PHILOSOPHICAL DESIGN

A repeated activity generated, according to Aristotle, a

rational habitus or competence in the practising
subject. The distinction between poìêsis and prãxis
meant for him to distinguish between instrumental
activities and actions that have their own meaning in
themselves. An instrumental action is one that is
carried out in order to achieve an intended end (for
example, building a house). The meaning of these
actions lies outside them, in the end achieved. An
action with its own meaning, on the other hand, is one
that brings about our own fulfilment, the satisfaction of
a vital need (for example, to live in the house).
Productive action involves a process that takes time
until it reaches its end. The end and the process do not
occur simultaneously in productive action. Only when
the production process has finished does the realised
end appear. The meaning-creating action is not a
process, but is, so to speak, an end in itself. The action
and its meaning coincide. As long as the action is
realised, its meaning and its end are realised,
otherwise they disappear. That is why the word end is
inadequate and should be reserved for the result of
instrumental or productive action. The expression "end
in itself" is a way of expressing meaningful action in
instrumental terms. I prefer to distinguish between
purpose and meaning.

The two Aristotelian concepts (poíêsis och prãxis) have

merged into one word in our modern languages. While
the word poíêsis has been reserved for poetic
activity(4), abandoning its former use, our practical
word has come to replace both concepts at the same
time, but its proper meaning for us, the aspect from
which it is understood, is the doing, the productive or
instrumental performance, what Aristotle called
poíêsis. Poiesis displaces Aristotelian praxis and takes
over its name and identity. Our modern techno-
addicted mentality no longer sees the need to
distinguish between two types of human action,
between meaning and instrumentality. A whole
dimension of our existence, which for Aristotle was
fully actualised, is relegated for us to the unconscious.
For the function of the concept is to actualise
something in consciousness, and when this disappears
from cultural consciousness, demanding its character
as something, its concept becomes superfluous. An
investigation of conceptual genealogy can nevertheless
discover the traces of disappeared concepts.