Labo vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 86564 | August 1, 1989
Cruz, J.

Petitioner: Ramon L. Labo, Jr.

Respondent: COMELEC and Luis L. Lardizabal

Facts and Procedural History:

 Petitioner asks Court to restrain the COMELEC from looking into the question of his citizenship
as qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City
 Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988
 Petitioner was married to an Australian citizen, was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on
28 July 1976
 Petition for quo warranto against petitioner by private respondent was filed on January 26, 1988
but was filing fee was paid only on February 10, 1988, 21 days after petitioner’s proclamation
 Petitioner’s arguments:
o Petition for quo warranto is not deemed filed if fee is not paid
o Section 253 of Omnibus Election Code: any voter contesting election of any city officer
on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Philippines shall file petition for sworn
quarranto with the Commission within 10 days after proclamation of result of election
o Rule 36, Sec. 5 of Procedural Rules of the COMELEC: petition for quo warranto is not
deemed filed without payment of filing fee (also according to decision in Manchester v.
CA)
 Private respondent’s arguments:
o Filing fee was not paid out of time
o His “petition for quo warranto with prayer for immediate annulment of proclamation
and restraining order or injunction” on January 26, 1988, COMELEC treated it as pre-
proclamation controversy and only on February 8, 1988 that COMELEC decided to treat
it as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it, serving him notice on February 10,
1988, the same day he paid it
o During the period COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclaimed controversy, the
time of filing an election protest or quo warranto was suspended – Section 248 of the
Omnibus Election Code
o Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure: effective only on November 15,
1988; could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the
COMELEC
 Petitioner’s arguments:
o Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated
on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively requires the payment of filing
fees
 Private respondent’s arguments:
o Res. No. 1450: intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not
apply to the 1988 local elections
o Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988

Issues:
1. W/N the petition for quo warranto against petitioner is valid, given that it was paid for late
 2. W/N the petitioner is a Filipino citizen
3. W/N petitioner is eligible to be Baguio City’s mayor
4. W/N the private respondent who filed the quo warranto  petition can replace the petitioner as
mayor

Judgment:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his
office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and
executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

Held:
1. NO. The petition for quo warranto  was filed on time.
a. The fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition
when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not
require the payment of a filing fee
b. No record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took
effect only on March 3, 1988, after the petition was filed
c. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion: “This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee.
However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In
the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed”
2. NO.
a. Although the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo
warranto proceedings against him, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding,
and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question
clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, it should be addressed in this same
action
b. There were two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship:
i. Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982 found the petitioner to be a citizen of
the Philippines
1. there was no direct proof that petitioner had been formally naturalized
as a citizen of Australia
2. inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen,
obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID
upon his return to this country in 1980
ii. Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988 held that
the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines
1. decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the
Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that
date by reason of his naturalization in 1976
2. “Prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to
either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance
which carries a renunciation of ‘all other allegiance’”
c. The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the evidence from CID, neither does
he deny that he obtained Australian Passport which he used in coming back to the
 Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an
alien and registered as such
d. Petitioner later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence but he also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn
statements voluntarily made by him and even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner
e. Doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship, it does not appear
that it was properly and seasonably pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
because it was invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private
respondent's comment
f. The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant
i. No claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
marriage
ii. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a
formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an
Australian citizen for which he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or
made the Affirmation of Allegiance
g. Petitioner’s naturalization in Australia made him only a dual citizen
i. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:
(1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country – all are applicable to the petitioner
ii. Article IV, Section 5, of 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
h. Petitioner voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country
i. CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725: Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation – not done by
petitioner
ii. PD No. 725: (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship
may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270,
and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
3. NO.
a. Section 42 of the Local Government Code: An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to
be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local
language or dialect.
b. People who voted for petitioner or even if he unanimously won cannot change the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution
 c. Qualifications are continuing requirements – once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited; here, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election thus
petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such
4. NO.
a. As he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City
b. Geronimo v. Ramos: The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.”

Separate Opinion:
o Guttierez, Jr., J.
o What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire
into the citizenship of the petitioner
o Section 7, Article IXA of the Constitution: a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
day from receipt of a copy thereof; no decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been
rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to the Court for review