Review: Reason and Culture: The Universal and the Particular Revisited

Reviewed Work(s): Rationality and Relativism by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes
Review by: Bob Scholte
Source: American Anthropologist , Dec., 1984, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), pp.
960-965
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association

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960 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [86, 1984

Radin, Paul
1926 Crashing Thunder: The Autobiography of an American Indian. New York: Appleton.
Simmons, Leo W.
1942 Sun Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press.

Reason and Culture: The Universal and the Particular

Revisited

Rationality and Relativism. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1982. viii + 312 pp. $12.50 (paper).

BOB SCHOLTE
University of Amsterdam

Certain issues in cultural anthropology are fundamental and perennial. The nature
and scope of reason, its universality and relativity, is one of them. This becomes even
more evident if we include directly related problems: questions of cross-cultural transla-
tion, ethnographic interpretation, and ethnological explanation. These are also the cen-
tral issues raised in Rationality and Relativism. Before reviewing their theoretical
significance and the different options taken by the contributors to this stimulating
volume, let me try to place the issues in a historical perspective.
The editor's informative introduction takes us a long way in this regard, though not far
enough, in my estimation. After distinguishing between three related issues-moral,
perceptual, and conceptual relativism--the editors announce the central focus of their
book: conceptual relativism or, conversely, the truth of reason. They locate the question
of rationality on several historical levels. Most broadly, as an issue that has preoccupied
us since the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction. The editors might, however,
have gone further. The preoccupation with rationality actually dates from our disen-
chantment with myth as an explanatory model. We would thus have to go back as far as
Plato. He first defined the nature of academic knowledge and abstract rationality - a
definition wrought with anthropological implications (see Diamond 1974).
The volume's constant reference to rationality in terms of science also demands a refer-
ence to the twin philosophers who indirectly inspire most of the contributors to the book
(for it is lopsided in favor of rationalism): Rene Descartes and Roger Bacon. They are not
discussed anywhere in the book (though both are mentioned incidently). Instead, the
editors favor a narrower historical framework. Even Marx, Weber, and Durkheim are
passed over in favor of contemporary developments. One could argue, of course, that
space is limited. But the omission has significant consequences. These absentee "fathers"
of the social sciences (like Vico before them and explicitly in reaction to Descartes) ago-
nized over the possibilities and limitations of reason, rationality, rationalization, and so
on -especially in relation to scientific and technological values and their sociological em-
bodiment and normative implications. This critical dimension is lacking, not only in the
introduction, but in the book as a whole. To put it another way, the contributors to Ra-

Copyright ? 1984 by the American Anthropological Association

0002-7294/84/040960-06$1.10/1

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 Scholte] REASON AND CULTURE 961

tionality and Relativism are eminently r

vantages and disadvantages. The issues
But I never got the sense that the contri
that is, sufficiently radicalized the proble
an Occidental obsession. Yet one would
philosophers to do precisely that.
The historical weight is placed on cont
surrounding the rationality debate. The s
(at least as far as the Anglo-American
language since Wittgenstein, including
find their anthropological analogue in th
related to the intellectual-historical tr
Peter Winch's (1958) historic reassessmen
magic.
Interestingly enough, two important co
rationalism of Levi-Strauss and the struc
cent interest in rationality and anthro
Frankfurter Schiile (see Habermas 198
tion would have necessitated a discussion
legitimacy and implications of a developm
ity (in the volume under review, only Sp
developmental psychology, but he seem
topic).
The editors also correctly point out that the rationality debate in cultural anthropology
is intimately tied to recent developments in the philosophy and sociology of science (see
Phillips 1977). In philosophy proper, they mention Rorty's recent work (1980) and his
skepticism with regard to the rational foundation of scientific knowledge. Another philo-
sophical tradition that might have been included, incidently, is the hermeneutical one,
especially since questions of translation and understanding are central to that tradition.
Moreover, the importance of hermeneutics to the social sciences has been amply docu-
mented recently (see, e.g., Rabinow and Sullivan 1979).
The most radical sociological challenge to scientific rationality is said to derive from
the so-called "strong programme" in the sociology of science. I personally find the strong
programme far less relativistic or antiscientific than Hollis and Lukes (see, for example,
Bloor's concluding paragraphs in Knowledge and Social Imagery [Bloor 1976]) and I
would also have given far more weight to Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn than the
editors or the contributors do (see Scholte 1983). But it is nevertheless a significant step
forward to have an entire volume devoted to crucial anthropological issues that pays pro-
per attention to the pivotal contributions of the sociology and philosophy of science. The
book is worth the trouble on that score alone.
There are additional issues more specifically related to the recent history of cultural
anthropology, especially in Great Britain. Notwithstanding Kuper's inexplicable neglect
of the rationality debate in his recently updated history of the British school (Ku
1983), that debate has been like a breath of fresh air in the stuffy academic drawi
rooms of the structural-functional establishment. It all started, as I have said, wi
Evans-Pritchard's interpretation of Azande magic and Winch's important critiqu
Subsequent reassessments appeared in two important books (Wilson 1970; Horton a
Finnegan 1973) as well as numerous articles in Philosophy of the Social Sciences and the
Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford. Though several important participan
in the earlier debates did not contribute to Rationality and Relativism (most nota
Winch), most of them are back to defend or to explicate their positions further. In oth

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962 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [86, 1984

words, the present volume is most profitably rea

in mind.

What, precisely, is being debated in Rationality and Relativism and what are the dif-
ferent positions taken by the respective contributors? The editor's introduction lucidly
summarizes both the central issues and the differing viewpoints. Three questions prov
the key to the volume's content: "Does the rich and extensive evidence of apparently ir
tional beliefs . . . require us to accept relativism in any strong form?"; "In identifying
beliefs, must we--indeed can we--discriminate between those which are true and
tional and those which, in varying ways, are not?"; and, "If so, does the kind of explan
tion to be sought vary with the category of belief explained or does it remain uniform
'symmetrical' throughout?" (p. 12).
The answers given to these questions indicate one's affinity to rationalism or relativism
The rationalist would answer "no" to the first, "yes" to the second, and he or she woul
favor the first of the two alternatives offered in question three. The relativist, on the ot
hand, would answer "yes" to the first, "no" to the second, and he or she would prefer
second alternative in question three. Put in another way, the rationalist believes t
universal standards of reason exist and that they may be context-free and thus irreducib
true. Therefore, translation, interpretation, and explanation are in fact possible and in
principle true. The relativist, in contrast, believes that all standards of reason are in th
final analysis local and conventional and thus context-dependent and reducible to ident
fiable sociocultural circumstances. Therefore, translation, interpretation, and expl
tion are in fact partial and in principle problematic.
Let me briefly summarize the reasons given and the arguments made by the rationalis
and the relativists respectively. Let me repeat that Rationality and Relativism is by-an
large a volume for and by rationalists (both editors adhere to this position, albeit in di
ferent degrees). I have therefore given the relativists a fairer treatment and a gre
voice in my summary than they receive in the book itself. I should add, in all fairness
that I, too, am a (reluctant) relativist.
There are essentially two types of argument for both positions. Let's call them epis-
temological and substantive. The latter tries to give to rationalism or relativism a spec
content: a set of biological, historical, and cultural characteristics. The former give pro
cedural reasons why the one or the other position is plausible, desirable, or necessary i
order to do anthropology.
With regard to the epistemological argument, the rationalist makes an excell
case--at least on the surface. Hollis, for example, argues that a priori rational assu
tions are required if we hope to do any anthropology at all. That is, unless a communic
tive bridgehead is posited between ourselves and others, no translation, interpretation
explanation would be possible. If, in other words, the anthropologist's rationality woul
be radically incommensurable with native rationality, understanding of whatever kind
would be precluded. As a result, ethnography would be impossible (Sperber,
149-180), as would the resultant ethnology (Gellner, pp. 181-200). One might, in f
be forced to deny the native any rationality whatsoever (Newton-Smith, pp. 106-
and relativism, which preaches charity and humanism, would in actual practice
neither. It would instead be incoherent (Lukes, pp. 261-305) and self-subverting
(Newton-Smith).
From a relativist point of view, the epistemological dangers of rationalism far outw
its superficial benefits. For when we ask the rationalist to define the exact nature of th
priori and necessary bridgehead, we are either given no definition at all (Hollis,
67-86) or one that begs the question; for example, "If the natives reason logically at all
then they reason as we do" (Hollis 1970:239). Even worse, as I shall show, the definition
of "universal" reason that are proposed are either ethnocentric or totally abstract. Bet

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 Scholte] REASON AND CULTURE 963

to assume, as does the relativist, that rati

of logic are, in the final analysis, socio
21-47, or see Scholte 1980).
If the relativist is right, incommensura
fairs in cultural anthropology. Perfect
possible in the light of actual practice an
munication and understanding, to the ex
are conditioned and conditional achievem
not about the "other" at all; it is more pr
our own cultural resources (see Barnes
history denied the other rational facultie
tionality. But the crucial point remains c
other is or is not.
It follows that the charity and humanism that the rationalist now claims for himself
and denies to the relativist is in reality neither benevolent nor humane. It is at mo
noblesse oblige. Moreover, noblesse oblige motivated by self-interest, that is, generated
by a professional desire to enter into a dialogue with the other. A dialogue, furthermor
initiated by us and defined in terms of our own needs and purposes. Actually it is more
monologue.
The rationalist argument becomes even less convincing when we turn to the substantive
characteristics attributed to rationality. They are of three kinds: epistemological (as
substantive attributes of genuine knowledge), historical (as stages in the development of
human cognition), and cultural (as traits of rationally privileged societies). Let me ex-
amine and criticize them in turn.

For the rationalist, Western scientific method--however incomplete in fact

theory the ideal vehicle for the eventual achievement of true rationality (Hacking,
48-66). Only scientific method rests on the required epistemological dualism of fals
true belief and on the necessary distinction between the context of discovery and th
text of verification. Happily, the rationalist also finds that reality is actually const
in accordance with the prerequisites of his method: facts exist independently (Holli
67-86), thus guaranteeing an observational core (Newton-Smith, pp. 106-122) th
mits detached understanding (Taylor, pp. 87-105). Even more fortunately, all this is
to rest on irrefutable ontological grounds: innate dispositions (Horton, pp. 201
primary theories (Lukes, pp. 261-305), and neurological constants (Horton again
if that weren't enough, we can always refer to the sine qua non of rationality in acti
universal payoff (Taylor) or, what amounts to the same thing, its success ove
(Newton-Smith).
The relativist might counter in numerous ways, none of them very thoroughly r
sented in this volume. One could argue, for instance, that scientific method is mer
of several legitimate means of acquiring knowledge and that, as one among a numb
changing symbolic forms, it is comparable to other symbolic forms ("symmetr
terms of the third question raised above). In that case, the distinction between
and verification is simply ad hoc or post hoc, that is, descriptive of the belief system
rather than an a priori, inherent, or necessary property of rationality tout court.
Furthermore, reality as constituted by the rationalist confirms what the relativi
always maintained: that the factual depends on a theory of "facticity," that what i
sidered an observational core is paradigmatically generated, and that detached u
standing or context-free knowledge is in fact historically and culturally mediated (
the critical sociologist would call an Erkenntnisinteresse).
Finally, the relativist might argue that what is considered a biological constant is
culturally generated and potentially no less ethnocentric than the ideologies of pay

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964 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [86, 1984

success, maximalization, self-interest, or whate

constants have proven to be something else en
order in "nature" become scientific means to r
Elias 1974). In any event, we should not fall ba
without radical contextual and thus anthropologic
said, are not always consistent in this regard. For
anchor their arguments in the final analysis on a
The historical and cultural arguments of the rat
view, even more explicitly ethnocentric or, at the
ton, for example, continues a line of argument he
the continuities and discontinuities between tra
(see Horton 1967). Despite the fact that his pre
critical than his previous one, he does not measur
has developed cognitive proclivities that the R
phrase these developments in terms of "styles of
Horton himself) or more judgementally in ter
(Gellner, pp. 181-200), the crucial point is clear
transition from traditional to modern thought is
cess (Taylor), the scientific/rationalist Weltan
cultural traits that our own societies exhibit in su
tiveness, critical monitoring, progress and order,
(Horton and Gellner).
The relativist might argue that the rationalist h
able dichotomies between "us" and "them"--dich
nocently descriptive but quite judgemental and se
Why should ordinary language and oral discourse be equated with "stone-age
metaphysics" (Horton, p. 236) while the written word -the pillar of Judeo-Christian and
Occidental logos-be equated with open societies and critical reflection (Gellner, p.
194)? Written discourse, whatever its merits, is an ambiguous virtue (see Goody 1977).
Unlike oral performance, writing is, after all, an abstract competence that cannot be
directly challenged. Its author is hidden. It is in that sense less rather than more critical
compared to oral discourse (see Ong 1982). Moreover, writing generates abstract
categories that may in turn function as political means to order and co-opt the concrete
other (see Asad 1979; Said 1979). Levi-Strauss, an unlikely critic of rationalism,
repeatedly emphasized this relation between power and writing, adding: "When we make
an effort to understand, we destroy the object of our attachment, substituting another
whose nature is quite different" (LMvi-Strauss 1955:394). In other words, rationality as
epistemocide - the crucial issue that this otherwise stimulating volume leaves totally unil-
luminated.

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