieved in this period, one way or
another, and largely retrospectively, found their way into the Roman jus-
tification for the declaration of war on the king in 171. The main purpose
of these two chapters (and the key concern of this study) is to establish
the most important likely causes of the Third Macedonian War in order
to clarify the nature and evolution of Roman imperialism during the mid-
dle republican period. Our view of the Romans as imperialists will differ
significantly if, for example, they eagerly and aggressively pursued the war
option against Perseus as soon as suitable pretexts presented themselves
or if, on the contrary, they ignored Perseus’ activities and all such pretexts
until other factors forced them to act at the last minute. The evidence must
be handled carefully and critically, and the analysis of possible causes car-
ried out reasonably free of interpretative bias.
I have, therefore, decided to step into the same river twice. This chapter
is meant to be a simple recapitulation of the chronology and the relevant
facts, insofar as they can be known, from the beginning of Perseus’ reign
in late 179 to the Roman declaration of war on him shortly after the begin-
ning of consular 171. Chapter 5 then shows how this same material has
been used by historians, both ancient and modern, to build their theories
about the causes of the Third Macedonian War. These theories will be
subject to analysis in terms of modern theories of imperialism. I will then
tentatively offer my own explanation for why the war broke out when it
did, and the implications of this for the nature of Roman foreign policy
and imperialism in the middle Republic. Casual readers, those who have
already made their minds up about the nature of Roman imperialism, and
56
The Reign of Perseus 57
those uninterested in such matters can safely skip the next chapter without
losing the thread of the story.
Perseus Rex
Among Perseus’ first acts as ruler was to renew his father’s friendship, amici-
tia, with the Romans, and to request that the senate formally recognize him
as king of Macedon.1 He also, apparently, had Philip’s alleged last-minute
successor and replacement for himself, Antigonus, son of Echecrates, exe-
cuted.2 Polybius claims that Perseus immediately began courting popularity
in Greece, recalling fugitive Macedonian debtors and exiles, and promising
them safety and the restoration of their property. These decrees were backed
up by propaganda and publicity: lists of those repatriated were erected at
Delos, Delphi, and one of the sanctuaries of Itonian Athena, probably the
one at Coronea in Boeotia. Within the Macedonian kingdom itself, Perseus
declared an amnesty for those in debt to the crown.3
Philip’s death could not have come at a worse time for his scheme to
transfer the Bastarnae away from their homeland north of the Danube
near the western shore of the Black Sea to the lands of Macedon’s perennial
enemies, the Dardani. Philip had apparently not provided supplies for the
massive numbers of Bastarnae now crossing the Danube, nor had he pre-
pared the ground diplomatically with the Thracians, through whose lands
the Bastarnae were bound to travel. Livy says that the Macedonian general
1
Polyb. 25.3.1; RDGE 40 l. 15; Livy 40.58.9; 41.19.6; 42.25.4, 10, 40.4, 41.9–11, 46.3; 44.16.5; 45.9.3;
App. Mac. 11.5–6; Zon. 9.22.2; Diod. Sic. 29.30 (implying that the senators renewed the amicitia
knowing full well that Perseus, like his father, was planning a war against Rome; Meloni 1953: 70–2,
against e.g. Pais 1926: 555; Pareti 1952: 753–4 and 1953: 38 thinks this implausible). Contra Hammond
1988: 492–3, 601–10 (cf. Meloni 1953: 69 and n. 3; Hammond 1989: 363), the amicitia being renewed
(actually, confirmed) was an informal relationship, there being no such thing as a formal “treaty of
friendship” as such. The “treaty” referred to by Appian, if not a complete distortion, probably refers
to the treaty of peace struck with Philip that ended the Second Macedonian War (Gruen 1973;
Walbank 1979: 275; Dmitriev 2011: 188–9; Goukowsky 2011: 139 n. 78, 146 and n. 119, 197 n. 121).
As has now been shown (Burton 2011: 79–84), the efficacy of the long-term relationship, amicitia,
was dependent on the ongoing observance of a peace treaty’s terms by both parties. In formal terms,
therefore, Perseus was bound only by the terms of the peace imposed on Philip in 196, but, pace
Briscoe 2012: 235, the treaty itself was not renewed at the start of Perseus’ reign.
2
Hammond 1988: 491 suggests that Antigonus was tried for treason and executed by the Macedonian
army assembly (in Hammond 1989: 363 he is executed for treason or incompetence).
3
Polyb. 25.3.1–3; discussion: Mendels 1978: 55–9. Which sanctuary of Itonian Athena is meant is
unknown: Giovannini 1969: 855; Walbank 1979: 276 nominate the one near Halus in Thessaly, but
given Perseus’ later interest in extending his influence in Boeotia, culminating in a Macedonian
treaty with the Boeotian League, and the fact that Coronea would be the last of the pro-Macedonian
Boeotian cities to capitulate to Rome, Hammond 1988: 493 is probably right to argue for the one at
Coronea in Boeotia.
Antigonus (not the executed son of Echecrates) and Cotto, a Bastarnian
leader, had got as far as Amphipolis, on their way to oversee the Danube
crossing, when word of Philip’s death reached them. They returned to
Macedonia, taking their army with them. Perseus himself quit Thrace at
the same time, taking his troops with him.4
Clashes broke out between the hungry, leaderless Bastarnae and the
Thracians, which soon escalated into all-out war. The Thracians abandoned
their homes and made for Mt. Donuca, with the Bastarnae in hot pursuit.
Then a fierce rainstorm broke out, striking terror into the Bastarnae, and
in the confusion that followed, the Thracians attacked. The Bastarnae fled
back to their camp to regroup, after which a contingent of 30,000 under
the leadership of Clondicus pressed on toward the Dardanian lands, while
the remainder returned home.5
Meanwhile, before Perseus’ renewal of amicitia with Rome had been
formalized,6 the king of the Thracian Sapaei, Abrupolis, broke into
Macedonia, making his way as far south as Amphipolis. After plunder-
ing the countryside and the mines of Pangaeum, he returned to his king-
dom with an abundance of slaves and cattle. Perseus soon counterattacked,
defeated Abrupolis, and drove him out of his kingdom.7
Perseus’ amicitia with Rome was probably formalized before spring, 178,
and the senate officially recognized him as king of Macedon.8 Soon after
this, he married Laodice, the daughter of Seleucus IV,9 his Bastarnian wife
having recently died.10 Probably around this same time, Perseus betrothed
his sister Apame to Prusias II of Bithynia.11 Meanwhile, his “charm
4
Livy 40.57.2–4.
5
Livy 40.58.
6
App. Mac. 11.6 establishes the correct order of events (τὸ μὲν δὴ περὶ Ἀβρούπολιν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν
ἐστι τῶν συνθηκῶν); cf. Polyb. 22.18.2 (μετὰ τὸν τοῦ Φιλίππου θάνατον … with Meloni 1953: 68
n. 1). Meloni 1953: 460, with 61–7, dates the Abrupolis affair to August or September 179, i.e.
around the time Perseus became king.
7
Polyb. 22.18.2–3 (prospective); RDGE 40 ll. 15–17; Livy 42.13.5, 40.5, 41.11; cf. Diod. Sic. 29.33;
App. Mac. 11.2, 6 (retrospective). Pausanias (7.10.6–7) is the only remaining source that reports the
event in “real time,” but he fails to note that Abrupolis invaded Macedonia before Perseus attacked
him (hence Pausanias’ extraordinary claim that the Romans declared war on Perseus specifically to
avenge the Sapaei). SEG 31.614 mentions Perseus’ campaigns in Thrace; this may refer to the expul-
sion of Abrupolis: Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 1981: 233.
8
Livy 40.58.8, 45.9.3. The date: Meloni 1953: 461, with 68–73.
9
Polyb. 25.4.8; cf. Livy 42.12.3. The date: Meloni 1953: 461, with 119–20.
10
For his marriage to the Bastarnian princess, see Livy 40.5.10 and above, Chapter 3, n. 12. For her
death, see Livy 42.5.4, but we need not believe the rumor reported there that Perseus killed her (cf.
Meloni 1953: 79 n. 2).
11
Livy 42.12.3, 29.3; App. Mac. 11.2 (cf. Mithr. 2); the date: Meloni 1953: 461, with 120. The literary
sources do not record the name of Perseus’ sister, but an inscription from the Athenian Piraeus (IG
II2 3172 = I.Apameia und Pylai 89 T12) does: Meloni 1953: 121 n. 1 (with earlier literature there cited).
offensive” toward the Greeks continued apace.12 Polybius describes the king
at the outset of his reign as capable, physically fit, serious, composed, and
of modest appetites, particularly as regards his father’s favorite vices, drink
and women. As a result, many Greeks had high hopes for his kingship.13
Perseus established good relations with the island republic of Rhodes early
in his reign; Rhodian sailors had escorted the Seleucid princess Laodice to
Macedonia since the Seleucid navy was forbidden, by the terms of the Peace
of Apamea (188), to sail beyond Cape Sarpedon or to march through Asia
Minor. In reward for their service, Perseus gave a golden tiara to each sailor
who served in the princess’s naval escort. Even before this, Perseus had
given the Rhodians a significant amount of Macedonian ship timber, with
which they had refitted their fleet in magnificent style.14 The Amphictyones
of Delphi also embraced the new king, for in 178, Macedon is one of the
twelve states on the Amphictyonic Council with two officials (hieromnem-
ones) in attendance – a significant shift from the organization’s earlier anti-
Macedonian stance.15 Behind this move, significantly, lay the Aetolians.16
Around this time, and for unknown reasons, the Aetolian League was
in the grip of a major debt crisis.17 According to a passage in Diodorus
Siculus, perhaps derived from Polybius, by late 177, debts were cancelled
not only in Aetolia, but also in Thessaly and Perrhaebia. Diodorus, perhaps
preserving some information from Polybius’ lost account, states that the
senate suspected that Perseus was behind this move.18 Confirmation of this
12
The word Polybius uses (25.3.1) is ἑλληνοκοπεῖν “to court the favour of the Greeks” (cf. App. Mac.
11.4, 7: φιλέλλην). It is used in a different, pejorative sense at Polyb. 20.10.7, where M’. Acilius
Glabrio mocks the Aetolian Phaeneas for “playing the Greek” (Walbank 1979: 81, 275; cf. LSJ s.u.).
Derow 1989: 301 argues that ἑλληνοκοπεῖν contains “something of both” definitions. Given the
prevailing pro-Perseus tone of this passage, I disagree with Goukowsky 2011: 159–60 and n. 185 that
the word is used pejoratively here.
13
Polyb. 25.3.4–8.
14
Polyb. 25.4.7–10; cf. App. Mac. 11.2; Livy 42.12.3 (retrospective). Giovannini 1969: 855 believes that
there was no Rhodian–Macedonian rapprochement since this was a purely commercial transaction,
born of necessity. While it is true that the Rhodians were the logical (if only) choice to perform
the task (Macedon lacking a navy, and the Seleucids forbidden to sail beyond Cape Sarpedon),
and the Macedonian refitting of the Rhodian fleet could be seen as compensation for their help,
Giovannini’s argument cannot explain the gift of golden crowns to each Rhodian crew member.
15
SIG 636 ll. 5–6 with Meloni 1953: 94–104; Walbank 1977: 89–90 (vs. Giovannini 1970, who believes
Macedon retained influence on the council throughout); Hammond 1988: 493–4.
16
Hammond 1988: 494 n. 1.
17
Livy 41.25.1–7; 42.4.5, 5.7, 10–12. The causes may have been the punishing indemnity exacted after
the Roman–Aetolian War in 189, or a long period of peace in the Greek East, which deprived the
Aetolians of their traditional sources of income – booty and employment as mercenaries. See De
Sanctis 1923: 263–4; Meloni 1953: 105; Gruen 1976: 35.
18
ἡ σύγκλητος ὑπέλαβεν ἐκ τοῦ Περσέως γεγονέναι τὴν σύγχυσιν (Diod. Sic. 29.33; Polybian
derivation: Meloni 1953: 149 n. 2; Hammond 1988: 494).
is lacking, however. Perseus later admitted only to installing a garrison in
Aetolia, perhaps at the League’s request.19 This, rather than a Macedonian-
brokered cancellation of Aetolian debts, may have been the quid pro quo
for Aetolian support for Macedonian representation on the Amphictyonic
Council. Perseus’ connection to the abolition of debts in Thessaly and
Perrhaebia can only be confirmed by a passage in Livy, where it is embed-
ded in Eumenes’ list of accusations against his Macedonian rival.20
To this same period may be assigned the alliance between Perseus and
Cotys, chieftain of the Thracian Odrysians.21 The precise extent of Perseus’
influence in Thrace is unknown, but Appian implies it was substantial.22
At the time of his defeat at Pydna, the king was apparently in charge of
Cypsela, less than fifteen miles inland from the north Aegean coast close to
the river Hebrus.23 He also held villages, towns, and forts east of the river
Nessus behind Abdera, Aenus, and Maronea on the coast.24 That is, along
with his connection to Byzantium (see below) and Cotys, Perseus may
fairly be said to have brought large parts of eastern Thrace, particularly
in the sensitive and strategically valuable Hellespontine and Bosphoran
regions, under his sway.
A few years later, in autumn 175, Perseus marched with his army to
Delphi, spending three days there before returning to Macedonia through
Phthiotic Achaea and Thessaly, taking care not to do any damage to Greek
property en route. He sent letters and ambassadors to all the peoples along
his marching route, asking them to forget about their differences with his
father, and pledging to initiate friendly relations with them.25 One state he
courted particularly diligently was the Achaean League. Late in 198, after
switching alliances from Macedon to Rome, the League had imposed a
blanket ban on Macedonians from entering its territory, the effect of which
was to prevent any Achaeans from entering Macedonia as well.26 As a result,
19
Livy 42.42.4. The fact that the Aetolian debt crisis still existed in 173 (cf. Livy 42.5.7: ingentem uim
aeris alieni) suggests that Perseus did not cancel Aetolian debts in 177, and may vitiate the reliability
of Diod. Sic. 29.33 altogether. Briscoe 2012: 168 attempts to reconcile the evidence by arguing that
a blanket cancellation of all debts may not have taken place in 177.
20
Livy 42.5.8–10 (Thessalian and Perrhaebian crisis); Livy 42.13.8–9 (Perseus’ abolition of Thessalian
and Perrhaebian debts); the date: Meloni 1953: 461, with 104–9.
21
Livy 42.29.12 (retrospective); the date: Meloni 1953: 461, with 90.
22
App. Mac. 11.1 (“in possessing Thrace, he held a great stronghold,” Θρᾴκην κατακτῷτο, μέγα
ὁρμητήριον), perhaps an exaggeration (as Hammond 1988: 497).
23
Discussion: Bickermann 1953: 493 (with references); Meloni 1953: 62; Hammond 1988: 496–7.
24
Livy 45.29.6; Diod. Sic. 31.8.8 (retrospective), with Hammond 1988: 497 and 611–12.
25
Livy 41.22.4–8, with Meloni 1953: 131–5.
26
Livy 41.23.1–3; cf. 42.6.2, where the ban is called uetus decretum. For the literature on and discussion
of this question, see now Briscoe 2012: 119.
says Livy, whenever slaves fled their Achaean masters, they made straight
for Macedonia. Perseus rounded up a group of these fugitives and wrote to
the Achaeans, promising to restore them, and asking them to take care that
such escapes did not happen in future. Early in his magistracy, Xenarchus,
the pro-Macedonian stratēgos of the League for 175/4, read out Perseus’ let-
ter, but the pro-Roman Callicrates rose to deliver a speech advising against
a rapprochement with Macedon, alleging that Perseus was preparing for
war with Rome. Archon, brother of Xenarchus, spoke against Callicrates,
reminding his audience that Perseus was an amicus of the Roman people,
and urging them not to allow vague rumors and speculation about Perseus’
intentions to obscure what was in full view – that the king was committed
to peace. The matter was deferred, but it was ultimately decided not to
receive Perseus’ ambassadors when they approached Achaea late in 174.27
Although the chronology is obscure, due largely to the fragmentary
state of Livy’s ninth pentad, it was probably also in 174 that Perseus
directed his attentions to Boeotia and Byzantium. It is only in retro-
spective passages condemnatory of the king’s actions that we hear about
these events. Boeotia had been struggling with debt and economic
hardship (as well as demographic decline and lawlessness) since at least
the late 190s.28 The region was indeed riven by faction. A democratic,
slightly anti-Roman bloc of “federalists,” who wanted to strengthen the
Boeotian confederacy, were locked in a struggle with the pro-Roman
oligarchic separatists, who wished to abolish it. Perseus intervened
on the side of the democratic federalists, and struck a treaty with the
members of the confederacy. The new relationship was loudly publi-
cized: copies of the treaty were set up at Delphi, Thebes, and perhaps
Delos.29 At some point in 174, Perseus also sent military assistance to
Byzantium.30
27
Livy 41.22.8–24.20. The debate belongs earlier than late 174, where Livy sites it, for it takes place
during Xenarchus’ strategia (175/4): Livy 41.23.4. Meloni failed to notice this, which vitiates his
chronology of this and surrounding events (1953: 461–2, with 110–11, 136–41, and below, nn. 29–30).
28
Hammond 1988: 494, with Polyb. 20.6.1–6. Polybius’ parti pris account of the decline and deca-
dence of Boeotia (20.4–7) may be exaggerated, but is not altogether false (as Walbank 1979: 66).
29
Livy 42.12.5–6 (Madvig emends the uncertain text to read Delium (in Boeotia), but given Perseus’
habit of publicizing his philanthropy at international shrines (cf. Polyb. 25.3.2, with above, p. 57
and n. 3), Delos works equally well, perhaps better); cf. Livy 42.38.5, 40.6, 43.5–6 (retrospect-
ive). Fragments of the treaty have recently been discovered at Dium: Hatzopoulos 1998: 1194–5.
Discussion: Meloni 1953: 145–8, although I disagree with his preferred date of 173 (462, with 146 n.
1), since it is based on the absence of any mention of Perseus’ involvement in Boeotia in the Achaean
League debate, which he places, incorrectly, in late 174 (above, n. 27).
30
Livy 42.13.8, 40.6, 42.4; App. Mac. 11.1 (retrospective). Discussion: Meloni 1953: 148–9, although,
once again, I disagree with his preferred date of 173 (462, with 148; cf. Heiland 1913: 27–9 (late 173);
While all of this diplomatic activity was going on, Perseus undertook
several military projects designed to please his Macedonian constituents,
as well as the Greeks. After the Bastarnian resettlement scheme fell apart in
the chaos following the death of Philip V, Perseus may have assisted those
30,000 Bastarnae, led by Clondicus, who had chosen to continue to march
against the Dardanian lands after the rest of the Bastarnae returned home
in 179/8, for Polybius reports a Dardanian embassy to Rome to complain
about the attacks of Perseus and the Bastarnians in 177. An embassy from
Thessaly supported the Dardanian complaints, and a senatorial embassy
was dispatched to look into the matter.31 The envoys returned to Rome in
175, and confirmed that indeed there was a war in progress in Dardania;
the omission of any mention of Perseus’ involvement was perhaps a tacit
acknowledgment that they could find no evidence of it.32 They reported
that they had visited the Bastarnae, presumably to ask them to make peace
with the Dardani, as well as Macedonia, where they witnessed Perseus’
war preparations. The king was fortifying the country, they alleged, lay-
ing in large stores of weapons, and drilling his troops.33 Around the same
time envoys arrived from Perseus, protesting that the king was in no way
involved in the war. “The senate,” says Livy, “neither absolved the king
from blame nor pressed it upon him; they only ordered him to consider
himself warned to take care again and again that he appear to hold sacred
the treaty he had with the Romans.”34
Meanwhile, the Bastarnae blithely ignored the Roman request for peace.
Clondicus’ men, now reinforced by their Scordiscian and Thracian allies,
were pressing more heavily against the Dardani. In late 176,35 the Dardani
mustered at a town about twelve miles from the main Bastarnian camp,
believing that the Scordisci and Thracians would probably return home
for the winter. This they did, and the Dardani launched a two-pronged
Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 234 n. 17 (between 174 and 172)), since it depends on his incorrect dating
of the Achaean League debate (above, n. 27). It should be noted that it is only at Livy 42.42.4,
in Perseus’ speech in defence of his conduct, that military assistance to Aetolia and Byzantium is
specified: Aetolis et Byzantiis praesidia misimus. None of the king’s accusers explicitly charge him
with this.
31
Polyb. 25.6.2–6. The campaign against the Dardani and Thracians must have occurred in spring
and/or summer, 178: Meloni 1953: 461.
32
Meloni 1953: 82–3; Errington 1971: 204; cf. Goukowsky 2011: 144.
33
Livy 41.19.4 (ambassadors’ report); App. Mac. 11.1 (visit to Bastarnae); App. Mac. 11.1; cf. Livy 41.19.4
(visit to Macedonia). It is uncertain whether the same Roman embassy visited both Macedonia and
the Bastarnae: Meloni 1953: 85; Walbank 1979: 282 (with previous scholarship there cited); Briscoe
2012: 16.
34
Senatus nec liberauit eius culpae regem neque arguit; moneri eum tantum modo iussit, ut etiam atque
etiam curaret ut sanctum habere foedus quod ei cum Romanis esset, uideri posset (Livy 41.19.6).
35
Here I follow the dating of Meloni 1953: 461, with 82–3 (against Hammond 1988: 496 (175/4)).
assault on the Bastarnian camp; one contingent was to attack it directly,
while the other was to approach it from the rear via a remote pass. The plan
ultimately succeeded, but probably not as the Dardani intended. Their
frontal assault on the camp failed, and the Bastarnae pursued them back to
their town and surrounded them there. Meanwhile, the Dardanian encir-
cling contingent seized the enemy camp, and probably took the Bastarnian
women and children hostage. Unfortunately, a large lacuna follows in
Livy’s account, but a later passage reveals that the Dardani were ultimately
victorious, for the Bastarnae, probably in exchange for the members of
their families, returned home.36 In late winter 175, the Bastarnae launched
another attack against the Dardani, allegedly with Perseus’ help, but the
Danubian ice collapsed under the weight of their massive forces, and most
of them perished.37
Whatever his involvement in these events, by 174, Perseus had brought
all the Dolopians under his authority (ius iudiciumque). The reason he did
this, Livy says, is because some of them wanted to refer their internal dis-
putes to the Romans rather than to Perseus himself, who evidently assumed
they were de iure under his control.38 The situation was certainly ambigu-
ous: technically freed by the Isthmian declaration of 196, the Dolopians
had been reconquered by Philip, with Rome’s blessing, in 191, but may
have been reliberated by the senatorial commission’s judgment, in 185, that
Philip’s kingdom should be restricted to its ancient boundaries.39 However
that may be, in 174, Perseus probably gambled – rightly, it turned out, at
least for the moment – on the senate’s ongoing indifference to his military
and diplomatic initiatives, and interpreted his prerogatives under Roman
amicitia as he saw fit.40 After subduing the Dolopians, Perseus marched
peacefully across Mt. Oeta to Delphi, returning, as was seen earlier, to his
kingdom via Thessaly and Phthiotic Achaea, without doing harm to any of
the Greeks or their property.41
36
Livy 41.19, 23.12 (retrospective). See Hammond 1988: 496 and n. 2.
37
Oros. 4.20.34–5. See Hammond 1988: 496 and n. 3.
38
Livy 41.22.4; cf. 41.23.13; Polyb. 22.18.4; and perhaps (see below, Chapter 5, p. 80) RDGE 40 ll. 19–20
(retrospective).
39
Livy 33.34.6 (liberation of Dolopians, 196); 36.33.7 (conquest by Philip, 191); 39.26.14 (senatorial
commission’s judgment, 185). On these events, see above Chapter 3, pp. 45–6, and below, Chapter
5, pp. 80, 83–5.
40
On the inherent flexibility of interpretation of the parameters of amicitia by its participants (which
is also fertile ground for the growth of disputes between them), see Burton 2011: 99, 113, 163, 212,
223, 234–44, 259, 331–2, 344, 353.
41
Livy 41.22.5–6; cf. Livy 41.23.13–14; Polyb. 22.18.4; RDGE 40 ll. 6–13 (retrospective). Discussion of
Dolopian campaign and visit to Delphi: Meloni 1953: 131–5.
Perseus and Rome, 179–172

Despite the scrupulously pacific nature of his journey to Delphi and back
to Macedonia, Livy says that Perseus’ sudden appearance in central Greece
struck great terror into the surrounding population, some of whom sent
envoys to Eumenes II of Pergamum. Thus began the process of Perseus’
undoing: within just over two years, and largely at Eumenes’ instigation,
Rome and Perseus would be in a formal state of war with each other.
It will be appropriate to pause here and review the evidence for the
Roman perspective on Perseus’ actions since the beginning of his reign.
Unfortunately, the view is obscured by rumor and innuendo in the
sources, most of it originating ultimately in anti-Macedonian Pergamene
propaganda, and Polybius’ thesis, to be discussed later, that Perseus inher-
ited his father Philip’s secret plans for a war of revenge against Rome. As
was seen earlier, the Romans gladly renewed their amicitia with Macedon
and acknowledged Perseus as king at the outset of his reign. After the
Dardani and Thracians complained to the senate of Perseus’ involvement
in the attacks of the Bastarnae on them, the senatorial embassy that was
sent to investigate allegedly discovered that all the resources of Macedon
were being mobilized for war. Significantly, Appian, probably following
Polybius, does not say against whom this mobilization was directed. Of
course, Eumenes would later allege that Rome itself was the intended tar-
get. But this need not have been the senate’s view in 175, as disturbing as
Perseus’ war preparations may have seemed. Indeed, the senate’s official
response to Perseus’ defense of his actions points in this direction. The
patres refused to exonerate or condemn the king, and asked him to take
care to give the appearance of adhering to their treaty. The studied ambi-
guity of the first part of the reply was meant to assuage Perseus’ accusers
without alienating the king unduly. The emphasis on the appearance of
compliance with the terms of his father’s peace treaty with Rome was for-
mulated with an eye to Rome’s watchful allies. The senate was requesting of
Perseus that he not give the latter even the slightest grounds for complaint.
This was purely for reasons of self-interest: to stem the flow of embassies of
grievance to Rome, avert the tedium of listening to endless ambassadorial
speeches, and avoid the expense, in terms of time and resources, of sending
senatorial embassies out to far-flung and potentially dangerous places.42
42
Livy 41.19.4-6, with Gruen 1984: 406. On the similarly studied ambiguity of the senatorial com-
mission’s judgment in 185 that Philip should restrict his territory to Macedon’s ancestral boundaries
(Livy 39.26.14), see above, Chapter 3, pp. 45–6. The senate’s warning that Perseus not give the
In 174, Massinissa, the king of Numidia, alleged that there had been
an exchange of ambassadors between Perseus and Rome’s old enemy,
Carthage, and that the Macedonian envoys met with the Carthaginian
senate under cover of night in the temple of Asculapius. Massinissa, of
course, had his own reasons for sowing suspicion against Carthage in
the minds of the senators. He was, after all, the main beneficiary of the
Roman victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War, and spent the rest
of his life chipping away at Carthaginian territory and power, while Rome
looked the other way, and, as Polybius asserts, always decided against the
Carthaginians, not because theirs was an unjust cause, but because it suited
Roman interests to decide against them.43 In 174, however, the senate knew
what Massinissa was about, and rather than seizing on his report as evi-
dence of Macedonian treachery, or a pretext to declare war on Perseus, the
patres sent out a fact-finding embassy to Macedonia.44 The ambassadors
returned in 173, and reported that Perseus refused to hear them, and that
some of his courtiers tried to excuse the king on the grounds of him being
absent or ill. Nevertheless, the ambassadors continued, they had seen clear
evidence of Perseus’ preparations for war, which was now imminent.45
Around this same time, Roman envoys who had been sent to Aetolia
in the previous year to look into the situation there returned to Rome
and made their report. As was seen earlier, in 177 Perseus intervened in
Aetolia, which was wracked by a debt crisis, and installed a garrison. By
176, civil strife had abated somewhat, the Aetolians began to negotiate
among themselves, and invited the Romans to broker a lasting agreement.
By the time the Romans arrived in the closing months of 174, however, the
appearance of anti-Roman behavior is precisely the same as that issued to Philip in 184/3 (Polyb.
23.9.7, see below, Chapter 5, n. 68) – and served the same purpose, i.e. to stem the flow of embas-
sies of complaint to Rome. This interpretation is certainly preferable to the vague and paradoxical
formulation of Hammond 1988: 496, that “Rome had no specific complaint against [Perseus]. But
the warning was emphatic.” Waterfield 2014: 167 over-translates Livy (“Perseus was warned … not
even [sic] to give the appearance of transgressing the terms of their treaty”; compare the Latin text
quoted above, n. 34), thus changing the senate’s meaning entirely and adding an inappropriate tone
of menace to the decree’s language.
43
Polyb. 31.21.6. On Rome’s relationship with Carthage and Massinissa between 200 and 146, see now
Burton 2011: 307–23, with references.
44
Livy 41.22.1–3.
45
Livy 42.2.1–2. Briscoe 2012: 16 (with e.g. Nissen 1863: 241; Bickermann 1953: 506, against e.g. Pais
1926: 555 and n. 42; Meloni 1953: 143) argues that this passage is probably an annalistic invention
since it seems to imply (in contradiction to Livy [P] 41.22.3 and 41.25.5–6) that it was the same set of
envoys that visited Thrace and Aetolia. Gruen 1984: 407 (contra Meloni 1953: 144) thinks it unlikely
that Perseus refused to hear the ambassadors because he was tired of Rome’s incessant meddling.
Only one prior embassy of this nature to Perseus – the one concerning the Bastarnae – is recorded
(Polyb. 26.6.2–6; cf. Livy 41.19.4–5; App. Mac. 11.1).
situation in Aetolia had degenerated considerably; Livy alleges “massive
slaughter, approaching genocidal proportions, on both sides.”46 The fol-
lowers of Eupolemus, who had been League stratēgos in 176/5, had, in 175/
4, massacred eighty aristocrats in the faction of his rival, Proxenus, former
League stratēgos for 183/2.47
The Romans met with delegates from the League at Delphi, perhaps
because the Aetolian cities themselves were too violent and dangerous. Livy
produces two versions of what followed.48 In the first, Proxenus gets the better
of a highly contentious debate, because of the superiority of his oratory, and
of his cause, but is poisoned a few days later by his wife Orthobula, who was
eventually tried and condemned for the act, and sent into exile. In the second
version, Livy states that the two sides argued their cases as fiercely as they
had fought their civil wars, and were equally matched in outrageousness and
rashness.49 The head of the Roman delegation, M. Claudius Marcellus (cos.
183?),50 refused to settle the matter, asking both factions to lay aside their quar-
rels and end the bloodshed. As a sign of good faith, they exchanged hostages,
who were to reside at Corinth. Whichever account is the truer, the outcome
was the same: unlike his colleagues, who managed to settle the debt crises in
Thessaly and Perrhaebia,51 Marcellus achieved nothing. He had to admit that
the Romans had lost complete control of the situation: the principals of the
warring factions could no longer be restrained by Roman authority.52 Before
returning home to deliver his report, Marcellus crossed to Achaea to con-
gratulate the League for its wisdom in not bowing to Macedonian pressure to
lift the ban on Macedonians entering their territory.53
46
Aeotolorum in semet ipsos uersus furor mutuis caedibus ad internecionem adducturus uidebatur gentem
(Livy 41.25.1).
47
Livy 41.25.1–4. On the chronology, see Meloni 1953: 142–3; Briscoe 2012: 132. Here I follow Briscoe
(against Meloni) that Eupolemus orchestrated the massacre of Proxenus’ followers after his stratēgia
of 176/5 since Livy calls him princeps ciuitatis, “a leading man of the state.” Livy’s usual Latin formu-
lation for stratēgos is praetor (cf. 35.12.4, 44.1; 38.8.1, etc.).
48
Livy 41.25.5–6; 42.4.5, 5.8–12. Briscoe 2012: 16, 131, 165 (following Nissen 1863: 243–4) argues
Polybius is the source of 41.25, and that 42.4.5, a doublet of 42.2.2, signals Livy’s transition from his
annalistic source back to Polybius for 42.5.
49
Aetolorum causas M. Marcellus Delphis per idem tempus iisdem hostilibus actas animis quos intestino
gesserant bello cognouit. Cum certatum utrimque temeritate atque audacia cerneret … (Livy 42.5.10–11,
with Ruperti’s emendation of quos for quas in the MS, and Madvig’s addition of iisdem, which does
not appear in the MS. These solutions seem as reasonable as any for the highly corrupt text that has
come down to us. See Briscoe 2012: 169–70).
50
Briscoe 2012: 169 for the conjecture.
51
The leadership of these communities was criticized by the Romans, who then ordered that only
just debts should be paid, and in ten annual instalments (the creditors having charged illegally high
interest on the original loans): Livy 42.5.7–10.
52
Livy 42.2.2.
53
Livy 42.6.1–2, and above, pp. 60–1.
Late in 173, Eumenes arrived in Rome, perhaps stimulated by the del-
egations from the Greek states that had been sent to Pergamum after
Perseus marched south with his army to Delphi in late 174. Eumenes
handed over a memorandum of charges against Perseus and, in the early
months of 172, was given the privilege of addressing a closed-door session
of the senate. Livy says that what transpired in the chamber only came to
light after the war with Perseus was over. Eumenes, who Livy (following
Polybius) says was a far more beneficent king to the Greeks than Perseus,
pious toward his relatives, just toward his subjects, and munificent
toward all men (as opposed to Perseus, who had killed his own wife, his
subjects, and various foreigners),54 delivered a scathing indictment of his
Macedonian rival.55 A few days later, an audience was granted to envoys
from Perseus. The senate rejected the king’s excuses and pleas, laid out
by leader of the embassy, Harpalus, who reacted with excessive arrogance
(ferocia nimia), according to Livy, arguing that the king had said and
done nothing hostile to Rome. Mars was impartial, warned Harpalus,
and the chances of war were unpredictable; if the Romans were thought
to be seeking a pretext for war against Perseus, the king would bravely
defend himself.56 A Rhodian ambassador was also present, who suspected
that Eumenes had laid accusations against Rhodes, and was angry at not
being allowed to be present when Eumenes made his speech. He attacked
Eumenes in the most vicious terms, accusing him of stirring up Rhodes’
Lycian subjects against the island republic, and stating that Eumenes was
a bigger enemy than Antiochus III had ever been.57 “The speech,” says
Livy, “was offensive to the senate and unhelpful to the ambassador and to
the Rhodian state.”58
Harpalus returned to Macedonia and informed the king that although
the Romans were not yet preparing for war, their open hostility to Perseus
54
Livy 42.5.4–6. Polybian derivation: Meloni 1953: 153; Briscoe 2012: 165.
55
Livy 42.11–14.1; cf. Diod. Sic. 29.34.1; Val. Max. 2.2.1; Plut. Cat. Mai. 8.12–13; App. Mac. 11.3.
Appian says that the senators criticized Eumenes for warmongering based on his private fears and
grudges, while Livy (42.14.1) says the king’s words “moved” the senate (haec oratio mouit patres con-
scriptos). Gruen 1984: 409 is probably right to query, “how far and to do what?” A year later, Rome’s
war preparations were still not complete. For a detailed analysis, see next chapter.
56
Livy 42.14.2–4; cf. App. Mac. 11.3. Diod. Sic. 29.34.1 says that Harpalus did not deliver a speech
in reply, perhaps misinterpreting his ignorance of the content of Eumenes’ closed-door speech as
silence. See Briscoe 2012: 198–9.
57
Livy 42.14.7–8.
58
Inuisam senatui inutilemque sibi et ciuitati suae (Livy 42.14.9). Appian (Mac. 11.3) adds that the
Rhodian spokesman was intemperate, but not necessarily untruthful. Livy 42.14.6 seems to be a
summary of some of the material in App. Mac. 11.3; it may be a gloss. On the decline of Roman–
Rhodian relations, see below, Chapter 5, pp. 84–5, and Chapter 7, pp. 178–81.
indicated they would not put it off much longer. Perseus, says Livy, was so
eager for war, thinking he was at the height of his power (and, it should be
added, thinking that the Romans were unprepared), that he decided to pre-
cipitate it by attempting to kill Eumenes as he was returning from Rome, via
Delphi, to his kingdom. He dispatched a Cretan mercenary captain called
Evander, along with three Macedonian assassins to Praxo, a friend of Perseus
and a very influential woman at Delphi. The assassins set up their ambush
at a spot on the steep incline leading up to the sanctuary, where the passage
was so narrow that visitors could only walk single-file. As Eumenes passed
by, in conversation with Pantaleon the Aetolian, the assassins rained down
huge boulders from atop the cliff onto the passageway below. Eumenes was
struck on the head and shoulder, and would have met his end under a hail of
stones had not Pantaleon shielded him from their blows. The assassins, reck-
oning it unnecessary to verify that they had finished Eumenes off, retreated
to Parnassus, killing a particularly sluggish member of their own party in
the process, lest he be captured and used as a source of information about
the plot. The assassins escaped, but Eumenes soon recovered, to the surprise
of everyone – including his brother Attalus, who, amid the confusion of
rumors about the king’s death, attempted to marry his wife, Stratonice.59
Meanwhile, a Roman embassy sent to Greece and Macedon in late 173
had completed its investigation of the state of Perseus’ kingdom.60 The
head of the delegation, C. Valerius Laevinus, reported to the senate in
mid-172 that his findings confirmed all of Eumenes’ charges. He brought
with him Praxo of Delphi, who had housed Eumenes’ would-be assassins,
as well as Rammius of Brundisium. The latter was a prominent citizen of
his hometown, and often entertained Roman ambassadors and generals
when they passed through. He was also an intimate of Perseus, who had
recently pressured him into agreeing to poison the Roman dignitaries who
visited his house, promising to furnish the poison himself. Rammius was
afraid that, if he refused, he would be the poisoner-king’s first victim, and
so he made contact with Valerius Laevinus near Chalcis, and travelled with
him to Rome rather than return to Brundisium.61
59
Livy 42.15–16; cf. 42.29.2, 40.8; 44.1.10; 45.5.4–5, 11; RDGE 40 ll. 29–35; Polyb. 22.18.5; 27.6.2; Diod.
Sic. 29.34.2; App. Mac. 11.4 (retrospective). Plutarch (Mor. 184A-B, 489D–490A) believes that Attalus
actually took the crown, married Stratonice, and had intercourse with her, producing the future
Attalus II. This is probably untrue: Walbank 1979: 217; cf. 417–18; Briscoe 2012: 209 (against e.g. Pais
1926: 556 n. 45). The story nevertheless demonstrates the cut-throat nature of Hellenistic court politics.
60
Livy 42.6.4–5.
61
Livy 42.17; cf. 42.40.9, 41.4 (retrospective). Rammius is called Erennius in App. Mac. 11.7, but
the actual name is unknown due to corruption in the MSS: Meloni 1953: 165 and n. 5; Briscoe
2012: 210–11.
At this stage, according to Livy, Perseus was declared an enemy (hostis),
and discussion of the war was placed on the agenda for the first senate
meeting after the election of the consuls for 171. Eumenes, after recuperat-
ing on Aegina, returned to his kingdom to begin his war preparations, and
the Romans sent an embassy to Pergamum to congratulate the king on his
recovery. Envoys from various Thracian tribes then arrived in Rome seek-
ing friendship and an alliance. The senate was only too happy to oblige,
says Livy, because of their proximity to Macedonia.62 The senate then dis-
patched Ti. Claudius Nero and M. Decimius to the Aegean islands and
Asia, with a view to testing the loyalties of the Cretans and Rhodians in
particular.63
Livy next reports an embassy from the Greek island state of Issa, an old
Roman amicus of almost sixty years’ standing.64 The Issaei complained of
attacks by the Illyrian king Genthius on their territory, and accused him of
collaborating with Perseus on his plans for war on Rome. Genthius must
have known what the Issaei were going to accuse him of, for an Illyrian
delegation was also present, whom the Issaei accused of being spies, sent
to Rome by Perseus. The Illyrians claimed, probably truthfully, that their
king was not collaborating with Perseus, but the senate refused to listen
to them as official ambassadors since they had failed to follow diplo-
matic protocol when they arrived in Rome. They had apparently failed to
inform a Roman magistrate of the purpose of their visit, or to secure offi-
cial lodging and entertainment. The senate then dispatched an embassy to
Genthius to inform the king that he was doing wrong by attacking Rome’s
Issaean allies.65
Meanwhile, a five-man embassy under the leadership of the consular
Q. Marcius Philippus was dispatched to Greece, along with a thousand
Roman infantry, to visit various Greek states and reaffirm loyalties.66
62
The motives of these Thracian peoples is unknown. Briscoe 2012: 219 speculates that they may have
been disturbed by Perseus’ march to Byzantium, his alliance with Cotys, Eumenes’ propaganda, or
some combination of the three.
63
Livy 42.19.6–8. The names of the Thracian tribes involved are hopelessly corrupt in the only surviv-
ing MS of Livy’s ninth pentad; for possible solutions, see Meloni 1953: 168–9; Briscoe 2012: 218–19.
For the problematic embassy of Cn. Servilius Caepio, Ap. Claudius Centho, and T. Annius Luscus
to Macedon (Livy 42.25), see Appendix A.
64
On the Roman-Issaean amicitia, established in 229, see now Burton 2011: 136–41, 229.
65
Livy 42.26.2–7. For the chronology of what follows, see Appendix B.
66
Gruen 1984: 411–12 quite rightly regards this activity as being designed “to present [Perseus] with
a formidable coalition that could induce compliance,” and “to establish Hellenic solidarity and to
demonstrate the isolation of Macedonia.” The parallel with the situation in 200, before the war with
Philip, is undeniable, but diplomatic activity in 172 was on a much larger scale – a probable result
of the deepening of Roman interests there after 196, and especially after 188, when the maintenance
While they were still at Corcyra, a letter from Perseus arrived asking why
the Romans had brought troops over and were garrisoning cities. The
ambassadors replied that they had brought the troops for the protection
of the cities.67 They then split up and visited their several destinations.
L. Decimius went to Genthius to remind him of his amicitia with Rome,
and to induce him to provide active support in the upcoming war with
Perseus. P. and Ser. Cornelius Lentulus were sent to Cephallenia so they
could cross to the Peloponnese and sail down its west coast before win-
ter. Marcius, along with the ex-praetor A. Atilius Serranus, were to visit
Epirus, Aetolia, and Thessaly before crossing to the Peloponnese to ren-
dezvous with the Lentuli.68
The visit of the latter did not go as smoothly as they had hoped. Despite
unanimous declarations of support for Rome in the upcoming war, the
Achaean League leadership was upset that the Romans made separate visits
to the Elaeans and the Messenians, since this subtly undercut the League’s
authority over these peoples.69 Marcius and Atilius were more successful,
securing the loyalty of the Epirotes, Aetolians, and Thessalians. Delegations
from Acarnania and a group of Boeotian exiles came to the Romans while
they were visiting Thessaly. To the Acarnanians the Romans extended
the benefit of the doubt for their siding with Philip V and Antiochus III
in Rome’s previous wars with those kings, allowing that they may have
been deceived by royal promises. Because the Romans had been merciful
toward them on these earlier occasions, when they clearly did not deserve
it, the ambassadors were urging them now to experience Roman generos-
ity by deserving well of it by siding with Rome in the upcoming war. The
Boeotians were faulted for their recent alliance with Perseus, and when
the exiles objected that it was all the fault of a single individual (Ismenias,
stratēgos of the Boeotian confederacy in 173/2), who had coerced various
of stability and the prevention of the emergence of any hegemonic rivals were paramount Roman
concerns.
67
Meloni 1953: 182; Rich 1976: 90; Gruen 1984: 412 (against e.g. Kahrstedt 1911: 428; De Sanctis
1923: 274; Broughton 1951: 413, 415 n. 8) note that the Roman delegation had no brief to visit
Perseus, its purpose being to demonstrate the isolation of Macedon (see n. 66). Marcius only agreed
to meet with him after Perseus himself requested it (Rich), and after confirming the loyalty of the
Greek states, “when he,” Marcius, “had stronger cards to play” (Gruen).
68
Livy 42.37.1–6.
69
Livy 42.37.7–9. What transpired in Achaea is more complicated than this, but the passage is hope-
lessly corrupt. Livy should thus not be held responsible for the apparent Achaean (false) assertions
that the League had sided with Rome from the very beginning of the Macedonian wars (the League
had, in fact, sided with Macedon in the First Macedonian War, and did not join Rome until 198,
two years into the Second), or that Elis and Messenia had sided with Philip V against Rome in the
First and Second Macedonian Wars (which is simply untrue). For various emendation attempts, non
liquet, see now Briscoe 2012: 274–5.
cities into joining in, the Romans replied that they would soon have the
power of deciding about themselves, thereby signaling their intention to
break up the confederacy.70
Marcius then met with envoys from Perseus. Both sides acknowledged
the mutual hospitium and amictia that existed between their fathers, and
on that basis agreed to meet in the Vale of Tempe in eastern Thessaly at
the earliest convenient opportunity. After some preliminary negotiations,
Perseus crossed the Peneus River, agreeing with Philippus’ joke that the
younger/inferior son should cross over to the elder/superior father.71 The
talks began with Marcius listing Perseus’ previous violations of his treaty
with Rome:72 he had driven from his kingdom Abrupolis, a socius et ami-
cus populi Romani; given shelter to the assassins of Arthetaurus, the most
faithful of all the kings of Illyria toward Rome (omnium Illyriorum fidis-
simum Romanis regulum); crossed through Thessalian and Malian territory
to Delphi in arms, sent military aid to Byzantium, and made an alliance
with Boeotia – all contrary to the treaty; had a hand in the deaths of
the Theban ambassadors Eversa and Callicritus; stoked the civil war and
slaughter of the principes in Aetolia; made war on the Dolopians; and
tried to kill Eumenes at Delphi, and Roman senators through his proxy
Rammius of Brundisium.73
Perseus attempted to defend himself even though, he said, Marcius was
both prosecutor and judge. He pointed out the absurdity of Eumenes’ and
Rammius’ claims on the grounds that the former had many enemies, and
the latter was simply beneath his (or any honest man’s) notice; he pointed
out that Eversa and Callicritus died in a natural disaster – a shipwreck – and
he was simply following the law of nations when he respected the exile of
70
Livy 42.37.7–38.7. The story of the disputed election of Ismenias, and his subsequent imposition of
the death penalty on the pro-Roman leadership (the exiles here visiting Marcius), is told, in flash-
back, at Livy 42.43.7–9.
71
The point of the joke being that Philippus’ name was the same as Perseus’ father, King Philip V, with
whom he shared hospitium and amicitia as well. But Philippus was also making a point about the
nature of the Roman-Macedonian amicitia; see below, Chapter 5, p. 116.
72
That is, the conditions of the peace imposed on his father in 196 (as opposed to Perseus’ “treaty of
friendship,” renewed in 179, which did not exist: above, n. 1). That the terms of the peace of 196 are
being referred to here is shown by Marcius’ list of charges, several of which violate the formulaic
pledge, common to all such treaties, that the parties will have the same friends and enemies. See
Libero 1997.
73
Livy 42.38.8–40.11. Livy’s Marcius says that Perseus’ ambassadors responded to the senate about this
last charge, but no such embassy is recorded, and Livy is probably exaggerating here. See Briscoe
2012: 287. Gruen 1984: 412–13 doubts that Livy, following Polybius, accurately reports what Marcius
actually said here, since a meeting with Perseus was not envisioned by the senate when they dis-
patched the embassy (above, nn. 66–7), and Marcius therefore had no specific instructions on what
to say at such a meeting.
the assassins of Arthetaurus, and in the end banned them from Macedonia
anyway; about Abrupoils and the Dolopians, Perseus defended himself on
the grounds of self-defense against the former, and of Macedonian sover-
eignty (previously acknowledged by Rome) over the latter, after they had
killed the Macedonian governor Euphranor; he had also, he insisted, done
no damage to any Greek state on his trip to and from Delphi; and as for
his military assistance to Aetolia and Byzantium, this had been cleared by
the Roman senate itself, and had only become a cause for complaint since
the visit to Rome of Eumenes, who was a far worse tyrant than Antiochus
III had ever been. Marcius then suggested that Perseus send envoys to
Rome, a plan congenial to both, since Marcius knew that the Romans’ war
preparations were not yet complete, and the king thought peace might still
be achieved.74
The Romans now moved on to Boeotia. Evidently Marcius’ earlier com-
ment to the Boeotian exiles, that the individual cities of the region would
soon have the power to decide their fate for themselves, did its work: the
confederacy was already breaking apart.75 Civil strife between the pro-
Roman and pro-Macedonian factions continued to blaze in Thebes over
the question of whether to maintain the treaty with Perseus. The men of
Coronea and Haliartus came to Thebes to shift sentiment in favor of the
treaty, but a certain Olympichus of Coronea persuaded the Thebans to
abandon it. Dicetas was dispatched to Marcius to apologize for making
the treaty, while the pro-Macedonians Neon and Hippias were expelled.
The Theban assembly voted honors to the Romans, and ordered their
magistrates to work on making an alliance with Rome, dispatch envoys
to Marcius, surrender Thebes to Rome, and bring the pro-Roman exiles
back.76
Meanwhile, Lases and Calleas of Thespiae, along with the pro-
Macedonian former Boeotian stratēgos Ismenias, accosted the Roman del-
egation on its way to Chalcis, the Thespians offering to surrender their city
to Roman discretion, and Ismenias offering to surrender all the cities of
the confederacy. The latter offer was refused, says Polybius, since it was in
74
Livy 42.41.1–43.4; cf. App. Mac. 11.5–8 (misplaced and wrongly attributed to an envoy of the king
before the Roman senate after Eumenes’ closed-door session, albeit for Appian’s own artistic rea-
sons: Goukowsky 2011: 161–2; cf. Rich 1976: 97–8; Warrior 1981: 47 n. 68; Gruen 1984: 413 n. 82;
Briscoe 2012: 11 n. 39, 287–8, but for all that, based on Polybian material: Briscoe 2012: 288; cf. Rich
1976: 98 n. 139). Gruen 1984: 413 doubts Marcius’ motive for wanting a breathing-space before the
war began.
75
Livy 42.38.5, 43.5.
76
Polyb. 27.1; cf. Livy 42.43.4–44.4 (including the background to the civil strife at Thebes; see above,
n. 70).
the Romans’ interest to break up the confederacy.77 Marcius froze Ismenias
out, but treated the delegates from the individual cities in a kindly manner.
The latter physically attacked Ismenias, forcing him to seek shelter at the
Romans’ headquarters.78
At Chalcis, the Romans were greeted by the news of the triumph of the
pro-Roman faction at Thebes, which in turn sparked a movement among
the other Boeotian states to the Roman side. The pro-Roman exiles at
Chalcis appointed a certain Pompides to begin building the indictment
against Ismenias, Dicetas, and Neon. The Romans were unable (or unwill-
ing) to restrain the violence of the mob against Hippias and the other pro-
Macedonians. Marcius then received the Thebans, advised them to allow
the exiles to return, and ordered the delegations from the rest of the cities
to go to Rome to announce their surrender to Roman discretion. Having
achieved their twin design, says Polybius, of breaking up the Boeotian con-
federacy and destroying the goodwill of the many towards the ruling house
of Macedon, Marcius and Atilius departed for the Peloponnese, leaving
Ser. Lentulus in charge of Chalcis, to be joined later on by a garrison of a
thousand Achaean League troops. Neon fled to Macedonia, while Ismenias
and Dicetas were imprisoned, and later committed suicide.79
The two-man embassy that had been sent to Asia and the Aegean verified
the loyalty to Rome of Ptolemy VI, Antiochus IV (both of whom had rejected
Perseus’ overtures), and of all the Greek allies.80 Polybius says they spent most
of their time at Rhodes, for which there was little need, for the pro-Roman
Hagesilochus, who was then prytanis of the Rhodians, had already success-
fully urged his countrymen to support the Roman cause, and arranged for
the preparation of forty ships before the Roman envoys arrived. This was seen
as a prudent course of action, says Polybius, since if the ships were required,
they would be ready to go, thus avoiding the hassle of rushing about at the
77
Polyb. 27.3.3, with Walbank 1979: 292, on Polybius’ meaning here.
78
Polyb. 27.1.4–6; cf. Livy 42.44.2.
79
Polyb. 27.2; cf. Livy 42.44.5–8. Chalcis, as one of “Three Fetters” of Greece, was obviously strategic-
ally far too valuable for the Romans to abandon at this stage, when hostilities with Perseus seemed
inevitable, and Boeotia had been so destabilized by recent events. The request for the Achaean gar-
rison, incidentally, is a strong argumentum ex silentio that Cn. Sicinius’ advance forces had not yet
crossed the Adriatic. See Appendix B.
80
Livy 42.26.7-9; for the dispatch of this embassy, see Livy 42.19.6-8, with above, p. 69. At 42.26.7–9,
Livy’s ambassadors report to the senate that the Rhodians were wavering, but this ill suits the thrust
of Polybius’ account of the Roman visit to Rhodes: the Rhodians needed little persuading to take up
the Roman cause, and the Roman ambassadors thought very highly of the goodwill of the Rhodians
(below, from Polyb. 27.3.2–3, 5). Livy omits this from his version of Polybius’ report at 42.45 (a
doublet of the annalistic Livy 42.26.7–9), and instead substitutes further arguments by the Rhodian
Hagesilochus (see n. 81).
last minute to prepare them.81 The Roman envoys departed Rhodes, pleased
with what they had witnessed.
While all this Roman activity was going on, Perseus was taking steps
to shore up his support in Greece. He sent envoys with letters to the
Byzantines and Rhodians, among others, outlining his exchange with
Marcius, constructing his account in such a way as to make it appear that
he had had the best of the dispute. The Rhodians were treated to more
than just a letter; Perseus’ envoys, Antenor and Philippus, also addressed
the Rhodian boulē, asking its members to remain neutral for the moment,
but if the Romans did attack Perseus, contrary to the treaty, then to try to
reconcile the warring parties. The Rhodians in particular were suited to
this task, the ambassadors argued, since insofar as they were the best pro-
tectors of equality, freedom of speech, and of their own political freedom
and that of the Greeks, it was all the more appropriate that they especially
should look out for and resist with all their power the opposite result.82 In
other words, they must see to it that the power and rule over everything
not be handed over to a single people.83 The envoys’ words, while pleas-
ing to everybody, were ultimately ineffective since all were restrained by
their goodwill toward Rome, and the pro-Roman policy prevailed.84 The
81
The other arguments put in Hagesilochus’ mouth at Livy 42.45, based upon but missing from
Polyb. 27.3, are that the Rhodians should prepare their fleet to fend off accusations of Rhodian
disloyalty by Eumenes, and that the Roman alliance is the only stable one left in the world in terms
of good faith and strength. I have earlier argued that the Polybian account is to be preferred to the
annalistic version (Burton 2011: 176), but now think the entire question of Rhodian disloyalty to
Rome during the Third Punic War is too mired in post euentum propaganda and speculation by the
ancient sources to permit such certainty (see below, Chapter 5, pp. 84–5, and Chapter 7, pp. 178–81).
The annalistic version at least has the virtue of being consistent with Rome’s attempt to humiliate
Rhodes in 177; see below, Chapter 5, p. 84.
82
Polyb. 27.4.7. Livy reduces Polybius’ lofty ideals of “equality, free speech, and … political freedom”
(τῆς ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας … καὶ ἐλευθερίας) to “esteem and strength” (dignitate atque opibus),
but glosses Polybius’ “the opposite condition of freedom” (ἐλευθερίας … τὴν ἐναντίαν προαίρεσιν)
as serua, “slavery,” thus retaining the idea of freedom. See Briscoe 2012: 311. For the use of the slogan
of Greek freedom here by Perseus’ envoys, see below, Chapter 7, n. 32.
83
This sentence is a paraphrase of Livy 42.46.4, the previous one of Polybius 27.4.6–7. The latter is
more allusive, while Livy spells it out, perhaps recalling a passage or passages in Polybius, e.g. Polyb.
30.6.5–8, where he discusses the strategic calculus of Greek politicians, like himself, who were not
happy with the supremacy of one power resulting from the war with Perseus, and so tried to avoid
supporting or opposing Rome, or 1.83.3–4, where Polybius praises Hiero II for trying to balance
Carthage and Rome. Livy knew about this Polybian sentiment, and used it elsewhere: Livy 37.35.5,
and, in the context of the war with Perseus, 42.30.5–6. Cf. also Cato ORF3 Cato fr. 164 (= Gell. NA
6.3.16), who argued that the Rhodians, like many nations, did not want the Romans to be victorious
over Perseus since there would be no state left for the Romans to fear, resulting in their enslavement
to Rome’s sole rule. Briscoe 2012: 311 lists the relevant parallels except for Polyb. 1.83.3–4.
84
Polybius writes (27.4.9) that τοῦ βελτίονος prevailed. Livy 42.46.5 took this to mean “the better
men,” the pro-Roman faction (partis melioris), which, according to Walbank 1979: 297, is what
Polybius meant. However, Briscoe 2012: 311 believes that τοῦ βελτίονος means “the better policy,”
envoys were asked to petition Perseus not to request of them anything that
might seem to go against Roman wishes.
A separate Macedonian embassy, led by a certain Antigonus, son of
Alexander, was sent to Boeotia since Perseus had learned that some towns
there were still favorable toward him.85 Antigonus visited Coronea, Thisbe,
and Haliartus, begging those places to stay loyal to Macedon.86 All three
towns sent envoys to Macedonia, and Antigonus returned to make his
report to Perseus. Upon their arrival at court, the Boeotians pleaded with
Perseus to send help to the pro-Macedonian towns since the Thebans were
harassing them to align with the Romans. Perseus responded that his hands
were effectively tied during a period of truce with Rome, and advised them
to fight the Thebans as best they could, but not to fight the Romans.87
Meanwhile, back in Rome, mobilization had begun. The praetors were
ordered to refit, assemble, and man the Roman and allied fleets; to raise
troops from the Latin allies, transfer a legion and some more Latin troops
from Liguria; and to assemble them all at Brundisium five days before the
and that Livy misunderstood Polybius. Given that modern theories that discern a class warfare/
social revolution dimension to the conflict between Perseus and Rome have no basis in the ancient
evidence (Gruen 1976; Mendels 1978; cf. below, Chapter 5, pp. 118–19), Briscoe’s reading is probably
to be preferred here.
85
Polyb. 27.5.1. Livy 42.46.6 has the embassy of Antenor and Philippus, rather than Anitgonus, visit
Boeotia on a circuitous route from Rhodes back to Macedon. Livy, perhaps “for reasons of com-
position” (Walbank 1979: 297, followed by Briscoe 2012: 311: “for literary motives”), has altered
Polybius, who is to be preferred here.
86
The Polybian MSS unanimously read Θήβας instead of Θίσβας at Polyb. 27.5.3, but Mommsen
1872: 287–8 recognized that the former lectio facilior must have replaced the latter in the trans-
mission of the text. This may have happened early enough for Livy to read Θήβας in his text of
Polybius since the Livian MS has the Macedonians visit Thebas et Coroneam et Haliartum (42.46.7),
and Livy (42.46.9) tries to resolve the inconsistency between this and the Thebans’ reckless arro-
gance (impotentem superbiam) in attacking the pro-Macedonian Boeotians by inserting a sentence
(42.46.8, not in Polybius) about Theban intransigence and anger before the Roman envoys (Thebani
nihil moti sunt … suscensebant Romanis), and by having only Haliartus and Coronea send envoys
to Macedonia (42.46.9). See Meloni 1953: 200 n. 3 (with earlier literature there cited); Gruen
1976: 59 n. 159; Walbank 1979: 298; Briscoe 2012: 312 (against e.g. Heiland 1913: 36–7, who rejects
Mommsen’s emendation; Tränkle 1977: 39–40 n. 72, who argued that a lacuna, corresponding to
Livy 42.46.8, followed Polyb. 27.5.3, but this makes nonsense of Livy [P] 42.44.5–6, where the pro-
Roman group is firmly in the saddle at Thebes).
87
Polyb. 27.5; cf. Livy 42.46.7–10 (modifying Polybius: Perseus tells the Boeotians not to give
the Romans an excuse to attack them). The “truce” (indutiae in Livy, αἱ ἀνοχαί in Polybius)
is also mentioned at Livy 42.43.2–4 and 47.1, 3, 10. The term is legally problematic since it
was declared by Marcius, a legatus without imperium, before war had been declared or begun.
This may, however, be convenient shorthand to describe what was, in fact, a more complicated
situation (“an agreement to refrain from hostilities”: Gruen 1984: 413 n. 83; “a postponement
of hostilities”: Walbank 1941: 86 and n. 35; “standstill”: Hammond 1988: 510 and n. 2; cf.
Bickermann 1953: 497 and n. 2; contra Frank 1910: 358–61; Warrior 1981: 6, 10, 22). See further
Appendix B.
consular elections on (Varronian) 18 February, ready for transshipment to
Apollonia. Commissioners were also sent to Apulia and Calabria to secure
grain supplies for the army at Brundisium.88 At the end of the year the con-
sul C. Popillius Laenas returned to Rome to preside over the consular elec-
tions for 171. P. Licinius Crassus and C. Cassius Longinus were returned,
and the senatus consultum advising the declaration of war on Perseus, citing
the king’s armed attacks on Rome’s allies, and his long-standing plans for
war and military buildup for that purpose, was successfully passed in the
centuriate assembly.89 After some dispute between the consuls over which
of the two was more entitled to be assigned command in the war against
Perseus, the lot determined that Licinius would undertake the task, with
two extra-strength legions, 16,000 allied infantry, and 8,000 allied cavalry
added to the forces already mustered at Brundisium.90
* * *
Perhaps as many as eighteen months had passed between Eumenes’

presentation of a list of Perseus’ crimes and misdemeanors to the Roman
senate and the Roman declaration of war on the Macedonian king in
April, 171. According to Livy, even before Eumenes’ arrival in Rome
in late 173, war with Macedon was already in expectatione, and before
the king addressed the senate in early 172, it was said to be “immi-
nent.”91 Despite this, the consuls of 172 had to be content with Liguria
as their province, though both desired a Macedonian command.92 After
88
Livy 42.27, 36.8–9; cf. Zon. 9.22.4. Pace Briscoe 2012: 19–20 (cf. Rich 1976: 96–7), just because
Livy (42.27.4) implausibly claims that the former praetor A. Atilius Serranus was to send the troops
across to Macedonia (Macedoniam mitteret: to whom? And why not to Apollonia, the usual Roman
destination on the other side of the Adriatic?), this does not mean the entire notice is to be rejected
as inauthentic. Given that the senate had already declared Perseus a hostis, and knew the discus-
sion of the war would take place very shortly after the consuls entered office (Livy 42.17.1–2),
some advance preparation makes perfect sense at this stage. Marcius, for one, was concerned about
Rome’s lack of preparedness for the war (Livy 42.43.2–3), so it is the tardiness of the mobilization,
not the mobilization itself that requires explanation (see further, Appendix B). I suspect that, in his
rush to get to the war itself, Livy has merely made some poor word choices (as Polybius, followed by
Livy, or his source had on the matter of the “truce”: see n. 87) (see further, Appendix A). The other
problem Rich identifies, that the troop numbers assigned to Sicinius at Livy 42.27.3–5 are too large
compared to the figure given at 42.36.8, is not a problem either, once it is recognized that Livy was
probably following two different accounts. See Appendix B.
89
Livy 42.28.4–5 (consular election), 30.10–11; cf. 42.33.4; Diod. Sic. 30.1 (declaration of war; discus-
sion: Rich 1976: 90–2).
90
Livy 41.31.2–4 (troop numbers), 33.1–4 (the dispute between the consuls).
91
Livy 42.2.3, 10.11 (imminente Persei bello).
92
Livy 42.10.11. The senate’s refusal to allow a Macedonian command is partly to be explained by
internal politics, as Livy says: because the consul C. Popillius Laenas (supported by his colleague
P. Aelius Ligus) vowed to oppose any senatorial decree related to the massacre of the Ligurians by
his brother Marcus in the previous year, the senate refused to decree Macedonia a province.
Eumenes’ speech, we are told that anticipation of the war was raised
to fever pitch,93 and “war had been decided upon (although not yet
declared).”94 By mid-year, Perseus was even declared an enemy (hostis),95
and an embassy had been sent to Macedon to break off amicitia with
him,96 and yet discussion of the war, to say nothing of its conduct, was
simply left for the consuls of 171 to deal with; “the Macedonian war was
put off for a year.”97 So runs Livy’s account: a paradoxical combination
of senatorial eagerness for a preemptive war and reluctance to do any-
thing about it even after it has been decided upon.
Polybius’ account, as will be seen in the next chapter, is paradoxical for a
different reason. In his view, Perseus inherited from his father Philip secret
preparations for a war of revenge on Rome – a war which had been perhaps
as long as two decades in the planning when Rome anticipated Perseus by
declaring war on the king in 171. And yet, as has been seen in this chapter,
Perseus seemed a most reluctant avenger, asking Marcius Philippus for one
last chance to send envoys to Rome, hoping to preserve peace to the last.
And, as will be seen in Chapter 6, even after he won the first significant
engagement of the Third Macedonian War, Perseus offered to make peace
with Rome and pay an indemnity – as though he had lost.
Clearly something has gone terribly awry in the source tradition(s), and
it is the task of the next chapter to discover what, and why. The problems
and paradoxes outlined here are intimately bound up with the question of
the causes of the Third Macedonian War, to which attention must now be
turned.
93
Livy 42.20.1 (in suspensa ciuitate ad expectationem noui belli).
94
Livy 42.19.3 (in expectatione senatus esset bello etsi non indicto).
95
Livy 42.18.1.
96
Livy 42.25.1, with Appendix A.
97
Livy 42.18.2, 6 (Macedonicum bellum in annum dilatum esset).
5
The Causes of the Third Macedonian War
Introduction
Determining the causes of events, as Polybius well knew, is the historian’s
most difficult task. He writes that simply listing the events that hap-
pened in the past, while interesting, is not terribly informative; it is only
when causation is studied that history becomes useful.1 But determining
causation is also fraught with peril for what should be the historian’s
cardinal quality – objectivity. What should be included, what should be
excluded? The process of selection itself – of events to relate, of emphasis,
of prior opinion – is inherently subjective. And how can the construc-
tion of causation, no matter how diligently and dispassionately carried
out, avoid assigning blame for such potentially world-changing events
as major wars? The historian should want to avoid over-simplification,
and recourse to “the unexplainable” – or fate, or the will of God or the
god(s), or, as Polybius most frequently characterizes it, Tyche, or divine
Fortune.2
Assessing the myriad causes of the Third Macedonian War proffered by
historians is a particularly perilous exercise – as indeed it was in antiquity.
For one thing, the war is at the heart of the debate over the nature of
Roman imperialism. Opinions – and they are little more than that – about
its most important causes tend to cluster around the extreme ends of the
spectrum of belief about the Romans as a people – were they essentially
(or exceptionally) aggressive, proactive, and agentic, or essentially (or
1
ἐπεὶ ψιλῶς λεγόμενον αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς ψυχαγωγεῖ μέν, ὠφελεῖ δ᾽ οὐδέν: προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς
αἰτίας ἔγκαρπος ἡ τῆς ἱστορίας γίνεται χρῆσις (Polyb. 12.25b.2).
2
On Thucydides’ concept of “the incalculable element,” ὁ παράλογος, see esp. Thuc. 2.61.3
(describing the great plague of Athens). There is a rich and growing bibliography on Polybius and
Tyche: Walbank 1972: 58–65 and 1994; Eckstein 1995: 254–71; Brouwer 2011; Maier 2012: esp. 210–48;
Deininger 2013.
78
The Causes of the Third Macedonian War 79
exceptionally) defensive, reactive, and passive imperialists?3 Taking a pos-
ition along this continuum of opinion is made no easier by the tattered
state of our few remaining, largely retrospective sources – to say nothing
of modern, western sensitivities about war and imperialism (these are bad
things), which are markedly different from those of the ancients (bigger is
better, war is glorious, military victory brings undying fame).
The most important task of the present chapter is to set out, as clearly
and dispassionately as possible, the causes of the Third Macedonian War
that have been identified and argued for since antiquity, beginning with
Perseus’ contemporaries.
The Specific Charges Against Perseus

To begin with the ancient sources, there are at least five extant discus-
sions, of varying length, depth, and quality, of the charges laid against
Perseus by his adversaries in the run-up to the Third Macedonian War.4
The most important discussions are Polybius’ in propria persona comments
on the causes of the war (22.18), the speech of Eumenes and its after-
math as related by Livy (42.11–18), and an inscription, probably recording
a letter of ca. 171 from a Roman magistrate to the Delphic Amphictyones
laying out the Roman case for war against Perseus (RDGE 40). The latter
is a remarkable document, a vivid contemporary witness to how Rome
publicly justified the war not just to the Amphictyones but to the Greeks
in general.5 Unfortunately, however, the stone is badly damaged, and in
places the text has been heavily restored from material borrowed directly
from the literary sources; where this has occurred, the inscription obvi-
ously cannot be said to represent independent evidence. As will be seen in
some of the notes that follow, multiple conjectures are possible at crucial
points in the document, and different reconstructions have been proffered
by its various editors.
3
The case for aggression was strongly put by Harris 1979, recently revived by Waterfield 2014, but
challenged by Sherwin-White 1980, and, to some extent, by Gruen 1984. Eckstein 2006 and 2008
challenges the conventional view that the Romans were exceptionally bellicose.
4
The two not tabulated here (but referred to in the notes to the table and in the subsequent discus-
sion) are the speech of the Callicrates at Livy 41.23.6–18, and the comparison of Eumenes and Perseus
at Livy 42.5.4–6, both drawn from Polybius (below, Appendix A, pp. 200–1, and above, Chapter 4,
n. 54).
5
Bousquet 1981: 413; Goukowsky 2011: 140. As Bousquet shows, Syll.3 613B is actually the Roman
magistrate’s (consul’s?) cover letter to RDGE 40, expressing his concern that the indictment against
Perseus should be inscribed and set up at Delphi for the edification of all the Greeks.
The charges as they are found in the three texts may be tabulated as follows:
Livy
Charge Polyb. 22.18 42.11-18 RDGE 40
Expulsion of Abrupolisa 22.18.2–3 (pretext) 42.13.6 ll. 14–17

Attack on the Dolopiansb 22.18.4 (pretext) 42.13.8 ll. 19–20 (?)c
Trip to Delphid 22.18.4 (pretext) ll. 6–13
Attack on Eumenes 22.18.5 ll. 29–35
(beginning)
Killing of Boeotian envoys Eversa and 22.18.5 42.13.6 ll. 17–19
Callicrituse (beginning)
Inheritor of Philip’s planned war on Romef 22.18.10–11 42.11.4–5 ll. 27–8
(allusive)
Marriage to Laodiceg 42.12.3–4
Marriage tie with Prusias IIh 42.12.3–4
Boeotian Treatyi 42.12.5
Overtures to Achaeaj 42.12.6
Cancelling Aetolian debt/providing military 42.12.6 ll. 19–25
assistance to Aetoliansk (allusive)
Military buildupl 42.12.7
Assassination of Arthetaurus and granting 42.12.7–10 ll. 27–9 (?)n
asylum to his killersm
Assistance to Byzantines contrary to the treatyo 42.13.6
Interference in civil strife in Thessaly and Doris 42.13.7 ll. 19–25
(allusive)
Cancellation of debts in Thessaly and 42.13.9 ll. 19–27
Perrhaebiap
Transfer of Bastarnae south of the Danubeq 42.11.4 ll. 10–12
a
Cf. App. Mac. 11.1 (Perseus possessed in Thrace a great base of operations), 2; Diod. Sic. 29.33.
b
Cf. Livy 41.23.13.
c
This reading (accepted by e.g. Hammond 1988: 501, but not by Goukowsky 2011: 146) was
a conjecture by the inscription’s first editors and commentators, Pomtow and Nikitski. Colin
rejected the reference to the Dolopes in his 1930 edition of the text of the inscription. Full
references: Sherk, RDGE 233.
d
Cf. Livy 41.23.13–14.
e
Cf. Livy 42.5.5 (allusive).
f
Cf. Livy 41.23.9–11, 16; App. Mac. 11.1; Plut. Aem. 8.4–7.
g
Cf. App. Mac. 11.2.
h
Cf. App. Mac. 11.2.
i
Cf. App. Mac. 11.1.
j
Cf. Livy 42.23.15–16; App. Mac. 11.1 (allusive).
k
Cf. App. Mac. 11.1; Diod. Sic. 29.33.
l
Cf. App. Mac. 11.1.
m
Cf. App. Mac. 11.2; Livy 42.5.5 (allusive).
n
A conjecture by Colin, but Pomtow and Nikitski saw a reference to Genthius rather than
Arthetaurus in this lacuna. As will be seen below, n. 56, there is good reason for rejecting
Colin’s proposed reading.
o
Cf. App. Mac. 11.1.
p
Cf. App. Mac. 11.1 (here referred to as causing civil strife when they wanted to send embassies
to Rome); Diod. Sic. 29.33.
q
Cf. Livy 41.23.12
Modern scholars have described some or all of these charges as
“absurd,” “comic,” “fabricated,”6 “facile,”7 “factitious,”8 “fantastic,”9 “far-
fetched,”10 “feeble,”11 “flimsy,”12 ludicrous,”13 and “spectacular and patently
ridiculous.”14 Most were not even held against Perseus at the time they
occurred, but only raked up by his enemies later on, when a case against
him was being constructed, and a pattern of hostility going back to the
beginning of his reign was being sought. After the war, the argument
continues, charges brought by Polybius and his informants, men who
had been profoundly and catastrophically affected by the king’s downfall,
were tainted by self-interest and retrospective bias. It has been suggested
that the proliferation of such charge-sheets, to say nothing of the piling-
up of the charges themselves, may in itself be a damning indictment of a
fatally weak case.15
None of this is by any means self-evident, however, and the apparent
absurdity of the individual charges demands careful scrutiny.
Beginning with Abrupolis, the king of the Sapaei and apparently an
amicus populi Romani:16 he failed to receive Roman protection against a
Macedonian attack in 179, which resulted in his ejection from his king-
dom. But, it should be noted, Perseus had not received Roman aid against
Abrupolis’ earlier invasion of Macedonia, and his overrunning of the
Macedonian mines around Mt. Pangaeum.17 Roman passivity and slug-
gishness were not malicious or self-interested in either case, of course. It
was pattern behavior – especially as concerned fast-moving events taking
place far from Rome, or beyond the senate’s immediate concerns.18 This
6
Gruen 1984: 409.
7
8
Harris 1979: 228.
9
Gruen 1984: 410.
10
Gruen 1984: 409; Green 1990: 428; Waterfield 2014: 175.
11
Harris 1979: 230.
12
Waterfield 2014: 173.
13
Gruen 1984: 412.
14
Adams 1982: 253.
15
Gruen 1984: 409: “the very quantity of alleged misdeeds undermines their credibility.” Cf. Green
1990: 427: “just how uneasy Rome was about the justice of this war may be determined from [the]
Delphic inscription listing Macedonia’s alleged offenses.”
16
Errington 1971: 207; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 1981: 234 n. 15 are skeptical of Abrupolis’ prior amicus
status (contra Bickerman 1953: 506; Meloni 1953: 63–4, 149, 186; Pédech 1964: 134; Mendels 1978: 55
and n. 2 (socius); Harris 1979: 232; Green 1990: 495, citing Diod. Sic. 29.33).
17
Polyb. 22.18.2.
18
Gruen 1984 passim. So, to take only the best known example, Spanish Saguntum’s repeated pleas for
Roman protection against Carthaginian aggression in the 220s fell on deaf ears; even after the city
was under siege, the Romans were very slow to act. For discussion, see most recently, and with full
bibliography, Burton 2011: 238–42.
is precisely why the informal amicitia tie was so appealing to the Romans
(and their international partners too, of course): its obligations were loose
and ill-defined, which allowed for a broad range of responses to calls for
help, including complete indifference.19 For their part, both Perseus and
Abrupolis may have been in breach of, if not the letter of amicitia (there
were no such rules), then its spirit, summed up in the term fides; the
Romans, after all, preferred their international amici to settle their differ-
ences peaceably rather than fight each other.20 But the evidence for Roman
passivity as their friends repeatedly went to war with each other, and Roman
acquiescence in the faits accomplis emerging from those conflicts, is over-
whelming.21 So in this case too. After Perseus’ expulsion of Abrupolis from
his kingdom, the Romans renewed their amicitia with Macedon without
mentioning the war at all. Later, when the Abrupolis affair was held against
him, Perseus tried to defend himself citing the Romans’ earlier indifference
– to no avail.22 Timing, chronology, and history itself were apparently pow-
erless in the face of the inherent flexibility of amicitia.23
Polybius was thus perhaps right to identify Perseus’ expulsion of Abrupolis
from his kingdom as a pretext (prophasis) – a stated reason for going to war.
But he certainly did not intend his readers to think Perseus was innocent on
this score, and the Romans rank hypocrites. Nor did the Romans think that
19
See now Burton 2011: 162, 163, 185, 265–6, and passim. Treaties, which typically mandated mutual
support during times of danger, where possible, were inherently less flexible – if one party under
attack insisted upon the activation of the mutual assistance clause, which was not always the case.
20
A principle established e.g. in Ptolemy V’s embassy to Rome in early 200, seeking to know whether
he, a Roman amicus, could provide help to Athens, another Roman amicus, against Philip V, still a
Roman amicus; the senate requested that he not do so (Livy 31.9.1–4, with Burton 2011: 208–9). On
the informal nature of amicitia, governed only by the spirit of fides, see Burton 2011: 38–45.
21
E.g. the Achaean League’s conquest of the entire Peloponnese in the 190s and 180s; when the
Messenians complained of the League’s attack on them to Flamininus, and surrendered to his discre-
tion, he simply ordered them to join the League. Discussion of this and several other cases: Burton
2011: 209–23).
22
App. Mac. 11.6, based on Polybian material (above, Chapter 4, n. 74). Livy, for patriotic reasons,
omits this argument from his version of Perseus’ defence (Livy 42.41.10–12), stressing instead
Perseus’ sovereign right to defend his kingdom. Despite the assertion of Eumenes (Livy 42.13.8),
the Roman envoys to Perseus in mid-172 (Livy 42.25.4), and Marcius (Livy 42.40.6), Philip’s treaty
with Rome in 196 did not forbid the king from waging war outside Macedonia without the senate’s
permission. That clause, at Livy 33.30.6, is a spurious addition to Polybius’ list of the treaty’s terms
(at 18.44; cf. 18.47). Discussion: Täubler 1913: 230; De Sanctis 1923: 95–6 n. 185, 246 n. 27; Meloni
1953: 73, 189 and n. 2; Mastrocinque 1975/6: 36; Briscoe 1973: 7, 306 (with previous scholarship
there cited) and 2012: 13, 197, 290–1; Goukowsky 2011: 145 and n. 113. It should also be noted that
the anti-Macedonian speech of Callicrates at Livy 41.23, based on Polybian material (below, n. 74),
makes no mention of the ban on Macedonian warfare beyond the kingdom.
23
A good parallel here is the Romans’ making an issue of the Achaean League’s treatment of Sparta in
the run-up to the Achaean War – thirty-five years after acquiescing in Sparta’s forcible incorporation
into the League, and washing their hands of the situation (Burton 2011: 347–8, with references).
they would be so regarded by anyone except the Macedonians, or else they
would never have added the Abrupolis incident to the list of Perseus’ delicts.
After all, in the noua sapientia debate that followed Marcius’ return from
Macedon, to be discussed shortly, the sharp practice that the older senators
criticized was the use of deception in diplomatic negotiations, not hypocrisy
or the invention of flimsy pretexts. I am not suggesting that modern scholars
are wrong to call Rome’s use of the expulsion of Abrupolis from his kingdom
“facile” or “absurd”; merely that this modern, cynical view may be at odds
with ancient perceptions of amicitia and its obligations.
The validity of the next charge, Perseus’ campaign against the Dolopians
in 174, is somewhat more complicated. When Marcius, following Eumenes’
lead, raised the matter with Perseus in 172, the Macedonian king defended
himself on the grounds that the Romans had placed the Dolopians under
Macedonian sway during his father’s reign, and the Dolopians had mur-
dered the Macedonian governor of the region in 174.24 The Dolopians
probably came under Macedonian sway in the late third century.25 They
were removed from Macedonian control in 196 as part of the settlement
in the Second Macedonian War, but returned to Philip by the Romans in
188 in gratitude for the king’s help in the Aetolian War.26 As has been seen,
however, the senatorial commission of 185 confined “Macedonia to its
ancient boundaries” (antiquis Macedoniae terminis).27 Were the Dolopians
included in or excluded from the “ancient boundaries”? The answer is by
no means clear, but Macedonian control over Dolopia could just be con-
sidered ancient by 185 if it had been incorporated into the kingdom in
210 or 207.28 On the other hand, “the ancient boundaries of Macedonia”
could just as easily refer to the kingdom as it stood under Philip II, the
immediate successors of Alexander the Great, in the time of Alexander I,
or indeed even earlier. Alternatively, because the Dolopians were usually
thought of as ethnic Thessalians, or at least certainly not Macedonians,
by antiquis Macedoniae terminis, the commissioners may have been refer-
ring to an ethnic restriction; that is, Philip was allowed to control only
24
Livy 42.13.8 (Eumenes raises the matter), 40.8 (Marcius raises it with Perseus), 41.13 (Perseus’
response); cf. App. Mac. 11.6 (who adds the detail about the murder of Perseus’ governor).
25
210 or 207 (Walbank 1967: 617).
26
Polyb. 18.47.6.
27
Livy 39.26.14; cf. Diod. Sic. 29.16, and above, Chapter 3, pp. 45–6. Errington 1971: 204 (cf. Adams
1982: 239) conflates the text of the commissioners’ decree with the terms of the treaty of 196 (“the
exact status of Dolopia may not have been precisely defined in the treaty with Rome which confined
Macedon to her ‘traditional boundaries’ ”).
28
Cf. Livy 34.31.5, where Nabis could characterize Sparta’s amicitia with Rome, established between
210 and 207, as a uetustissima foedus in 195.
the ancestral lands of the Macedones, located within the four merides of
Macedonia – the areas around Amphipolis, Amphaxitis, Bottia, and Upper
Macedonia.29
In the end, probably none of this matters. As has been noted, the
commissioners were being deliberately vague when they restricted the
Macedonian kingdom to its ancient boundaries in 185. In 174, moreover,
when the invasion of Dolopia occurred, the Romans issued no objection
to Perseus’ activity, nor did they object when Perseus refused the Dolopian
request to refer their dispute to Rome.30 The presence of a Macedonian
governor in Dolopia in 174, and presumably since 188, when the region
was returned to Philip, was apparently not a problem either; so far as is
known, it was never mentioned after the “ancient boundaries” ruling of
185. But after Eumenes raised the matter in the senate in 172, it figured
repeatedly in the list of charges against the king, including, perhaps, the
official justification for war as found in the Delphic charge-sheet inscrip-
tion. Perseus was probably justified in arguing that the Dolopians were his
subjects. So, too, was Polybius in labeling Perseus’ attack on the Dolopians
a Roman pretext for war, rather than a cause.31
As in the case of the expulsion of Abrupolis, however, it is Rome’s amici-
tia with Macedon that was the decisive factor in prompting the Romans to
add the Dolopian invasion to their indictment. As has been demonstrated
elsewhere, amicitia both giveth and taketh away: those in possession of
rewards or gifts for prior services to Rome – whether these were grants of
territory or even political freedom – enjoyed only precarious tenure. The
Romans decided when and under what circumstances to “de-gift” friends
they regarded as having betrayed trust, or being perceived to have done so,
by doing something, or being perceived to have done something, contrary
to Roman interests.32 Only a few years before, in retaliation for aiding
Perseus in his nuptials, the Romans tried to deprive the Rhodians of their
sovereignty over their Lycian subjects, granted them by Rome in 188 in
recognition of their assistance in Rome’s war against Antiochus III.33 In
29
See below, Chapter 7, pp. 173–4.
30
Livy 41.22.4 (cf. 24.8), 23.13.
31
Bickermann 1953: 89–90; Errington 1971: 20; Harris 1979: 228 n. 4 are hesitant to accept that Perseus
was completely in the right.
32
Cf. Bickermann 1953: 490: “selon les principes et la pratique constante des Romains, une parcelle de
leur empire ne pouvait être cédée à un tiers seulement qu’en usufruit et seulement à titre précaire”
(perhaps too legalistic).
33
Livy 41.6.8–12 (see below, p. 97). On the Romans “de-gifting” many cities and peoples of their free-
dom, which had been granted them by Rome in the Isthmian Declaration of 196, see Burton 2011:
227.
time, and for a perceived betrayal of Rome, Rhodes would be deprived
of its empire in Lycia and Caria altogether, as well as its port duties when
Rome diverted Aegean trade through Delos, once it was declared a free
port under Athenian sovereignty.34 As in the case of Abrupolis, the Romans
would not have added Perseus’ Dolopian campaign to its list of charges
unless they felt they had a moral, as opposed to a legal, leg to stand on.
They had no interest in making themselves look ridiculous. Where mod-
ern, post-Christian, western conventional morality might see hypocrisy,
and what used to be called, in accordance with acceptable moral conven-
tions of an earlier day, “Indian-giving,” ancient Mediterranean people may
have viewed things differently. In the moral economy of international rela-
tions in antiquity, where the prime imperative was to help friends and
harm enemies,35 Roman behavior in this case may have seemed eminently
justifiable – indeed, expected – once they became convinced of Perseus’
hostility.
The next charge on the list is Perseus’ trip to Delphi in 174, which he
undertook immediately after subduing the Dolopians, accompanied by
the army he used to conquer them. Livy says that Perseus “struck great ter-
ror into the neighboring cities,”36 but was scrupulously careful “not to do
any damage or injury to the people through whose territory he marched,”37
as even his enemy Callicrates later could not deny.38 Eumenes later raised
the stakes, alleging before the senate that Perseus had traversed Thessaly
and Doris in order to aid the worse side and attack the better in their civil
wars.39 Marcius embellished further before Perseus himself, claiming that
the king “had come with his army through Thessaly and Malis to Delphi
contrary to the treaty.”40 Perseus defended himself on the ground that his
34
See now Burton 2011: 289–91.
35
Blundell 1999.
36
Finitimis … urbibus terrorem praebuit (Livy 41.22.5).
37
Sine damno iniuriaque eorum, per quorum fines iter fecit (Livy 41.22.6).
38
Thessaliam deinde peragrauit … sine ullius eorum quos oderat noxa (“Then he travelled through
Thessaly … without doing harm to anyone of those he hates”; Livy 41.23.14). On Perseus’ marching
route, see below.
39
Livy 42.13.8.
40
Per Thessaliam et Maliensem agrum cum exercitu contra foedus Delphos isti (Livy 42.40.6). Note that
the Delphic charge-sheet inscription does not say Perseus’ trip was contrary to the treaty (παρὰ τὰς
συνθήκας, uel sim.), but “inappropriate” (παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον: RDGE 40 l. 7) – a moral, rather than a
juridical distinction. See Goukowsky 2011: 141 n. 86, 145. An annalistic source added the accusation
that Perseus captured a number of Thessalian cities (Thessaliae aliquot urbes captas: Livy 42.36.4),
but this detail is missing from the Polybian doublet at Livy 42.48.1–4 (on which, see Appendix B).
It is best discarded (cf. Meloni 1953: 208; Mendels 1978: 55 n. 6; Gruen 1984: 417 n. 103; Briscoe
2012: 269; Goukowsky 2011: 138–9 n. 137, who believes it is an anticipation of Perseus’ initial moves
once the war broke out).
soldiers had done no harm to anyone on the march around the Malian
Gulf via Larisa Cremaste, Antron, and Pteleum, and challenged Marcius
to call a conference of the Greeks through whose territory he marched, and
challenge them all to claim otherwise.41 Again, because the Romans made
no complaint about Perseus’ journey in 174, and it only became an issue
after Eumenes’ visit in 172, Polybius is perhaps right to label this charge a
pretext rather than a cause of the war.
A few questions remain, however. Was Marcius correct in claiming that
by traversing Thessalian and Malian territory, Perseus was in breach of
the treaty? As was seen earlier, by the terms of the Roman settlement after
the Aetolian War, Philip had been allowed to keep the Magnesian coast-
line of Thessaly, including Demetrias, as well as several towns around the
Malian Gulf,42 and these lay, precisely, on the indirect route Perseus scru-
pulously followed on his way to Delphi. But, like the Macedonian claim
on Dolopia, this was complicated by the Roman commissioners’ decree
of 185 that Macedon should be confined to its ancient boundaries. And,
if the decree was intended to deprive Philip of more than just Aenus and
Maronea (the main bones of contention the commission of 185 was meant
to resolve), then Thessaly had even less claim than Dolopia to be within
Macedonia’s ancient boundaries. It may also be significant that, unlike his
defense of his actions involving Abrupolis and the Dolopians, Perseus did
not defend his trip to Delphi under arms on the ground that it was not
forbidden by the treaty, but because his army had done no harm. This may
have been a tacit admission that he knew he had no legal leg to stand on
in this case – what amounted to a Macedonian military invasion, albeit a
peaceful one, of a foreign land.
The result is that modern scholars have taken Perseus’ trip to Delphi
a bit more seriously than Polybius’ other two pretexts, the expulsion of
Abrupolis and the attack on the Dolopians. And for good reason. The king’s
journey deep into central Greece with an army of perhaps 43,000 men,43
while perhaps not technically contrary to the treaty (but complicated by
the commissioners’ decree of 185), was certainly provocative to those pre-
disposed to suspect the worst of Perseus, and to put the worst possible
41
Livy 42.42.1–3.
42
Above, Chapter 3, p. 40.
43
Livy 42.51.11 (the figure). Admittedly this was the size of the Macedonian army in 171, but even
if it had not reached this size in 174, it must have been large enough to cause “great terror” (mag-
num … terrorem: Livy 41.22.5) when it suddenly appeared in central Greece. This was the same
army that had just subdued all of Dolopia (41.22.4), and so is not likely to have been a minor
expeditionary force.
construction on his desire to extend his influence over the Greeks.44 Such
a one was Eumenes, to whom the terrified cities of central Greece sent
embassies when Perseus passed through with his army. The now unpopular
Pergamene king regarded Perseus’ action as hostile towards himself, but
would later spin it as being directed against Roman influence in Greece.45
The next item on the charge-sheet – the attempted murder of Eumenes
at Dephi – was not, of course, mentioned by Eumenes in his meeting
with the senators because it occurred on his return journey from Rome
to Pergamum. It is hard to know whether to credit this story, in whole
or in part. It does seem a bit far-fetched since it depends on the idea that
“Perseus now even wished for war, thinking he was at the height of his
power,” as Livy says in the context of Eumenes’ visit to Rome in late 173/
early 172,46 which contrasts so sharply with almost everything Perseus him-
self said and did during the run-up to the Third Macedonian War, and
even after it had begun, which indicated that the king wanted to avoid war,
not bring it on.47 Most scholars who have dealt with the story believe that
what was probably a perfectly natural and easily explained event (a rock-
slide) may have been worked up in retrospect as an assassination attempt,
and an additional charge against Perseus.48
Some scholars, however, seem reluctant to dispense with the story as it
stands.49 The appearance of specific and detailed information, such as the
name of the woman, Praxo, at whose house in Delphi the would-be assas-
sins stayed, and of the Cretan mercenary captain and leader of the mission
to kill Eumenes, Evander, lends an air of authenticity, as does Valerius
Laevinus’ introduction into the senate of Praxo, as well as Rammius of
Brundisium. On the other hand, as Peter Green notes, “The specificity of
the charges … does not per se validate them.”50 It is also strange that the
44
Errington 1971: 204–5.
45
On Eumenes’ lack of popularity, see Livy 42.5.1–6. On the significance of the choice of Eumenes
rather than Rome as a source of help, see below, pp. 121–2.
46
[Perseus] iam etiam [bellum] uolebat, in flore uirium se credens esse (Livy 42.15.2).
47
Harris 1979: 230; Adams 1982: 255; Gruen 1984: 416–17; Errington 1990: 214; Green 1990: 428. As
we will soon see (below, Chapter 6, p. 132), after defeating Rome at Callicinus, Perseus offered to
negotiate on humiliating terms, as though he had lost the battle.
48
Bickermann 1953: 499; Errington 1971: 208; Gruen 1984: 409; Hammond 1988: 499 and n. 1; Green
1990: 427; Briscoe 2012: 202–3.
49
Pais 1926: 556; Benecke 1930: 258; Hansen 1971: 110; Walbank 1979: 207; Adams 1982: 252–3. Meloni
1953: 164 (following Benecke 1930: 259; De Sanctis 1923: 274) accepts that it was an assassination
attempt, but that Perseus had nothing to do with it; the assassin was most likely a fanatical anti-
Pergamene nationalist. Similarly Heiland 1913: 32–3, who adds that Eumenes may have stage-
managed the entire thing.
50
Green 1990: 841 n. 132.
senate apparently did not order Praxo to produce Perseus’ letter to her
asking her to house Evander and his team of assassins. Stranger still is the
idea that Perseus would have committed such matters to writing. As Green
says, all this was “scraping the bottom of the barrel with a vengeance”
in the search for charges – any charges – that could be used against the
king.51 The circumstantial details may indeed have been grafted on to the
story of the rock-slide at Delphi precisely in order to lend verisimilitude
to the claim by Perseus’ enemies that the king was behind it. But it should
be remembered that Polybius, who was closer in time and place to these
events than us, chose to believe the story, not making it a cause of the war,
to be sure, but part of its beginning. It was also convincing to enough sena-
tors to earn it a place on the Delphic charge-sheet inscription. These same
senators certainly did not intend themselves to be thought of as credulous
dupes of Eumenes by endorsing, in so public and prominent a fashion, the
story of Perseus’ assassination attempt on Eumenes. An attack on Eumenes
by paid assassins of Perseus, while not beyond the realm of possibility, was
not terribly likely. It was believable enough to many intelligent people at
the time, however, or at least they so alleged.
The other beginning Polybius identifies – the killing of the Boeotian
envoys Eversa and Callicritus – is perhaps best discussed in conjunction
with the other assassination in the charge-sheet, that of Arthetaurus the
Illyrian. Eumenes alleged that the Boeotian envoys were killed for speak-
ing out against Perseus in the Boeotian council, and vowing to report the
king’s activities to the senate, while Arthetaurus, a friend and ally of Rome,
was assassinated for corresponding with the Romans, presumably about
Perseus’ activities.52 In his later parley with the king, Marcius merely insin-
uated that Perseus arranged for the murder of Arthetaurus, and added that
the king hosted his murderers.53 He was similarly coy about the identity
of the Boeotians’ killer, saying “I prefer to inquire as to who killed them
rather than to make an accusation.”54 Perseus shrewdly used Marcius’ coy-
ness against him, saying that everyone knew that the Boeotians died by
shipwreck, and, since Marcius did not accuse him of plotting the assassin-
ation of Arthetaurus, he would answer only to the charge of harboring his
assassins. Perseus pointed out that granting asylum to exiles charged with
crimes of this nature was common to all nations, including Rome. He also
51
Green 1990: 427.
52
Livy 42.13.6–7.
53
Livy 42.40.5.
54
Quaerere malo quis interfecerit quam arguere (Livy 42.40.7).
revealed that when the Romans told him Arthetaurus’ assassins were in
Macedonia, he caught them, ejected them from his kingdom, and placed
a ban on them returning there.55 Unfortunately, we have no way of verify-
ing this last claim, but the fact that Polybius does not list the assassination
of Arthetaurus among either the pretexts or the beginnings of the war –
and most certainly will not have considered it a cause, about which he is
certain (see below) – probably means that we need not take it seriously
either. Marcius’ reluctance to accuse Perseus outright of being behind the
assassination of Arthetaurus, a friend and ally of the Roman people, is a
particularly damning indictment of the validity of the charge. The con-
trast with the Roman condemnation of Perseus’ expulsion of Abrupolis,
another friend and ally of the Roman people, cannot be starker.56
The assassination of the Boeotian envoys raises the issue of the deepening
factionalism within the Greek states in this period, and it is perhaps best to
deal with the charges relevant to the issue as a group. Perseus was accused
of interfering in the internal politics of several Greek states – Boeotia,
Aetolia, Achaea, Thessaly, Doris, Perrhaebia, and Byzantium, most, if not
all, roiled by civil strife between, to a lesser or greater degree, creditors
and debtors, and pro-Roman and pro-Macedonian factions.57 Marcius
alleged before the king that his military aid to Byzantium was contra foe-
dus,58 and that his “separate alliance [with Boeotia] was not permitted.”59
But Marcius is again evasive about making Perseus himself responsible for
the slaughter of the confederacy’s principes, instead asking, “who, aside
from your men, can seem to have done this?”60 Further, he does not even
mention the king’s attempt to reach an accommodation with Achaea,
55
Livy 42.41.5–8.
56
This inclines me to disagree with Colin’s conjecture that the plot against Arthetaurus should be
restored to ll. 27–9 in RDGE 40. See above, note n in the table.
57
As will be seen shortly, it is not necessary to equate the parties of the poor with the pro-Macedonians
or the parties of the rich with the pro-Romans.
58
Livy 42.40.6. I agree with Meloni 1953: 148 that the appearance of Macedonian troops in Asia
Minor, while not legally problematic (i.e. contrary to any treaty), was certainly a cause for concern
to some living there. The last time a Macedonian army was there was when Philip V rampaged
through between 204 and 200.
59
Secretam … societatem quam non licebat (Livy 42.40.6, with Briscoe 2012: 286 on the meaning of
secretam here). Frank 1914: 203 accepts Marcius’ allegation that the alliance was forbidden; contra
Briscoe 2012: 287: “nothing in the peace treaty of 196 forbad the making of such an alliance; if it
had, Philip V would not have sought to do so,” referencing that king’s attempt to establish amicitia
with the Boeotians related at Livy 42.12.5. Philip would have at least queried such a ban had it
existed, and we would have heard about it, if not among the fragments of Polybius’ book 18, then at
least in Livy’s fully extant narrative.
60
Per quos, nisi per tuos, factae uideri possunt? (Livy 40.20.7), with Gruen 1976: 36: “hardly a firm
conviction.”
his interference in civil strife in Thessaly and Doris, or his cancellation
of debts in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia – all on Eumenes’ charge-
sheet. Again, these evasions reveal the weakness of Marcius’ case. Perseus’
response, if true, seems reasonable: military aid to Aetolia and Byzantium,
to say nothing of amicitia with Boeotia, were all declared and defended
before the senate in Rome at the time they occurred.61 Again, verifica-
tion of this claim is not available in either Livy’s or Polybius’ fragmentary
narrative. Nevertheless, Polybius’ silence on the charges examined here,
combined with Marcius’ evasiveness, suggests they are not to be taken very
seriously. In addition, the alleged treaty violations – aiding Byzantium and
the amicitia with Boeotia – apparently did not appear on the Delphic
charge-sheet inscription.
The remaining charges – Perseus’ marriage alliances with the Bithynian
and Seleucid royal houses, his military buildup in Macedon, and his inher-
itance of his father’s war-plans (including the population transfer of the
Bastarnae) – are best left until the next section since they are so intim-
ately bound up with more complex theories of the causes of the Third
Macedonian War discussed there that extensive anticipatory discussion
here would be unduly tedious. It will be appropriate to round out the pre-
sent discussion of the specific charges with a few observations. Some of the
items in the indictment, closely analyzed within their proper ancient con-
text, appear not to be as ridiculous as most modern scholars allege them
to be. The Romans would not have raised them publicly if they thought
they would be mocked for doing so. The validity of some of these charges,
moreover, emerges from the dynamics of the amicitia bond, which gov-
erned the Roman–Macedonian relationship. Some of the less plausible
charges (the assassination of Arthetaurus and the Boeotian envoys) are
those Marcius could only raise in a roundabout way with Perseus, and
that concerning Arthetaurus fails to appear in Polybius or (likely) on the
Delphic charge-sheet inscription. The truly baseless charges may be identi-
fied as those Marcius refused to reiterate from Eumenes’ list of accusations
before Perseus himself, those that are missing from Polybius’ discussion
of the causes, pretexts, and beginnings of the war, and several of those
missing from the Delphic inscription; in this category belongs the notion
that Perseus’ military buildup and marriage alliances were directed against
Rome. Finally, the outright ridiculous charges that appear in the narra-
tive tradition of the run-up to the war fail to appear on the charge-sheets
at all; thus Massinissa’s report that Carthage and Perseus had exchanged
61
Livy 42.42.3–4. App. Mac. 11.1 inflates the amicitia with Boeotia into military assistance.
embassies with sinister, anti-Roman intent. Such an exchange, assuming
Massinissa was telling the truth, was not in breach of Roman amicitia,
since, as has been seen, both Carthage and Macedon were Roman amici.62
Complex Causation
(i) Defensive/Preemptive Theories

As was seen in Chapter 3, Polybius’ thesis that Philip V, his house, and
his kingdom were destroyed by divine Fortune in revenge for the crimes
and sacrileges of his early career has been branded inadequate as histori-
cal analysis – if it can be so characterized at all. But what of the corol-
lary embedded within this scheme, that Philip spent the last part of his
life secretly planning a war of revenge against Rome, the preparations for
which Perseus inherited upon his succession? In his analysis of the causes
of the war, Polybius forcefully, unapologetically, and without embarrass-
ment proclaims:
Just as I said that Philip, son of Amyntas, conceived and intended to bring
to completion the war against the Persians, and that Alexander took up
what his father had decided and became the executor of the design, so now
too I say that Philip, son of Demetrius, first took the notion to fight the last
war against the Romans and held in readiness everything necessary for the
assault, but when Philip died, Perseus became the executor of the design.
If these things are true, the other is also clear. For it is impossible that the
causes came into existence after the death of the man who decided upon the
war and planned it.63
This is the one element Polybius plucked from the speech of Eumenes,
and elevated to the level of the single (most important?) cause, aitia, of
the Third Macedonian War.64 As a consequence, it pervades all the extant
62
Livy 41.22.1-3, and above, Chapter 4, p. 65. Gruen 1984: 407 wonders why this charge is omitted
from the indictments. Meloni 1953: 127–9 assumes the exchange of embassies is an invention, either
of an annalist or of Massinissa, since it would have been regarded as overt anti-Roman behavior
at a time when Perseus was scrupulously trying not to provoke Rome, thus forgetting the fact that
Rome, Carthage, and Perseus were all amici at the time. If the story is true, Waterfield 2014: 167 may
be right that it was “a probably innocent exchange of diplomatic courtesies.”
63
Polyb. 22.18.10–11. The thesis recurs consistently throughout the extant sources (Polyb. 22.14.7–8;
23.10.4; Livy 36.25.5–8; 39.23.5, 8–10, 24.1, 29.3, 35.2; 40.16.3, 21.2, 57.2, 6–9 (cf. Just. Epit. 32.3.5;
Trog. Prol. 32); 41.23.9; 42.52.3, 7; Plut. Aem. 8.4, 6; App. Mac. 9.6; Zon. 9.21.5). On the relationship
between Polyb. 22.18 and Livy 39.23.5–29.3, see Werner 1977.
64
itaque Persea hereditarium a patre relictum bellum (“and so the war has been left to Perseus as an
inheritance by his father”; Livy 42.11.5). Actually, if Livy is to be trusted, Callicrates was the first to
ancient accounts of the run-up to the war. But the schematicism of the first
part of Polybius’ statement, while clearly appealing on the level of literary
symmetry – and to Polybius personally (after all, his pet theory about the
Hannibalic war was that it had been conceived and planned by Hamilcar,
and inherited by his son Hannibal) – has been condemned, like Polybius’
notion that Philip was punished by the divine for his crimes, as rather less
than satisfying as historical analysis.65
In fact, the theory that Philip secretly planned, and Perseus inherited a
war of revenge on Rome is unanimously rejected by scholars, either tacitly
or overtly. As was seen at the end of Chapter 3, Philip may have occasionally
tested the limits of his independence within his unequal relationship with
Rome, for example by refusing to comply with Roman orders to evacuate
Aenus and Maronea for two entire years, and massacring a portion of the
Maroneans before finally doing so. But such behavior cannot on its own
prove plans for a war of revenge. In the absence of actual evidence for
Philip’s war-plans, the ancient sources report that Philip complied with
Roman orders in order to avoid giving the appearance of hostility, so he
could continue carrying out his war preparations in secret.66 Absence of
evidence for the plot thus becomes evidence for it. Marcius Philippus also
alleged before the senate in 183 that Philip would take the first opportunity
to act against Rome, which seems at odds with his earlier statement that
Philip had complied with Rome’s orders to evacuate Aenus and Maronea.67
Despite Philippus’ warning, there is no evidence that a majority of senators
ever felt threatened by Philip after 196. What vexed them most was the
constant trooping of ambassadors from the Greek world to Rome in order
to subject them to lengthy speeches that simply dredged up the same old
issues again and again. The patres tried to stem this flow, as was noted earl-
ier, by asking Philip (and later, Perseus) to avoid giving the appearance of
being hostile toward Rome, that is, to avoid giving even the hint of a pre-
text for Rome’s allies to send more embassies of complaint to the senate.68
Perseus, it seems, was even more careful than his father to do or say
nothing overtly hostile against the Romans, complying with each and
publicize the thesis in 175/4: below, pp. 94–6. Note that in the official Roman declaration of war,
the war-plans are attributed to Perseus, not Philip (Livy 42.30.10).
65
Eckstein 2010: 239 and n. 63, and 2013: 88; cf. Werner 1977: 157–8. On the divine punishment of
Philip, see above, Chapter 3, pp. 47–8.
66
Polyb. 23.8.2; cf. Livy 39.53.11–12; App. Mac. 9.6; Zon. 9.21.
67
Polyb. 23.9.6–7; cf. Livy 40.3.1–2.
68
Polyb. 23.9.7, with Gruen 1974: 238, and above, Chapter 4, n. 42, for the comparison with the
response to Perseus. Waterfield’s paraphrase of the senate’s response to Philip – “not even the appear-
ance of disobedience would be tolerated” (2014: 160) – distorts its meaning.
every Roman request right down to the eve of the Third Macedonian War,
and scrupulously avoiding giving the Romans even the slimmest plausi-
ble pretext for declaring war. So, as was seen earlier, when he traveled to
Delphi in 174, he took a roundabout route, through what he construed as
his own territory, and during the period of the “truce” in 172, he told the
pro-Macedonian Boeotians that he could do nothing to help them during
the truce, and advised them not to harm the Romans. As will be seen later,
even after the war began, following the Macedonian victory at Callicinus,
Perseus acted as though he lost the battle, suing for peace on terms worse
than those imposed in 196 on his father, who had actually been soundly
defeated by Rome at Cynoscephalae.
Polybius’ worst-case construction of Philip’s and Perseus’ actions and moti-
vations in these years was no doubt retrospective, conceived shortly after
Perseus’ defeat by Rome and the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy
in 168–167. Polybius himself was obviously in no position to verify any of
it; he was a mere teenager in Megalopolis when events unfolded behind the
closed palace doors at Pella in the 180s. Nor did he have access to Philip’s pri-
vate thoughts and secret plans. So where did the Polybian thesis come from?
Scholars suppose that his informants were highly placed Macedonians at the
courts of Philip and Perseus, some of whom were eventually exiled to Italy,
along with Polybius himself.69 Polybius was no doubt impressed by their for-
mer closeness to the kings and access to their innermost thoughts and plans;
he placed a high value on such eyewitness evidence.70 He must have known,
however, that these men were highly motivated to distance themselves from
the last two kings of Macedon by putting the worst possible construction on
their actions, and attributing to them private plans and conversations that
would exonerate Rome for going to war against Perseus. Like Polybius him-
self and the other Achaean detainees, the Macedonian exiles probably worked
hard throughout the 160s and 150s to convince the Roman authorities to
allow them to return to their homeland and families.71 They therefore had a
vested interest in distancing themselves from the deeds and policies of Rome’s
recent enemy Perseus and his father – especially when talking to Polybius,
who had unique access to members of the Roman senatorial aristocracy.72
69
Livy 45.32.3–7. For Polybius’ consultation with the Friends of Perseus, see Polyb. 29.8.10 (explicit).
For the scholarship, see below, n. 72.
70
Cf. Polyb. 4.2.2–3; 12.4c.2–5, 25g.4, 28a.7, etc.
71
Cf. Polyb. 32.3.14–17; 33.1.3–8, 3, 7.14; 35.6; Paus. 7.10.11–12 (embassies seeking the repatriation of
the Achaean hostages).
72
These arguments are refinements of Walbank 1938: 65 and 1957: 33–4; Meloni 1953: 41; Gruen
1974: 224–5; Harris 1979: 227–8.
If Polybius corrected for the potential biases of his Macedonian eye-
witnesses, as he surely must have done as a highly self-conscious critical
historian, he must have also convinced himself that what they were telling
him approximated the truth. It was, of course, not unbelievable that Philip
may well have resented the Romans, perhaps as early as 191, when he was
ordered to call off the siege of Lamia, and particularly after 186/5, when
the ten commissioners began to stymie his projects, reduce his realm, and
embarrass him on the world stage. For a proud and restless Hellenistic
monarch, plotting a war of revenge would be an appropriate response –
and certainly understandable to Polybius. It is also just conceivable that
this resentment was handed down to Perseus, which was made all the
more credible to Polybius by the apparent antagonism between him and
his brother Demetrius, to say nothing of the indisputable fact of the latter’s
execution. This is not to say that what Polybius’ Macedonian informants
told him is to be accepted in all its particulars; merely that the historian
deemed what they said to be sufficiently plausible in explaining the known
facts of the last years of Philip’s reign.73
Consider this, as well. Polybius’ theory was shared by Callicrates of
Leontium, whom Polybius despised not only for his political views, but
because he was personally responsible for Polybius’ own downfall and
exile. If Livy is to be trusted, Callicrates was the first to suggest publicly, at
an Achaean League council meeting in 175/4, that Philip had been plan-
ning a war against Rome before he died.74 This could suggest one of two
possibilities. First, Polybius could not possibly blame Perseus (who had
always been conciliatory and inclined to peace) or the senate (perforce,
given Polybius’ position as a hostage) for starting the war, so he fixed on
Philip, and amplified the implausible and no doubt fictional notion that
that king had planned the war from the start.75 The second possibility is
73
On Polybius’ plausibility test, see Polyb. 12.7.4 (in the absence of the true facts, plausibility must
suffice, and of two historians aiming at plausibility, the account of the one who is elsewhere guilty
of overt bias will be less plausible).
74
Livy 41.23.9. Callicrates’ speech may be based on Polybian material (Mendels 1978: 66 n. 58;
Goukowsky 2011: 142; Briscoe 2012: 120–1) – indeed, Polybius may even have been present at the
meeting where it was delivered. But, as Briscoe warns, Livy altered his source material as he saw
fit, and so may well have inserted the charge that Philip planned a war against Rome. We need not
go so far as Meloni 1953: 137 n. 1, 138, who argues that Livy may have invented the entire speech,
since Polybius would never have credited his mortal enemy Callicrates with giving good, pragmatic
advice that was ultimately vindicated by its success. This gives too little credit to Polybius as a con-
scientious historian.
75
For the idea that Polybius suppressed his true beliefs for fear of enraging his Roman masters, see
Harris 1979: 227–8.
that Polybius really believed in Philip’s secret preparations, to such a degree
that he was willing to hold his nose and side with his nemesis Callicrates,
and also with Eumenes, whose conduct during the war he condemns as
foolish, grasping, and most wicked.76 The second possibility may lend
support to “the wrath of Philip, as inherited by Perseus” thesis. Polybius
must have had good historical grounds, beyond mere congeniality to his
own literary pretensions and pet theories about the origins of wars, to
associate himself with the allegations made by such shady characters as
Callicrates and Eumenes. In other words, his research into the allegations
about Philip’s secret war-plans made by Callicrates and Eumenes, as well as
by the Macedonian exiles in Italy after the war, when set against the known
facts, at least satisfied the historian’s plausibility test, though perhaps fall-
ing just short of being able to be established as hard fact.
We can go further. So confident must Polybius have been in his thesis
that he included a speech in response to Callicrates’ by the Achaean pol-
itician Archon of Ageira, future colleague of Polybius in the stratēgia of
the Achaean League for 170/69, protégé of Philopoemen, a man Polybius
revered, and political ally of Polybius’ father Lycortas.77 His speech con-
tained the devastating reply to the Polybian theory: we have no idea what
Philip would have done had he lived; we can only judge Philip’s, and
Perseus’, plans and states of mind by what takes place in plain sight, that is,
by their actions.78 No historian could have put it better. It is also, inciden-
tally, testimony to Polybius’ historical integrity that he included the speech
of Archon at all, a man congenial to him politically, but whose words on
this occasion were so uncongenial to his thesis. This tends to undermine
the first possible explanation, noted above, for Polybius’ adoption of the
idea that Philip planned the war – that he willfully or under duress dis-
torted the historical record to absolve the Romans from appearing to be
the instigators of the war. If he were so comfortable with playing fast and
loose with the truth, why include Archon’s speech at all, which only tended
to undermine his thesis? He did so in the interest of preserving the histor-
ical record, and because he believed his thesis was sufficiently resilient to
sustain the challenge represented by Archon’s words. In other words, after
careful research according to self-imposed historiographical principles,
76
Polyb. 29.8.2 (πανουργοτάτου, “most wicked”), 8 (πανουργίᾳ, “wickedness”), 9 (φιλαργυρίας,
“grasping”), 10 (κακίας, φιλαργυρία, “wickedness,” “grasping”), 9.2 (ἄγνοιαν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν
βασιλέων, “foolishness of both kings”), 11 (ἐκφανοῦς ἀλογιστίας, φιλαργυρία, “blind foolishness,”
“greed”). For discussion, see now Burton 2011: 292–9.
77
Polyb. 22.10.8; cf. Deininger 1971: 177–84.
78
Livy 41.24.5.
Polybius became convinced that the idea that Philip planned the war was
sufficiently historically plausible to account for why the war ultimately
broke out. It was not simply a preference based on personal bias.
We need not agree with Polybius, however. His thesis makes the
anger and aggression of Philip, not Perseus, the main cause of the Third
Macedonian War. Polybius apparently did not credit Perseus, whose
attempted execution of his father’s plans ended in catastrophe, with the
native ability or organizational skills to pull it off. With the exception of
his positive description of Perseus at the outset of his reign,79 Polybius’
view of the king is almost entirely negative. At one point, he describes him
as “far inferior to his brother Demetrius not only in terms of his good will
towards Rome, but also in terms of everything else due to his nature and
native ability.”80 Plutarch, reflecting the same tradition, describes the king
as not being up to the task given him because of his meanness of character,
incapacity, and especially his avariciousness.81 Mommsen largely followed
Polybius in this, making the cause of the war Perseus’ flawed character: he
lacked the kingly qualities of geniality and vigor; he pursued his goals tire-
lessly and persistently, but when the time came to act, he shrank from the
grandeur of his own vision; his smallness of spirit caused him to stockpile
resources for the war against Rome, but when the Romans were in his
lands, he could not be separated from his money; “a dime-a-dozen king,”
Perseus was not the man to restore the fortunes of the Antigonid house, a
task a better man might have found inspiring.82
It is now time to confront the necessary corollary of Polybius’ thesis: did
the Romans have good reason to mistrust or fear Perseus, who, as a duti-
ful son, was committed to carrying out his father’s designs? We may safely
leave aside Perseus’ alleged ineptitude and character flaws, as most schol-
ars now do.83 All agree that the senate mistrusted Perseus; the only thing
at issue is when this mistrust began.84 Some argue that it began as early
79
Polyb. 25.3.4–8. See above, Chapter 4, p. 59.
80
ὁ δὲ Περσεύς, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίᾳ παρὰ πολὺ τἀδελφοῦ λειπόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ
περὶ τἄλλα πάντα καθυστερῶν καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ κατασκευῇ … (Polyb. 23.7.5).
81
Plut. Aem. 8.6–7. The charge of avariciousness comes from the Polybian tradition (above, n. 76).
82
Mommsen 1856: 733–4 (I am indebted to my colleagues, Prof. Hans Kuhn and Dr Gabrielle
Schmidt for their aid in translating “einen Kӧnig vom Dutzendschlag,” “a dime-a-dozen king”). Cf.
Heiland 1913: 13, 57: Perseus lacked his father’s willpower, endurance, and determination, and was
hesitant and indecisive; Raditsa 1972: 579–80: Perseus was inept, feeble, avaricious, indecisive, prone
to anger, and always laboring in the shadow of his beloved father, and after his death, with his ghost
looming behind him.
83
See e.g. the critique of Giovannini 1969: 857.
84
In addition to the literature cited below, see Mommsen 1856: 739; De Sanctis 1923: 270–9; Meloni
1953: 148–9, 158–9, 444–51; Badian 1958: 95; Walbank 1977a.
as before his enthronement, the catalyst being the execution of his pro-
Roman brother Demetrius,85 while a very small minority believes it was
only after Eumenes’ speech to the senate that the Romans woke up to
the king’s untrustworthiness.86 The former argument may be supported by
Perseus’ specific request upon his accession that the senate recognize him
as the legitimate king of Macedon, which could be taken as an implicit
acknowledgment that he knew the senate mistrusted him.87 On the other
hand, he may have done this because the succession was in dispute – if the
denouement to the tragedy of Philip’s last days, including his grooming
of a new successor, Antigonus, son of Echecrates, nephew of Antigonus
Doson, is accepted as fact.88
Another possible confirmation of Roman suspicion of Perseus from the
outset of his reign may be seen in the senate’s very public pronouncement
against the Rhodians in 177 in their dispute with their Lycian subjects.
After an embassy from Lycian Xanthus came to Rome to complain of the
Rhodians’ treatment of themselves and the rest of the Lycians, the patres
sent a letter to Rhodes, ordering that state to treat the Lycians as allies
rather than subjects.89 But it was not just the Rhodian mistreatment of the
Lycians that provoked the Roman response. Polybius also says the letter
was sent in retaliation for the Rhodians’ naval escort of the Seleucid prin-
cess Laodice to her nuptials in Macedon, and for Perseus’ generous gifts to
them.90 Of course, the senate’s order was the mildest of responses, and was
without effect in any case: the Rhodians continued to oppress the Lycians
for years to come.91 But that does not affect the point being made here,
that the Romans may have harbored suspicions of Perseus – and those who
helped him – as early as 177. As will be seen shortly, however, this argu-
ment depends partly on the assumption, by no means self-evident, that
Perseus’ dynastic policies in themselves were a cause of concern for Rome.
Did the Romans have legitimate cause to fear Perseus, and if so, when
did this fear originate? According to Appian:
The senate, in reality because they did not prefer to have on their flank
a stable and industrious king, beneficent toward all, and who attained
85
Benecke 1930: 255; Edson 1935: 201; Badian 1958: 95; Errington 1971: 201; Green 1990: 426; Waterfield
2014: 166. Contra Bickermann 1953: 483: this was a “rivalité banale entre deux hériteurs présomptifs.”
86
Gruen 1984: 416–17; Eckstein 2013: 89.
87
Livy 40.58.8, with the interpretation of Adams 1982: 245.
88
See above, Chapter 3, p. 54. Hammond 1988: 491–2 accepts the idea of a disputed succession.
89
Polyb. 25.4.1–5; cf. Livy 41.6.8–12 (with embellishment); discussion: Meloni 1953: 124–5.
90
Polyb. 25.4.7–8.
91
Livy 41.25.8.
prominence so suddenly, and was a hereditary enemy toward themselves,
but ostensibly because they credited what Eumenes set before them, decided
to go to war with Perseus.92
Where did this tradition, seemingly so at odds with the Polybian thesis of
Perseus’ incompetence, originate? Unfortunately, certainty is unattainable
because of the tattered state of Polybius’ text. Nevertheless, it resembles
the positive tradition about Perseus at the outset of his reign found in
Polybius.93 As was seen earlier, the historian describes Perseus as capable,
physically fit, serious, composed, and of modest appetites, particularly as
far as women and drink are concerned. The case for Polybius as Appian’s
source here may be strengthened by his use of ἐν πλευραῖς ἔχειν, “on their
flank” in the passage. Elsewhere Polybius uses πρὸς ταῖς πλευραῖς, “near
their flank,” to describe Roman strategic thinking in the 220s in reference
to the Celtic threat: the Romans chose to deal with the latter as a matter of
priority, says Polybius, since the danger was near their flank, which neces-
sitated turning a blind eye toward the extension of Carthaginian power
in Spain.94 Appian’s statement thus likely originated in Polybius, whom
we know Appian followed closely for his account of eastern affairs.95 The
notice should be treated as authentic: the Roman senate had reason to fear
the growth of Macedonian power.96
92
ἡ [σύγκλητος] δ᾽ ἔργῳ μὲν οὐκ ἀξιοῦσα βασιλέα σώφρονα καὶ φιλόπονον καὶ ἐς πολλοὺς
φιλάνθρωπον, ἀθρόως οὕτως ἐπαιρόμενον καὶ πατρικὸν ὄντα σφίσιν ἐχθρόν, ἐν πλευραῖς ἔχειν,
λόγῳ δ᾽ ἃ προύτεινεν ὁ Εὐμένης αἰτιωμένη, πολεμεῖν ἔκρινε τῷ Περσεῖ (App. Mac. 11.3).
93
Polyb. 25.3 (see above, Chapter 4, p. 59), with Adams 1982: 251 n. 99.
94
Polyb. 2.22.10. I owe this suggestion to Arthur Eckstein.
95
Briscoe 2012: 288; cf. Rich 1976: 98 n. 139, and now Rich 2015, who convincingly argues that
Polybius was the source for the first two-thirds of Appian’s Syriakē. Meloni 1955: 134–3 believed the
anti-Roman-sounding material at Mac. 11.3 came from an unknown Greek source using a combi-
nation of Polybius, an annalist, and an anti-Roman Greek source (119–21). Gabba 1956: 100–6 (a
review of Meloni 1955), followed by Mastrocinque 1975/6: 34–40 (cf. Bickermann 1953: 481), argued
that Appian was following two annalistic sources, one strongly pro-Catonian. While these theories
have their attractions (Gabba/Mastrocinque/Bickermann e.g. finds strong support in Livy 42.11.1,
where the historian refers to several competing annalistic traditions about the Pergamene embassy
of 172), they are both ultimately based on silence, and thus unverifiable. Meloni’s theory is especially
problematic since it posits multiple unknown authors in an unnecessarily complicated chain of
transmission to account for the anti-Roman-sounding material at App. Mac. 11.3. Such material,
however, may have come from Polybius directly, whom we know preserved elements of the pro-
Perseus tradition (thus, as we have seen, Polyb. 25.3; cf. Pais 1926: 554 n. 31). We should also heed
the words of Goukowsky 2011: 127 n. 17 that “tous les adeptes de la Quellenforschung” overlook the
real possibility that the source favorable to Perseus may be Appian himself. He was not, after all, a
mindless copying-machine.
96
Even Harris 1979: 230, who believes the statement is “exaggerated,” cannot deny it contained “part
of the truth.” Eckstein 2010: 241 argues that, although Perseus scrupulously avoided giving judicial
grounds for complaint, he was altering the balance of power through his military buildup – and he
knew it.
A few more hints of Rome’s fear of Perseus survive in the sources.
During the dilectus for the upcoming war, the consul Licinius Crassus
urged that everything must be done to encourage enlistment in “the new
war, so close to Italy, against a most powerful king.”97 Of course, it could
be that Licinius was simply exaggerating the Macedonian threat out of
self-interest, that is, to ensure the levy produced a large enough army to
defeat Perseus under his leadership. His words, nevertheless, must have
seemed plausible to his audience, whom he was trying to persuade to fol-
low his lead. And in the event, the levy was unusually large, and the consul
was allowed to draft veterans and centurions past the legal age limit, and
to choose his own military tribunes – all good indications, as John Lendon
has shown, that the Romans knew the Macedonian war would be “great
and terrible.”98
One further item bears notice. Livy states that Philip’s purpose in trans-
ferring the Bastarnae to the lands of the Dardani was to clear a path to
the Adriatic, whence they would be sent to plunder Italy, distracting the
Romans from Philip, who would then recover his Greek possessions.99
Eumenes confirmed to the senate that this plan was inherited by Perseus,
and the accusation duly appears in the Delphic charge-sheet inscription.
How likely was it that the Romans took this intelligence seriously, either
when the Dardani and Thracians reported it in 177, or when Eumenes
brought it up in 172? Seriously enough, apparently, to publicize it promin-
ently at Delphi.100 Most scholars now agree that the idea that Philip, and
then Perseus, planned to use the Bastarnae to attack Italy is “false and fan-
tastic,” “absurd,” “pure invention,” “almost impossible,” and besides that,
“impracticable,” and “a logistic absurdity, since Perseus had no navy.”101
This is no doubt all true, but what matters here is whether the senate
believed this was the Macedonian plan, either in 177 or 172. On the former
occasion, at least, the Romans were concerned enough to send ambassadors
97
Nouo bello, tam propinquo Italiae, aduersus regem potentissimum (Livy 42.33.5).
98
Lendon 2005: 193. Evidence and further discussion: below, p. 114, Chapter 6, p. 138.
99
Livy 40.57.5–9. Pais 1926: 550–1 n. 9 argues that the Romans established a colony at Aquileia in 181/
180 because they suspected Philip or his proxies would soon invade Italy.
100
Although there it is the Greeks who are under threat rather than Italy. This is only natural in a
decree aimed at a Greek audience. As Goukowsky 2011: 150 observes, the inscription represents
Perseus as trying to use the barbarians to enslave Greece – a perversion of Macedon’s traditional
role, which was to serve as a buffer between the barbarians and Greece.
101
Mastrocinque 1975/76: 36; Errington 1971 (“false and fantastic”); Harris 1979: 229; cf. 231 (“logistic
absurdity”); Gruen 1984: 417 n. 106 (impossible because of Perseus’ lack of a navy); Hammond
1988: 468 n. 2 (“impracticable”), 471 (“almost impossible”); Hammond 1989: 361 n. 16; Goukowsky
2011: 143 (“pure invention”); cf. Waterfield 2014: 161 (“against all likelihood”).
on a distant and dangerous mission into the barbarian wilds beyond the
northern frontier of the kingdom of Macedon. They were gone for almost
two years.102
A later defensive/preemptive theory is a creation of modern scholarship:
that Rome was deeply suspicious of a “coalition of kings” developing on
its eastern flank in the 170s. In its original form, the theory stated that the
Romans feared an anti-Roman coalition when Perseus, at the outset of
his reign, married the Seleucid princess Laodice, and betrothed his sister
Apame to Prusias of Bithynia.103 Its critics noted that the theory could not
account for Roman indifference toward Perseus at the time the marriages
took place.104 In 1953, however, Elias Bickermann offered a refinement of
the “coalition of kings” thesis, arguing that the broader geopolitical sig-
nificance of Perseus’ marriage alliances – and true Roman fear of them
– only became apparent in the later 170s. The timing of the transform-
ation of Roman fear into action against Perseus, Bickermann argued, is
best explained in the context of the Sixth Syrian War: the Romans feared
that the eventual victor in that conflict would link up with Perseus, and his
undefeated army of 43,000 men, in order to destroy Rome’s hegemonial
position in the East, and so decided to take out Perseus before that could
happen. Thus, the Roman war on Perseus was preemptive, that is, funda-
mentally defensive.105
Bickermann’s thesis appeared to be entirely discredited in 1977 by Frank
Walbank, who argued that it depended on a chronological impossibility.
Walbank noticed a passage in Livy, derived from Polybius, which stated
that Antiochus was waiting for the Roman war with Perseus to break out
before beginning his own war against Egypt.106 Thus,
[i]f the imminence of the Third Macedonian War was a factor encouraging
Antiochus to make war on Egypt, the Senate can hardly have been led to
declare war on Perseus because Egypt and Syria were themselves at war – as
Bickermann alleges.107
102
Livy 41.19.4; App. Mac. 11.1. Reinach 1910: 265; Pareti 1952: 741, 750; Meloni 1953: 158–9; Papazoglou
1978: 161–3 accept the historicity of Philip’s plan. Hammond 1989: 361 notes that the Dardanians
enjoyed Roman amicitia, which originated in their collaboration against Philip in the Second
Macedonian War (cf. Livy 31.40.7, 43.1–3; Zon. 9.15.5). This is probably why they were given the
courtesy of a Roman fact-finding mission into the activities of the Bastarnae.
103
Niese 1903: 82–3, 100; Meloni 1953: 122–5; Schmitt 1957: 134–7; Errington 1971: 202–3; Hopp
1977: 35.
104
Giovannini, 1969: 855; Gruen 1975: 66–7 and 1984: 404.
105
Bickerman 1953: 501–5 (with 481–2: preventive war); cf. Will 1967: 227.
106
Livy 42.29.5–6 (quoted below, n. 121). Polybian derivation: Nissen 1863: 248–9; Walbank 1979: 23,
290; Briscoe 2012: 246.
107
Walbank 1977a: 84.
A Coalition of Kings Redux
Since Walbank’s apparent demolition of Bickermann’s thesis few scholars
have been willing to entertain the Roman fear of a Syrian–Egyptian war as a
serious explanation for the Romans’ decision to go to war against Perseus.108
In an attempt to salvage something from the wreckage, Adams suggested,
quite reasonably, that Perseus’ connections to Prusias, the Rhodians, and
the Seleucids were directed primarily at Eumenes, who was by the mid-
170s completely isolated and surrounded by potentially hostile states and
kings.109 This was precisely why, in late 175, he helped Antiochus IV secure
the Seleucid throne after the assassination of Seleucus IV: it was a deliber-
ate attempt to undermine Perseus’ coalition.110 The plan worked: Eumenes
got his Seleucid alliance.111 Erich Gruen further noted that all of this was
done without reference to the Romans; it was Hellenistic dynastic politics
as usual. The Romans, therefore, had nothing to fear from a “coalition of
kings” in the 170s – Eumenes did, and so did something about it.112
It has apparently escaped notice, however, that Walbank’s demolition of
Bickermann’s thesis was based on a misrepresentation of it. Bickermann
did not argue that fear of the outcome of the Sixth Syrian War motivated
Rome to act against Perseus, but fear of its outbreak. Bickermann writes:
On the eve of the war against Perseus, Antiochus IV Epiphanes was menac-
ing Egypt. He assumed that the Romans, preoccupied with the Macedonian
conflict, would not stand in the way of his plans. The war between Egypt
and Syria only began in 170/169, precisely because the courts of Alexandria
and Antioch were awaiting the start of hostilities between Pella and Rome.
But everyone was expecting war since 173 or 172. The ministers of Ptolemy
VI declared openly and loudly that with Egyptian money they would buy
off the Syrian garrisons and win over the cities of Coele-Syria. Not only
would they reclaim this province, but committed themselves to acquiring
all of Antiochus’ kingdom. The Roman embassy that visited the courts of
the East in 172 informed the senate of this. As in the run-up to the war
108
Cf. Harris 1979: 230; Gruen 1984: 417 n. 106, against e.g. Green 1990: 246.
109
Adams 1982: 246; cf. Goukowsky 2011: 160–1, who notes that Perseus also threatened Eumenes’
position in Thrace, thanks to his expulsion of Abrupolis, his alliance with Cotys, and his posses-
sions in eastern Thrace (on which, see above, Chapter 4, pp. 58, 60).
110
App. Syr. 45 (Eumenes and his brother Attalus drive out Seleucus’ assassin Heliodorus, then install
Antiochus); OGIS 1.248 ll. 15–18 (the Pergamenes escort Antiochus to the Syrian frontier, give
him money, an army, a diadem, and other insignia of royalty). Discussion: Zambelli 1960: 372–89
(we need not accept his timeline, however); McShane 1964: 163–4; Mørkholm 1966: 41–2; Mittag
2006: 42–4.
111
Although, in the event, it did him little good, for Antiochus soon ingratiated himself with all and
sundry, enemy of Perseus or not. See below, pp. 103–4.
112
Gruen 1984: 555–56; cf. Hansen 1971: 107–108; Adams 1982: 246–47.
against Philip, the political and military equilibrium in the Aegean basin
was in peril again.113
So as early as 173 or 172, a renewal of the perennial Syrian–Egyptian con-
flict over Coele-Syria was eminently predictable, and indeed even inevita-
ble, with potentially dangerous consequences for Roman arrangements in
the East. It was not so much a coalition of kings that threatened, but the
opposite: another destructive and destabilizing war between the Seleucid
and Ptolemaic kingdoms, with significant adverse ripple effects through-
out the eastern Mediterranean. For Rome, as will be seen, the timing was
not ideal, as relations with Perseus were beginning to deteriorate; by mid-
172, he was already declared a hostis. And, of course, should one of the
belligerents in the ongoing fight over Coele-Syria emerge victorious this
time, as seemed likely, Rome’s unipolar hegemony in the East, established
in 188 and carefully maintained for a decade and a half, would be destroyed
at a stroke.
Contributions to scholarship since Bickermann’s article appeared
have allowed for further refinement of his basic insight. Recently, John
Grainger has shown that, whenever one or both of the Seleucid and
Ptolemaic rulers died, the treaty that ended the most recent war in the
series over Coele-Syria was typically considered to be no longer bind-
ing, and the successor(s), almost as a matter of course, started strategic-
ally positioning themselves for the resumption of hostilities.114 And, of
course, the other states of the eastern Mediterranean held their col-
lective breath, knowing it was only a matter of time and opportunity
before war broke out afresh. This was the situation after April or May
176, when the Egyptian Queen Cleopatra Syra, daughter of Antiochus
III, died, thus depriving her children by Ptolemy V (dead since 181),
all of them under the age of 12, of a responsible regent.115 As long the
Dowager Queen was at the helm, there had been little chance of war
113
Bickermann 1953: 502. Cf. Will 1967: 265: everyone in the East was expecting the war to break out
from 172 at the latest.
114
Grainger 2010: 115 (establishing the paradigm: “by 261 Antiochus was dead, and the Ptolemaic-
Seleukid peace of 271 no longer applied”; the Second Syrian War broke out almost immediately),
151, 186–7, 236 (the most obvious instance: Ptolemy IV dies and the boy-king Ptolemy V succeeds
in 204; in 204, Philip V is in Asia Minor, attacking Ptolemaic possessions; by winter 203/2, Philip
has struck a pact with Antiochus III to dismember the Egyptian kingdom; and by spring 202,
Antiochus is attacking Coele-Syria).
115
Grainger 2010: 282 (following Ray 1976: 79, based on the Demotic archive of Hor of Sebennytos)
on the date of Cleopatra Syra’s death (also recorded at Porph. In Dan. fr. 49a). The ages of her
children at the time of her death were 11 (Cleopatra II), 9 (Ptolemy VI), and 6 (the future Ptolemy
VIII Physcon).
with Syria since it was very unlikely she would make war on her own
brother, Seleucus IV.116 But as soon as she died, two courtiers – Eulaeus,
a eunuch, and Lenaeus, a Syrian former slave – immediately seized con-
trol, stockpiled all the wealth they could lay their hands on, staged the
marriage of Ptolemy VI and his sister Cleopatra, and put on massive
public banquets.117 From the outset of their regime, rumors were rife
that the two ministers were preparing not just to recover Coele-Syria,
but to conquer the entire Seleucid empire.118 Eulaeus and Lenaeus, that
is, behaved as though the treaty between Antiochus III and Ptolemy V
that had ended the Fifth Syrian War in 195 had been nullified in 176/5
by the death of Cleopatra Syra.
The danger of a renewal of the war over Coele-Syria intensified after
Antiochus IV seized the Seleucid throne late in 175.119 Although the new
king took no overt steps to instigate a war at the time, his coup put him in
control of resources and manpower unsurpassed in the region.120 Livy, fol-
lowing Polybius, says that before the war with Perseus broke out, “Antiochus
was already threatening Egypt, despising the youth of the king and the
laziness of his ministers; he thought that by raising the issue of Coele-Syria
he would have a justification for war, and he could conduct it without hin-
drance once the Romans were preoccupied with the Macedonian war.”121
Antiochus also immediately started consolidating support, mounting, as
Perseus had done at the start of his reign, an aggressive charm offensive
toward the states of Asia Minor, Athens, Delos, the Boeotian confederacy,
116
Mittag 2006: 94 and 152.
117
Diod. Sic. 30.15; 2 Macc. 4:21–2, with Mørkholm 1966: 68 n. 18; Gruen 1984: 686; Grainger
2010: 282, 287.
118
Diod. Sic. 30.16.
119
Grainger 2010: 282–3: after Seleucus IV was killed, “he was succeeded by a younger brother under
circumstances which destabilized the Seleucid kingdom once more, and this encouraged those in
Egypt keen to reopen the conflict over Koile Syria, and thereby opened the way to a new war.”
120
Diod. Sic. 30.15. Ptolemy V, following the usual pattern (above, n. 114), had evidently been plan-
ning a war of revenge against Syria after the death of Antiochus III, which may be the source of
Antiochus IV’s considerable resources and manpower (Diod. Sic. 29.29).
121
Antiochus imminebat quidem Aegypti regno, et pueritiam regis et inertiam tutorum spernens; et
ambigendo de Coele Syria causam belli se habiturum existimabat gesturumque id nullo impedimento
occupatis Romanis in Macedonico bello (Livy 42.29.5–6). Bickermann, as we have seen, dates
Antiochus’ calculations mentioned here to 173 or 172, i.e. before the Roman embassy to Asia and
the Aegean, which affirmed the loyalty of the kings (42.19.6–8), since Livy syntactically connects
the Seleucid king’s strategic thinking to his promise to help Rome in its war with Perseus with
tamen at 42.29.6. What Livy seems to say is that Antiochus was threatening Egypt, and was think-
ing he could provoke war by raising the issue of Coele-Syria, but wanted to wait and see how the
Rome–Perseus business (revealed by the embassy of 172) played out, knowing that if it came to
war he could attack Ptolemy without interference from a preoccupied Rome; that was what he was
thinking, but nevertheless promised the embassy in 172 that he would provide everything Rome
needed for the war with Perseus.
and various cities in the Achaean League.122 Polybius remarks that, at the
outset of his reign, Antiochus’ generosity toward cities and temples of the
gods throughout Greece was unsurpassed.123
The volatility in the eastern kingdoms in the mid-170s, to say nothing
of the Egyptian regime’s open preparations for war, imperiled the stability
of the eastern Mediterranean; thus far Bickermann, supplemented by later
scholarship. When or whether any of these events aroused Roman suspi-
cion and fear is a different question entirely. The Romans certainly knew
about Egypt’s preparations for war by 174, when a Roman embassy visited
the East.124 The purpose of the embassy was to look into the state of the
Seleucid kingdom, recently rocked by the assassination of King Seleucus
IV, the enthronement of his 4- or 5-year-old son Antiochus by Seleucus’
prime minister and killer Heliodorus, the coup engineered by Eumenes and
Antiochus IV, and the odd compromise that made Antiochus IV co-ruler
with the younger Antiochus, as well as his regent and adoptive father.125
Even though the envoys were satisfied that the pro-Roman Apollonius of
Miletus was Antiochus’ leading advisor,126 and that the king himself was
behaving in Roman fashion, canvassing his subjects in a toga and sitting
in a curule chair,127 they may still have had some misgivings about him.
He was, after all, a different sort of man from his predecessor, Seleucus IV,
a virtual pacifist by comparison. An armed coup brought Antiochus to
122
The primarily epigraphic evidence is gathered in Mørkholm 1966: 56–63, but unfortunately much
of it is undated. Polyb. 26.1 (below) helps to date this activity to early in the reign, while a key
inscription, SIG3 644/645, a decree honoring Eudemus of Seleucia for his services, provides a rough
terminus ante quem of 172 (Mittag 2006: 101 and n. 21).
123
Polyb. 26.1.10–11. In 169/8, Lycortas (with his son Polybius in attendance) remarked on Antiochus’
remarkable generosity before the Achaean League council (Polyb. 29.24.13).
124
The report of the embassy is recorded at Livy 42.6.12, but its dispatch is unrecorded; it probably fell
into the large lacuna following Livy 41.28: Briscoe 2012: 175. The date: Mørkholm 1966: 64–5 n. 3;
Mittag 2006: 99; Briscoe 2012: 175.
125
This arrangement would last until mid-170, when the child was killed by Antiochus.
Discussion: Zambelli 1960; Mørkholm 1964; Mørkholm 1966: 36, 40–60; Walbank 1979: 284–5;
Gruen 1984: 646–7; Mittag 2006: 157–8; Grainger 2010: 284–7, 292–3. On the purpose of the
Roman embassy of 174, see Grainger 2010: 288 (“mainly investigative”), vs. Mørkholm 1966: 64
(“purely formal – to establish contact”); Mittag 2006: 99 (“gratulierte dem neuen seleukidischen
König”).
126
Livy 46.6.12. On the identity of Apollonius, see Mørkholm 1966: 47–8; Mittag 2006: 63.
127
His behavior caused some of his subjects to label him Epimanes, “madman,” a play on his honor-
ific “Epiphanes” (Polyb. 26.1a-1 = Diod. Sic. 30.32; cf. Livy Per. 41). Antiochus had no doubt picked
up his Roman habits while a hostage in Rome for thirteen years (App. Syr. 39, 45; he seized the
Seleucid throne when he was on his way back to Syria after being replaced as hostage by his brother
Seleucus’ eldest son Demetrius). Antiochus would later use a Roman architect, Cossutius, to help
him in his attempt to complete the Temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens (Vitr. Arch. 7 pr. 15). The
king must have died while the project was underway since it was left unfinished for Hadrian to
complete three centuries later: Mørkholm 1966: 58; Mittag 2006: 116–17.
power, he was in possession of massive resources and manpower, and he
was young, vigorous, and ambitious.128 In the next generation, if Polybius
is to be believed, the senate preferred to have Antiochus IV’s son Antiochus
V, a boy of 8 or 9, on the Seleucid throne rather than Demetrius, the cap-
able and vigorous 23-year-old son of Seleucus IV.129 The patres may have
felt the same in 174. One reason the Romans may have been happy to
discover that Apollonius was influential with Antiochus IV was because he
was part of a court faction that was loyal to the boy-king Antiochus.130 As
long as the co-rulership held, the potential for internal Seleucid instability
existed, which made Syrian aggression against their neighbors less likely,
and thus less likely to undermine the Roman-supported order in the East.
But how long could a young, vigorous, ambitious king, who needed to
establish his prestige and legitimacy as early as possible, be content with
mere co-kingship and regency? After all, the longer he waited, the closer
his young nephew moved toward majority, and to staking his claim to the
throne that rightfully and solely belonged to him.131 It did not bode well
that by 173/2, the senior Antiochus began styling himself Theos Epiphanes,
“god manifest,” thus elevating himself above his younger co-ruler – as well
as the rest of mankind.132
Roman ambivalence toward Antiochus IV, who, after all, had seized
power in a coup, may explain why renewal of the Roman–Seleucid amici-
tia was not on the agenda of the embassy of 174. The normalization of rela-
tions with the new Seleucid regime had to await the return of the Roman
embassy, and the arrival in Rome of the follow-up embassy of Antiochus’
advisor Apollonius in 173. On that occasion, Apollonius no doubt reported
what he witnessed at Alexandria on his way to Rome: the opulent celebra-
tions mounted by Eulaeus and Lenaeus, and perhaps their preparations
for a new war over Coele-Syria.133 Apollonius also brought with him the
128
Like Perseus, Antiochus was at this time in his late 30s: Mørkholm 1966: 38; Mittag 2006: 32–7. On
his ambition, see Mørkholm 1966: 48, and below.
129
Polyb. 31.2.6–7; discussion: Burton 2011: 219; cf. 300.
130
Mørkholm 1966: 48.
131
In the event, Antiochus did away with his co-ruler and nephew in 170: Zambelli 1960: 363–5;
Mørkholm 1966: 42–3, 71; Mittag 2006: 157–8; Grainger 2010: 293 (based on an entry in the
Babylonian Astronomical Diaries); cf. above, n. 125. But this was, of course, all in the future, and
thus did not affect the elder Antiochus’ strategic calculus in 174.
132
Mørkholm 1966: 48, based on numismatic evidence. As Mørkholm (47 n. 35) also notes, the
younger Antiochus is not mentioned in Appian’s account of Antiochus IV’s accession (Syr. 45), or
in the Athenian decree recording the same events (OGIS 1.248, with above, n. 110).
133
2 Macc. 4:21–2, with Livy 42.6.6–12, and Gruen 1984: 686–7; cf. above, p. 103. Mørkholm 1966: 65
n. 5 doubts that discussion of the Egyptian situation took place at all, and (68 n. 18) that there is
no way of determining whether Apollonius visited Egypt before or after he visited Rome. It makes
final instalment of Antiochus III’s indemnity from the Syrian War,134 as
well as lavish gifts of golden vases. The Romans renewed their amicitia
with the Seleucid kingdom, and gave Apollonius himself 100,000 asses,
as well as a house in Rome for his enjoyment.135 A congenial outcome for
all concerned, no doubt, but the paying off of the indemnity may have
raised concerns in some quarters. Here was a tangible sign of resurgent
Seleucid prosperity, and worse, of a state that no longer regarded itself as
an inferior to Rome, but an equal, the most graphic symbol of its infer-
iority – the indemnity – having been removed.136 However that may be,
after Apollonius’ visit, the Romans had confirmation of the prosperity of
the Seleucid kingdom, and probably further intelligence on the Egyptian
regime’s preparations for war. It makes sense, then, that a fresh batch of
ambassadors was dispatched to Asia and the Aegean in 172, with special
instructions to sound out the attitude of the kings. In the event, they
reported back that Perseus had already tried to make alliances with both
Antiochus and Ptolemy, but he had been rebuffed.137
In all this there is a vague sense of déjà vu. In 172, the Romans renewed their
amicitia with the Syrian kingdom, whose new king, Antiochus, had effectively
seized power in an armed coup after the assassination of Seleucus IV, and had
the resources (as the payment of the indemnity and the gift of golden vases
proved), capability, and motivation to attack Ptolemy. Similarly, at the outset
of Perseus’ reign, the Romans renewed their amicitia with Macedon, even
though they were already suspicious of Perseus because of the death of his
brother Demetrius (a preemptive coup?), and his aggression against Roman
amici (Abrupolis and the Dardanians). Both renewals of amicitia probably
contained an element of defensiveness; that is, they were in part designed to
assure the Romans that their eastern flank would remain stable in the short,
if not the long term – which we know was a source of concern for them.138
no difference to the argument presented here since the Romans most likely already knew about the
Ptolemaic regime’s activities, thanks to the intelligence gathered by the Roman embassy sent to the
East in 174.
134
The payment was long overdue, the final instalment having been scheduled for 177 (Mørkholm
1966: 65).
135
Livy 42.6.6–12.
136
Compare the situation after 151, when Carthage made its final indemnity payment from the set-
tlement of 201: Burton 2011: 310, 315–16, 322. While the Romans occasionally remitted indemnity
balances (as with Philip in 190: above, Chapter 3, pp. 39–40), they frowned upon any attempts
at voluntary early payments: Livy 36.4 (Rome rejects Carthage’s attempt – in 191 – to pay off the
balance of their indemnity imposed in 201).
137
Livy [P] 42.45.8; App. Mac. 11.4 (Livy 42.19.7–8, 26.7–9 is evidently an annalistic doublet of the
Polybian report: Mørkholm 1966: 66 n. 6; Luce 1977: 126–7, 132 and n. 40; Briscoe 2012: 17).
138
App. Mac. 11.3, and above, pp. 97–8.
But the sense of history repeating goes deeper than this. Some of the
older senators, including Cato, no doubt recalled a time when events in
the Hellenistic East threatened to upset the precarious balance of power
there, when a coalition of formidable and vigorous kings united against
an unstable regime with a child on the throne.139 In 203/2, Antiochus III
Megas, fresh from his reconquest of Alexander’s eastern empire, ganged
up with the expansionist Philip V, who believed the blood of Alexander
the Great flowed through his veins, against the terribly weakened Egyptian
kingdom, rocked by a nativist insurrection and with a child, Ptolemy V, on
the throne, a virtual hostage to his ministers.140 In 174 (and perhaps earlier),
there existed the potential for a similar configuration. An impotent child
subject to the whims of his ministers sat on the Egyptian throne, while the
other two major Hellenistic kingdoms were ruled by vigorous and ambi-
tious kings in the prime of life, related by marriage, and each possessing vast
amounts of manpower and resources that could be brought to bear against
Ptolemy. Adding to the danger was the fact that Ptolemy was controlled by
ministers with their own ambitious agenda, which was known to include
the reignition of the war over Coele-Syria.141 The situation in the East was
very volatile in the mid-170s. Both the Seleucid and Ptolemaic regimes were
highly motivated to go to war with each other over Coele-Syria, and indeed,
seemed to be taking steps in that direction. If provoked by an attack from
a severely weakened (and delusionally overconfident) Ptolemaic regime,
Antiochus was certainly strong enough on his own to deal with it, but he
could virtually guarantee preponderance, and victory, by calling upon his
relatives Prusias and Perseus (Antiochus’ friend Eumenes might also be
persuaded to hold his nose and join in). Antiochus, moreover, had all the
moral and legal cover he needed to attack Egypt preemptively, if neces-
sary: as uncle and closest surviving competent blood relation of the young
Ptolemies, he could claim that he was well within his rights to rescue them
from the pernicious control of their evil ministers.142
None of this matters, of course, unless the Romans could foresee the
potential dangers of the situation from 173, as Bickermann claims. As
Walbank correctly saw, the parallels between 203/2 and the mid-170s are
by no means precise.143 Neither Perseus nor Antiochus IV were the men
139
Bickermann 1953: 504.
140
Sources and discussion: Eckstein 2008: 129–80 (cf. 2006: 271–5) (definitive).
141
Cf. Grainger 2010: 287.
142
He would later claim to be Ptolemy VI’s protector in an attempt to undermine the influence of the
ministers in Alexandria: Mørkholm 1966: 84; Grainger 2010: 299.
143
Walbank 1977a: 83: “History can of course repeat itself; but rarely so soon, or so precisely.”
their fathers had been; the latter were great conquerors, while the former
merely possessed the potential (the resources and manpower) to be so.
And, crucially, there was as yet no sign, beyond their marriage tie itself,
that Perseus and Antiochus intended to create a grand coalition to take out
Egypt.144 The family connection between Perseus and Antiochus IV may
also have been a far less potent catalyst for collaboration than Philip and
Antiochus’ secret pact of 203/2, which was struck for the very purpose of
destroying Ptolemaic power. There was certainly no sense in the mid-170s
that a latent coalition, arising from the marriage bond between Perseus and
Antiochus, would automatically be activated should Antiochus choose to
attack or retaliate against Ptolemy VI.
On the other hand, if history does not repeat, as Mark Twain is alleged to
have said, it at least rhymes. If, as turned out to be the case, the Ptolemaic
regime began preparing for war against Antiochus over Coele-Syria in the
mid-170s; and if, as turned out to be the case, Egypt was weak and vulner-
able in the mid-170s, with a child on the throne in thrall to ministers with
no experience of war themselves, and no competent military advisors;145
and if, as turned out to be the case, those ministers foolishly decided to
go to war against Antiochus, who had more resources and manpower than
his nearest competitor;146 and finally, if, as Livy (following Polybius) rec-
ognized, Antiochus, while taking no overtly hostile steps against Egypt,
was predisposed to raise the issue of Coele-Syria, and thus provoke a war
with Ptolemy as early as 173;147 then it was not at all unlikely that Perseus
would be drawn into the conflict somehow, most probably on the side
of his relative Antiochus, who, moreover, was clearly much stronger than
Ptolemy.148 The war between Perseus and Rome prevented this possibility
from becoming a reality.
This brings us back to the geostrategic view of our ancient sources, and
in particular Polybius. If the outbreak of a major war between the Seleucid
and Ptolemaic regimes in the late 170s was a mere possibility based on a
scenario that did not actually come to pass, does this mean Rome had
nothing to fear from what was happening in the East? Walbank’s critique
of Bickermann, with which this discussion of the situation in the eastern
144
Although the decree honoring Eudemus of Seleucia for his services (above, n. 122) hints at
Antiochus’ early connections to Perseus’ friends and allies Byzantium and the Boeotian confederacy.
145
Diod. Sic. 30.15.
146
Diod. Sic. 30.15.
147
Livy 42.29.5–6, quoted above, n. 121.
148
Walbank 1977a: 83: “admittedly, we are here dealing with ‘ifs.’ ” But deal with them we must, once
they have been raised.
Aegean began, actually contains the necessary ancient evidence to lend
greater plausibility to the idea that such geostrategic thinking was in the
air for Rome to consider in the late 170s. Recall that Walbank argued
Bickermann’s argument was fatally flawed because the outbreak of the
Third Macedonian War antedated the Sixth Syrian War, and, according
to Livy, motivated Antiochus to attack Egypt. Thus dismissed, the Livy
passage receives no further analysis. Walbank thus fails to appreciate its
true significance. It reveals, as Bickermann recognized, complex historical
analysis that saw an intimate geostrategic connection between Rome’s war
with Perseus and the Sixth Syrian War. The connection, in fact, originates
with Polybius, who ends his account of both wars as follows:
Fortune thus passed judgment on the affairs of Perseus and the Macedonians
in such a way that Alexandria and the whole of Egypt, having been brought
into extreme danger, were set to right again by the decision about Perseus’
fate coming first. For had this not happened or been confirmed for him,
Antiochus, it seems to me, would never have obeyed the Romans’ orders [to
withdraw from Egypt].149
This is just another way of saying, as indeed Livy does (in the passage
Walbank uses to attack Bickermann), that Antiochus was planning to
attack Egypt whenever the Roman war with Perseus broke out, so that he
could wage war on Ptolemy without Roman interference.150
In sum, the Romans were not so much afraid of the dynastic connec-
tions between Perseus, Prusias, and Antiochus IV, but what those connec-
tions might mean in the context of a further, likely, and indeed imminent
round of the ongoing Syrian – Egyptian wars over Coele-Syria. By 174, or
173 at the latest, the Romans were alerted to the situation in the East, and
concerned enough about it to send two embassies, in 174 and 172, to look
into Seleucid and Ptolemaic affairs. Although Antiochus IV apparently
made no move to transform his marriage connection with Perseus into
a grand coalition of kings to bring to bear against the Ptolemaic regime,
it would surely have entered Rome’s foreign policy calculus that such a
move was possible as Syria and Egypt edged closer to war. For the Romans,
moreover, the situation in the Hellenistic East in the mid-170s was also
149
τῆς τύχης οὕτω βραβευούσης τὰ κατὰ τὸν Περσέα πράγματα καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ὥστε καὶ
πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον καιρὸν ἐλθόντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην Αἴγυπτον παρὰ
τοῦτο πάλιν ὀρθωθῆναι, παρὰ τὸ φθάσαι κριθέντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν Περσέα πράγματα: [13] μὴ
γὰρ γενομένου τούτου καὶ πιστευθέντος, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ πειθαρχῆσαι τοῖς ἐπιταττομένοις
Ἀντίοχος (Polyb. 29.27.12–13). The latter statement refers to the famous “Day of Eleusis,” on
which, see below, Chapter 7, pp. 177–8.
150
Livy 42.29.5–6, quoted above, n. 121.
disconcertingly similar, in some aspects, to that in the late third century,
but with the crucial difference that they themselves were now more deeply
enmeshed in eastern affairs by virtue of being the protector of Greek free-
dom, established by the Isthmian decree of 196.151
Another important difference from the situation in 203/2: Syria
and Egypt were equally belligerent at this point. The Romans had also
expended considerable amounts of blood and treasure in the Macedonian
and Syrian Wars to establish a stable unipolar hegemony over the East,
and this could be upset at a stroke if, as seemed likely, Antiochus crushed
Ptolemy’s ministers in war. As what would become the Sixth Syrian War
moved ever closer to becoming reality, the Romans reacted in 171 pretty
much as they had done in 200: they responded positively to a request for
help by an amicus, attempted to isolate Macedon diplomatically and com-
pel it to obedience, and when that failed, went to war against the kingdom,
and tried to resolve the war between Egypt and Syria through diplomacy.
Although Bickermann perhaps exaggerated Rome’s fear of a coalition of
kings, in other words, he was probably correct to suggest that the manifest
instability in the East and rapidly approaching Syrian War directly threat-
ened Rome’s arrangements and geostrategic position there. Pace Walbank,
it is not implausible that this situation caused anxiety for Rome in the late
170s, and may have played a role in the decision to declare war on Macedon
in 171, just as it had done, in roughly similar circumstances, in 200.
(ii) Theories of Roman Aggression

Because hardly anyone is willing to credit Polybius’ thesis that Perseus
inherited a war long planned by his father Philip, and because Perseus
seemed to want to avoid war at all costs, it is perhaps not surprising that
causal theories predicated on Roman aggression currently hold the field.
The roots of this view lie in the ancient sources, and in particular in
the “new wisdom” (noua sapientia) debate that took place in the senate
following the return of the Roman embassy to the East led by Marcius
Philippus.152 Livy says that Marcius and Atilius Serranus prefaced their
151
I owe this observation to Arthur Eckstein.
152
Livy 42.47 (based on Polybian material: Nissen 1863: 250; Briscoe 1964: 68 n. 32; Walbank 1974:
10–11, 23; Gabba 1977: 68; Eckstein 1995: 109 n. 90 and 2010: 243; Briscoe 2012: 313). Discussion:
Meloni 1953: 202–3; Briscoe 1964; Errington 1971: 210–12; Derow 1989: 309–10; Eckstein 1995: 109.
The authenticity of the debate has been challenged (cf. Adams 1982: 256; Gruen 1984: 414–15),
but there is nothing inherently false or unlikely about it, and indeed it makes perfect sense in this
context since there are parallel instances when the senate debated the morality of undertaking a
report with a boast that they had deceived the king by making the truce
and giving hope of peace (decepto per indutias et spem pacis rege). They
explained that because Perseus was fully armed and ready, but the Romans
were by no means prepared, the king could have had a significant strategic
advantage, but the truce period would deprive him of this, allowing the
Romans to mobilize and begin the war on equal terms. They also reported
that they had broken up the Boeotian confederacy so that it could never
be used to support Macedon again. A large section of the senate, says
Livy, approved of the embassy’s success as displaying the height of reason
(summa ratione), but the older senators, mindful of the old ways and the
Roman character (antiqui moris … Romanas … artes), disapproved. The
Romans of old, they said, did not wage war with ambushes, night attacks,
or feigning retreat, only to turn back against the enemy, nor did they take
more pride in their cleverness than in true courage (nec … astu magis quam
uera uirtute gloriarentur). Roman fides compelled their ancestors to declare
war before waging it, sometimes even informing the enemy of the time
and place of battle. The Roman sense of right was unlike the cunning of
the Carthaginians or the cleverness of the Greeks (religionis haec Romanae
… non uersutiarum Punicarum neque calliditatis Graecae), who prided
themselves on deceiving the enemy instead of overcoming him by force
(fallere hostem quam ui superare gloriosius). Deceit (dolo), skill (arte), and
chance (casu) may overcome the enemy in the short term, but only courage
(uirtute), and a trial of strength in war waged justly and according to sacred
principle (iusto ac pio … bello), can crush the enemy’s spirit and force him
to accept defeat on a permanent basis. The older senators, Livy concludes,
were displeased by Marcius’ new and overly clever wisdom (noua ac nimis
callida … sapientia), but the greater part of the senate, preferring expedi-
ency to honor (potior utilis quam honesti cura), approved of his actions.
The older senators, who disapproved Marcius’ deception, can safely be
identified with Cato and others of the generation who remembered the
threats posed by Hannibal, Philip V, and Antiochus the Great. They did
not necessarily disapprove of declaring war on Perseus per se, and may
indeed have seen in his military buildup, his charm offensive in Greece,
and maybe the deteriorating relations between Ptolemy and Antiochus in
the East as threats, perhaps not comparable to the earlier ones, but threats
nevertheless. Who made up the magna pars of the senate that approved
of Marcius’ conduct, and was eager to bring on the war? H.H. Scullard,
potentially risky and/or lengthy war (e.g. before the First Punic War: Burton 2011: 128–33). It also
fits with the tradition of the debate following Eumenes’ visit in 172, on which, see below, pp. 114–15.
adopting a prosopographical approach, suggested plebeian noui homines
who had missed out on the spoils of victory in Rome’s earlier wars. Two
such men, C. Popillius Laenas and P. Aelius Ligus, were consuls in 172,
and wanted Macedonia assigned as a province, but the senate refused after
Popillius refused to discuss his brother Marcus’ massacre of the Statellate
Ligurians the year before.153 The consuls for 171, P. Licinius Crassus and
C. Cassius Longinus, were both plebeians as well, and became involved in
an unseemly competition to secure Macedonia as their province. Cassius
tried to declare Licinius ineligible for the command since as praetor in 176
he had sworn an oath that he could not take up his command for religious
reasons, which, Cassius argued, was still the case now that Licinius was
consul. The senate rejected Cassius’ claim and the lot decided: Licinius got
Macedonia, Cassius Italy.154 After the war was underway, Cassius blithely
left his province and entered Illyria, exposing Italy’s northern flank. The
senate had a hard time bringing him to heel. He ordered the Alpine tribes
friendly to Rome to supply guides for his march into Macedonia, but
turned back in the middle of his march and raped, pillaged, enslaved, and
plundered his way through their lands. Cassius then turned around and
resumed his journey to Macedonia, becoming a military tribune under
A. Hostilius, Licinius’ consular replacement in the Macedonian com-
mand in 170.155 All of these men – the Popillii, Cassius, Licinius, Aelius –
belonged to a “violent plebeian clique … who looked for glory in war,”
according to Scullard, and in the late 170s had overwhelmed “the more
cautious elements in the Senate.”156
In 1964, John Briscoe began the necessary task of chipping away at such
party-political explanations for Roman aggression: “a more revealing link
[than these men’s family connections],” Briscoe argues, “lies in the pattern
of their behavior,” which, in Marcius’ case, was “subtle and deceptive,” while
the other men were simply “harsh and unfeeling.”157 In 1979, William Harris
dismissed prosopographical explanations as completely “fallacious,” for, ple-
beian arrivistes or not, “for the most part they behaved as members of the
153
Livy 42.10.8–12; on M. Popillius Laenas’ massacre of the Statellate Ligurians, see Livy 42.8, with
Burton 2011: 326–8.
154
Livy 42.32.1–5.
155
Livy 43.5.
156
Scullard 1950: 194–200 (quotations from 198); cf. Frank 1914: 190–2; Bickermann 1953: 500–1
(“arrivistes”); Meloni 1953: 150; Will 1967: 224; Mastrocinque 1975/6: 30–4 (who believes that “the
entrepreneurial class – bankers, merchants, money-lenders [ – who] sought to expand their busi-
nesses by opening up new sources of gain” were behind the electoral victories of “the plebeian
interventionist party”).
157
Briscoe 1964: 74, 75. Badian 1958: 95 n. 4 had simply dismissed the prosopographical approach
without argument.
aristocracy had behaved for centuries” – that is, with an exceptionally large
appetite for warfare and conquest.158
Party-political explanations for Roman aggression in the run-up to the
war have by now gone completely out of fashion.159 For Harris, Roman
aggression and bellicosity was innate and systemic, a function of a com-
petitive aristocratic regime that valued winning gloria in war above all else.
So, in the case of the Third Macedonian War, because the wars in Spain
were over and the Ligurian War was winding down by 172, “a new thea-
tre [for Roman aggression] was in a sense needed”; Roman commanders
were now “seeking a new target.”160 Errington believes that a terrible failure
of Roman character had set in by the late 170s: “brutal war mongering”
had become the norm, a legacy of the long and bloody wars in Spain
and Liguria, which gave free rein to “innate Roman brutality and ruth-
lessness.”161 Roman diplomacy had become “so single-minded, so extra-
ordinarily brutal,” that Perseus did not stand a chance in the face of “the
brutal determination of the majority in the Roman senate to destroy a
state in which they saw the opportunity of making rich booty.”162 Harris
too stresses the greed of the men volunteering for service against Perseus
since they had missed out on the booty from the wars against Philip and
Antiochus.163
It is, of course, impossible to deny that some Romans were motivated
by the desire for glory and/or plunder, but there are problems with the
idea that the Romans were so exceptionally brutal and greedy that add-
itional causes beyond this need not even be sought.164 For one thing, if
an overwhelming majority of Romans were eager for war from as early as
late 173, as indeed Livy’s account maintains,165 and for the reasons Harris
158
Harris 1979: 231 (critique of Scullard’s thesis in n. 6 and Additional Note XVIII, 270–1, whence
“fallacious”).
159
Cf. Giovannini 1969: 868 and n. 4; Adams 1982: 249–50 (the dispute was a generational rather than
a gentilic problem); Errington 1990: 214 (competition for gloria was endemic).
160
Harris 1979: 231–2 (cf. Hammond 1988: 502 on gloria). As Green 1990: 428 points out, however, the
Romans were more likely exhausted from the wars in Spain and Liguria rather than feeling at loose
ends and needing a new war to occupy them. The recruitment difficulties during the initial dilectus
for the war with Perseus (on which, see below, p. 114, Chapter 6, p. 138) seem to support this.
161
Errington 1971: 289 n. 30 (“brutal war mongering”) and 1990: 214; cf. Waterfield 2014: 18 (“war-
mongering”), 58 (“brutal”).
162
163
Harris 1979: 233, with Livy 42.32.6; cf. Hammond 1988: 502.
164
Critique of Harris 1979, especially of his thesis of Roman exceptionalism in terms of aggres-
sion: Burton 2009: 249–50. For an extensive analysis showing that Roman militarism was not
exceptional in the ancient Mediterranean, see Eckstein 2006: 37–117.
165
See above, Chapter 4, pp. 76–7.
and others state, it is strange that war was not declared until more than
a year after Eumenes’ visit, and Roman troops did not cross to Greece in
any substantial numbers until several months after that.166 One reason for
this was problems with the levy. There appears to be more evidence in Livy
for attempts to avoid and interfere with the dilectus in 171 than for the
purported floods of volunteers flocking to the standards out of sheer greed
for easy plunder. In order to cope with the larger sized legions author-
ized by the senate for the war against Perseus, Licinius was permitted to
enroll former centurions and veterans up to 50 years old. The seriousness
of the war mandated a further significant change: by senatorial decree, the
right to choose military tribunes was transferred from the people to the
consuls and praetors.167 The consuls conducted the levy with greater care
than usual, but their chosen military tribunes disregarded the former rank
of ex-centurions when enrolling them.168 The matter was brought before
the tribunes, with former consul M. Popillius Laenas advocating for the
ex-centurions being restored to their former rank, while Licinius advised
the people not to hinder the levy or the consul’s right to assign rank as he
saw fit.169 Spurius Lugistinus, a former centurion, then made an emotional
appeal to the people, after which Licinius recommended him to the senate,
and restored him to his former rank. The other centurions gave up their
protests and enrolled according to the senate’s decree.170 These arguments
over who should not serve and in what capacity those who had to serve
should do so suggest the opposite of a greed-induced rush to the standards
in the hope of easy money and plunder.
In terms of glory-seeking senators, as has already been seen in the con-
text of the noua sapientia debate, senatorial opinion about the wisdom of
undertaking the war against Perseus was by no means monolithic even as
late as the beginning of consular 171. Precious evidence from Appian shows
that senatorial opinion was divided after Eumenes laid out his indictment
of Perseus in the closed-door meeting of the senate in early 172. Some
senators criticized the king for warmongering based on his private fears
and grudges.171 This is of a piece with (and probably belongs in the same
context as) a notice in Plutarch in which Cato the Elder criticizes Eumenes
166
Gruen 1984: 414, 416; Rosenstein 2012: 216. The salience of this argument depends in part on care-
ful attention to chronology. See Appendix B.
167
Livy 42.31.2–5.
168
Livy 42.32.6–8.
169
Livy 42.33.
170
Livy 42.34–35.2. For trouble with the levy, see Warrior 1981: 8.
171
τῶν δὲ βουλευτῶν πολλοὶ τὸν Εὐμένη δι’ αἰτίας εἶχον ὑπὸ φθόνου καί δέους αἴτιον τοσοῦδε
πολέμου γενόμενον (App. Mac. 11.3).
and the senators who fawn over him, for “a king is by nature a carnivorous
beast.”172 Elsewhere, Polybius cites with approval the comments of Cato on
the decline of morality in the Republic, which he dated to the destruction
of Macedon and the influx of wealth that resulted.173 It stands to reason
that there would have been intense debate and division within the sen-
ate over the wisdom of undertaking a potentially lengthy, dangerous, and
expensive war with the kingdom of Macedon, especially when there were
grave doubts about Eumenes’ evidence and motives. The eagerness with
which some senators sought important commands in recent years must
have concerned some of their peers that the competition for commands in
the Macedonian war would be incredibly fierce and could lead to violent
disputes among the magistrates. It is important to remember in this con-
text that the senate refused to declare a Macedonian province in 172 know-
ing full well how desperately the consuls of that year wanted it. Senatorial
consensus on a Macedonian war had to be built up gradually as individual
senators’ misgivings were overcome by argument, persuasion, and, most
importantly, verifiable intelligence and hard evidence.
Other possible motives for Roman aggressive intervention against
Perseus suggested by modern scholars include Roman resentment at their
influence being displaced by Macedon’s in the East.174 The idea actually
goes back over a century to Tenney Frank, an advocate of the thesis that
the Romans were defensive imperialists.175 Around the same time, Paul
Heiland argued that the Romans could not tolerate their replacement by
Perseus as the Greeks’ benefactor.176 As Harris argues, the rise of Perseus’
auctoritas among the Greeks irritated the Romans, but they did not act
until Eumenes explained it to them.177 Derow and Eckstein likewise regard
Perseus’ charm offensive toward the Greeks as a threat to the Romans’
own auctoritas in the East, and to the arrangements they made (at great
expense and sacrifice) to stabilize relations among the Greeks. Gruen con-
curs: after Eumenes pointed out to the senators that Perseus regarded their
172
Plut. Cat. Mai. 8.6-7, with the quotation at §7 (… φύσει τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον ὁ βασιλεὺς σαρκοφάγον
ἐστιν).
173
Polyb. 31.25.5–7; discussion: Eckstein 1995: 78 n. 82, 183 n. 85, 264–5, 1997: esp. 192–8, and
2010: 243; cf. Briscoe 1964: 76. This suggests, pace Meloni 1955: 140–2, that Polybius is the likely
source behind App. Mac. 11.3 (above, n. 95).
174
Cf., among the others cited below, Hammond 1988: 495, 497; Rosenstein 2012: 216.
175
Frank 1914: 203; cf. Errington 1971: 204–5; Walbank 1977a.
176
Heiland 1913: 18–19.
177
Harris 1979: 231, with Livy 42.27.6; cf. Giovannini 1969: 863, 857, 860. Green 1990: 427 points out
that, rather than untangle the complex intrigues of the Greeks, the Romans simply believed the
man they trusted – Eumenes of Pergamum – when he told them they were gradually being replaced
by Perseus as arbiter of eastern affairs.
passive acquiescence in his activities as proof they had ceded their author-
ity in the East to him, they suddenly became concerned about their repu-
tation (their dignitas, in other words); they feared that Rome would appear
a “helpless, pitiful giant” if they failed to act any longer.178 The Romans
therefore resented Perseus becoming the “alternative focus for Greek polit-
ical attention,” and stepped in to reverse the trend.179
Related to this is the thesis that the Romans could not tolerate Perseus
behaving like an independent power, equal to themselves – a “peer com-
petitor.”180 This is sometimes couched in terms of foreign clientela: Perseus
forgot his place as a dutiful, inferior client, and comported himself as a
status equal to Rome.181 Macedon was not, of course, a Roman cliens, but
an amicus.182 It is, nevertheless, plausible that the Romans were annoyed
by Perseus’ pretensions to equality, which they took steps to correct and
recalibrate in several of their other international friendships.183 This was
precisely why, before he would consent to talks with Perseus, Marcius
insisted that the king come to him as his inferior (minor), and demanded
hostages – a tangible demonstration to Rome’s allies that the king did not
have equal status (pari dignitate) with Rome.184
Neither of these theories – that the Romans resented being replaced as
the focus of the Greeks’ political attention, and that they needed to remind
178
Gruen 1984: 418, with Livy 42.13.10 (“Since [Perseus] did these things with the Romans’ permission
and silence, and he saw that Greece had been given to him by them …,” haec cum uobis quiescen-
tibus et patientibus fecerit et concessam sibi Graeciam esse a uobis uideat …). Note how damaging
Eumenes’ criticism of Roman inaction is to causal explanations for the Third Macedonian War
based in Roman aggression, which assume a high level of Roman interference and interventionism
in the East. As Gruen points out, it is to be preferred to the analysis of App. Mac. 11.1, where it is
asserted that the Romans are hated because of the actions of their generals. The passage is probably
annalistic: Mastrocinque 1975/6; contra Meloni 1955: 119–21: anti-Roman Greek source.
179
Derow 1989: 303 and 2003: 67, followed by Eckstein 2010: 241 and 2013: 89; cf. Briscoe 2012: 14;
Rosenstein 2012: 218; Waterfield 2014: 176.
180
Eckstein 2010: 241 and 2013: 89; cf. Rosenstein 2012: 217; Waterfield 2014: 175; and earlier, Pareti
1953: 43 (reduced to a secondary power, Macedon was now flourishing economically and demo-
graphically, with a young, vigorous king on the throne with a social policy opposed to Roman
interests); Meloni 1953: 190 (Perseus’ mistake was twofold: he forged an independent foreign policy
designed to recalibrate the balance of power in the East to his advantage, and he raised his kingdom
to the status of a first-tier power both economically and militarily).
181
Errington 1971: 212; Walbank 1977a: 93–4.
182
Burton 2003 and 2011; cf. Walbank 1977a: 93: Perseus “did not know his place as an amicus.”
183
E.g. with Pergamum and Rhodes after the war with Perseus (Burton 2011: 278–99, and below,
Chapter 7, pp. 178–82).
184
Note that Livy does not assimilate this inferior status to clientela. For him, there is no contradiction
between Macedon’s inferior status and its standing as an amicus of Rome, or between Perseus’ infe-
riority and his status as a personal amicus and hospes of Marcius (Livy 42.38.9). When the two men
meet at the Peneus river, after establishing Perseus’ inferior status, they greet each other hospitably
and warmly (hospitalis ac benigna: Livy 42.39.8).
a status inferior of his proper place in their relationship – are inherently
implausible in and of themselves as causes of the Third Macedonian War.
But they are less able to account for the timing of the Roman decision to
declare war, or the significant delays in mobilizing and launching the Roman
war machine.185 The Romans surely knew that Perseus had been steadily
chipping away at their authority in the East throughout the 170s, long before
Eumenes brought it to their attention; the mild rebuke to Rhodes for help-
ing Perseus in 177 is enough to show that. They also knew about Perseus’
interventions in the debt crises in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia in the
early 170s, and his attempt at rapprochement with Achaea in 175, for they
tried to counter the former with their own intervention in 173,186 and the
Achaean debate over the latter was a matter of public record as early as 175/
4, when Callicrates dissuaded the League from détente with Macedon, for
which the Romans later commended the League.187 The Romans were also
well aware that Perseus was behaving like an independent Hellenistic king
of old as far back as 177, when the Dardani alleged before the senate that
Perseus was involved in the Bastarnian attacks on their lands, and, of course,
his dynastic marriages in 178 were no secret. The Romans would also surely
have heard about Perseus’ conquest of Dolopia, immediately followed by
his march through Greece to Delphi in 175, with an army of perhaps 43,000
men at his back.188 In short, the Roman resentment and status-adjustment
causal theories cannot account for the timing of Rome’s reaction to Perseus’
activities. They knew his status was rising in the Greek East throughout the
170s, but instead of taking any action to adjust it downward, let their resent-
ment (if resentment there was) fester for a long time before taking any action.
(iii) Systemic Theories

Neither purely defensive/preventive nor aggressive theories suffice to
explain both the motivation behind and timing of the Roman declaration
185
As has been seen (above, 112 and Chapter 4, p. 76), despite Livy’s insistence that war had been
decided in early 172, the senate refused to declare Macedonia a province in that year, and by the
beginning of consular 171, Roman military preparations for the war were still incomplete. Harris
1979: 229 seems to accept Livy’s thesis since he argues that Appian’s evidence (Mac. 11.3) that the
senate was dismissive of Eumenes and his congeries of pretexts “implies perhaps correctly that [the
senate] had in effect already decided on war.” This assumes that the senate was unable to come up
with any pretexts of its own until Eumenes pointed the way, but this is unlikely (below).
186
Livy 42.5.7–12.
187
Livy 41.22.5–24; 42.6.1–2, and above, pp. 94–6 and Chapter 4, p. 61.
188
App. Mac. 11.1 says the Romans knew about Macedon’s military buildup as early as the return of
the embassy from the Dardanians and Macedonia in 175: above, Chapter 4, p. 64.
of war on Perseus. Some modern scholars have therefore turned to modern
theories that may be broadly labeled “systemic,” in that agency is attrib-
uted to unseen social and political forces rather than individuals.
The earliest such theory, first suggested by Mommsen, stresses the eco-
nomic dimension of the antagonism between Macedon and Rome.189 In
its fully developed form, the theory proposes that one of the side-effects
of the preponderance of Roman power in the East was the polarization
of the rich and the poor in the Greek city-states, largely as a result of the
well-known Roman preference for aristocratic over democratic govern-
ments. The social revolutions in the city-states in the 170s, several of them
supported by Perseus, “the red king,”190 eventually drew negative Roman
attention to the situation in the East. Alfredo Passerini and Michael
Rostovtzeff put this situation in the context of a middle Hellenistic
decline and eventual disappearance of the Greek middle class (“moderate
democrats” in Passerini’s formulation, “the bourgeoisie” in Rostovtzeff’s),
and an increasing wealth gap between rich and poor, largely as a result of
the economic uncertainty generated by continuous warfare and revolu-
tion.191 Adalberto Giovannini argued that the economic problems inten-
sified around 173, which explains the timing of the Roman intervention
against Perseus.192 But even Passerini recognized the problem with his the-
sis that eventually became fatal to it: the Romans did not necessarily sup-
port the landowning classes against the poor in all cases.193 Their solution
for the Thessalian and Perrhaebian debt crises, for example, was to cancel
some debts, expand the schedules for repayment, and declare illegal the
high interest rates charged by creditors.194 The other side of the coin, and
a good counter to the “red king” thesis, is that Perseus’ promise to return
the fugitive Achaean slaves in exchange for the League lifting the ban on
Macedonians entering their territory could only have benefitted the slave-
owning class of the Achaean League.195 The notion that Greek economic
problems divided Greek support for Rome and Perseus along class lines,
189
Mommsen 1856: 738–9; cf. Pais 1926: 554–5.
190
Bickermann 1953: 500.
191
Passerini 1933: 324–35; Rostovtzeff 1941: 603–30, esp. 617–18, 621–2, 625–6, 762–3 (cf., earlier,
Frank 1914: 201–3), followed by Bickermann 1953: 494, 500; Meloni 1953: 119, 141–5; Will 1967: 218;
Giovannini 1969: 860.
192
Giovannini 1969: 860.
193
Passerini 1933: 326 (dismissed by Giovannini 1969: 869 n. 2); cf. Rostovtzeff 1941: 612. See the
extensive critiques by Gruen 1976 (with earlier literature listed at 48–9 nn. 1–4); Mendels 1978; cf.
Walbank 1977a: 87.
194
Livy 42.5.7–10; discussion: Gruen 1976: 39–40.
195
Gruen 1976: 33–4, with Livy 41.23.4.
and thus contributed to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War, is
therefore deeply problematic.
The social revolution thesis may, however, contain a more plausible
systemic explanation. There can be no denying that the fact of Roman
hegemony in the East caused political polarization within the city-states.
Polybius carefully documented not just the complex internal divisions
around the Roman question within his own Achaean League, but also
in Epirus, Boeotia, and elsewhere on the eve of the Third Macedonian
War.196 The causes of this polarization are complex, but the psychology
of the imperial relationship is probably among the most important. The
exercise of imperial power, whether soft or hard, tends to create collabora-
tors (less generously, flatterers) and resisters (less generously, subversives).
Flamininus intuited this dynamic when taking leave of the Greeks in 194,
warning them to preserve consensus lest seditious plotters divide the com-
munity, opening the door for kings and tyrants to deprive them of their
freedom, that is, to disrupt and overthrow Roman hegemony.197 With their
victories over Philip V and Antiochus, the Romans had created a unipolar
Mediterranean system, intensifying their hold over the East, or at least
depriving lesser states of viable system competitors to turn to as alterna-
tives to Rome.198 As recent history has shown, lesser states, even allied and
friendly ones, tend to chafe under a system dominated by a single super-
power, even one that exercises its imperial power as lightly as the United
States does on most of the rest of the world. The discontent of lesser pow-
ers, or at least significant factions within them, only intensifies when the
hegemon is seen to “throw its weight around,” yielding to the “hegemon’s
temptation” to employ a harsh assertiveness in dealing with other states,
whether friends or foes.199
In the early 1970s, Leo Raditsa developed an interesting psychologi-
cal explanation for the Third Macedonian War based precisely on this
dynamic. Starting with Mommsen’s idea that the Romans declared war
on Perseus because he decided to turn Macedon’s formal sovereignty into
political reality,200 Raditsa noted that in the zero-sum atmosphere created
by Roman supremacy, any independent action could only be construed
as rebellious hostility toward and defiance of Rome. Large numbers of
the Greek and Macedonian populations unconsciously and independently
196
The evidence is conveniently gathered by Deininger 1971: 135–91.
197
Livy 34.49.8–11, quoted above, Chapter 2, p. 35.
198
Eckstein 2006: 1–2, 306, 314, and 2008: 1, 25–7, 336–81.
199
Eckstein 2010: 242–3 and 2013: 90, following Layne 1993: 28.
200
Mommsen 1856: 739.
thought this way because the psychology of the imperial relationship was
the same everywhere. Roman unipolarity rigidified and simplified political
behavior, creating “a situation of increased intolerance to sovereignty, to
independent movement and initiative and therefore of increasing instabil-
ity.” “It seems to have been a time,” Raditsa concludes, “in which it was
difficult to be one thing without being against another.”201
Once again, there are too many problems with such arguments for
them to be fully compelling. The fact is, Rome did not choose to regard
independent behavior, whether by Perseus or anyone else, as defiance or
hostility (to say nothing of rebellion) at the time this behavior took place.
Perseus’ expulsion of Abrupolis from his kingdom, his campaign against
the Dolopians, and his marriage alliances did not provoke Roman reprisals
until much later on. The Rhodians’ defiance of Rome’s order to treat their
Lycian subjects as allies is another powerful counter-example to Raditsa’s
zero-sum thesis.202 And, once again, it was not Rome’s oppressive presence
in the East that caused problems in the 170s, but, as Eumenes pointed out,
Rome’s absence and lack of interest.203 Despite Raditsa, not even Eumenes’
indictment, which alleged a pattern of independent, and indeed, anti-
Roman behavior, was enough to spur enough of the senators to take action
against the king, at least not right away.
One final systemic thesis attempts to account for the timing of Roman
intervention against Perseus through a pericentric explanation.204 Arnold
Toynbee noted that the Romans sent a remarkable thirteen diplomatic
missions to the East between 174 and 171, thus revealing a dynamic in
which peripheral states were largely responsible for drawing Rome into
deeper involvement, and ultimately, war against Perseus.205 Raditsa notes
that the evacuation of Roman troops from the East in 194 “acted paradoxi-
cally to incite further involvement in the East,” first against the Aetolian
League and Antiochus in 192, and again in 171 against Macedon.206 Eckstein
would push this dynamic further back, to 201, when Pergamum, Rhodes,
and Athens called on Rome to intervene against Philip V. In 171, Eckstein
argues, “Rome was again being drawn into conflict by a second-tier state,
just as in 200.”207 The call for intervention against Perseus did not come
201
Raditsa 1972: 578 (citation of Mommsen), 581–2 (whence the quotations).
202
Above, p. 97.
203
Above, pp. 115–16.
204
On pericentric explanations for empire, see Doyle 1986: 25–6.
205
Toynbee 1965: 467 n. 8 (after Colin 1905: 390–1; cf. Pais 1926: 555 n. 44).
206
Raditsa 1972: 585.
207
Eckstein 2010: 242 and 2013: 89.
until Rome’s collaborator on the periphery, Eumenes, addressed the senate
in 172. The pericentric explanation – with the corollary moral implication
that the Romans became involved in the war because of its fides towards
an amicus – thus accounts for the timing of Rome’s war against Perseus.
Such explanations, however, like the metrocentric theories predicated on
Rome’s resentment at its auctoritas being replaced by Perseus’ in the East,
and its desire to cut a status inferior back down to size, cannot account
for Rome’s lack of interest in eastern affairs since at least as far back as the
early 170s, when the city-states were in turmoil due to various debt crises.
Why did the Romans not intervene in force in 174, when they became
diplomatically involved in trying to resolve Aetolian League stasis, or in
175/4, after Callicrates (another collaborator on the periphery) publicized
Perseus’ attempt at détente with the Achaean League, and put the worst
possible spin on his actions to date? And, of course, why were a majority of
senators not convinced of the threat posed by Perseus even after Eumenes’
address in early 172? As usual, pericentric explanations can tell only part
of the story.
Conclusion and Synthesis

In this chapter I have tried to present the explanations, by both ancient
and modern historians, for why and when the Third Macedonian War
broke out as dispassionately and agnostically as possible, both for the sake
of clarity, and to encourage readers to make up their own minds. It will
not have escaped notice, however, where the author’s preferences lie. This
is unavoidable for an historian with his own views on the causes of the
war with Perseus. The majority of scholars who have given any significant
thought to this issue agree, if not on a particular set of causes, then at least
on a relatively precise point in time when the war against Perseus suddenly
became more likely than before, if not quite inevitable. The tipping point
appears to come around 175 or 174.
It was the combination of events taking place in these years, and intel-
ligence reaching the Romans about earlier events in 175 and 174 that may
have first raised some concerns at least among some Roman senators.
The first reports of the military buildup taking place in Macedon reached
Rome in early 175, when senatorial ambassadors returned from their mis-
sion to Dardania and Macedonia. Later that same year, Perseus, fresh from
conquering the Dolopians and accompanied by a large conquering army,
suddenly appeared in Greece on his way to Delphi. This was sufficiently
disturbing to enough central Greek states for them to send embassies to
Eumenes, seeking the king’s protection. The choice is significant: Eumenes
was an engaged, vigorous, militarily successful king, a viable challenger to
Macedonian power. Rome, on the other hand, had proved a passive and
indifferent “helpless, pitiful giant.”
The next year, 174, the Romans had their first glimpse into the chaos that
the debt crisis had unleashed throughout Greece when a senatorial mission
intervened in the civil strife in Aetolia. The presence of a Macedonian gar-
rison,208 and the evidence for the massacres that had taken place on its watch,
must have been a cause for concern. By late 175/early 174, Callicrates had pub-
licized Perseus’ attempt to interfere in Achaean League policy, and painted his
earlier acts in similarly lurid colors, culminating in the charge that Perseus
inherited a plan to make war on Rome that his father had been working on
for some time. By mid-174, a Macedonian army suddenly appeared in Asia
Minor for the first time since 200. By the time the Romans finally turned
their attention to the Aetolian debt crisis in the closing months of 174, Perseus’
ambassadors were probably on their way to or at the borders of Achaea, trying
to change League policy toward Macedon. Around the same time, the stabil-
ity of Rome’s arrangements in the eastern Aegean were on the verge of being
thrown into turmoil by the outbreak of war that was daily expected between
Antiochus IV and an aggressive Egyptian regency government.
So by late 174/early 173 at the latest, a growing number of Roman senators
had likely become more concerned about the potential destabilization in the
East, and the erosion of the Roman position there. The thirteen senatorial
embassies sent out to the East between 174 and 171 (compared to the paltry
three sent out in the first half of the decade) are a sure indication of this
rising concern. The disturbances on the periphery were slowly drawing the
Romans into an increasingly dangerous situation there, which if not brought
under control diplomatically, could force a potentially costly and bloody
military intervention in order to shore up Rome’s hegemonial position.
Despite strong diplomatic posturing, including the declaration of Perseus
an enemy of Rome (hostis) and breaking off amicitia with him by mid-172,
the senate balked at declaring Macedonia a consular prouincia that year, and
waited well over a year after the arrival of Eumenes in Rome before declar-
ing war, and mobilizing significant forces and dispatching them across the
Adriatic. Why? As is well known from the escalation phase in other Roman
wars, Rome was willing to attempt diplomatic solutions up until the very last
minute;209 after all, a new major war in the East was an expensive proposition,
208
There is no evidence that the garrison installed by Perseus (Livy 41.25.1–6), evidently with Rome’s
blessing (Livy 42.42.4), had been ejected before the Roman visit.
209
Burton 2011: 332–53.
especially after the exhausting ordeals of the recent Spanish and Ligurian
wars. Many senators needed convincing that such an effort was worthwhile
or even necessary. A new major war in the East might also intensify aristo-
cratic competition over the Macedonian command to an unacceptably high
level, resulting in civil disobedience at home – as indeed turned out to be the
case. The recent defiance of the senate by the Popillii showed that aristocratic
consensus was indeed breaking down.
Finally, as Erich Gruen has shown, Roman willingness to pursue
a diplomatic solution was especially strong in the run-up to the war
against Perseus, since the king had acquiesced to every Roman demand
hitherto: “the senate had every reason to expect that he would bow to
bullying.”210 That he did not, but strenuously defended his actions first
before Marcius Philippus, and then in his follow-up embassy to Rome,
rather than do what the Romans demanded – to give satisfaction on all
points – was only to be expected for a proud Hellenistic monarch who
had dedicated his career to pushing the limits of independent action
under Roman hegemony.211 For the Romans, Perseus’ defensiveness
smacked of intransigence – further proof of what Eumenes had earlier
alleged, and what they feared most: that their auctoritas in the East was
rapidly disappearing.
Sometime after the noua sapientia debate in March 171, and the depart-
ure of the Roman fleet for Apollonia some weeks later, enough of a con-
sensus had emerged among the senators that a Macedonian war was now
advisable. The specific arguments used to tip the balance in favor of the
war option are, unfortunately, unknown, but presumably many, if not all
of them found their way into the Delphic charge-sheet inscription, and the
literary-historical tradition. Most of these, as Polybius well knew, and as
this chapter has attempted to show, should not be equated to causes of the
war with Perseus. These latter were deeply embedded, to a lesser or greater
degree on both sides of the conflict, in mental and emotional states, and
psychological and culturally determined predispositions. Fear, mistrust,
pride, resentment, anger, and perhaps healthy doses of greed, vanity, and
glory-seeking as well have all left traces in the historical record of the run-
up to the Third Macedonian War.
210
Gruen 1984: 417.
211
Polyb. 27.6.1–4; Diod. Sic. 30.1; App. Mac. 11.9; Livy 42.48.1–4 (the final Macedonian embassy
to Rome; despite Niese 1903: 111 n. 1; Heiland 1913: 38–9; Benecke 1930: 260, Livy 42.36.1–7 is a
doublet; see Meloni 1953: 207–8 n. 4, and below, Appendix B). On the senate’s demand, see Livy
42.25.1, 7, “the senate thought it just that satisfaction be given for these injuries,” ad res repetendas,
pro his iniuriis satisfieri senatum aequum censere).
6
The Third Macedonian War
The First Year: Opening Maneuvers

Despite his decade-long charm offensive throughout the Greek world,
when the Third Macedonian War began, Perseus stood alone.1 One of his
brothers-in-law, Prusias II of Bithynia, opted for neutrality in the upcom-
ing conflict, and the other, Antiochus IV, remained solidly on the side of
Rome. Four years of intensive diplomacy and coalition-building by the
Romans (along with some robust political intervention, particularly in
Boeotia, but also in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia) thoroughly under-
mined the most significant foreign policy achievement of Perseus’ reign,
the recovery of Greek goodwill toward Macedon. Even worse, by the time
his envoys returned to Macedonia and reported that war with Rome was
now unavoidable, the king had squandered whatever strategic advantages
time and advance preparations had initially afforded him. Thanks to the
machinations of Marcius Philippus, and Perseus’ apparent eagerness to
avoid war at this point, in the diplomatic lull that followed the dispatch of
his final embassy to Rome, Roman war preparations had caught up to his
own. His prospects for success seemed fairly bleak.
By this time, Roman troops were already on the ground in Greece.
Cn. Sicinius and his advance force had crossed in January or February
171 (Julian), and were now based at Apollonia.2 2,000 of Sicinius’ men
had already been dispatched to hold the forts in Dessaretian and Illyrian
territory. The thousand men who had accompanied Marcius’ embassy in
September 172 (Julian), had probably stayed on in Greece after he returned
1
Mommsen 1856: 741; Niese 1903: 119–23; Colin 1905: 405, 413, 414–15; Kromayer 1907: 236–40;
Heiland 1913: 51–6; De Sanctis 1923: 279–88; Pais 1926: 557–8; Benecke 1930: 261; Pareti 1953: 52–5;
Meloni 1953: 211–30; Errington 1971: 213–14; McDonald 1981: 246–7; Hammond 1988: 511–17; Helly
2007: 131–64; Waterfield 2014: 182.
2
He was accompanied by 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, or a significantly larger number. See
Appendix B, n. 22.
124
The Third Macedonian War 125
to Rome, and been added to Sicinius’ forces. In early April 171 (Julian),
before the final Macedonian embassy was heard, according to Livy’s chro-
nology, the former praetor A. Atilius Serranus crossed to Greece, and was
ordered to take 2,000 of Sicinius’ men to garrison Larissa in Thessaly
before Perseus could seize this strategically vital stronghold. P. Cornelius
Lentulus, a military tribune, was dispatched across the Adriatic as well;
he was to take 300 of Sicinius’ men to Thebes to ensure Boeotia stayed
loyal to Rome. Marcius was sent back to Greece with perhaps a handful of
quinqueremes with the open-ended task of doing whatever seemed most
advantageous for Rome.3
After the order was given to Perseus’ envoys to depart Italy within thirty
days, Licinius Crassus the consul began to gather the troops. The praetor
C. Lucretius Gallus took forty quinqueremes across from Brundisium,4
and sent his brother to requisition one trireme from Rhegium, two from
Locri, and four from Uria.5 When Lucretius arrived at Dyrrhacium, he was
joined by seventy-six lemboi supplied by the allies, and then moved on to
Cephallenia via Corcyra.6 The praetor arrived at Cephallenia five days later to
await the transports and supply ships.7 At this point, according to Polybius,
Lucretius sent a letter to the Rhodians asking them to send ships. After vig-
orous debate before the Rhodian assembly, the people agreed to dispatch
five quadriremes. Lucretius warmly greeted the Rhodians, along with the
other allied naval contingents (the Carthaginians, the Pontic Heracleotes,
the Samians, the Chalcedones), but released them from service since no
naval operations were in prospect, the Macedonian fleet remaining docked
at Demetrias, and Roman supremacy at sea having been established between
the dispatch of the letter to Rhodes and the arrival of the fleet.8 Licinius the
3
Livy 42.47.9–12. For the chronology, see below, Appendix B. Briscoe 2012: 317–18 quite reasonably
suggests that the thousand escorts were added to Sicinius’ forces, that Licinius took his 300 men
from Sicinius, and that the best restoration of the number of Marcius’ quinqueremes (missing in the
MS) is quinque, which was omitted by haplography with quinqueremibus at §9.
4
In an earlier, annalistic section (Livy 42.27.1), Lucretius was ordered to refit fifty ships. Livy’s com-
ment here (42.48.5) that the consul decided to leave ten ships behind may be his attempt to recon-
cile the conflicting figures given by his annalistic source and Polybius (so Briscoe 2012: 320). On the
other hand, what Livy says at 42.48.5 may have actually happened (so Meloni 1953: 212 n. 1).
5
The reading is uncertain; see Meloni 1953 212 n. 3; Briscoe 2012: 320–1 for discussion.
6
Fifty-four of the lemboi belonged to Genthius whose loyalty was still in doubt (cf. Livy 42.29.11,
45.8); the ships were thus probably taken without his knowledge or approval (Meloni 213 n. 1;
Walbank 1979: 337; Gruen 1984: 420 n. 119; Briscoe 2012: 321, against e.g. Niese 1903: 141 n. 3; Thiel
1946: 387–8 n. 728).
7
Livy 42.48.3–10.
8
Polyb. 27.7 (the identity of the other allied contingents – condensed to πάντας by Polybius’ excerp-
tor at 27.7.16 – is supplied by Livy 42.56.7). Walbank 1979: 305 (cf. Waterfield 2014: 194) sug-
gests Lucretius dismissed the Rhodian ships in a fit of pique, given that the Rhodian Hagesilochus
consul arrived at Apollonia, probably in late April (Julian), accompanied by
perhaps as many as 30,000 men.9
A few days before the consul’s arrival, Perseus met with his advisors to
determine his next move. Those in favor of appeasing the Romans with fur-
ther concessions lost to the “more defiant” (ferocioris) majority in favor of war.
The latter pointed out that Perseus would probably be ordered to abandon his
kingdom if he surrendered to Rome without a fight. Perseus summoned all
his forces to muster at Citium – a total of 43,000 men, half of them phalan-
gites under the command of Hippias of Beroea, the rest auxiliary troops from
Thrace and Gaul, Greek mercenaries, and 4,000 cavalry. Although Livy claims
that no Macedonian king, except Alexander the Great, had ever possessed an
army so large, this one may have been even greater than Alexander’s.10
After hearing that the Romans had begun their eastward march from
Apollonia, Perseus met with delegations from the Macedonian cities, which
offered funds and grain for the war. The king confidently refused these, cit-
ing the full royal stores (but commandeered some wagons from the cities
to transport his vast amount of materiel),11 and then set off for Thessaly
via Eordaea, heading due west. His plan was to secure the two main passes
into Macedonia, the Volustana leading into Perrhaebia, and Tempe leading
to the plains of Thessaly.12 He camped at Lake Begorritis before turning
had earlier promised forty ships (Polyb. 27.3.3). But Lucretius dismissed all the allied contingents,
and there is no indication he was angry with them; to the contrary, he greeted all, including the
Rhodians, warmly. The best reason for the dismissal is that given by Livy and Polybius. On Roman
naval supremacy having been established at this point, see Hammond 1988: 513.
9
Livy 42.49.10. For the numbers, see Livy 42.31.3, 52.8. The troop numbers are conjectural. The
16,000 Latin allies (Livy 42.31.3) is a MS restoration (Briscoe 2012: 255), while Livy’s “extra strength”
Macedonian legions of 6,000 (Livy 42.31.2) may be an error, since Polybius (3.107.11; 6.20.8) says the
extra-strength legions of the Hannibalic War period had 5,000 infantry (up from the usual 4,000).
De Sanctis 1923: 280; Meloni 1953: 196; Pareti 1953: 46 accept Livy’s figures, which total 29,400 men;
Kromayer 1907: 239, 343 rejects Livy’s extra-strength number, estimating 25,000 men; and Briscoe
2012: 255, estimating the number of allies proportionally from Livy’s extra-strength legionary num-
bers (which he accepts), replaces 16,000 Latin allies with 17,300 (a 15% increase), yielding a total for
Licinius’ forces of 30,700.
10
Livy 42.50–1. Briscoe 2012: 326 for the translation of ferocioris at Livy 42.50.4. For the size of
Perseus’ army, Livy 42.51.11 (cf. Niese 1903: 119–20; Eckstein 2010: 240 and 2013: 89; Kromayer
1907: 231: larger than Alexander’s). Walbank 1967: 371–2 compiles the estimates for Alexander’s
expeditionary army in the sources, which range from 34,000 to 48,500, not counting later reinforce-
ments. Hammond 1988: 515 believes that the description of the muster at Citium, including the
figures, comes from the King’s Journal, and is thus reliable, assuming Polybius and Livy excerpted
the information accurately. Hatzopoulos 1996: 114–15 n. 5, 319 emends Titium in the MS to Cyrrus
rather than Citium, against all editors (cf. Briscoe 2012: 330, oddly not citing Hatzopoulos here, but
a later, derivative work).
11
Livy 42.53.2–4. For the loose dependence of the cities on the Macedonian king, and the significance
of this piece of evidence for this, see above, Chapter 1, p. 7.
12
Hammond 1988: 516.
south into Elimea, crossing the Haliacmon River and marching through
the Volustana pass between the Cambunian mountain range and Mt.
Olympus (Map 3), and pushed south into Perrhaebia. There, the cities
of Tripolis (Azorus, Pythium, and Doliche) (Map 2), despite having fur-
nished hostages to the Roman forces at Larissa, quickly surrendered to
the king out of fear. Perseus then received the voluntary surrender of one
Perrhaebian city, and took Chyretiae after a brief siege. He was then forced
to lay siege to Mylae for four days, before his troops managed to enter the
city via the main gate after a careless sally by the townspeople. The city was
sacked and reduced to rubble, and all the inhabitants were killed or sold
into slavery.13
Perseus then marched east along the Titaresios River to Phalanna, where
he made camp before traveling northeast, and arriving the next day at
Gyrton in the western foothills of Mt. Ossa.14 Hearing that a Roman leg-
ate, T. Minucius Rufus, along with a Thessalian general called Hippias,
had already garrisoned the town, Perseus pressed ahead to Elatia and
Gonnus at the eastern end of the Tempe pass.15 Surprised by the king’s
unexpected arrival, the towns surrendered to him out of fear. The garrison
in Gonnus was strengthened, and a triple ditch and a rampart were built
around the town’s perimeter. The army then marched around Mt. Ossa to
the southern foothills, and encamped at Sycurium, whence they were sent
to gather supplies from the Thessalian countryside to the south.16 Perseus
had succeeded in his plan to secure both the Volustana and Tempe passes,
through which his armies could now easily be supplied by wagon and ship
from Macedonia.17
Meanwhile, the consul Licinius made his way from Apollonia to Larissa
via forced marches through Epirus and Athamania, whose difficult ter-
rain considerably delayed the arrival of the legions at Gomphi.18 Here the
consul rested his men for a few days before setting off toward Larissa.
Three miles distant from there, he pitched his camp at Tripolis, also called
Scaea, overlooking the Peneus River.19 Presently joining him there were
13
Livy 42.53.5–54.6; cf. Zon. 9.22.4. The name of the Perrhaebian city that surrendered voluntarily to
Perseus has fallen into a lacuna, and the cities of Tripolis have had to be restored from the corrupt
MS reading at Livy 42.53.6 (Adzorus, Pytolum et Doscen). See Briscoe 2012: 342–3.
14
On the location of these places, see Helly 2007: 131–2 n. 9 (Gyrton), 198 (Phalanna).
15
On the location of these places, see Briscoe 2012: 346.
16
Livy 42.54.6–11.
17
Hammond 1988: 517.
18
On his route, see Hammond 1988: 513 n. 2; Helly 2007: 145–6.
19
The exact names and location are disputed due to MS corruption. See Briscoe 2012: 349 (against
Helly 2007: 148–54).
King Eumenes of Pergamum and his brother Attalus, accompanied by
4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. The Romans were also joined by aux-
iliary forces from Apollonia, the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, and the
Thessalians, totaling 100 heavy and 1,500 light infantry, and 1,100 cavalry.20
The Romans also began naval operations in Greece. The Pergamene
fleet that brought Eumenes and his brothers Attalus and Athenaeus across
the Aegean had put in at Chalcis, where Athenaeus remained with 2,000
infantry while his brothers joined the consul at Tripolis Scaea.21 The praetor
C. Lucretius dispatched the fleet under the command of his brother around
the Peloponnese to Chalcis, while the praetor himself sailed to Boeotia via
the Corinthian Gulf. P. Cornelius Lentulus, the military tribune who had
been charged with protecting Boeotia with 300 men, was ordered to break
off the siege of Haliartus, which he had apparently undertaken without
authorization. The praetor’s brother Marcus brought up from Chalcis 10,000
Roman marines, along with Athenaeus and his 2,000 Pergamene troops,
and restarted the blockade of Haliartus in earnest. Marcius Philippus then
arrived at Chalcis with his ships, after having captured Alope and attacked
Larisa Cremaste in Phthiotic Achaea.22 A more efficient Roman supply
route than the trans-Adriatic one had thus been established. The Roman
armies could be supplied at Chalcis by cargo ships sailing south around the
Peloponnese, or across the Aegean from ports on the Black Sea.23
The Battle of Callicinus

Back in Thessaly, Perseus attempted to lure the Romans away from their base
at Tripolis Scaea into the Pelasgian plain by attacking Rome’s Thessalian allies,
particularly Pherae.24 When that failed, he allowed his soldiers to feast on the
cattle and grain they had plundered from round about. Both king and con-
sul then held war councils with their respective advisors. Perseus was urged
20
Livy 42.55. It is unclear in Livy’s text (§8) whether any or all of the Greek contingents assembled
at Tripolis Scaea or at Chalcis. My paraphrase is meant to capture this ambiguity. See Briscoe
2012: 349–50.
21
Livy 42.55.8.
22
Livy 42.56.1–7.
23
Hammond 1988: 513.
24
Mommsen 1856: 741–2; Niese 1903: 123–4; Colin 1905: 412; Kromayer 1907: 240–6; Heiland 1913:
56–7; De Sanctis 1923: 288–90; Pais 1926: 558; Benecke 1930: 261–2; Meloni 1953: 223–40; Pareti
1953: 55–8; Errington 1971: 214; McDonald 1981: 247–8; Hammond 1988: 517–19; Derow 1989: 310;
Helly 2007: 170–86; Waterfield 2014: 182–3. The Livian MS has Callicinum at Livy 42.58.5, which
was emended by Madvig to Callinicum to yield a meaningful Greek toponym (“[the place of the]
beautiful victory”). This is unnecessary (so Briscoe 2012: 357–8, whose commentary, however, prints
Callinicum ad loc. and “Callinicus” across the top of the right-hand pages between 357 and 371).
to attack the Roman camp, while the consul was feeling some pressure, par-
ticularly from the Pheraeans, to protect allied property by taking to the field.
While Licinius was locked in discussions with Eumenes and Attalus, among
others, a messenger arrived saying the enemy was at hand with a large column
of troops. The order was given to the men to arm themselves, and some cavalry
and skirmishers were sent from the camp to harass the king’s column. Perseus
halted his march about a mile from the Roman camp, and led an advance
force of light infantry and Macedonian and allied cavalry to reconnoiter the
Roman position. Having spied the Roman cavalry and light infantry outside
the camp, at around 8 o’clock in the morning the king ordered up from the
column detachments of Macedonian and allied troops to an amount equal
to the number of Romans in the field. The subsequent skirmishing ended in
a draw, and Perseus withdrew to Sycurium. For several days afterward, at the
same time of day, Perseus marched the twelve miles from Sycurium to the
Roman camp and back again, the Roman cavalry and light-armed troops
only emerging to attack the retreating Macedonian column. According to
Livy, the Macedonian cavalry got the best of these engagements.25
One night, Perseus moved his camp westward to within five miles of
the Roman position at Tripolis Scaea, and deployed his army as he had
on previous days, but this time at sunrise. The Romans were alarmed by
the sudden appearance of large amounts of dust on the plain at such an
early hour. Confusion and panic broke out in the camp; the men thought
that the entire enemy force was suddenly upon them. Half a mile from
the camp, Perseus took up his position on the hill of Callicinus. King
Cotys of the Odrysian Thracians was placed in charge of the left wing with
his 1,000 cavalry and light-armed skirmishers, while Meno of Antigonea
commanded the right with the Macedonian cavalry, aided by Cretan skir-
mishers under the command of Midon of Beroea. Next to the wings came
the royal horsemen and the mixed auxiliary elite cavalry under the com-
mands of Patrocles of Antigonea and Didas, governor of Paeonia. Perseus
held the center with the elite cavalry and the Sacred Squadron, behind
two divisions of slingers and javelin-throwers under the command of
Ion of Thessalonica and a Dolopian leader.26 The consul Licinius drew
25
Livy 42.56.8–57.12. The numbers involved in the fighting are uncertain. The hundred cavalry and
hundred javelin-throwers sent out by Licinius at Livy 42.57.5 is much smaller than the Roman forces
mentioned at 42.57.7, and the numerical equivalents of Livy’s alae, turmae, and cohortes (§§7–8) are
unclear.
26
The name of this person is hopelessly corrupt. The agēma (which I have here identified as “elite cav-
alry”) is probably not to be conflated with the alae sacrae – whatever that was (Livy’s use of the term
is a hapax in the extant evidence). Briscoe 2012: 359.
up his infantry behind the rampart, and sent out his cavalry and light-
armed infantry. On the right, he placed his brother, C. Licinius Crassus,
in command of the Italian cavalry, interspersed with the light infantry; on
the left was the ex-praetor M. Valerius Laevinus commanding the Greek
allied cavalry and light troops; and former consul Q. Mucius Scaevola held
command in the center with the Roman and allied select cavalry, includ-
ing 200 Galatian light horse, and 300 of Eumenes’ Cyrtian skirmishers.27
400 Thessalian horsemen were stationed not far beyond the left wing, and
Eumenes and Attalus drew up the Pergamene cavalry between the rampart
and the rear line. 28
The two sides clashed. For the Roman side, the shock of the Macedonian
attack was overwhelming:
First of all the Thracians, little different than wild beasts confined to their
cages for a long time and then suddenly released, attacked the Italian cavalry
on the right wing with such violent force and with such a great shout that
despite their inborn fearlessness and experience in war, they were thrown
into utter confusion … Perseus, attacking the center of the column, turned
back the Greeks at the first charge. The enemy pressed hard on them as they
scattered in retreat.29
The Greeks fled toward the 400 Thessalians and the reserve line of
Pergamenes, who absorbed them into their ranks. These then began advan-
cing against the enemy. At this point, with Perseus’ men scattered about
the battlefield in pursuit of the fleeing Roman forces, Hippias the Beroean
and the Macedonian commander Leonnatus brought up the Macedonian
phalanx on their own initiative, hoping to drive the victory home. The
king himself hesitated, however, and Evander (the Cretan who allegedly
ambushed Eumenes at Delphi), seeing the Roman infantry standards
approaching, persuaded the king to call off the battle.30 It was a clear
27
Briscoe 2012: 359 places the Roman cavalry, not otherwise mentioned in Livy’s description of the
Roman deployment, in the center with the “allied select cavalry” (Briscoe’s translation of Livy’s
delectis equitibus extraordinariis at 42.58.13).
28
Livy 42.58. Hammond 1988: 518 n. 1 believes that the contingents and commanders come from the
King’s Journals.
29
Livy 42.59.1–4. Because of a fairly substantial lacuna and a corrupted text at Livy 42.59.3, the account
of the opening melée is lost. The Greek allied cavalry is in the center in this passage, although earlier
Livy had placed them on the left (42.58.12). Briscoe 2012: 362 assumes Livy has made a mistake, but
the delectis equitibus extraordinariis Livy places in the center (42.58.13) may have included some elite
Greek units.
30
Doubted by Hammond 1988: 518 n. 1, who believes that Perseus independently and prudently
decided to keep his powder dry rather than risk the integrity of his phalanx by besieging a forti-
fied camp. Waterfield 2014: 186 oddly believes that Perseus “had offered [a single decisive battle] at
Callinicus [sic] in 170 [sic] but had been refused.”
victory for the Macedonians. On the Roman side, 200 cavalry and 2,000
infantry were lost, and 600 infantry were captured, while Perseus lost just
20 cavalry and 40 infantry.31
The Romans, depressed and fearful of a Macedonian attack, retreated
into their camp. Eumenes advised shifting camp to the north bank of
the Peneus River. Licinius worried about appearing weak and losing
face, and was unwilling to abandon Larissa since doing so would be
tantamount to abandoning the entire Thessalian plain (and its crops) to
Perseus. In the end, however, reason prevailed, and the Romans crossed
the Peneus in the dead of night. After the camp was safely established,
Licinius held a war council where all the chiefs of the allied contin-
gents placed the blame for their defeat squarely on the Aetolians, who,
they said, were the first to panic and flee, followed by the rest of the
Greek contingents. Two former Aetolian League stratēgoi, Nicander and
Lochagus, along with an Aetolian called Hippolochus and two others,
who had been the first to turn tail, were accused by their political rival
Lyciscus, stripped of command, and dispatched under guard to Rome.
The Thessalians, by contrast, were praised by Licinius before the assem-
bled troops, and their leaders rewarded with gifts for the uirtus they
displayed in battle.32
Meanwhile, the triumphant Macedonian side returned to its camp after
the battle, the Thracians singing songs and bearing the severed heads of
their enemies. The next day, when Perseus rode up to the Romans’ previ-
ous position, on the south bank of the Peneus, he realized he had made
two mistakes: the first was not pressing his advantage the day before in bat-
tle, and the second, greater mistake was his failure to be vigilant during the
previous night, for using only his light troops he could have inflicted mass
slaughter on the Romans as they tried to get across the river. Returning to
camp at Sycurium, Perseus set about dividing the spoils. He distributed
horses, finely wrought arms, and prisoners to some of his men, and to the
rest over 1,500 shields, 1,000 coats of mail and breastplates, and a larger
number of helmets, swords, and missiles. Perseus addressed his men, pre-
dicting ultimate victory, the recent battle being but a foretaste of the war’s
31
Livy 42.59–60.1; cf. Enn. Ann. 17.429–33 W (431–4 Sk.); Just. Epit. 33.1.4; Zon. 9.22.4; Eutrop. 4.6.3;
Oros. 4.20.37. Plut. Aem. 9.2 records 2,500 Roman dead, and at Mor. 197F, 2,800 dead and cap-
tured, which matches Livy’s figures.
32
Livy 42.60.3–4, 7–10. Polybius (27.15.14) says the Aetolian leaders were falsely accused by the pro-
Roman Lyciscus. Livy, “by using oratio obliqua … reflects Polybius’ scepticism” (Briscoe 2012: 365).
Appian (Mac. 12) has Licinius himself lay the false charges against the Aetolians and the other
Greeks.
outcome. He then shifted his camp to Mopselus, a hill above the Tempe
pass, lying halfway between Gonnus and Larissa.33
The Romans now shifted their camp away from the bank of the Peneus
to safer ground, where they were met by Misacenes, son of the Numidian
king Massinissa, who delivered a particularly welcome gift: twenty-two
elephants, along with a thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry.34 Shortly
afterward, Perseus’ envoys Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, and Midon of
Beroea, arrived at the Roman camp to discuss peace on the same terms
that had been imposed on Philip V in 196, that is, the king offered to pay
a 1,000-talent indemnity and give up those places Philip had been told
to relinquish.35 Such a comparatively minor loss as they had suffered at
Callicinus, however, only increased the Romans’ determination to pre-
vail. This was not 205, when the Romans, unable to sustain a war on
four fronts, were forced to sign the unsatisfactory Peace of Phoenice with
Perseus’ father Philip V. The consul’s response – that the king must sur-
render unconditionally to the discretion of the senate – mystified some,
and frightened others, not least, we are told, Perseus himself. The king
attempted to bribe the Romans into softening their position by raising
the proffered indemnity by ever greater amounts, but to no avail. Perseus
gave up and withdrew to his previous camp at Sycurium.36
As was seen in Chapter 5, throughout the Polybian and Polybian-derived
ancient accounts of Perseus’ reign, there always lurks in the background an
implicit, negative contrast between the king and his father, Philip V. This
appears no more strongly than it does here, where Perseus’ timidity and
failure to press his strategic advantage is implicitly contrasted with Philip’s
well-known boldness and tenacity. Whereas Philip’s early successes in the
Social War proved his dashing, Alexander-like daring and capability as a
commander,37 Perseus’ hesitation and failure to follow up his initial success
at Callicinus showed the opposite. Whereas Philip’s wolf-like survival of a
blockade of his forces in winter 201/0 at Bargylia in Asia Minor showed his
vigor and resourcefulness in adversity,38 Perseus, by contrast, was unwilling,
33
Livy 42.60.5–6, 61. For the place names and location in a corrupt portion of the MS, see Helly
2007: 134, 189–91; Briscoe 2012: 367.
34
Livy 42.62.1–2. The spelling of the Numidian’s name is uncertain (Briscoe 2012: 249).
35
Appian (Mac. 12) exaggerates, claiming that Perseus offered to make concessions his father had
refused (πολλὰ δώσειν ὑπισχνεῖτο ὧν ὁ πατὴρ Φίλιππος οὐ συνεχώρει) – unless he is alluding to
the fact that Perseus offered repeatedly to raise the indemnity amount (below). Few will agree with
Appian (Mac. 12) that Perseus tried to negotiate as a test of or a joke on the consul.
36
Polyb. 27.8; cf. Livy 42.62.3–15; Just. Epit. 33.1.5; Eutrop. 4.6.3.
37
On Philip’s character and reputation at the outset of his reign, see Polyb. 4.77.1–3; 5.102.1;
7.11.1–9, 14.4.
38
Polyb. 16.24, 28, with discussion at Eckstein 1995: 226–7.
even in victory, to risk his considerable resources any further. Perseus was
no Philip V.39 As the previous chapter also showed, however, this could be
partly illusory, a function of Polybius’ thesis that Philip carefully planned
the war that Perseus incompetently lost. But if Perseus’ squandering of his
initial strategic advantage, by trying to make peace long after this was pos-
sible, proved to the satisfaction of Polybius and others the king’s lack of self-
confidence and strategic insight, his loss of nerve at Callicinus must have
removed all doubt.40 At Callicinus, Perseus made his second grave strategic
error of the war. If too many more followed, disaster would surely ensue.
The Campaigns in Boeotia and Thessaly, and

the End of the First Year of the War
If Perseus thought that halting the Battle of Callicinus and offering
peace terms to the Romans would gain him allies (Livy 42.59.10), he
was wrong.41 he was wrong. Sympathy he certainly gained. As Polybius
explains, using the metaphor of a boxing match, human nature being
what it is (cf. 27.9.5, 10.5: φύσει), the crowd always unthinkingly favors
an underdog when he takes on a seemingly invincible champion. Their
support grows stronger if the underdog can score a blow or two off his
stronger opponent.42 The crowd even begins to taunt and make fun of
the former champion. So it was after Callicinus: “when after the victory
of the Macedonians,” the historian writes, “the report of the cavalry bat-
tle was spread throughout Greece, the disposition of the majority toward
Perseus, which hitherto had been for the most part concealed, blazed
forth like fire.”43
39
Mommsen 1856: 742: “allein Perseus war ein guter Soldat; aber kein Feldherr wie sein Vater.” Cf.
McDonald 1981: 248: “we may regard him as a sound strategist but indeterminate in the field,” 251,
254: “a good soldier, slow but steady, and consistent in his policy [to produce a stalemate]”; Eckstein
1995: 261: “Perseus is … an altogether less vigorous figure than Philip.”
40
Hammond 1988: 518 believes that Perseus’ decision to hold back his phalanx was strategically pru-
dent: he was unwilling to risk his “once-for-all army, irreplaceable if it suffered a severe defeat” (515)
on a siege of the Roman fortified camp (cf. Kromayer 1907: 245 “Ein Kampf auch mit einem stark
erschütterten Gegner unter dem Schutz seiner Wälle und im Bereich der feindlichen Geschosse
bot wenig Aussicht und viel Gefahr eines kräftigen Rückschlages”). Per contra Heiland 1913: 57 (on
Perseus’ “Unentschossenheit, Warten und Zögern”).
41
Mommsen 1856: 742; Niese 1903: 124–8; Kromayer 1907: 246–54; Heiland 1913: 58–9; De Sanctis
1923: 290–2; Pais 1926: 558; Benecke 1930: 262–4; Pareti 1953: 58–64; Meloni 1953: 240–51; Derow
1989: 310–11; Hammond 1988: 519–20; Helly 2007: 194–208; Waterfield 2014: 183.
42
Polyb. 27.9–10. Livy’s summary of this passage (42.63.1–2) is a crude approximation at best.
43
ὅτι τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἱππομαχίαν φήμης μετὰ τὴν νίκην τῶν Μακεδόνων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
διαγγελθείσης ἐξέλαμψε καθαπερεὶ πῦρ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τὸν Περσέα διάθεσις, τὸν πρὸ
τούτου χρόνον ἐπικρυπτομένων τῶν πλείστων (Polyb. 27.9.1).
As events unfolded in Thessaly, the praetor Lucretius Gallus pursued
operations in Boeotia, continuing the siege of Haliartus with the greatest
violence (summa ui), according to Livy, while the men of the town, aided
only by some young men from Coronea, mounted a spirited defense. When
parts of the city walls collapsed, the defenders simply rebuilt them from
the rubble, and mounted bold sallies against the siege works, especially the
battering ram, which they weighed down with lead and other materials
whenever and wherever it threatened the walls. Lucretius countered by
having the scaling ladders brought up against the walls at all points except
the portion where the swampy shore of Lake Copaïs girded the city. When
two towers and the wall between them collapsed, the praetor brought up
2,000 picked men to scale the rubble, but those inside rallied to oppose
them, heaving bundles of dry kindling onto the debris and threatening to
set it all alight, so that behind this fiery barrier they could construct a new
inner wall. A heavy rainstorm intervened, however, and the townspeople
now had to defend as best they could the collapsed section of wall against
the Romans, who were pulling the faggots aside, scrambling over the bro-
ken masonry, and entering the town. Meanwhile, those on the ladders
successfully scaled the other sections of the wall, which were now almost
completely denuded of defenders since all were now feverishly trying to
repair the collapsed portion. As they entered the town, the Romans cut
down the old and young men. In the chaos that followed, 2,500 armed
defenders managed to flee to the acropolis. Seeing that further resistance
was hopeless, they surrendered the next day, and were promptly sold into
slavery. Haliartus itself ceased to exist: the city was looted and razed to
the ground. Lucretius marched thence to Thisbe, where he took over the
city, overthrew the government favorable to Perseus, and installed the pro-
Roman faction in its place. The praetor also confiscated and sold at auction
the estates and slaves (and perhaps the wives and children as well) of the
leaders of the pro-Macedonian party. He then returned to the fleet.44
Meanwhile, when it was reported to Perseus that the Romans had reaped
the grain of the fields surrounding their camp north of the Peneus, and
that the camp itself was full of dry straw from the husking of the grain, the
king decided that the conditions there were right for a conflagration. The
44
Livy 42.63.3–12; cf. Strabo 9.2.30 (411C); Paus. 9.32.5; 10.35.2. On Thisbe (the MS reads Thebas, an
error Livy transmitted from his copy of Polybius, in which Θίσβας will have already been corrupted
into Θήβας at the point corresponding to Livy 42.63.12; see above, Chapter 4, n. 86), see also Syll.3
646, a senatus consultum resolving some outstanding issues arising from Lucretius’ arrangements
for the city (his attack is mentioned at ll. 22–4). This and similar decrees relating to Coronea and
Abdera are discussed in the next section and in Appendix C.
Macedonians’ approach was anything but stealthy, however: they caused
a massive uproar and panic by attacking the outposts, thus alerting the
Romans in the camp to their presence. The Romans were able to arm and
man the ramparts and the gates in plenty of time before the Macedonians
arrived. Perseus ordered the retreat. Out of shame over the botched opera-
tion, says Livy, the king insisted on being the last to withdraw, knowing
full well that he would have to bear the brunt of any Roman attacks on the
rear of the column. He sent the baggage and the infantry ahead while he
stayed behind with the cavalry until the rest were safely away. After some
skirmishing with the pursuing Roman light troops, the Macedonians got
safely back to their camp at Sycurium.45
The Romans now shifted their position to Crannon, south of the Peneus
but a little farther west of their original position at Tripolis Scaea. Although
they initially felt safe at this distance, and did not have to worry about sup-
plies since they were surrounded by abundant grain ready for harvesting,
they were surprised at dawn one morning by the sudden appearance of the
Macedonian cavalry and light troops in command of the heights around
Crannon. When the Romans could not be enticed into battle, Perseus
ordered the infantry, which had been stationed in a nearby plain, to return
to the Macedonian camp at Sycurium, while he remained behind to see
if the Romans would react. Some Roman cavalry did come out and fol-
lowed at a cautious distance while Perseus withdrew, but no fighting took
place since Perseus’ men kept formation and there were no stragglers to
pick off.46
The king then moved his camp again to Mopselus, closer to the Roman
position, while the Romans, after stripping the territory around Crannon
of all its grain, moved on to Phalanna. Upon being informed by a deserter
that the Romans were scattered about everywhere, reaping the harvest
without armed guards, Perseus took a force of cavalry and 2,000 mixed
Thracian and Cretan skirmishers on a quick march to the fields surround-
ing Phalanna. He captured around 600 men and almost a thousand wag-
ons, some of them fully loaded with grain, together with their teams. He
set 300 Cretans to guard the booty, while he himself gathered the cavalry
and the rest of the infantry together to lead an attack on the closest Roman
guard force. A certain L. Pompeius, the military tribune in charge of the
800-strong guard force, withdrew to a nearby hill, and formed his men
45
Livy 42.64.1–6. A fragment of Appian (Mac. 13), describing the Romans threshing grain in their
camp and Perseus doing the same in the fields, probably belongs in this context.
46
Livy 42.64.7–10.
into a tightly packed circle. Behind the relative safety of their close-packed
shields, they managed to fend off most of the incoming missiles from the
Macedonians surrounding the hill, but endured many direct hits whenever
they broke rank to try to push back against those of the enemy who were
now attempting to scale the hill. Perseus tried to convince the beleaguered
guardsmen to surrender, to no avail.47
Then the tide turned. When some of the foragers reported to the con-
sul what was going on, he quickly assembled the cavalry and Roman and
allied light infantry, attaching to them the recently arrived Numidian troops
and elephants, and marched out of the camp against the Macedonians, leav-
ing orders for the legions to assemble and follow. Perseus awaited the enemy
and sent orders for the phalanx to be brought up. Licinius, protected on his
flanks by Eumenes, Attalus, and Misacenes, joined battle straightaway. The
Macedonians stood their ground initially, but after sustaining the loss of 300
infantry and 24 of the best horsemen of the Sacred Squadron, including
their commander, they began to retreat.48 Meanwhile, tragedy soon devolved
into farce:
The phalanx, summoned by an alarmed messenger, was hastily being led
up when it first encountered in the narrows the column of prisoners, and
became entangled with the wagons loaded with grain. Then there was great
irritation on both sides, with no one waiting until somehow the column
could be disentangled, but the armed men were hurling headlong down the
steep slope the wagons – for the road could not otherwise be cleared – while
the pack-animals, as they were being goaded, were raging against the crowd.
Hardly had they disentangled themselves from the disordered column of
prisoners when they ran into the royal column and the defeated cavalry.
Then indeed the shouting of men ordering retreat also created panic almost
similar to complete disaster.49
The consul, satisfied with his modest success, returned to camp. On the
Macedonian side, 8,000 men were killed, 2,800 were taken prisoner, and
27 military standards were captured; on the Roman side, over 4,300 men
and 5 standards were lost.50
47
Livy 42.65.1–11. Polyb. 27.11, a description of a new weapon, the kestros, or sling-dart, which was
an innovation of this war and used to great effect against Pompeius and his men, roughly cor-
responds to §§9–10 of the Livian passage, but the source of Polyb. 27.11, Suda s.u. κέστρος, may
not reproduce Polybius’ ipsissima uerba, which Livy apparently misunderstood or abbreviated.
Discussion: Walbank 1979: 308–10; Briscoe 2012: 379–80. L. Pompeius, incidentally, is the earliest
known possessor of that famed gentilician name in the historical record.
48
Livy 42.65.12–66.5.
49
Livy 42.66.6–8.
50
Livy 42.66.9–10.
Such was the Battle of Crannon – if indeed it be worthy of such a
name. Livy certainly had his doubts: he distances himself from those writ-
ers, most likely Roman annalists, who proclaim, in stentorian tones, that
“a great battle was fought that day.”51 Legion had yet to come to grips with
phalanx, and so it was an inevitably small affair, and a large number of
the casualties must have fallen in the confusion in the narrows. The result,
nevertheless, buoyed the Romans’ spirits after their pitiful performance at
Callicinus. And while perhaps not in the category of a major error, Perseus’
generalship at Crannon appeared erratic at best, and at worst, incompe-
tent, perhaps betraying his lack of experience or strategic nous.
The campaign of 171 wound down with Perseus abandoning Mopselus,
garrisoning Gonnus, and returning to Macedonia. He dismissed Cotys
with honorable gifts when it was reported that a Thracian chieftain along
with Corragus, Eumenes of Pergamum’s governor in the Chersonese and
southeastern Thrace, had attacked and seized a portion of Cotys’ terri-
tory.52 During the winter, Timotheus, one of Perseus’ governors, was to
try to entice, from his base at Phila, the peoples of the Magnesian coast-
line south of the Peneus to join the Macedonians. Before retiring for
the winter, the consul Licinius took and sacked Malloea in Perrhaebia;
recovered Tripolis and the rest of that region; and in Macedonian-held
Phthiotic Achaea pressed on with the Roman attack on Larisa Cremaste,
destroyed Pteleum, and received the surrender of Antron. The consul
also dismissed Eumenes and Attalus, and assigned Misacenes and his
men winter quarters in the Thessalian towns near Larissa. Roman troops
were scattered throughout Thessaly for the winter near the cities, while
2,000 legionaries were sent with Licinius’ legate Q. Mucius Scaevola
to hold Ambracia. The consul himself, debating whether to attack the
Macedonian fleet’s base at Demetrias before the campaigning season was
over, was summoned by the Thebans, who currently were being harassed
by the people of Coronea, the last remaining pro-Macedonian strong-
hold in Boeotia. The consul decided to accept the Thebans’ invitation
rather than attack Demetrias since it was preferable to winter in Boeotia
rather than Magnesia.53
* * *
51
Sunt qui eo die magno proelio pugnatum auctores sint (42.66.9).
52
A fragment of Polybius praising Cotys (27.12) may have been part of his lost narrative of this event.
53
Livy 42.67; cf. Zon. 9.22.4 (“Crassus … captured a few towns, and some of these he razed to
the ground and sold the captives into slavery,” ὁ Κράσσος … ἔστι δ᾿ ἃς ἐχειρώσατο καί τινας
κατασκάψας τοὺς ἁλόντας ἀπέδοτο). Errington 1974: 83–5 is probably correct to date the fall of
For both sides, the first year of the war yielded mixed results. Perseus,
despite being able to steal a march or two on the Romans, seizing the two
main passes into Macedonia and taking control of parts of Perrhaebia and
Thessaly well ahead of the enemy, missed at least two spectacular oppor-
tunities to deliver a morale-crushing blow to Roman arms early on in the
piece. It is possible that the king was still hoping for peace;54 after all, he
offered everything short of full deditio after Callicinus to secure it. But this
was a later decision. Immediately after the victory, he promised his men
that their success in the cavalry battle was but a foretaste of the victory to
come.55 What stands out more starkly from the accounts of the first year
of the war is a pattern of strategic incompetence and indecisiveness on the
part of the king, whether one thinks of his hesitation to deploy his phalanx
at Callicinus, his failure to prevent the Romans from shifting their camp
beyond his reach in the aftermath, his failed surprise attack on the Roman
camp at Crannon, and the farcical movement of his phalanx, prisoners,
and supplies after the Battle of Crannon.
The Romans’ lack of success in the first year of the war has been vari-
ously put down to Licinius Crassus’ lack of familiarity with the terrain,56
and the rawness of the Roman legionary recruits, which bears some rela-
tion to the difficulties of conducting the levy for the war discussed earlier.57
Because Perseus had effectively established what would be the theater of
conflict (Perrhaebia and Thessaly) well in advance of the Roman arrival
in central Greece, Licinius was unable to bring about a decisive battle on
ground of his own choosing. It would have been unwise for him to test his
tironem exercitum against Perseus’ battle-hardened phalangites on ground
of the king’s choosing, especially after an exhausting forced march from
Illyria to Thessaly through the rough country of Epirus and Athamania.58
This, in part, accounts for Licinius’ seeming lack of initiative and failure to
accomplish much once he arrived in central Greece.
What is truly puzzling about Roman strategy in the first year of the
war, however, is their failure to use their fleet more effectively. This was,
Coronea to autumn 171 (contra Meloni 1953: 250 and n. 2 (with earlier literature there cited): win-
ter). See further, Appendix C. Livy’s epitomator erroneously calls Licinius a proconsul at Per. 43.
This will have been either a slip on the epitomator’s part (so Errington 1974: 84 n. 4), an error made
by Livy himself, or by his source, Polybius. For the last possibility, see below, n. 82.
54
So Meloni 1953: 251.
55
Livy 42.61.4–8.
56
Benecke 1930: 263.
57
Benecke 1930: 261; Hammond 1988: 515. On the problems with the levy, see above, p. 114 and
Chapter 5, p. 99.
58
Benecke 1930: 263; Meloni 1953: 251. Livy 42.55.3 (tironem exercitum).
after all, the Roman military arm whose supremacy was unchallenged in
the East in 171. The fleet could have provided a valuable distraction in
Perseus’ rear by attacking the Magnesian coastline of Thessaly, or indeed,
raiding the Pierian plain or the Lower Macedonian heartland of coastal
Bottia and Amphaxitis, which must have been poorly defended if the king
had his entire army with him. It was apparently deemed more important
to use the fleet to secure sea-borne supply routes by clearing out the last
remaining southernmost pockets of Macedonian control and influence in
Boeotia and around the Malian Gulf. Sheer greed for plunder may also
have played a role as well. As has been seen, the praetor in charge of the
fleet, C. Lentulus, ordered the military tribune Cornelius Lentulus to stop
the siege of Haliartus in Boeotia so that he himself could bring 12,000
marines in to do the job properly. As will be seen shortly, the Boeotians,
as well as Rome’s friends and allies, were to suffer terribly at the hands of
Roman troops and their commanders over the winter 171/0. In sum, a mix-
ture of lack of preparedness, an inexperienced army, unfamiliarity with the
terrain, a conservative strategy, especially on sea, and a burgeoning cruelty
and greed accounts for the Roman performance in the first year of the war.
The Second Year
Surviving testimony of the events of 17059 is a stark reminder of just how
precarious is the state of our knowledge for the history of mid-Republican
Rome. Our fullest surviving account is book 43 of Livy, but in the sole sur-
viving MS of books 41–45, a massive lacuna opens up after 43.3.7 as a result
of a loss of four quaternions of text – the equivalent of around thirty-five
pages of modern printed text. A significant proportion of Res Macedoniae
for 170 are missing, and must be reconstructed from scattered bits and
pieces of evidence drawn from Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, the Livian
Periocha of book 43, and from Livy’s later compilers and epitomators.
When Livy’s text resumes, one of the first things we learn about the
Roman campaigns of late 171 and 170 in Greece is the extraordinary greed
and cruelty of the Roman commanders.60 After Coronea surrendered to
59
Mommsen 1856: 742–4; Niese 1903: 128–44; Colin 1905: 411, 414, 415–30; Kromayer 1907: 255–67;
Heiland 1913: 58–62; De Sanctis 1923: 292–300; Pais 1926: 558–60; Benecke 1930: 264; Meloni 1953:
251–84; Pareti 1953: 64–9; Errington 1971: 214–19; McDonald 1981: 248–9; Hammond 1988: 520–3;
Derow 1989: 311–12; Waterfield 2014: 183–6.
60
Crudelius auariusque in Graecia bellatum et ab consule Licinio et ab Lucretio praetore erat (“The war
in Greece was fought with great cruelty and greed by the consul Licinius and Lucretius the prae-
tor”; Livy 43.4.5, cf. 11). Their conduct was probably a function of the frustrations and losses of the
Licinius in autumn 171, the consul treated the inhabitants very badly,
sparking an embassy from the city, and the passage of a senatus consultum.61
The praetor Lucretius collected enormous amounts of booty from the
allies, and apparently both he and his successor, L. Hortensius, inflicted
much violence upon them.62 Both in their turn plundered and abused
the cities along the Thracian shoreline, but when they were shut out of
enemy cities (Emathia, Amphipolis, Maronea, and Aenus), they turned
on the Romans’ allies and friends.63 They plundered their own naval base
at Chalcis, Lucretius despoiling the shrines, and he and Hortensius both
kidnapping and selling Chalcidians into slavery, and billeting the sailors
in private houses, with grim consequences for the resident women and
children.64 Hortensius also attacked Abdera, a Roman amicus, after the
townspeople asked for time to discuss his demand for money and grain
with the consul and the senate. The envoys had barely reached the consul
when the praetor’s men stormed the town, beheaded the leading men, and
sold the rest of the inhabitants into slavery.65
By late summer or early autumn, delegations from Abdera and Chalcis,
and perhaps, if they had not done so earlier, Thisbe as well, arrived in
Rome to complain about their treatment at the hands of the Roman com-
manders. The senate passed senatus consulta, based on that passed earlier on
behalf of Coronea, and issued orders that those who had been improperly
enslaved by the consul of 170, A. Hostilius Mancinus, and Hortensius the
praetor should be recovered and restored to free status. Lucretius was tried
and unanimously condemned by all thirty-five tribes at Rome, and had to
pay a fine of one million asses.66
Meanwhile, Perseus was able to attack the Roman fleet at Oreus on
Euboea, seize twenty supply ships with their cargo, sink the rest with their
previous campaigning season; the Romans, now humiliated and angry, were ready to pounce at the
slightest hint of perceived disloyalty – as they had done to the Aetolian commanders after Callicinus
(Errington 1971: 214–15). The Greeks’ secret sympathy for the underdog Perseus after that battle was
probably not lost on them either.
61
Livy 43.4.11–13. For the content of the s.c., see Appendix C.
62
Livy 43.4.6–7, 7.10 (booty); Per. 43 (“many things were done violently against the allies by the
prefects of the Roman fleets,” a praefectis classium Romanarum multa impotenter in socios facta).
Lucretius’ treatment of the Thisbeans has already been mentioned, above, p. 134.
63
Livy 43.7.10; cf. Zon. 9.22.5 (“Crassus attacked the Greek cities subject to Perseus, and was shut
out from most of them,” ὁ Κράσσος δὲ ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς ταῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου
κατεχομέναις προσέβαλε, καὶ τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ἀπεκρούσθη).
64
Livy 43.7.5–11.
65
Livy 43.4.8–10.
66
Livy 43.4.11–13 (Abdera), 8.4–8 (Chalcis), 8.1–3, 9–10 (trial of Lucretius). The mistreatment of
Thisbe, which also resulted in an embassy of complaint to Rome and an s.c. (see Appendix C), was
probably reported by Livy, but fell into the lacuna after 43.3.7.
grain, and capture four quinqueremes besides.67 In early 170, some Molossian
Epirotes, recently allied to Perseus, plotted with him to kidnap the newly
arrived Roman consul Hostilius, who only narrowly escaped.68 Hostilius
tried and failed to penetrate Macedonia via the Thessalian coast,69 and was
then defeated in battle by Perseus as he tried to penetrate Macedonia from
Elimea.70 Hostilius eventually entered the kingdom via the Thessalian coast,
but declined battle when challenged by Perseus, choosing instead to spend
the campaigning season foraging in the Macedonian countryside.71 Perseus,
for his part, ignored the Roman army, invaded Perrhaebia and Thessaly, and
besieged and captured many towns.72 So confident in the security of the
southern battlefront did Perseus feel that at one point he marched north to
confront the Dardanians. He killed 10,000 and captured enormous booty.73
He also resumed relations with the Bastarnae, perhaps reviving his father’s
old plan to have them invade Italy.74
Livy’s text resumes with his account of embassies to the senate, includ-
ing those of the Abderites and Chalcis, discussed earlier. A delegation from
Athens reported that, in the previous year, although the consul Licinius and
the praetor Lucretius had refused any military assistance from them, they
had requested 100,000 modii of grain, and the Athenians provided it, even
though their land was largely barren. Nevertheless, they pledged to provide
whatever was needed in the future. Ambassadors from Miletus promised to
provide anything that was needed for the war as well. Envoys from Alabanda
reported the construction of a new temple in their city and the initiation of a
new religious festival in honor of Urbs Roma. They also had with them a gold
crown to deposit in the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol,
as well as 300 cavalry shields to dedicate. The latter the senate ordered to
be brought to the consul Hostilius in Macedonia.75 A gold crown was also
67
Plut. Aem. 9.3; Oros. 4.20.38 (allusive).
68
Polyb. 27.15–16; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.5–5a; Zon. 9.22.5. As had occurred in Boeotia in 172, disputes
over whether to back Rome or Macedon split the Epirote League. The Molossians, led by Charops,
backed Perseus (Polyb. 27.15–16), while the other states, under the leadership of the Thesprotians
and Chaonians, remained loyal to Rome (Livy 43.21.4; cf. Polyb. 27.16.4–5).
69
Livy 44.2.6 (retrospective).
70
Plut. Aem. 9.4; cf. Livy 43.11.9 and Oros. 4.20.38 (allusive).
71
Plut. Aem. 9.4; cf. Livy 44.2.6, 36.10 (alluding to previous consuls wasting the summer marching
around Macedonia).
72
Polyb. 29.17.7; Livy 45.3.7; cf. Zon. 9.22.7.
73
Livy Per. 43 (cf. 43.19.14, 11.9 (allusive)); Plut. Aem. 9.5; cf. Polyb. 28.8.2; (perhaps) Diod. Sic. 30.4.
74
Plut. Aem. 9.5.
75
An inscription recording the renewal of Alabanda’s amicitia with Rome (REG 11 (1898): 256–66)
may date from this period, although it may just as likely belong to the early 180s, after the war with
Antiochus, or from the Mithridatic War in the 80s. Discussion: Gruen 1984: 733–5.
brought by ambassadors from Lampsacus, who reminded the senators that
when the Romans first entered Macedonia, they had abandoned Perseus, des-
pite having been Macedonian subjects since his father Philip’s time.76 They
also reminded the senate that they had furnished everything required for the
war effort, and all they asked in return was to be admitted to friendship with
Rome. They were enrolled in the “list of Roman allies,” the formula sociorum.77
Envoys from Carthage and Numidia also arrived. The former reported
that they had brought down to the African coast a million modii of wheat
and half a million modii of barley, offering to deliver it wherever the senate
decided, while King Massinissa offered the same amount of wheat, 1,200
cavalry, and twelve elephants, offering to supply whatever else the senate
should require. The envoys were told to have all they offered brought to the
consul Hostilius. Cretan ambassadors arrived to report that in the previous
year they sent as many archers to the consul Licinius as he had requested, but,
upon being questioned about it, they could not deny that a larger number
of Cretans were serving with Perseus. They were instructed to make an effort
to recall those Cretans serving with Perseus at the earliest possible moment.78
Next, the senate ordered eight war-ships to be sent to the naval leg-
ate C. Furius at Issa, with 2,000 newly conscripted soldiers aboard, while
the consul Hostilius sent Ap. Claudius Centho with 4,000 men to the
Illyrian coast to protect Rome’s amici there (he gathered another 8,000
from the allies on the journey). The reason for these moves, writes Livy, is
that the senate was increasingly concerned about what Genthius, the king
of the Illyrian Ardiaei, might do. They had good reason not to trust him,
of course. Two years earlier, the king’s envoys had received a cool recep-
tion from the patres after his attacks on Issa, a Roman amicus. A Roman
embassy expressing the senate’s displeasure was sent shortly afterward. In
172, when Marcius Philippus’ mission fanned out across the Greek world,
L. Decimius had to be dispatched to Genthius to remind him of his amici-
tia with Rome, but failed to secure his support in the war.79
76
Not true (Meloni 1953: 266 n. 3, with earlier literature there cited; cf. Walbank 1957: 606–7).
77
Livy 43.6.1–10. On the formula sociorum (also called the formula amicorum and the formula sociorum
et amicorum), see now Burton 2011: 82–3, to which add now Snowdon 2014.
78
Livy 43.6.11–7.4. The Cretans serving on both sides were probably mercenaries. Whether any Cretan
state could withdraw its mercenaries from service may be doubted (Briscoe 2012: 410) – hence the
senate’s order that they “make an effort” (dare operam: 7.4) to recall them, rather than that they
must do this. A token effort was all that was required to show their friendship and loyalty to Rome.
On such gestures among international amici, see now Burton 2011: 200 (on the senate’s offer, at the
Rhodians’ request, to have Soli transferred from Antiochus to Rhodes in 188).
79
On all this, see above, Chapter 4, pp. 69, 70. As was seen earlier in this chapter (n. 6), the
fifty-four Illyrian lemboi that the Romans commandeered were probably taken against
At some point late in the year, Hostilius sent the former consul
C. Popillius Laenas and Cn. Octavius on a diplomatic mission to reassure
the Greek allies, and to undo some of the damage he and the praetor
Hortensius had done to Rome’s reputation earlier in the campaigning
season. At Thebes they thanked the Thebans for their loyalty and urged
them to maintain it. In the Peloponnese, they quoted from the recent
senatus consultum, which forbid Roman commanders in the field from
requisitioning supplies from the Greek allies without senatorial permis-
sion.80 They also said they could distinguish those who were eager to sup-
port Rome from those who were reluctant. This, like Marcius Philippus’
comments to the Boeotian envoys in 170, telegraphing his intention to
break up the Boeotian confederacy, and punish those responsible for
defection to Perseus, had the desired effect: the Greeks were now anxious
about how to speak and act so as to show their loyalty to Rome. At the
Achaean League council meeting at Aegium, the Romans, says Polybius,
were about to accuse Polybius himself, his father Lycortas, and Archon
of waiting on events, but had no grounds to do so, and so made a brief
statement, and moved on to Aetolia.81 At the Aetolian League assembly
meeting at Thermum, the Romans asked for hostages. Mutual recrimin-
ation followed, as various Aetolian politicians protested their loyalty and
accused their rivals of betraying the Roman cause. The meeting ended in
a near-riot when anti-Roman politicians began stoning their former pol-
itical ally Thoas, who had since turned to the Roman side. The envoys
departed, apparently without taking the hostages, and arrived at Thyrreum
in Acarnania, where an assembly was taking place. The pro-Roman faction
asked for Roman garrisons to prevent treachery. Their opponents objected
on the grounds that they had never done anything against the Romans.
The matter was dropped, no garrisons were installed, and the envoys
returned to Larissa to report back to the consul.82
Genthius’ will. On the failed Roman attempt(s) on Uscana, which chronologically belongs
here, see Appendix D.
80
Livy 43.17.3. Polybius omits the substance of the decree in the parallel section, probably having
already quoted it in an earlier part of his text, now lost (but paraphrased at Polyb. 28.13.11 and 16.2).
81
Whether Polybius had any certain knowledge that the envoys were about to accuse him, his father,
and Archon may be doubted. It is perhaps an embittered inferential reflection based on what hap-
pened to him and his faction after the war was over. On the other hand, although there were no
grounds to suspect Polybius and Archon, who advocated a policy of complete cooperation with
Rome, their association with Lycortas, who advocated neutrality in the war, despite the League’s
treaty with Rome, may have caused the Romans to suspect them of time-serving as well. On the
policy split within the Lycortas faction at this time, see Eckstein 1995: 5 and n. 20.
82
Polyb. 28.3–5; cf. Livy 43.17.2–9. Polybius mistakenly refers to Hostilius as a proconsul at 28.3.1
and 5.6 (Meloni 1953: 271 n. 1 (with earlier literature there cited); Walbank 1979: 329). Hammond
Meanwhile, Perseus was eager to follow up his diplomatic success in
Epirus and his military successes against the Dardani with a winter cam-
paign in Illyria, which might also entice Genthius to join the Macedonian
cause. Waiting until winter was truly advanced, when the passes from
Thessaly into Macedon are blocked with snow,83 he set out around the time
of the winter solstice with 10,000 infantry, 2,000 light troops, and 500
cavalry. He stopped at Stuberra to take on supplies and siege equipment,
and then proceeded to Uscana, which was occupied by a mixed Roman-
Illyrian force. The city resisted fiercely until the people saw Perseus’ siege
sheds being brought up to the walls, and realized they did not have enough
grain to hold out much longer. The Romans requested that they be allowed
to leave with their possessions and arms, or, alternatively, with their lives
and freedom. The king agreed to the first request, but then stripped the
soldiers of their arms, took them into custody, and marched them back to
Stuberra. The Illyrian cohort and the townspeople he sold into slavery.84
Perseus then marched back to the Penestae region and made for
Oaeneum, a strategically important town on the route to the Labeates,
Genthius’ stronghold. On the way, he captured Draudacum and eleven
other forts, mostly without a fight, and took 1,500 Roman soldiers pris-
oner. Moving on to Oaeneum, Perseus set to work on besieging the place.
He built a mound right up against the wall, and at the same time that his
men began climbing the mound, the ladders were brought up as well. The
town was taken, the adult males were killed, the women and children were
taken into custody, and the booty was distributed to Perseus’ men. The
king returned to Stuberra with his victorious army, and immediately sent
envoys to Genthius to report on his great successes that year, and to urge
him to join the Macedonians. With great difficulty the ambassadors made
their way across Mt. Scordus and down to the Illyrian coast, alighting at
Scodra (Map 1), whence they were summoned by Genthius to Lissus. The
king was favorable to the Macedonian cause, but needed money. When
this was reported to Perseus at Stuberra, he sent a follow-up embassy to
urge Genthius again to join him, but avoided any discussion of money.
1988: 523 is surely right to conclude that “the tactics of Hortensius’ envoys must have offset any
goodwill which the senatorial decrees were designed to excite.”
83
This would ensure against the Romans making a winter-time incursion into his kingdom. Hostilius
had already withdrawn from Macedonia for, as has been seen, he was at Larissa when his envoys
reported back to him late in the year.
84
Livy 43.18–19.2; cf. Livy 43.11.9 (allusive); Zon. 9.22.7 (possibly confusing Illyricum with Epirus).
The number of Roman prisoners given in the MS (4,000) is probably too large (Pareti 1953: 65 n. 3;
Briscoe 2012: 453). On Uscana, see Appendix D.
After reinforcing Uscana and the other forts among the Penestae, Perseus
returned to Macedonia.85
At this point, L. Coelius sent M. Trebellius of Fregellae to take hos-
tages from the Penestae who remained loyal to Rome, and from the
Parthini, also Roman amici, and send them to Epidamnus and Apollonia.
Meanwhile, Ap. Claudius Centho tried to besiege Phanote, an Epirote
fort, with 6,000 men, but the Macedonian garrison was too strong. Then,
hearing that Perseus was marching to Stratus, Claudius withdrew,86 with
the Macedonian garrison under Cleuas in hot pursuit. His men killed
around 1,000 Romans and took 200 prisoner. Claudius encamped in the
Meleon plain, while Cleuas directed his forces to plunder the territory
of Antigonea. Armed men poured out of the city and attacked the scat-
tered Macedonians, killing at least a thousand and capturing a hundred.
They then encamped close to Claudius in the plain, who then dismissed
the Epiorote contingents, sent the others into winter quarters among the
Parthini, and himself returned to Illyricum with his Italian troops, and
thence to Rome to offer sacrifices.87
After purifying his army at Elimea, Perseus, at the invitation of some
Epirote exiles, marched with 10,000 infantry and 300 cavalry across dif-
ficult terrain in harsh winter conditions to Stratus in Aetolia. He met
Archidamus on the Aetolian frontier, who promised to betray Stratus to
the king. But when Perseus arrived at the town the next day, he found the
gates shut and a Roman garrison of a thousand men under the command
of C. Popillius inside. Soon Dinarchus, the Aetolian hipparchos, arrived
with 600 infantry and some cavalry, originally intended for Perseus, says
Livy, but now handed over to the Romans. Perseus attempted a parley but
failed as the Romans rained down missiles on the Macedonians. Perseus
withdrew five miles away across the Petitarus River, and held a council.
It was decided not to test the weather conditions any further by continu-
ing the winter campaign, but to return to Macedonia. On the difficult
journey back, Perseus received the surrender of Aetolian Aperantia, and
installed Archidamus with a garrison of 800 men there. The king later
sent 1,000 infantry and 200 cavalry to garrison Cassandrea, and continued
85
Livy 43.19.2–20.4; Polyb. 28.8–9; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.9; Plut. Aem. 9.6; Dio fr. 66.1; Zon. 9.22.9 (on
negotiations with Genthius). It is at this point that L. Coelius perhaps tried to recover Uscana. See
Appendix D. On Perseus’ miserliness, see also Polyb. 29.8–9, discussed at Eckstein 1995: 73, 261, and
below, p. 60.
86
Perhaps to attack Perseus rather than to flee him (so Briscoe 2012: 462). For Perseus’ march to
Stratus, see below.
87
Livy 43.21.1–5, 23.1–6.
to exchange envoys with Genthius, never giving in to the Illyrian king’s
requests for money.88
Meanwhile, at Rome, Sex. Digitius, a tribune of the soldiers, made an
informal report to the senate on the progress of the war. The patres, fearing
further disgrace, dispatched M. Fulvius Flaccus and M. Caninus Rebilus
to investigate. Upon their return, shortly after the consular elections for
169, they reported on Perseus’ spectacular successes, and the panic among
Rome’s allies because the king had taken control of so many cities. The
consul’s army, they continued, was in disarray because leave was granted
too generously by Hostilius, hoping to secure his soldiers’ political sup-
port. So the military tribunes. The consul, in turn, blamed the military
tribunes. The senate placed discussion of the Macedonian situation first
on the agenda of the inaugural senate meeting of the new consular year.89
* * *
As the senate’s reaction to Sex. Digitius’ report makes clear, the second
year of the war witnessed the gradual erosion of the Roman position in
Greece to the benefit of Perseus. The king displayed enormous energy,
both diplomatically and militarily, throughout the year and, most strik-
ingly, deep into the winter months. He succeeded in chipping away at
the hitherto secure Roman position in Illyria, as well as making further
gains in Perrhaebia, Thessaly, and even in Aetolia. He was victorious in
battle against the Dardanians, and against the Romans themselves, and
succeeded in winning over the Molossian Epirotes.
Roman frustration with the mixed results of the first year of the war
manifested itself in an orgy of cruelty and violence against friend and foe
alike. Even a senatus consultum designed to mollify the allies and begin the
task of rebuilding these relationships was delivered by the Roman com-
mand in Greece in such a way as to bully and intimidate. Clearly the
humiliations and continuing lack of progress of the campaign of 170 – the
near-kidnapping of the consul Hostilius, the destruction of Roman ships
and supplies at Oreus, the Macedonian victory over the Roman army in
battle, the Roman failure to come to grips with Perseus thereafter – had
only redoubled Roman frustration and anger. They now saw treachery and
sabotage everywhere. And so they resorted to beheading leaders of friendly
states they suspected of wavering (as at Abdera), garrisoning allied cities
88
Livy 43.21.5–23.1, 7–8.
89
Livy 43.11.1–2, 9–12.
to keep an eye on things (as at Stratus – and with good reason, of course),
and taking hostages from loyal amici to ensure good behavior (the Penestae
and Parthini).
The senate’s reaction to the ignominia of the campaign of 170 – sending
a commission to investigate – is a clear indication that enough senators felt
that things had gone terribly wrong.90 The commissioners’ report discov-
ered a serious morale problem in the army: too many men had been seek-
ing leave, and too many officers, and the consul himself, had been willing
to grant it to gain political popularity. The fact that Hostilius lost a battle
to Perseus (the details of which are, unfortunately, wholly unknown), and
failed to penetrate Macedonia twice by land could indicate that a failure
of generalship or the rawness of the soldiery, or some combination of the
two, was responsible for the lackluster performance.91 The consul’s refusal
to accept battle when it was offered subsequently, on ground chosen by the
king, could indicate a lack of confidence in himself or his troops as well.
Lack of progress in the war due to poor performance by the Republic’s
generals and/or its armies easily explains why the people next chose as a
potential commander in the Macedonian war a man of great military expe-
rience, who had already led consular armies to victory, a man with deep
knowledge about the East, the geography of Macedon, and the character
of its king. On 28 January Q. Marcius Philippus was elected consul for 169
alongside Cn. Servilius Caepio.92
The Third Year
93
At the start of the new year, the Roman levy was conducted with great
difficulty. Evidently greed for plunder was still no match for the desire to
avoid the rigors of service, or the fear of facing the formidable Macedonian
phalanx. Echoing the accusations the military tribunes in the field made
against Hostilius, two of the recently elected praetors, M. Claudius
Marcellus and C. Sulpicius Galus, argued that the consuls were unwilling,
for political reasons, to conscript anyone who displayed any reluctance
to serve, and offered to conduct the levy themselves. The new censors,
90
Livy 43.11.2, 11 (ignominia).
91
Pareti 1953: 64; Hammond 1988: 521.
92
Livy 43.11.6.
93
Mommsen 1856: 744–5; Niese 1903: 144–51; Colin 1905: 421–2, 431–7; Kromayer 1907: 267–94;
Heiland 1913: 62–4; De Sanctis 1923: 300–6; Pais 1926: 560–3; Benecke 1930: 264–7; Meloni
1953: 285–326; Pareti 1953: 69–73; Pritchett 1969: 164–76 and 1991: 101–36; Errington 1971: 219;
Helly 1972; McDonald 1981: 249–50; Hammond 1988: 526–30; Derow 1989: 312–15; Waterfield
2014: 186–7.
C. Claudius Pulcher and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, added a new military
oath to the existing censorial oath, and ordered that all soldiers who had
been ordered to serve from 172 on should present themselves to the censors
in Rome, and swear the new oath before returning to their posts.94 Marcius
Philippus was allotted Macedonia as his province. He departed Rome with
12,000 mixed Roman and allied legionary reinforcements, and 550 mixed
Roman and allied cavalry.95 The praetor C. Marcius Figulus (Philippus’
cousin), who was to command the Roman fleet, accompanied him.96
Once landed in Greece at Actium, the port of Acarnania, the con-
sul quickly gathered his troops and marched overland to Thessaly,
while Figulus rounded the Peloponnese, put in at Creusa in the Gulf of
Corninth, and marched overland to rendezvous with the fleet at Chalcis.
The consul met his predecessor Hostilius at Palaepharsalus. He had spent
the winter months toughening up his soldiers and protecting the allies,
and was now to stay on with Philippus.97 The new consul addressed his
men and immediately called a war council. He was joined by the praetor
Figulus, just arrived from Chalcis. An amphibious assault on Macedonia
was decided upon: Philippus would lead his forces overland through one
of the passes, while Figulus would attack the Macedonian coastline with
the fleet. On the march, there was some controversy over which pass to
take, but the consul ultimately decided upon the route through the lower
Olympus range past Lake Ascuris.98 Meanwhile, Perseus, aware of the
Romans’ approach, decided to occupy all the passes into his kingdom. He
dispatched 10,000 light infantry under the command of Asclepiodotus to
the Cambunian Mountains above the Volustana pass; 12,000 troops under
Hippias to occupy Lapathus fort near Lake Ascuris; another unnamed
commander to encamp near Otolobus; while the king himself encamped
94
Livy 43.14, 15.6–8.
95
Livy 43.12.3, 15.3. The figures given here are far larger than the 5,000 reinforcements that accompany
Marcius to Greece recorded at Livy 44.1.1 (Polybian). This is the preferred number of Kromayer
1907: 345. But the smaller number may be corrupt, since 5,000 reinforcements seems far too small
for the Macedonian theater, especially given all the recent Roman defeats and desertions (so Briscoe
2012: 465–6). De Sanctis 1923: 299 n. 73; Meloni 1953: 288 are unconcerned by the apparent contra-
diction since the 5,000 will have been used to fill gaps in the existing legions, exclusive of the 12,000
new reinforcements. Pareti 1953: 69–70 estimates 24,000 to be the total number of men Marcius
took with him.
96
Livy 44.1.3.
97
Livy 44.1.7 (and perhaps his source, Polybius) mistakenly calls Hostilius a proconsul. If the sen-
ate had prorogued him, Livy would have recorded it at 43.15 (so Briscoe 2012: 467; contra Meloni
1953: 290). On Polybius’ habit of misidentifying commanders as pro-magistrates, see above, n. 82.
98
It was probably during deliberations over which route to take that Polybius, hipparch of the
Achaean League for 170/69 (Polyb. 28.6.9), along with some colleagues, joined the consul (Polyb.
28.13.1). On Philippus’ route, see Appendix E.
at Dium near the Petra pass in the Pierian plain with the remainder of his
forces, from where he could keep watch on the Pierian coastline between
Dium, Heracleum, and Phila (Map 3).99
Philippus now began his invasion of Macedonia, sending his son, Q.
Marcius, and M. Claudius Marcellus with 4,000 men to occupy strategi-
cally important advance positions. Their journey was long and arduous
over steep and broken terrain. They barely covered twenty-two miles in
three days before reaching a high defensive position opposite Hippias and
the Macedonians (Figure 6.1).100 A messenger was sent to the consul to say
that he should follow on with the rest of the army since the advance forces
had succeeded in occupying a safe and convenient location. Philippus
brought the army up to the Roman position, from where they could see
the enemy camp across a ridge, as well as Dium, Phila, and the entire
Macedonian coast. The consul then rested his men for a day.101
When Hippias spied the Roman camp from his base at Lapathus,
he prepared his men for battle, and marched out with his light infan-
try, encountering Philippus’ column on the march. The battle began
straightaway with the Macedonians hurling their weapons. After tak-
ing a few casualties, both sides withdrew, only to return the next day in
greater numbers. But the narrowness of the mountain ridge upon which
they fought permitted the deployment of only three units, and so both
sides deployed their light infantry again, with the heavily armed men
looking on. The battle continued until nightfall, both sides sustaining
more wounded than killed, before it was called off. Philippus decided on
the third day that he could no longer maintain his position on the ridge,
cut off as he was from his supply lines, but retreat was not an option
either. He chose a different, considerably bolder alternative: to make his
way through the Callipeuce forest, and from there descend through one
of the gorges to the coastal plain of Pieria. Livy remarks on Perseus’
wandering about the shoreline, refusing to reinforce his light troops at
Lapathus a mere twelve miles away, or to appear on the battlefield him-
self. “Had the consul had for an enemy a man similar to the ancient
kings of Macedon,” he says, “a great disaster might have followed.” The
99
Livy 44.1.3–3.2. On the location of Lapathus and Otolobus, see Appendix E. Contra Livy 44.2.12
(followed by Hammond 1988: 526), Perseus was not running up and down the coast to no end, like
a crazy person, but was monitoring the area for landings by the Roman fleet: Kromayer 1907: 281,
291 n. 1; De Sanctis 1923: 305 n. 183; Meloni 1953: 297; Briscoe 2012: 471.
100
For the controversy over the exact location of the Macedonian and Roman positions around Lake
Ascuris, see Appendix E.
101
Livy 41.3.2–10.
Figure 6.1 Camp Sites on Mt. Metamorphosis
consul, by contrast, labored with great energy and vigor, despite being
over 60 and overweight.102
102
Livy 44.4.1–10 (with the quotation from §9: si hostem similem antiquis Macedonum regibus habuis-
set consul, magna clades accipi potuerit); cf. App. Mac. 14 (on Philippus’ energy despite his age and
physical condition); Diod. Sic. 30.10.1 (on Perseus’ refusal to engage the enemy). Perseus’ deci-
sion not to reinforce his light troops at Lapathus is defended by Kromayer 1909: 279–81; Meloni
1953: 297–8.
Philippus detailed M. Popillius Laenas to guard the ridge, and Attalus
and Misacenes to guard the soldiers sent ahead to clear a pathway through
the forest, while he himself, after sending the cavalry and baggage ahead,
brought up the rear with the legions. They made their way through the
Callipeuce forest without much trouble, but the descent via the Karavidha
gorge was a grim ordeal (Figure 6.2). After four miles, the Romans were
about ready to give up since great damage had been done to the pack
animals and their loads, while the elephants caused enormous confusion
and panic among the horses as they tried to negotiate the steep down-
ward slope, trumpeting fiercely and throwing off their mahouts. A series of
descending, tilting platforms or bridges had to be built in order to trans-
port the elephants down the steep slopes of the gorge:
From solid ground an elephant would proceed onto a bridge; before he
could reach the edge of it, the posts holding it up were cut away and the
bridge inclining down forced him to slide down gently to the start of the
next bridge. Some of the elephants would slide standing on their feet, others
would squat on their haunches. Whenever another level expanse of a bridge
intercepted them, they were again carried down by a similar collapse of the
lower bridge, until they arrived at a more level valley.
After four days, having covered barely twelve miles, the army finally arrived
at the coastal plain, and encamped between Heracleum and Libethra.103
The sudden appearance of the Roman legions in the Pierian plain took
Perseus completely by surprise. He is said to have leaped out of his bath,
shouting that he had been beaten without a fight.104 The king gave orders
for the royal treasure to be removed from the royal citadel at Pella and
dumped into the sea, the dockyards at Thessalonica to be torched, and
for all Macedonian forces to be evacuated from the Volustana and Tempe
passes, as well as from Lapathus.105 The king himself removed the gilded
103
Livy 44.4.11–5.13; cf. Flor. 1.28.5; Ampel. 16.4; Zon. 9.22.8. For the marching route down from the
Callipeuce forest, see Appendix E. On Libethra, the town (and not Libethrum, the area, as Meloni
1953: 300–1 n. 3) being the correct location here, see Briscoe 2012: 481. Waterfield 2014: 187 locates
the place where the Roman army debouched in “the north Thessalian coastal plain,” but clearly
it was in Macedonia, north of the Peneus River. The description at Livy 44.5.12–13 of the exact
disposition of the Roman camp(s) in the plain is beyond recovery (Briscoe 2012: 481–2).
104
Livy 44.6.1–2. Cf. App. Mac. 15; Diod. Sic. 30.10.2 (with variants on Perseus’ exclamation).
105
The details have dropped out here, but can be restored (thus Madvig) from Livy 44.7.8, 10.1–4;
Diod. Sic. 30.11 as follows: <Asclepiodotum [at Volustana] et Hippiam [at Lake Azuris], quique cum
iis erant,> ex praesidiis reuocat omnisque aditus aperit bello (“he recalled Asclepiodotus and Hippias
and all the soldiers with them from their garrisons, and opened all the passes to warfare”; Livy
44.6.1–2). Although Tempe is not explicitly mentioned among the passes evacuated at 44.6.2, it
is covered by omnis aditus aperit bello. Livy’s counter-factual argument later on in this passage
(44.6.5–12, discussed below) also depends on Tempe having been abandoned by Perseus.
Figure 6.2 Lower Olympos Range
statues from Dium, evacuated and abandoned the city, and moved every-
thing to Pydna, thus abandoning the Petra pass as well. Livy faults Perseus
for all of these decisions, attributing them to the panic of a timorous mind.
The dumping of the treasure may well be apocryphal, however, and the
torching of the dockyards, if that be authentic, may have been designed
to deprive the Roman fleet of a possible landing place for an amphibious
assault.106 Perseus’ abandonment of the passes is more difficult to explain.
Livy says that had the king stood his ground at Dium and maintained con-
trol of the Tempe pass, the only viable route of retreat and supply available
to the Romans would have been the way they came, through the Callipeuce
forest and past Lake Azuris.107 This would probably have resulted in disas-
ter since the Macedonians could have harassed the slow-moving column as
it made its way through the treacherous Karavidha gorge. Better, too, says
Livy, had Perseus fortified the narrow ground in the Pierian plain between
106
Kromayer 1907: 291 n. 1; Meloni 1953: 302; Pareti 1953: 72 n. 1; McDonald 1981: 250; Hammond
1988: 528 n. 2 (both stories apocryphal).
107
Access to the Volustana and Petra passes would have been blocked by the Macedonian presence
at Dium, at the head of the Petra pass. According to Kromayer 1907: 277, followed by Heiland
1913: 63 and n. 2; Meloni 1953: 294 and n. 1, despite Livy’s silence, Perseus must have had a small
garrison in the Petra pass.
Mt. Olympus and the coast. In that case, the Romans would have been
bottled up along the coast south of Olympus, with no safe line of retreat or
supply. To break out, they would have been forced either to fight their way
north through the coastal fortifications and past Dium into the heartland
of the enemy,108 or to try their luck fighting their way through the heavily
fortified and garrisoned Tempe pass back into Thessaly.109
Whatever the reasons for his actions, Perseus soon came to his senses,
and realized how foolish he had been. He publicly blamed Hippias and
Asclepiodotus before his assembled troops for abandoning their posts.110
Fortunately for the king, Livy says, Andronicus had second-guessed his
order to burn the dockyards at Thessalonica, and Nicias recovered the royal
treasure from the sea floor. Perseus nevertheless allegedly put these two to
death, as well as the divers who retrieved the royal treasure, in order to
remove any witnesses to his shameful cowardice.111
Philippus, finding all ways open to him, sent a message to the legate Sp.
Lucretius at Larissa, ordering him to seize the enemy forts in the Tempe
pass, and sent Popillius to reconnoiter the situation at Dium (Map 3). He
then proceeded to Dium himself and pitched camp next to the temple
of Zeus. A few days later, he advanced to the Mitys River and beyond,
bypassing Pydna, and eventually reaching Agassae and other Macedonian
communities in the area northwest of Pydna. He received their surrenders,
took hostages, but otherwise gave them their freedom, imposing no gar-
risons and taking no tribute. Philippus then advanced further north to
the Ascordus River, but sensing his supply lines were being stretched too
thin, returned to Dium. The fleet soon arrived, but, to the consul’s cha-
grin, carried no grain at a time when supplies were quickly running out.
Fortunately, word soon came that the Tempe pass as well as the town of
Phila were securely in Roman hands, and supplies would soon be forth-
coming. The consul moved south to Phila – a controversial move, since
it allowed Perseus to recapture Dium, refortify it, and encamp five miles
108
Livy confusingly calls the coast route into Macedonia a saltus (OLD, s.u., 1–2a), as though it is a
mountain pass like Tempe. A superficial reading would suggest he meant the Petra pass, but this is
clearly not intended since that route would have been blocked had Perseus remained at Dium.
109
Livy 44.6.2–17; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.11; App. Mac. 18.3; Flor. 1.28.6. The Livy passage is highly corrupt
and perhaps riddled with misunderstandings of his source, Polybius, but the gist of what he says is
nevertheless fairly straightforward, and can be reconciled with the topography and known physical
remains in the area (Pritchett 1969: 176). It is curious that Livy does not consider that the Romans
could have been supplied by the fleet operating freely in coastal waters south of Dium.
110
Livy 44.7.8–9. Polyb. 28.10 mentions only Hippias.
111
Livy 44.10.1–4; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.11; App. Mac. 16. McDonald 1981: 250; Briscoe 2012: 498 (against
e.g. Meloni 1953: 302 n. 2) doubt that Perseus had Nicias and Andronicus killed.
distant on the north bank of the Elpeus River, which was very difficult to
cross in winter, and could thus act as another line of fortification against
the Romans to the south.112
Philippus then dispatched Popillius with 2,000 men to see if he could
take Heracleum. After his request for a voluntary surrender was rejected
(the townspeople could see Perseus’ camp fires across the Elpeus), Popillius
began a joint siege with the praetor Figulus and the Roman fleet. The town
was taken when the wall was surmounted with the aid of a maniple of
young soldiers in testudo formation. The consul now brought up his camp,
as though he intended to eject the king from Dium and penetrate further
into Macedonia, but instead began his preparations for winter, improving
the roads out of Thessaly, organizing grain dumps, and building lodging
houses for those transporting supplies.113
At this point, according to Polybius, he and his colleagues, who had been
in the consul’s retinue since before the invasion of Macedonia, requested
an interview with Philippus. They showed him the Achaean League decree
pledging their full military support for the Roman cause, and declared
that they had unhesitatingly complied with all Roman requests and com-
muniqués thus far in the war. The consul released the Achaeans from the
burden of service, and all returned home save Polybius, who was later
sent by Philippus back to Achaea to prevent the dispatch of 5,000 League
troops to Ap. Claudius Centho in Epirus. Polybius wonders whether the
consul so requested in order to stymie a political rival or out of regard for
the Achaeans, but Philippus was clearly honoring the spirit of senatorial
policy, implemented the previous year, which forbid Roman commanders
from requisitioning anything from the allies without senatorial authoriza-
tion. Philippus was evidently aware that the Romans still had a lot of work
to do to recover their reputation among the Greeks. In the event, Polybius,
rather than revealing that he was acting under the consul’s instructions,
and not wishing to defy Claudius publicly (and thus provide ammuni-
tion for his political enemies), cited the senatus consultum of the previous
year, and prevented the dispatching of troops to Claudius, thus saving the
Achaeans over 120 talents.114
112
Livy 44.7.1–7, 10–8.7.
113
Livy 44.8.1–9.11; cf. Polyb. 28.11 (on the testudo); Zon. 9.22.8. Philippus was not preparing to go into
winter quarters – after all, it was only July (Meloni 1953: 465–6).
114
Polyb. 28.13. His political calculus failed, according to the historian (§14), since his enemies now
had the perfect pretext for accusing him before Claudius. Discussion: Gruen 1984: 509 and n. 130
(with earlier literature there cited; cf. Walbank 1979: 346–7); Eckstein 1995: 6–7.
After the capture of Heracleum, the praetor Figulus crossed the Thermaic
Gulf to Chalcidice (Map 3), disembarked his soldiers near Thessalonica,
and set about ravaging the surrounding territory. The Romans managed to
drive back several sorties from the city, but could not endure the projectiles
(mostly stones) that were hurled by machines from atop the walls, striking
down the besiegers, and even those still on the ships. The praetor called
off the siege and took ship to Aenea, fifteen miles south. After ravaging
the fertile land thereabout, Figulus sailed further south to Antigonea, and
began plundering the territory there. The Macedonians then attacked the
raiders scattered about, killing 500 and capturing an equal number. When
the Romans reached the shore, they turned about, and, reinforced by their
comrades on the ships, killed 200 and captured 200 of the enemy.
Figulus then sailed on to the Pallene peninsula, and was ravaging the
territory around Cassandrea when Eumenes arrived with twenty ships,
and Prusias (evidently beginning to reconsider his position of neutrality)
with five. Confident that with this support he could take Cassandrea itself,
Figulus began constructing siege works across the narrow neck of the pen-
insula to prevent further reinforcements coming down from Macedonia.
The Romans also began filling in a moat cut by Perseus to aid in the
defense of the town. Figulus spied brick arches in the walls where the soil
from the moat had been deposited, and decided to concentrate his attack
on these, which were thinner than the rest of the fortifications, diverting
attention from what he was doing by sending troops with siege ladders
to other parts of the wall. The Romans easily pierced the brickwork, but
failed to muster enough men to make an entry into the town feasible.
The garrison commanders, Pytho and Philip, alerted to what was going
on, sallied out with their Illyrian and Agrianian units, and attacked the
disorganized and scattered Romans, who were now shifting their positions
from the walls to the arches. 600 were driven into the moat and killed, and
all between the moat and the wall received injuries. Figulus abandoned
his assault on the brickworks, beefed up his defenses across the peninsula,
and brought up the siege works. However, some picked Gallic auxiliaries
aboard Macedonian scout-ships slipped into Cassandrea at night, forcing
the praetor to abandon the siege as hopeless.
Figulus then sailed east against Torone, but it was too well defended to
attack. He finally abandoned the Chalcidice altogether, sailed to Demetrias
(Map 2), which was also well defended, and landed at Iolcus. Euphranor, one
of Perseus’ generals, having successfully driven back an attack by Popillius
with 5,000 troops on Meliboea in the foothills below Mt. Ossa, slipped
into Demetrias by night, and added to the difficulty of taking the place by
siege. Figulus called a halt to operations, sent part of the fleet into winter
quarters at Sciathus, off the southern tip of Magnesia, and himself went
with the rest to Oreus, whence he could supply the armies in Thessaly and
Macedonia. Eumenes sailed to Phila to congratulate Philippus on a suc-
cessful campaign before returning to Pergamum.115
When the campaigning season was over, the senate in Rome received
several embassies from the East. Envoys from King Prusias, who had lately
joined the Romans with a handful of ships, had promised Perseus that he
would try to broker a peace with Rome, and so was now entreating the
Romans to end the war.116 The Rhodian embassy, led by the pro-Roman
Hagesilochus, was introduced next. He requested the renewal of Rhodes’
amicitia with Rome, as well as permission to export grain from Sicily,
and protested Rhodian loyalty against some recent accusations by their
enemies. The senators gave them a very kind reception, the amicitia was
probably renewed, and Rhodes was given permission to export 100,000
medimnoi of corn from Sicily.117 At around the same time, writes Polybius,
Rhodian ambassadors visited Philippus at Heracleum in order to protest
their loyalty and friendship. Philippus responded that he paid no attention
to rumors of Rhodian disloyalty put about by their enemies. He then took
aside Hagepolis, the leader of the embassy, and asked why Rhodes had not
tried to broker a peace between Rome and Perseus. Hagepolis evidently
took the consul’s words to heart, for a Rhodian embassy would later appear
in Rome, offering their services as mediators in the war.118
Back in Rome, dispatches from Philippus were read out. He recounted
his invasion of Macedon, and his success in securing supplies for the
winter, much of which came from the Epirotes, who should be appro-
priately compensated. The consul also requested clothing for the army,
and 200 horses, mostly Numidian. A decree authorizing the fulfillment of
Philippus’ requests was passed, and the urban praetor C. Sulpicius Galus
let out contracts for the transshipment to the front of 6,000 togas, 30,000
115
Livy 44.10.5–13.11; cf. Polyb. 29.6.1 (Demetrias); Diod. Sic. 30.12 (perhaps a reference to the skir-
mishing around Antigonea); Zon. 9.22.8.
116
Livy 44.14.5–7.
117
Polyb. 28.16. Livy 44.14.8–15.8 (cf. Dio fr. 66.2; Zon. 9.22.10), a report of a very hostile exchange
between the senate and the Rhodian ambassadors, is an annalistic fabrication, designed to justify
Rome’s post-war treatment of Rhodes. See now Burton 2011: 280–1 n. 61, with earlier scholarship
there cited (to which add now Dmitriev 2011: 296; Briscoe 2012: 507–508). On Rome’s post-war
treatment of Rhodes, see below, Chapter 7, pp. 178–81.
118
Polyb. 28.17; cf. App. Mac. 17. On Philippus’ request to mediate “the present war” (τὸν ἐνεστῶτα
πόλεμον: §4) – most likely a reference to the war with Perseus rather than the Sixth Syrian War –
see now Burton 2011: 282 n. 61, with earlier scholarship there cited (to which add now Goukowsky
2011: 204 n. 194; Dmitriev 2011: 292, who argue against it being a reference to the Macedonian war).
tunics, and 200 horses, and arranged the reimbursements for the Epirotes.
Then a Macedonian noble, Onesimus, son of Pytho, addressed the sen-
ate. He said that he had persistently urged Perseus to make peace, and
having fallen under suspicion of disloyalty to the king, had defected to
the Romans and tried to make himself useful to the consul.119 The sen-
ate decreed that Onesimus should be enrolled in the formula sociorum,
provided with lodging and entertainment, granted 200 iugera of ager pub-
licus in the territory of Tarentum, and have a house purchased for him in
Tarentum.120 Several months before the end of the year, the consular elec-
tions were held. L. Aemilius Paullus was elected consul for the second time,
and was allotted the Macedonian command. He immediately arranged for
the dispatch of a senatorial commission of three to reconnoiter and report
on the Roman and Macedonian dispositions at the front. Cn. Octavius
was allotted the fleet for the upcoming campaign against Macedon.121
* * *
The third year of the war, while certainly an improvement on the pre-
vious two years, was not an unqualified success for the Romans. Thanks
to Philippus’ personal energy, fine generalship, and knowledge of the
local terrain, a durable Roman presence had finally been established
in Macedonia itself.122 Treatment of the allies, moreover, had greatly
improved. But the consul failed to come to grips with Perseus, and his
toe-hold in Macedon was at the extreme southern edge of the kingdom,
at Heracleum. Despite attempting to do so, Philippus also failed to
coordinate effectively with the Roman fleet, which almost led to disaster
in terms of supply, and cost him dearly in terms of strategic advantage.
He had advanced well past Pydna, making for the heart of Macedon
itself, and perhaps a showdown with Perseus when, in fear of his thinly
stretched supply lines, he withdrew first to Dium, where the fleet failed
119
To prove his bona fides, and to contrast the bellicose Perseus with the peaceful Philip V, Onesimus
says the latter used to read through his treaty with Rome twice a day, every day, until he died (Livy
44.16.5). If Polybius is right that Philip was planning a war of revenge (above, Chapter 5, pp. 91–6),
then he may have done this in order to “maintain the rage” (to use a common Australianism) rather
than reinforce his dedication to peace with Rome. Briscoe 2012: 514 cites the instructive parallel
of the Persian shah Darius after the Athenian sack of Sardis, who had a servant remind him three
times before dinner each day of what the Athenians had done to him (Hdt. 5.105).
120
Livy 44.16.1–7.
121
Livy 44.17–18.5; cf. CIL 11.1829 (the elogium Paulli); Vell. 1.9.3 Val. Max. 1.5.3; Plut. Aem. 6.8–7.1, 10;
Plut. Mor. 197F–198A; Just. Epit. 33.1.6. Plutarch insists (Aem. 10.5–6; cf. Mor. 197F; Just. Epit. 33.1.6;
cf. Meloni 1953: 319–20 n. 4) that the people conferred the command of the war on Paullus, but this
is probably wrong. The lot, nevertheless, may not have been completely arbitrary on this occasion.
122
Benecke 1930: 264; Pareti 1953: 72.
to supply him, forcing him to move south to Phila, where he could be
supplied by land through Tempe. This allowed Perseus to recover Dium
and his position in the Pierian plain – precisely the same position he was
in when the campaigning season began. All the king had lost was control
of the passes into Macedonia. The sense of stalemate persisted. It is per-
haps no wonder that in the course of this year Prusias and Rhodes had
been emboldened to offer to mediate the war, and Genthius was finally
preparing to get off his fence.123
The Final Year of the War and the Battle of Pydna

Within days of the new consuls taking office, the senatorial commissioners
returned from the front and presented their report.124 They said that the
Romans had been led through mountain paths at greater risk than the stra-
tegic gains justified; little separated the legions from the enemy camp other
than the Elpeus River; Perseus refused to offer battle, while the Roman
forces were too weak to compel him to; the Roman troops were sitting idle
with supplies about to run out;125 Ap. Claudius had been prevented from
opening up a second front against Perseus, and was now in danger with
so few troops so close to hostile territory; the fleet was under-manned due
to disease and desertions, and the sailors that remained had not been paid
and were poorly clothed; Eumenes had come and gone with his fleet with-
out cause; and Perseus was determined to fight on. The allegations were
no doubt prompted well in advance by the consul Paullus himself, whose
123
Hammond 1988: 530.
124
Mommsen 1856: 746–7; Niese 1903: 159–69; Colin 1905: 437–8; Kromayer 1907: 294–348; Meyer
1909; Heiland 1913: 65–70; De Sanctis 1923: 318–33, 369–76 (chronology); Kromayer and Veith
1924: 600–8; Pais 1926: 563–8; Benecke 1930: 267–72; May 1946: 52–4; Pareti 1953: 73–7, 81–96;
Meloni 1953: 326–440; Lehmann 1969; Pritchett 1969: 145–63; Errington 1971: 220–1; Walbank
1979: 376–91 (far more than just a commentary!); McDonald 1981: 252–4; Hammond 1984 and
1988: 539–60; Reiter 1988: 39, 51–4, 99–100, 134–5; Derow 1989: 315–16; Lendon 2005: 193–211;
Dzino 2010: 55–7; Goukowsky 2011: 205–8; Waterfield 2014: 187–90. Our main source is Livy (fol-
lowing Polybius, for the most part), but Plut. Aem. fills some Livian lacunae. Polybius will have
had many eyewitness sources to the Pydna campaign, including Paullus himself, his sons, Scipio
Aemilianus and Fabius Maximus (both of whom were intimates of Polybius), and Cato the Elder
(whose son fought at Pydna). He may have spoken to Scipio Nasica, or at least have been familiar
with his memoir, which Plutarch used as a source (see Appendix F). Polybius’ informants about the
Macedonian side of the conflict will have been those courtiers of Philip who were later interned in
Italy, like Polybius himself (above, Chapter 5, pp. 93–4).
125
Concerning the amount of supplies, the Livian MS reads sex followed by a gap at 44.20.4. Editors
have variously supplied dierum, mensium, and modium. Briscoe 2012: 528 now believes sex is cor-
rupt as well, and would obelize it. The meaning is clear, however: the soldiers were sitting idle and
consuming their quickly dwindling supplies. This is absurd, of course, since Roman supply lines
through Tempe were now wide open.
upcoming campaign could only benefit, in propaganda terms, by compari-
son with that of Marcius Philippus in the previous year.126
Military dispositions for the coming year were then taken in hand.
Paullus’ colleague C. Licinius Crassus was ordered to enroll and send to
his colleague in Macedonia 7,000 citizen infantry, 200 citizen cavalry,
7,000 Latin infantry, and 400 Latin cavalry, and to order the proconsul
in Gaul, Cn. Servilius Caepio, to enroll 600 cavalry. With these, the
two existing Macedonian legions were to be brought up to a strength of
6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry each, and the rest were to be distributed
as garrisons. L. Anicius Gallus, the praetor peregrinus, was ordered to
replace Ap. Claudius in the Illyrian theater with much larger forces, now
that Genthius was confirmed to be in alliance with Perseus.127 Anicius
was to transport, in addition to the troops enrolled by Crassus, two
legions of 5,200 infantry and 300 cavalry each, as well as 10,000 infantry
and 800 cavalry from the allies. 5,000 sailors were enrolled for the eastern
fleet as well.128
Before he departed, Paullus addressed the Roman people at a contio,
warning them not to be misled by rumors, or to trust the pronouncements
of armchair generals. The latter, the consul said, are in no position to say
where a camp should be established, where garrisons should be installed,
by what passes Macedonia should be invaded, where grain dumps should
be placed, by what routes on land and sea supplies should be brought, or
when to engage in battle. Such criticism of Rome’s generals was unfair to
the troops and bad for morale. Shortly after the celebration of the Latin
Festival, the consul and praetor Cn. Octavius departed Italy.129
126
Livy 44.20. Alternatively, Livy has simply adopted the very positive portrait of Paullus from his
source, Polybius. In any case, little of what he says corresponds to reality (so Briscoe 2012: 527,
against e.g. Meloni 1953: 324, who says the report contains some inaccuracy, but is substantially
acceptable).
127
Polyb. 29.3–4.7, 9.13, 11.3; Livy 44.23.1–4, 7–9, 26.2, 27.8–12; Val. Max. 3.3.2; Plut. Aem. 13.1–2;
App. Mac. 18.1, Ill. 9; Dio fr. 66.1; Flor. 1.29.1 (where the Illyrians serving with Perseus are called
mercenaries). The alliance was struck before winter, according to Polybius (29.3.1). Perseus prom-
ised Genthius 300 silver talents, but in the end only had to deliver ten, deciding to withhold the
rest after Genthius publicly committed himself to the Macedonian cause by jailing some Roman
ambassadors (see below, p. 162).
128
Livy 44.21.4–11. The figure of 7,000 citizens at §5 is uncertain; the MS figure of 100,000 is absurd
as it stands, but it may be a confusion for the total number of Roman forces in the field in the East
(so Niese 1903: 153; Pais 1926: 564; Meloni 1953: 325 and n. 1, 336; Hammond 1988: 539–40). The net
effect of the supplementary troops (Livy 44.21.7) is unknown, and so the total number of Roman
troops in the East cannot be estimated with accuracy (Briscoe 2012: 589). Pareti 1953: 83 puts the
number of troops accompanying Paullus at 30,000–35,000.
129
Livy 44.22; cf. Polyb. 29.1; Plut. Aem. 11. Livy provides two dates for the Latin Festival – 31 March
(pridie idus Apriles: 44.19.4) and 12 April (pridie kal. Apriles: 44.22.16).
Perseus had not been inactive over winter months. He came close to
receiving the support of 10,000 horsemen and 10,000 infantry with cav-
alry skills from the Bastarnae, but his reluctance to part with money got
the better of him in the end, and he refused to pay the amount originally
agreed upon for their services.130 Perseus tried but failed to secure the
support of Antiochus IV as well,131 and despite promising beginnings,
ultimately failed to secure the alliance of the Rhodians, who opted to
mediate the war instead.132 Perseus also tried to bring Eumenes on side
through a series of private negotiations, but the money the Pergamene
king demanded as the price of his neutrality for the duration of the
war failed to materialize, and negotiations broke down because Eumenes
proved too deceptive, and Perseus too miserly.133 Polybius, for one, found
Perseus’ greed baffling. Here was a king who, in the best case scenario,
could have secured peace with Rome through Eumenes’ agency, and
the survival of himself and his kingdom; in the worst case, regardless of
whether he won or lost the war, he would have exposed Eumenes’ perfidy
to the Romans, and thus have had his revenge on the Pergamene king for
provoking the Romans into making war on Macedon in the first place.134
His reluctance to expend his treasure, however, was of a piece with his
reluctance to risk his phalanx in the first three years of the war, despite
being within an ace of victory several times. He was not the bold risk-
taker his father had been.
After his embassy returned from Pergamum, Perseus sent forty lem-
boi and five smaller ships under the command of Antenor and Callippus
from Cassandrea to Tenedos in order to protect Macedonian grain ships
130
Livy 44.26.2–27.7; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.19, 21.3; Plut. Aem. 13.1 (where the Bastarnae are called Gauls,
but Bastarnae at Plut. Aem. 9.6–7, 12.4–7); App. Mac. 18 (where the Bastarnae are called Getae);
Dio fr. 66.1 (where the Bastarnae are called Thracians); cf. Polyb. 29.9.13 (where the Bastarnae are
called Galatians). They were, in fact, Bastarnae: Meloni 1953: 329–35; Pareti 1953: 75; Walbank 1979:
369; Ma 2011: 540; Briscoe 2012: 550. Their leader is variously called Clondicus (Livy 44.26.11, 27.2;
perhaps the same man who took a contingent of 30,000 Bastarnae to attack the Dardani in 178
(Livy 40.58.8; see above, Chapter 4, pp. 58, 62–3); cf. Pareti 1953: 75–6 n. 1; Meloni 1953: 330), or
Cloelius (App. Mac. 18.2–3). The figure of 100,000 Bastarnae, given by Plut. Aem. 12.7, is clearly
absurd. The figure of 20,000 will have come from Polybius.
131
Polyb. 29.4.8–10; Livy 44.24.1–7.
132
Polyb. 29.3.7–9, 4.7, 10.1–11.6; Livy 44.23.4–6, 10, 29.6–8; discussion: Dmitriev 2011: 294, 303.
133
Polyb. 29.4.8, 5.1–9.12; Livy 44.13.9–10, 12–14, 24–26.1, 27.13; App. Mac. 18.1; Dio fr. 66.1. The fig-
ure given in Polybius (29.8.5) as the price for Eumenes’ neutrality – 500 talents – is to be preferred
to Appian’s 1,000 talents (Mac. 18.1) (Pais 1926: 563; Pareti 1953: 74; Meloni 1953: 339 and n. 1; contra
Waterfield 2014: 195). On the historicity of these negotiations, see Burton 2011: 293–4, and below,
Chapter 7, pp. 181–2.
134
Polyb. 29.9.7–11. Eumenes’ belief (not Polybius’, contra Walbank 1979: 368; Briscoe 2012: 546) that
the Romans had made no progress in the war (Polyb. 29.7.5) before 168 is patently wrong.
scattered throughout the Aegean.135 At Tenedos, the fleet encountered some
Rhodian ships, which the commanders sent away unharmed and with kind
words. Antenor surprised some Pergamene war-ships on the other side of
the island, which were currently blockading fifty Macedonian cargo ships.
The war-ships fled, and Antenor dispatched the cargo ships to Macedonia
under escort of ten of his lemboi. He rejoined the rest of the fleet at Sigeum
near the Hellespont before sailing down to Subota off the southern tip of
Chios.136 In the narrow straits between Chios and the Asia Minor coast,
the Macedonian lemboi intercepted thirty-five Galatian horse transports
that had been dispatched by Eumenes to his brother Attalus, who was in
Macedonia with the Roman forces. Some of the Galatians swam for it, and
others beached their ships on Chios and fled. The Macedonians killed 800
and captured 200, and hamstrung whatever horses had not been lost at sea,
reserving the twenty finest specimens to be sent, along with the prisoners,
to Thessalonica. The Macedonian fleet then sailed for Delos.137 Because
of the sacredness of the site, no hostile action could be taken against the
Macedonians. When a Roman embassy on its way to Alexandria called in
at Delos and encountered the lemboi and the Pergamene quinqueremes
there, they did nothing. Instead, the Macedonian fleet made brief forays
into the Cyclades to attack any cargo ships not bound for Macedonia,
and then one of the ambassadors, C. Popillius Laenas, would sail out with
Roman or Pergamene ships to try to effect a rescue. He was outwitted
by the Macedonians, who only sailed by night in groups of two or three
ships.138
In late February (Julian), the consul Paullus arrived in Macedonia, the
praetor Cn. Octavius met the fleet at Oreus, and the praetor L. Anicius
Gallus arrived in Illyria to fight Genthius. The latter was holding Lissus
with 15,000 men, whence he dispatched his brother Caravantius with
1,000 infantry and 50 cavalry to attack the Cavii, while he himself marched
against the city of Bassania, a Roman ally. Caravantius received the sur-
render of Durnium, but ravaged the territory of Caravandis when that
town shut its gates to him. Some of his men were killed by farmers still
in their fields. Meanwhile, Genthius was besieging Bassania when Ap.
Claudius marched out with his forces, augmented by auxiliaries of the
135
Appian (Mac. 18.4) wrongly states that the fleet’s purpose was to prevent grain from reaching the
Roman army.
136
Not the more famous Sybota islands off the coast of Epirus, of course, but probably the tiny island
of Venetico (so Briscoe 2012: 558).
137
Livy 44.28; cf. Polyb. 29.11.3; App. Mac. 18.4.
138
Livy 44.29.1–5.
Bullini, as well as citizens of Dyrrachium and Apollonia, and encamped
by the Genusus (Shkumbi) River (Map 1). Three days later, the praetor
Anicius arrived in camp, having added 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry of
the Parthini, amici of the Romans since the First Illyrian War in 229. His
lifting of the siege of Bassania was delayed by reports that eighty Illyrian
lemboi were ravaging the coastal area around Apollonia and Dyrrhachium.
Some of these Anicius captured, and then went on to defeat Genthius in
battle, and shut him up in a fortress.139
After this, the townspeople of the cities under Genthius’ control sur-
rendered to the praetor. Anicius then marched against Genthius’ capital
Scodra. The inhabitants marched out and engaged the Romans, but 200
were cut down while trying to exit through the city gate. Genthius sent
envoys to Anicius to seek a truce. Three days were granted, during which
time the king waited for his brother to arrive with reinforcements. When
these failed to materialize, at the end of the three days, Genthius arrived
at the Roman camp and surrendered. He then dined with the praetor,
after which he was placed in the custody of C. Cassius, a tribunus militum.
Anicius freed the Roman ambassadors Genthius had earlier jailed, L. Petilius
and M. Perpenna, and sent Perpenna to arrest the members of Genthius’
family. Perpenna was then dispatched to Rome to report that the Illyrian
war was over within thirty days of the praetor’s arrival, and a few days later,
Genthius, his mother Etleva, her two children Pleuratus and Scerdilaidas,
and the king’s brother Caravantius were sent to Rome under guard.140
At this time, Perseus was reinforcing strategic points around the coastal
areas of his kingdom (Map 3). He sent a force to camp near the dockyards
of Thessalonica, adding to the existing garrison of 2,000 light infantry
in the town, 1,000 cavalry to protect the coastal area around Aenea, and
5,000 troops to garrison the Petra pass. The king himself began fortifying
the bank of the Elpeus River, which was now dry, and thus crossable by
enemy forces. The consul Paullus soon arrived at the Elpeus from his pos-
ition at Phila, and was immediately faced with the problem of water sup-
ply. He ordered his soldiers to dig wells near the sea, suspecting that fresh
water flowed beneath the sands. No sooner had they started to dig than
139
Because a large lacuna opens up at the end of Livy 44.30, the closing details are supplied by App.
Ill. 9. Polyb. 29.13, a description of Genthius’ character, including his drunkenness, corresponds
to Livy 44.30.2. For the Illyrian king’s alcoholism, see further Aelian VH 2.41. On drunkenness in
Polybius generally, see Eckstein 1995: 285–9.
140
Livy 44.31–32.5; cf. Plut. Aem. 13.3; Flor. 1.29.2; App. Ill. 9 (20 days); Fest. Brev. 7.5; Eutrop. 4.6.4;
Zon. 9.24.1. Meloni 1953: 358 and n. 4 accepts Appian’s 20 days against the vast majority of scholars
(Colin 1905: 436; Heiland 1913: 65; De Sanctis 1923: 318; Pais 1926: 565 (four weeks); Pareti 1953: 84;
Niese 1903: 159 splits the difference (three to four weeks)).
jets of fresh water burst forth. The consul then ordered the soldiers to ready
their weapons, while he himself with the tribunes and the six senior cen-
turions reconnoitered the Elpeus bank for likely crossing places. He then
improved the system for the conveyance of orders down the battle line,
and ordered soldiers on sentry duty not to carry a spear (which was often
used as a prop for catnaps), and the soldiers at the outposts to be relived at
midday by fresh guards (to avoid the exhaustion of horses and men, who
had to stand around all day in full panoply under the blazing sun).141
An odd lull enveloped the two camps, now facing each other across
the dry riverbed of the Elpeus.142 News of Anicius’ victory over Genthius
arrived, lifting the spirits of the Romans, and causing panic among the
Macedonians. A Rhodian embassy arrived at the Roman camp offering to
broker a peace, and despite calls for them to be thrown in chains or driven
out of the camp, Paullus said he would give them his response later on.143
He then held a council of war at which various suggestions were canvassed:
that the army should march across the riverbed and storm the Macedonian
fortifications; or that the fleet should be sent to ravage the coast near
Thessalonica, thus forcing the king to divide his forces and thin out the
defenders of the riverbank opposite. Neither of these appealed to the con-
sul, and he dismissed the council. He then summoned two Perrhaebian
merchants, Coenus and Menophilus by name, and inquired into the state
of the passes into their native territory. They said that Perseus had regar-
risoned Pythium and the Petra pass with 5,000 men (Figure 6.3).144 Paullus
assigned the task of dislodging the garrison and taking Pythium and Petra
to one of his sons, Q. Fabius Maximus, and P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. He
then ordered Octavius to bring the fleet to Heracleum with ten days’ worth
of cooked rations for a thousand men. He dispatched Scipio and Fabius
with 5,000 men to Heracleum in order to deceive the Macedonians into
thinking their task was to board the ships, and sail toward Thessalonica to
ravage the Chalcidicean coastline. The Romans were to collect the rations
141
Livy 44.32.5–34.1; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.20.1; Val. Max. 2.7.14; Plut. Aem. 12.1, 13.4–14.2, Galb. 1.2
and Mor. 198A; Zon. 9.23.1–2. Livy (44.33.8) says Paullus forbid sentries from carrying a shield,
Plutarch, in one passage, a spear (Aem. 13.7), and in another passage, a spear and sword (Mor.
198A). Plut. Aem. 13.7 is likely correct (so Briscoe 2012: 574).
142
On the chronology of this part of the campaign, see De Sanctis 1923: 369–76; Meloni 1953: 376–7
and 1954; Pédech 1964: 453 n. 126; Pritchett 1969: 145 n. 1; Walbank 1979: 381, and below, n. 153,
against Oost 1953.
143
He probably did not specify the fifteen days that appears at Livy 44.35.5 (Livy clearly imported the
figure from 45.41.5, where Paullus claims to have completed the war in fifteen days), but gave the
Rhodians a rough timeframe within which he was certain he would be victorious.
144
See Appendix E.
Figure 6.3 The Turning Movement by Scipio Nasica
Octavius brought, and begin their journey toward Pythium at nightfall.145

Meanwhile, to further distract the enemy, at dawn the next day Paullus
engaged with the Macedonian outposts in the middle of the riverbed. Both
sides took considerable casualties before the Romans withdrew around
midday. The consul did the same the next day, but after reaching the far bank
145
On Scipio’s route, see Walbank 1979: 381 (with bibliography), where three possibilities are can-
vassed. I think Pritchett 1969: 159–60 (against Kromayer 1907: 303, among many others) is prob-
ably right that the route via Tempe is too circuitous, and not really opposite the sea at Heracleum
(per Plut. Aem. 15.8). The Romans knew about the Lake Ascuris route via the Callipeuce forest,
which they used to such great effect in 169, and so this is the best candidate. Scipio marched “from
Skotina past Nezero [near Lake Ascuris] towards Kallithea [near Oloosson]” (Pritchett 1969: 160).
For the completion of the flanking maneuver, see below, n. 149.
of the riverbed, was forced to retreat after taking even greater losses than on the
day before. On the third day, the Romans did not venture out of their camp.146
By this point Scipio, Fabius, and their force of 5,000 men had surprised
in their beds and overwhelmed the 5,000-man Macedonian garrison at
Pythium in the Petra pass.147 When Perseus heard about this, fearing he
would be trapped in his current position on the north bank of the Elpeus,
marched further north to Pydna, taking up his position a little over a mile
away from the city (Figure 6.4). The ground was flat and smooth – per-
fect for deploying his phalanx – and flanked by some hills, which would
give his skirmishers cover when they retired from harassing the Roman
wings. There were also two rivers, the Aeson and the Leucus, which,
though shallow (this being early summer), would nevertheless cause some
trouble for the Romans.148 Paullus rendezvous-ed with Scipio, who had
marched around the foothills of Mt. Olympus along a goat-track,149 and
then moved north with the legions, where they encountered Perseus’ army
massed in a double phalanx before Pydna.150 The consul, surprised by the
Macedonians’ battle-readiness and dismayed by the phalanx’s deployment
on ground of the king’s choosing, had to devise a way to convince his
weary, yet eager men (and especially Scipio) not to rush into battle pre-
cipitously, but to wait until the next day, after they were fresh and rested.151
He ordered the centurions of the first rank to lay out the camp while he
himself rode through the ranks delivering a lengthy battle exhortation.
The ruse worked: as the time approached high noon, and Paullus kept
talking, the heat of the sun sapped the men’s spirits and strength. Once the
camp was laid out, Paullus quietly began withdrawing his men from the
146
Livy 44.34.10–35.24; cf. Polyb. 29.14.1–3 (= Plut. Aem. 15.3–5), 4 (on Ligurian shields); Plut. Aem.
15.1–7 (with exaggerated numbers for Scipio’s force, see Appendix F); Zon. 9.23.2–3.
147
Plut. Aem. 16.1–3 (with the dubious epic battle with Perseus’ 12,000 men, see Appendix F).
Unfortunately, Livy’s Polybian account has disappeared into a large lacuna after 44.35.24.
148
There is some controversy as to the exact location of Perseus’ camp. See Kromayer 1907: 310–16 with
Karte 9; Meyer 1909; Heiland 1913: 69; Benecke 1930: 269; Meloni 1953: 394; Pareti 1953: 87; Pritchett
1969: 152–3 with map on 147; Walbank 1979: 385; McDonald 1981: 252; Derow 1989: 316 (between the
modern Pelikas (= Aeson) and Mavroneri (= Leucus) Rivers), vs. Hammond 1984: 37, with map on
34, and 1988: 552, with map on 554 (= my Figure 6.4) (north of the Yeoryios River, nearer to the coast).
149
Pacuv. Paulus 5 (apparently a reference to the goat track by which Scipio skirted Mt. Olympus). For
his route back to the coast (not via Vrondi to Kalivia Fteri but via Petra through the Petra pass),
see Hammond 1984: 36 with map on 32 (= my Figure 6.3) (decisive against Kromayer 1907: 306;
Meloni 1953: 369).
150
For the location of Perseus’ camp, see Figure 6.4 and above, n. 148. For the double phalanx, see
Front. Str. 2.3.20, which Hammond 1984: 39 and n. 28, 42–3 convincingly argues was Perseus’ initial
deployment, which the Romans first encountered before withdrawing to their camp for a few days.
On the day of the battle itself, only a single phalanx nearly a mile long was used. See further n. 155.
151
No doubt Scipio’s eagerness to fight is another bit of self-promotion from his memoir (see Appendix
F). His words included the patently false claim that all previous Roman commanders shrank from
battle with Perseus. This was only true of Marcius Philippus; Licinius Crassus and A. Hostilius had
both engaged the Macedonians and been defeated.
Figure 6.4 The Roman and Macedonian First Positions before Pydna
field, starting with the reserve units, followed by the middle lines, and then
the front line, one maniple at a time, beginning with the right wing. When
Perseus figured out what was going on, he ordered the phalanx to advance, for-
cing Paullus to order the cavalry to gallop across the front of the phalanx. The
cavalry and light troops only withdrew after Perseus, realizing he had lost the
initiative, sent his men into camp as well.152 That night (21 June), a lunar eclipse
took place. The Romans were overjoyed for the same reason that Perseus’ men
152
Frontin. Str. 2.3.20, who, however, unduly exaggerates the effect of the Roman cavalry maneuvers,
saying they broke off the points of the enemy sarissae, forcing the Macedonians to break and flee
(Hammond 1984: 43).
were deeply disturbed by the phenomenon: it was regarded as an omen por-
tending the fall of Macedon.153
Paullus purposely delayed deploying the legions early the next morning.
Indeed, because the strategic situation still favored Perseus, he would have
let the day pass without action, despite the eagerness of his men for battle.
But then fortuna, according to Livy, took a hand:
Around the ninth hour, a pack-animal slipped out of the hands of its grooms
and fled to the opposite bank. While three soldiers were chasing it through
the river, which was almost knee-deep, two Thracians captured the animal
and were dragging it from the middle of the stream to their bank. The
Romans then gave chase, killed one of the men, recaptured the animal, and
returned to their post. There was a guard of 800 Thracians on the enemy
bank. At first a few of these, infuriated that one of their fellows had been
slaughtered before their eyes, crossed the river to pursue the killers, then
more followed, then finally the entire force.154
Hearing the commotion, Perseus and Paullus hastily deployed their
armies. The king’s Paeonian auxiliaries and mercenary troops clashed
with the Roman advance guard while the phalanx was drawn up behind.
The Roman skirmishers were driven back to within a quarter of a mile
of their camp. By the time Paullus brought his two legions up, Perseus
had deployed his phalanx, sixteen ranks deep and nearly a mile long, with
the Thracians, mercenaries, and the Macedonian peltasts on the left, and
Perseus himself with 3,000 Macedonian horse, and 10,000 mixed Gauls,
Cretans, Greeks, and more peltasts on the right.155
The phalanx advanced on the Roman light infantry, mostly Paeligni
and Marrucini, with devastating effect. The long sarissae of the phalangites
penetrated the shields and armor of the Italian cohorts, who, because of
the length of the sarissae, could not get near enough to the Macedonians
and use their swords against them. In an attempt to break the stalemate, a
heroic Italian leader and his men made the ultimate sacrifice:
Salvius, the commander of the Paelignians, grabbed the standard of
those under his command and cast it into the enemy ranks. Then the
153
Polyb. 29.16. Other sources discussed in Appendix F. The dates of the eclipse and of the battle (22
June) seem to be confirmed by an Athenian inscription honoring a certain Calliphanes (ISE 35).
The inscription also confirms, incidentally, that both Attalus and Athenaeus, Eumenes’ brothers,
served with the Romans at Pydna (only Attalus is mentioned at Livy 44.36.8).
154
Livy 44.40.7–10; cf. Zon. 9.22.5 (against Plut. Aem. 18.1, 3). See Appendix F.
155
For the deployment, see Hammond 1984: 39 and n. 28, 42–3 (above, n. 150), against e.g. Walbank
1979: 388 (with earlier scholarship there cited). The Roman numbers are not recorded. Kromayer’s
estimates (1909: 343–4) of 33,400 infantry, 4,200 cavalry, and 22 elephants are as good as any.
Meyer 1909: 786 suggests 30,000–35,000; Pritchett 1969: 158, 38,000; Hammond 1984: 46, “short
of 40,000.”
Paelignians – for the Italians consider it neither righteous nor allowed by
the gods to abandon a standard – rushed toward the place where it was,
and terrible losses were suffered and inflicted on both sides. For the Italians
tried to knock aside the Macedonian sarissas with their swords and press
them back with their shields, or to take hold of them with their very hands
and turn them aside, but the Macedonians, strengthening their spear-thrust
using both hands ran through those who fell on them … The Paelignians
and Marrucini with the fury of wild beasts threw themselves onto the blows
that met them, and certain death. Thus they were cut to pieces.156
The remnants of this contingent soon withdrew to Mt. Olorcus. Paullus,
horrified by the slaughter of the Italians, almost despaired when he saw
the legions begin to withdraw slightly before the bristling wall of sarissae.
But then he noticed that as portions of the extended enemy line began
to advance at an uneven rate over undulating terrain, the integrity of the
phalanx began to deteriorate, and gaps were beginning to open up in the
lines. He first ordered the elephants to be brought up on the right wing
and sent them in against the enemy; a charge of the Latin allies followed,
and the Macedonian left crumbled.157 Paullus then focused on the center,
and ordered his main cohorts to penetrate the gaps in the Macedonian
lines. This was the beginning of the end:
As soon as the Romans plunged into the enemy ranks and separated them,
they attacked some of the Macedonians in their unprotected flank, and cut
off others by encircling them in the rear. The strength and general effec-
tiveness of the phalanx, thus broken up, was now lost. The Macedonians
[cast aside their sarissae and] were forced to fight either man to man or in
small groups; they could only put up a poor resistance, hacking with their
small daggers at the solid and tall shields of the Romans, and opposing with
their wicker shields the Roman swords, which, through their weight and
momentum, penetrated through all their armor to their bodies.158
The Macedonian center was routed. Perseus fled to Pella with Cotys and
his cavalry not far behind, followed by the Macedonian cavalry.159 The
156
Plut. Aem. 20.1–5.
157
Why Perseus’ elephantomachae – specially trained troops equipped with shields and helmets stud-
ded with sharp nails (Zon. 9.22.7) – were not deployed against the Roman right is unknown.
Polybius (29.17.2; cf. Livy 44.41.4) remarks on their absence from the battle. Discussion: Walbank
1979: 389, with earlier scholarship there cited.
158
Plut. Aem. 20.9–10; Livy 44.41.6–9.
159
Perseus is said to have departed the battlefield early on, either through fright (per Polybius), or
because he had been kicked on the leg by a horse the day before, and was then seriously injured
by an iron javelin grazing his left side (per a contemporary historian, Posidonius). Plut. Aem. 19.4,
7–10 reports both versions, indicating his preference by devoting more space to Posidonius’ (not,
of course, the more famous Posidonius of Apamea, fl. ca. 135–51). In any case, “the story of an early
Romans continued chewing up what was left of the phalanx from all sides.
Those few Macedonians who managed to escape dropped their weapons
and ran for the shore before Pydna town. They swam out toward the boats
deployed by the Roman fleet, thinking they would be taken prisoner, but
the Roman marines instead began slaughtering them where they swam. The
survivors turned tail and swam back toward the shore, but the elephants,
recently brought up by their mahouts, trampled and crushed them as they
emerged onto the beach. In the end, the Romans killed 20,000 men and
took 11,000 prisoner. Roman losses amounted to fewer than a hundred,
mostly Paeligni, with many more wounded. Perseus’ army of 43,000 men,
a formidable fighting force that had been built up over twenty-five years,
first by Philip V, and then by Perseus himself, had been destroyed in less
than an hour.160
Meanwhile, Perseus reached Pella, but afraid of being betrayed by his
men, escaped with his closest companions, Evander the Cretan, Neon
the Boeotian, and Archidamus the Aetolian, to Amphipolis. The king
sent envoys to Paullus to seek peace, and then departed the city for
the sacred island of Samothrace, taking what treasure he had left with
him.161 By this time, Beroea, Thessalonica, and Pella had surrendered to
Paullus, and Pydna had been thoroughly plundered after shutting its
gates to the consul. Paullus then dispatched Scipio to Amphipolis to
interfere as best he could with the king’s movements, and to plunder
Sintica. The praetor Octavius captured and plundered Meliboea near
Mt. Ossa, and the legate Cn. Anicius was sent to attack Aeginium in
withdrawal [by Perseus] is to be treated with suspicion” (Walbank 1979: 390; cf. Pareti 1953: 92 and
n. 2; McDonald 1981: 254, against e.g. Meloni 1953: 398; Hammond 1984: 46; Eckstein 1995: 37
and n. 35). Pareti 1953: 92 n. 2 rejects both Posidonius’ and Polybius’ versions; Meyer 1909: 802–3;
De Sanctis 1923: 326 try to harmonize the two; Hammond 1988: 557 accepts Posidonius’ version;
Meloni 1953: 385 and n. 4 rejects it. It could be that the battle lasted such a short time that any
withdrawal by Perseus before it was over may have seemed premature in retrospect.
160
Sources for the battle: Pacuv. Paulus 1–4; Polyb. 29.17.1–4; Diod. Sic. 30.22.1; Livy 44.40.2–42.9,
44.1–3; Plut. Aem. 18–22.1 (who says 25,000 of the enemy were killed); Vell. Pat. 9.1.4; Frontin. Str.
2.3.20, 4.5.20; Plut. Cat. Mai. 20.10–11, Mor. 70A–B; Flor. 1.28.8–9; Just. Epit. 33.2.1–4; [Euseb.]
Chron. 239.2; [Vict.] Vir. Ill. 58.1; Eutrop. 4.7.1; Oros. 4.20.39; Zon. 9.23.5–7. Plutarch Aem. 21.1–5;
Cat. Mai. 20.10–11 (cf. Just. Epit. 33.2.1–4) is an account of an aristeia by the son of Cato the Elder,
who lost his sword in the battle but fought bravely to retrieve it. Livy 44.44.1–3 (cf. Plut. Aem.
22.3–9; Diod. Sic. 30.22; [Vict.] Vir. Ill. 58.10) records Paullus’ anxiety when his 17-year-old son,
Scipio Aemilianus, briefly went missing.
161
Livy 44.43, 45.1–2, 12–15; Diod. Sic. 30.21.1–2; Plut. Aem. 23; Zon. 9.23.7. The story of the
Macedonian governor Diodorus tricking his Thracian garrison into departing Amphipolis, lest
they make trouble following the announcement of the result of Pydna (Livy 44.44.4–8; Frontin.
Str. 3.16.5 (where the governor is called Diodotus)), may be apocryphal, for the Thracians are still
in the city at Livy 45.13 (so Briscoe 2012: 603 against e.g. Meloni 1953: 403; Pareti 1953: 93).
Thessaly, where he killed 200 of the townspeople when they sallied out
against him.162
Paullus soon reached Pella (Map 3), but found the royal treasury empty,
except for the 290 talents that had been held back from Genthius. There
he received congratulatory embassies, most of them from Thessaly. Upon
hearing that Perseus was on Samothrace, he left for Amphipolis, where the
Romans were welcomed with open arms. Paullus then marched north-
west to Sirae, where he was met with envoys bearing a letter from Perseus.
Witnessing the envoys’ low rank, shabby appearance, and tears, Paullus
contemplated the lot of man, and, shedding a few tears himself, briefly
felt sympathy for Perseus. The mood passed, however, when the consul
read Perseus’ opening salutation, in which he called himself “King of the
Macedonians.” The envoys were dismissed without a response. Perseus
soon stopped using his title in subsequent letters to the consul, but peace
negotiations kept foundering because he insisted on retaining his title,
while Paullus would not be budged from his position that Perseus must
surrender himself and his kingdom to Rome’s complete discretion.
In the end, it was the praetor Octavius who secured the surrender of the
king. Livy, perhaps following Polybius, who, as was seen in the previous
chapter, may have heard about Perseus’ last days from his former cour-
tiers in exile in Italy, reports that the king was gradually abandoned by
most of his friends, he had Evander the Cretan assassinated (thus profan-
ing a sacred sanctuary with the blood of the man who had allegedly pro-
faned Delphi by attacking Eumenes there in 172), and was betrayed and
abandoned by Oroandes, another Cretan, who absconded with the king’s
treasure. When Octavius announced an amnesty for the royal pages and
any other Macedonians on Samothrace if they surrendered immediately,
Perseus was left alone with his eldest son Philip. He soon surrendered, and
was sent to the consul at his camp near Amphipolis, where he was treated
kindly and entertained by Paullus.163
162
Livy 44.44.4–7, 46.1–3. The relationship of this Anicius to the praetor is unknown. It is likely that
Aeginium defected to the pro-Macedonian Molossian Epirotes, whose land bordered the town (so
Briscoe 2012: 606). At 45.27.1–4, Livy records that Paullus sent his son Fabius Maximus to plun-
der Aeginium and Agassae, and L. Postumius Albinus to plunder Aenus. This could be a doublet
or a continuation of the same operation recorded at Livy 44.46.3. On the identity of the town
Postumius was sent to attack (Aenus rather than Aenea), see Briscoe 2012: 691 (contra Hammond:
1988: 563; Meloni 1953: 409, who apparently forgot that Aenus refused to open its port to the
Roman fleet in 171 and 170; cf. above, p. 140).
163
Polyb. 29.20–1; Cic. Tusc. 5.118; Livy 44.46.4–9; 45.4.2–8.8; Diod. Sic. 29.25.1; Vell. Pat. 1.9.4–5;
Val. Max. 5.1.8; Plut. Aem. 26–7; Dio fr. 66.3–4; Flor. 1.28.9–11; Eutrop. 4.7.2; Ampel. 16.4; Zon.
9.23.7–10. The story of the murder of Evander may be apocryphal; he may have committed suicide
Conclusion
The Battle of Pydna, like the war itself, was a near-run thing. It could
have all been over for the Romans shortly after the heroic sacrifice of the
Paeligni and Marrucini when, Plutarch says, Paullus rent his garments as
he witnessed his legions falling back before the devastating onslaught of
the Macedonian phalanx. The phalanx was, he would later say, the most
terrifying thing he had ever seen in his life.164 Fortunately for the Romans,
the extended phalanx lost its formation as it advanced across the plain to
more uneven ground.
But why had the war itself been such a long and difficult affair, which
often enough threatened to end in disaster for Rome? No senator, of
course, expected the war to be easy; division of opinion and the lengthy
period of deliberation before war was declared are enough to show that.
There is enough evidence, however, to show that by the end of the second
year, there was genuine confusion in Rome as to why the war had not
yet been won. The dispatch of a senatorial commission of inquiry to the
East in 170 and, shortly afterward, the election of the experienced Marcius
Philippus as one of the consuls of 169 cannot be otherwise explained. By
the time Paullus had been put in charge of the war, he could refer to the
war before the Roman people as “long and drawn out.”165
The explanations for the length and difficulty of the war, as has been seen,
need not lie entirely on the Roman side of the ledger. Perseus’ men were
obviously well trained and drilled. The king enjoyed home ground advan-
tage, which he seized early on and controlled for longer than expected. The
Romans may have underestimated their antagonist. He showed incredible
energy and daring, mounting winter campaigns, waging war on multi-
ple fronts simultaneously, and quickly seizing opportunities when they
presented themselves. But he was also hesitant, often made mistakes, and
sometimes exhibited erratic behavior. When faced with the Romans, he
was inconsistent; when left to his own devices, he approached the strategic
brilliance and daring of his father.
On the Roman side, failures of command and control recur throughout the
war, from the defeats of Licinius and Hostilius in battle, through the failure
of Marcius to hold Dium due to problems of supply, to Paullus being forced
of his own accord (so Briscoe 2012: 623), or after being sentenced to death by Perseus (so Meloni
1953: 406). On the denouement to Pydna, especially in terms of how the king’s Friends “decoupled”
themselves from him, see Ma 2011: 527–8, 542–3.
164
Polyb. 29.17.1; Plut. Aem. 19.2.
165
[Bellum] diu trahitur (Livy 44.22.3).
to fight on ground favorable to the enemy. Three problems in particular
stand out above all: the failure of the Romans, more often than not, to
make effective use of their fleet; the inexperience and indiscipline of the
Roman soldiery, a consequence of recruitment problems; and the inability
(or unwillingness) by Roman commanders to restrain themselves or their
troops from giving in to anger and frustration, with grim consequences for
friend and foe alike.
The first problem is a genuine puzzle, although the fragmentary state of
our sources may be responsible for concealing a more coherent naval pol-
icy. As it stands, however, the tradition seems to indicate that the Roman
navy functioned as little more than a pirate fleet, transporting raiding and
plundering parties into southern Boeotia in 171, Euboea and the Thracian
coast in 171 and 170, and the Chalcidice in 169. This may link the first
problem with the second and third, which are themselves connected.
The difficulties of recruitment should put paid to the idea that simple (or
exceptional) Roman greed explains why the Romans undertook the war
against Perseus. Plundering certainly took place, and on a massive scale.
But greed for plunder was less a cause than a consequence of service. The
fact that Roman commanders felt compelled, usually at the end of frus-
trating campaigning seasons, to unleash their troops on enemy (and some-
times friendly) cities, or, as in the case of Hostilius, to provide generous
leave to their men, is further proof that the consuls had great difficulty
finding enough recruits. Men of experience were especially hard to recall to
the standards. In the field, the generals pandered to their men because they
saw them as an increasingly rare and valuable commodity. The result was a
serious imbalance in the traditional commander–soldier relationship: the
auctoritas of the imperator was no longer met with the commensurate level
of disciplina and obedience from the miles. This is why Paullus insisted on
sending a senatorial commission to investigate the state of the military
before he departed Rome, and told the Roman people (some of whom,
presumably, would be accompanying him to Macedonia as soldiers) not
to lower morale by trusting the analysis of armchair generals. Still, this
did not exempt him from pressure from his own troops to fight Perseus
on ground unfavorable to themselves or, as will be seen in the following
chapter, to unleash them on the hapless cities of Macedonia and Epirus in
the war’s aftermath.
7
Aftermath
The Crackdown
The short-term consequences of the Roman victory in the Third
Macedonian War were predictably devastating for Rome’s enemies, start-
ing with the Macedonians themselves. King Perseus was dispatched from
the consul’s camp near Amphipolis to Rome, where he would later be
displayed in a cage during Paullus’ triumph. The last of the Antigonids was
then thrown into a dank and smelly underground prison at Alba Fucens,
around sixty miles east of Rome. According to one tradition, he endured
these conditions for seven days until Paullus convinced the senate to inter-
vene and place him under house arrest in more comfortable conditions.
Perseus lingered on at Alba Fucens until 165, when, according to Plutarch,
most authorities said he starved himself to death. Some sources, however,
recorded that he somehow offended his guards, who then slowly killed him
through sleep deprivation, since they had been forbidden to injure him
physically. The former king of Macedon was given a state funeral.1
The kingdom of Macedon, as is well-known, ceased to exist. The trad-
itional four administrative units/regions (merides) of the Macedonian
kingdom were formally restructured into four semi-autonomous states
(Map 3).2 To the first meris, consisting of the districts around Amphipolis
between the Nessus and Strymon Rivers, were added some of Perseus’
former Thracian holdings east of the Nessus (excluding the free cities of
1
Sources for Perseus’ death: Polyb. 36.10.3; Sall. Hist. 4.67.7; Diod. Sic. 31.9.1–5; Vell. Pat. 1.11.1; Val.
Max. 5.1.1 (public funeral); Plut. Aem 37.2–4; [Euseb] Chron 239.2 (who dates his death to 162); Zon.
9.24.5. The ban on injuring him (so Plut. Aem. 37.3) may have arisen from the fact that he was taken
into Roman custody before the gods of Samothrace, which resulted in a pledge not to kill him (so
the Sallust passage). Diodorus and Plutarch are the source of the story of Paullus securing Perseus’
family’s transfer from prison to house arrest (cf. Velleius, who characterizes Perseus as a prisoner on
parole).
2
See above, Chapter 1, p. 5. Given the Macedonian origin of the merides, I fail to see how the Romans
behaved “rather sinisterly” in perpetuating these arrangements, as Waterfield 2014: 193.
173
Aenus, Maronea, and Abdera).3 The second Meris, Amphaxitis, consisting
of the lands between the Strymon and the Axius Rivers, was expanded to
encompass the part of the Antigonid stratēgia of Paeonia on the right bank
of the Axius.4 The third meris, Bottia, containing the lands between the
Axius and Peneus, was unchanged, while the fourth, Upper Macedonia,
stretching to the borders of Illyricum and Epirus, included the western
part of Paeonia (which, along with Derioppus, was called Pelagonia).5
In terms of the legal framework for the new states, the Macedonians were
to be free, self-governing, and in full possession of their laws, cities, and
lands; they had to elect annual magistrates, and were to pay to the Romans
half the annual taxes (on land) they paid to their kings – amounting to 100
talents.6 Each meris was to have its own assembly, which would meet at its
capital (Amphipolis in the first meris, Thessalonica in the second, Pella in
the third, and Heraclea Lyncestis in the fourth), gather the tax revenue,
and elect its magistrates.7 The bi-annual gatherings of the entire assembly
of the Macedones at Pella or Aegae were abolished.8 Intermarriage between
citizens of different merides (ius connubium) was declared legally invalid, as
were the sale and trade of land and buildings (ius commercium).9 The first,
second, and fourth merides were to have their own garrison units, stationed
along their frontiers with the Thracians, Illyrians, and Dardanians. The
gold and silver mines were shut down, and the importation of salt was
forbidden. The Macedonians were no longer allowed to use their forests
to cut ship timbers, or to permit others to do so.10 In a process resembling
“de-Ba’athification” after the ouster of Saddam Hussein from Iraq in ad
3
Hatzopoulos 1996: 248 doubts that the other addition to the first meris mentioned by Livy – the
Bisaltae and Heraclea Sintica on the right bank of the Strymon – was a Roman innovation, but in
fact reflected the traditional Antigonid boundary.
4
Hatzopoulos 1996: 253.
5
Livy 45.29.5–9; Diod. Sic. 31.8.8; Strabo 7 fr. 47, with Hatzopoulos 1996: 248–50.
6
Livy 45.18.7, 29.4; Diod. Sic. 31.8.3, 5; Eutrop. 4.7.3; Suda, s.u. Αἰμίλιος; cf. Plut. Aem. 28.3–5
(reporting the figure of 100 talents); Just. Epit. 32.3.7. The leges that Paullus foreshadows he would
establish (Livy 45.31.1) may refer to alterations to the legibus suis at Livy 45.29.4 to bring the existing
law-codes into line with the new Roman restrictions on connubium, commercium, etc. (see below).
7
Livy 45.29.9 (where the assemblies are called concilia; cf. 45.18.7 (consilia, necessarily emended to
concilia by most editors: Briscoe 2012: 663)). The identity of the capital of the fourth meris is uncer-
tain. Livy writes Pelagonia, which is a region, not a city. Hammond 1988: 565 n. 4; Hatzopoulos
1996: 254 opt for “the Pelagonians,” Benecke 1930: 274 n. 2; Briscoe 2012: 705, for Heraclea Lyncestis.
8
Livy 45.29.6–7.
9
On the important distinction between legally invalid, as opposed to illegal, in these circumstances,
see Briscoe 2012: 705.
10
Livy 45.29.10–11, 14. The s.c. also forbid the leasing of mines and rural estates, which, according to
Livy (45.18.3–5), would require publicani to oversee the process, resulting in seditiones and certamina.
This may be an anachronistic back-projection of a problem that would affect the province of Asia
later on in the century. See Briscoe 2012: 659–61.
Aftermath 175
2003, all former Macedonian officials and associates of Perseus – pages,
Friends, military commanders, officeholders, even ambassadors – were
purged. They were ordered to quit Macedonia and make their way to Italy,
or be put to death.11
Livy tells us that arrangements similar to those mandated for Macedonia
were to be implemented in Illyricum – similia his et in Illyricum mandata.12
L. Anicius Gallus, the praetor of the previous year, and now on the five-
man commission for settling the affairs of Illyricum, divided Genthius’
former kingdom into three parts (Map 1): the first, southernmost part
encompassed the coastline from Pistum, roughly twenty miles northeast
of Dyrrachium, to the borders of the Labeatae; the second contained the
core Labeate territory of the former kingdom, including the old royal capi-
tal at Scodra; and the third stretched along the coastline from Olcinium,
including Rhizon, the Agravonitae, and their neighbors, north to the Naro
River, forty miles northwest of Epidaurus.13 The citizens of the new Illyrian
states were declared free and without garrisons. Immunity from taxation
was granted to Issa, Rome’s oldest amicus in the area, the Taulantii, as well
as the Dessaretian Pirustae, Rhizon, and Olcinium, the last three having
joined Rome while Genthius had yet to be defeated, and the Daorsi, who
likewise abandoned Genthius’ half-brother Caravantius. The remainder,
including the people of Scodra, the Dessarenes, and the Selepitani, would
pay half what they had paid in annual tax to their former king.14
Perseus’ Epirote allies were also punished. Anicius marched into Chaonia,
receiving the surrender of Phanote, and then moved into the heartland of
pro-Macedonian sentiment, Molossia (Map 1). All the cities here, except
for Passaron, Tecmon, Phylace, and Horreum, surrendered without a
fight. At Passaron, two anti-Roman politicians, Theodotus and Antinous,
tried but failed to induce their fellow-citizens to resist Anicius, and com-
mitted suicide by rushing out of the city gate and throwing themselves
onto the waiting swords of the Roman soldiers. At Tecmon, Cephalus, the
Epirote leader who had abandoned the Roman cause soon after Callicinus,
locked the gates, but was killed by the townspeople, who then received the
11
Livy 45.32.3–7, with Briscoe 2012: 716 for the de-Ba’athification parallel.
12
Livy 45.18.7.
13
Livy 45.26.15, with Hammond 1988: 562–3 n. 3; Briscoe 2012: 690–1 on the geography.
14
Livy 45.26.12–14; Diod. Sic. 30.8.2, 3. The Roman garrisons that were withdrawn had been stationed
at Rhizon, Scodra, and Olcinium (Livy 45.26.1–2). The Illyrians Paullus sent his son Fabius and
Scipio Nasica to plunder later on for helping Perseus in the war (Livy 45.33.8) probably do not
include the peoples of the new Illyrian states, but those in the borderlands with Macedonia. See
Briscoe 2012: 720.
Romans. Shortly afterward, Phylace and Horreum chose to surrender as
well.15 Paullus, under secret orders from the senate, then sent instructions
to the ten leading citizens from each of seventy Molossian towns to gather
up all the gold and silver and pile it up in the city center, and then to make
their way to his headquarters at Passaron. He then sent centurions to the
towns to announce, falsely, that they were there to oversee the liberation of
the Epirotes, as had been granted to the Illyrians and Macedonians, and to
remove the Roman garrisons. Paullus soon dispatched cohorts to the cities,
timing their marches so that they would all arrive at their destinations on
the same day. As dawn broke, the centurions collected the gold and silver,
but around 9 o’clock, the signal was given for the soldiers to rape and pil-
lage at will. The walls of the cities were torn down, and 150,000 captives
were sold into slavery.16
The region of Epirus that nurtured the first eastern potentates to invade
Italy, Alexander the Molossian in the late fourth century and Pyrrhus of
Epirus in the third, was now a deserted, smoking ruin. Of course, there
were greater reasons, having to do with more recent history, that the
Epirote Molossians, rather than the Illyrian Ardiaei, for example, were the
victims of the single greatest post-war Roman atrocity. They were the only
Roman ally – and the earliest in the war – to defect to the Macedonian
cause as a result of the Roman defeat at Callicinus. The timing of the
defection made the Molossians appear not just traitors, but particularly
opportunistic ones, unlike Genthius, who sat on his fence for a long time.
Moreover, two Molossians – Theodotus and Philostratus – were responsi-
ble for a plot to kidnap Hostilius, the consul of 170. This humiliation was
only narrowly avoided through the Roman receipt of some last-minute
intelligence. By unleashing his men on the Molossian Epirote towns in
167, Paullus achieved the double goal of rewarding his hard-working sol-
diery, and of avenging those perceived to have been the most egregious
traitors to the Roman cause during the war.17
15
Livy 45.26.3–10.
16
Livy 45.33.8–34.9; Plut. Aem. 29.1–30.1; App. Ill. 9.3; cf. Polyb. 30.15.1; Strabo 7.7.4 (322C); Plin. NH
4.39 (72 Macedonian cities – a slip); Dio fr. 67; Eutrop. 4.8.1.
17
Molossian defection and kidnap attempt: Polyb. 27.15–16; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.5–5a. Polybius explains
that Cephalus of Epirus tried to adhere to the best policy (complying with the Roman alliance
and not being subservient to Rome) for as long as possible. But when he heard that the Aetolian
generals were sent to detention in Rome after Callicinus on the basis of accusations by their polit-
ical enemy Lyciscus, he feared that the accusations of anti-Roman behavior made against him by
his rival Charops might result in a similar fate for himself, and so was forced to side with Perseus.
Such explanations matter less than Roman perception, which probably knew nothing of Cephalus’
deliberations – not that the circumstances under which he betrayed the Roman alliance likely would
Aftermath 177
Meanwhile, Aulus Baebius, a Roman garrison commander, had overseen
the massacre of 550 leading Aetolians at the instigation of the pro-Roman
politicians Lyciscus and Tisippus. Others had been forced into exile, and
the property of the dead and exiled was confiscated. Paullus upbraided
Baebius for allowing his men to participate in the slaughter of the Aetolian
principes, but the killers themselves were let off, while the exiles were con-
firmed as such, the only criterion used to adjudicate their cases being which
side they had supported in the recent war.18 All over Greece, pro-Roman
politicians supplied the names of their allegedly pro-Macedonian rivals
to Paullus. He rounded up politicians from Aetolia, Acarnania, Epirus,
and Boeotia, who would accompany the legions on their return home to
stand trial in Rome. It is said that over a thousand Achaean League politi-
cians, Polybius among them, were rounded up, destined to be sent into
custody in Italian towns throughout Italy.19 The Acarnanians were stripped
of their most important city, Leucas, thus restricting their access to the
coast, and hobbling their confederacy. Q. Fabius Labeo, one of the ten
commissioners for the settlement of Macedonia, was dispatched to Lesbos
to depopulate Antissa and raze the city to the ground – this in retalia-
tion for the Antissans giving safe harbor to the ships of the king’s admiral
Antenor during the war, and providing him with supplies. Paullus ordered
the beheading of two prominent politicians – Andronicus the Aetolian and
Neon of Thebes, the latter for being the architect of the Boeotian alliance
with Macedon.20
Special humiliations were reserved for Rome’s amici Antiochus IV,
Rhodes, and Eumenes of Pergamum. Immediately after Pydna, the
Seleucid king’s aggression toward Ptolemaic Egypt came to a sudden end.
He had come within a mile of the Canopic Gate of Alexandria, at a place
called Eleusis, when a Roman embassy, headed by the former consul of
172, C. Popillius Laenas, approached him. Popillius refused to greet him
as an amicus populi Romani by shaking his hand, but rather handed him
a copy of the senate’s decree ordering him to end his war against Ptolemy.
Antiochus said he would consult with his Friends before responding, but
have made much difference in the post-war treatment of the Molossians anyway. See the sole criter-
ion used by the Roman to adjudicate the cases of the Aetolian exiles, below.
18
Livy 45.28.6–8, 31.1–2. Diod. Sic. 31.8.6 adds the detail that Amphilochia was detached from the
Aetolian League at this time.
19
Livy 45.31.9–11; cf. Polyb. 31.23.5; Paus. 7.10.5–12 (Achaeans); Just. Epit. 33.2.8 (Aetolians); Polyb.
32.5.6 (Epirotes); Zon. 9.31.1 (Greeks generally). Unlike the Macedonian officialdom, these men
were not to make their own way to Rome. See Briscoe 2012: 713–14.
20
Livy 45.31.12–15.
the Roman drew the proverbial line – or rather, circle – in the sand with
the staff he was carrying, ordering the king to respond to the senate’s decree
before stepping out of it. The king agreed to do as the senate ordered, even
though Popillius had no troops with him, and Antiochus may have already
achieved, or had at least come within an ace of achieving, the 130-year-old
Seleucid dream of taking control of Egypt. Such was the seismic effect of
the Roman victory at Pydna.21
The long saga of Rome’s strained relationship with Rhodes was about
to come to an end. To recap: Roman suspicion of the Rhodians first arose
early in Perseus’ reign, when they provided a naval escort to Macedonia for
the king’s Seleucid bride – an act for which Perseus richly rewarded them,
and which prompted the senate, in 177, to issue a letter instructing the
Rhodians to treat their Lycian subjects as allies. The Rhodians ignored the
order, and later made an offensive speech in the senate against Eumenes,
but the Romans were in general pleased with their attitude on the eve
of the Third Macedonian War when an eastern embassy confirmed they
had prepared forty ships for the Roman war effort.22 When Perseus sought
their help, he was politely rebuffed. The Romans refused Rhodian offers of
material assistance during the war itself, and in 169 they responded warmly
to a Rhodian request to renew amicitia and to be allowed to export Sicilian
grain.23 At this same time, Rhodian ambassadors to the consul Marcius
Philippus were invited to mediate in the war with Perseus. 24 When Perseus
approached the Rhodians for an alliance just before the Pydna campaign,
they refused, adhering to their plan to mediate in the war instead. After
Pydna, the Rhodians passed a decree condemning to death anyone who
had said or done anything in favor of Perseus and against the Romans dur-
ing the war. Those who did not flee into exile or kill themselves were tried
at Rhodes and brought to Rome.25
Meanwhile, the Rhodian mediation embassy was in Rome awaiting an
audience with the senate when the news of Rome’s victory over Perseus
at Pydna arrived. The ambassadors told the patres that they had initially
21
Polyb. 29.27.1–9; Livy 45.12.1–6, 34.14 (for a full list of later sources and discussion, see Gruen
1984: 658–60; sources also listed at Briscoe 2012: 638). Porph. FGH 260 F 49a says Antiochus IV
had actually already been crowned king of Egypt at Memphis, but this is in dispute (Mørkholm
1966: 82–3; Walbank 1979: 358; Briscoe 2012: 638; contra Mittag 2006: 171–6).
22
Livy’s report that Rhodian loyalty was reported to be wavering at this time is a fabrication: above,
Chapter 4, n. 80.
23
Livy’s report of an angry, threatening Rhodian embassy is likely an annalistic fantasy: above, Chapter
6, n. 117.
24
Not the Sixth Syrian War: above, Chapter 6, n. 118.
25
Livy 45.10.14–15, 22.9, 24.6; Dio fr. 68.1; cf. Polyb. 30.31.14, 20 (retrospective).
Aftermath 179
come to offer their services as mediators in the war, but now had the pleas-
ure of offering their congratulations for the Roman victory. The senate’s
response was a total shock to the Rhodians: their offer of mediation had
been designed to benefit Perseus, not Rome, since it had been made when
Perseus was on the defensive, with Roman troops holding the passes into
Macedonia, and not when the king had been successful and ravaging
Greece earlier in the war.26
When did Rome’s attitude toward Rhodes change for the worse?
Relations were outwardly cordial in 172, when the Romans witnessed
Rhodian war preparations, and in 169, when the Rhodians renewed their
amicitia with Rome and were permitted to export grain from Sicily. That
same year, Marcius Philippus encouraged the Rhodians to mediate in
Rome’s war with Perseus. According to Polybius, however, this was done so
that it might “give the Romans a sensible starting point for deciding about
[the Rhodians] whatever seemed good to them.”27 Whether Polybius’ thesis
is true is neither here nor there. If the Romans were suspicious of Rhodian
disloyalty as far back as 177, then Polybius may indeed be right. But the real
significance of his statement is that he believed that statesmen – probably
not just Roman statesmen – made such calculations when dealing with
foreign states. As has been seen often in this study (not least in the run-up
to the Third Macedonian War itself ), the Romans did not forget slights
and offenses, and sometimes chose to avenge them – but only at their con-
venience. This is a function of “the uncertainty principle,” or “the problem
of other minds,” in international relations. Because states are opaque, that
is, one state’s knowledge of other states’ intentions is imperfect, intent can
only be guessed at from public actions alone, both physical and verbal.28
These crumbs of information are seized upon and filed away until a plaus-
ible pattern of intent emerges from the data (whose significance may have
been magnified in the interim).29 When perceived intent crosses the thresh-
old from minor worry to credible threat, action is taken – but only if the
26
Livy 45.3.3–8.
27
τοῦτο πράξαντας δοῦναι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀφορμὰς εὐλόγους εἰς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς
ἂν αὐτοῖς φαίνηται (Polyb. 28.17.8). For similar cynical sentiments by Polybius, see Walbank 1972:
166–73 with passages there cited (as at Walbank 1979: 521). For similar senatorial treatment of
Demetrius of Syria, see above, p. 105.
28
See Eckstein 2008: 242–4.
29
This is why Marcius Philippus recited his list of Perseus’ delicts at his parley with the king in late
172, and why Popillius Laenas, on his visit to Rhodes just after Pydna, “recited everything that had
been said or done with hostility [toward Rome] in the recent war, either by individuals or by the
whole state [of Rhodes]” (omnia enim Popillius quae singuli uniuersique eo bello hostiliter dixerant
fecerantque rettulit; Livy 45.10.7).
threatened state has the time, energy, and resources to deal with the dan-
ger. Thus Philip V’s hostility and resentment toward Rome simmered away
from at least the mid-180s, when he was publicly humiliated by a Roman
commission of inquiry and was forced to give up Aenus and Maronea. The
Romans, for their part, took note of Philip’s stubborn refusal to give up
these places, and his involvement in the massacre of the pro-Pergamene
faction in Maronea before finally doing so. Similarly, Perseus’ delicts were
noted and filed away throughout the 170s until the threat threshold was
crossed, sometime in 174, as has been argued in Chapter 5, by the end of
which year Perseus had secured his alliance with the Boeotian confederacy,
brought the Dolopes under his control, and then marched his 43,000-man
army into the heart of Greece. This dovetailed with a highly fluid situation
in the Near East when another, perhaps decisive war between the Seleucid
and Ptolemaic kingdoms seemed to be on the horizon. It was no wonder,
then, that the Romans were so pleased when the Rhodians were found to
be loyal when the Third Macedonian War was imminent, and remained
so, at least in terms of their overt actions, while it was ongoing. Relief that
the pro-Roman faction was in power – and that Rome would not have to
deal with that problem at a very busy time for her – is palpable in Polybius’
version of the embassy of 172 and those of 169.30
So, in 168, freed from both the war with Perseus and the fear that
Antiochus IV might conquer Egypt, Rome could now turn to a problem
that had been a source of concern for her for almost a decade – the prob-
lem of Rhodian loyalty. Had the problem crossed the threat threshold?
Of course not, but Pydna had, in its immediate aftermath at least, shifted
the goalposts significantly, expanding the criteria for what constituted a
threat to Rome.31 The Roman victory had also expanded the moral and
political gulf separating them from their friends, constraining the abil-
ity of the latter to comport themselves as status equals of the conquerors
of Macedon. Rome had succeeded against Perseus after great difficulties,
yielded to the “hegemon’s temptation,” and regarded an assertive, brutal
response to minor transgressions and suspect behavior as fully proportion-
ate in these circumstances. That the Rhodians did not see things this way
was, of course, their prerogative as Roman amici. They could interpret
30
Polybius’ thesis – and that is all it is – that the senators in 169 “pretended” to be ignorant of the
anti-Roman sentiments of some Rhodian politicians, and of the rumors of Rhodian double-dealing
(28.2.3–5) does not affect the interpretation offered here. Indeed, overlooking a minor problem
when preoccupied by a greater crisis is pattern behavior by states, as has been argued here.
31
On what follows, see now Burton 2011: 283–9 (with references).
Aftermath 181
their standing relative to Rome’s however they wished. That this conflicted
with the senate majority’s view was unfortunate, but not at all unpredict-
able, given the dynamics and phenomenology of friendship. Because the
Rhodians could not see for themselves that the relationship had changed,
with their own status having decreased in direct proportion to the increase
in the Romans’ by virtue of the Pydna victory, the Romans would have to
provide a tangible demonstration of that fact. Seen in this light, Rome’s
declaration of war on Rhodes, and the senate’s later diversion of their rev-
enues from the slave trade by declaring Delos a free port under Athenian
control, and liberation of their subjects in Lycia and Caria, do not seem
at all surprising. Not all senators felt this way, of course. It was largely
thanks to Cato’s censure of the hawkish senators for trying to punish
alleged Rhodian intentions rather than actions that they were spared a
Roman war.32
Finally, Eumenes II of Pergamum also experienced the wrath of the
senators.33 Recall that, during the war, a rumor circulated that Perseus had
tried to make a deal with the Pergamene king, offering him 500 talents
to remain neutral, and 1,500 talents to broker a peace. The deal broke
down amid mutual deceit and avarice. The damage, however, was done,
and rumors of the deal soon reached Rome. Polybius claims that he him-
self could scarcely believe the rumors were true at the time, but they were
confirmed for him by Perseus’ Macedonian Friends in exile in Italy after
the war. That, plus the fact that it would explain Rome’s shoddy post-war
treatment of Eumenes, sufficed for Polybius to believe the negotiations
actually occurred. Scholars are divided on whether Polybius was deliber-
ately deceived by the Macedonians – and whether his own ex post facto
rationale meets the criteria for good historiographical practice. But this
is all beside the point. What matters here is Roman perception: from the
32
Dmitriev 2011: 290–312 for the most part concurs with this analysis, but further argues that the
Rhodians deployed the slogan of Greek freedom in defense of their policy of ending the war, and
thus tried to usurp Rome’s position as the guarantor of Greek freedom, which was the immedi-
ate source of Roman hostility. But at no point between 172 and 168 did the Rhodians claim they
were defending Greek freedom through their policy; it was only Perseus’ envoys who claimed this
on their behalf in late 172 to try to persuade them to mediate. The Rhodians themselves only
ever claimed to offer mediation for primarily self-interested financial reasons (and, secondarily, for
the financial health of other Greeks, and of the Romans) (cf. Polyb. 29.19.3; Livy 44.14.10; 45.3.5;
Diod. Sic. 30.24.1). Pace Dmitriev, Cato argued that the Rhodians were concerned only with their
own freedom (libertatis suae causa: ORF3 Cato fr. 164 (= Gell. NA 6.3.16)), and indeed, they per-
sistently complained that the other Greeks were falsely accusing them of disloyalty (Polyb. 28.2.2,
16.7; 30.4.12–14; Livy 45.20.9). They were unlikely to concern themselves with the freedom of their
calumniators.
33
On what follows, see now Burton 2011: 292–9 (with references).
patres’ point of view, that the man who was the catalyst for the war against
Perseus, and for whom the Romans undertook this dangerous and, in the
end, difficult and expensive task, should have attempted to betray their
cause – and for filthy lucre, at that – was a moral outrage worthy of censure
and punishment. Eumenes thus put the senators in a very awkward posi-
tion when he arrived in Italy in winter 167/6 to offer his personal congratu-
lations. If the patres now reproached him publicly, they would be exposed
as poor judges of character, since they had been touting the king as being
among their greatest friends. On the other hand, if they held their noses
and treated him kindly, they would appear to be overlooking his shameful
behavior, and thus would damage their own reputation, and indicate to
their other amici that they could act as Eumenes had with impunity. The
patres hit upon a brilliant solution, passing a decree banning all kings from
Italy, and dispatched a lowly quaestor to Brundisium to show the senatus
consultum to the king, and to order him to quit Italy as soon as possible if
he had no requests to make of the senate.34
At the time, Eumenes was fighting the Galatians – a side-effect of the
outcome of the war with Perseus, according to Polybius.35 Once the senate’s
snub of Eumenes became public knowledge, again according to Polybius,
the Galatians would fight him with greater determination.36 Although the
king eventually succeeded in gaining the upper hand against them, the
Galatians were declared free by the Romans precisely at the moment of
Eumenes’ victory over them. Punishment thus followed humiliation. Of a
piece with this is the fact that the Romans also began cultivating Eumenes’
brother Attalus at the king’s expense, treating him with great kindness, thus
highlighting, by contrast, the dim view they took of Eumenes. On the other
hand, the senate refused to grant Attalus’ request, on behalf of his brother,
that Aenus and Maronea be restored to Pergamene control.37 Eumenes,
moreover, continued to fight the Galatians, with no response forthcoming
from their Roman amici, and proceeded from strength to strength for the
remainder of his reign, recovering his high reputation among the Greeks.38
After some initial humiliation and punishment of Eumenes, Roman anger,
and interest, eventually ebbed away – to the benefit of the Pergamene king.
34
Polyb. 30.19.
35
Polyb. 29.22.4. The revolt may have been occasioned by the heavy losses the Galatians had sustained
in fighting on the side of Pergamum and Rome during the war (cf. Livy 42.57.9; 44.28.7–14).
36
Polyb. 30.19.12.
37
Polyb. 30.1.7–3.7; cf. Livy 45.19–20.2 (who, however, does not say that the two cities were
denied him).
38
Polyb. 32.8.
Aftermath 183
The Withdrawal
Indeed, the point can be made more generally. After a brief post-Pydna
orgy of interventionism and brutal assertiveness, the Romans withdrew
their attention from eastern affairs. This was, of course, pattern behav-
ior: they withdrew their forces, and interest, from the eastern Adriatic after
the First and Second Illyrian Wars; they were very reluctantly (and half-
heartedly) drawn back to the East after the Carthaginian–Macedonian alli-
ance was struck in 215, but thereafter ignored the region until recalled by
their eastern amici in 201–200; and they withdrew their attention, and
troops, in 194 after the Second Macedonian War, and again in 188 after
the Syrian and Aetolian Wars. Coincidentally enough, almost precisely the
same amount of time – seventeen years or so – would pass between 167
and the next Roman deployment to the East, in 150, as had passed between
the evacuation of 188 and the first deployments against Perseus in late 172.
Not that the post-167 period would be a rerun of the post-188 period –
and for one crucial geopolitical reason: the absence of a viable regional
hegemonic power in the East, particularly in the Balkan area. The sud-
den disappearance of the Macedonian kingdom, structurally predisposed
toward imperial expansion, along with its ruling house, its ideology of
conquest, its enormous resources, and its 43,000-strong army significantly
altered the power configuration in the eastern Mediterranean. This opened
up for the remaining first- and second-tier powers in the region potential
new opportunities for asserting their interests, which Rome would have
to attempt to check with greater rigor than in the post-Apamea period
if stability in the East were to be maintained, and Roman arrangements
there protected. Perhaps not surprisingly, this was most difficult to achieve
in places farthest away from Italy – Asia Minor and Syria. As has been
seen, despite Rome’s attempt to free the Galatians from Attalid aggres-
sion, the rulers of Pergamum continued to wreak havoc against them,
as well as the kingdom of Bithynia. The Attalids also instigated regime
change in Syria and Cappadocia, thus upsetting, with impunity, arrange-
ments formally mandated by Rome.39 The Seleucid Demetrius I Soter fled
captivity in Rome, returned to his ancestral kingdom, and deposed and
killed Rome’s favored candidate on the throne, Antiochus V. According
to Polybius, the senators “could not do anything about it even if they
wanted to.”40 Demetrius then went on to replace Rome’s amicus Ariarathes
39
See now Burton 2011: 221–2 for sources and discussion.
40
ἅμα δὲ προορώμενοι τὸ βουληθέντες κωλύειν ἀδυνατῆσαι (Polyb. 31.15.8).
V with Orophernes on the Cappadocian throne.41 In all this Rome was
not completely passive or idle. After Demetrius’ coup, in 162, a senator-
ial commission under the leadership of Cn. Octavius discovered Seleucid
violations to the treaty of Apamea, and so torched Seleucid ships and ham-
strung the regime’s elephants of war.42 Rome also attempted to undermine
Pergamene power, not least by encouraging Eumenes II’s brother Attalus
to depose the king, and favored sycophants like Prusias II of Bithynia.43
True, such measures lacked effect even in the short term.44 But that such
measures were taken at all bears notice – as does the fact that the micro-
imperialisms playing out on the periphery of Rome’s imperium at no point
directly affected Roman security arrangements in the East. The increas-
ingly hermetic kingdom of the Ptolemies, the shrinking Seleucid empire,
and the monarchies of Asia Minor, perpetually wearing themselves out in
war against each other, suited the Romans just fine.
Much closer to Rome, politics in Greece resumed their normal course.
The Achaeans continued to lord it over their defeated rivals the Aetolians,45
and the most hated and reluctant member of their own League, Sparta.
Elsewhere, the pro-Roman politicians who had been responsible for
slaughtering and exiling their political rivals from even before the Third
Macedonian War broke out continued to victimize their opponents.
Lyciscus the Aetolian harried his political enemies until his death, ca. 158,
as did Mnasippus of Coronea in Boeotia, and Chremas in Acarnania.46
Charops of Epirus, either on his own or through proxies, executed some of
his enemies in the agora and in their homes, before turning to proscription
and property confiscation.47 Such people continued to be in very bad odor
among their own people. So despised were the Achaean Callicrates and the
League politicians in his faction, for example, that (according to Polybius,
anyway) everyone avoided bathing in the same tub with them at the pub-
lic baths, and insisted that the bath attendants drain the tubs and put in
fresh water after they left. They were catcalled and booed whenever they
were proclaimed victors at public festivals. Even street urchins would yell
“traitor!” after them whenever they passed by.48 Polybius says that when the
41
See now Burton 2011: 219–22 for sources and discussion.
42
Polyb. 31.2.9–14; App. Syr. 46; Zon. 9.25.
43
Polyb. 30.1.4–10 (Attalus), 19.1–6 (Prusias).
44
Gruen 1984: 579–92.
45
Paus. 7.11.3.
46
Polyb. 32.4.1–5.2.
47
Polyb. 32.5.4–6.9; Diod. Sic. 31.31.
48
Polyb. 30.29.2–7. Some (but probably not much) skepticism is in order here because of Polybius’
deep personal hatred for Callicrates, who was instrumental in ending his career and having him
deported to Italy.
Aftermath 185
Romans discountenanced the activities of Charops, and promised to send
a commission of inquiry to investigate his crimes, the Greek community
in Rome was overjoyed.49
But this sort of non-violent protest was really the only option left for
the critics of Rome and their supporters throughout Greece; their spir-
its were crushed, their mood nearing despair, says Polybius.50 No wonder,
then, in a pattern reminiscent of Perseus’ increasing popularity during the
pre-war 170s, the Greeks increasingly turned to anyone exuding even the
faintest whiff of Roman disfavor. So Eumenes, Polybius alleges, grew more
popular among the Greeks in direct proportion to how badly the Romans
treated him.51 However that may be (and the point is in any case moot after
Eumenes’ death in 159), Roman suppression of pro-Macedonian factions
in places like Boeotia before the Third Macedonian War began, followed
by the purges and mass exile of Greek politicians perceived to be unreli-
able when it was over, seems to have done its work. Fear of Rome’s agents
and sycophants compelled self-censorship in the councils, assemblies, and
marketplaces. Robust and unfettered political debate in mainland Greece
seems to have come to an end.
By contrast, factional strife of an uncertain nature seems to have
occurred in the new Macedonian states. Unfortunately, the failure of the
full text of Livy’s history after 167 makes it very difficult to document
the history of the merides between 167 and the late 150s. Nevertheless, a
stray notice among the fragments of Polybius happens to reveal that stasis
gripped the Macedonian governments within only four years of their foun-
dation.52 We also hear that a Macedonian called Damasippus massacred
members of the plenary Council at Pella in 162.53 In 154 the Macedonians
invited Scipio Aemilianus (who apparently inherited his biological father
Paullus’ patronage of the Macedonian people) to come and settle their
staseis, but he chose to fight in Spain instead.54 What impact the reopening
of the gold and silver mines four years earlier, in 158, had on this civil strife
is unknown.55 Whether stasis plagued the merides throughout this period,
and the fragmentary notices, therefore, are the only visible indicators of
49
Polyb. 32.6.6. The commission was probably sent, but the results are unknown (Walbank 1979: 525).
Another was sent two years later, in winter 157/6, at the request of the exiles (Polyb. 32.14).
50
Polyb. 30.32.11.
51
Polyb. 31.6.6.
52
Polyb. 31.2.12 (quoted below, n. 57).
53
Polyb. 31.17.2.
54
Polyb. 35.4.11.
55
Cassiod. Chron. 596. If the Macedonian elite, rather than Roman publicani, held these concessions
(so Gruen 1982: 263–4 and 1984: 427 n. 161), this may have increased the wealth of a few, and inten-
sified competition among the Macedonian leadership and stasis in their communities.
a persistent problem, cannot of course be known for sure. But Polybius’
statement that the Macedonians were freed by the Romans from serious
civil strife and partisan massacres should counsel caution.56 As the histor-
ian indicates elsewhere, what was going on in the merides was what would
be expected from new democracies: robust political debate that, due to the
inexperience of the participants, periodically spun out of control into full-
blown stasis.57 Whatever the case, factional strife had very little to do with
the next serious security crisis in mainland Greece, when it appeared like a
bolt from the blue in the late 150s.
“The Fourth Macedonian War”

Andriscus was a poor citizen of Adramyttium in the Troad in Asia Minor.58
Styling himself Philip, son of Perseus, he publicized an elaborate back-story,
involving buried treasure, secret instructions from a dead relative, foster par-
ents, and a deathbed revelation of his true identity, to explain his origins.59
He entered Macedonia in force in 153, but was driven out by local troops,
presumably a concentration of the garrison forces the Romans permitted to
be raised in the first, second, and fourth merides to prevent incursions on
Macedonia’s northern and western frontiers. In 151, Andriscus sought help
from Demetrius, the Seleucid king who had fled Rome some years before
and usurped the throne. The choice was only natural; after all, Andriscus
was posing as Philip, son of Perseus and Laodice, who was the daughter of
Seleucus IV, and therefore sister to Demetrius, making the latter Andriscus’
“uncle.” Demetrius, having no interest in securing the recovery of the false
Philip’s inheritance, had him arrested and sent to Rome under guard. The
patres, good aristocrats as they were, felt nothing but contempt for him as
a commoner of no distinction, and released him. Andriscus then went to
Miletus, where he was imprisoned, but upon the advice of some (probably
Roman) ambassadors there, was again released. He escaped to Pergamum,
and made contact with Callippa, a former concubine of Perseus, who fitted
56
Polyb. 36.17.13, quoted above, Chapter 1, n. 21.
57
συνέβαινε γὰρ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀήθεις ὄντας δημοκρατικῆς καὶ συνεδριακῆς πολιτείας στασιάζειν
πρὸς αὑτούς (“for it happened that the Macedonians, being unused to democratic and republican
government, engaged in civil strife”; Polyb. 31.2.12). Hatzopoulos 1996: 222–3, 365 n. 6, 494 is skep-
tical of Polybius’ reasoning here.
58
What follows is based on Polyb. 36.10, 17; Diod. Sic. 32.9a–b, 15; Livy Per. 49–50; Vell. Pat. 1.11.1–2;
Flor. 1.30; Porph. FGH 260 F 3.19–20; Eutrop. 4.13; Oros. 4.22.9; Ampel. 16.5; Zon. 9.28.1–8.
59
The real Philip, son of Perseus, had died in custody in 163: Polyb. 36.10.3. Waterfield 2014: 219
believes Andriscus was an illegitimate son of Perseus, based on his apparently striking resemblance
to the dead king.
Aftermath 187
him out in royal attire and a diadem, and gave him money and slaves. He
then entered Thrace, where various Thracian chiefs, including Teres, who
was married to a granddaughter of Perseus, gave him troops. With these he
re-entered Macedonia in 150, but was repulsed and driven back to Thrace.
On his third attempt, Andriscus was successful: he fought and won two
battles against the Macedonians, one on either side of the Strymon River.
Arriving at Pella, Andriscus declared himself king, and took the dynastic
name Philip (VI). He then went on to conquer most of Thessaly.60
With their state arrangements annulled by the forcible restoration of
the Macedonian monarchy, the senators finally decided to act, and sent
Scipio Nasica (probably the same man who executed the flanking move-
ment around Olympus before the Battle of Pydna in 168) to see what
was going on, and to try to settle matters peacefully. When Nasica dis-
covered just how far things had progressed, he wrote back to Rome, and
in the meantime advanced through Thessaly as far as Macedonia with
Achaean League troops. A Roman army led by the praetor P. Iuventius
Thalna was sent against Andriscus in 149, but was soundly defeated, and
its commander killed. The remnants of the legions had to withdraw under
cover of darkness. Andriscus went on to recover Thessaly and launched a
diplomatic offensive in Thrace, probably during the winter of 149/8, and
began the slaughter of his Macedonian (mostly upper-class) opponents.
In summer, 148, another Roman army, under the command of the prae-
tor Q. Caecilius Metellus, arrived in the East. At some point, Andriscus’
general Telestes defected with the Macedonian cavalry, but, in an eerie
replay of the events of the war with Perseus, we also hear that a (different?)
troop of Macedonian horsemen won an initial cavalry skirmish against
the Romans, as had occurred at Callicinus in 171. Andriscus then divided
his army in two and sent one half to ravage Thessaly while he remained
with the other half, near Pydna, to confront Caecilius. Caecilius defeated
Andriscus in the second Battle of Pydna, and won over the rest of his army.
Andriscus fled to Thrace, but was handed over to Caecilius by Byzes, a
Thracian prince. Yet before the Roman commander could return to Rome
and a well-earned triumph, he had to chase down yet another pretender
who had occupied some territory around the Nessus River, and began styl-
ing himself King Alexander (V), son of Perseus.61 The pretender fled as far
60
He also minted coinage. See de Callataÿ 2011: 58–9 with pl. 8 no. 1 (with Roman overstrikes).
61
The real Alexander, son of Perseus, became an expert in fine metal work and embossing, learned
Latin, and became a secretary for the local magistrates of Alba Fucens: Plut. Aem. 37.4. The date of
his death is unknown.
as Dardania, and then vanished, never to be heard from again. Caecilius
then returned to Rome, “King Philip” was paraded in a cage in his tri-
umph, and the praetor adopted the honorific “Macedonicus.” The meri-
des continued to exist, but Macedonia was made tributary, Roman armies
were from this point a permanent presence in the region, and a Roman
provincial administration gradually coalesced.62
Macedonian independence was at an end. How had this happened so
suddenly, and at the instigation of such an unlikely individual, part con
artist, part huckster? For his part, Polybius was entirely flummoxed as to
how the “false Philip who fell from the skies” could possibly have been
so successful so quickly.63 He put the whole sorry episode down to the
mysterious workings of Fortuna, or the wrath of the gods. He could not
figure out why the Macedonians fought so valiantly for Andriscus, who
exiled, tortured, and killed so many of them, against the Romans, who
had rescued them from servitude and granted them their freedom, among
other benefits.64 “Nationalism,” or its nearest ancient Greek equivalent
(φιλοπατρία), apparently did not occur to him, nor did a nostalgic yearn-
ing on the part of the Macedonians for their kings.
Polybius was probably right to avoid such explanations. Modern schol-
ars, on the other hand, have been considerably less cautious. The con-
ventional explanation may be summarized as follows: the new Roman
dispensation had failed to inspire a sense of independence and meris-
loyalty in the Macedonians, who longed for the glory days of the mon-
archy; this nostalgia, combined with a short-sighted, and ultimately
self-defeating weakening by the Romans of the Macedonians’ ability to
defend themselves, caused the merides to be “swept away … with ease” as
soon as Andriscus appeared.65 Such reconstructions are highly problematic
for several reasons – not least of which is that there is not a shred of evi-
dence to support them, and much circumstantial evidence to the contrary.
First of all, as Hatzopoulos has shown, these local foci of loyalty were not
innovations of the Romans, but had in fact been going concerns for per-
haps as long as two centuries, after they had been established by Philip II.
This is probably why, as was noted above, the troops of the Macedonian
meris governments expelled Andriscus from their lands – twice – in 153,
62
There was no sudden declaration of a province, no lex prouinciae: Gruen 1984: 433–6; Kallet-Marx
1995: 11–41.
63
ἀεροπετής Φίλιππος (Polyb. 36.10.2).
64
Polyb. 36.17.12–15; cf. 36.10.5–6.
65
Eckstein 2010: 246–7; cf. Gruen 1984: 433; Derow 1989: 318 (a “fragile conception”); Eckstein 2013:
94. Others listed at Kallet-Marx 1995: 33 n. 94, to which add now Waterfield 2014: 219–20.
Aftermath 189
and again in 150.66 The Macedonians also chose to fight two pitched battles
against the pretender rather than voluntarily cede their states to his con-
trol. This would suggest that a Macedonian longing for monarchy, to say
nothing of the Antigonids, is an illusion, as is the notion that the merides
were bland, uninspiring, artificial creations imposed on an unwilling and
resentful populace. They fought hard to preserve the independence of their
states against the restoration of the monarchy.
Is there perhaps a class-based explanation for the low-born pretend-
er’s ultimate success in crowning himself King Philip?67 The civil dis-
putes in the Macedonian merides may have had a class warfare aspect to
them, but, as with the civil disputes in the Greek states leading up to
the war with Perseus, it was more a case of aristocrats struggling against
each other for political influence and debt relief. The common people,
if they played a role at all, were merely swept along in these disputes.
This should be kept in mind as well: Andriscus, despite being a com-
moner himself, evidently did not promote himself as a “red king” – no
more than Perseus had68 – when he was trying to penetrate Macedonia.
It was only after his victories in battle over the local troops that he
posed as a populist. And for good reason: he needed money to defend
himself against the inevitable Roman reprisals, and proscription, with
its attendant confiscation of property, seemed as good a solution as any.
If enthusiasm there was among the people for the pretender, it was only
the enforced sort that follows from military success.69 It is thus no sur-
prise that Andriscus’ army abandoned him for the Romans when the
tide turned against him at Pydna.
What about the Macedonians’ attitude toward Rome? Not want-
ing monarchy back and enjoying their traditional local self-government
are not necessarily the same as having great affection for the Romans. If
Walbank is right in his reading of a highly corrupt passage in Polybius,
the Greek historian probably wrote something to the effect that “after
Pydna the Macedonians had abandoned their former ill will towards the
Romans.”70 Another passage may clinch it: it was commonly agreed by
all, ὁμολογουμένως – including, presumably, the Macedonians themselves
– that the Romans had benefitted the Macedonians immensely by freeing
66
Kallet-Marx 1995: 34–6 argues that the Thracian associates of Andriscus alienated the Macedonians.
This is possible, but Kallet-Marx (31) is too quick to allege the “instability” of the merides.
67
Per Bernhardt 1985: 14–15.
68
See above, Chapter 5, p. 118.
69
“Victory changes minds, of course” (Kallet-Marx 1995: 35).
70
Walbank 1979: 682.
them from servitude to their kings.71 If true, this makes perfect sense of the
picture of the Macedonians resisting Andriscus to the utmost. Why else,
moreover, would the Macedonians have called upon their Roman patron,
Scipio Aemilianus, in 154, when civil strife broke out, instead of, say, the
Achaean League, as was their prerogative as free citizens of free states? The
reopening of the mines in 158 should also be mentioned in this context. If
these concessions belonged to the Macedonians themselves, then this is a
good indication that much goodwill and trust had been built up between
Rome and the Macedonians over nine years of relative stability.72
Finally, did the Romans purposely leave the merides virtually defense-
less, to be swept away by the first serious effort to invade Macedonia?
Surely not. Aside from the persistent and stout resistance of the local lev-
ies to Andriscus already mentioned, note that when debating what to do
about Macedonia before the settlement of 167, the Elder Cato confessed
that the country should be free since Rome could not defend it.73 Cato
did not say that the Macedonians could not defend themselves – and
indeed may have implied that they could do a better job of it than the
Romans. This may be supplemented by an additional argument, admit-
tedly one from silence, but nonetheless suggestive for all that. We only
hear of civil strife in the merides after Pydna, and never about military
disasters suffered by the Macedonians at the hands of frontier tribes. Nor,
apparently, were Roman troops ever called upon to supplement the local
levies, despite relentless pressure by the external tribes.74 That the Romans
would leave their Macedonian arrangements, to say nothing of the rest of
Greece, virtually undefended against the perennial threat of invasion on
the Macedonian frontiers is hardly believable.75 The last thing the Romans
wanted to do (as Cato’s comment indicates) was to allow a power vacuum
to suck them back into the East to undertake routine (and unprofitable)
frontier defense duties against impoverished tribal peoples. The Romans
no doubt authorized the governments of the first, second, and fourth
71
Polyb. 36.17.13. Walbank’s (1979: 681) skepticism (“P. fails to envisage a Macedonian view which
could be quite different”) is out of place, based as it is on the demonstrably flawed conventional
scholarly view of the Macedonian attitude toward Rome and the merides before Andriscus appeared.
72
Briscoe 2012: 660. See above, n. 55, for the mines likely being run by the Macedonians rather than
Roman publicani.
73
Macedonas liberos pronuntiauit, quia teneri non poterant (ORF3 Cato fr. 162 (= SHA Hadr. 5.3)).
74
Documented in Kallet-Marx 1995: 38–40.
75
As e.g. Kallet-Marx 1995: 40: “Clearly, some more effective force than the local levies, which had
failed to stave off Andriscus and his Thracian friends, was needed in order to protect Macedonia
from the incursions that, as he and further pretenders showed, were a dangerous source of internal
instability and could even cause trouble for Greece.”
Aftermath 191
merides to raise troops in sufficient numbers to ensure a robust frontier
defense, while at the same time avoiding dangerous concentrations of mili-
tary power. They were used to such balancing acts in their own polity,
where military force was traditionally split between at least two (and often
more) imperium-wielding magistrates as a hedge against tyranny. And as
was the case with the Roman military, there was nothing preventing the
individual meris armies taking coordinated action in the face of significant
threats, such as a Dardanian invasion or Andriscus’ incursions. The merides
were stripped of ius commercium and ius connubium, but nothing appar-
ently forbade the unification of their armies to deal with hostile incursions
when and where they occurred.
The traditional scholarly view of the rapid sweeping away of Rome’s
Macedonian arrangements after Pydna is untenable. It is, in part, an unfor-
tunate by-product of the false impression created by the exiguous remaining
evidence for the war with Andriscus, and a misinterpretation of Polybius’
comments on it. What surprised him was not so much the eagerness with
which the Macedonians threw off the Roman yoke, or the ease with which
the governments of the merides were swept away, but how Andriscus, a most
unlikely (that is, common, undistinguished, royal in physiognomy only)
character, could have succeeded in conquering Macedonia so quickly. What
started off as an amusing rumor about some crackpot commoner with a
hare-brained scheme to pass himself off as Philip, son of Perseus – when
everyone knew that Philip was already long dead – had evolved, within a
few years, into something far more dangerous: all of Macedonia was in his
hands, and he was now going after Thessaly. This is what Polybius meant by
“the false Philip who fell from the skies.”76
Pretenders would occasionally reemerge in the period following.
One such, styling himself King Philip (VII), made a bid for power in
Macedonia in 143 or 142, but was easily defeated by a quaestor, Tremellius
Scrofa.77 A bizarre story in Diodorus indicates that, as late as 90, there
were still some ambitious adventurers willing to have a tilt at reviving the
Macedonian monarchy.78 Pretenders came and went, in other words, but
the merides, with Roman security arrangements in place, endured.
76
Polyb. 36.10. At Polyb. 36.17.12–14, he does not fault the Macedonians for going over to Andriscus
so quickly, but for valiantly defending him after he exiled, tortured, and killed so many of them in
such a short space of time, i.e. after he had defeated them in battle. Polybius is being a bit unfair
here: as if they had a choice but to fight for Andriscus after he conquered them! The alternative was
to suffer exile, torture, or death.
77
Livy Per. 53; Obseq. 22; Eutrop. 4.15; Varro, RR. 2.4.1–2.
78
Diod. Sic. 37.5a.
Conclusion
The Pydna victory marks a watershed in ancient geopolitics. The de facto
balance of power between the three major Hellenistic kingdoms that had
dominated the eastern Mediterranean for over 150 years had been shattered
in an instant. The infamous meeting of C. Popillius Laenas and Antiochus
IV at Eleusis is the starkest illustration of this: that a mere ambassador,
unaccompanied by troops, could order arguably the most successful
of Alexander’s epigonoi to stand down at the moment he was poised to
become ruler over all the East, including Egypt, is striking testimony to
Pydna’s world-changing significance.
The war’s denouement was shaped by this new reality. Not only would
Rome’s enemies, real or perceived, be punished (some, like the Molossian
Epirotes, on a genocidal scale), but friends, such as Eumenes and Rhodes,
who had been perceived to have betrayed the Roman cause, would feel
Rome’s wrath as well. Rome’s friends had to be taught that the status gap
separating them from the conquerors of Macedon had just been widened,
and practical demonstrations to that effect would be necessary. The purges
of pro-Macedonian politicians all over the Greek world before, during,
and after the war would serve to limit dissent and debate in the post-war
period. Roman authority and power would certainly not go unchallenged,
especially in faraway Asia Minor and Syria, but it also bears notice that
when the first serious threat to Roman security arrangements in the East
materialized after Pydna, in the person of Andriscus, it was completely
unpredictable and lacking the support of all but the Thracians.
Conclusion
At some point after the mid-140s, Polybius decided to revise the original
plan of his Histories. He added a further ten books to the original thirty,
in part to allow his readers to pass judgment on Roman foreign policy,
and to decide whether Roman rule over the conquered peoples in the
post-Pydna period deserved praise or blame.1 He was inspired to do this
because of a time of “trouble and disturbance”2 that followed the Third
Macedonian War, including the wars and coups in Asia Minor and Syria,
and the Roman wars against Andriscus and Achaea in the East, Carthage
in North Africa, and the Celtiberi and Vaccaei in the West.3 Polybius did
not, nevertheless, revise his original thesis that the result of Pydna had
established Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean: he stood firm that,
as a result of the defeat of Antigonid Macedon, “the advance of Roman
power had reached completion,” and “henceforth, all would have to heed
the Romans and obey their orders.”4
Polybius was right not to correct himself. As was seen in the previ-
ous chapter, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, something
world-changing had taken place in the Mediterranean basin as a result
of the Third Macedonian War. True, Rome had acquired no new terri-
tory; the Macedonians and Illyrians had been granted their freedom,
as the Greek poleis and Leagues had in the past; Rome’s loyal friends
were praised and rewarded, and her enemies chastised and punished; and
Roman forces were withdrawn west of the Adriatic within a year or two
of the war’s end.
1
Polyb. 3.4.1–5.6 (revised plan); discussion: Walbank 1972: 173–83 and 1977b: 145–50, 159–62; Eckstein
1995: 10–11.
2
ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις (Polyb. 3.4.12).
3
Polyb. 3.5.1–6.
4
προκοπὴ τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας ἐτετελείωτο· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενον ἐδόκει τοῦτ᾽
εἶναι καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἅπασιν ὅτι λοιπόν ἐστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν
ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων (Polyb. 3.4.2–3).
193
194 Conclusion
On the other hand, not just Roman enemies, but (perceived) disloyal
friends were punished as well. Most of Rome’s Greek opponents and crit-
ics were either in exile or dead, rounded up or liquidated by the Romans
themselves or by their regional political rivals. Great swathes of valuable
agricultural land in Greece, especially in Thessaly, Epirus, and Boeotia,
had been devastated and would probably be unproductive for the short
to medium term, with predictable consequences for the health and well-
being of the inhabitants and the local economy. And perhaps most import-
antly, Rome’s closest system competitor, in terms of both geography and
power, had been eliminated. Rome no longer had any challengers to its
nearly global rule, as Polybius recognized.5
The final war Rome fought in mainland Greece clearly demonstrates how
things had changed.6 The year 150 was a watershed year for the Achaean
League. The Achaean exiles deported at the end of the Third Macedonian
War were finally returned, and Scipio Nasica called upon League forces to
protect Greece against the pretender Andriscus since the Romans them-
selves had no troops there at the moment. These moves signaled to two
League politicians, Diaeus and Critolaus, that Achaean status equiva-
lence with Rome had been restored; the restoration of the exiles removed
the final symbol of Achaean subordination to Rome, and the Achaean
provision of troops to Scipio indicated a Roman status deficit relative to
Achaea. Diaeus and Critolaus were thus emboldened to begin harassing
Sparta again, even though they knew this would be met with Roman dis-
approval. The Roman struggle against Andriscus followed, Roman military
defeats further emboldening the Achaean leaders. The Romans tried for a
number of years to resolve the Sparta problem diplomatically, but to no
avail. They could not understand, any more than Polybius could, why the
Achaeans persisted in their futile intransigence: “the whole land must have
fallen under an evil spell.”7 In the end, the Achaeans were of course no
match for the Roman legions, Corinth was destroyed, and the League was
dismembered.
Far from being a resurgent threat to Roman power in mainland Greece,
the Achaean War was the project of two delusionally overconfident politi-
cians in the last remaining viable middling power in the region. Unlike
resurgent Carthage, the Achaean League never stood a chance in a contest
5
Ῥωμαῖοί γε μὴν οὐ τινὰ μέρη, σχεδὸν δὲ πᾶσαν πεποιημένοι τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον αὑτοῖς
(“The Romans have made subject to themselves not some portion, but almost the entire world”;
Polyb. 1.2.7; cf. 1.1.5).
6
On what follows, see now Burton 2011: 345–51.
7
πάντα δ᾽ ἦν πλήρη παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας (Polyb. 38.16.7).
Conclusion 195
with Rome. The Romans knew this, and pleaded with the Achaeans to
curb their arrogance and hostility since they had no desire to go to war
against a loyal ally which could only lose in such a contest.8 Diaeus and
Critolaus were on their own from the beginning; there were no potential
allies available, nor did they seek any. The Roman purges in Greece, and
now the Roman military presence in Macedonia, had ensured that the
Achaean League stood alone. The contrast with, for example, the Aetolian
League and its alliance with Antiochus III against Rome in the late 190s,
and the constellation of Greek states that flocked to the Seleucid’s banner
after he crossed to Greece in winter 192/1, could not be starker. There was,
quite simply, no other viable first-tier power in the eastern Mediterranean
that disgruntled states could use as leverage against Roman hegemony.
There had not been since 167. This is what Polybius means when he says
Roman power was complete by this date.
If, as appears to be the case, Polybius is justified in claiming that the
Third Macedonian War secured Rome almost global power, does this also
mean he is correct that the conquest of Macedon was but a stage in Rome’s
“plan of universal aggression”?9 For Polybius, the result of the Hannibalic
War, the most important, decisive step in their plan for world conquest,
was that the Romans reached out for the rest, starting with the legions
that crossed to Greece to fight Philip V in the Second Macedonian War.10
But as has been seen in this study, Roman motivations in the wars against
Philip, and especially in the war against his son, defy such simplistic ana-
lysis. One wonders whether Rome would have made war on Philip in
200 if the latter had not struck a treaty with Hannibal in 215 to destroy
Rome. The Second Macedonian War was declared, in part, for the sake of
protecting the friends and allies the Romans had made during the first war
against Philip. The settlement of 196, unless desperate arguments about the
Romans deliberately leaving traps for Philip and his successor to blunder
into are resorted to,11 seems antithetical to the idea that the Romans sought
to take out Macedon as the next stage on a fully planned journey toward
world domination. Over two decades of Roman–Macedonian cooper-
ation, accommodation, and coexistence followed before a very complex
8
Polyb. 38.9.8.
9
ἔννοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς (Polyb. 3.2.6; cf. 1.3.6, 10, etc.). The meaning of “the assault
on the whole [world]” (τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς), translated here as “universal aggression,” clearly
refers to the acquisition of a world (or large) empire.
10
Polyb. 1.3.6. Cf. Polyb. 3.32.7, where Polybius regards the war with Philip resulting from that with
Hannibal. Elsewhere (15.20.8), he regards Tyche as responsible for raising the Romans up against
Philip in punishment for his pact with Antiochus to destroy Ptolemy.
11
As e.g. Dmitriev 2011: 201–9 does in his analysis of Nabis of Sparta.
196 Conclusion
and frightening geopolitical situation – one which Perseus apparently had
no qualms about contributing to – stirred the Romans to action against
Macedon again. For various reasons – the difficulty and danger of the
war for Rome, the demonstrated vulnerability of Roman arrangements in
Greece to the Macedonian kings’ pathological addiction to warfare and
expansion, Roman pride and desire for revenge – at war’s end, the king-
dom of Macedon would no longer be allowed to exist. This was not in
view in 215, much less in 200 or 196, and probably not even in 171. It was
a product of more recent experience.
The Third Macedonian War was the final trial of Macedonian arms
against those of another first-tier Mediterranean power. Perseus failed,
but his failure was not inevitable. Historiographical convention and the
perspective of most of our surviving sources have limited its significance
to what it reveals about Roman imperial ambitions. As I hope to have
shown in this study, this is only half the story. The Third Macedonian War,
especially its context and causes, reveals as much, if not more, about late
Antigonid Macedonian power and imperial aspirations as it does about the
nature and evolution of Roman imperialism.
Appendi x A
The Embassy of Cn. Servilius Caepio, Ap.

Claudius Centho, and T. Annius Luscus to
Macedon (Livy 42.25)
Between the report of the dispatch of the Roman embassy to Asia, Crete,
and Rhodes at 42.19.7–8 and the arrival in Rome of the embassy from
the Issaei and the dispatch of the embassy to the Illyrian king Genthius
at 42.26.2–7 in mid-172, Livy records the return of a Roman embassy to
Perseus, whose purpose was to demand satisfaction and renounce friend-
ship (ad res repetendas … renuntiandamque amicitiam: 42.25.1). There is,
however, no record of the dispatch of this embassy, nor would a formal
demand for satisfaction (rerum repetitio) be appropriate at this point, for,
as Livy (following Polybius) had previously said, the discussion and prepa-
rations for war (including the indictio belli), were deferred until after the
election of the consuls for 171 (belli administratio ad nouos consules reiecta
est: Livy 42.18.2; cf. 42.26.2: cum Macedonicum bellum expectabatur).1 A
further problem is caused by Livy’s assertion that the Roman ambassadors
demanded that Perseus respond to each and every charge made against him
by Eumenes II of Pergamum ([legati] exposita deinde ab se ordine, quae ipsi
nuper in senatu Eumenen uera omnia et comperta referentem audissent: Livy
42.25.5). Elsewhere, Livy says that the specifics of the Pergamene king’s
indictment only leaked out after the war against Perseus was over (bello
denique perfecto, quaeque dicta ab rege quaeque responsa essent emanauere
(Livy 42.14.1). And Perseus’ own envoy, Harpalus, was certainly excluded
from the closed-door senate audience granted to Eumenes (App. Mac.
11.3, explicit), and could report nothing to the king upon his return to
Macedon, beyond the fact of Eumenes’ meeting with the senate, and
Roman hostility toward Macedon (Harpalus … nuntiasset regi … Romanos
… infestos: Livy 45.15.1–2).
In addition, the king’s tone in the passage at Livy 42.25 is uncharacter-
istically intemperate, compared to his other diplomatic exchanges with
1
Polybian derivation: Briscoe 2012: 9. Falsity of the rerum repetitio: Rich 1976: 89–90.
197
198 Appendix A
the Romans in the run-up to the Third Macedonian War. The king rails
at the ambassadors out of anger (regem … accensum ira inclementer locu-
tum, frementem, multum ac diu uociferatum, accensum … uoce clara), accus-
ing the Romans of being greedy and arrogant (auaratiam superbiamque
obicientem), and complaining about the repeated embassies sent to spy
on him (alii super alios legati uenirent speculatum dicta factaque sua). He
insisted on a new treaty based on equality (ex aequo foedus), then quickly
stormed off, failing to engage in any of the usual diplomatic courtesies.
The Romans then renounced the friendship and alliance, at which the king
stopped short, rounded on the ambassadors, and ordered them to depart
his kingdom within three days (Livy 42.25.8–13).
The king’s obstreperous demeanor and harsh tone here fit ill with his
later conciliatory behavior before Roman officials. His demand for an
equal treaty is out of kilter with Perseus’ envoys’ later offer to give satis-
faction, at the senate’s discretion, for injuries he had done to Rome’s allies
(regem de inuriis, si quas sociis factas quererentur, arbitratu senatus satisfac-
turum esse: Livy 42.36.3). After war had been declared on him, Perseus
was perfectly cordial toward Marcius Philippus, agreeing, at the Roman’s
suggestion, to cross over as the younger/inferior son to his elder/superior
father (ioco etiam Marcius cunctantes mouit: Minor, inquit ad maiores et –
quod Philippo ipsi cognomen erat – filius ad patrem transeat. Facile persuasum
id regi est). Instead of hostages, Marcius demanded (and Perseus provided)
“a pledge of good faith … so that it might appear to the allies that the
king was meeting the Roman envoys on by no means equal terms” (pignus
fidei … ut appareret sociis nequaquam ex dignitate pari congredi regem cum
legatis). The two men then greeted each other not like enemies, but with
great warmth and kindness (salutatio non tamquam hostium sed hospitalis
ac benignia fuit: Livy 42.39.5–8). After Marcius suggested that Perseus
send envoys to the senate, the king still believed that “everything should
be tried to the very end, that no hope [for peace] should be overlooked,”
to the extent that his “counsels were blinded by a vain hope for peace”
(cum experienda omnia ad ultimum nec praetermittendam spem ullam cen-
suisset rex … spes uana pacis occaecasset consilia: 42.43.1, 3). This cost him
whatever strategic advantage he may have enjoyed at that moment, since
the Romans were still in the midst of their war preparations – which is,
of course, why Marcius encouraged the dispatch of ambassadors to Rome
in the first place.
During this “truce” period (see above, Chapter 4, n. 87), Perseus begged
the Rhodians to remain neutral, or if war broke out, to strive as hard as
they could to re-establish peace (Polyb. 27.4.4–6; Livy 42.46.3–4). He also
Appendix A 199
refused to help the pro-Macedonian Boeotian cities, citing the truce, and
warned them not to attack the Romans (Polyb. 27.5.7–8; Livy 42.46.6,
slightly modifying Polybius: above, Chapter 4, n. 87). Later still, after
his victory over the Romans at the Battle of Callicinus, Perseus tried to
negotiate as though he were in the weaker position, offering to accept the
conditions of the treaty imposed on his father in 196, including the pay-
ment of a 1,000-talent indemnity (Polyb. 27.8.1–5; Livy 42.62.3–10). When
that failed, and the Roman commander P. Licinius Crassus demanded that
Perseus surrender himself and his kingdom to the senate’s discretion (Polyb.
27.8.7–8; Livy 42.62.11–12), the king sent delegation after delegation to the
consul, offering to raise the indemnity by ever-increasing amounts (Polyb.
27.8.13; Livy 42.62.14; cf. App. Mac. 12, who is, however, overly cynical in
his interpretation of Perseus’ offers). Perseus’ desire for peace and concili-
atory attitude was trumped by the Romans’ refusal to accept defeat, and in
fact only redoubled their determination to fight on.
The account of the Roman embassy to Perseus at Livy 42.25 is thus
deeply problematic, at odds, as it is, with what we know of Perseus’ behav-
ior and attitude around this time. It may go too far, however, to dismiss
it entirely as a fiction, as the majority of scholars who have dealt with
it do.2 The fact that Livy does not record the dispatch of the embassy is
not in itself damning, especially in an author who is inclined to summar-
ize material and omit details. In the previous book, Livy admitted that
the great labor involved in recording the history of the Romans is justi-
fication enough for not recording in detail the disputes of foreigners (sed
externorum inter se bella, quo quaeque modo gesta sint, persequi non operae
est satis superque oneris sustinenti res a populo Romano gestas scribere: Livy
41.25.8). Although the dispatch of the Roman embassy that returns at Livy
42.25 does not fit this criterion stricto sensu, the fact that it is related to the
rivalry between Eumenes and Perseus may just account for its absence. At
the very end of his account of the Roman embassy to Macedon at 42.25,
moreover, Livy, seemingly in haste to get to the war itself and not want-
ing to lose his focus on it, quickly mentions that the senate heard delega-
tions from the Aetolians and Thessalians – without even reporting what
2
Nissen 1863: 246–7, 254; Kahrstedt 1911: 421; Münzer 1920: 152 n. 1; Heuss 1933: 50–1; Klotz 1940: 67–
8; Walbank 1941: 90 n. 60 and 1949: 18 n. 19; Scullard 1950: 200 n. 1, 203 n. 1; Bickermann 1953: 506;
Meloni 1953: 177–9; Rich 1976: 89–90; Luce 1977: 123; Harris 1979: 230 n. 2; Warrior 1981: 16–17;
Gruen 1984: 410–11; Hammond 1988: 512 n. 1; Goukowsky 2011: 154; Briscoe 2012: 17–18; Waterfield
2014: 258 n. 16. Contra Niese 1903: 111 n. 1; Colin 1904: 379–80, 391; Pais 1926: 556; Benecke 1930:
260; Broughton 1951: 413–14, 415 nn. 8–9; Pareti 1953: 45–6.
200 Appendix A
they said (42.25.14; it probably concerned their ongoing debt problems
rather than their relations with Perseus). In the very next sentence, he says
that the consuls achieved nothing worth mentioning that year (42.26.1),
before resuming with cum Macedonicum bellum expectaretur (42.26.2), and
reporting the embassies stimulated by Perseus’ activities. The fact that Livy
does not report the dispatch of the embassy that returns at 42.25 is there-
fore not damning in and of itself.
The contradictions in Livy’s narrative regarding the rerum repetitio and
the report of Eumenes’ specific charges to Perseus need not cause too much
trouble either; Livy (or his source) may simply have been getting carried
away with his own rhetoric, or the momentum of his narrative, and was
thus inadvertently anticipating events here. Related to this, it is not at all
inappropriate for the senate to have dispatched an embassy to Macedonia
at this point. It stands to reason (and is indeed pattern behavior) that the
senate would send a fact-finding embassy to Macedonia to investigate
the allegations just made by Eumenes before the senate. Parallel cases
are all too numerous to choose from. To take but one example that this
study has treated in detail, an embassy was sent in 177 to investigate the
complaints of the Dardani and Thracians against the Bastarnae (Polyb.
25.6.2–6; above, Chapter 4, pp. 62, 64, Chapter 5, pp. 99–100). There is
thus nothing inherently unlikely about a Roman embassy being sent to
Perseus to investigate Eumenes’ complaints; Livy’s stated reasons (ad res
repetendas … renuntiandamque amicitiam: 42.25.1) are simply an exagger-
ation or an anticipation.
That leaves Perseus’ intemperate tone and overt hostility to the Roman
ambassadors, which seem so out of kilter with his otherwise consistently
conciliatory behavior. An angry reaction, however, is only to be expected of
a proud monarch suddenly confronted by a charge-sheet from a despised
rival. The mutual hatred and rivalry of Eumenes and Perseus are well
attested. Livy (42.5.1–6) preserves a Polybian comparison of the two, where
their competition to benefit and ingratiate themselves with the Greeks is
strongly marked. Perseus, naturally, comes off second best in Livy’s view,
but he is equally clear that by the late 170s, the vast majority of the Greek
states favored him over Eumenes. Since coming to the Macedonian throne,
Perseus had done significant damage to Eumenes’ popularity and repu-
tation among the Greeks, which guaranteed that Eumenes would try to
strike back at him any way he could (for example, stoking Roman suspi-
cions of him). This toxic rivalry Livy calls a uetus odium (42.29.2) in the
context of the run-up to the Third Macedonian War. In the specific con-
text of the diplomatic exchange under scrutiny here, just before the Roman
Appendix A 201
embassy recorded at Livy 42.25 arrived, Harpalus, we are told, had already
stoked Perseus’s anger against Eumenes in particular ([Perseus] Eumeni ante
omnes infestus erat: Livy 42.15.3) with his news of the Pergamene king’s
presence in Rome. Perseus might well have still been in this state when he
faced Servilius Caepio, Claudius Centho, and Annius Luscus in spring,
172, especially if Eumenes’ name (to say nothing of his accusations) was
mentioned by them.3 And, of course, there are some other possibilities that
must be left open: Perseus was having a bad day, he found the ambassadors
personally repugnant, or some combination of the two.
In sum, the material at Livy 42.25 may have started out as an unadorned
report of a Roman embassy being dispatched to Macedonia, perhaps to
sound out Perseus’ attitude in light of the accusations made by Eumenes,
but then simply grew in the telling. It was in this somewhat embellished
form that the story of the embassy was set down in the historical record
after the war was over, perhaps with an eye to bolstering the Roman case
for a iustum bellum against Perseus.
3
Perseus, like his father, may have been naturally prone to anger in any case; cf. Polyb. 23.7.5, Livy
40.6.7, etc., in addition to 42.15.3, quoted in the text. Perseus’ anger in 172 is not necessarily con-
tradicted by what Polybius describes as Perseus’ kingly manner, composure, and seriousness at the
outset of his reign (Polyb. 25.3.4–7: προστασίαν τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ἀξίωμα … ἐπισκύνιον καὶ τάξιν;
see above, Chapter 4, p. 59). Appian’s general statement, in the context of Eumenes’ visit in 172, that
Perseus was industrious and self-controlled (σώφρονα καὶ φιλόπονον: Mac. 11.3), is not specific to
that situation, since in the same passage Appian also refers to Perseus’ sudden prominence (ἀθρόώς
οὕτως ἐπαιρόμενον), which implies that the comment is drawn from same tradition as Polyb. 25.3.4–
7, and thus concerns only the beginning of Perseus’ reign.
Appendi x B
The Chronology of 172-171 and the Timing of the

Dispatch of Cn. Sicinius (pr. 172) to Epirus
The chronology of events of the years 172 and 171 is very confused, thanks
not only to the increasing disjuncture between the Roman calendar and
the solar year, but also to Livy’s rather unskillful blending of Polybius’
account with annalistic sources (betrayed by the doublets at 42.26.7–9
and 42.45.1–7, 42.36.1–7 and 42.48.1–4, and the overlapping variants at
42.18.2–3 and 42.27.3–8, and 42.35.3 and 42.48.5).1 It would be pointless
to recapitulate here the ongoing scholarly controversy over the absolute
(Julian) chronology of the various events leading up to the outbreak of
the Third Macedonian War, none of which can be definitive,2 or the insol-
uble question of which source(s) Livy was following when.3 The only issue
that needs resolving here, since it impinges directly on the question of the
causes of the war, and whether the Romans were the aggressors in the con-
flict, is the date of the dispatch of Cn. Sicinius, praetor in 172, across the
Adriatic.
1
I should state right at the outset that this does not make Livy a bad historian; we have all made such
mistakes when we have lost control of our irreconcilable source material. Luce 1977 and Warrior
1981, who disagree with the reconstruction of Kahrstedt 1911 and Walbank 1941, which I follow here,
seem to assume, rather defensively, that those who side with Kahrstedt and Walbank are excessively
uncharitable to Livy. However, accepting Warrior/Luce is no less damning of Livy’s chronology than
agreeing with Kahrstedt/Walbank (see below). I am fully sympathetic with Luce’s view (134–5) that
Livy did the best anyone could have done in “combining two accounts that clashed on many impor-
tant points of fact and interpretation.”
2
See, most recently, Briscoe 2012: 5–8 and 21–9 against Bennett 2005. Earlier discussions include
Kahrstedt 1911; Walbank 1941; Meloni 1953: 461–3, with 61–209; Oost 1953; Derow 1973; Rich 1976:
92–7; Warrior 1981; Gruen 1984: 414 n. 86; Bennett 2004 and 2005; Wiemer 2004; cf. Michels 1967:
102–3; Hannah 2005: 112.
3
The Quellenforschung argument assumes that all annalistic sources are inherently untrustworthy, and
all Polybian material the opposite. The best summary of the different scenarios that have been offered
(chiefly Nissen 1863: 243–9 vs. Walbank 1941) is Luce 1977: 124–9, who comes down on the side of
Nissen.
202
Appendix B 203
Before turning to this problem, it will be useful to tabulate the chron-
ology adopted in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study, showing both Varronian
and Julian dates.4
Varronian Julian
Nov. 172 Sept. 172 Marcius’ embassy departs Romea

Dec. 172/Jan. 171 Oct./Nov. 172 Marcius meets with Perseus/“truce”b
Jan.–Feb. 171 Nov.–Dec. 172 dissolution of the Boeotian Leaguec
Jan.–Feb. 171 Nov.–Dec. 172 arrival of embassy to Aegean and Asiad
Jan.–Feb. 171 Nov.–Dec. 172 Perseus sends envoys to Rome, Asiae
13 Feb. 171 11 Dec. 172 Cn. Sicinius at Brundisiumf
18 Feb. 171 18 Dec. 172 consular electionsg
15 Mar. 171 12 Jan. 171 consuls enter officeh
Mar. 171 Jan. 171 return of Marcius/report/debatei
Mar.–Apr. 171 Jan.–Feb. 171 departure of Cn. Siciniusj
early June 171 early April 171 hearing of Macedonian envoysk
early June 171 early April 171 war declaration/levyl
early June 171 early April 171 departure of Lucretius with fleetm
late June 171 (?) late April 171 (?) departure of Licinius with armyn
a
Livy 42.37.1.
b
Livy 42.37–43.3.
c
Livy 42.43.4–44 (cf. Polyb. 27.1–2).
d
Livy 42.45 [42.26.7–9] (cf. Polyb. 27.3). This is the embassy whose dispatch is recorded
at Livy 42.19.6–8, even though the personnel listed is different: Walbank 1979: 294–5;
Briscoe 2012: 17. Contra Warrior 1981: 15.
e
Livy 42.46 (cf. Polyb. 27.4–5).
f
Livy 42.27.
g
Livy 42.28.
h
Livy 42.29.1.
i
Livy 42.47.
j
Livy 42.36.8–9.
k
Livy 42.48.1–4 [42.36.1–7] (cf. Polyb. 27.6; Diod. Sic. 30.1; App. Mac. 9).
l
Livy 42.30.10–31.4.
m
Livy 42.35.3.
n
Livy 42.48.5–49.
When did Sicinius depart Brundisium for Epirus? I have anticipated

my own view by placing it after the return of Marcius’ embassy to Greece,
his report to the senate, and the noua sapientia debate at the beginning of
4
I have chosen, not completely arbitrarily (although the lack of any definitive solution to the chrono-
logical problem would permit it), to follow Kahrstedt 1911; Walbank 1941: 82–6; Meloni 1953: 462–4,
with 171–209 (with modifications); Bennett 2004 and 2005. In the citations that follow, items in
square brackets indicate doublets.
204 Appendix B
consular 171. In this, I am following Walbank 1941/Kahrstedt 1911 against,
for example, Warrior 1981: 8–14, 23. As I indicated earlier, a definitive solu-
tion to controversy is unobtainable. The problem boils down to which of
two phrases in Livy one chooses to reject: paucis post diebus at 42.37.1 or
principio hiemis at 42.44.8.
A review of the relevant passages is necessary:
Livy 42.27.3–6; cf. 42.18.2–3: Sicinius is instructed to prepare ships
and gather 8,400 Latin troops, perhaps send some of them to the
ex-praetor A. Atilius Serranus (pr. 173) at Brundisium, enrol 12,100
troops and, after his command is prorogued, hold the province of
Macedonia until his successor should arrive in early 171.
Livy 42.27.6: Sicinius’ praetorian imperium had to be prorogued for
another year before he crossed to Epirus.
Livy 42.36.8–37.1: Sicinius had already crossed to Epirus and garrisoned
some places on the Illyrian coast when, “a few days later” (paucis post
diebus), Marcius’ embassy arrived at Corcyra.
Livy 42.37.3: P. and Ser. Cornelius Lentulus are told to circumnavigate
the Peloponnese “before winter” (ante hiemem).
Livy 42.37.5; cf. 42.40.1: Perseus asks why the Romans came with troops
and are garrisoning cities.
Livy 42.44.8: Marcius’ embassy returns to Rome at the beginning of
winter (principio hiemis).
Polyb. 27.2.11–12: Marcius asks the Achaeans to garrison Chalcis until
the Roman army arrives; Marcius’ embassy carried out its business
during the winter (κατὰ χειμῶνα).
Livy 42.47.10–11: 2,000 of Sicinius’ troops are sent to garrison Larissa
after Marcius’ embassy returns to Rome.
Livy 42.43.8; cf. 42.47.2: at the time of Marcius’ interview with Perseus,
the Romans were not prepared militarily for the war; the Roman army
has not yet crossed to Greece and garrisoned convenient locations.
Polyb. 27.4.3–5: Perseus asks the Rhodians to mediate the war with
Rome should the Romans attack Macedon.
Walbank (following Kahrstedt) argued that Livy’s statement that Marcius’
embassy arrived at Corcyra “a few days after” (paucis post diebus) Sicinius
crossed to Epirus, and garrisoned some places on the Illyrian coast, is annal-
istic and “nothing more than a loose copula without chronological signifi-
cance.”5 The “loose copula” here was a function of Livy unskillfully fusing
5
Cf. De Sanctis 1923: 398: “è una forma di transizione cronologica introdotta autoschediasticamente
ed erroneamente da Livio per collegare due racconti di provenienza diversa i cui rapporti cronologici
in realtà Livio non si è studiato di chiarire”; Briscoe 2012: 10: “autoschediasm.”
Appendix B 205
together the information from his annalistic source(s) with Polybius.6 T.J.
Luce raised the intriguing possibility that paucis post diebus is tied not to
Sicinius’ crossing to Epirus, but to his departure from Rome earlier in the
month.7 In any case, on the Walbank/Kahrstedt reading, Perseus’ objection
to Roman troops garrisoning cities must refer to the activity of the 1,000
troops that accompanied the ambassadors in Greece (Livy 42.37.1), and not to
Sicinius’ occupation of Illyrian forts, and the king’s failure to refer to Sicinius’
significant expeditionary force (at least 5,000 men) “is a strong argumentum
ex silentio that [Sicinius] in fact had not yet crossed.”8 Finally, Polybius’ report
that Marcius’ embassy did its work “during the winter” should be preferred to
Livy’s view that the embassy returned to Rome “at the beginning of winter.”
After all, the task of P. and Ser. Cornelius Lentulus was to circumnavigate the
Peloponnese ante hiemem. Because Polybian winter begins around the time of
the autumn equinox (after which sailing becomes riskier), Marcius’ embassy
must have arrived in Greece in (Julian) September 172, which allows a good
four months for the envoys to carry out their rather complex diplomatic
tasks.9 Walbank concludes that the pattern of a Roman embassy, designed to
isolate the potential Roman enemy, followed by advance forces wintering on
the Illyrian coast has solid parallels from the Antiochene War and the Second
Macedonian War. It also makes better chronological sense of Sicinius sending
2,000 men to garrison Larissa after Marcius’ embassy returned to Rome.10
6
Cf. also Aymard 1945: 335; Briscoe 1964: 68. Contra Nissen 1863: 246, 250; Meloni 1953: 181, 193 (who
oddly cites De Sanctis 1923: 398 (previous n.), despite explaining the problem differently, that Livy
simply had trouble synchronizing Polybian Olympiads with Varronian consular years); Walbank
1955: 194.
7
Luce 1977: 126.
8
Walbank 1941: 84. Even Warrior 1981: 23 must admit that the reference to troops could be to the
1,000 men who escorted Marcius’ embassy. It is of no concern to the present argument whether
Sicinius was in command of 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry (as Livy 42.36.8), or a significantly
larger amount (18,100, as Livy 42.27.3, 5). Most agree that the lower figure is the correct one,
since it comes from Polybius, and has the support of Zon. 9.22.4, where Sicinius’ advance force
is described as being “small” (ὀλίγης): Kromayer 1907: 233 and n. 1; Heiland 1913: 20, 40–4; De
Sanctis 1923: 275 and n. 1; Walbank 1941: 82 and 1979: 294; Meloni 1953: 193–4 n. 5; Rich 1976: 96–7;
Warrior 1981: 42; Hammond 1988: 506. Contra Kahrstedt 1911 (who accepts the numbers reported
at Livy 42.27.3, 5); Pareti 1953: 46–7 and n. 1 (who argues that the 5,300 was the portion of the
8,400 mentioned as the advance force at Livy 42.27.3 that Sicinius dispatched to various places in
Illyria, keeping the remaining 3,100 with him at Apollonia); Brunt 1972: 659 (who posits a lacuna
at Livy 42.36.8 where the rest of the 18,100 of Livy 42.27.3, 5 will have been accounted for). Briscoe
2012: 20–1 remains agnostic. In my view, this is further evidence for Livy’s unskilful blending of
multiple sources of information (vs. Warrior’s view of “Livy’s powers of combining his skills as a
literary artist and as a historian” (18)).
9
Here Walbank follows Holleaux 1923: 354 and 1932: 533–4 (cf. also Heiland 1913: 50, 71) against e.g.
De Sanctis 1923: 398, and later, Pédech 1964: 461–4, who argue that the ancients believed that winter
began at the dawn setting of the Pleiades, that is, in early November. Meloni 1953: 180 and n. 1 fol-
lows Walbank. Warrior 1981: 26 pushes the arrival of Marcius in Greece to as late as early December
or even the winter solstice.
10
Walbank 1941: 84–5 and 1979: 294.
206 Appendix B
Erich Gruen added in support to Walbank/Kahrstedt’s arguments that
Sicinius’ praetorian imperium had to be prorogued for 171 before he could
cross to Epirus, which indicates that his departure from Brundisium
occurred after the inauguration of the new consular year 171. Moreover,
Marcius had to ask the Achaeans to garrison Chalcis until the Roman
army crossed (thus indicating that Sicinius’ army was not yet in Greece),
and Perseus asked the Rhodians to try to mediate should the Romans
attack Macedon, which indicates that “Roman mobilization still lay in the
future.”11
The alternative view,12 which defends Livy’s chronology that has Marcius’
embassy crossing to Greece after Sicinius took his troops across, depends
on accepting a late winter date for Marcius’ embassy, thus dismissing Livy’s
chronology at 42.44.8, which has Marcius’ embassy returning to Rome at
the beginning of winter, and Polybius’ chronology at 27.2.12 (on whom
Livy depends here), which has the embassy doing its business during
the winter.13 This interpretation must also assume that a literal truce (as
opposed to a pause in the escalation of hostilities: above, Chapter 4, n. 87)
was granted by Marcius to Perseus,14 and that the legatus Marcius was actu-
ally invested with imperium,15 for which there is no precedent or parallel,
and is therefore highly unlikely.
I prefer the view of Walbank/Kahrstedt, that Sicinius crossed after
Marcius’ embassy returned to Rome, since it only requires rejecting the
possible autoschediasm at Livy 42.37.1 (paucis post diebus), or, if Luce is
right that that chronological marker is tied to Sicinius’ departure from
Rome, rejecting none of the evidence at all. This is far preferable to reject-
ing a host of other evidence that suggests no Roman forces of any signifi-
cance were on the ground in Greece before late winter/early spring 171.
11
Gruen 1984: 413–14 n. 85. Cf. also Meloni 1953: 179–81; Briscoe 1964: 68 and 2012: 10–11; Errington
1979: 209.
12
Kromayer 1907: 233; Heiland 1913: 20, 42–3; Benecke 1930: 259; Pareti 1953: 46–7; Warrior 1981: 8–
14, 23; cf. Rich 1976: 95–6; Luce 1977: 123–6; Hammond 1988: 506 and n. 1, and 1989: 366;
Wiemer 2004.
13
The apparent contradiction between Livy’s chronology and Polybius’ may be explained in various
ways: either Polybius’ excerptor has distorted what stood in his original text and Livy is correct (so
Rich 1976: 94–5, followed by Warrior 1981: 45–6 n. 53), or Livy was trying to reconcile his narrative
with his earlier chronological marker ante hiemem (42.37.3) (so Wiemer 2004: 28–9). It is a minor
issue and does not affect the main problem under discussion here: the dating of Sicinius’ crossing to
Greece with his forces.
14
Warrior 1981: 6, 10.
15
Warrior 1981: 6, 10, 22.
Appendi x C
Three Senatus Consulta
Two inscriptions relevant to the Roman treatment of the Boeotian cit-

ies in 171–170 survive: one contains a mere fragment from an s.c. de
Coronaeis (SEG 19.374), of unknown date, and the other a complete s.c. de
Thisbensibus (Syll.3 646),1 issued on 14 October 170. The text of the former
matches very closely a portion of the latter, suggesting a close relation-
ship between the two.2 The decrees record the privileges granted to the
restored pro-Roman factions in the cities. Those who remained Rome’s
friends before the consul P. Licinius Crassus brought his army to their
walls are confirmed in their possession of what was formerly theirs; they
are allowed to fortify the acropolis and live there;3 and at Thisbe, at least,
they are granted control of all sanctuaries, revenues, and magistracies for
ten years. The Thisbe decree records in addition sanctions against some
individuals from the pro-Macedonian party, as well as other matters of
dispute that are now obscure.
At 43.4.11–13, Livy records that the senate, in response to complaints
by the city of Abdera about Roman atrocities committed there in 170,
issued an s.c. de Abderitis on the same terms as that issued de Coronaeis
the year before.4 This implies that this s.c. de Coronaeis was in response
1
Oddly misidentified by Hammond 1988: 522 n. 1 as SEG 19.374.
2
The Thisbe decree also mentions Coronea in l. 59: the senate will give friendly letters to the Thisbenses
and to the Coroneans to the Aetolians and Phocians, and to anyone else they request. There is no rea-
son for the Coroneans to be mentioned here other than as an indicator that the s.c. de Coronaeis was
the model for the s.c. de Thisbensibus, which the surviving text of the former would suggest is true.
3
All that survives of the relevant clause in the s.c. de Coronaeis is το περὶ ἄκρας [————————
————] | τειχίζειν (ll. 10–11). This appears to match the clause permitting the fortification of the
citadel in the s.c. de Thisbensibus, but whether the pro-Romans of Coronea were allowed to live there
cannot be known. Robert 1938: 287–9 suggested restoring something like the Thisbean decree’s τὴν
ἄκραν αὐτοῖς ὅπως τειχίσαι ἐξῆι καὶ ἐκεῖ (ll. 28–9).
4
As Errington 1974: 79–86 argues, there is no reason to doubt Livy’s date since previous challenges
to it were based on a misreading of Livy 42.67.11, which does not say that Licinius marched against
Coronea in the winter, but that he decided to march against Coronea, Boeotia being a better place
to spend the winter. Licinius knew before he started out that a siege might be necessary to bring
207
208 Appendix C
to similar complaints about Roman mistreatment of them. Coronea (as
well as Malloea and Pteleum: above, Chapter 6, pp. 137, 139–40) will there-
fore be among the complures in Graecia urbes that Livy’s epitomator claims
Licinius attacked and cruelly plundered during his consulship.5 It is, there-
fore, quite possible that the s.c. de Coronaeis mentioned by Livy is the very
same decree as the epigraphic s.c. de Coronaeis, whose date will therefore
be sometime late in 171.
A somewhat more vexed question is whether the epigraphic text will
have contained a clause or clauses relating to the restoration of the wrongly
enslaved inhabitants of Coronea, implicit in Livy 43.4.11–13. Assuming that
Coronea is included among the complures in Graecia urbes at Per. 43, whose
inhabitants were captured and sold by the consul but later restored ex s.c.,6
this might seem likely. On the other hand, the fully extant epigraphic s.c.
de Thisbensibus, whose language resembles that of the extant portion of the
epigraphic s.c. de Coronaeis, contains no such provision. It may be that,
despite Per. 43 (which also erroneously calls Licinius a proconsul), the res-
toration of the enslaved, who will have been supporters of Perseus, was not
carried out ex s.c. at all, as indeed Livy states in the extant portion of book
43: “two legates, C. Sempronius Blaesus and Sextus Julius Caesar, were
sent to restore the Abderites to freedom. And they were further ordered
to announce to the consul Hostilius and the praetor Hortensius that an
unjust war had been brought against the Abderites, and that all who were
in servitude should be recovered and restored to liberty.” The senate’s
orders to the praetor and consul were to be delivered orally, and were not,
apparently, backed up by an s.c.7
Coronea to heel, and so would not have been so foolhardy as to start this process in the winter
months. He therefore will have departed for Boeotia in late summer or autumn, 171, which gave
him just enough time, if necessary, to besiege Coronea, and then winter in Boeotia. That Coronea
surrendered without a fight is likely, given that the other Boeotian city that chose to fight, Haliartus,
was destroyed, while Thisbe, which we know surrendered sine certamine (Livy 42.63.12), was not.
But there was no way Licinius could have predicted a swift surrender when he set off for Boeotia.
The quick surrender of Coronea allowed plenty of time for Licinius to abuse the inhabitants, for the
latter to send a delegation to Rome, and for an s.c. to be issued on their behalf, all before the end of
consular 171. Livy’s dating of the s.c. de Coronaeis to 171 should stand.
5
Livy Per. 43, with Licinius erroneously called a proconsul (above, Chapter 6, n. 53).
6
P. Licinius Crassus … ob id captiui, qui ab eo sub corona uenierant, ex s.c. postea restituit; cf. Zon.
9.22.6, perhaps following Polybius, who does not mention an s.c., has Licinius Crassus receive a
fine, and limits the freeing of the enslaved to those who were in Italy (τόν τε Κράσσον ὕστερον
ἐξημίωσαν χρήμασι καὶ τὰς ἑαλωκυίας πόλεις ἠλευθέρωσαν καὶ τοὺς πραθέντας ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν
τῇ ᾽Ιταλίᾳ εὑρεθέντας τότε παρὰ τῶν ἐωνημένων αὐτοὺς ἐξεπρίαντο). Briscoe 2012: 403 suggests
that these activities may have been the subject of a separate s.c. to the one granting privileges to the
pro-Romans.
7
Legati duo, C. Sempronius Blaesus Sex. Iulius Caesar, ad restituendos in libertatem Abderitas missi.
Iisdem mandatum, ut et Hostilio consuli et Hortensio praetori nuntiarent, senatum Abderitis iniustum
Appendix C 209
A good parallel from the same year involves Chalcis. Like Abdera in
170, and Coronea, Malloea, and Pteleum in 171, Chalcis had been brutal-
ized by the Romans, and a Chalcidian delegation sought redress from the
senate. Livy writes that “the senators would send a letter to the praetor L.
Hortensius saying that the senate was displeased at what the Chalcidians
complained about; that if any free persons had been sold into slavery, at
the first possible moment he should make every effort that they be recov-
ered and restored to freedom.”8 These commands, in other words, were to
be delivered in a letter, and not in a formal decree.
I think it stands to reason that material critical of Roman magistrates
would not have been enshrined in formal senatorial decrees, especially in
time of war. The Romans knew full well that the Greek cities affected by
Rome’s harsh treatment would proudly publicize such material in the usual
way, in monumental inscriptions set up in public places, since the docu-
ments demonstrated Roman benevolence toward themselves. This was bad
publicity for Rome in a time of war, and also a potential risk to the polit-
ical arrangements made by Roman commanders in the cities concerned.
Publicizing Roman benevolence to pro-Macedonians wrongly enslaved
after surrendering to Rome’s good faith might alienate the pro-Roman
faction newly ensconced in power. It might even reignite factional squab-
bling since the pro-Romans now had to reintegrate their former political
enemies into civic life. That trouble might be expected is indicated by the
fact that the s.c. de Thisbenses and (perhaps) the s.c. de Coronaeis granted the
pro-Roman factions the exclusive right to occupy and fortify the citadels
of Thisbe and Coronea.
The extant epigraphic s.c.s de Thisbenses and de Coronaeis, like the s.c.
de Abderitis mentioned by Livy, most likely only recorded new privileges
granted to those peoples, and did not mention explicitly the punish-
ments and humiliations inflicted on them by previous Roman command-
ers. Those latter were communicated orally or through letters to current
Roman commanders on the ground.
bellum illatum conquiri omnes, qui in seruitute sint, et restitui in libertatem aequum censere (Livy
42.4.12–13). Unfortunately, the key words, nuntiarent, senatum, are corrupt in the MS. Briscoe
2012: 403 argues that censere indicates a senatorial decree (as e.g. LSJ s.u. II B 1), but here it could
just as easily refer to an opinion expressed by a vote (equivalent to sententiam dicere in post-classical
Latin) (LSJ s.u. II A 1).
8
The tribune M. Iuventius Thalna said, litteras se ad L. Hortensium praetorem daturos esse, quae
Chalcidenses querantur acta, ea senatui non placet; si qui in seruitutem liberi uenissent, ut eos conquiren-
dos primo quoque tempore restituendosque in libertatem curare … Haec Hortensio iussu senatus scripta
(Livy 42.8.7).
Appendi x D
Two Failed Roman Assaults on

Uscana in 170?
In an annalistic portion of his text, Livy (43.10) writes that Ap. Claudius
Centho was lured into a trap by the people of Uscana, an Illyrian town
garrisoned by a small force of Cretan archers in the service of Perseus,
and lost 10,000 of his men.1 Later on, in a Polybian section of book 43
(21.1), Livy records another failed Roman attempt on Uscana, this time
under the command of L. Coelius, with the town itself being garrisoned
by Macedonians rather than Cretans. Despite the significant differences
between the two accounts, some scholars suspect a doublet because of the
similarity of the names of the Roman commanders (Claudius, Coelius),
and some striking verbal similarities between the passages describing
their attacks.2 On the other hand, an intervening passage (Livy 43.18.5–11)
has the Romans garrisoning Uscana instead of Cretans or Macedonians.
Complicating matters further is a passage from Orosius that has Perseus
attacking an otherwise unknown town in Illyria called Sulcamum (in some
MSS, Sulcanium), which is sometimes emended to read “Uscana” in order
harmonize Orosius’ report with Livy’s account of Perseus’ attack on the
Roman garrison there at 43.18.5–11.3
The only way to harmonize all the evidence is to reconstruct as fol-
lows: Claudius attacked Uscana in late 170 and initially failed to take it
(per Livy 43.10); he then attacked it again, this time successfully, elim-
inating the Cretan garrison (not recorded); Perseus successfully attacked
1
Claudius brought with him 4,000 Romans and Italians, and gathered 8,000 more allies on the way
(Livy 43.9.6–7), and returned to his camp at Lychnidus among the Dassaretii with barely 2,000 men
(Livy 43.10.6–7). On Lychnidus, see Briscoe 2012: 419.
2
Briscoe 2012: 419, 424, following Nissen 1863: 60; cf. Kromayer 1907: 261 n. 1; De Sanctis 1923: 296
n. 160; Meloni 1953: 279 n. 2; Walbank 1979: 340.
3
Oros. 4.20.38. The canonical English translation of the Orosius’ Aduersus Paganos by R.J. Defarrari
in the Catholic University Press of America edition prints “Uscana”: Defarrari 1964: 167. The most
recent English translation confidently notes “In fact Uscana” after printing “Sulcamum” (Fear
2010: 200 n. 292). So, too, the most recent Latin text: Arnaud-Lindet 1991: 68 (Sulcamum), 249 n. 34
(“erreur d’Orose pour Uscana”).
210
Appendix D 211
and took the town back from the Romans (per Livy 43.18.5–11), installed
a Macedonian garrison there (per Livy 43.21.1), and also assaulted another
Roman-held town called Sulcamum or Sulcanium (per Oros. 4.20.38);4
the Romans attacked Uscana again under Coelius, and failed to retake
it (per Livy 43.21.1).5 Whether this is what actually happened cannot be
determined, but it should be noted that there is nothing unusual, in a
highly lacunose historical tradition, about some material, such as a success-
ful Roman assault by Claudius on Uscana, dropping out. It is perhaps the
case that this reconstruction does less violence to the surviving evidence
than the alternative, which requires discarding as false the identity of one
Roman legate (Claudius or Coelius) and one garrison force (Cretans or
Macedonians) – to say nothing of emending Oros. 4.20.38 without any
MS authority for doing so. A successful Roman assault on Uscana under
Claudius Centho, not reported in the extant tradition, must remain an
open possibility.
4
The order may be reversed if Sulcamum is among the eleven Illyrian forts Perseus takes at Livy
43.19.5, after his success at Uscana.
5
Cf. Hammond 1988: 522–3, assuming, based on Livy’s mention of Illyriorum cohors of 500 at 43.18.11,
that the town’s Illyrian inhabitants rose up against the Cretan garrison after Claudius’ failed attack,
and invited the Romans in. If I read him correctly, Pareti 1953: 66 n. 1 suggests that Claudius was
subordinate to Coelius, who was in charge of Roman forces in Illyria; Coelius, in other words, sent
Claudius to attack Uscana, and Livy 43.10.1–8 and 21.1 refer to the same event, and “Coelius” at 21.1
is metonymical for “Claudius.”
Appendi x E
The Roman and Macedonian Positions near

Lake Ascuris and the Route of Marcius Philippus
through the Lower Olympus Range in 169
The Roman and Macedonian positions near Lake Ascuris are highly
controversial. Kromayer located the Macedonian encampment, called
Lapathus by Livy (44.2.11), at Agios Elias (512MASL), south of Rapsane,
four and a half miles southeast of Lake Ascuris (mod. Lake Nezero, mostly
drained).1 Pritchett, however, initially located the camp on Mt. Analipsis
(1,365MASL), about a mile north of the lake.2 He then changed his mind,
placing the Macedonian camp on Mt. Kolikoumiakou (also called Leake’s
Fort) (1,398MASL), four miles northeast of Mt. Analipsis.3
All scholars after Kromayer, including Pritchett in 1969, placed the
Roman camp on Mt. Metamorphosis (also called Pinakia, Katé-ti-Vrysi,
Durjana, and Livadaki) (1,590MASL), a little under two miles east of Lake
Ascuris.4 Pritchett then reconsidered his former view and located the camp
on Palaiostathmos (1,398MASL), a little under two miles north of Mt.
Metamorphosis,5 but this required rejecting the parenthesis Lapathus uoca-
tur locus at Livy 44.2.11 as an intrusive gloss.6 Nevertheless, his revised view
of the location of both camps, and the ridge on which the two armies
clashed, is based on autopsy, and makes good sense of the rest of Livy’s
account.
The location of the mountain variously called Ottolobum, Octolobum,
Attalobum, and Octolophum in the MSS of Livy (31.36.6, 31.40.9, 44.3.1),
by which Marcius marched toward Lake Azuris, is also controversial.7
1
Kromayer 1907: 272–3 (followed by Meloni 1953: 296 and n. 7; Helly 1972: 281). On the identifica-
tion of Ascuris with the modern Nezero, see Kromayer 1907: 270 n. 1; Meloni 1953: 291 and n. 3;
Pritchett 1969: 170; Briscoe 2012: 469. On what follows, see above, Chapter 6, Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
2
Pritchett 1969: 164–9, with pls. 153, 158–9.
3
Pritchett 1991: 109–12, with fig. 7 on p. 115.
4
Kromayer 1907: 272 and n. 2; Meloni 1953: 296; Pritchett 1969: 173, with pl. 153; Briscoe 2012: 473.
5
Pritchett 1991: 112–16, with Fig. 7 on p. 115 (= my Fig. 6.1, above, Chapter 6, p. 150).
6
Pritchett 1991: 110–11, apparently on the grounds that Livy locates the similarly named Lapathous
(also known as Charax) in the Tempe pass (44.6.10–11).
7
Meloni 1953: 295 n. 4 was unsure of its location.
212
Appendix E 213
Pritchett suggested that the actual name of the mountain was Otolobus,
“Earlobe,” and found a likely candidate in Mt. Kokouli (1,141MASL), the
profile of whose peak contains a concave dip resembling the outline of an
earlobe.8 The dux regius, mentioned by Livy (44.3.1), who held this pos-
ition in 169 cannot be Hippias, according to Briscoe, since his camp was
located at least fifteen miles away as the crow flies, near Lake Ascuris.9
A robust debate also surrounds the route by which Marcius descended
from the Callipeuce forest into the plains to the east of the foothills of
Olympus. There are two possible candidates: the gorge through which the
Ziliana River flows, or the Karavidha gorge to its south. Kromayer and his
followers opted for the former, but Pritchett has twice defended the latter,
on the ground that the Ziliana was easier to traverse, and so would have
been blocked by Macedonian garrisons in 169 (Perseus blocked “all the
passes,” omnis saltus (Livy 44.2.9)).10 The Karavidha, by contrast, was a far
more difficult route, especially for an army with baggage and elephants.
“The Romans,” therefore, “hoped to use [the Ziliana route] when they
were blocked by the Macedonians at the top of the pass. It follows that …
the southern route was not guarded and was … in antiquity a [less] viable
way down” – and this was the one Marcius, perforce, chose.11
8
Pritchett 1969: 171–4, with pl. 148, and 1991: 102–4.
9
Briscoe 2012: 471–2.
10
Pritchett 1969: 174, with pl. 143, and 1991: 126–8 (against Kromayer 1907: 277, 283; Meloni
1953: 300).
11
Pritchett 1991: 124.
Appendi x F
The ἐπιστόλιον of Scipio Nasica and the

Battle of Pydna in 168
Knowledge of the Battle of Pydna suffers not only from the loss of Polybius
and the large lacuna in the sole surviving MS of Livy book 44, but also
from partisan accounts written by participants after the event. The most
important of these is a memoir written by Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos.
I 162, cos. II 155), a first cousin once removed of Paullus’ brother-in-law,
Scipio Africanus Maior, and addressed to a king, probably Massinissa of
Numidia. Traces of the memoir survive most prominently in Plutarch’s
Life of Aemilius Paullus, and much of this material conflicts with what we
know (or think we know) stood in Polybius’ original account, and the
surviving Polybian-derived material in Livy book 44. The most important
discrepancies are:
1. The number of Roman troops that accompanied Scipio on his flanking
maneuver around Olympus.
2. The number of Macedonian troops guarding the Petra pass.
3. The timing of Perseus’ garrisoning of the Petra pass.
4. The mood in the Roman camp on the night of 21 June, during the
eclipse of the moon.
5. How the Battle of Pydna began.1
Scipio’s account has been variously accepted as fact, rejected as self-
glorifying propaganda, reconciled with other surviving accounts, and
cherry-picked for seemingly reliable data, with the rest discarded.2 In my
1
There are several more discrepancies, which may be traceable to Scipio’s memoir, including the
negotiations for Perseus’ surrender at Samothrace, and Paullus’ treatment of the captured king (see,
conveniently, Lehmann 1969: 405–10). On the modern scholarly controversy over Scipio’s marching
route around Olympus, see above, Chapter 6, nn. 145 and 149.
2
Skeptics include Niese 1903: 160–1 n. 5; Lehmann 1969; Hammond 1988: 544, 545 and n. 3, 546; opti-
mists include Pritchett 1969: 159–60; harmonizers include Kromayer 1907: 305 n. 1; Meyer 1909: 783–
4 and nn.; Heiland 1913: 66–7; De Sanctis 1923: 321 n. 321; Meloni 1953: 367; Pareti 1953: 85–6 n. 1, 87,
89–90 n. 3, 90 n. 1; Hammond 1984: 42; pickers and choosers (understandably overlapping to some
extent with the previous category) include Kromayer 1907: 303 n. 1, 304 n. 1; Benecke 1930: 268;
Walbank 1979: 380, 383; Hammond 1984: 41, 42. The only agnostic is Pais 1926: 566 n. 114.
214
Appendix F 215
own account of the Pydna campaign in Chapter 6, I strived to avoid
crediting the Scipionic version of events since I believe it to be highly
tendentious, and it contradicts what we know from other, what I judge
to be more reliable – that is, less transparently politically motivated, and
more self-consciously historical – sources.3
In terms of the first problem, Scipio claimed that he was accompanied
by 8,200 infantry and 120 cavalry on his flanking maneuver (Plut. Aem.
15.5–6). We know that Polybius had a different number, for Plutarch states
explicitly that the 8,320 men Scipio says he took with him “is not as many
as Polybius says.”4 Frustratingly, Plutarch does not say what that number
is; it has also partially disappeared into a lacuna in Livy’s Polybian-derived
account. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the vast majority of scholars
accept the only extant figures, that is, Scipio’s.5 The relevant Livy passage
(44.35.14) reads quinque delectorum militum, five men, in the MS – an
absurdly small number. Briscoe restores this as quinque <milibus> delec-
torum/is militum, 5,000 men, demanded by Plutarch’s different Polybian
number.6 Hammond argues that the mission would have required no more
than a few hundred men, and so perhaps Briscoe’s figure is too high.7 As
Briscoe points out, however, the easiest way to explain the problem is to
assume that ū (where ū = 5,000) once stood in the Livian exemplar, but
the macron over the u was lost in transmission – a fairly common corrup-
tion – and became u (where u = 5). For Lehmann, what matters most is
that Polybius’ integrity must be assumed to be higher than Scipio’s, and so
rejects the latter’s figure of 8,320 men on the principle of quo accuratius,
eo falsius.8
The second and third problems are interrelated. Whereas Livy, follow-
ing Polybius, wrote that a garrison of perhaps 5,000 Macedonians was in
the Petra pass at Pythium and Petra before Scipio left Heracleum,9 Scipio
3
I include Polybius among the latter, even though he may have fallen victim to his Macedonian
informants, who tried to distance themselves from Perseus and his regime, resulting in Polybius’ per-
haps excessively hostile picture of the king (above, Chapter 5, pp. 93–4), and was close to Paullus’ son
Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor. On the other hand, as Lehmann 1969: 401–2, 412 has shown,
Polybius knew of Aemilianus’ relative Scipio’s version of events, but firmly rejected some parts of it.
4
ἡσθεὶς οὖν ὁ Αἰμίλιος δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὅσους Πολύβιος εἴρηκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσους αὐτὸς ὁ Νασικᾶς
λαβεῖν φησι (Plut. Aem. 15.3).
5
Kromayer 1907: 303 n. 1; Meyer 1909: 470 and n. 1; Heiland 1913: 65; Pais 1926: 566; Benecke
1930: 268; Pareti 1953: 88; Meloni 1953: 365–6 and n. 4; Walbank 1979: 380; Hammond 1984: 41.
6
Briscoe 2012: 580.
7
Hammond 1984: 41.
8
Lehmann 1969: 391–3.
9
Briscoe 2012: 570, on the same principle as enunciated in his emendation at Livy 44.35.14 (see
above), argues that the milia (or, more likely, the macron over the u in the exemplar) between
216 Appendix F
said that the pass was empty when he entered, but then a Cretan deserter
informed Perseus about the Romans’ entry, and the king installed a gar-
rison of 12,000 men, against whom Scipio and his men fought a fierce
battle after surprising them in their sleep.10 Leaving aside the self-glorifying
elements in this tale (Scipio fought from his horse an aristeia against a
giant Thracian, and killed him with his cavalry lance), despite the best
efforts of scholars, beginning with Plutarch himself, there is no plausible
way to reconcile Scipio’s evidence with Polybius’. The timeline, for one
thing, cannot work. Scipio’s men made it from Heracleum to Pythium,
a distance of more than twenty miles over rough, hilly terrain, in a single
night (Plut. Aem. 15.8). The Cretan deserter who reported Scipio’s march-
ing route to Perseus will have had to make his way back along Scipio’s
route to the king at Dium to make his report to Perseus, and Perseus will
have had to send his 12,000 men over fifteen miles from Dium to Pythium
and Petra (Livy 44.32.9), where the soldiers will have had enough time to
encamp and sleep – all of this before Scipio launched his assault on the
sleeping soldiers at Pythium, when the great struggle ensued (Plut. Aem.
16.3). Modern scholars, trying to salvage Scipio’s account, are forced to
invent alternative scenarios, whereby Scipio surprised the Macedonians at
Pythium and either began slaughtering them before a great battle ensued,
or slaughtered them where they slept, and then moved on to Petra, where
the great battle against another group of Macedonians ensued.11 Because
of the unreliability of the self-serving Scipionic memoir, I prefer to reject
what cannot be reconciled with Livy’s Polybian account: Scipio and his
men surprised the Macedonian garrison that had earlier been installed in
the pass, and slaughtered them where they slept.
Turning to the fourth point, four versions of what happened in the
Roman camp on the night of the lunar eclipse of 21 June exist. The earli-
est, but incomplete version, in Polybius (29.16; cf. Just. Epit. 33.1.7), simply
contrasts the mood in the Roman camp during the eclipse – joy and elation
at the portended fall of Macedon – with the panic among the Macedonians.
Cicero (Rep. 1.23–4; cf. Val. Max. 8.1.1), reports that the learned Sulpicius
quinque and Macedonum at Livy 44.32.9 dropped out in the process of transmission, and thus
restores quinque <milia> Macedonum. Zon. 9.23.3, following Livy or Polybius, reports that “a very
small guard,” ἐλαχίτην … ϕρουράν, was holding the Petra pass.
10
Plut. Aem. 16.1–3. Rejected, along with the skeptics, by Kromayer 1907: 304 n. 1; Benecke 1930: 268;
Walbank 1979: 383; Hammond 1984: 42.
11
Meyer 1909: 783–4 and nn.; Heiland 1913: 66–7; De Sanctis 1923: 321 n. 321; Meloni 1953: 367; Pareti
1953: 85–6 n. 1, 89–90 n. 3, 90 n. 1; cf. Kromayer 1907: 305 n. 1; Meyer 1909: 784; Pareti 1953: 87;
Hammond 1984: 42.
Appendix F 217
Galus, in 168 a tribunus militum in Paullus’ service, explained to the ter-
rified men the morning after the eclipse the scientific reason for the inci-
dent, thus calming everyone down. Livy (44.36–37.9; cf. Plin. NH 9.53;
Quint. 1.10.47; Front. Str. 1.12.8) has Sulpicius predict the eclipse before the
assembled soldiers, and explain the phenomenon, and so on the following
night all was calm in the Roman camp, while widespread panic gripped the
Macedonians. The version preserved in Zonaras (9.22.4–5, via Dio, prob-
ably annalistic) has Paullus predict the eclipse before the assembled sol-
diers. Plutarch’s account (Aem. 16.7–13) lacks any prediction, by Sulpicius
or Paullus, and instead has the Roman soldiers follow their usual practice
during an eclipse of the moon – clashing bronze utensils together in order
to call the moon back, and wielding torches and firebrands. Paullus, though
he understood the scientific explanation for the phenomenon, nevertheless,
because he was a pious man, sacrificed eleven heifers as the moon began to
re-emerge. In the morning, he sacrificed twenty oxen before the twenty-first
predicted victory if he remained on the defensive. He then ordered his men
to prepare for battle, and calmly sat in his tent until late in the day, so the
sun would not be in his men’s eyes when they joined battle.
Most scholars now reject the historicity of Sulpicius’ involvement for a
number of reasons, the most important of which is that Polybius appar-
ently did not know of it, and so it must come from an annalist.12 It may be,
however, that Polybius’ account is simply too fragmentary at this point or
compressed by his excerptor to exclude the possibility that Sulpicius played a
role similar to that in Cicero, our earliest Latin source, that is, that the mili-
tary tribune explained the eclipse to the men the next morning. Moreover,
Polybius disliked Sulpicius – he describes him as “a man who had lost his
wits”13 – and so may have maliciously scrubbed him from the eclipse episode.
But if Zonaras, perhaps following a different annalist from the one
Cicero used, is correct in saying that Paullus predicted the eclipse to his
men before it occurred, then what are we to make of Plutarch’s elaborate
and detailed account, where Paullus knows the scientific explanation for
the phenomenon, but does not share it with his men, and instead performs
a sacrifice out of piety? In 1969, Lehmann made the intriguing suggestion
that, like a lot of other variants surrounding the Pydna story, the allegation
of Sulpicius’ involvement ultimately goes back to Scipio’s account.14
12
De Sanctis 1923: 270–1; Meloni 1953: 377; Walbank 1979: 386–7; Hammond 1988: 552; Briscoe
2012: 584–5.
13
παρεστηκὼς ἄνθρωπος τῇ διανοίᾳ (Polyb. 31.6.5; on the meaning of διάνοια here, see LSJ,
s.u. B 6).
14
Lehmann 1969: 399–400 and n. 38, 400–1.
218 Appendix F
This would seem to make sense since the logical consequence of the story
– that Paullus was eager to bring on battle (our fifth problem) – must also
depend on Scipio. In Plutarch, Paullus, as a consequence of the eclipse, sac-
rifices ox after ox until he gets the prediction of victory in a defensive clash,
and then calmly sits in his tent until late in the day, when the position of
the sun will not affect his men. Then, toward evening, the consul brings
on the battle by arranging for a draught animal to bolt across the riverbed
toward the enemy lines (Plut. Aem. 17.11–18.1). Plutarch then reports a variant
tradition at Aem. 18.2 (derived, perhaps, from Posidonius, the other source
he consults for Pydna: above, Chapter 6, n. 159), according to which some
Thracians under a certain Alexander attacked Roman foraging parties, and
700 Ligurians retaliated, thus beginning the battle. Plutarch then reverts to
the source he followed at Aem. 17.11–18.1, describing Paullus calmly leaving his
tent and encouraging the soldiers, and then – and here is Lehmann’s damning
evidence for Plutarch’s account of the eclipse – Scipio rides out to the skir-
mishers, and sees the enemy advancing, among whom are the Thracians who,
Plutarch says, Scipio described in his account as most fearsome in appear-
ance (Aem. 18.3–5). And, of course, the subsequent Roman victory vindicates
Scipio’s advice to Paullus the day before – that he should not wait for Perseus
to withdraw deeper into Macedonia, but take the fight to the enemy straight-
away (Livy 44.36.8–14, 38.1–3 (where Paullus describes Scipio as “an outstand-
ing young man,” egregius adulescens), Plut. Aem. 17.3–4).
All of this is, once again, a Scipionic whitewash. Nobody predicted the
eclipse, it did not seem to agitate the Romans, the battle began the next
day by accident, Paullus was not planning to fight that day, and in fact was
caught unawares when the fighting broke out.15
In sum, where it conflicts with other evidence, the evidence that is explic-
itly attributed or likely traceable to Scipio’s self-aggrandizing ἐπιστόλιον
is probably to be rejected – the practice I have followed in my account of
the Pydna campaign.
15
As Lendon 2005: 204–5, 208 points out, Paullus hoped to delay as long as possible since the
Macedonian phalanx was deployed on ground of Perseus’ choosing and most suited to it; the consul
believed that, if he waited long enough, he could lure the Macedonians onto the more uneven
ground in front of the Roman camp. For the record, most scholars believe that the battle started as
Livy says, that is, by accident (Kromayer 1909: 316–28 and 1924: 600–8; Meloni 1953: 385; Hammond
1984: 44). As Meloni points out, Paullus’ victory monument at Delphi seems to represent a bolting
horse in a prominent position, but the surviving fragments surrounding the horse cannot tell us
whether this was by accident or prearranged by the consul. The belief of Niese 1903: 162, and Meyer
1909: 791, that Perseus actually brought on the battle, has found no followers.
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Index
Abdera, Greek city on the Thracian coast, 15n. second year

41, 60, 174 political disruption sparked by Roman
Third Macedonian War embassy, 143
second year troubles with Sparta, 13, 82n. 23
brutalized by Hortensius, 140 Acilius Glabrio, M’. (cos. 191), 44, 59n. 12
embassy to Rome, 140 Aetolian War
s.c. de Abderitis issued, 140, see also second year
Appendix C passim given (unsolicited) strategic advice by
Abrupolis, king of the Thracian Sapaei, 15n. 41 Flamininus, 42
attacks Macedonia (179), 58, 81 Syrian and Aetolian Wars
Acarnania, Acarnanians, 14 second year
deprived of the city of Leucas (167), 177 Battle of Thermopylae, 36–37
First Macedonian War recovers some cities in Thessaly, 36
Roman operations in (211), 25 Aelius Ligus, P. (cos. 172), 112
politicians exiled to Italy (167), 177 Aemilius Lepidus, M. (ambassador)
Third Macedonian War embassy to Philip V at Abydus (200), 28,
second year 28n. 53
political disruption sparked by Roman Aenus and Maronea, Greek cities on the
embassy, 143 Thracian coast, 40, 60, 140, 174
two executed by the Athenians (201), 28n. 53 declared free by the senate, 46–47
Achaean League, Achaeans, 12–13 dispute between Philip V and Rome over,
Achaean War (146), 194 44–45, 55, 86, 92, 180
Archon-Callicrates debate (175), 61, 61n. 29, embassy to Rome from Maronean exiles (186/
62n. 30, 94–96 5), 45
congratulated by Rome for resisting Perseus Maronean exiles address senatorial
(173), 66, 117 commission (185), 46
conquest of the Peloponnese, 13, 82n. 21 Maroneans allegedly massacred at Philip V’s
courted by Perseus (175), 60–61, 80, 89, orders (184), 47, 55, 92, 180
117, 118 Rome refuses to restore to Pergamene
Fourth Macedonian War control, 182
first year Aetolian League, Aetolians, 12
supplies troops to Scipio Nasica, alliance with Antiochus III, 34n. 88, 36
187, 194 civil strife (170s), 71
over a thousand politicians exiled to Italy Roman attempts to end (174), 65–66, 121
(167), 177 debts cancelled (177), 59, 80, 89, 90, 117
Second Macedonian War defends Delphi against the Celts (279), 12
third year embassy to Philip V (193), 39, 46
sides with Rome (198), 13, 32 embassy to Rome (172), 199
Third Macedonian War embassy to Rome (202), 27
first year massacre of principes by pro-Roman
contributes troops to Roman war politicians (167), 177
effort, 128 politicians exiled to Italy (167), 177
228
Index 229
receives Macedonian garrison (177), 60, 62n. captured by the Romans, 128
30, 65, 72, 80, 89 amicitia, ”friendship”, 63, 81–82, 84, 85, 116, 121,
Second Macedonian War 180–181
anger with Rome over settlement, 36 amicus, amici, ”friends of the Roman people”
first year Abrupolis, 71
refuses to aid Romans, 30 Apollonia, 22
second year Arthetaurus, 71
defeated by Philip V, 31 Demetrius of Pharos, 19
Third Macedonian War Egypt, 19
first year Elis, Sparta, and Messenia, 25
Battle of Callicinus in Illyria, 3, 14
blamed for Roman defeat, leaders sent Issa, 69
to Rome under guard, 131 Pergamum, 11, 26
contributes troops to Roman war Rhodes, 11
effort, 128 Seleucid Empire, 35
second year Thracian tribes (172), 69
political disruption sparked by Roman Amphipolis (Macedonian city), 58, 84, 140, 169,
embassy, 143 169n. 161, 170, 173, 174
treaty of alliance with Rome (211), 12, 24, 25, Amynander, king of the Athamanians, see
25n. 36 Acarnania, Acarnanians
treaty of peace with Philip V (206), 12, 26 Andriscus (Philip VI), Macedonian pretender,
Aetolian War (192−189) 186–191
causes arrested by Demetrius I, sent to Rome, 186
Aetolian anger with Rome over Second war with Rome, see also Macedonian
Macedonian War settlement, 36 War, Fourth
first year Anicius Gallus, Cn. (legate)
defection of Greeks from Rome, 36 Third Macedonian War
Seleucid troops massacre Roman garrison fourth year
at Delium, 36 attacks Aeginium, 169–170
second year Anicius Gallus, L. (pr. 168), 159, 175
Acilius Glabrio, Baebius Tamphilus, and commissioner for the Roman settlement of
Philip V recover some cities in Illyria (167), 175
Thessaly, 36 Third Macedonian War
Flamininus gives Acilius Glabrio fourth year
(unsolicited) strategic advice, 42 defeats Genthius, 161–162
Heracela besieged by Acilius Annius Luscus, T. (ambassador), see Appendix
Glabrio, 42 A passim
Lamia besieged by Philip V, 42, 46, 94 Anticyra, city in Phocis
third year First Macedonian War
Aetolian operations against Philip V, 43 captured by the Romans (210), 25
Philip V assists Roman army marching Antigonus II Gonatas, Macedonian king, 5, 5n.
overland through Macedonia and 14, 9n. 36
Thrace, 39, 43 Antigonus III Doson, Macedonian king,
fourth year 5n. 14, 13
peace settlement, 37n. 106, 43 Battle of Sellasia (222), 20
Alexander (V), Macedonian pretender, 187 Antigonus the One-Eyed, 12, 55
Alexander I, Epirote Molossian king Antigonus, son of Echecrates
invasion of Italy (334–330), 14, 18–19, 176 chosen Philip V’s successor, 54, 97
Alexander the Great, Macedonian king, 1, 6n. executed by Perseus, 57
23, 7n. 25, 9, 14, 15, 19, 35, 55, 126 reveals to Philip V Perseus’ plot to eliminate
and Roman embassy at Babylon (323), 18 Demetrius, 54
orders Romans to stop Etruscan pirate Antiochus III the Great, Seleucid king, see also
raids, 18 Aetolian War (192–189) and
Alope, city in Phthiotic Achaea, 40, 46 Syrian War (192–188),
Third Macedonian War conquests, 10, 15
first year inability to reconquer Pergamum, 11
230 Index
Antiochus III the Great, Seleucid king (cont.) embassy to Rome (186/5), 45
makes Seleucid empire a Roman amicus Second Macedonian War
(200), 35 second year
pact with Philip V (203/2), 27, 35, 102n. 114 defeated by Philip V, 31
parallels with situation in late 170s, Syrian War and Aetolian Wars
107–110 major cities defect from Rome, 36
Syrian and Aetolian Wars Athenaeus, brother of Attalus II and Eumenes
second year II, 128
Battle of Thermopylae, 36–37 Third Macedonian War
Syrian War, 34 fourth year
third year at the Battle of Pydna, 167n. 153
Battle of Magnesia, 37 Athens, Athenians, 78n. 2, 82n. 20, 104n. 127
negotiations with L. Scipio fail, 37 attacked by Macedon (200), 28
fourth-fifth years embassy to Rome (201), 27–28, 120
agrees to peace terms (Peace of executes two Acarnanians (201), 28n. 53
Apamea), 37–38 Third Macedonian War
Antiochus IV Epiphanes, Seleucid king second year
accession to the throne and its effects, 101–110 embassy to Rome, 141
charm offensive toward Greek states, 103–104 Atilius Serranus, A. (ambassador, legate), 70,
eagerness to provoke Sixth Ptolemaic – 73, 125
Seleucid War (“Sixth Syrian War”) and noua sapientia debate (171), 110–113
(mid-late 170s), 101–110 Attalus I, king of Pergamum, 28
embassy to Rome (173), 105–106 declares himself king, 11
expansion, 11 defeats Galatians, 11
ordered to retreat from Egypt by Rome (168), makes Pergamum a Roman amicus
177–178 (209/8), 11, 26
rejects Perseus’ alliance request, 73, 124 Attalus II, brother of Eumenes II, 128
Third Macedonian War cultivation by Rome, 182, 184
fourth year requests that Aenus and Maronea be restored
refuses to support Perseus, 160 to Pergamene control, 182
Antiochus V Eupator, Seleucid king, 105 Third Macedonian War
Antron, city in Phthiotic Achaea, 40, 46, 86 first year
Third Macedonian War at the Battle of Callicinus, 130
first year at the Battle of Crannon, 136
surrenders to the Romans, 137 third year
Apelles, Friend of Philip V, 49, 52, 52n. 62, 54 accompanies Roman invasion of
Apollonia, Greek city, 22, 31, 76, 76n. 88, 124, Macedonia, 151
126, 127, 145, 162, 205n. 8 fourth year
First Macedonian War at the Battle of Pydna, 167n. 153
besieged by Philip V (214), 25
siege lifted by Valerius Laevinus (214), 25 Baebius Tamphilus, M. (pr. 191), 45
Third Macedonian War Syrian and Aetolian Wars
first year second year
contributes troops to Roman war recovers some cities in Thessaly, 36
effort, 128 Baebius, A. (praef.)
Apollonius of Miletus, advisor to Antiochus IV, oversees massacre of Aetolian principes
104, 105 by pro-Roman politicians
embassy to Rome (173), 105–106 (167), 177
Appian of Alexandria, historian Baebius, Q. (tr. pl. 200)
use of Polybius as a source, 97–98, 115n. 173 urges rejection of declaration of war on
Ardiaei, an Illyrian people, see Illyria, Illyrians Macedon, 28
Arthetaurus, Illyrian king, 71, 72 Bastarnae, Bastarnians, 15
Athamania, Athamanians, 13 Third Macedonian War
Aetolian War second year
operations against Philip V, 43 resume relations with Perseus, 141
Index 231
fourth year Cato the Elder, 107, 111
refuse to support Perseus, 160 aristeia of his son at the Battle of Pydna,
transfer to Dardania by Philip V, 40, 169n. 160
57–58, 99–100 as a source for Polybius, 158n. 124
war with Dardanians (early 170s), 62–63 criticism of kings, 114–115
Bithynia, Asia Minor kingdom, 11, see also defense of Rhodes (167), 74n. 83, 181, 181n. 32
Prusias II, king of Bithynia on bipolar balancing, 74n. 83
Boeotia, Boeotians, 13 on Rome’s inability to defend
civil strife and breakup of Boeotian League Macedonia, 190
(172), 111 on the decline of morality, 115
embassy to Macedon (172), 75, 93, 198–199 Chalcis, Greek city, 30, 30n. 61, 32, 36, 68, 72,
politicians exiled to Italy (167), 177 73, 73n. 79, 128, 128n. 20, 140n. 66,
Syrian and Aetolian Wars 148, 204, 206, 209
first year Syrian and Aetolian Wars
defects from Rome, 36 first year
treaty of alliance with Perseus (174), 61, 70, defects from Rome, 36
71, 80, 89 Third Macedonian War
Bottia, region in Macedonia, 84, 174 first year
Byzantium, 60 brutalized by Lucretius, 140
receives military assistance from Perseus (174), second year
61, 62n. 30, 71, 72, 80, 89 brutalized by Hortensius, 140, 209
embassy to Rome, 140
Caecilius Metellus, Q. (ambassador), 45 Claudius Centho, Ap. (legate, ambassador), 2n.
Caecilius Metellus, Q. (pr. 148) 6, 154, 154n. 114, 158, 159, 161
celebrates triumph over Andriscus, 188 embassy to Macedon (172), see Appendix
Fourth Macedonian War A passim
third year Third Macedonian War
defeated by Andriscus in cavalry second year
skirmish, 187 operations in Epirus, 145
defeats Andriscus at the Battle of two assaults on Uscana, see Appendix
Pydna, 187 D passim
Callicrates of Leontium, Achaean League Claudius Centho, C. (legate), 30
politician Second Macedonian War
despised by his fellow citizens (after 167), 184 first year
speech against Perseus (175/4), 48n. 43, 61, 85, defends Athens, 30
91n. 64, 94–95, 117, 121 Claudius Marcellus, M. (ambassador), 66
Carthage, Carthaginians Claudius Marcellus, M. (legate), 149
accused by Massinissa of meeting with Claudius Marcellus, M. (pr. 169), 147
Macedonian ambassadors (174), Claudius Nero, Ti. (ambassador), 69
65, 91n. 62 Claudius Pulcher, C. (cens. 169), 148
First Punic War (264–241), 3, 20 Cleopatra Syra, queen of Egypt, daughter of
Second Punic War (218–201), 3, 23, 65 Antiochus III
Third Macedonian War death and its effects (176), 102–103
first year Cleuas, Macedonian garrison commander
naval contribution to Roman war Third Macedonian War
effort, 125 second year
second year operations in Epirus, 145
embassy to Rome, 142 Coele-Syria
treaty with Philip V (215), 7, 29 Ptolemaic – Seleucid wars (”Syrian Wars”)
Cassius Longinus, C. (cos. 171) over, 10, 101–110
dispute over Macedonian command (171), 112 Coelius, L. (legate)
Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War
first year second year
invades Illyria and Macedonia, 112 fails to take Uscana, see Appendix D
Cassius, C. (tr. mil.), 162 passim
232 Index
commissions, senatorial fragments of Aemilius Paullus’ victory
about Philip V (185), 45–46, 63, 83–84, monument at, 218n. 15
86, 94 inscription listing charges against Perseus
investigates Seleucid empire (162), 184 (RDGE 40), 79, 84, 88, 90, 99, 123
Corcyra, Greek island, 14, 30, 70, 125, 204 Delphic Amphictyony, 12
Corinth, 26n. 40, 32, 66, 194 grants Macedon place on Council (178), 59
Cornelius Lentulus, P. (ambassador, tr. mil.), 70 Demetrias, Greek city, 30, 32, 36, 36n. 101, 40,
Third Macedonian War 45, 86, 125, 137, 155, 156n. 115
first year Demetrius I Soter, Seleucid king, 105
besieges Haliartus, ordered to stop, 128 arrests Andriscus, sends him to Rome
garrisons Thebes, 125 (151), 186
Cornelius Lentulus, Ser. (ambassador), 70, 73 escapes Rome, usurps Seleucid throne
Coronea, Boeotian city, 57, 57n. 3, 72, 75, (161), 183
75n. 86 replaces Ariarathes V with Orophernes on
Third Macedonian War Cappadocian throne (158), 183–184
first year Demetrius II, Macedonian king, 15
attacked by the Romans, 137 Demetrius of Pharos, Illyrian dynast, see also
embassy to Rome, 139–140 Illyria, Illyrians, Illyrian Wars (229
s.c. de Coronaeis issued, 139–140, see also and 219)
Appendix C passim convinces Philip V to turn to the West, 22
surrenders to and brutalized by Licinius, provision in treaty between Macedon and
139–140 Carthage concerning (215), 23n. 25
Cotys, chieftain of the Odrysian Thracians rewarded by Rome (229), 19
alliance with Perseus (early 170s), 60, Demetrius the Besieger, 12, 13
101n. 109 orders Romans to stop Etruscan pirate
Third Macedonian War raids, 18
first year Demetrius, son of Philip V
at the Battle of Callicinus, 129 hostage in Rome (196–190), 48, 104n. 127
dismissed with gifts by Perseus, 137 murdered, 54, 94, 97
kingdom invaded and territory private discussion with Flamininus
seized, 137 (184), 49, 52
fourth year returned to Macedon (190), 39–40
at the Battle of Pydna, 168 rivalry with Perseus, 47–54, 94
Crete, Cretans sent to Rome as ambassador (184), 47,
Third Macedonian War 48–49, 55
second year Dicetas, Boeotian politician, 72, 73
embassy to Rome, 142 Didas, general of Philip V, 53, 54
garrison Uscana, see Appendix D passim poisons Demetrius, son of Philip V, 54
Cynoscephalae, Battle of (197), 33 Third Macedonian War
first year
Dardanians, 15 at the Battle of Callicinus, 129
embassy to Rome (177), 62, 64, 99, 117, 200 Digitius, Sex. (tr. mil.)
Philip V’s plan to transfer Bastarnae to their Third Macedonian War
territory, 40, 57–58, 99–100 second year
Second Macedonian War reports to the senate on war’s
second year progress, 146
attacked by Macedonians, 31 Dium, Macedonian city, 149, 152, 153, 154, 157,
Third Macedonian War 158, 171, 216
second year Dolopia, Dolopians, 83
attacked by Perseus, 141 assassinate their Macedonian governor
war with Bastarnae (early 170s), 62–63 Euphranor (mid-170s), 72, 83
war with Thracians, 58 conquered by Macedon (late 3rd c.), 83
Decimius, M. (ambassador), 69 removed from Macedonian control (196), 83
Delos, 57, 61, 61n. 29, 161 subdued by Perseus (mid-170s), 63, 71, 72, 80,
Delphi, 57, 61 83–85, 117, 120
assassination attempt on Eumenes II at (172), Doris, region in central Greece
68, 71, 80, 87–88 civil strife involving Perseus, 80, 85, 89
Index 233
Egypt, 11 hired by Perseus to assassinate Eumenes II
embassy to Rome (201), 27–28 (172), 68, 87–88
wars over Coele-Syria (”Syrian Wars”), 10, Third Macedonian War
101–110 first year
Eleusis at the Battle of Callicinus
suburb of Alexandria, Egypt, 177–178 convinces Perseus to call off
Elimea, region in Macedonia, 127, 141, 145 battle, 130
Elis, region in the Peloponnese fourth year
First Macedonian War accompanies Perseus to Samothrace after
joins Rome against Philip V (210), 25 Pydna, 169
Syrian and Aetolian Wars assassinated on Perseus’ orders, 169
first year
defects from Rome, 36 Fabius Labeo, Q. (legate)
Eordaea, region in Macedonia, 126 destroys Antissa (167), 177
Epirus, Epirotes, 14 Fabius Maximus, Q. (legate)
politicians exiled to Italy (167), 177 raids Illyrians (167), 175n. 14
Roman reprisals against Perseus’ Molossian Third Macedonian War
Epirote allies (167), 175–176 fourth year
Second Macedonian War (198 campaign) executes flanking maneuver around
brokers Aous conference, 31 Mt. Olympus, 163–165, see also
Eulaeus and Lenaeus, advisers to Ptolemy VI Appendix F passim
Philometor fides, “good faith”, 29, 111
eagerness to provoke Sixth Ptolemaic – Flamininus, T. Quinctius (cos. 198, procos.
Seleucid War (”Sixth Syrian War”) 197–194, ambassador 191–190)
(mid-late 170s), 101–110 Aetolian War
Eumenes II, king of Pergamum second year
accuses Rhodes of disloyalty to strategic advice (unsolicited) to Acilius
Rome, 74n. 81 Glabrio, 42
death (159), 185 first letter to Philip V (184), 49
embassies from Greek cities about Perseus orders Messenia to become part of the
(mid-170s), 64, 87 Achaean League (191), 82n. 21
expansion, 11 private discussion with Demetrius, son of
gains in Asia Minor after Syrian War, 44 Philip V (184), 49, 52
gains in Europe after Syrian War, 44 proclaims freedom of the Greeks
helps Antiochus IV secure Seleucid throne (196), 34
(175), 100, 104 second letter to Philip V (181), 49–50, 54
humiliated by Rome (167/6), 181–182 Second Macedonian War
popularity with the Greeks (after 167), 183, 185 third year
speech to the senate against Perseus (172), 60, Aous conference, 31
67, 76, 85, 88, 91, 97, 99, 114, 115– arrives at Aous gorge, skirmishes with
116, 121, see also Appendix A passim Macedonians, 31
Third Macedonian War captures cities in Phocis, 31–32
first year conference at Nicea, 32
at the Battle of Callicinus, 130 convinces Achaean League to join Rome
at the Battle of Crannon, 136 (198), 13, 32
contributes troops to Roman war destroys Phaloria, attacks outposts of
effort, 128 Aeginium, fails to take Atrax by
third year siege, 31–32
participation in Roman campaign in fourth year
Chalcidice, 155, 158 Battle of Cynoscephalae, 33
fourth year takes leave of the Greeks, 35, 119
alleged secret deal with freedom of the Greeks, 7, 34–35, 74–75
Perseus, 160, 181 Furius, C. (naval legate), 142
victim of assassination attempt at Delphi
(172), 68, 71, 80, 87–88 Galatians, 11
war on the Galatians (168–166), 182, 184 declared free by Rome (166), 182
Evander, Cretan mercenary captain Third Macedonian War
234 Index
Galatians (cont.) raided by Scipio Nasica and Fabius Maximus
fourth year (167), 175n. 14
horse transports intercepted by Roman settlement (167), 175
Macedonians at sea, 161 Ismenias, stratēgos of the Boeotian League (173/
war with Eumenes (168–166), 182, 184 2), 70, 72, 73
Genthius, Illyrian king Issa, Issaei, Greek island, 142, 175
attacks Issa (172), 69 embassy to Rome (172), 69, 197
Third Macedonian War Iuventus Thalna, P. (pr. 149)
first year Fourth Macedonian War
(unwittingly?) supplies fifty-four lemboi second year
to the Romans, 125n. 6 defeated by Andriscus and killed, 187
second year
embassies to Perseus, 145–146 Lamia, city in Malis, 26n. 39, 40
fourth year Aetolian War
alliance with Perseus, 159 second year
arrests Roman ambassadors Petilius and besieged by Philip V, 42, 46, 94
Perpenna, 162 Larisa Cremaste, city in Phthiotic Achaea,
defeated by Rome, 161–162 40, 46, 86
Gonnus, Thessalian city, 127, 132, 137 Third Macedonian War
first year
Hagesilochus, Rhodian politician (prytanis 172), attacked by the Romans, 128, 137
73, 125n. 8 Larissa, Thessalian city, 31, 125, 127, 131, 132, 137,
embassy to Rome (169), 156, 178 143, 144n. 83, 153, 204, 205
Haliartus, Boeotian city, 72, 75, 75n. 86 Licinius Crassus, C. (cos. 168), 130, 159
Third Macedonian War Licinius Crassus, P. (cos. 171)
first year dispute over Macedonian command (171), 112
besieged by the Romans, 128, 134 Third Macedonian War
destroyed by the Romans, 134 first year
Hannibal, Carthaginian commander, 4, attacks Coronea, 137
23, 27, 92 attacks Larisa Cremaste, 137
destroys Saguntum (219), 28, 81n. 18 Battle of Callicinus, 128–133
Second Punic War (218–201), 3, 11 Battle of Crannon, 135–137
Syrian War captures and sacks Malloea in
third year Perrhaebia, 137
commands Seleucid fleet, 37 destroys Pteleum, 137
Heraclea, city in Malis difficulties conducting the levy, 99, 113n.
Aetolian War 160, 114
second year march to Thessaly, rendezvous with
besieged by Acilius Glabrio, 42 allied contingents, 127–128
Heracleum, Macedonian city, 149, 151, 155, 156, mobilization, 76, 124–126
157, 163, 215, 216 receives surrender of and brutalizes
Hippias of Beroea, Macedonian general, 126, Coronea, 139–140
127, 130, 148, 149, 151n. 105, 153, 213 receives surrender of Antron, 137
Hortensius, L. (pr. 170) recovers Tripolis (Azorus, Pythium, and
Third Macedonian War Doliche), 137
second year Liguria, Ligurians, 75
brutalizes Abdera, 140 assigned as province to consuls (172), 76
brutalizes Chalcis, 140, 209 Ligurian War (197–172), 113
Hostilius Mancinus, A. (cos. 170), 148 Lissus, Greek city, 27, 161
Third Macedonian War Locris, region in central Greece, 12, 14, 32
second year Lucretius Gallus, C. (pr. 171)
almost kidnapped, defeated in battle by Third Macedonian War
Perseus, 141, 176 first year
besieges and destroys Haliartus, 134
Illyria, Illyrians, 14 brutalizes Chalcis, 140, 209
embassy to Rome (172), 69, 142 captures Thisbe, punishes Macedonian
Illyrian Wars (229 and 219), 3, 14, 20 partisans, 134, 140n. 62
Index 235
naval operations, 128 first year
Lucretius, M. (legate) Aetolian League refuses to aid Romans, 30
Third Macedonian War Claudius Centho defends Athens, 30
first year Philip V attacks Athens, ravages Attic
blockades Haliartus, 128 countryside, 30
Lucretius, Sp. (legate), 153 fourth year
Lycia, Lycians, region in SW Asia Minor Battle of Cynoscephalae, 33
Romans attempt to free from Rhodian second year
control (177), 84, 120 Macedonians defeat Dardanians, 31
uprising against Rhodes (late 170s), 67 Philip V victorious over the Aetolians and
Lyncestis, region in Macedonia, 30 Athamanians, 31
Roman fleet takes Oreus, 31
Macedonia, Macedonians Roman victories over Macedonian
army, 9–10, 129n. 26 forces, 30–31
civil strife in (after 167), 186 third year
merides, 5, 84, 173–174, 185, 186, 188–191 Achaean League joins Rome, 13, 31–32
political structure and institutions, 4–9 Aous conference, 31
Macedonian War, First (214–205), 13, 24–27, 32 conference at Nicaea, 32
Apollonia besieged by Philip V (214), 25 Flamininus captures cities in Phocis, 31–32
Elis, Sparta, and Messenia join Rome against Flamininus destroys Phaloria, attacks
Philip (210), 25 outposts of Aeginium, fails to take
mediation attempts (209, 208, 207), 26 Atrax by siege, 31–32
Oricum captured by Philip V (214), 24 Macedonian embassy to Rome, 32
Pergamum becomes a Roman amicus Philip V retreats to and plunders Thessaly,
(209/8), 11, 26 withdraws to Tempe pass, 31
Philip V captures Lissus (213/2), 25 skirmishing in Aous gorge, 31
Philip V’s operations in the Peloponnese and fourth year
Illyria (213–212), 25 Battle of Cynoscephalae, 33
Roman and Macedonian operations fifth year
(209), 26 settlement and peace, 34, 82n. 22
Roman operations in Acarnania and on Macedonian War, Third (171–168)
Zacynthus (211), 25 causes
Romans capture Anticyra (210), 25 defensive/pre-emptive theories
treaty between Rome and Philip V (“Peace of coalition of kings, 100
Phoenice”) (205), 25n. 36, 27, 28 coalition of kings (revised), 101–110
treaty of alliance between Rome and the parallels between late 200s and late 170s,
Aetolian League (211), 12, 24, 25 107–110
treaty of peace between Philip V and the Perseus inherits Philip V’s secret war
Aetolian League (206), 12, 26 plans, 91–100
Valerius Laevinus recaptures Oricum synthesis, 121–123
(214), 25 systemic theories
Valerius Laevinus relieves siege of Apollonia economic crisis/social revolution,
(214), 25 117–119
Macedonian War, Fourth (150–148), 186–191 pericentric theories, 120–121
first year political polarization of the Greek
Achaean League supplies troops to Scipio world, 119
Nasica, 187, 194 zero-sum psychology of imperial
second year relationship, 119–120
Iuventius Thalna defeated by Andriscus theories of Roman aggression
and killed, 187 exceptional bellicosity (gloria-seeking
third year and greed), 113–115
Andriscus defeats Romans in cavalry intolerance of Perseus’ pretensions to
skirmish, 187 status equality, 116
Romans defeat Andriscus at Pydna, 187 party political explanations, 110–113
Macedonian War, Second (200–196), 13, resentment at being replaced as
27–35, 48 hegemon, 115–116
causes, 29–30 first year, 124–139
236 Index
Macedonian War, Third (171–168) (cont.) sparks political disruption in Achaea,
Alope captured by the Romans, 128 Aetolia, and Acarnania, 143
Antron surrenders to the Romans, 137 embassy from Thisbe to Rome, 140
Battle of Callicinus, 128–133 L. Coelius fails to take Uscana, see
Battle of Crannon, 135–137 Appendix D passim
Chalcis brutalized by Lucretius, 140, 209 Oreus raided by Perseus, 140–141
Coronea attacked by the Romans, 137 Perseus campaigns in Perrhaebia, Thessaly,
Coronea surrenders to and brutalized by and against the Dardanians, 141
Licinius, 139–140 Perseus resumes relations with the
Cotys dismissed by Perseus with gifts, 137 Bastarnae, 141
embassy from Coronea to Rome, 139–140 Perseus’ winter campaign in Illyria
failed Macedonian attack on Roman camp, capture of Uscana, 144, see also
134–135 Appendix D passim
Larisa Cremaste attacked by the Romans, Roman and Macedonian operations in
128, 137 Epirus, 145
Licinius captures and sacks Malloea in Roman naval reinforcements sent to
Perrhaebia, 137 Illyria, 142
Macedonian mobilization, 126 s.c. de Abderitis issued, 140, see also
Perseus seizes Volustana and Tempe passes, Appendix C passim
126–127 s.c. de Thisbensibus issued, 140, see also
Pteleum destroyed by the Romans, 137 Appendix C passim
Roman mobilization, 76, 124–126 Sex. Digitius reports to the senate on war’s
Roman naval operations, 128 progress, 146
Romans besiege and destroy third year, 147–158
Haliartus, 134 embassy from Prusias II to Rome, 142
Romans capture Thisbe, punish embassy from Rhodes to
Macedonian partisans, 134, Rome, 156, 178
140n. 62 Perseus abandons passes into Macedonia,
Romans march to Thessaly, rendezvous 151–153
with allied contingents, 127–128 Perseus occupies passes into Macedonia,
s.c. de Coronaeis issued, 139–140, see also 148–149
Appendix C passim Roman campaign in Chalcidice, 155–156
Tripolis (Azorus, Pythium, and Doliche) Roman invasion of Macedonia, 148–151, see
recovered by the Romans, 137 also Appendix E passim
surrenders to Perseus, 127 Roman operations in Macedonia
second year, 139–147 capture of Agassae, Pydna, Heracleum,
Abdera brutalized by Hortensius, 140 Tempe pass, 153–154
Chalcis brutalized by Hortensius, 140, 209 Roman troubles with the levy, 147–148
Claudius Centho makes two assaults on fourth year
Uscana, see Appendix D passim alleged secret deal between Perseus and
consul Hostilius almost kidnapped, Eumenes II, 160
defeated in battle by Perseus, alliance between Perseus and
141, 176 Genthius, 159
embassies exchanged between Genthius Battle of Pydna, 9, 10, 165–169
and Perseus, 145–146 heroic self-sacrifice of Paeligni and
embassies from Miletus, Alabanda, and Marrucini at, 167–168
Lampsacus to Rome, 141–142 Perseus flees battlefield early (?),
embassy from Abdera to Rome, 140 168n. 159
embassy from Athens to Rome, 141 Pydna taken and plundered after
embassy from Carthage to Rome, 142 battle, 169
embassy from Chalcis to Rome, 140 Cn. Anicius attacks Aeginium, 169–170
embassy from Cretans to Rome, 142 Cn. Octavius takes and plunders
embassy from Massinssa to Rome, 142 Meliboea, 169
embassy from the Romans to embassy from Rhodes to Aemilius Paullus
Greece, 143 in Macedonia, 163
Index 237
embassy from the Romans to Massinissa, Numidian king, 214
Genthius, 162 embassy to Rome (174), 65, 91n. 62
Galatian horse transports intercepted by Third Macedonian War
Macedonians at sea, 161 first year
Genthius arrests Roman ambassadors contributions to Roman war
Petilius and Perpenna, 162 effort, 132
Genthius defeated by Rome, 161–162 second year
naval encounters in the Aegean, embassy to Rome, 142
160–161 merides, see Macedonia
Paullus’ report on Roman position in Messenia, region in the Peloponnese, 25, 70,
Macedonia, 158–159 82n. 21
Perseus fails to secure the support of the First Macedonian War
Bastarnae, Antiochus IV, and joins Rome against Philip V (210),
Rhodes, 160, 178 25
Perseus flees to Samothrace after Pydna, 169 Minucius Rufus, T. (legate), 127
Roman military arrangements, 159 Misacenes (?), son of Massinissa, 132
Scipio Nasica and Fabius Maximus Third Macedonian War
execute flanking maneuver around first year
Mt. Olympus, 163–165, see also at the Battle of Crannon, 136
Appendix F passim third year
Scipio Nasica plunders Sintica, 169 accompanies Roman invasion of
Macedonian War, Third (172–168) Macedonia, 151
chronology of escalation phase, see Molossians, an Epirote people, see Epirus,
Appendix B passim Epirotes
specific charges against Perseus, 79–81 Mucius Scaevola, Q. (legate), 130
Magnesia, Battle of, 37 Third Macedonian War
Malian Gulf, 26n. 39, 40, 86 first year
Marcius Figulus, C. (pr. 169), 148, 154 sent to hold Ambracia with 2,000
Third Macedonian War men, 137
third year Myonessus, Battle of (190), 37
campaigns in Chalcidice, 155–156
departs with Roman fleet, 148 Nabis, Spartan king
Marcius Philippus, Q. (cos. II 169), 2n. 6, 124, Second Macedonian War
143, 159 third year
and noua sapientia debate (171), 110–113 joins Philip V, 32
embassy to Greece (172), 69–73 third–fourth year
negotiations with Perseus (172), 71–72, joins Rome, 32
77, 85–86, 88–90, 116, 198, see war with Rome (195), 39, 55
also Rome, Romans, embassy to Neon of Thebes, Boeotian politician, 72, 73
Greece (172) beheaded on Aemilius Paullus’ orders
Third Macedonian War (167), 177
first year Third Macedonian War
captures Alope, 128 fourth year
naval operations, 128 accompanies Perseus to Samothrace after
third year Pydna, 169
advises Rhodians to mediate between
Rome and Perseus, 156, 178 Octavius, Cn. (pr. 168), 143, 157, 163, 164
allotted Macedonia as his province, senatorial commission to the East (162), 184
departure, 148 Third Macedonian War
invasion of Macedonia, 148–151, see also fourth year
Appendix E passim takes and plunders Meliboea, 169
Marcius Philippus, Q. (legate), 149 Oreus, Greek city, 140, 146, 156, 161
Marrucini, Italian people Third Macedonian War
heroic self-sacrifice at the Battle of Pydna, second year
167–168 raided by Perseus, 140–141
238 Index
Oricum, Illyrian city declared a Roman hostis (172), 69, 77, 100
First Macedonian War embassy to Rhodes (172), 74–75, 178, 198
captured by Philip V (214), 24 embassy to Rome (172), 67, 124, 198
recaptured by Laevinus (214), 25 embassy to Rome (175), 62
fights in Aetolian War, 48
Paeligni, Italian people gains Macedon a place on Amphictyonic
heroic self-sacrifice at the Battle of Pydna, Council (178), 59
167–168 gives shelter to Arthetaurus’ assassins, 71–72,
Paullus, L. Aemilius (cos. II 168), 8, 9, 9n. 36, see 80, 88–89
also Macedonian War, Third (171– imprisonment and death, 173
168), fourth year induces Rammius of Brundisium to kill
addresses contio, 159 Roman dignitaries, 71
allotted Macedonian command, 157 influence in Thrace, 60
elected consul, 157 instals garrison in Aetolia (177), 60, 62n. 30,
report on Roman position in Macedonia, 65, 72, 80, 89
158–159 interference in civil strife in Thessaly and
Pelagonia, region in Macedonia, 174 Doris, 80, 85, 89, 90
Pella, Macedonian capital, 5n. 14, 6, 30, 42, 93, involvement in debt cancellation in Thessaly
151, 168, 169, 170, 174, 185, 187 and Perrhaebia (177), 80, 89,
Pergamum, Asia Minor kingdom, 11 90, 117
and senatorial commission (185), 46 involvement in murder of Eversa and
embassy to Rome (167), 182 Callicratus, 71, 80, 88–89
embassy to Rome (186/5), 45 involvement in transfer of Bastarnae (early
embassy to Rome (201), 27–28, 120 170s), 62, 80, 90, 99–100, 106, 117
expansion under Eumenes II, 11 involvment in Arthetaurus’ assassination,
gains in Asia Minor after Syrian War, 37–38 80, 88–89
punished by Rome (after 167/6), 181–182 marches to Delphi (175), 60, 71, 72, 80,
Third Macedonian War 85–87, 117
first year marries his sister Apame to Prusias II (early
naval operations, 128 170s), 58, 100
fourth year marries Laodice (early 170s), 58, 80, 90, 97,
naval operations, 161 100, 178
victim of Macedonian aggression, 28 military assistance to Byzantium (174), 61,
Perpenna, M. 62n. 30, 71, 80, 89
Third Macedonian War military buildup, 80, 90, 98n. 96
fourth year negotiations with Marcius Philippus (172),
embassy to Genthius, 162 71–72, 77, 85–86, 88–90, 116, 198,
Perrhaebia, Perrhaebians see also Rome, Romans, embassy to
debt crisis, 13 Greece (172)
debt crisis resolved by Romans (174), 66, 118 origins, birth, 50
debts cancelled (177), 59, 80, 89, 90, 117 recognized as King of Macedon by Rome
embassy to Rome (186/5), 45 (178), 58, 64, 97
Perseus, Macedonian king refuses to meet Roman ambassadors
”charm offensive” toward the Greeks, 58–59 (174), 65
undermined by Rome, 124 renews amicitia with Rome (179–178), 57, 58,
alliance with Cotys, chieftain of the Odrysian 64, 82, 106
Thracians (early 170s), 60 resources, 8–9
assassination attempt on Eumenes II at rivalry with Demetrius, 47–54, 94
Delphi (172), 68, 71, 80, 87–88 Second Macedonian War (200–196)
attacks Abrupolis, expels him from his occupies passes of Pelagonia, 48
kingdom (179), 71, 72, 80, 81–83, sends letters to Rhodes and Byzantium
101n. 109, 106, 120 seeking support (172), 74
attempted rapprochement with Achaean services to Rhodes (early 170s), 59, 97, 178
League (175), 60–61, 80, 89, 117, 118 subdues Dolopians (mid-170s), 63, 71, 72, 80,
banishes Arthetaurus’ assassins, 71–72 83–85, 117, 120
Index 239
Third Macedonian War fourth year
first year disappointed with settlement, 43
at the Battle of Crannon, 135–137 gains, 83, 86
dismisses Cotys with gifts, 137 allegedly orders massacre of Maroneans (184),
failed Macedonian attack on Roman 47, 55, 92, 180
camp, 134–135 assists Rome against Nabis of Sparta (195), 39
mobilization, 126 becomes aware of Rome, 20
receives surrender of Tripolis (Azorus, campaigns in Asia Minor (204–200), 27,
Pythium, and Doliche), 127 82n. 20, 102n. 114
seizes Volustana and Tempe passes, 126–127 coinage, 5
sues for peace after Battle of Callicinus, deports political leaders to Emathia, 6n. 24
77, 87n. 47, 93, 132, 199 dispute with Rome over Aenus and Maronea,
victory at the Battle of Callicinus, 44–45, 55, 86, 92, 180
128–133 expedition to Mt. Haemus (Thrace) (180), 53
second year First Macedonian War, 11, 13, 24–27
campaigns in Perrhaebia, Thessaly, and besieges Apollonia (214), 25
against the Dardanians, 141 captrues Oricum (214), 24
embassies to Genthius, 145–146 captures Lissus (213/2), 25
raid on Oreus, 140–141 operations in the Peloponnese and Illyria
resumes relations with the Bastarnae, 141 (213–212), 25
winter campaign in Illyria gains, 27, 29
capture of Uscana, 144, see also last years/domestic tragedy, 47–54
Appendix D passim launches fleet and retreats (216), 22
third year on inscriptions, 5n. 14
abandons passes into Macedonia, 151–153 ordered to vacate Aenus and Maronea, 46–47
occupies passes into Macedonia, 148–149 pact with Antiochus III (203/2), 27, 35,
fourth year 102n. 114
alleged secret deal with Eumenes II, parallels with situation in late 170s, 107–110
160, 181 parley with Roman embassy at Abydus
alliance with Genthius, 159 (200), 28
Battle of Pydna plan to transfer Bastarnae to Dardania, 40,
flees battlefield early (?), 168n. 159 57–58, 99–100
fails to secure the support of the recovers (after 196), 39–41
Bastarnae, Antiochus IV, and refuses to join Aetolians and Antiochus
Rhodes, 160, 178 against Rome, 39, 46
flees to Samothrace after Pydna, 169 resources, 8, 9n. 36
treaty of alliance with Boeotian League (174), rewarded for loyalty (190), 39–40
61, 70, 71, 80, 89 Second Macedonian War, 13
Petilius, L. (ambassador) first year
Third Macedonian War attacks Athens, ravages Attic
fourth year countryside, 30
embassy to Genthius, 162 second year
Phalanna, Thessalian city, 127, 135 defeated by Romans, 30–31
phalanx, Macedonian, see Macedonia, victories over the Aetolians, 31
Macedonians, army third year
Phila, Perrhaebian city, 137, 149, 153, 156, Aous conference, 31
158, 162 conference at Nicaea, 32
Philip II, Macedonian king, 1, 5, 8, 8n. 33, 13, 14, embassy to Rome, 32
15, 35, 55, 83 retreats to and plunders Thessaly,
Philip V, Macedonian king withdraws to Tempe pass, 31
accession to the throne (221), 20 skirmishes with Romans in Aous gorge, 31
Aetolian War fourth year
third year Battle of Cynoscephalae, 33
operations against Aetolians and fifth year
Athamanians, 43 settlement and peace, 82n. 22
240 Index
Philip V, Macedonian king (cont.) on the Second Macedonian War (200–196), 29
loses Dolopia, 83 on the senate’s preference for a weak Seleucid
senatorial commission about (185), 45–46, 63, regime, 105
83–84, 86, 94 on the symplokē, 22, 28n. 51, 38
sends Demetrius as ambassador to Rome on the Syrian War (192–188), 34n. 88, 36
(184), 47, 48–49, 55 on the time of ”trouble and disturbance”,
siege of Abydus (200), 28 16, 193
Syrian and Aetolian Wars on the virtues of bipolar power balancing,
gains, 40 74n. 83
second year participation in the Third Macedonian War,
helps Romans recover some cities in 2, 148n. 98, 154
Thessaly, 36 source for Appian, 97–98, 115n. 173
Syrian War sources for the Third Macedonian War, 52n.
third year 61, 81, 93, 170, 181, 215n. 3
assists Romans marching overland The Histories
through Macedonia and Thrace, fragmentary state of, 2, 25, 29, 98
37, 39, 43 revision of the original plan, 193
visited by Sempronius Gracchus to test Pompeius, L. (tr. mil.)
his loyalty, 42–43 Third Macedonian War
fourth year first year
suspected of being involved in ambush at the Battle of Crannon, 135
of Roman army in Thrace, 43–44 Popillius Laenas, C. (cos. 172), 143, 145, 161
tensions with Rome (191–179), 41–55 forbids discussion of brother Marcus’
treaty with Carthage (215), 7, 23–24, 29 massacre of Statellates, 112
war on Scerdilaidas (217), 22 orders Antiochus IV to retreat from Egypt
Philip, son of Perseus, 170, 191 (168), 177–178
Philocles, Friend of Philip V, 49, 52, 52n. 62, 54 Popillius Laenas, M. (cos. 173), 114, 151, 153,
Phocis, region in central Greece, 12, 14, 25, 32 154, 155
Phthiotic Achaea, region in central massacre of Statellate Ligurians, 112
Greece, 60, 63 Praxo of Delphi
Pieria, region in Macedonia, 149, 151, 158 brought to the senate, 68, 87
Pleuratus III, Illyrian dynast, 34 houses Eumenes II’s alleged assassins,
Polybius of Megalopolis, historian and Achaean 68, 87–88
League politician Prusias II, king of Bithynia, 101, 107, 109
exile, 2, 177 favored by Rome (after 167), 184
on Andriscus, 188, 191 marries Apame, sister of Perseus (early 170s),
on Boeotian decline and decadence, 61n. 28 58, 80, 90, 100
on causation, 29n. 54, 78 Third Macedonian War
Tyche, 47, 78, 188 first year
on Charops of Epirus, 176n. 17 maintains neutrality, 124
on Eumenes II of Pergamum, 95 third year
on Perseus, 59, 96, 98, 133, 201n. 3 embassy to Rome, 156
his greed, 160 participation in Roman campaign in
on Philip V, 23n. 21, 41 Chalcidice, 155
on Philip V’s last years, 47–48 Pteleum, city in Phthiotic Achaea, 40, 46, 86
on Philip V’s secret plans for war on Rome, Third Macedonian War
39n. 1, 41n. 13, 42n. 16, 47, 64, 77, first year
80, 90, 91–100, 110, 133, 157n. 119 destroyed by the Romans, 137
on Roman imperialism, 1–2, 19, 193, 195 Ptolemaic – Seleucid War, Sixth (”Sixth
on the Achaean League, 13, 119 Syrian War”)
on the Battle of Pydna, 218 imminence of (mid-late 170s), 101–110
on the causes of the Third Macedonian War, Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Egyptian king
82, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91–96 makes Egypt a Roman amicus, 19
on the post-Third Macedonian War mood in Ptolemy V Epiphanes, Egyptian king
Greece, 184–185 death (181), 102
Index 241
embassy to Rome (200), 82n. 20 cultivation of Attalus II, 182, 184
victim of Macedonian aggression, 28 declare Galatians free (166), 182
victim of pact between Philip V and declare war on Macedon (200), 28
Antiochus III, 27, 102n. 114 declare war on Perseus (171), 76, 91n. 64
victim of Seleucid aggression, 34, 35 declare war on the Aetolian League and
Ptolemy VI Philometor, Egyptian king Antiochus III (192), 36
rejects Perseus’ alliance request, 73 embassy to Alexander the Great at Babylon
Pydna, Battle of (168), 9, 10, 165–169 (323), 18
Pydna, Macedonian city, 152, 153, 165, 169 embassy to Dardanians and Macedonia (177),
taken and plundered after the Battle of 62, 64, 99–100, 117n. 188
Pydna, 169 embassy to Genthius (172), 69, 142, 197
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus embassy to Greece (172), 69–73, 142, see also
invasion of Italy (280–275), 14, 19, 176 Appendix B passim
embassy to Greece (173), 65–66, 117
Rammius of Brundisium embassy to Greece and Macedon (173), 68
brought to the senate, 87 embassy to Macedon (172), 69n. 63, 77, see
plot to kill Roman dignitaries, 71 also Appendix A passim
Rhodes, Rhodians, 11–12 embassy to Macedon (174), 65
accused of disloyalty to Rome, 74n. 81 embassy to Philip V at Abydus (200), 28
Colossus, 12 embassy to Philip V’s general Nicanor at
embassy to Rome (169) (fabrication), Athens (200), 28
156n. 117 embassy to the East (172), 69, 73–74, 106,
embassy to Rome (172), 67, 178 178, 197
embassy to Rome (201), 27–28, 120 embassy to the East (174), 104, 105
escorts Laodice to Macedon (early 170s), 59, humiliate Eumenes II (167/6), 181–182
84, 97, 178 impatience with proliferation of embassies
gains in Asia Minor after Syrian War, 12, from the East, 92
37–38, 84 imperialism, 56, 78–79, 194–196
prepares forty ships for Roman war against passiveness and indifference, 81–82
Perseus, 178 noua sapientia debate (171), 110–113
punished by Rome (after 168), 117, 178–181 ordered to stop Etruscan pirate raids by
rejects Perseus’ overtures (172), 74–75, 178, 198 Alexander the Great, 18
reprisals against pro-Macedonian politicians punishes Pergamum (after 167/6), 181–182
(168/7), 178 punishes Rhodes (after 168), 117, 178–181
sovereignty over Lycia threatened by Rome refuse to grant Aenus and Maronea to
(177), 84, 97, 117, 120, 178 Pergamene control, 182
Third Macedonian War treaty of alliance with the Aetolian League
first year (211), 12, 24
spared ship contribution to Roman war withdraw from the East (after 167), 183
effort, 125, 178
third year Salvius, commander of the Paeligni
embassy to Marcius Philippus in heroic self-sacrifice at the Battle of Pydna,
Macedonia, advised to mediate 167–168
between Rome and Perseus, 156, 178 Sapaei, see Thrace, Thracians
embassy to Rome, 156, 178 sarissa, Macedonian, see Macedonia,
fourth year Macedonians, army
embassy to Aemilius Paullus in Scerdilaidas, Illyrian dynast, 20n. 14, 27, 34
Macedonia, 163 Scipio Africanus, P. Cornelius (legate), 3, 4, 214
refuses to support Perseus, 160, 178 Syrian War
victim of Macedonian aggression, 28 third year
Rome, Romans, 3–4 advises L. Scipio to test Philip V’s
attempt to deprive Rhodes of sovereignty over loyalty, 42
Lycia (177), 84, 97, 117, 120, 178 impressed by Philip V, 42
attempt to resolve Aetolian civil strife on his brother Lucius’ staff as an
(174), 65–66 adviser, 37
242 Index
Scipio Asiaticus, L. Cornelius (cos. 190, First Macedonian War
procos. 189) captures Anticyra (210), 25
Syrian War proposes declaration of war on Macedon,
third year denied (200), 28
advised by Scipio Africanus to test Second Macedonian War
Philip V’s loyalty, 42 first year
Battle of Magnesia, 37 attempts to gain Aetolian help, 30
crosses army to Asia Minor, 37 second year
negotiations with Antiochus III fail, 37 victories over Macedonian forces, 30–31
Scipio Nasica Corculum, P. Cornelius (tr. mil.) speech to the people in favor of war on
raids Illyrians (167), 175n. 14 Macedon (200), 28, 29
sent to investigate Macedonian affairs Sulpicius Galus, C. (pr. 169, tr. mil. 168),
(150), 187 147, 156
source for Third Macedonian War, 158n. 124, Third Macedonian War
see also Appendix F passim fourth year
Third Macedonian War explains lunar eclipse before Battle of
fourth year Pydna, 216–217
executes flanking maneuver around Syrian War (192–188), 35–38
Mt. Olympus, 163–165, see also causes
Appendix F passim Aetolian anger with Rome over Second
plunders Sintica, 169 Macedonian War settlement, 36
Seleucid Empire (Syria), 10–11 escalation phase (190s), 34, 35–36
disarmed by senatorial commission to the first year
East (162), 184 defection of Greeks from Rome, 36
wars over Coele-Syria (”Syrian Wars”), 10, Seleucid troops massacre Roman garrison
101–110 at Delium, 36
Seleucus IV, Seleucid king second year
assassination and its effects (175), 101–110 Acilius Glabrio, Baebius Tamphilus, and
marries his daughter Laodice to Perseus (early Philip V recover some cities in
170s), 58, 80, 90, 97, 100, 178 Thessaly, 36
Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (ambassador 190, Battle of Thermopylae, 36–37, 42
cens. 169), 45, 148 third year
Syrian War Battle of Magnesia, 37
third year Battles of Side and Myonessus, 37
visits Philip V to test his loyalty, 42–43 negotiations between L. Scipio and
Sempronius Tuditanus, P. (procos. 205) Antiochus III fail, 37
First Macedonian War Philip V assists Roman army marching
campaign against Philip V, 26n. 44 overland through Macedonia and
Servilius Caepio, Cn. (procos. 168, ambassador), Thrace, 37, 39, 43
159, see also Appendix A passim Roman army crosses to Asia Minor, 37
Sicinius, Cn. (pr. 172) Scipio Africanus advises L. Scipio to test
Third Macedonian War Philip V’s loyalty, 42
first year Sempronius Gracchus visits Philip V to test
advance forces in Greece, 73n. 79, 124– his loyalty, 42–43
126, see also Appendix B, passim fourth year
Side, Battle of (190), 37 Roman army ambushed in Thrace, 43–44
Social War (220–217), 20, 21, 24 fourth-fifth years
Sparta negotiations and peace terms (Peace of
First Macedonian War Apamea), 37–38
joins Rome against Philip V (210), 25
troubles with the Achaean League, 13, 82n. Teuta, Queen of the Illyrian Ardiaei, 14, 19, see
23, 194 also Illyria, Illyrians, Illyrian Wars
Spurius Lugistinus (centurion), 114 (229 and 219)
Sulpicius Galba, P. (procos. 210–206, cos. II Thebes, 13, 33, 72, 72n. 76, 73, 75n. 86, 125, 143
200, procos. 199), 29, 30, 31 Thermoplylae, Battle of (191), 36–37, 42
Index 243
Thermopylae, 26n. 39, 33 Timotheus, Macedonian governor, 137
Thessalonica, city in Chalcidice, 46, 151, 153, 155, treaties of alliance
161, 162, 163, 169, 174 between Aetolia and Rome (211), 25,
Thessaly, Thessalians, 13 25n. 36
civil strife involving Perseus, 80, 85, 89, 90 between Carthage and Philip V of Macedon,
debt crisis resolved by Romans (174), 66, 118 7, 23–24, 29
debts cancelled (177), 59, 80, 90, 117 between Macedon and the Boeotian League,
embassy to Rome (172), 199 61, 70, 71, 80, 89
embassy to Rome (177), 62 between Rome and the Aetolian League
embassy to Rome (186/5), 45 (211), 12, 24
Syrian and Aetolian Wars treaties of peace
first year between Macedon and Rome (196), 34,
defects from Rome, 36 82n. 22
second year between Philip V and the Aetolian League
some cities recovered by Rome, 36 (206), 12, 26
Third Macedonian War between Rome and Antiochus III (Peace of
first year Apamea), 37–38
Battle of Callicinus between Rome and Philip V (”Peace of
praised for bravery, 131 Phoenice”) (205), 25n. 36, 27, 28
contributes troops to Roman war between Rome and the Aetolian League (189),
effort, 128 37n. 106, 43
Thisbe, Boeotian city, 75, 75n. 86 Tripolis (Azorus, Pythium, and Doliche) in
Third Macedonian War Perrhaebia
first year Third Macedonian War
captured by Romans, Macedonian first year
partisans punished, 134, 140n. 62 recovered by the Romans, 137
second year surrenders to Macedonians, 127
embassy to Rome, 140 Tripolis Scaea, Thessalian city, 127, 128, 128n. 20,
s.c. de Thisbensibus issued, 140, see also 129, 135
Appendix C passim
Thrace, Thracians, 14–15, see also Cotys, Uscana, Illyrian city, 144, see also Appendix D
chieftain of the Odrysian Thracians passim
and Abrupolis, king of the
Thracian Sapaei Valerius Laevinus, C. (ambassador), 68
embassy to Rome (177), 64 Valerius Laevinus, M. (legate), 130
garrison Amphipolis, 169n. 161 Valerius Laevinus, M. (propr. 214–211)
seek amicitia from Rome (172), 69 First Macedonian War
war with Dardanians, 58 recaptures Oricum, 25
three fetters of Greece (Demetrias, Chalcis, relieves siege of Apollonia (214), 25
Corinth), 32, 73n. 79 Villius Tappulus, P. (cos. 199), 31

Rome and The Third Macedonian War

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RO M E A N D T H E T H I R D

paul j. burton is a senior lecturer in Roman History in the Centre

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

List of Figures page viii

Appendix A: The Embassy of Cn. Servilius Caepio, Ap. Claudius

6.1 Camp Sites on Mt. Metamorphosis (© W.K. Pritchett) page 150

Polybius of Megalopolis, the second-century Greek historian,1 begins

Rome and Macedon

“The Storm Clouds Appearing from the West”

Philip Joins the Fray

At this stage, the Polybian symplokē, the “intertwining” of the events of

The Last Years of Philip V

The Seeds of Future Conflict

The Reign of Perseus

Perseus and Rome, 179–172

Perhaps as many as eighteen months had passed between Eumenes’

The Causes of the Third Macedonian War

The Specific Charges Against Perseus

Expulsion of Abrupolisa 22.18.2–3 (pretext) 42.13.6 ll. 14–17

(i) Defensive/Preemptive Theories

(ii) Theories of Roman Aggression

(iii) Systemic Theories

Conclusion and Synthesis

The Third Macedonian War

The First Year: Opening Maneuvers

The Battle of Callicinus

The Campaigns in Boeotia and Thessaly, and

Figure 6.1 Camp Sites on Mt. Metamorphosis

Figure 6.2 Lower Olympos Range

The Final Year of the War and the Battle of Pydna

Figure 6.3 The Turning Movement by Scipio Nasica

Octavius brought, and begin their journey toward Pythium at nightfall.145

“The Fourth Macedonian War”

The Embassy of Cn. Servilius Caepio, Ap.

The Chronology of 172-171 and the Timing of the

Nov. 172 Sept. 172 Marcius’ embassy departs Romea

When did Sicinius depart Brundisium for Epirus? I have anticipated

Three Senatus Consulta

Two inscriptions relevant to the Roman treatment of the Boeotian cit-

Two Failed Roman Assaults on

The Roman and Macedonian Positions near

The ἐπιστόλιον of Scipio Nasica and the

Abdera, Greek city on the Thracian coast, 15n. second year

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