1

Engineering
for Safe Operation
Booklet Nine in a series designed to point out
potential hazards in refining and related
operations and suggest ways and means of
correcting or eliminating them.

Copyright 1964, © 1966, © 1981, © 1984 Amoco

Oil Company Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
Copyright protected under Universal Copyright Convention
Copyright protected under International Copyright Union All rights
reserved under Pan-American Convention

First Edition, 1964

Revised Second Edition, 1966
Revised Third Edition, 1984

2
 It should not be
necessary for each gen-
eration to rediscover prin-
ciples of safety which the
generation before already
discovered. We must learn
from the experience of
others rather than learn
the hard way. We must
pass on to the next
generation a record of
what we have learned.

-Jesse C. Ducommun

1
 Acknowledgement
The cooperation of the following in
furnishing some of the data and illustrations
for this booklet is gratefully acknowledged:
Hills-McCanna Company Humble Oil &
Refining Company I-T-E Circuit Breaker
Company Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc.
OPW Division of Dover Corporation
Rockwell Manufacturing Company Shell Oil
Company
U.S. GAUGE, a Division of
AMETEK, Inc.

2
 Contents
I. Introduction 7
II. Operating Practices and Requirements 10
A. Common Hazards to Avoid 11
Mixing Air or Oxygen with Hydrocarbons 11
Mixing Hydrocarbons with
Reactive Chemicals 14
Contact of Water and Hot Oil 16
Water in Storage Tanks 18
Disposal of Waste Gases 19
Toxic or Reactive Chemicals 21
Oxygen and Oxygen Handling Systems 22
B. Handling of Light Ends 23
C. Adequate Utility and Auxiliary Connections 24
D. Operating Procedures 29
///. Corrosion and Erosion 30
A. Liners and Wearing Surfaces 30
B. Dead-End Sections in Piping and Equipment 31
C. Use of Screwed Alloy Piping Plugs 32
D. Corrosion Inhibitors 33
E. Sentry Holes in Piping 34
F. Adequacy of Corrosion Protection 35
IV, Electrical 40
A. Area Classification 40
B. Static Electricity 41
C. Stray Currents 43
D. Lightning 44
E. Installation 45
F. Emergency Power 45
V. Fire and Safety Equipment 46
A. Turret Nozzles, Hydrants and
Other Protective Equipment 46
B. Escape Routes 46
C. Noise Level 47
D. Equipment Guards 48
E. Remote Shutdown Devices 48
F. Automatic Water-Deluge Systems 49
G. Pump Manifold Areas 49

3
 VI. Foundations, Building, Structures and Stacks 50
A. Soil and Foundations 50
B. Buildings 50
C. Structures 51
D. Stacks 52
VII. Furnaces and Air Preheaters, Fired Reboilers,
Exchangers and Cooling Towers 54
A. Furnace Safety 54
B. Furnace Air-Preheater System Safety 56
C. Fired Reboilers 57
D. Air Heaters 57
E. Heat Exchangers 58
F. Cooling Towers 61
VIII. Instruments 62
A. General 62
B. Instrument Leads 63
C. Oxygen and Combustible Analyzers 63
D. Alarms 63
E. Orifices 64
F. Pressure Instruments 64
G. Glass Inserts 65
H. Sampling 65
IX. Insulation, Auxiliary Heating and Fireproofing 66
A. Insulation 66
B. Auxiliary Heating 67
C. Fireproofing 69
X. Piping 72
A. Water Pockets 72
B. Auxiliary Piping Facilities 74
C. Piping Materials 75
D. Expansion and Supports 76
E. Vibration 77
F. Valves 79
G. Pipe Joints 82
H. Water Hammer 83

4
 XI. Relief Valve and Pressure-Relieving Systems 84
A. Thermal Expansion 84
B. Relief Valves 88
C. Relief-Valve Piping 91
D. Depressuring Systems . 92
XII. Plot Plans and Equipment Spacing 94
A. Spacing Between Units 94
B. Spacing Within Units 96
XIII. Storage Facilities 98
XIV. Vessels and Trays 102
A. Design 102
B. Drainability 102
C. Knockout Drums 103
D. Venting 103
E. Internals 105
F. Vacuum Systems 106
XV. Waste Disposal 108
XVI. Pumps and Compressors 110
XVII. Engineering Safety Checklist 116
XVIII. Reference Material 126

This booklet is intended as a safety supplement to operator training courses,

operating manuals, and operating procedures. It is provided to help the reader
better understand the "why" of safe operating practices and procedures in our
refineries. Important engineering design features are included. However,
technical advances and other changes made after its publication, while generally
not affecting the principles, could affect some suggestions made herein. The
reader is encouraged to examine such advances and changes when selecting
and implementing practices and procedures at his facility.
While the information in this booklet is intended to increase the storehouse of
knowledge in safe refining operations, it is important for the reader to recognize
that this material is generic in nature, that it is not unit specific, and, accordingly,
that its contents may not be subject to literal application. Instead, as noted
above, it is supplemental information for use in already established training
programs; and it should not be treated as a substitute for otherwise applicable
operator training courses, operating manuals, or operating procedures.
Amoco Oil Company and its parent, subsidiaries, and affiliates disclaim any
responsibility for specific application of any of this material by outside parties.
The aforesaid make no warranties or other claims as to the appropriateness of
these practices and procedures in specific operations. The suggestions should
be carefully evaluated before implementation.

5
6
 I. Introduction
Process safety in oil refineries depends
on three main factors: ( 1 ) how a unit is
designed, (2) how it is constructed (i.e.,
the workmanship) and (3) how it is
operated. Just as it is virtually
impossible to build facilities that are
foolproof in the hands of improperly
trained operators, it is also impossible to
safely operate equipment that is
basically faulty in design. Thus, process
and design engineers must provide
properly designed facilities that can be
safely operated by following normal
operating procedures.

7
 Failure to recognize and eliminate dramatizes the necessity for strict at-
hazardous situations has resulted in tention to details since many of the
serious injuries to personnel and costly accidents described in this booklet were
damage to key facilities, as illustrated caused by seemingly minor items.
by Figure 1. This booklet presents
While most hazardous operating
many of the engineering practices
situations can be avoided in the design
currently being used to design and
stage with little or no extra cost,
build facilities that promote operating
occasionally some hazards are just too
safety in our refineries. Although it
expensive to eliminate. In resolving
should not supplant individual thinking
such cases, the seriousness of the
and initiative, this booklet can serve as
hazard, the odds against the occurrence
a ready reference for engineers to use
of an accident, and the consequences if
as they consider each operational step
it does occur must
on a process unit. It also

Figure 1
This was a fluid hydroformer!
It was destroyed during
startup by a series of internal
detonations when air
accidentally entered the unit
and formed an explosive
mixture with circulating inert
gas and naphtha vapors. The
explosion threw a 65-ton
piece of steel 1,200 feet.

8
 all be considered. Particularly where
relatively large expenditures are re-
quired to avoid a possible difficulty, the
cost versus risk must be evaluated in
order to arrive at a practical as well as
economical solution.
Design engineers must be thoroughly
familiar with codes, specifications and
standards; and they must be constantly
alert to assure adherence to them. The
information in this booklet is intended
only to supplement these governing
regulations.
9
The simplified checklist in Section XVII
of this booklet should be especially
useful during the final design check and
hazard review which are necessary
before engineering on any project can
be considered complete.
This booklet is primarily concerned with
good design practices. Others in this
process-safety series emphasize good
operating practices. You will profit from
reading all of them.
 //. Operating Practices
and Requirements
There is no substitute for thoroughly
informed and trained operators. Clear,
concise procedures and instructions are
essential for operating safety. The
technical staff must present all
operating information —including the
safe operating limits for each specific
processing unit —in simple, accurate
language that can be easily understood
by nontechnical personnel.
Many operating practices are
developed from experience gained
during abnormal or anticipated
Figure 2
"Are you sure this manual
is up-to-date?"
10
operating situations. Therefore, a
continuous flow of information must be
maintained between operators and
engineers so that this experience c$n be
made available for use in the operation
of other units and in the design of future
projects. Operating manuals,
particularly startup and shutdown
procedures, must be frequently
reviewed and revised so that the latest
information is always available (Figure
2).
Some of the common hazards that have
caused serious problems through faulty
design and poor operating practices are
included in the following discussion.
 A. Common Hazards to Avoid
Mixing Air or Oxygen with
Hydrocarbons
Under certain conditions, vapors from
most petroleum products will burn and
may even explode. This burning process
is frequently described by the use of the
fire triangle, illustrated in Figure 3. The
three sides represent fuel vapor, oxygen
and a source of ignition. A fire can occur
only when all three are present. The
fuel-vapor side of the triangle is always
assumed to be present in oil refineries.
Of course, it is impractical to eliminate
all air (oxygen) or all sources of ignition
from a refinery.
However, safe operation demands the
elimination of one of these
Figure 3
If designers understand
the fire triangle, fires can
be avoided by designing
to prevent the three sides
from getting together
inadvertently.
When all
elements are
present, there
may be a fire!
If any one of
the three is
removed, fire
is impossible!
11
elements in every process that cannot be
rigidly controlled. Since a source of
ignition is usually present, air or oxygen
must be eliminated in most cases. Thus
the maxim: in general, avoid mixing air
or oxygen with hydrocarbons.
Since the flammable range of hydro-
carbons is considerably wider in oxygen
than in air, the presence of commercial
oxygen creates a much greater hazard.
For example, Figure 4 shows the
flammable limits of propane vapor in all
concentrations of oxygen and air at
atmospheric conditions. It is easily seen
that propane vapor has a much broader
flammable range in commercial oxygen
than in air. Also, as any propane-air
mixture becomes enriched with oxygen,
the flammable range increases.
Figure 4
Fuels are much more
flammable in commercial
oxygen than in air.
 A number of processes require the use
of air: for example, cracking catalyst
circulation, catalyst regeneration,
oxidation and treating (never use
commercial oxygen for treating).
Remember, hydrocarbons must not be
mixed with air in pressure vessels or
lines except under rigorously controlled
conditions. Control usually depends on
the measurement of conditions, such as
oxygen content, pressure, temperature
and flow rate. These variable factors
must be kept within predetermined safe
operating limits. Where ignition cannot
be tolerated, the vapor phase must be
maintained either above or below the
flammable limits, i.e., too rich or too
lean to burn.
Figure 5
Safe torch-oil injection re-
quires special precautions.
Catalyst bed must be
hot enough to insure
instant ignition and
continuous burning.
12
A: heavy oil known as torch oil is often
injected into the catalyst bed of fluid
catalytic cracking unit regenerators to
help maintain the unit heat balance. This
is one case where the burning of
hydrocarbons in the presence of air in a
closed vessel is: an integral part of a
processing system. To ensure safe
operation through immediate ignition
and continued combustion, torch oil
should not be admitted until the injection
nozzle is submerged under at least 4|feet
of catalyst which has been heated to
700 °F, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Thermocouples, used to determine if the
torch oil is burning,
 must be located adjacent to the in-
jection nozzle so that ignition can be
immediately detected.
There are many ways that air (oxygen)
can get into processing equipment. The
following are the most common:
• Through open or defective lines,
valves and equipment during shutdown
• During improper purging or line
blowing
• Leakage into equipment operating at
less than atmospheric pressure
• Dissolved air in water used for flushing
and process washing
• Dissolved air in hydrocarbon feed
streams
• During agitation or oxidation of
hydrocarbon process streams
Figure 6 shows an alkylation unit that
was extensively damaged because of the
unrecognized introduction of oxygen
into some propane storage drums
located on the unit. In this case, oxygen
that was carried in solution with the
propane stream was slowly released and
concentrated in the vapor space of the
storage drums, where an explosive
mixture developed and detonated with
devastating effects.

Figure 6
This alkylation unit was
severely damaged when an
oxygen-propane mixture
detonated in three propane
storage drums. Ignition was
probably caused by iron
sulfide.

Arrows indicate
location of
storage drums

13
 Figure 7 illustrates that it is impractical
and virtually impossible to design and
build equipment strong enough to
withstand a detonation. The possibilities
of accidental development and ignition
of explosive mixtures must therefore be
recognized and eliminated in the design
stage.
Inert gases, such as nitrogen and carbon
dioxide, are often used to purge air or
vapors from vessels and equipment. It
must be remembered that these
gases will not remain inert if they
become contaminated with air
(oxygen) or hydrocarbon vapor.
Therefore, inert-gas streams should be|
continuously monitored so that th0 true
composition is always known.
Mixing Hydrocarbons with
Reactive Chemicals
Certain hydrocarbon-chemical mix-
tures can be as dangerous as hydro-
carbon-air mixtures. For example, a
chlorine-hydrocarbon mixture
detonated in a conventional mixer-
settler arrangement used to treat
naphtha with a hypochlorite solution.
Fortunately, the damage was minor.

Figure 7
These detonation fragments
from a 5’/a-inch-thick drum (8
times thicker than needed for
operating pressure) illustrate
that it is impractical to design
for detonative forces. A shell
that was 30 to 50 times
thicker than needed probably
could not have resisted the
detonation!

14
 A schematic diagram of the naphtha
treating process is shown in Figure 8.
Investigation revealed that a liquid-
phase detonation probably occurred
when liquid chlorine came in contact
with the naphtha stream after it was
injected batchwise to fortify the
hypochlorite solution. This was a
violent chlorination reaction; no air or
oxygen was involved.
This accident, like many others, could
have been prevented if someone had
carefully checked to see if this was a
safe operating procedure. As far back
as 1925, after a similar, more damaging
hydrocarbon-chlorine
detonation had occurred at a natural
gasoline treating plant, the mechanism
of this reaction was confirmed by an
outdoor test. When gasoline was
introduced into a test cylinder of liquid
chlorine, it detonated with enough force
to fragment the cylinder and knock
down a 14-inch-diameter oak tree 20
feet away!
The chance development of dangerous
hydrocarbon-chemical mixtures must
be prevented by careful investigation of
each process or process change before
actual operation.

Figure 8
Schematic diagram of
naphtha treating facilities
showing location of
chlorine-naphtha
detonation.

15
 Contact of Water and Hot Oil
At atmospheric pressure, a volume of
water expands about 1,600 times when
it flashes to steam. Figure 9 illustrates
that the expansion is even greater when
the pressure is less than atmospheric.
Gradual heating of water is normally
harmless because the steam-generation
rate is slow. However, if a quantity of
water is heated rapidly, as it is when
injected into hot oil or hot equipment, all
of it will immediately flash to steam. The
sudden formation of large quantities of
steam in process units —particularly in
vacuum systems —causes a pressure
surge that is usually very damaging to
equipment. This is the reason why the
contact of water and hot oil must be
avoided.
Figure 9
A small amount of water
can expand to a tremen-
dous quantity of steam
when heated.
16
The trays in a vacuum tower were
seriously damaged during startup even
though the tower had been purged and
drained before charging with oil. After
the temperature had been slowly raised
to about 500° F by oil circulation, a valve
was opened at the bottom of the tower
in preparation for starting normal oil flow.
Suddenly, pressure surged upward
through the tower and upset the trays!
Investigation revealed that an additional
block valve in the charge line (valve B in
Figure 10) had been installed during the
shutdown to provide double block valves
for safety in maintenance work.
However, no one realized that the
second valve also created an undrained
water pocket.
 The water that was trapped in this
pocket caused the pressure surge when
it suddenly vaporized as it mixed with
hot oil from the bottom of the tower.
Aside from illustrating the damaging
effects of small amounts of water in
vacuum towers, this incident demon-
strates the need for careful analysis of all
physical changes, even minor ones, to
existing process units. In this case, the
addition of a single valve for
maintenance safety created an unsafe
startup condition.
In some cases, water is introduced into
heated oil or vapor at uniform and
carefully regulated rates. These
operations include catalytic polymeri-
zation, where water is carefully ad-
Figure 10
The tower temperature was
raised to 500°F, with water
trapped between valves "A"
and "B." Valve "A" was
opened, allowing hot oil to
mix with the water which
flashed to steam and upset
trays. The location of the
valve "C" connection
prevented draining.
17
mitted into the system by proportioning
pumps; catalyst regenerators, where
quench water is provided; desalters,
where water is used to facilitate salt
removal; and some light-ends streams,
where water is injected for corrosion
control. In all cases, the amount of
water used must be closely controlled.
The danger lies in uncontrolled mixing
of water with hot oil.
Large quantities of steam condensate
should not be discharged to sewers,
because sewers are not usually designed
to handle hot liquids. Further,
condensate will heat and vaporize most
light hydrocarbons present in sewers,
thereby creating the danger of an
explosion.
 Water in Storage Tanks
It is quite common to find water in the
bottom of storage tanks. However,
water in the bottom of a tank of hot oil
is a serious potential hazard. Even
when the tank is normally operated well
below the vaporization temperature of
water, there is always the possibility of
accidental heating through failure of
temperature controls or insufficient
cooling of feed to the tank.
Violent foaming action, caused by
vaporization of water, may result in
"boilovers" similar to the one shown in
Figure 1 1 .
18
Strangely enough, water droplets,
carried in as an emulsion, can exist in!
oil tanks at temperatures well above
212°F. Laboratory tests have
demonstrated that even a turbulent
layer of oil at 300°F can be maintained
over a water layer for a long period of
time. However, just a few degrees’ rise
in temperature may upset these
seemingly stable conditions and trigger
violent foaming as the water
immediately flashes to steam.
The vaporization of light hydrocarbons
in stocks of wide boiling range can also
cause boilover. As a case in point, a
water-free fuel-oil tank that
Figure 11
Hot asphalt and a leaking
steam coil caused this
boilover of 500,000 gallons
of product.
 normally operated at temperatures of
170-180°F boiled over when the run-
down-line temperature accidentally
reached 300°F.
To prevent tank boilovers due to
vaporization of accumulated water,
storage-tank temperatures should not
exceed 200°F, and adequate rundown
line and tank-heater temperature
controls must be provided. Steam
supply lines to tank heaters should be
equipped with positive shutoff valves
that will automatically close when the
tank temperature reaches a
predetermined set point.
19
The viscosity of some heavy products,
such as asphalt components and some
asphalts, may make higher storage
temperatures, even above 300° F,
necessary. These cases must receive
special attention, including
management Approval, and every
precaution must be taken to prevent
water contamination.
Disposal of Waste Gases
Waste gases Should never be
discharged directly into furnace fire
boxes. Simply venting to fireboxes
through open-end ducts or existing
burners creates serious explosion
 hazards because the waste gas may
continue to flow after furnace shut-
down. Waste or sour gases from
equipment such as sour-water strippers
and vacuum-tower eductors can be
burned safely if the precautions listed
below and illustrated in Figure 12 are
carefully observed:
1. A liquid seal or equivalent flame-
arresting equipment must be provided
in the waste-gas line. (Mechanical flame
arresters should not be used because
plugging can make them unreliable.)
2. The waste gas must pass through a
knockout drum, equipped with a high-
level alarm, to prevent liquid slugs from
entering the furnace.
3. Waste-gas piping, downstream of
the knockout drum, must be equipped
with a continuous steam or inert-gas
purge to prevent flashback.
Figure 12
Safe burning of waste
gases or vapors requires
extra equipment.
20
4.! Waste gases must be introduced
through a separate burner that is used
only for waste-gas disposal.
5.; A separate pilot and pilot gas system
that is not associated with the regular
furnace pilot gas system must be
provided for each waste-gas burner.
6.: Waste gases must have an alternate
means of disposal when the furnace is
shut down.
Discharge to a conveniently located flare
is the most desirable method of Waste-
gas disposal. A flame-failure alarm must
be provided for furnace burners and
flare pilots if the waste gas contains a
toxic material, such as hydrogen
sulfide. Certain nontoxic Waste gases
may be discharged to the atmosphere
from a selected high point on the unit if
this does not cause air pollution
problems.
 Of course, these precautions, which
apply primarily to small volumes, may
not be practical for waste-heat recovery
units and other similar installations where
very large volumes of waste gases are
burned. These facilities are special cases
and require thorough investigation and
analysis.
Toxic or Reactive Chemicals
Many additives and treating chemicals
used in refining processes are toxic and,
under certain conditions, some may
even react violently with themselves. Be
alert for chemicals (such as tetraethyl
lead) that decompose rapidly and
develop enough pressure to rupture
containers with detonative forces.
Fireproofing, sprinkler systems, turret
nozzles and hydrants must be
considered for installations where
excessive heat input through external
fire or other means can be hazardous.
Figure 13
Provide safety showers and
eye-wash fountains in all
areas where dangerous
chemicals are used.
21
Piping, storage and processing
equipment for toxic chemicals —such as
chlorine gas, acids, caustic and lead
compounds (tetraethyl and tetramethy)-
j-must be specifically designed to
prevent leakage and spills. Since many
of these chemicals are corrosive alloys,
lining or other special materials may be
necessary. Generally, the chemical
manufacturer's handling instructions
should be consulted before designing
any facilities that will use chemicals.
Adequate personnel safety devices,
such as safety showers, eye-wash
fountains (Figure 13) and gas masks,
must be provided in all areas where
toxic chemicals are used. Use of a
flushing agent in the showers, such as
kerosene for removal of tetraethyl lead,
may be necessary because some of the
chemicals which can be absorbed
through the skin cannot be washed
away with water.
 Connections for chemical cleaning of
piping and equipment should be
carefully located so that the disposal of
cleaning chemicals does not constitute
a hazard. Recently, a stack painter,
working about 40 feet in the air,
discovered that the rope supporting his
boatswain chair was damaged. The rope
had been stored on the ground in an area
where boiler cleaning chemical had been
drained. Fortunately, the rope held until
the painter could be lowered to the
ground.
Oxygen and
Oxygen-Handling Systems
Oxygen —in either liquid or gaseous
form —must be handled with extreme
caution. Although liquid oxygen must
not be stored or piped inside buildings, it
may be stored outdoors if all
combustible materials are located a safe
distance away.
Figure 14
Light ends are more difficult
to contain than heavy
hydrocarbons.
22
The handling of gaseous oxygen also
requires special precautions. Before
starting to design oxygen-handling
systems, engineers should review
current literature and make a thorough
study of the precautions necessary for
safe handling, such as th0 following:
• Carefully select materials. Carbon
steel, stainless steel, copper and other
usual piping materials will burn in the
presence of commercial oxygen at very
high temperatures even though normal
fuel sources are absent. Copper and
stainless-steel materials are preferred at
pressures above 450 pounds per square
inch (psi) because they have less
frictional resistance and melt prior to
ignition.
• Select valves and fittings for low
frictional resistance.
• The velocity in carbon steel piping—
particularly in valves and fit-
 tings —must be carefully controlled
because fast-moving impurities, such as
dirt and scale, may cause sparks which
will in turn cause ignition.
• Eliminate all oil, grease, dirt, sand,
scale and other foreign materials from
the system.
B. Handling of Light Ends
Skill and knowledge are required for the
safe handling of all hydrocarbons
whether at the well head, in the refinery
or at the service station. However, the
lower-boiling hydrocarbons, known as
light ends, have proved to be
particularly hazardous. Pure
hydrocarbons or hydrocarbon mixtures
having a Reid vapor pressure (Rvp) of
at least 18 psia-such as butane,
propane, ethane, methane, liquified
petroleum gas (LP-gas), natural gas and
fuel gas —are usually classified as light
ends.
Figure 15
Heavy hydrocarbons at high
temperatures act like light
ends.
23
Most light ends will vaporize rapidly at
room temperature and pressure. For
this reason, they are more difficult to
contain than heavier hydrocarbons and
are more hazardous if allowed to
escape. The low viscosity of light ends
(figure 14) also aggravates leakage and
sealing problems. Similar problems are
encountered with heavy hydrocarbons
at high temperature because they act
like light ends|(Figure 1 5).
Handling light ends in the liquid state
requires confinement under pressure,
reduction in temperature or both. If a
liquid light end leaks from a container, it
will quickly vaporize, mix with air and
almost certainly form a flammable
mixture. This is a serious explosion and
fire hazard because most light-ends
vapors are heavier
 than air and will spread along the ground
(Figure 1 6 ) where there are many
sources of ignition.
C, Adequate Utility and Auxiliary
Connections
Adequate and properly located vent,
drain, purge, steamout, pumpout and
waterwash connections must be
provided in the initial design. When
these seemingly minor items are
overlooked, operators are forced to
improvise during operation. In one
case, the results were deadly!
Two men were killed and a serious fire
erupted when a temporary 6-inch
waterwash line for a forthcoming
shutdown was being connected to the
fractionating tower on an operating
catalytic cracking unit. Figure 17 is a
simplified sketch of the bottom of the
fractionating tower and associated
equipment. To be certain that the 6-
inch waterwash valve on the bottom
head of the fractionator
Figure 16
Most light-ends vapors are
heavier than air.
24
was closed, the workmen had checked it
several times and had opened the one-
inch bleeder valve twice to check for oil
leakage. While the bolts holding the
paddle-blind flanges were being
loosened, there where a few oil drips
from the paddle blind but none from the
bleeder valve. When no more oil
appeared, the paddle blind was pulled
part-way out. At first there were a few
small oil spurts —then, a deluge of hot
oil which vaporized and flashed at
once.
Evidently, the workmen did not realize
that the bleeder was plugged or that the
block valve which appeared to be closed
was actually open. Positive position-
indicating double block valves with a
bleeder in between or a permanent
waterwash line would have saved these
men and prevented the ensuing fire.
A coking unit operator was burned
when hot condensate from a deaerator
vent poured on him. The vent
 was located so that it sprayed both
the platform where he was working
and the only exit ladder. Fortunately,
the operator was not seriously in-
jured even though he was forced to
jump down through the ladder cage
to escape the Deluge of hot water,
Although the control system was not
functioning correctly, proper vent
design would have prevented this ac-

Figure 17
Two men were killed as they
attempted to install a 6-inch
waterwash line in
preparation for a forthcom-
ing unit shutdown.

25
 cident. Vents and overflow connec-
tions must be located and oriented so
that the safety of personnel and
equipment is not jeopardized when
these connections are in use.
To prevent accidents like those just
described and at the same time reduce
the preparations necessary for
maintenance and startup, adequate
auxiliary connections such as the
following should be provided:
1. Water filling, wash and overflow
connections
2. Pumpout equipment and
connections
3. Steamout and purge connections
Water and steam purging connec-
tions on piping, vessels and equip-
Figure 18
Locate vents at high points
and drains at low points.
26
ment should be temporary unless they
serve as part of the process. These
connections must be separated from the
supply headers by at least two steel
valves — one being a check valve-and
should be disconnected and blinded
when not in; use.
In! a recent case, someone forgot to
shut off the steam after purging a
vessel prior to startup. Since there was
no check valve in the steamout
connection and the vessel operated at!
a pressure higher than the purging-
steam pressure, oil backed into the
steam line. This was not discovered
until an operator attempted to snuff out
a small flange fire with steam! Just
imagine the serious consequences that
could have oc-
 curred when the operator discovered he
was holding a "lighted blow torch." All
utility connections must be isolated
(disconnected or blinded) from process
streams and equipment when not in
use.
4. Properly located drain and vent
connections (Figure 1 8).
To prevent undesirable liquid pockets,
drains must be installed at low points in
lines, vessels and equipment.
Vessel drains and all other connections
to closed drain systems must be double
blocked, i.e., two block valves with a
bleeder or "telltale" between them. To
assure proper elimination of air and
gases, vents
Figure 19
Hazardous vapors can
escape if ice, formed while
draining light ends,
prevents complete closing
of drain valves.
27
must be installed at high points and all
other locations where vapor may be
trapped. Drains, vents and bleeders
should be blinded or plugged when not
in use.
Water drainage from vessels in light-
ends service can be complicated by the
refrigeration effect of light-hydrocarbon
stocks that vaporize at atmospheric
pressure. Figure 19 shows how an ice
plug, formed by this refrigeration effect,
can prevent proper valve closure. Of
course, hazardous vapors wjll be
released when the ice melts if thjs valve
is not plugged.
In most cases, steam tracing or other
means of applying heat to drain lines and
valves will prevent freezing. Spring-
loaded, self-closing valves,
 sometimes called "dead-man" valves,
may be used on water drain lines. As
these valves close automatically unless
the operator holds them open, they give
reasonable assurance that drains will
not be left open by freezing or operator
negligence. Where large quantities of
water are drawn, an automatic system
using an interface float arrangement
may be desirable.
A combination cracking unit was
severely damaged by explosion and fire
because water froze in a drain
connection. During depressurizing in
preparation for shutdown, a stabilizer
relflux drum was cooled below the
freezing point of water by the vapori-
zation of butane in the-drum. As
nothing could flow from the frozen
drain, the operators assumed that all
liquid was out of the drum and mis-
takenly left the drain valve open. When
the drain later thawed, a large amount
of liquid butane escaped, vaporized and
ignited at a nearby furnace.

Figure 20
Key interlocks give positive
control over valve operating
sequence.

Courtesy of I-T-E Circuit Breaker Company

28
 D. Operating Procedures
Visual sequence annunciators or similar
devices are frequently needed to give
better control over the sequence of
operation of critical valves, motors and
special equipment. Key interlock
installations, as illustrated in Figure 20,
are sometimes used on critical valves in
feed, relief, blow-down and vent
systems to assure proper operating
sequence. All key interlock components
should be clearly labeled. Spare keys
must not be available, or the system is
sure to
29
be operated improperly. Operating
sequence procedures for interlock in-
stallations should be carefully prepared
in simple, easily understood terms;
otherwise, as has happened, operators
may unintentionally operate the system
improperly with unfortunate results.
Operating procedures, maintenance
schedules and procedures for routine
testing of automatic emergency devices
must be established for each unit and
then frequently reviewed and updated.
///. Corrosion and Erosion
Unanticipated corrosion can cause
material failure which may result in
serious damage to valuable equipment
and even loss of life. Since many
processing streams contain corrosive
elements, additional wall thickness,
corrosion-resistant materials, corrosion
inhibitors or other means of protection
are used to lengthen equipment life.
Replacement of corroded refinery
equipment and use of special materials
to combat corrosion cost the American
petroleum industry many millions of
dollars each year. This does not include
downtime and production losses or
damage to property. Good judgment
and prudent use of ex-
30
perience and available information will
minimize most corrosion problems.
A. Liners and Wearing Surfaces
Metal, enamel, epoxy resin, and
fiberglass coatings and liners are often
used for corrosion protection. For
example, aluminized steels are
frequently used for high-temperature
naphtha reformer piping. Stainless-
steel cladding, lead liners or refractory
linings may be required in very
corrosive services. All lining material
must be suitable for the intended
service.
In Services where the flowing medium
contains abrasive material, erosion can
cause serious problems,
 as illustrated in Figure 2 1 . This is
especially true for equipment in catalyst
or slurry service. As erosion is usually
most severe at points of high velocity
and changes in direction, proper
system layout can minimize many
erosion problems. Refractory lining or
hard surfacing should be used to
provide wearing surfaces where erosion
is expected.
Special protection, such as hard sur-
facing, may be necessary where the
prolonged use of wet steam is ex-
pected, because the minute water
droplets in wet steam act as an
abrasive.
Piping, fittings, valves and other
equipment have been severely dam-
Figure 21
The seating surface on this
plug valve was severely
damaged by catalyst
erosion.
31
aged by steam erosion. Wet steam
should not be used in turbines unless
they are specifically designed for this
type of service.
B. Dead-End Sections in
Piping and Equipment
Corrosion is usually very high in locations
where the flowing medium becomes
stagnant. Even in noncorrosive service,
condensation will accelerate corrosion in
these dead-end locations. Dead-end
sections in piping, such as caps and
blind flanges, should be avoided
wherever possible. Particular attention
should be given to seldom-used lines,
such as startup lines and bypasses, to
assure that they are completely
drainable.
 C. Use of Screwed Alloy
Piping Plugs
Solid screwed piping plugs (Figure 22),
made of an alloy suitable for this
service, should be provided for all
tapped openings which will not be seal-
welded. Carbon-steel plugs are used in
carbon-steel seal-welded connections,
such as test vents in piping, because
there is less chance of weld cracking
and no need for post-weld heat
treatment. Generally, the use of tapped
openings should be minimized in
equipment and particularly in piping
containing hydrogen.
Figure 22
Plugs for tapped openings
must be made of an alloy
suitable for the service.
Arrows indicate
solid plugs
32
The failure of excessively corroded plugs
has caused several serious fires and
accidents. Figure 23 shows the tapped
opening in a pump casing where a
carbon steel plug blew out and caused a
serious fire. Corrosion of the plug
threads weakened the screwed joint and
allowed internal pressure to blow out the
plug.
In another instance, high-temperature
sulfidic corrosion caused a high-nickel-
alloy plug to drop out of the bottom
cover plate on an alloy control valve in
hot reduced-crude service. A crude
distillation unit could have been seriously
damaged if this incident had caused a
fire.
 Both of these accidents occurred
because the plugs were made of the
wrong material. Plugs must be made
of a material suitable for the service.
Material requirements for plugs, as well
as for piping and all other equipment in
the system, must be carefully checked
before changing services. Plugs that
are suitable for a certain set of
conditions may not be adequate when
the flowing medium or operating
conditions are changed.
D. Corrosion Inhibitors
It may be necessary to inject chemicals
such as ammonia into process streams
to combat corrosion by forming
protective films, neutralizing
Figure 23
A serious fire resulted when a
screwed plug in the top
casing of this pump blew out
after corrosion had destroyed
the threads.
33
harmful agents or controlling acidity.
Both the corrosion inhibitor and the
point of injection must be carefully
selected.
An aqueous phase should be present for
most inhibitors to be effective. In fact,
the addition of ammonia may even
accelerate corrosion by the deposition
of ammonium chloride in piping and
equipment operating above the dew
point of water. If corrosion inhibitors
are used in some systems, such as
fractionating-tower overhead systems,
it may be necessary to recirculate air
(oxygen) free receiver water to provide a
continuous aqueous phase.
 E. Sentry Holes in Piping
Sentry holes are very small holes,
usually 1/8-inch in diameter, that have
been drilled in the outer surface of piping
or equipment to a depth equal to the
safe minimum wall thickness. Leakage
from one of these holes is advance
warning that excess metal has corroded
away and repair or replacement is
necessary. Strategically located sentry
holes may help prevent rupture or failure
of
piping systems from corrosion by in-
dicating unsafe sections before they
can be overstressed.
Sentry holes should be considered for|
high-corrosion-rate services as defined
in Engineering Specifications 54fc-8 and
54S-16. Vacuum lines must not be drilled
because leakage would allow air
contamination which mjght result in an
explosive mixture in the system. Relief-
valve vent headers, lubricating-oil
piping, utility pip-

Figure 24
There were no sentry holes
to give advance warning
before this corroded elbow in
a furnace outlet ruptured and
caused a serious fire. The
failure occurred between
points A and B in the upper
picture. The lower picture
shows the almost paper-thin
ruptured elbow matched to
the line A in the upper
picture.

34
 ing and small secondary piping that is
not essential to the processing system
usually do not require sentry holes.
Figure 24 shows a piping elbow that
failed from excessive corrosion and
caused the fire damage shown in Figure
25. If sentry holes had been drilled, they
may have given advance warning and
enabled the operators to prevent this
accident.
Figure 25
General view of the fire
damage caused by the rup-
tured transfer-line elbow
shown in Figure 24.
35
F. Adequacy of
Corrosion Protection
Materials selection, corrosion
allowances, liners and wearing
surfaces must be thoroughly checked
to make sure that each refinery facility
Is adequately protected against both
onstream and offstream corrosion.
Since corrosipn rates are affected by
many factors, such as stream com-
position, temperature and pressure,
 corrosion probes to determine the rate
of corrosion may be considered for
most processing systems.
Figures 26 and 26A show a portion of
the curves that G.A. Nelson of Shell Oil
Company has assembled to show the
operating limits of carbon and alloy
steels when exposed to hydrogen.
These curves are an ex-
36
cellent reference when selecting
materials to withstand hydrogen attack
at high temperatures and pressures. The
curves have been developed from actual
operating expedience. Therefore,
designers should apply good judgment,
as well as a safety factor, when using
them.
Figure 26
Operating limits for carb
and alloy steels in hydro
service.
37
38
 In most cases, protection against
external corrosion is as important as
internal corrosion protection. Under-
ground pipe should be protected
against stray current corrosion and
corrosive agents —such as slag, cin-
ders and wood —in fill material. Con-
tact of dissimilar metals that can
cause corrosion through galvanic
action must be avoided.
Chemical piping requires special
precautions and materials. Each case
lshould be extensively reviewed for
proper materials selection. For
example, stress-relieved carbon steel or
other materials that will resist caustic
embrittlement cracking must be used in
piping and equipment containing
caustic solutions.

Figure 26A
Operating limits for steel in
hydrogen service showing
effect of trace alloying
elements.

39
IV. Electrical
Electrical hazards—sparks and arcs that
start fires and shocks that injure or kill
—can be greatly reduced by good
design. The following discussion should
be supplemented by reading Booklet
No. 5 in this series, entitled Hazards of
Electricity.
A. Area Classification
The National Electrical Code (NEC)
classifies refinery areas that have been
made hazardous by the presence of
flammable gases or vapors, and states
the type of equipment that is safe for
use in each. Designers are most
concerned with locations which the NEC
calls Class I, Group D, Division 1 or 2.
Locations which contain or may contain
the usual flammable refinery gases or
vapors in sufficient quan-
40
tities to produce ignitible or explosive
mixtures are called Class I, Group D,
Division 1 or Division 2 locations. Areas
that are always considered hazardous
because gases or vapors are! usually
present are classified as Division 1
locations. Areas that are rarely
hazardous because gases or vapors are
present only as the result of ;an accident
or abnormal operation fall into the
Division 2 category. For additional
information about area classification,
consult the National Electrical Code and
American Petroleum Institute Bulletin
No. RP-500A.
The NEC requires that all electrical
equipment in Division 1 locations be
explosion-proof. In Division 2 loca-
tions, only equipment which sparks or
arcs during normal operation must have
special enclosures, which can be either
explosion-proof, hermeti-
 cally sealed or filled with oil. Design
engineers must know the area classi-
fication and must be sure that all
electrical equipment in each area meets
NEC requirements.
B. Static Electricity
The principal hazard of static electricity is
ignition by spark discharge. Gasoline,
kerosene, jet fuels, fuel oils and similar
distilled products become charged with
static electricity from pumping, flow
through pipes, filtering, splash filling or
water separation, as shown in Figure 27.
Two static hazards may result when
refined hydrocarbon liquids are
pumped into tanks. The first, which
is the chance of a spark discharge
from the shell of an ungrounded
container (such as a tank truck) to
earth, can be eliminated by grounding.
The second and most dangerous,
which cannot be removed by
grounding, is the sparking that can
occur on the liquid surface. However,
the chance of surface sparking will
disappear after a period of time called
"relaxation time," which is usually a
matter of seconds but may range up to
hours.
Loading facilities can be designed to
minimize the hazards of static electricity
by careful attention to the following:
1. Install adequate facilities for
grounding.

Figure 27
Generation of static elec-
tricity occurs from oil flow
through filters, pumps, pipe
and fittings, and by splashing
and spraying.

*Since flow in a pipe

generates static electricity at
a relatively low rate, in-
creasing the length of
straight pipe downstream
from a filter or other high-
static-charge generator can
provide additional relaxation
time to reduce the high static
charge.

41
 2. For refined products other than
gasoline, provide filling systems that
can be operated at low flow rates (3 feet
per second is safe) until loading spouts
are submerged. A low flow rate greatly
reduces the generation of static
electricity.
3. For refined product loading, provide
loading spouts that will stay on the
compartment bottom during loading.
Spouts should have deflectors similar to
that shown in Figure 28 to minimize
splash and spray and help counter
reaction force. Asphalts, including
cutbacks, have no static problem and
should be loaded with short spouts.
4. Provide air-jet, steam-jet or other
eduction equipment, such as shown in
Figure 29, for protection against switch-
loading accidents. This equipment is
used to free tank compartments of rich,
low-flash-point vapors
Figure 28
A simple deflector resting
on the tank bottom reduces
splashing and spraying and
helps counter reaction
force.
42
before loading high-flash-point prod-
ucts. Switch loading is suspected of
being responsible for 9 out of 10 loading-
rack truck fires because (a) the high-
flash-point product absorbs some of
the rich, low-flash-point vapors,
creating an explosive mixture in the
compartment, and (b) the high-flash-
point product is an excellent static
generator.
5. Locate loading-line filters as far as
jmpossible from the loading rack to
provide maximum relaxation time to
minimize static in high-flash-point
products.
6. Static-charge reducers may be in-
stalled in distillate-type product-load-
ing; piping, as close to the loading
spouts as feasible, to substantially
reduce static electricity accumulation.
They must be tested at annual or more
frequent intervals to ensure proper
performance.
Figure 29
Switch-loading accidents
car be prevented by purg-
ing flammable gases with
an aductor.
 7. Additives to relax or substantially
reduce static-charge accumulation in
distillate-type products are available.
8. For positive protection when
loading tankers and barges, it is
necessary to eliminate flammable
mixtures. Blanketing the product
surface with carbon dioxide,
educting the compartments prior to
loading with steam air-jet or steam-
jet equipment, or purging the entire
compartment with scrubbed flue gas
are several of the methods used.
Belt-driven equipment should be
avoided in hazardous areas because
belts ( 1 ) generate static electricity
and (2) sometimes start friction fires.
Conductive-rubber belts will control
the static hazard, but frequent re-
placement is required because they
become less conductive with use.
Figure 30
Even if new pipe is the same
material as the old, the fact
that the new is clean and the
old is rusty is enough
difference to produce current
and subsequent corrosion of
the new pipe.
43
There is no single cure-all for the
static electricity problem, but careful
observation of the above rules by
both designers and operators can
greatly reduce the chances of static
ignition.
C. Stray Currents
Stray currents flow through piping,
connected vessels or other metal
objects in contact with the ground.
These currents result from power-line
leakage or from the battery action of
different kinds of soils and metals.
Stray currents may cause ( 1 ) corro-
sion of underground metallic objects,
as shown in Figure 30, and (2) figures
or explosions from arcs when pipe
flanges are parted.
Corrosion occurs where stray direct
current flows from an underground
metallic object. This can be halted by
forcing direct current to flow to the
 object (cathodic protection) at that
point. An on-site survey will indicate
whether a cathodic-protection system
is required.
Stray-current arcs are an ignition
hazard at tank-car loading racks. In-
sulated joints in both the rails and piping
entering and leaving the rack area will
minimize the flow of stray currents.
Bonding (metallically connecting) the
rails to the fill piping will eliminate arcs
between the fill pipe and tank-car
dome. Bonding and insulated joints are
also used at ship loading docks for
protection from stray-current arcs.
D. Lightning
Lightning is a frequent hazard to
electric power lines, structures and
flammable liquid storage. A typical
lightning stroke may release —for a few
millionths of a second —energy at the
rate of a trillion horsepower.
44
Objects can be shielded from lightning
by overhead ground wires, rod or masts
which create a zone of protection as
illustrated in Figure 31.
Direct lightning strokes can ignite
flammable contents of cone-roof tanks
unless the tanks are protected by
bonding the internal supporting
members to the roof at not more than
10-foot intervals. Floating-roof tanks
with seal hangers in the vapor space
may be ignited directly when bound
charges on the roof are released by
discharge of a nearby storm cloud
(lightning stroke). These tanks can be
protected by ( 1 ) bonding the roof to the
seal shoes at 101-foot intervals, (2) use of
insulating sections in the hanger
linkages, (3) covering sharp points on
hangers with insulating material and (4)
installing short jumpers around each
pinned hanger joint.
Figure 31
Objects within the pro-
tected area will not be
struck by lightning.
 E. Installation
Electrical apparatus should be grounded
for protection of both personnel and
equipment. A permanent ground
connection should be made to fixed
electrical equipment, and connections
should be provided for temporary
grounding of portable electrical
equipment.
Extreme caution must be observed
when nonexplosion-proof equipment in
a nonhazardous area is connected to
conduits which run underground or to
hazardous areas, because flammable
gases or vapors can travel through
conduit and even pass through conduit
seals.
For safety, equipment which sparks or
arcs must be enclosed in explosion-
proof housings—nor vapor-tight
housings-when connected to such
conduits.
Adequate clearance must be provided
between conduit and hot piping or
equipment to prevent damage to wiring
insulation. Generally, ambient
temperatures at conduits should not
exceed 100°F.
45
To provide safety for personnel working
inside metal enclosures, such as tanks
and vessels, circuits for extension-lamp
outlets at these locations should not
exceed 12 volts. Equivalent personal
protection is provided by 120-volt
portable lights equipped with ground-
fault circuit interrupters, as the GFI will
trip the circuit when current (4 to 6
milliamps) flows from the protected
circuit to ground. Do not use this system
where flammable liquids and/or vapors
may be present.
F. Emergency Power
The process unit design should provide
for automatic switching of emergency
lights, critical valves and critical
instruments to an alternate source of
power if the normal source fails. The
alternate power source can be a
separate feeder, a UPS system, or an
engine or turbine-driven generator.
Provide a means to test the automatic
switching and alternate power source.
 V. Fire and Safety
Equipment
Adequate fire and safety equipment,
readily accessible for immediate use in
any emergency, must be provided in all
refinery areas.
A. Turret Nozzles, Hydrants and
Other Protective Equipment
Turret nozzles should be located so that
they can be quickly and effectively
operated with minimum manpower. An
adequate number of fire hydrants
should be installed in locations that will
allow the most efficient use during a
fire or other emergency that requires
large quantities of water.
Fire-water sprays, hose reels, steam for
smothering, purging and cooling, heat-
actuated devices, fire extinguishers,
fire alarms and
Figure 32
If possible, stairways
and ladders should be
located on the outside of
structures.
46
telephones should be installed as
necessary for protection of furnaces,
pumps, stacks, buildings, vessels and
other equipment. Each unit must be
provided with proper and conveniently
located emergency personnel-
protection equipment, such as fire
blankets, self-contained breathing
equipment, safety showers and eye-
wash fountains.
B. Escape Routes
Generally, an alternate escape route
should be provided from all elevated
equipment and platforms. Of course,
this is not feasible for tall towers and
other small, isolated platforms where
an additional exit would be too close to
the source of danger to be useful. On
fired units where towers are very close
to furnaces, bridging to an adjacent
tower or structure may be justifiable if
the towers need to be climbed
frequently.
 Stairways and ladders should be
located entirely on the outside of
structures (Figure 32) wherever
possible.
Stairway designs that require escape
traffic to pass through a process-
equipment structure to get from the
end of one stairway to the beginning of
the next one must be avoided.
Turnaround-type landings, similar to
that shown in Figure 33, should be
used.
All buildings and enclosures, except
small storage or equipment areas that
are rarely entered by personnel, must
have at least two exits.
C. Noise Level
Excessive noise can prevent alarms and
other sounding devices from being
heard and may even cause permanent
damage to the human ear.
Figure 33
Use stairway designs that
avoid the need for escape
traffic to pass through the
structure to get from the
end of one stairway to the
beginning of the next.
47
To keep noise levels within tolerable
limits, all items of noise producing
equipment should be investigated to see
if special precautions are necessary. It is
usually more economical to engineer
noise control features into equipment
during design as opposed to subsequent
retrofitting.
1. Silencers or other sound
attenuation devices should be
considered for flue-gas stacks,
vents and outlets discharging to the
atmosphere; injection nozzles; jets;
and sound-producing restrictions in
piping.
2. Burner installations should be
designed to limit noise to a safe
level.
3. Permissable noise levels should be
specified for large items of rotating
equipment such as air-cooler fans,
motors, and motor-gear
installations.
 D. Equipment Guards
Guards and covers must be provided for
rotating shafts, couplings, fly wheels
and other equipment with exposed
moving parts. Fragile equipment, such
as sensitive instruments, should be
installed in protective enclosures.
Electrical start-stop pushbutton stations
should be equipped with mechanical
guards similar to that shown in Figure
34, to prevent accidental operation. An
entire process unit was shut down
when a painter accidentally bumped an
unguarded pushbutton and stopped an
11,000-horsepower motor.
Figure 35 illustrates that large equip-
ment may also need protection. In this
case, piping at the end of a
Figure 34
Pushbutton guards may
prevent accidental shutdown
of critical equipment.
48
rajlroad spur track was damaged when a
railroad car was accidentally pushed
over an inadequate bumper guard. A
small fire resulted, but the results could
have been serious. T0 prevent accidents
like this, all dead-end railroad trackage
must be equipped with adequate railroad
bumping posts. Critical processing
equipment and piping should not be’
located where it can be easily damaged
by runaway or derailed railroad cars,
heavy mobile equipment, trucks or even
automobiles.
E. Remote Shutdown Devices
If .access to important areas on process
units can be blocked during a fire or
other serious situation, vital equipment
must have remote shutdown
Figure 35
Dead-end railroad trackage
must be equipped with ade-
quate bumping posts to
prevent accidents like this.
 devices, and valves with remotely
controlled "operators" should be in-
stalled in critical piping. Electrical
conduit and air transmission lines that
serve these remote devices must be
fireproofed in areas where they could be
damaged by fire. Provide a means to
test these shutdown devices.
F. Automatic Water-Deluge
Systems
Automatic water-deluge systems,
similar to that illustrated in Figure 36,
should be considered for unfire-proofed
pressure vessels in remote locations. In
this example, heat-actuated devices on
the sphere surface detect any sudden
temperature rise and open the remote
deluge
Figure 36
Typical fire protection for
spheres.
49
valve. A sloped berm is provided
underneath the sphere to cause any
hydrocarbon leakage to drain away and
thus prevent flame envelopment. To
minimize the possibility of liquid-
hydrocarbon overflow to adjacent
areas, the diked area should contain at
least the volume of the sphere.
G. Pump Manifold Areas
Fire and safety equipment for major
pump manifold areas should be as
complete as that for processing areas.
Relief valves with vent lines discharging
a safe distance away should be installed
on all headers that can be
overpressured. Turret nozzles and
remotely controlled foam lines should
also be considered for manifold areas.
 VI. Foundations, Buildings,
Structures and Stacks
A. Soil and Foundations
Allowable soil-bearing loads for new
facilities should be established only after
the soil at the proposed site has been
investigated. In addition, at least one
test boring should be made at the
foundation site for each major tower
or other tall structure, particularly if
there is history of uneven settlement or
other uncertain soil conditions in the
vicinity. All test borings should be
plotted in their entirety. Where soil
conditions require the use of piling, it
may be necessary to drive test piles for
load tests.
The bearing plane of major footings
should not be higher than the invert
elevation of nearby sewers or piping,
unless special precautions, such as
encasement in concrete, are taken to
Figure 37
Foundations must be stable
for all loading conditions.
50
prevent washouts or unstable bearing
conditions. All major foundations must
extend below the soil frost line to protect
against settlement or displacement
from heaving. Foundations for pumps,
compressors and other machinery which
produce vibration require special
attention.
Foundations must be designed to be
stable under all conditions of loading
(Figure 37) including wind (hurricane
forces where applicable), vibration, test
conditions, platforms, piping and
bundle pulling. Normally, vessel
foundations should be designed so that
the vessel can be water filled.
B. Buildings
At least two exits should be provided for
all rooms, buildings and enclosed areas
on process units. Exterior doors for
these enclosures must open outward
and must be equipped
Figure 38
This connection was in-
volved in the accident
shown in Figure 39.
with fusible-link closing devices that will
cause them to close automatically when
subjected to abnormal heating.
A safe ventilation system, preferably of
the pressurized type, should be provided
for all control rooms. Spare pressurizing
fans, low-pressure alarms and a safe
source of air must be provided before
control-board atmospheres can be
considered safe for the use of general-
purpose electrical equipment. Since
pressurizing systems will not produce a
safe atmosphere when exterior doors
are open, air conditioning should be
considered for most pressurized control
rooms.
The use of open floor drains in buildings
inside the unit areas should be limited.
Open floor drains must be avoided in
switchgear rooms and control rooms.
Figure 39
This catalytic cracking unit
structure collapsed as the
reactor and regenerator
vessels were being filled
with water for a load test.
51
C. Structures
Structures mist be designed for all
loading conditions that may be en-
countered, including wind, vibration
and testing. Particular attention should
be given to critical support and bracing
components and connections, and
to the overturning safety factors on tall
structures.
Figure 38 shows one of the connections
that failed during the collapse of the
reactor-regenerator structure on a
catalytic cracking unit (Figure
39) being testing with a water load.
It is important that the structure design
provide for unequal distribution of loads
resulting from unequal deflection of
component supports. Eccentric
connections should be avoided, if
possible. Each structural design must
be thoroughly analyzed.
 Sufficient ladders and platforms should
be installed to permit adequate access
for normal operation and equipment
maintenance. Ladders on tall towers
and structures should be offset at
intervals, usually 30 feet maximum.
Platforms and other elevated structures
should have guards, such as toeplates,
to prevent tools and other objects from
falling on personnel and equipment
below.
Unfireproofed steel structures should be
protected from external corrosion.
Galvanizing or other special protection
is the rule for structures subjected to
salt-water mist or spray or other
corrosive atmospheres.
Structures that are constructed of
hollow members, such as supports
made of pipe, must be capped or
otherwise sealed to prevent water
accumulation and subsequent corro-
sion or freezing.
D. Stacks
Distance from hazardous equipment,
prevailing wind direction and terrain
must all be considered when deter-
mining safe flare and blowdown stack
locations (Figure 40). Flare stacks must
be high enough to prevent the flame
from acting as a source of ignition for
any other possible flammable mixtures
in the area of the flare. In general,
knockout drums should be installed
ahead of all blowdown stacks and
flares. Air should be kept out of all
collecting lines, flare headers and flare
stacks.
Generally, all stacks, except derrick-
type flare stacks, should be self-sup-
porting. Stacks must be designed to

Figure 40
Locate flare and blowdown
stacks a safe distance from
equipment and personnel
areas so that the flame can-
not become an unintentional
source of ignition.

52
 withstand all loading conditions, in-
cluding hurricane and earthquake
forces where applicable. Stacks
should also be investigated for vibra-
tion behavior to see if additional rein-
forcement is necessary. Supports for
grade-mounted stacks must be fire-
proofed to at least 35 feet above
grade.
All furnace stacks handling
corrosive flue gas must be lined
with corrosion-resistant
insulating concrete. Stacks
should be designed with butt-
welded joints rather than for
bolted joint construction. In
addition to eliminating external
bolt corrosion problems,
welded construction also
prevents corrosion from internal
leakage through the joint. As
an example of problems
associated with bolted stacks,
53
a reformer furnace stack was
found to be held in place by only one
bolt. Fortunately, the prevailing wind
placed that bolt in tension, and
repairs were made before any damage
was done. Investigation revealed that
overstress together with some
corrosion probably caused the bolting
failure.
Lined steel stacks in congested areas
and most unlined steel stacks in proc-
essing areas should be provided with
water sprays for cooling. Seldom-
used spray devices with carbon-steel
water-supply piping frequently plug
with corrosion deposits. If corrosion-
resistant piping or special "blow-out"
valves cannot be economically
justified, frequent inspection and
flushing are mandatory to assure
proper operation when the sprays are
needed.
VII. Furnaces and Air
Preheaters, Fired Retailors,
Exchangers and Cooling
Towers
A. Furnace Safety
The design and location of each furnace
installation require careful consideration
to minimize the potential fire hazards
associated with equipment using an
open flame. The following discussion
covers some of the principles that
should be observed in safe furnace
design. This information should be
supplemented by reading Booklet No. 3
in this series, Safe Furnace Firing.
Furnace installations should have en-
circling curbs or dams or a depressed
area under the furnace to contain oil
Figure 41
Avoid liquid in fuel-gas
systems because it may
run out of the gas burners,
both inside and outside the
furnace.
54
spills. Each encircled area must be
equipped with a water-sealed paving
drain. Floor-fired furnaces should be
avoided, if possible, because split
tubes may release enough hot oil to spill
out of the burner openings. Four-inch-
high dams that completely encircle
each burner or group of burners must
be installed inside the furnace if floor-
fired furnaces are used.
Furnace and boiler fire boxes must be
equipped with adequate facilities for
purging to prevent the development of
explosive mixtures when lighting fires.
All furnaces must be equipped with
smothering-steam connections to
control possible tube rupture incidents.
 Generally, each furnace burner should
be equipped with a separately supplied
gas pilot burner to prevent flame failure
in case the main fuel supply is
interrupted. Gas burners must be
designed to prevent flashback over the
entire range of duties at design gas
pressures and compositions. The fuel-
gas system must have enough
condensation drums to prevent liquid
slugs from entering burners (Figure 41).
It may be desirable to steam trace and
insulate fuel-gas lines downstream of
knockout drums to prevent condensation
and hydrate formation in cold weather.
Fuel-gas systems should be equipped
with enough redundant alarms and
controls —such as low-pressure alarms,
high-liquid-level alarms and
Figure 42
Flame impingement causes
coking and tube damage.
55
shutdown devices —to assure a safe
fuel supply.
Although the prevention of flame im-
pingement is the primary responsibility
of operators, burners must be designed
and located so that there
is no impingement on tubes, supports
or refractory during normal operation
from startup to 125 percent of design
heat release. Figure 42 illustrates the
damaging effects of flame impinge-
nent. To give accurate outlet-stream
temperature readings, temperature-
sensing equipment should be located
as close as possible to the outlet tube.
Thermosouples, to measure the tube
skin temperature, should be considered
for installations where
 considerable coking is expected. Low-
flow alarms should be considered for
furnace installations. Flue ducts should
be designed to prevent the
accumulation of water. Water
accumulation accelerates corrosion.
B. Furnace Air-Preheater
System Safety
Air-preheat systems for fired heaters
must be designed to allow the heater to
operate on natural draft in the event of
fan failures, air-preheater failures, etc.
Stack dampers and emergency-air
doors and their operators must be
designed to be absolutely reliable. If
either of these dampers does not open
in an emergency transition to natural-
draft operation, the firebox
56
can run "fuel rich." This may result in
a serious explosion.
The inlet to the emergency-air doors
must be located so that an operator will
not be burned in the event that hot air
discharges from the inlet.
The instrumentation system, which
allows the fired heater to return to
natural-draft operation in an emer-
gency, also must be very reliable.
Process measurements which actuate
transfer to natural draft on fuel
shutdown should be taken from their
own process taps and be isolated from
other measurements.
Sulfuric-acid corrosion, where sulfur is
present in the fuel, can occur
downstream of the air preheater since
the flue gas may be near the acid
dewpoint temperature. The
 ductwork, induced-draft fan and stack
must be designed to resist dilute
sulfuric-acid corrosion. Failure of the
stack from corrosion could cause the
stack to fall, resulting in a serious
accident to personnel and equipment,
and/or a fire.
C. Fired Reboilers
In most cases, the precautions
necessary for furnaces are also
applicable for fired reboilers. Fired
reboilers must be located a safe
distance from the processing area.
However, this may require a large and
cumbersome inlet and return piping to
give the low pressure needed in long
reboiler lines. Generally, fired reboilers
have limited application in oil refineries.
Figure 43
Air-heater igniters must be
designed to give positive
ignition.
57
D. Air Heaters
Some processes, such as fluid catalytic
cracking, use preheated air for startup.
Since this requires the introduction of a
flammable mixture into the air heater,
special precautions and equipment are
required. Igniters must be designed to
give positive ignition as ignition failure
may produce an explosion mixture in the
heater even in processing equipment.
Figure 43 shows a reliable igniter
design. Igniters must be retractable if
the spark-producing mechanism can be
damaged by heat.
Air heaters must be equipped with sight
glasses so that an operator can observe
the flame at all times. The fuel-gas shut-
off valve should be
 within the reach of this operator so that
he can light the burner while observing
the flame. Fuel-gas supply systems, in
addition to meeting the requirements for
furnaces, must be equipped for blinding
when not in use.
Air-heater outlets should be equipped
with high-temperature alarms to prevent
damage from overheating.
E. Heat Exchangers
All areas in heat exchangers must be
drainable. Exchangers with diagonal
tube-side baffles should be avoided, if
possible, as this arrangement usually
allows water to be trapped in some of
the tubes (Figure 44). A drain or weep
hole (weep holes are not always
effective) must be provided in all
undrainable partitions.
Figure 44
A drain through the channel
cover or weep holes in the
baffles will prevent the trap-
ping of water in exchangers
with diagonal tube-side
baffles.
58
Drains should also be provided in bonnet
low points on floating-head exchangers,
as water trapped here may contact hot
oil during startup. Annular distributors
on exchangers should be provided with
some means of draining and venting if
liquid or vapor pockets can exist.
Tube materials must be carefully
selected to resist corrosion and fouling.
As corrosion conditions are usually
different on each side of the tube wall,
carbon steel or other relatively
inexpensive homogenous materials may
not be suitable for both conditions.
Bimetallic or alloy tubes or tubes with
bonded coatings may be necessary in
very corrosive services.
 Since most refinery cooling water
causes fouling, tube materials with
low-fouling coefficients, such as
inhibited admirality or brass, are
usually used in cooling service. In
services that are corrosive to ad-
miralty, bimetallic tubes (such as
steel over admiralty) may be used. If
hydrogen blistering has been ex-
perienced or if the formation of
atomic hydrogen by corrosion is
suspected, bimetallic tubes must be
vented. Otherwise, atomic hydogen
will penetrate the steel portion of the
tube and collect between the tube
walls, where it will form molecular
hydrogen and cause collapse of the
inner tube (Figure 45). Collapse of
bimetallic tubes may also be caused
by ( 1 ) end annealing treatment, (2)
foreign material trapped between the
tube walls during fabrication or (3)
leakage into the space between the
tube walls as illustrated by Figure 46.
The use of single tube-pass ex-
changers in flammable or toxic ser-
vices is usually undesirable unless
multiple tube-pass units are not
economical. This is primarily due to
problems that have been experienced
with the expansion or packing joint
that is usually necessary at the bon-
net end to allow for differential ex-
pansion. These expansion mechan-
isms are prone to leak unless special
precautions are taken. In one case
where a single tube-pass reboiler was
equipped with an internal bellow

Figure 45
Hydrogen may collect between
tube walls and cause the inner
tube to collapse.

Figure 46
Water entered the space
between the tube walls on this
bimetallic tube at Point 1,
flashed to steam, and caused
the inner tube to collapse.
Points 2 and 3 show scale
accumulation after the tube
collapsed. A section through an
undisturbed bimetallic tube is
shown at the bottom of the
picture.

59
 type expansion joint, the bellow leaked
enough to raise the pressure in a
connecting tower. Complete failure of
the bellows would have released enough
material to exceed the relieving capacity
of the tower.
Although air-cooled exchangers are
economical in some services, they
should be carefully considered before
being used to cool heavy products. With
the many parallel paths, tubes with low
flow tend to be plugged by viscous
material. Double-pipe coolers and even
multiple tube-pass shell and tube
exchangers may also be subject to this
problem in similar services.
Leaking exchanger tubes will usually
release oil or vapor to the cooling-water
system because most cooling water is at
a lower pressure than the process
stream. Since this may create serious fire
hazards, gas detectors or gas separators
should be considered for cooling-water
return lines. At one refinery, an entire
cooling tower was destroyed when light
hydrocarbon vapor was ignited after it
had leaked into the cooling-water
system.

Figure 47
Cooling towers may pro-
duce dense fog in cold
weather.

60
 F. Cooling Towers
Cooling towers must have adequate fire
protection because they are usually built
of flammable materials. Height or size of
the tower, proximity to an ignition
source, or relative importance to refinery
operations may justify special fire
protection. Nonflammable materials or
sprinkler systems can probably be
justified if cooling towers are exposed to
a continuous hazard, such as a nearby
furnace. Turret nozzles, fire hydrants
and hose reels will usually provide
61
sufficient protection for most cooling-
tower installations.
In cold weather, water vapor from
open drains, exhaust heads or cooling
towers may produce dense fog that can
extend over large areas. Cooling
towers should be carefully located so
that prevailing winds will not cause
fog to drift over process units or to
obscure highways (Figure 47). If
temperatures are below freezing, fog
may cause roads, walks and stairways
to become slippery from ice
accumulation.
VIII. Instruments
Safe and accurate operation of modern
refinery units depends, in a large
measure, upon proper instrumentation.
Design engineers must thoroughly
analyze each process and provide
suitable instruments, alarms and
controls for safe off-process conditions
as well as for startup, shutdown and
normal operation. In addition, the
design engineer must design the
functions and limitations of each
instrument and instrument system for
operating personnel. Equipment for
automatic startup or shutdown
sequences should be carefully reviewed
for possible booby traps.
A. General
The following precautions apply to
most instrument installations:
1. All instruments must fail safe. That
is, instrument failure should cause
controlled equipment to auto-
62
matically open, close, start, stop, re-
main in position or do whatever has been
predetermined as necessary to continue
safe unit operation.
2. Avoid the use of instruments in dual
or multiple service if operator confusion
can cause unsafe conditions. In any
case, separate indicators must be used
for each specific danger point.
3. Use visual-sequence annunciators
when it is necessary to know the
sequence of failures of associated
equipment.
4. Instruments must be made of
materials suitable for the service, par-
ticularly when subjected to corrosive or
erosive conditions.
5. Generally, instruments should be
located so that they can be operated
and serviced from a grade or a con-
venient platform. Over paved areas,
instruments may be located overhead
 if they can be serviced from portable,
rolling scaffolds.
6. Control and/or computer rooms
should be protected by "halogenated
agent fire-suppression systems" when a
fire inside the room could negate
automatic unit-shutdown procedures.
B. Instrument Leads
Hydrocarbons or other flammable or
toxic fluids or vapors must not be piped
into control rooms for instrumentation
(Figure 48). In general, pneumatic or
electrical signals should be used.
Tubing bundles, instrument ducts, and
conduit must be equipped with vapor
seals and vents to prevent process-area
vapors from entering control rooms and
instrument cases.
C. Oxygen and
Combustible Analyzers
Oxygen and combustible recording
analyzers, with alarms, should be in-
Figure 48
Direct-pressure lines in
flammable or toxic service
must not be connected to
control-room instruments.
63
stalled on the main control board for
all inert-gas systems. These instru-
ments are necessary to sound a warning
( 1 ) if the inert gas becomes
contaminated with hydrocarbon vapors
and (2) if the inert-gas stream goes off
specification. Remember, ordinary
combustible gas indicators (vapor
testers) do not function in inert
atmospheres.
D. Alarms
Alarms ( 1 ) should be loud enough to be
heard in all parts of the unit and (2)
should sound long enough to ensure
being heard. Extra-loud sounding
devices may be necessary at furnaces
or other locations with high noise levels.
In one case, an alarm that signaled tie
need for starting a fire-water pump
sounded only in the control room end
for only 30 seconds. During a routine
fire drill, the operator happened to be
outside the control room end was never
aware that the alarm had sounded. For-
 tunately, corrections were made before
the pump was needed in an actual
emergency.
Generally, alarms should be provided on
the main control board for the following
unusual conditions:
1. Low pressure in instrument air,
cooling water or fuel-gas systems.
2. High liquid levels in fuel gas, com-
pressor suction, relief valve or blow-
down knockout drums.
3. Failure of control-room ventilation in
pressurized control rooms.
4. All other system failures that can
affect safe and continuous operation.
Low-flow alarms should be considered
for furnace feed streams.
E. Orifices
Figure 49 shows how concentric orifice
plates in horizontal lines can
Figure 49
Concentric orifice plates in
horizontal lines can cause
water pockets.
64
cause water pockets. Weep holes
should be drilled at the bottom of orifice
plates to eliminate these pockets and at
the top if vapor and non-condensibles
can collect there. In dirty service, it may
be necessary to install separate valved
drains or to use eccentric orifices that
allow drainage because weep holes may
plug. However, it must be remembered
that eccentric orifices are less accurate.
Valves with notched gates may be
substituted for restriction orifices where
orifice plugging is a problem. A tag
must be attached to the valve handle to
indicate that the valve will not stop flow
and must be opened occasionally to
clear obstructions.
F. Pressure Instruments
Cleanout-type protector systems
should be provided for pressure in-
Figure 50
Pressure instruments must be
equipped with overpressure
protection. This pressure
gauge has a blow-out back.
 struments if elements can corrode, plug
or freeze. All pressure instruments
should have blow-out backs (Figure 50)
or blow-out grommets in the case.
Instruments with blow-out protection
must not be mounted or otherwise
located where the relief mechanism is
obstructed. Also, steam tracing or
insulation should not be installed over
parts that are designed to blow out.
G. Glass Inserts
Since ordinary glass will fail under most
operating conditions found in
hydrocarbon processing equipment, it
certainly is not suitable for use in level
gauges and sight glasses. Glass inserts
must be made of a material, such as
tempered borosilicate glass, that is safe
at all conditions of the intended service.
As an added safety margin, it is
recommended that glass
inserts for level gauges in hydrocarbon
service should not be used under
conditions more severe than one third of
the manufacturer’s pressure-
temperature rating.
Figure 51 shows a glass-tube rotameter
that failed when it was used at
pressures above the manufacturer’s
recommendations. Fortunately, no one
was injured by this accident.
H. Sampling
Laboratory testing of hazardous
samples should be minimized because
gas chromatographs and other in-place
stream-analysis equipment are usually
safer, quicker and more accurate.

Figure 51
This glass-tube rotameter
failed when it was used
at pressures above the
manufacturer’s
recommendations.

65
 IX. Insulation, Auxiliary
Heating and Fireproofing
A. Insulation
Adequate insulation should be provided
for heat conservation, temperature
control, maintenance of cold
temperatures, prevention of ice
formation and control of corrosion.
Climate and fuel costs should be
considered in determining justifiable
insulation thicknesses.
Since anti-sweat insulation for cool
piping and equipment cannot be eco-
nomically justified, it should be used
only where condensed moisture will
damage equipment or create personnel
hazards, such as slippery walking
surfaces. Piping and equipment oper-
ating above 150°F should be insulated
or equipped with guards for burn
prevention where physical contact by
operating personnel is likely.
66
To avoid stress corrosion cracking in the
presence of soluble chlorides if moisture
is present, insulation for austenitic
stainless steel must be a water-proofed,
low-chloride material. Tests have
shown that moisture accumulation can
dissolve enough chlorides out of many
insulating materials, including some of
the resin-bound glass fiber insulations,
to cause austenitic stainless-steel piping
to crack. Insulation may even provide an
absorbent medium for soluble chlorides
carried by moisture, such as salt-water
spray or mist. Austenitic stainless-steel
piping operating at relatively low
temperatures should be coated with a
waterproofing material before the
insulation is installed.
In some cases, such as hot piping
containing hydrogen, it may be
necessary to omit flange insulation.
Insulation on flanged joints in hot
 piping allows the flanges to be heated,
which in turn may loosen the joint and
cause leakage and possibly a fire.
B. Auxiliary Heating
Auxiliary heat, normally furnished by
external steam companion piping (steam
tracing), may also be supplied by
electrical heating cables, internal steam
tracing or steam jacketing. Insulation is
normally used in conjunction with
auxiliary heating to conserve the heat
that is being supplied. Some method of
auxiliary heating is normally used in the
following situations:
1. External heating should be used for
freeze protection where piping or
equipment contains or can collect water
at temperatures near ambient (Figure
52).
Figure 52
Unprotected vessel connec-
tions may collect water and
freeze during prolonged
periods of cold weather.
67
Freezing temperatures must not be
allowed to interrupt equipment oper-
ations. Freeze protection for critical
equipment may be necessary even in
locations where freezing temperatures
rarely occur. Several processing units at
a southern refinery had to be shut down
when an extended period of subnormal
temperatures caused freezing in
instruments and other critical
equipment.
2. Fluids with high viscosities at ambient
temperature may need to be heated to
give better flow characteristics.
3. Auxiliary heating is necessary where
fluid temperatures can drop below the
pour or or freeze points. Although this is
usually required for asphalts and other
heavy hydrocarbons, certain chemicals
—such as
 caustic and monoethanolamine (MEA)-
must also be heated to prevent
freezing.
4. Steam tracing is generally needed for
hydrocarbon vapor and gas piping
where condensation and icing can affect
safety and operation by causing a
reduction in pressure at control, throttle
and relief valves.
5. Water seals on vacuum systems must
be steam traced if freezing can interrupt
operation or permit air leakage through
broken piping.
6. All instruments that can be affected
by freezing must be protected by either
heated housings (Figure 53) or auxiliary
heating (Figure 54).
Instruments and instrument leads are
especially susceptible to freezing be-
cause water pockets are not flushed
Figure 53
Heated housings will keep
critical instruments from
freezing.
68
out during normal operation. Even small
quantities of ice may make instruments
inoperable or erratic. Discretion is
necessary in liquid light-ends service
where heating of instruments and leads
may cause vaporization and subsequent
erroneous readings on flow meters,
level indicators and pressure
instruments.
Steam tracing for piping containing
acid, caustic or other chemicals that are
corrosive or dangerous at high
temperatures must be separated from
the piping by spacers to prevent
overheating of the contents. If the
piping contains tetraethyl lead (TEL) or
other substances that are unsafe at
temperatures above 250°F, steam
tracing should not be used. Rather,
electrical heating or other means that
can be rigidly controlled
Figure 54
Instrument leads usually
must be steam traced
and insulated to prevent
freezing.
 should be used for supplying auxiliary
heat.
Magnesia insulation must not be used
for steam-traced piping if either the
piping or tracer is aluminum, because it
will cause severe corrosion.
C. Fireproofing
Properly located fireproof ing (non-
flammable protective coatings, such as
light-weight concrete or insulation) will
reduce personnel hazards and
equipment losses from fire. In general,
fireproofing is most important where it
confines a fire by protecting adjacent
sources of fuel, such as vessels or
piping filled with flammable
hydrocarbons. The fireproofing of
supports prevents overheating and
subsequent weakening, as illustrated by
Figure 55.
Fireproofing materials must be carefully
selected. The use of low-fire-resistant
materials should be avoided. For
example, some fiberglass insulating
blankets have half the fireproofing value
of mineral wool. Metal jacketing must be
used to protect all fireproofing insulation
that can be damaged by high-pressure
water streams. Since it has a low melting
point, aluminum should not be
substituted for galvanized steel as a
jacketing material when fireproofing is
the requirement.
Adequate fireproofing, to a distance of at
least 35 feet above grade or above a
potential pool of burning fluid, should be
provided for the following:
1. Furnace and stack structural supports.

Figure 55
This vessel fell during a fire
when the skirt buckled from
overheating. Fireproofing
would have prevented this
failure.

69
 2. Steel supports for elevated proc-
ess equipment, such as towers and
spheres.
3. Vessels containing flammable
materials or dangerous chemicals.
Adequate fireproofing will slow down
heat input to a rate where economical
relieving systems can control
overpressure. Without fireproofing,
vessels that operate dry or with very
little liquid in the vessel to wet the
surface may overheat and fail at
pressures below relief-valve settings.
(Generally, storage spheres are not
fireproofed if they are protected by
water-deluge systems or other suitable
means for controlling external heat
input.)
4. All process unit pipe supports
(Figure 56) in main pipeways and all
Figure 56
Fireproofing will prevent the
failure of most pipe supports
during a fire. (Arrow points to
an unfireproofed beam.’)
70
other supports for piping, such as
hydraulic oil lines to control valves, that
are vital in case of fire. To prevent
corrosion of the pipe at the point of
contact, bare piping should not be
supported directly on concrete
fireproofing or other concrete surfaces.
5. Pipe supports for vital lines in haz-
ardous areas outside the unit area
limits.
6. All instrument leads and control
equipment that are necessary during
safe off-process operations. As an il-
lustration, the blowdown valve for a
furnace that was on fire from a split
furnace tube could not be operated
because intense heat had melted parts
in the air motor operator. With the
furnace blocked in, 34 additional
 tubes ruptured and nearly destroyed the
furnace.
7. Electrical conduit that contains
wiring vital to safe off-process opera-
tion of motor-operated valves and
emergency lighting circuits. Recently, a
small exchanger fire caused a unit
shutdown when overhead conduits
were damaged enough to prevent
operation of essential control valves.
8. Relief and blow/down piping, in-
cluding small relief valve inlet piping,
containing flammable materials. This is
necessary to prevent relieving systems
from being damaged by intense heat.
9. Radioactive sources. (Locations of
radioactive material must be clearly
marked.)
71
Fireproofing needs should be carefully
balanced between the cost of
fireproofing and the risk involved with
unfireproofed equipment. Although
items to be fireproofed should be
carefully selected during the engineering
stage, fireproofing needs should also be
reviewed at the job site to be sure that all
critical items are protected.
Critical instrument and electrical leads
should be routed to minimize their
damage from fire. Main instrument and
electrical wiring and tubing runs should
not be installed in the vicinity of hot oil
pumps or other fire-prone areas.
X. Piping
Many safety and operating problems
have been associated with the layout
and design of piping systems. Although
this section is primarily concerned with
the elimination of hazards in piping,
designers must also strive to develop
economical systems that contribute to
efficient unit operation. In general,
piping is the most expensive single item
of equipment in a process unit.
Normally, all hydrocarbon-carrying
process lines are located above grade to
( 1 ) reduce initial installation costs, (2)
reduce external corrosion, and (3) give
access for inspection and maintenance.
Sewers, drains and pumpout systems
are usually located underground.
Figure 57
Water may collect above
valves in vertical piping. If
not drained, it may cause a
pressure surge that will
upset fractionator trays
when it contacts hot oil.
72
A. Water Pockets
Pockets must be avoided in all piping
and equipment where water can ac-
cumulate and ( 1 ) contact hot oil and
flash to steam, (2) freeze and cause
rupture, (3) mix with acid or caustic and
cause corrosion or generate excessive
heat, or (4) cause operating problems.
The following design practices will
eliminate most water-trapping
problems:
1. Use eccentric reducers with the
straight side on the bottom in horizontal
lines except in pump suction lines where
vapor pockets may cause cavitation in
the pump.
2. Avoid valves in vertical piping
wherever possible. Figure 57 shows
how water can accumulate above a
valve during steaming, washing or
hydrotesting.
3. Minimize the use of reduced port
valves in horizontal piping if the piping
is not self-draining on each side of the
valve.
4. Avoid dead-end sections, as they
tend to trap water and accelerate
corrosion.
5. Provide drainage for idle process
lines, such as bypasses, startup lines
and piping to spare pumps. Whenever
possible, this piping should be
designed so that sections on each side
of block valves are self-draining.
6. Piping must be designed for ease of
drainage during both startup and
normal operation. Adequate means
to check for water accumulation dur-
ing operation, such as valved drains at
low points and boots on accumu-
lator drums, must be provided. Special
attention should be given to piping
systems that are connected to hot
vessels and equipment like that
illustrated in figure 58.
7. Slowdown lines should slope away
from the unit and toward blow-down
drums.
8. Compressor suction lines should slope
toward suction knockout drums. Where
this is not practical, suction lines should
be as short as possible, free From
pockets, insulated and steam traced.
9. Avoid pockets in vacuum lines
because normal water drainage through
open |valves will introduce air

Figure 58
Tower "A" was connected to
coke drum "B" by a long
horizontal line with a vertical
leg. When heated, tower "A"
expanded and lifted the
tower end of the line,
allowing condensation from
steam testing and water
from the gas oil to collect in
the line. When coke drum
"B" was heated, it expanded
and dumped the water into
tower "A," where it flashed
and damaged the internals.

73
unless special precautions are taken.
Slope horizontal vacuum transfer lines
generously. A substantial pressure
surge experienced during startup of a
vacuum tower was traced to water
trapped in horizontal sections in the
inlet transfer line.
Piping systems must be designed with
adequate connections for cleaning and
water flushing prior to startup.
B. Auxiliary Piping Facilities
In addition to the piping necessary to
transport hydrocarbons for processing,
refining units must be equipped with
adequate auxiliary facilities—such as
air, steam, water, gas, drains and
sewers —to meet normal as well as
emergency situations. Even though
these facilities are usually of less
importance than process piping,
engineers must make sure that all
auxiliary piping is pro-
Figure 59
Grouping of steam traps
facilitates discharge of con-
densate to a collection
system.
74
perly designed. Attention to details,
such as those listed below, may prevent
the development of serious hazards.
1. Steam for smothering, snuffing,
service hoses, space heating and
protective heating should be connected
to a source that will not be shut off
during unit shutdown.
2. If a source of emergency cooling
water is required, the fire-water system
can be connected to the cooling-water
main at a point downstream of all
cooling-water pumps.
3. A condensate-collecting system
should be used when several steam
traps are installed on a process unit
(Figure 59). A large number of steam
traps venting to the atmosphere can
cause fog and ice formation.
4. Instrument-air systems should be
equipped with an air dryer to prevent
 freezing and subsequent instrument
failure. A local supplemental instrument-
pressure source (N2, plant air, auxiliary
compressor, etc.) should be considered
where central systems are subject to
frequent outages.
5. All process unit sewers should have
gas-tight manhole covers with properly
identified vent lines to discharge vapors
safely. Process sewers must be
equipped with double-trap manholes at
unit area limits.
C. Piping Materials
Although carbon steel is the most
commonly used piping material, correct
materials for each particular service
must be determined for both normal and
emergency conditions (Figure 60).
Special alloys, liners or
coatings may be necessary ( 1 ) in cor-
rosive or erosive services, (2) where very
high or low temperatures are expected or
($) when unusual operating conditions
are anticipated. Malleable, nodular and
cast-iron materials should not be used
for piping and components in
hydrocarbon or toxic services. These
materials, which are brittle and have a
low melting point, will frequently fail
during a fire from excessive heat or con-
tact with water. Generally, copper,
aluminum and their alloys should not be
used for piping in hydrocarbon service.
Where salt water is the cooling
medium, carbon steel should not be
used for cooling-water piping at pumps
because it becomes plugged with
deposits ;in a short time.

Figure 60
This equipment failed
because it was made of
a material that was
not suitable for emergency
conditions.

75
 Although copper or copper-alloy piping
is preferred in this service, precautions
against electrolytic corrosion are
necessary if copper contacts anything
made of steel.
Chemical piping requires special pre-
cautions and, usually, special materials
because most chemicals are corrosive.
Some materials, such as welded
carbon-steel piping in caustic or MEA
service at elevated temperatures, require
stress relief to avoid caustic-
embrittlement cracking.
D. Expansion and Supports
Piping systems, including supports,
must have adequate provisions for
expansion or contraction during startup,
operation and shutdown. Hot piping
attached to supports that do not expand
as much as the piping are often causes
of trouble.
Figure 61
Sliding supports that did
not slide caused this pipe-
support failure.
76
Figure 61 illustrates that improperly
designed sliding supports can also cause
problems. In this case, the sliding joints
on the pipe support did not allow
movement when the hot vessel attached
to the piping being supported was cooled
during a shutdown. Evidently, the
sliding joint worked properly when the
vessel was heated but later "froze" in
the hot position.
Piping or other equipment attached to
vessels to be field stress-relieved must
be disconnected if expansion during the
stress-relieving operation can cause
overstress in the piping. Even piping that
operates at relatively cool temperatures
should be analyzed for flexibility if the
system will be steam purged prior to
startup.
 Piping systems should have enough pipe
supports, anchors, guides and spring
hangers (Figure 62) to allow trouble-free
operation. In addition to being designed
for all normal loadings, piping supports
—such as those for large overhead
vapor lines — should be designed to
permit purging of connected vessels and
drums by water flooding.
Piping that discharges to the at-
mosphere must be firmly anchored to
counteract the reaction force of the
discharged fluid, especially if the piping
is screwed construction. A man was
killed when he opened a drain valve in a
line discharging to the sewer. The piping
downstream of the valve included a
horizontal screwed elbow that loosened
and allowed the discharge pipe to swing
up and strike the operator.
Figure 62
Spring hangers will provide
continuous support for pip-
ing that moves from
expansion.
77
E. Vibration
Although most piping systems will
vibrate to some extent, piping layouts
that are conducive to vibration should
be avoided if possible. If stresses
developed by vibration are greater than
the fatigue strength, eventual failure is
certain. Vibrations that are not
noticeable, such as low amplitude,
high-frequency vibrations, often
produce the most dangerous stresses.
As an illustration, a small flash fire
developed when vibrations induced by
a malfunctioning relief valve caused the
nipple for a 4-inch purge vent to fail.
The vent was equipped with an
oversize unsupported valve that acted
as a large mass at the end of the vent
and thus helped develop the fatigue
stresses that caused failure.
 The exciting forces causing vibration in
piping may be ( 1 ) mechanical vibration
of connected equipment, such as
compressors, pumps and vessels, (2)
wind-produced vortices that form
alternately on opposite sides of
cylindrical surfaces, (3) internal
pulsations in flowing fluids, such as
those set up by reciprocating pumps and
compressors or (4) slug flow, under
mixed-phase flow conditions, from
partial condensers to overhead
separators or reflux drums. The most
desirable solution to vibration problems
is the elimination or isolation of the
source of vibration.
Where vibration is expected, good
design should include the following:
1. Provide adequate foundations,
especially for reciprocating pumps and
compressors.
2. Pipe guides and supports should be
strategically located to reduce
vibration. Where pulsating flow ex-
78
ists, piping should be supported at all
changes in direction, and cantilever
sections must be avoided. In one case,
compressor vibration caused a screwed
valve to loosen and release high-
pressure hydrocarbons. Although
welded or bolted construction should
have been used, this instance illustrates
the need for special attention
everywhere vibration is anticipated.
3. Small branch connections should be
avoided in vibrating systems. Additional
supports, such as gusset plates, may
help reduce vibration problems.
4. In cases of pulsating flow, an
acoustical study should be made to
determine if dampening equipment is
needed.
Failure can be caused by resonance of
some part of the system with the
pulsation frequency. Pulsation-snub-
bing devices should be installed as
 close as possible to the pulsation-
producing equipment.
F. Valves
Although gate valves are generally used
in wide open or block service, lubricated
or nonlubricated plug valves, butterfly or
ball valves also may be used. Strict
attention must be given to temperature
restrictions and economic
considerations when using plug,
butterfly or ball valves. Process unit
valves with resilient seating surfaces,
such as Teflon, that cannot withstand
high temperatures must be equipped
with secondary metal seats to prevent
leakage during a fire. Brass or cast-iron
valves should not be used in
hydrocarbon or toxic service.
Available pressure drop may prevent the
use of some plug and ball valves because
some of these valves have small port
openings. Each type and brand of valve
must be thoroughly investigated for
pressure drop. In a
Figure 63
All plug and ball valves
must have visible position
indicators that cannot be
misassembled.
Courtesy of Hills-McCanna Company
79
recent case, some 2-inch ball check
valves were found to cause over a 50-
psi drop in pressure.
Valves, particularly plug valves, that do
not give an absolute indication of
whether the valve is completely open or
closed must not be used under any
circumstances. Several serious
accidents have occurred while dis-
connecting piping downstream from
open valves. In all cases, the valves
were thought to be closed but were
actually open!
All plug, butterfly or ball valves must be
constructed or equipped with visible
positive position-indicators (Figure 63)
that cannot be misassembled to give an
incorrect indication of valve position.
These valves must not have an
appearance that can be confused with
closed gate valves. Nonrising-stem gate
valves must not be used in hydrocarbon
service.
 Proper orientation of valve handles is pipe when the valve is in the open
essential. On one unit an operator, position.
who occasionally injured his knuckles
A small bypass should be considered for
when adjusting valve settings on the
large gate valves when the pressure
furnace burners, changed all the
differential across the gate is ap-
handles (valves were plug cocks with
proximately equal to the pressure rating
handles) without telling anyone else! An
of the valve. Opening the bypass valve
operator on the next shift thought the
will usually allow the pressure to equalize
setting had been changed and upset the
on each side of the gate and permit the
unit when he moved the valve settings
operators to quickly open valves that
to the old handle positions. Plug-valve
otherwise would require assistance or
handles should be orientated so that
considerable physical effort.
they are perpendicular to the line when
the valve is shut off and aligned with the

Figure 64
Avoid extension stems that
do not reveal the position of
the valve stem. With the
installation shown above,
operators cannot tell
whether the valve is open or
closed.

80
 Extension stems for outside screw and
yoke gate valves should be designed so
that operators can determine whether
the valve is open or closed by the
position of the valve stem (Figure 64).
This usually can be done by slotting the
stem extension so that the valve stem is
visible. However, if the extension
passes through a wall, more elaborate
provisions may be required.
Valve handwheels should be operable
from grade or a convenient platform
whenever possible. Chain
Figure 65
Provide barricades around
handwheels for under-
ground valves if they can
cause tripping hazards.
81
operators, gear operators or extension
stems should be used for valve
handwheels that are inaccessible or are
more than 6 feet above an operating
area. Valve operator chains that hang in
access ways must be avoided if they
cannot be stored out of the way. Chain
operators should not be used on
screwed valves or on valves smaller than
2-inch size. Underground valves with
extension stems must be located so that
hand-wheels are not tripping hazards
(Figure 65).
 G. Pipe Joints
Welded construction must be used for
( 1 ) all hydrogen piping, (2) all primary
process piping on units, (3) all primary
hydrocarbon piping outside unit area
limits and (4) most caustic, acid and
steam piping. Even where screwed
piping is permissible, welded
construction is generally preferred
because screwed couplings and valves
are more likely to fail when exposed to
fire (Figure 66). Back-welded screwed
connections should be kept to a
minimum and generally should not be
substituted for socket-welded fittings.
When welded joints are used to join
piping of varying chromium contents
Figure 66
Screwed piping is more
likely to fail than welded
piping when exposed to
fire.
82
in systems operating above about
850°F, consideration should be given to
the possibility of carbon migration or
diffusion which may lead to em-
brittlement of the joint and consequent
cracking. Also, expansion
characteristics of different metals in
welded joints may, under temperature
cycling conditions, lead to fatigue
failure at the joint.
Flanges, gaskets and bolts for bolted
joints should be carefully selected.
Gasket materials must be compatible
with the intended service. For example,
since Teflon deteriorates at higher
temperatures, its use for gaskets and
packing must be avoided at
temperatures above 450°F. When
 unusual gasket materials are used, the produce some degree of water hammer,
gasket seating-surface area should be in any case, the shock wave, which may
checked to make sure that there is be several times the normal pressure,
sufficient bolting force to seat the gasket will travel to the end of the line where it
and thus seal the joint. will be reflected back. This cycle will
repeat until all the energy is dissipated or
H. Water Hammer relieved.
All piping systems should be designed
Quick-closing valves and layouts that
to avoid water hammer, since this
are conducive to water hammer should
phenomenon can occur in all liquid lines
be avoided if possible. Surge tanks,
under pressure when there is an abrupt
pneumatic chambers, spring-operated
change in flow velocity or pressure
relief valves, or shock absorbers and
(Figure 67). Complete stoppage of flow,
arresters are sometimes used to help
such as quickly closing a plug, ball or
control this phenomenon.
butterfly valve, is not necessary because
any sudden change in flowing conditions
may

Figure 67
Water hammer may cause
failure of critical pipe lines.

83
XI. Relief Valves and
Pressure-Relieving Systems
Most refining processes require the
confinement of hydrocarbons under
pressure, usually at elevated temper-
atures. Since it is not economically
feasible to design all equipment for
emergency pressure conditions, some
method of pressure relief is necessary.
The following discussion describes
some of these emergency situations
and some of the pressure-relieving
systems that can be used for
protection.
Figure 68
Thermal expansion, particu-
larly in conjunction with
steam generation, can cause
substantial damage.
84
A. Thermal Expansion
Thermal expansion of hydrocarbon
liquids can cause dangerously high
pressure —high enough to rupture
almost any equipment not protected
with pressure-relieving devices — when
a blocked-in vessel, exchanger, pipe or
other item of liquid-filled equipment is
heated. The destruction is even greater
if the liquid is water or light
hydrocarbons at temperatures above
their atmospheric boiling points (Figure
68).
 Figure 69 illustrates the pressure rise in
typical water-filled vessels when they
are heated. A rise in temperature of
only 50° F above ambient causes a
pressure of 2,500 psi or an average of
50 psi for each degree rise in
temperature. At higher temperatures,
the rate of pressure rise per degree is
even greater because the expansion of
the water is greater.
When a vapor space is present (Figure
69), warming causes expan-
sion of the water and compression of
the vapor. The pressure rises slowly
until the vapor space is compressed into
a small volume or the vapor dissolves in
the water. Thereafter, the pressure rises
abruptly at the higher temperature level,
100 to 160 psi per degree of temperature
rise.
An exchanger with 1000°F hydrogen in
the tubes and 400°F gas oil in the shell
was initially installed without a relief
valve, as there was only one block valve
on the shell side of the

Figure 69
When water-filled vessels
are heated, a relatively small
increase in temperature
causes a large increase in
pressure.

85
exchanger. Later, an additional block
valve was installed to isolate the shell
a n d —someone did just that—while
1000°F hydrogen continued to flow
through the tubes. Rapid thermal
expansion of the blocked-in gas oil
caused the shell to rupture into about 20
pieces!
Figure 70 shows the channel section of
a condenser that blew off and
caused serious injuries and extensive
property damage. After hydrotesting
the tubes in this condenser, steam was
injected into the shell side for testing
before the water was drained from the
tubes. Thermal expansion, together
with the steam that was generated by
heating, ruptured the condenser and
threw the channel section about 20
feet.

Figure 70
Thermal expansion caused
serious injuries and extensive
property damage when this
channel section of a
condenser was blown off
during testing.

86
 Heat from the sun can cause excessive
pressures to build up in long blocked-in
lines full of liquid light ends. Serious
fires have resulted when gaskets or
fittings failed under these conditions. If
relief valves are not provided to relieve
pressure buildup, block valves should
be slightly open to allow the pressure
to relieve into a connecting tank or
vessel.
Pump suction lines from vessels con-
taining light stocks, such as butane and
propane, should be made as short as
possible. These stocks are highly
volatile, and very little warming of
suction lines may vaporize enough liquid
to cause vapor binding in centrifugal
pumps (Figure 7 1 ) .

Figure 71
The sun may provide
enough heat to vaporize
light stocks in pump suc-
tion lines.

87
 B. Relief Valves handle the total capacity that might be
All drums, tanks, vessels, towers, ex- generated simultaneously from all
changers and other equipment subject equipment being protected.
to internal pressure must be protected The following are some of the criteria
from overpressure by adequate relieving that must be observed in developing
capacity (Figure 72). Generally, safe pressure-relieving capacity:
requirements for pressure-relieving
devices for both fired and unfired 1. Equipment must be protected against
pressure vessels are specified by overpressure caused by an external fire.
applicable codes and regulations. Of 2. Overpressure protection from thermal
course, unusual cases require special expansion is essential if any source of
attention. heat can raise the pressure of blocked-in
Equipment must be protected from all liquids above design pressures.
sources of overpressure. Where two or Additional relief capacity is necessary if
more sources can cause overpressure blocked-in conditions can generate
simultaneously, relieving devices must be steam or vapor.
sized for the combined effect. Separate 3. If practical, equipment downstream of
relief equipment is not required for pumps should be designed for at least
pressure vessels which cannot be pump shut-off pressure; otherwise,
isolated from a connecting vessel that is adequate relieving capacity must be
protected by a relief valve. However, the provided.
relieving device must be sized to

Figure 72
The bottom of this vessel
failed because of insuffi-
cient relieving capacity.

Courtesy of Wide World Photos

88
 4. Where equipment operates below
ambient temperature, overpressure
from loss of refrigeration must be
prevented.
5. Heat exchangers and similar vessels
should be protected against
overpressure from failure of internal
pressure components. Normally, the
flow of two tubes is considered as a
design criterion for relief-valve sizing.
When there is a large pressure dif-
ferential between the shell and tube side
of exchangers, special attention is
necessary because ordinary relieving
devices may not be adequate for split-
tube failure. Tests have shown that
high-pressure shock waves are
propagated at sonic velocity in a low-
pressure liquid when it is suddenly
contacted with high-pressure gas.
These shock waves, which could be set
up by a split-tube failure
89
in a high-pressure gas cooler, may have
sufficient energy to overpressure the
containing equipment before ordinary
relieving devices can function. Waste-
heat boilers and reactors in certain
services also may require protection
against the failure of internal-pressure
components.
6. Adequate relieving capacity must be
provided for protection against
overpressure from control-equipment
failures or loss of cooling capacity, such
as failure of cooling water or tower
reflux.
Safety and relief valves should be the full
nozzle, refinery type and must be
stamped in accordance with applicable
codes|. All safety and relief valves for
hydrocarbon service must be flanged.
Balanced-type relief valves may be
considered for most conditions of
variable back pressure.
 Rupture discs should not be
substituted for safety valves.
Relief and safety valves must be con-
structed of materials that are suitable for
the intended service. Since most relief-
valve installations are dead ends,
corrosion is a serious problem that can
cause valves to become inoperable. In
some cases, it may be desirable to install
rupture discs under relief valves to
protect against corrosive materials.
Where these combination rupture-
disc/relief-valve installations are used,
an atmospheric bleeder must be installed
to detect and release any leakage that
might accumulate between the rupture
disc and the relief valve. This bleeder
must be equipped with a locked-open
block valve that can be closed if the disc
ruptures or corrodes away.
Full-capacity duplicate relief valves,
connected by a three-way plug cock
(Figure 73) that cannot have more than
one port completely blocked at a time,
should be considered where failure of
the relieving device can cause an
unexpected unit shutdown. When
multiple-valve installations are
necessary, only one additional relief
valve is required. Due to lubricant
limitations at higher temperatures,
locked-open gate valves should be
used instead of three-way cocks at
temperatures above 350°F. For this
installation, a simple chain and padlock
locking arrangement is preferred to key
interlock systems. (Car seal locking
devices must not be used.)
Valves, piping or other restrictions
located between relief valves and
protected equipment must not limit
relieving capacities.

Figure 73
Installation of full-capacity
duplicate relief valves con-
nected by a three-way plug
cock allows relieving devices
to be removed for
maintenance during operation
without sacrifice of
overpressure protection.

Courtesy of Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc.

Courtesy of Rockwell Manufacturing Company

90
 C. Relief-Valve Piping
Relief-valve discharge piping must be
designed to avoid excessive back
pressure from either liquid accumulation
or pressure drop. A refrigerated
propane storage tank ruptured and
caused a serious fire because liquid in a
pocketed blowdown line prevented
release of pressure through
autorefrigeration when the refrigeration
system was shut down for repairs.
Discharge piping that vents to the
atmosphere should be drain-able to
prevent water accumulation and
subsequent freezing.
On units, piping that vents flammable
vapors to the atmosphere should be
equipped with connections for snuffing
steam because vapors from leaking
valves may be ignited by lightning. To
protect personnel and minimize the
possibility of equipment
Figure 74
Relief-valve piping must be
designed for expansion
when relieving hot liquids
or vapor.
Courtesy of Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc.
91
damage, vents should discharge at a
safe height above grade, above
operating platforms and away from
furnaces. Open piping or vents should
never discharge toward equipment that
can be damaged or overheated if the
vent is accidentally ignited.
Excessive pressure drop should be
prevented in relief-valve inlet piping
because it will cause valve chatter
and hinder proper valve operation. Inlet
piping must be self-draining. Both inlet
and discharge piping must be designed
for all stresses that may
be developed when relief valves
open. Provisions for expansion
(Figure 74) and vibration control
are also essential.
Relief valves in low-temperature service
must be protected from freezing if
condensed moisture can collect on
 seating surfaces. Auxiliary heating may
be necessary if the temperature of
heavy material flowing in long discharge
lines can drop below the pour point and
thus restrict flow. Fouling or plugging of
either inlet or discharge piping must be
prevented.
D. Depressuring Systems
When a vessel which is partially filled is
exposed to an external fire, the
92
portion of the vessel shell below the
liquid level remains close to the liquid
temperature while the remainder of the
shell becomes heated. Since material
strength at high temperatures (above
700° F) decreases with temperature
increase, it is possible for heated
vessels to fail from over-stress before
the internal pressure reaches the relief-
valve set pressure. To protect against
this situation, a
 vapor-depressuring system similar to any emergency exists. Remotely
that illustrated in Figure 75 may be operated valves must be used if it will
desirable. be necessary to depressure
A vapor-depressuring system designed equipment that may be enveloped
to reduce vessel pressures to one half of by fire.
the relief-valve set pressures in 10 to 15
minutes should eliminate most vessel-
failure hazards during a fire. Normally,
depressuring systems will be activated
as soon as

Figure 75
A vapor-depressuring
system will help protect
units containing large
volumes of light
hydrocarbons.

93
 XII. Plot Plans and
Equipment Spacing
A. Spacing Between Units
The spacing of process units within
refineries requires careful consideration.
Access for fire fighting and fire-fighting
equipment is of prime importance.
Adequate access for maintenance and
normal traffic is also essential. The risk
and inconvenience of closely spaced
units must be
balanced against the cost and
availability of additional real estate.
Generally, a distance of 250 feet be-
tween units or between units and
tankage has been used as a desirable
spacing. Of course, this distance will
vary with the potential hazards inherent
in each unit or facility.
The grade elevation of a unit should be
high enough to prevent the spread of
fires by the flow of spilled

Figure 76
Grade against oil-water flow.
If the unit deck is at normal
ground elevation, pipe alleys
should be below the unit
grade and the combination
firewall and road above unit
grade.

Figure 77
Locate operating units
above adjacent tankage.

94
 oil from nearby facilities. Usually, units
should be located above adjacent land
areas and below encircling access
roads which also serve as dikes or
firewalls (Figure 76). Drainage ditches,
roadways and pipe alleys must be laid
out to prevent the transfer of fire
between refinery areas. Trenches,
sumps or other below-grade pockets
where flammable vapors are prone to
collect
should be eliminated wherever
possible. Figures 76, 77, 78
and 79 illustrate useful
methods for minimizing the
hazards of flooding from
adjacent areas or equipment.
For refineries located along the
seacoast or adjacent to rivers
and streams, consideration
should be given to providing
protective dikes or to raising
unit grades above high-water
levels.

Figure 78
Isolate tankage by adequate
firewalls.

Figure 79
Provide curbs and sewer
capacity to take spills when
unit decks are above sur-
rounding areas.

95
 B. Spacing Within Units from toxic gases, such as hydrogen
Safety, economy, operability and ease sulfide and sulfur dioxide.
of maintenance must all be considered in
The unit hydrocarbon inventory should
selecting a location for each item of
be held to a minimum to reduce the
equipment on a process unit. Actually,
amount of fuel available to feed possible
equipment spacing is as important as
fires. Surge drums and rundown tanks
spacing between units, and most of the
should be eliminated wherever practical,
unit spacing considerations are
and reflux drums should be located to
applicable to some degree. Of course,
avoid the concentration of large volumes
no single layout is satisfactory for all
of hydrocarbons in any one area.
units or even for similar units at different
refineries. The ends of horizontal vessels should
not face control rooms or other per-
Furnaces, stacks and blowdown vents
sonnel areas. Also, hydrants and turret
should be located in the safest place
nozzles should not be located at the
with respect to other hazardous
ends of, or in line with the ends of,
equipment, prevailing wind, grade and
horizontal vessels. Figure 80 illustrates
personnel areas. The proximity of cooling
how a horizontal vessel can act like a
towers and tankage should be
rocket if fire causes a circumferential
considered in the design and location of
seam to fail. Several firefighters were
refinery flare systems. Blowdown, flare
killed when this hap-
and furnace stacks should be designed
so that there is no pollution problem

Figure 80
Horizontal vessels, as
shown, or vertical vessels
may act like rockets if they
fail at circumferential
seams.

96
 pened during a fire at some above-
ground horizontal drums.
In general, all hydrocarbon-handling
equipment, such as pumps and
compressors, should be located
outdoors. In some cases it may be
desirable to provide a roof over com-
pressors for easier maintenance.
Process units should be designed so
that there is no need to lift heavy pieces
of equipment over operating lines or
equipment (Figure 8 1 ) . Equipment for
lifting heavy items and procedures for
erecting towers and structures should
be thoroughly checked to assure that
they are safe. Recently an improperly
designed turnbuckle parted and caused
tower erection equipment to fall across
operating lines. Fortunately, the
damage was minor.
Figure 81
This buckled crane boom il-
lustrates why heavy pieces
of equipment must not be
lifted over operating lines or
equipment.
97
Wherever possible, equipment should
be located at grade with clearance for
operation and maintenance. There must
be enough space between pieces of
equipment to avoid congestion after
piping, valves and instruments have
been installed. Accessways should be
large enough to accommodate
maintenance equipment. Where special
handling problems are expected,
additional clearances should be
provided.
The safety of operating and
maintenance personnel is of prime
importance. The personnel area (control
room) should be separated from the
ignition (furnace) and process areas.
Although located near the edge of the
unit, personnel areas should be
convenient to important equipment
requiring attention.
 XIII. Storage Facilities
The extensive facilities required for safe
storage of the many hydrocarbons and
chemicals used in a petroleum refinery
must be carefully designed. Liquids are
usually stored at atmospheric pressure
in either cone or floating-roof tanks,
depending on the amount of
vaporization expected. Heavier gases,
such as propane and butane, are often
stored under pressure as liquids in
spheres or drums. Light products, such
as methane and ethane, are usually
stored as gases, either at atmospheric
pressure in gas holders or under
pressure in vessels. Underground
caverns, refrigerated tanks and
spheroids may be used for storage of
some products.
Adequate fire protection must be
provided for all storage facilities.
98
Foam systems or portable foam-
handling equipment should be provided
for cone-roof tanks when the flash point
of the contents is below 120°F. Gas
blanketing may be necessary when low-
vapor-pressure stocks are stored in
vessels with a vapor space. However,
for large tanks, a floating roof will
probably be more economical than
blanketing. Other fire-protection
devices, such as automatic water-
deluge systems, are discussed in
Section V of this booklet.
Filling lines should discharge near the
bottom of storage tanks to eliminate the
free fall of liquid and thereby reduce the
generation of static electricity. Section
IV of this booklet discusses some of the
hazards of static electricity in storage
tanks.
 Many storage tanks accumulate a layer
of water below the oil. So that oil-not
water-is pumped from the tank, suction
nozzles (Figure 82) should be designed
so that the inlet section is above the
water level in the tank bottom,
particularly where the tank supplies
process units or other equipment
sensitive to water.
To prevent tank boilover from vapori-
zation of accumulated water, oil should
be stored at temperatures below 200°F.
If higher storage temperatures are
necessary, high-temperature alarms
must be installed in rundown lines to
warn operators of potential boilover
conditions. Problems associated with
tank boilovers are discussed in more
detail in Section I of this booklet.
Figure 82
To prevent water contami-
nation of feed streams, the
inlet to storage-tank suction
nozzles must be located
above the water level.
99
Generally, pressure-storage vessels,
such as spheres and spheroids, should
be kept under positive pressure, ever
though the vapor pressures of some
stored liquids at reduced temperatures
are less than atmospheric. For
example, both butane (at temperatures
below 31 °F) and pentane (at
temperatures below 97°F) have vapor
pressures below atmospheric pressure.
Where low temperatures may exist for
long periods, some method of admitting
an inert gas, such as nitrogen, to the
vapor space should be provided to
prevent air leakage into the vacuum
created by the reduced ambient
temperatures. In any case, air must not
be allowed to enter! Although the
amount of air admitted at any one
time may be small, subsequent tem-
perature cycling will concentrate the
 oxygen and cause the development of
an explosive mixture in the vapor space.
Spheres must be designed to withstand
an absolute vacuum to prevent collapse
if the internal pressure is accidentally
reduced below atmospheric.
Vents and relief-valve-vent piping must
be so arranged that, if vented vapors
are ignited, the flames cannot strike
vessels, piping or other equipment. At
one refinery, burning
vapors from a relief-valve-vent pipe
impinged on the shell of a partially filled
spheroid and weakened the metal in the
top plate. When the vessel ruptured
(Figure 83), vapors from about 500,000
gallons of a mixture of pentane and
hexane escaped as a huge ball of fire
and killed 19 fire fighters.
Storage vessels must be equipped with
adequate water drain lines and valves
that are protected from freez

Figure 83
The spheroid at "A" rup-
tured and caused this fire
when flame impingement
from a burning relief-valve
vent weakened the shell.
The spheroid at "B" is a
companion to the one at
"A."

Courtesy of Amarillo Daily News

100
 ing. Frozen drains can ( 1 ) rupture,
(2) prevent drainage of water, and
(3) cause loss of stock when the ice
melts. Nonfreeze type drains, similar
to the one illustrated in Figure 84 for
spheres, are preferred. No external
means of freeze protection is needed
because the water is drained away
from all valves and piping exposed to
freezing temperatures. Operators
must be sure that there is no source
of ignition in the area before using
this type of drain because the water
will be preceded by a slug of hydro-
carbons. Similar drains can also be
used for draining water from tanks.
Firewalls should be provided around
all storage vessels. Foundations
should be located at sufficient
heights above the surrounding area
to provide proper drainage. Firewall
enclosures can be equipped with
valved and trapped drains if accumu-
lation of surface or fire-fighting
water can become a problem.

Figure 84
To operate this internal water
drain: (1) open valves "A" and
"B" to let the liquid head push
out the water; (2) after the
water is drawn, close valve
"B" and open valve "C" to
clear the water from lines; and
(3) then close valves "A" and
"C."

101
 XIV. Vessels and Trays
A. Design
Pressure vessels should be designed in
accordance with applicable codes,
specifications, state laws and regula-
tions. Design pressures and tempera-
tures should be selected to protect
against the worst combination of
conditions that can be reasonably ex-
pected. In addition to pressure re-
quirements, vessels must be designed
for all external loadings, such as
platforms, piping, insulation, snow and
ice, wind forces, and vibration. Also,
excessive deflection in tall, thin vessels
must not be overlooked. All vessels must
be stable under earthquake and
hurricane-induced forces in those areas
where these phenomena can be
expected.
In high-temperature service, insulating
vessel linings can be used to protect
against overheating and subse-
quent overstress. For example, catalyst
regenerators and some reactors are
lined with refractory material to protect
the shells and other critical metal parts.
Skirts and vessel supports must be
adequately designed for all loads.
Vertical slots in skirts at the point of
attachment to the shell should be
considered for large vessels in cyclic
temperature service, such as fluid
catalytic unit reactors and coke drums.
Support lugs may be more desirable
than slotted skirts for smaller, thick-
walled vessels, such as reformer
reactors.
B. Drainability
Vessels must be completely drain-able.
Areas where liquid pockets can form,
such as at intermediate heads on dual
or multiple-section towers, must be
avoided (Figure 85).

Avoid Use
Intermediate head Intermediate head
is hard to drain is self-draining
because irregularities

Figure 85
Intermediate heads must be
completely drainable.

will trap water

102
 The trays in one dual-section tower
were upset because the trapout pan
was not drained. Vapor traveled up-
ward from the bottom stripping sec-
tion through a chimney into the frac-
tionating section. The head of the
lower vessel served as a trapout pan
for gas oil in the upper section (an
arrangement similar to that shown
for tower A in Figure 85). A ring of
water about 3 inches deep collected
on the trapout pan because the drain
line did not leave the tower at the
bottom of the pan. When hot oil
mixed with this water, causing it to
flash to steam, a pressure surge was
created that upset the upper trays.
C. Knockout Drums
Knockout drums should be installed
in all streams where liquid entrain-
ment is undesirable or hazardous,
such as in the gas to a compressor.
Figure 86
Top outlets or vents on
vessels must be located at
the high point to prevent
undesirable vapor pockets.
103
blowdown stack or flare stack. To be
effective, these drums must reduce
the gas velocity sufficiently to allow
separation of liquid particles. Entrain-
ment can be minimized by tangential
inlet nozzles or internal downcomers
on the inlet lines. Drums should be
equipped with high level alarms and
facilities for liquid removal.
D. Venting
Vessel top outlets should be located
at high points (Figure 86) to permit
purging with steam, inert gas or
water. Additional vent connections
must be provided at all pockets
where oil or vapor can be trapped
during purging operations.
GenerallV, all vapor pockets should
be eliminated by proper location and
orientation of nozzles.
 A 45,000-barrel noded spheroid was
ruptured by an internal explosion as
purging water was being drained. After
pumping out most of the oil in
preparation for an inspection, the
spheroid was water filled and over-
flowed through the overhead vent until
the effluent was oil-free. After the
water level had drained down about 14
feet, an internal explosion ripped
through the shell.
Investigation and sampling indicated
that the probable source of ignition was
iron sulfide. Air entered through the
open top manway, and trapped
Figure 87
This schematic cross section
of a noded spheroid shows
how vapor was trapped even
though the vessel was
overflowed with water.
104
oil and vapor provided the fuel. Figure
87 shows that Trap 1 existed because
the overhead vent nozzle was not
located at the high point. Traps 2 and 3
were caused by the manway and other
nozzles. Trap 4 was a pocket running
entirely around the spheroid in the space
enclosed by the node tie-plate
connection, the spheroid shell and the
rising water. Although the existing
design of this vessel made it impossible
to eliminate all vapor and oil by
overflowing with water, proper vent
connections would have permitted
adequate purging and prevented this
accident.
 Vents or sample connections should be
provided for all vapor spaces in all
vessels where air or oxygen might
accumulate. If possible, these vessels
should be provided with means to vent
vapors continuously from the top.
Venting of undesirable vapors to
blowdown stacks or directly to the
atmosphere if environmentally accep-
table may prevent the accumulation of
hazardous compositions further along in
the system.
Vents for vessels that are washed or
purged with water must be large
enough to prevent the development of a
vacuum when draining.
105
Most vessels should be equipped with
vents large enough to permit adequate
air circulation for personnel during
inspection and maintenance work.
E. Internals
Vessels internals must be designed for
drainability Large horizontal baffles
should be avoided in towers, if possible,
because they may become distorted
and trap water. If process
considerations prevent these baffles
from being sloped, weep holes and
stiffeners to prevent distortion must be
provided.
 Tray sections must be provided with
weep holes or other positive means for
draining. The bottom tray in each tower
should be carefully checked for
excessive drainability, which may
cause operational difficulties. Excessive
liquid leakage through reboiler trap-out
trays can cause startup problems in
towers because low flow to the reboiler
will prevent it from producing enough
vapor to seal the trays.
Trays and other internals must be
operable over a wide range of condi-
tions. Even though flows are low
Figure 88
Too much vacuum dam-
aged this catalyst storage
drum.
106
during startup, internals should function
sufficiently to allow an orderly and safe
startup. Out-of-level and leakage
tolerances for trays, pans and shower
decks must be practical.
F. Vacuum Systems
Equipment must not be subjected to
pressures or vacuums greater than
those for which it is designed. This
applies to equipment of all sizes from
pressure gauges to complete tower and
vessel systems.
To remove catalyst from the reactor and
regenerator on a catalytic crack-
 ing unit, the fresh catalyst storage bin
was designed to be placed under a partial
vacuum by use of a portable steam-jet
ejector. Although the system had been
used twice without incident, the storage
bin (Figure 88) collapsed when a larger
evacuator, without a suitable vacuum-
limiting device, exceeded the partial
vacuum for which the vessel was
designed. Fortunately, the steam
connection to the steam-jet ejector
broke and thus prevented complete
collapse of the vessel. Use of the
equipment that was designed for this
unit, or a suita-
107
ble vacuum-limiting device, would have
prevented this accident.
Steam ejectors for vacuum systems in
hydrocarbon service must have facilities
for prevention of air contamination if the
steam supply fails. Drains and vents in
vacuum systems should be minimized
since each one is a possible source of air
contamination. To prevent the possibility
of air contamination through open
bleeders or utility stations, steam for
vacuum-producing equipment should
be supplied directly from steam mains
without any intermediate connections.
XV. Waste Disposal
Safety demands the practice of good
housekeeping in refineries. Refuse and
debris must be promptly removed to
avoid the creation of obstructions, fuel
sources and tripping hazards. Facilities
must be designed to promote good
housekeeping.
A separate sanitary sewer should be
provided on each unit for water closets,
urinals, lavatories, showers and
drinking-water coolers. This sewer is
usually a gravity type to the unit area
limits where tie-in to local refinery
facilities is made. Septic tanks may be
required at some refineries or in areas
where sewer systems are inadequate.
Unit process sewers should be gravity-
type systems that normally receive
surface run-off water, oily-water
streams, pump-gland cooling water,
wash water, and all other streams
containing oils and chemi-
Figure 89
Underground sewers must
have adequate cover or
other protection to prevent
damage from trucks and
heavy equipment.
108
cals. Some refineries use two systems:
( 1 ) a "dry oil system" that handles
relatively water-free oil drainage and (2)
a water system that handles surface
drainage and other relatively oil-free
streams. Trapped or sealed drains
should be provided for all paved areas on
units. Each process unit sewer should
have a compartmented gas trap, with
gas-tight manways and proper vents,
located at or beyond the unit limits.
Piping materials for sewers must be
carefully selected, with special attention
to joint details, especially in acid,
caustic or aromatic hydrocarbon
service. Sewers, although not usually
designed to withstand pressure, should
not leak during normal usage. They
must be buried under enough cover to
prevent damage from heavy equipment
(Figure 89).
Flammable mixtures are difficult to avoid
in sewers, and it is almost impossible to
eliminate all sources of ig-
 nition. Thus, gas-tight systems must be
used. Avoid the discharge of steam, hot
condensate or other hot material directly
to the sewer system because any oil in
the sewer probably will be vaporized.
Recently, a serious fire erupted in a
refinery sewer system after a large
quantity of hot condensate had been
dumped to the sewer. Presumably,
either static electricity or pyrophoric iron
sulfide ignited the flammable mixture
created by vapors that were released
when the hot condensate came in
contact with oil in the sewer.
An atmospheric flash drum with
quench-water injection for cooling
should be used for disposal of large
quantities of condensate. Sewer
systems should be equipped with
adequate venting facilities that
discharge vapors at safe locations.
When it may be necessary to isolate
sections of a sewer system in case of
fire, devices such as traps or gates
should be considered.
109
Generally, open drain "telltale" systems
are used on most processing units. The
distance between the end of the
"telltale;" and the drain cup should be no
ignore than necessary to install drain
plugs. In most cases, a closed drain
system is also necessary to give safe
operation.
Where practical, facilities and equip-
ment should be provided within the
process unit to recover hydrocarbon
drainage and Slop oil. Facilities or
procedures to eliminate objectionable
chemical wastes and foul-water
discharge to the sewer are required due
to environmental considerations.
Odorous, toxic or noxious gases should
not be discharged to the atmosphere in
since quantities or in such a manner! as
to cause air pollution problems. The
disposal of waste gases is discussed in
more detail in Section I.
 XVI. Pumps and
Compressors
In general, pumps, compressors and
other items of special equipment should
be provided with valved vent and drain
connections. Where drains are
impractical, facilities or procedures for
water removal, such as ( 1 )
displacement by circulation, (2) gradual
heating during startup, (3) dry-gas
purging or (4) high-velocity gas purging,
must be provided. Barrel type or
multistage pumps, furnace headers,
control valves and horizontal pipe that
sags between supports are typical
locations where it is usually impractical
to provide drains.
Figure 90
This pump froze and burst
because it was not properly
drained.
110
The following design practices should be
considered for most pump, compressor
and associated equipment installations.
Generally, use pumps and compressors
that are completely drain-able with a
minimum number of drains (Figure 90).
If equipment cannot be drained, it must
be designed to be flushed; i.e., all
undesirable liquids or gases can be
removed by flushing. Pumps with many
separate drains should be avoided in
hydrocarbon service because a large
number of drains presents an even
greater hazard from plugging, dead-end
corrosion and in-
 accessibility. Figure 91 shows the water
box from a diaphragm water-cooled
compressor that was damaged by
freezing during shipment because it
could not be drained. Procurement of a
new water box caused several weeks’
delay in completion of a major new
processing unit.
Avoid oil-accumulating pockets and
traps in air-compressor systems. Air
compressors should be designed to limit
the discharge temperature from any
stage to less than 300°F and should be
equipped with high-temperature alarms
on all discharge lines. "Closed loop"
operation of air compressors —even for
testing — must be avoided. Where
possible (in
most cases, it is possible), avoid bypass
lines in air-compressor systems that
connect suction and discharge piping.
Pump and compressor driver governors
should fail safe whenever possible.
Avoid total reliance on over-speed trips,
and provide positive-shutoff trip valves
for steam engine and turbine drivers.
Gas engines should be equipped with
positive fuel shutoff valves that are
arranged to avoid explosions in exhaust
manifolds. Inert gas, rather than air,
should be used for starting gas-engine
drivers.

Figure 91
This cast-iron water box
from a diaphragm water-
cooled centrifugal air
compressor was damaged
when water that could not
be drained froze during
shipment.

111
 Cast iron must not be used for support
parts, such as bearing housings on
centrifugal pumps. Do not use cast-iron
components to hold pressure in
hydrocarbon or toxic service (Figure 92).
Figure 93 illustrates that pumps, as well
as all other items of equipment, must
be built of materials suitable for the
service. Protection against corrosion
and erosion is essential in equipment
with moving parts at close tolerances.
Figure 92
Pressure pulsation caused
this cast-iron pump to fail.
Proper material (a steel
case) would have prevented
this.
112
Each stage of multiple-stage equipment
and even the suction side of single-
stage equipment, particularly
compressors, should be designed to
contain the maximum pressure that can
be expected under upset as well as
normal operating conditions. In one
case, a control valve in the bypass from
the discharge to the suction side of a
high-pressure compressor failed and
opened rapidly, thus allowing the
suction side to be damaged when it
was over-pressured.
 Avoid labyrinth seals or eductors on tanks, special precautions must be
compressors handling flammable gases taken to prevent air leakage into the
if air can be drawn into the gas system. system.
Vents on gas-compressor suction lines,
Excessive pressure drops should be
and all other connections that may
avoided in pump suction lines. Ade-
provide a source of air contamination,
quate net positive suction head (NPSH)
should be avoided. Generally, pump
must be provided for all centrifugal
suction lines in hydrocarbon service
pumps. To prevent loss of suction and
should not be allowed to operate at
subsequent damage to the pump,
pressures below atmospheric. When
suction drums, tanks or vessels for
this is impossible, as in the case of
centrifugal pumps must have adequate
pumps that take suction from vacuum
holding time (usually 5 to 10 minutes).
towers and some storage

Figure 93
Pumps must be built
of materials suitable for
the service. This one
was damaged by catalyst
erosion.

113
 When necessary to use indoor pumps
and compressors to handle propane,
butane or volatile liquids, each must
be equipped with an appropriate
mechanical seal for the stuffing boxes.
In general, avoid tail rods on
reciprocating compressors because
failure may cause serious accidents.
When it is necessary to use com-
pressors with tail rods, a tail-rod-catcher
assembly, strong enough to withstand
cylinder discharge pressure (Figure 94),
must be used.
Since foreign substances may damage
wearing surfaces, lubrication-system
piping and seal-oil systems for
compressors and other similar
equipment should be pickled (acid
treated) to remove rust, scale and

Figure 94
Tail-rod catchers must be
installed if compressors
with tail rods cannot be
avoided.

114
 dirt. Pickling may be necessary also in
compressor suction piping, especially
for reciprocating compressors.
Necessary connections for flushing and
cleaning must be provided.
Inlets for air compressors should be
carefully located to avoid drawing dust,
dirt, steam or other undesirable
substances into the compressor.
115
Screens for these intakes must have
holes that are large enough to prevent
moisture from freezing in them and
plugging the inlet.
Steam exhaust heads for turbine drivers
and other equipment should not be
located where they can cause
personnel hazards either from spraying
droplets of hot water or causing icy or
wet surfaces.
 XVII. Engineering Safety Checklist
Many safety engineering ideas have been discussed in this booklet. To make sure that
most of them are available for quick reference, the following simplified checklist has
been developed. Each new project, large or small, should be checked against this list at
least twice-at the start of design and at the completion of design. (Numbers that follow
each item indicate the page or pages in this booklet where additional information can
be found.)
A. General
1. Provide thorough operating instructions. (10)
2. Define the safe operating limits of the unit. ( 1 0 )
3. Carefully analyze all physical changes to existing processing
equipment. ( 1 6 )
4. Provide adequate and properly located utility and auxiliary
connections. (24, 74)
5. Locate drains at low points and vents at high points. (27)
6. Use special precautions when handling toxic or reactive chemicals. (21)
7. Recognize that inert gas may not remain inert if it can pick up
hydrocarbons or oxygen. (14)
8. Consider the refrigeration effect when draining equipment in light-ends service.
(27)
9. Consider an alternate source for cooling water. (74)
10. Consider key interlocked valves for critical systems. (29)
1 1 . Review automatic startup and shutdown equipment and procedures for possible
booby traps. (60)
12. Avoid the discharge of large quantities of steam to the atmosphere or to sewers.
(74, 109)
13. Eliminate pockets in equipment where dissolved air (oxygen) may be released and
concentrated. ( 1 3 )
14. Eliminate pockets where water can accumulate. (16, 72)
1 5. Prevent air leakage into vacuum equipment and systems. ( 1 3 , 73, 107)
16. Do not mix air or oxygen with hydrocarbons except under rigorously controlled
conditions. ( 1 1 )
17. Do not use pure oxygen with hydrocarbons except under rigorously controlled
conditions. ( 1 1 )
18. Do not pipe or store liquid oxygen in buildings. (22)
19. Do not mix reactive chemicals with hydrocarbons. ( 1 4 )
20. Do not allow uncontrolled amounts of water to be mixed with hot oil.
(16)
2 1 . Do not discharge toxic gases to the atmosphere in harmful
quantities. (20, 96, 109)

116
 B. Corrosion (30)
1. Provide adequate corrosion protection. (35)
2. Use alloy plugs. (32)
3. Consider sentry holes in piping. (34)
4. Protect underground objects from corrosive agents in fill material. (39)
5. Consider corrosion probes. (35)
6. Consider corrosion inhibitors. (33)
7. Consider an aqueous phase of inhibitors. (33)
8. Consider the operating limits for steel in hydrogen service. (36)
9. Consider cathodic protection for control of stray-current corrosion. (43)
10. Consider protective coatings and linings. (30)
1 1 . Avoid dead ends in piping and equipment. ( 3 1 )
C. Erosion (30)
1. Provide adequate erosion protection. (30, 1 1 2 )
2. Consider protective linings. ( 3 1 )
3. Avoid the use of wet steam. ( 3 1 )
D. Electrical (40)
1. Provide adequate explosion-proof equipment. (40,45)
2. Provide grounding facilities. ( 4 1 , 4 5 )
3. Provide adequate clearance between conduit and hot piping or
equipment. (45)
4. Provide emergency power sources. (45)
5. Provide 12-volt outlets for extension lamp use inside metal enclosures. Equivalent
personnel-protection is provided by 120-volt GFI circuits. (45)
6. Use approved type loading-spout deflectors. (42)
7. Recognize the limitations of conduit seals. (45)
8. Consider eductors for evacuating hazardous vapors from shipping
containers. (42)
9. Consider lightning protection. (44)
10. Minimize the generation of static electricity in hazardous areas. (41)
1 1 . Minimize sparks and arcs from stray currents. (43)
1 2. Eliminate sparks and arcs in hazardous areas. (40)
13. Do not use belt-driven equipment in hazardous areas. (43)
14. Do not route main electrical runs through fire-prone areas. ( 7 1 )

117
 E. Safety and Fire Protection (46)
1. Provide adequate fire protection devices and equipment. (46)
2. Provide adequate personnel protection equipment, such as fire blankets, safety
showers and respiratory equipment. (21, 46)
3. Provide alternate escape routes. (46)
4. Provide guards for protection of both personnel and fragile
equipment. (48, 8 1 )
5. Provide guards for motor start-stop pushbuttons. (48)
6. Provide adequate bumping posts for dead-end railroad trackage. (48)
7. Consider automatic water-deluge systems. (49)
8. Consider remote shutdown devices. (48)
9. Consider bridging between closely spaced towers on fired units. (46)
10. Avoid stairway landings that cause escape traffic to pass through process unit
structures. (47)
1 1 . Avoid equipment that provides excessive noise. (47)
F. Foundations (50)
1. Investigate soil conditions. (50)
2. Provide stable foundations for all possible loading conditions. (50)
3. Locate the bottoms of major foundations below the frost line. (50)
G. Buildings (50)
1. Provide safe ventilation. ( 5 1 )
2. Provide fusible-link door-closing devices. (50)
3. Avoid enclosures with only one exit. (50)
4. Do not install open drains in control rooms. ( 5 1 )
H. Structures (51)
1. Provide designs that are safe for all loadings. ( 5 1 )
2. Provide toe plates on elevated platforms. (52)
3. Avoid undrained water pockets in structural members. (52)
/. Stacks (52)
1. Provide stacks that are stable for all wind loadings. (52)
2. Consider water-spray systems for steel stacks. (53)
3. Avoid guyed stacks. (53)
4. Avoid bolted joints in furnace stacks. (53)
5. Avoid water pockets in flue-gas ducts. (56)

118
 J. Furnaces and Air Preheaters (54)
1. Provide for the containment of oil spills. (54)
2. Provide burners that protect against flashback. (55)
3. Locate outlet-stream temperature-sensing equipment as close as possible to the
outlet tube. (55)
4. Provide adequate facilities for burning waste gases. (19)
5. Consider steam tracing for fuel-gas lines. (55)
6. Consider separate gas pilots for each burner. (55)
7. Avoid liquid slugs to gas burners. (55)
8. Avoid flame impingement on tubes. (55)
9. Avoid the use of mechanical flame arresters. (20)
10. Do not pipe waste gases directly to furnace fireboxes. (19)
1 1 . Isolate natural-draft transfer signals to their own process taps. (56)
1 2 . Ductwork must resist dilute sulfuric-acid attack. (57)
K. Fired Air Heaters (57)
1. Provide sight glasses. (57)
2. Provide igniters that give positive ignition. (57)
3. Provide permanent blinds for each fuel-gas supply. (58)
4. Consider retractable igniters. (57)
L. Exchangers (58)
1. Minimize the use of single tube-pass exchangers. (59)
2. Minimize the use of fired reboilers. (57)
3. Minimize the use of air coolers and double-pipe coolers in heavy-products
service. (60)
4. Avoid excessive tube fouling. (58)
5. Eliminate undrained pockets. (58)
6. Avoid collapse of bimetallic tubes. (59)
M. Cooling Towers (61)
1. Provide adequate fire protection. ( 6 1)
2. Consider sprinkler systems in hazardous areas. ( 6 1 )
3. Consider gas detectors or gas separators for cooling-water return lines.
(61)
4. Minimize the hazards from cooling-tower fog. ( 6 1 )

119
 N. Instruments (62)
1. Provide instruments that fail safe. (62)
2. Provide separate indicators for each danger point. (62)
3. Provide adequate control-room alarms for critical processes and
equipment. (64)
4. Provide alarms that are audible. (63)
5. Provide vapor seals for ducts, tubing and conduit. (63)
6. Provide emergency instrument-air supplies. (74)
7. Provide blow-out protection for pressure instruments. (64)
8. Provide freeze protection. (68)
9. Provide thermocouples at torch-oil injection nozzles. ( 1 2 )
10. Provide glass inserts that are made of safe materials. (65)
1 1 . Consider oxygen and combustible analyzers. (63)
1 2 . Consider combustible range alarms in inert-gas systems. (63)
13. Consider visual-sequence annunciators. (29, 62)
14. Consider air dryers for instrument-air systems. (74)
15. Avoid vapor or liquid pocket at orifices. (64)
1 6 . Avoid vaporization in leads to liquid measuring instruments. (68)
17. Avoid laboratory testing of hazardous samples. (65)
1 8. Do not use multiple-service instruments if they can cause operator
confusion. (62)
19. Do not connect direct-pressure lines in flammable or toxic service to
control-room instruments. (63)
20. Keep main instrument runs out of fire-prone areas. (70)
0. Insulation (66)
1. Provide adequate freeze protection. (66)
2. Provide personnel burn protection. (66)
3. Protect austenitic stainless-steel piping from soluble chloride
deposition. (66)
4. Consider freeze protection for critical equipment in normally warm
climates. (67)
5. Consider anti-sweat insulation for cool piping and equipment. (66)
6. Consider auxiliary heating for fluids whose temperature may fall below the pour or
freeze point. (67)
7. Avoid insulated flanges in hydrogen piping. (66)

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 P. Fireproofing (69)
1. Provide adequate fireproofing for:
a. Furnace, stack and elevated equipment supports. (69)
b. Vessels. (70)
c. Pipe supports. (70)
d. Critical instrument leads, control equipment and conduit. (70)
e. Leads to remote shutdown devices. (70)
f. Relief valve and blowdown piping. ( 7 1 )
g. Radioactive sources. (71)
2. Do not use low-fire-resistance insulating materials for fireproofing. (69)
3. Do not use aluminum as a jacketing material for fireproofing. (69)

121
 Q. Piping (72)
1. Locate hydrocarbon piping above grade. (72)
2. Slope compressor suction and flare lines toward knockout drums. (73)
3. Provide steamout connections for heavy-oil drain lines. (75)
4. Provide a separate source for utilities used during unit shutdowns if they are
normally shut off during these periods. (74)
5. Anchor piping that discharges to the atmosphere. (77)
6. Use valves that have positive-position indicators (open and closed.) (79)
7. Use extension stems that indicate the position of the valve. (81)
8. Orient valve handles properly. (80)
9. Make provisions for expansion and contraction of both piping and supports.
(76)
10. Make provisions for control or elimination of vibration. (77)
1 1 . Use special precautions for piping in oxygen service. (22)
12. Use special precautions for piping in chemical service. (21, 76)
13. Consider copper or copper-alloy materials for small piping in salt-water service.
(75)
14. Consider check valves for most utility connections to vessels and
equipment. (26)
15. Consider a condensate collection system for steam traps. (74)
16. Minimize vents and drains in vacuum piping. (73, 107)
17. Minimize the use of valves in vertical piping. (72)
18. Minimize the use of screwed piping. (82)
19. Avoid undrained pockets in piping. (72)
20. Avoid vents that can discharge toward operating or access areas. (24, 9 1 )
21 . Avoid excessive pressure drop across valves. (79)
22. Avoid the use of gaskets that cannot be seated with the available bolting force.
(83)
23. Avoid water hammer. (83)
24. Do not use cast, wrought, malleable and nodular iron materials in
hydrocarbon or toxic service. (75)
25. Do not use valves with position indicators that can be misassembled. (79)
26. Do not use chain operators on small and screwed valves. ( 81)
27. Do not substitute backwelded screwed joints for socket-welded
piping. (82)
28. Do not use Teflon gaskets, valve seats and packing at temperatures above
450°F. (82)
29. Do not use nonrising-stem gate valves in hydrocarbon service. (79)

122
 R. Relief Valves (84)
1. Provide adequate pressure relief for all pressure vessels. (88)
2. Provide adequate facilities for relief of thermal expansion. (84)
3. Provide overpressure protection for heat exchangers and similar vessels subject to
internal failure. (89)
4. Provide a spare relief valve where relief-valve failure can cause a unit
shutdown. (90)
5. Provide snuffing-steam connections for atmospheric vents that discharge
hydrocarbons at high points. ( 91)
6. Protect against the freezing of moisture on relief-valve seats in low-
temperature service. (91)
7. Design both relief-valve inlet and discharge piping to avoid excessive
pressure drop. (91)
8. Consider designing equipment downstream of pumps for pump shutoff pressure.
(88)
9. Consider corrosion protection for relief valves. (90)
10. Consider balanced-type relief valves for variable back-pressure
conditions. (89)
1 1 . Consider depressuring systems for units containing large volumes of light
hydrocarbons. (92)
12. Exercise care in the use of rupture discs. (90)
13. Avoid the use of three-way plug cocks under relief valves at temperatures above
350°F (use regular gate valves). (90)
14. Avoid liquid accumulation in relief-valve discharge piping. (91)
15. Avoid fouling or plugging in long relief-valve discharge lines. (92)
5. Equipment Spacing (94)
1. Provide adequate spacing between units. (94)
2. Set grade elevation of operating units above adjacent land and below surrounding
roadways. (94)
3. Locate operating units above the base elevation of tankage. (94)
4. Provide adequate firewalls. (95)
5. Provide curbs to contain spills if the unit grade is above the surrounding area. (95)
6. Protect against high water in areas subject to flooding. (95)
7. Provide safe locations for furnaces, stacks and vents. (96)
8. Separate the personnel, ignition and process areas. (97)
9. Provide adequate accessways. (97)
10. Locate all hydrocarbon-handling equipment outside buildings whenever possible.
(97)
1 1 . Minimize hydrocarbon inventories on units. (96)
12. Avoid open drainage paths through refineries. (95)
13. Avoid the location of several reflux drums within a small area. (96)
14. Avoid the need for lifting heavy items over operating equipment and
piping. (97)
15. Eliminate open ditches, pits and pockets where vapors can collect. (95)
16. Do not face the ends of horizontal drums toward control rooms. (96)

123
 T. Storage (98)
1. Locate tank suction nozzle inlets above the water level. (99)
2. Provide freeze protection for water drains. (100)
3. Provide foam systems or portable foam-handling equipment for low-flashpoint
stocks. (98)
4. Provide adequate firewalls. ( 1 0 1 )
5. Provide adequate fire protection. (98)
6. Consider automatic high-temperature shutoff valves for steam-supply lines to tank
heaters in hot-oil service. ( 1 9 , 99)
7. Consider means to continuously vent vapors from the top of vessels.
(105)
8. Consider gas blanketing or floating roofs for low-vapor-pressure
stocks. (98)
9. Consider means to keep spheres and spheroids under positive
pressure. (99)
10. Consider lightning protection for both cone and floating-roof tanks. (44)
1 1 . Consider drains for firewall enclosures. ( 1 0 1 )
12. Minimize water in storage tanks and vessels. ( 1 8 )
13. Avoid free fall of liquid into tankage. (98)
14. Avoid unvented vapor pockets. (103)
15. Avoid pressure-vessel vents that discharge directly upon the vessel
surface. (100)
16 . Avoid hot-oil storage (over 200°F). ( 1 9 , 99)
U. Vessels (102)
1. Provide adequate knockout drums for elimination of liquid
entrainment. (103)
2. Provide high liquid-level alarms for knockout drums. (103)
3. Provide steamout connections. (26)
4. Provide drainage for trapout pans and internal heads. (103)
5. Provide drainable vessel internals. (105)
6. Provide vents that are large enough to prevent the development of a
vacuum when draining. (105)
7. Locate the top outlet at the high point. (103)
8. Protect vacuum vessels from excess vacuum. (106)
9. Consider the use of insulating linings in high-temperature service. (102)
10. Consider support lugs, or vertical slots in skirts, for vessels in high-
temperature cyclic service. (102)
1 1 . Consider permanent water-wash connections. (24)
12. Consider sample connections for vapor spaces where oxygen might
accumulate. (105)
13. Minimize the use of large horizontal plate internals. (105)
14. Avoid instability under hurricane and seismic loadings. (102)
15. Avoid unvented vapor pockets. (103)
16. Eliminate liquid pockets. (102)

124
 V. Sewers (108)
1. Provide double manhole gas traps in process sewers at unit area limits. (75,
108)
2. Provide gas-tight covers and vents for sewers inside process units.
(75, 108)
3. Provide trapped or sealed drains for all unit paving. (108)
4. Provide adequate cover for underground sewers. (108)
5. Minimize explosive mixtures in sewers. (108)
6. Avoid open sewer connections in control rooms. (51)
7. Do not discharge steam or hot liquids to sewers. (17, 109)
W. Pumps and Compressors ( 1 10)
1. Provide high-temperature alarms in air compressor discharge piping. ( 1 1 1 )
2. Provide facilities or procedures for removal of water where drains are impractical.
( 110)
3. Provide positive shutoff trip valves on steam engine and turbine
drivers. ( 1 1 1 )
4. Provide inert gas for starting gas engine drivers. ( 1 1 1 )
5. Provide appropriate mechanical seals at each stuffing box on indoor
compressors and pumps handling light ends. ( 1 1 4 )
6. Design equipment for the maximum pressure that can be expected under
emergency conditions. ( 1 1 2 )
7. Arrange positive fuel-shutoff valves on gas engines to avoid explosions in the
exhaust manifold. ( 1 1 1 )
8. Provide adequate NPSH for centrifugal pumps. ( 1 1 3 )
9. Provide adequate suction capacity for centrifugal pumps. (113 )
10. Use fail-safe governors for pump and compressor drivers. ( 1 1 1 )
1 1 . Design to eliminate vibration in piping attached to reciprocating pumps and
compressors. (78)
12. Consider pickling of lubricating oil and compressor suction piping. ( 1 1 4 )
13. Consider proper locations for air-compressor inlets and steam exhaust heads.
(115)
14. Consider pulsation dampeners for reciprocating compressors. (78)
15. Avoid water pockets. ( 1 1 0 )
16. Avoid air compressor bypass piping (discharge to suction). ( 1 1 1 )
17. Avoid vents in gas-compressor suction piping. ( 1 1 3 )
18. Avoid labyrinth seals on flammable gas compressors if air can be drawn into the
gas system. ( 1 1 3 )
19. Avoid indoor pumps and compressors. (97, 1 1 4 )
20. Avoid tail rods on reciprocating compressors, if possible. ( 1 1 4 )
21. Avoid hydrocarbon pumps with many drains. ( 1 1 0 )
22. Avoid long pump-suction lines, particularly in light-ends service. (87)
23. Avoid pump-suction lines that operate at pressures below
atmospheric. ( 1 1 3 )
24. Avoid cast-iron pressure-carrying components in flammable or toxic
service. ( 1 1 2 )
25. Eliminate oil pockets in air-compressor systems. ( 1 1 1 )

125
 XVIII. Reference Material
A. Nationally Accepted Codes, Specifications and Standards
This listing, although not intended to be complete, is presented so that
designers can become familiar with some of the more important codes,
specifications and standards.
1. Buildings
American Concrete Institute (ACI) standards American
Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Code American
Standards Association (ASA) standards American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
(material specifications) American Welding Society
(AWS) Code National Fire Codes (NFPA), Vol. Ill
Local and state building codes and regulations
2. Electrical Equipment
American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE) standards
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletins RP-500and RP-2003
American Standards Association (ASA) standards
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards
National Electrical Code (NFPA-70)
National Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (NEMA) standards
National Electric Safety Code NBS Handbook H30
National Fire Codes (NFPA), Vol. V
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Bulletins NFPA-77
and NFPA-78 Local and state codes and
regulations
3. Exchangers
American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 640
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Sects. II, VIII and IX)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications Heat
Exchanger Institute (HEI) standards
Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers’ Association (TEMA) standards Local
and state codes and regulations
4. Fire Prevention and Safety Equipment
American National Standards (hose threads)
Chicago Fire Department standards (hose threads)
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletins RP-2001 and RP-2002
American Standards Association (ASA) (standards on fire-protection
systems and equipment) American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) (standards on
materials)
National Fire Codes (NFPA), Vols. I through X Local
safety regulations

126
 5. Foundations and Substructures
American Concrete Institute (ACI) standards
Amerian Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Code (for structural steel)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) (material
specifications)
American Welding Society (AWS) codes American Wood
Preservers Association Standard P2
6. Furnaces
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletin RP-530 (heater-tube
thickness calculations)
American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 630 (tubes and headers) American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Sects. I, II, VIII and IX)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications American
Standards Association (ASA) Standards A57.1, A58.1, B16.5
and B31.3 American Welding Society (AWS)
specifications
7. Instruments
American Gas Association (AGA) Report No. 3
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletins RP-520, RP-525 and RP-550
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Sect. VIII)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
American Standards Association (ASA) standards Instrument Society of
America (ISA) Bulletin RP-5.1
8. Piping
American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 5L
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletin RP-520
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
American Standards Association (ASA) Standard B31.3-Petroleum
Refinery Piping American Standards Association (ASA) Standards B16, B31
and B36
9. Pumps and Compressors
American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 610 (centrifugal pumps) American
Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 617 (centrifugal
compressors)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications American
Standards Association (ASA) standards

127
 10. Stacks and Chimneys
American Concrete Institute (ACI) Bulletin 318-56 American Petroleum
Institute (API) Standard 650 American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
American Standards Association (ASA) standards American Welding
Society (AWS) codes
11. Structures
American Concrete Institute (ACI) standards
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Code
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
American Standards Association (ASA) standards
American Welding Society (AWS) specifications
Research Council Bulletin on Riveted and Bolted Structures
Local and state codes and regulations
12. Storage Facilities
American Petroleum Institute (API) Standards 620 and 650
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Sects. II, VIII and IX)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
American Welding Society (AWS) specifications
13. Transportation Facilities
American Concrete Institute (ACI) standards
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
(road materials) State regulations governing
track clearances
14. Turbines and Other Drivers
American Gear Manufacturers’ Association (AGMA) Bulletin 421 American
Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 615 American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) specifications American Standards Association (ASA)
standards National Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (NEMA)
Publication SM20-1958 and TU4-1952
15. Vessels
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletin RP-510
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Sects. II, VIII and IX)
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications
American Standards Association (ASA) standards American Welding
Society (AWS) specifications Local and state codes and regulations

128
 16. Wastes and Drainage
American Petroleum Institute (API) Bulletin RP-520
American Petroleum Institute (API) (manuals on disposal of refinery
wastes)
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Sect. VIII)
American Standards Association (ASA) standards (piping codes)
B. Electrical Hazards
1. American Petroleum Institute. "Classification of Areas for Electrical Installations in
Petroleum Refineries." Bulletin No. RP-500, New York, 1957.
2. American Petroleum Institute. "Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static,
Lightning and Stray Currents," Bulletin No. RP-2003, New York, 1956.
3. Bustin, W.M., Culbertson, T.L. and Schleckser, C.E., Jr. "General
Considerations of Static Electricity in Petroleum Products." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings, 37 (III), 24 (1957).
4. Croft, Terrell. American Electrician’s Handbook. McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., New York, 1953.
5. Howard, J.C. "Static Electricity in the Petroleum Industry." Electrical
Engineering, 77, No. 7, 610 (1958).
6. Howard, J.C. "The Hazards of Static Electricity." Petroleum Refiner, 38, No.
1 1 , 3 6 7 (1959).
7. Klinkenberg, A. and Van der Minne, J.L. Electrostatics in the Petroleum Industry.
Elsevier Publishing Company, New York, 1958.
8. Lewis, W.W. Protection of Transmission Systems Against Lightning.
John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1950.
9. National Fire Protection Association. NFPA No. 70, "National Electrical Code,"
Boston, 1962.
10. National Fire Protection Association. NFPA No. 77M, "Static Electricity," Boston,
1 96 1.
1 1 . National Fire Protection Association. NFPA No. 78, "Code for Protection
Against Lightning," Boston, 1963.
12. Rogers, D.T. and Schleckser, C.E., Jr. "Engineering and Theoretical Studies
of Static Electricity in Fuels." Paper presented at Fifth World Petroleum
Congress (Section VIII, Paper No. 1 0), New York, May 30-June 5, 1959.
13. Rogers, D.T., McDermott, J.P. and Munday, J.C. "Static Electricity in Petroleum
Products." Oil and Gas Journal, 55, No. 46, 166 (1957).
14. Rogers, D.T., McDermott, J.P. and Munday, J.C. "Theoretical and Experimental
Observations of Static Electricity in Petroleum Products." American Petroleum
Institute Proceedings, 37 (III), 44 (1957).

129
 C. ABC’s of Light Ends
1. Anfinger, M.B. and Johnson, O.W. "Characteristics of Liquefied
Petroleum Gas That Affect Its Fire Hazard." American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings, 22 (I), 50 (1944).
2. Griswold, J. Fuels, Combustion and Furnaces. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York,
1946.
3. Maxwell, J.B. Data Book on Hydrocarbons. D. Van Nostrand Co., New York,
1950.
4. Rohman, A. and Keappe, J.M. "Handbook: Butane-Propane Gases." Western
Business Papers Inc., Los Angeles, 1942.
5. University of Texas. LP-Gas Service, Training Course, Book I. Austin, Texas,
1959.
D. Storage, Loading and Shipping of Light Ends
1. American Petroleum Institute. "Design and Installation: Pressure-Relieving Systems
in Refineries, Part I." Bulletin No. RP-520, New York, 1963.
2. Anon. "Five Fire Protection Lessons Proved by Tank Farm Blaze."
Petroleum Processing, 6, No. 10, 1 1 1 7 ( 1 9 5 1 ).
3. Anon. "This Truck Loading Rack Fights Fire Hazards." Oil and Gas
Journal, 55, No. 24, 100 (1957).
4. Factory Insurance Association. "Recommended Good Practices for the Storage and
Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Fuel Gases." Hartford, Conn., 1950.
5. Fuller, H.T. and Bristline, R.E. "Safe Operation of Spheres." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings, 41 (III), 180 ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
6. Jacobs, R.B. and Upson, F.A. "Hazards Associated with the Storage of LPG."
Paper presented at Annual Meeting of ASME, New York, Dec. 2, 1958.
7. National Fire Protection Association. "The National Fire Codes, Vol. I."
Boston, 1963-1964.
8. National Fire Protection Association. "The National Fire Codes, Vol. VI."
Boston, 1963-1964.
9. National Fire Protection Association. "LP-Gas Fires and Explosions." Pamphlet
No. Q46-1, 62 July (1952).
10. National Fire Protection Association. "LP-Gas Fires and Explosions." Pamphlet
No. Q46-1, 81 July (1952).
1 1 . National Fire Protection Association. "Fire Fotos —Contest Results,"
Pamphlet No. Q46-4, 325 April (1953).
12. National Fire Protection Association. "Railroad and Ship Fires." Pamphlet No.
Q48-3, January (1955).
13. University of Texas. "LP-Gas Service, Training Course, Book II." Austin,
Texas, 1959.
1 4. Woodworth, M.E. "Texas Refinery Tragedy." National Fire Protection
Association, Pamphlet No. Q50-2, Oct. (1956 ).
15. Woodworth, M.E. "Inadequate Vents on Flammable Liquid Tanks." National Fire
Protection Association, Pamphlet No. Q53-3, Jan. (1960).

130
 E. Standard Procedures and Purging Practices
1. American Gas Association. "Purging Principles and Practices " New York,
1954.
2. Bluhm, W.C. "Protective Facilities for Refinery Process Units." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings, 39 (III), 507 (1959).
3. Bonnell, W.S. and Burns, J.A. "Startup Shutdown Procedures for a Large
Crude Oil Distillation Unit." American Petroleum Institute Proceedings, 40
(III), 285 (1960).
4. Blunck, F.H., Jacobs, R.B. and Scheineman, F.W. "Beware Process Explosion
Hazards." Petroleum Refiner, 38, No. 9, 361 (1959).
5. Coates, J.J. "Safety in Process Operations." American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings. 39 (III), 496 (1959).
6. Ducommun, J.C. "A Pattern for Process Safety," American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings. 40 (III), 21 (1960).
7. Hayes, A.M. and Melaven, P.M. "Safe Ups and Downs for Refinery Units."
American Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 40 (III), 270 (1960).
8. Howard, J.R. "Are Standard Procedures the Whole Answer?" American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 39 (III), 502 (1959).
9. National Board of Fire Underwriters. "Inerting for Fire and Explosion
Prevention." Pamphlet No. 69, New York, July (1956).
10. Oriolo, D.J. "How Clear Are Those Instructions." Oil and Gas Journal, 56, No.
47, 93 (1958).
1 1 . Steinhoff, R.C., Jr. "Development of Safe Procedures." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 39 (III), 499 (1959).
F. Mists, Sprays and Dusts
1. Burgoyne, J.M. "Mist and Spray Explosions." Chemical Engineering
Progress. 53, 1 2 1 - M (1957).
2. Eichhorn, J. "Careful! Mists Can Explode." Petroleum Refiner. 34, No. 1 1 ,
194(1955).
3. Hartman, I. "Recent Findings on Dust Explosions." Chemical Engineering
Progress. 53, 107-M (1957).
G. Hydrocarbon Flammability Data
1. Coward, H.F. and Jones, G.W. "Limits of Flammability of Gases and Vapors."
U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 503, 1952.
2. National Fire Protection Association. "Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable
Liquids, Gases and Volatile Solids." Pamphlet No. 325, Boston, 1954.
3. Swarts, D.E. and Orchin, M. "Spontaneous Ignition Temperature of
Hydrocarbons." Industrial and Engineering Chemistry. 49, 432 (1957).
4. Zabetakis, M.G., Furno, A.L. and Jones, G.W. "Minimum Spontaneous
Ignition Temperature of Hydrocarbons." Industrial and Engineering Chemistry.
46, 2173 (1954).
5. Zabetakis, M.G. "Flammability Characteristics of Combustible Gases and
Vapors." U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 627, 1965.

131
 H. Detonations
1. American Petroleum Institute. "No. 1 Dubbs Dephlegmator Explosion." Fire
Protection Circular No. 152, New York (1959).
2. Anon. "What Happened at Whiting." Petroleum Processing. 1 1 , No. 1, 39 (1956).
3. Brooks, B.T. "The Detonation of Gasoline and Liquid Chlorine Mixtures." Industrial
and Engineering Chemistry. 17, No. 7, 752-753, July (1925).
4. Ducommun, J.C. "6:12 at the FHU-700." American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings. 36 (VI), 144 (1956).
5. Ghormley, E.L. "Guard Against Detonation Hazards." Petroleum Refiner. 37,
No. 1, 185 (1958).
6. Ginsburgh, I. and Bulkley, W.L. "Multiple Detonations in Piping." Oil and
Gas Journal. 60, No. 45, 1 1 5 (1962).
7. Ginsburgh, I. and Bulkley, W.L. "Hydrocarbon-Air Detonation —Industrial
Aspects." Chemical Engineering Progress. 59, No. 2, 82 (1963).
8. Jacobs, R.B., Bulkley, W.L., Rhodes, J.C. and Speer, T.L. "Destruction of a
Large Refinery Unit by Gaseous Detonation." Chemical Engineering Progress. 53,
565 (1957).
9. Jacobs, R.B. "Occurrence and Nature of Hydrocarbon-Air Detonations."
American Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 39 (III), 15 (1959).
10. Johnsen, J.H. and Yahnke, R.L. "Chlorine-Naphtha Detonation."
Chemical Engineering Progress. 58, No. 6, 71 (1962).
1 1 . Kistiakowsky, G.B. "Initiation of Detonations in Gases." Industrial and
Engineering Chemistry. 43, 279 (1 9 5 1) .
12. Morrison, R.B. "A Shock Tube Investigation of Detonative Combustion."
Engineering Research Institute, University of Michigan, 1955.
13. Pipkin, O.A. "Detonation-Old Processes Are Not Immune." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings, 39 (III), 21 (1959).
14. Randall, P.N., Blank, J., Dudley, W.M. and Jacobs, R.B. "Effects of
Gaseous Detonation Upon Vessels and Piping." Chemical Engineering
Progress. 53, No. 12, 574 (1957).

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 /. Industrial Explosions and Accidents
1. American Petroleum Institute. "Explosion and Fire in Naphtha Treating Plant."
Fire Protection Circular No. 125, New York, January 15, 1952.
2. American Petroleum Institute. "Fire in Thermal Cracking Unit." Fire Protection
Circular No. 129, New York, September 15, 1952.
3. American Petroleum Institute. "Tank Failure at Bottom Seam." Fire Protection
Circular No. 1 4 1 , New York, March 19, 1956.
4. American Petroleum Institute. "Report of JP-4 Jet Fuel Tank Explosion and
Fire," Fire Protection Circular No. 143, New York, June 6, 1956.
5. American Petroleum Institute. "Description of an Explosion in Propane Storage
Facilities and the Resulting Fire." Fire Protection Circular No. 148, New York,
May 20, 1957.
6. American Petroleum Institute. "Gasoline Agitator Fire." Fire Protection Circular
No. 149, New York, February 6, 1958.
7. American Petroleum Institute. "Fire in Combination Unit Pump Room." Fire
Protection Circular No. 150, New York, June 12, 1958.
8. Ducommun, J.C. "Sample Bombs Can Be Bombs," Petroleum Refiner. 39, No.
6, 231 (1960).
9. National Fire Protection Association. "Gas Explosions." Pamphlet No.
Q43-11, Boston, April, 1950.
10. Schmitt, D.W. "Compressor Test Facility Explosion." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 39 (III), 34 (1959).
1 1 . Smith, T.L. "Explosion at the Aberdeen Wind Tunnels Laboratory."
American Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 39 (III), 42 (1959).
12. Woodworth, M.E. "Oil Froth Fire at Signal Hill Refinery." National Fire
Protection Association. Pamphlet No. Q52-5, Boston, 1958.

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 J. General
1. Adamson, T.C. and Morrison, R.B. "On the Classification of Normal Detonation
Waves." Jet Propulsion Journal. American Rocket Society. 400 (1955).
2. Alvey, R . R . "Vessel Design for Explosive Mixtures." Holmes and Nawer, Inc., Los
Angeles.
3. American National Red Cross. "First Aid Textbook." Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
Garden City, New York, 4th Ed., 1957.
4. Anon. "Explosion —Water in Process Systems." Petroleum Refiner. 34,
No. 8, 92, (1955).
5. Armistead, Geo., Jr. "Safety in Petroleum Refining and Related
Industries." John G. Simmonds and Co., 2nd Ed., 1959.
6. Austin, C.H. "Risk Analysis and Safety." American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings. 40 (III), 18 (1960).
7. Ballmar, R.W. "Towers Are Touchy," American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings. 40 (III), 279 (1960).
8. Becker, R. "Impact Waves and Detonation, Part I." NACA-TM 505 (1929),
Part II, NACA-TM 506 (1929).
9. Berets, D.J., Greene, E.F. and Kistiakowsky, G.B. "Gaseous Detonation. I.
Stationary Waves in Hydrogen-Oxygen Mixtures." Journal, American Chemical
Society. 72, 1080 (1950).
10. Blume, W.C. "Safe Operation of Refinery Flare Systems." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings. 41 (III), 169 ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
1 1 . Bodurtha, F.T. "Flare Stacks-How Tall." Chemical Engineering. 65, No. 25, 177
(1958).
12. Bone, W.A. and Townend, D.T.A. "Flame and Combustion in Gases." pp. 48,
49, 103-163, 165, 167-180, 186, 51 6. Longman, Green and Co., London (1927).
13. Bulkley, W.L. "Torch Oil for Cat Cracker Startup." Oil and Gas Journal. 59, No.
37, 1 1 8 ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
14. Cousins, E.W. and Cotton, P.E. "Design Closed Vessels to Withstand
Internal Explosion." Chemical Engineering. 58, No. 8, 133 ( 1 9 5 1 ) .
15. Driskell, L.R. "Instrumentation and Plant Start-up." Petro/Chem
Engineer. 30, No. 3, 36 (1962).
16. Driskell, L.R. "Piping of Pressure Relieving Devices." Petroleum Refiner. 39,
No. 7, 127 (1960).
17. Ducommun, J.C. "How to Use Sample Bombs Safely." Petroleum Refiner.
39, No. 12, 1 7 1 (1960).
18. Ducommun, J.C. Progress in Process Safety." American Petroleum Institute
Proceedings. 42 (III), 16 (1962).
19. Ducommun, J.C. "Stop Disaster!-Major Goal of Newest API
Committee." World Petroleum. 32, No. 4, 48 ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
20. Hajek, J.D. and Ludwig, E.E. "Safe Flare Stacks." Petro/Chem Engineer. 32, No.
6, C-31 (1960).

134
 2 1 . Hajek, J.D. and Ludwig, E.E. "How to Design Safe Flare Stacks."
Petroi’Chem Engineer. 32, No. 7, C-44 (1960).
22. Henderson, E. "Combustible Gas Mixtures in Pipe Lines." Procedures,
Pacific Coast Gas Association. 32, 98 (1941).
23. Jost, W. "Explosion and Combustion Processes in Gases." McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
New York, 1946.
24. Kayser, J.N. and Williams, R.W. "Safer Operations Through Committee Action."
American Petroleum institute Proceedings. 41 (III), 164 ( 1961) .
25. Kennedy, R.E., Scott, G.S., and Zabetakis, G.W. "Gas Explosions and Their
Prevention." U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1 . C , 7601 (19 51).
26. Lauderbaugh, A.B. "The Fundamentals of Galvanic Corrosion." Paper
presented at 43rd Annual Meeting, Canadian Gas Association, Murray Bay,
P.O., Canada, June 17-23, 1950.
27. Lewis, B. and von Elbe, G. "Combustion Flames and Explosions of Gases."
Academic Press, New York, 1 9 5 1 .
28. Moyle, M.P. and Churchill, S.W. "Impact Pressures Developed in
Hydrogen-Oxygen Detonations." Symposium on Shock Waves. Annual Meeting,
AlChE, Chicago, Decembers, 1957.
29. National Safety Council. "Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial
Operations." Chicago, 4th Ed., 1959.
30. Pappas, M.A. "The Human Factor in Operating Practice." American
Petroleum Institute Proceedings. May 14, 1962,
3 1 . Parker, M.F. "Pipe Line Corrosion and Cathodic Protection." Gulf
Publishing Company, Houston, Texas, 1954.
32. Samans, C.H. "Results of the Survey of the Study Group on Oil Storage Tank
Failures." American Petroleum Institute Proceedings, 34 (III), (1954).
33. Shnidman, L. "Gaseous Fuels." American Gas Association, New York, 1954.
34. Steel, A.B. and Duggan, J.J. "Safe Handling of Reactive Chemicals."
Chemical Engineering. 157, April 20, 1959.
35. Weir, A. Jr. and Morrison, R.B. "Equilibrium Temperatures and
Compositions Behind a Detonation Wave." Industrial and Engineering Chemistry,
46, 1056 (1946).
36. Zeldovich, Y.B. "Theory of Combustion and Detonation in
Gases."Technical Report No. R-Ts-1226-IH (Translation from Russian prepared by
Brown University).

135
 K. Films
1. American Oil Company. "The Fire at Whiting." Chicago, Illinois.
2. American Oil Company. "Detonations." Chicago, Illinois.
3. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. Safe Handling of Light Ends. Wilmington,
Delaware. This movie is based on information from the first edition of the
booklet "Safe Handling of Light Ends," published by The American Oil Company.
4. Ethyl Corporation. "Danger! —Air!" New York, New York. This movie is based
on information from the fourth edition of the booklet "Hazard of Air in Refinery
Process Systems," published by The American Oil Company.
5. Ethyl Corporation. "Danger! —Water!" New York, New York. This movie is
based on information from the second edition of the booklet "Hazard of Water in
Refinery Process Systems," published by The American Oil Company.
6. Ethyl Corporation. "Safe Ups and Downs for Refinery Units." New York, New
York. This movie is based on the revised second edition of the booklet "Safe Ups
and Downs for Refinery Units," published by The American Oil Company.
7. Humble Oil and Refining Company. "Thermal Forces." Baytown, Texas.
8. Shell Oil Company. "Electrostatics and Explosion Hazards." Products Application
Dept., 50 West 50th Street, New York, 50, New York.

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