Germani Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism

AUTHORITARIANISM, FASCISM, AND
NATIONAL POPULISM
GINO GERMANI
0
T ra n sa c tio n B ooks
N ew B ru n sw ick , N ew Je rse y
Copyright© 1978 by Transaction, Inc.
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903
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Library o f Congress Catalog Number: 77-80871

ISBN: 0-87855-241-3 (cloth); 0-87855-642-7 (paper).
Printed in the United States of America
Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Germani, Gino.
Authoritarianism, fascism, and national populism.
Includes index.
1. Authoritarianism. 2. Fascism. I. Title.
JC481.G42 321.9 77-80871
ISBN 0-87855-241-3
ISBN 0-87855-642-7 pbk.
CONTENTS
Introduction vii
Part I: Theoretical Background
1 Authoritarianism in Modern S ociety............................ 3

2 Social Mobilization and Political Change........................13
3 Middle-Class Authoritarianism and
Fascism: Europe and Latin Am erica.................... 43
4 Lower-Class Authoritarianism and
National Populism............................................................... 85
Part II : A Case Study o f National Populism

and a Comparison with Classic Fascism
5 Political Traditions and Social Mobilization at

the Root o f a National Populist Movement:
Argentine Peronism...........................................................125
6 Structural Change, Fascist Attempts, and the
Rise o f Lower Classes and NationalPopulism..............153
7 Political, Cultural, and Structural Changes in the
Rise o f Liberal Populism and National Populism. . . .209
8 Middle Classes, Working Classes, and Social
Mobilization in the Rise o f Italian Fascism: A
Comparison with the Argentine Case............................ 225
Part III: Mobilization From Above
9 Political Socialization o f Youth in Fascist

Regimes: Italy and Spain................................................. 245
Index 281
INTRODUCTION
In the social sciences the choice o f a subject—when it expresses more than a

passing interest—often finds its roots in some personal experience. In my case
it was the rather unhappy encounter with the first instance of modern author
itarianism. I was a child when fascism reached power in Italy, and still a teen
ager when it established a totalitarian state. In my early youth I experienced
the total ideological climate involving the everyday life o f the common citi
zen, and more strongly so, the younger generations. Later, in Argentina, where
I went as a political refugee, I m et another variety o f authoritarianism. Both
Italian fascism and Argentine Peronism came to power as an outcome of the
crisis o f liberal-democratic regimes hitherto considered fairly well established.
Though quite different in their social structure and political history, the two
countries presented similarities and divergences which made it possible and
useful to conduct comparative studies on the social and political experiences
leading to different forms o f authoritarianism . This book, mostly based on re
cent research, finds its origins in this lifelong experience.
In the study o f authoritarianism I have adopted several theoretical and
methodological assumptions only partially discussed in the book. I believe it
will be useful to m ention some o f them .
To consider totalitarianism as a form o f modern authoritarianism is the
first o f such assumptions. In chapter 1 the distinction between modern and
vii
viii AUTHORITARIANISM, FASCISM, AND NATIONAL POPULISM
nonm odern authoritarianism is introduced. M odernity is here defined not as a

necessary or universal evolutionary stage in human society, achieved by West
ern culture before all others, but as the particular line o f development histor
ically taken by this culture and peculiar to it. The diffusion and imposition of
m odernity to the rest of the planet was possible because o f the type o f knowl
edge and technology developed by the West, both primarily oriented to the
control o f nature. But there is no proof that this type o f knowledge and tech
nology represents the only possible line o f development o f human potentiali
ties, nor th at it is the best. My ideas on authoritarianism have changed over
the years, but the pecularity o f modern authoritarianism was clear to me since
its beginnings. The pessimistic climate o f the twenties and thirties was the most
im portant intellectual influence. However, the personal experience o f growing
up in a totalitarian society as a form o f normal everyday living provided an
emotional and existential background far more effective than any conceptual
construct. Totalitarianism was not a peculiarity o f certain societies and cul
tures, nor a mere regression or restoration o f previous forms o f absolutism,
but an expression of trends rooted in the modern social structure itself. This
was not a very popular view at that time: most scholars and politicians
regarded fascism as a purely Italian phenom enon. But since the turn of
the century there were philosophers and social scientists who expressed their
pessimism on the future o f liberal dem ocracy. Many disturbing com ponents
in modern societies had been disclosed in the analysis o f the classical sociolo
gists—from Comte to Durkheim , Toennies, Weber, or Pareto. In a different
context this view could also be translated in Marxist terms, provided that
Western m odern industrial society be interpreted as capitalist, and the author-
itorian solution as a probable outcom e o f the internal contradictions of weak
capitalist economies, or perhaps o f all capitalist systems at a certain stage o f
development. A fter nazism came into power, the close connection between
totalitarianism and m odernity became more diffused, particularly in the late
thirties and forties with theories o f mass society and the notion o f totalitari
anism equally applied to leftist and rightist political regimes. The rise o f Ar
gentine Peronism, its interpretation as the fascism of the working class, the
role o f the military in developing countries, and in general the spread of
authoritarianism in the Third World seemed to confirm the modernization
hypothesis. In many cases, however, such a connection was conceived as in
terpreting authoritarianism as one o f the possible paths towards moderniza
tion, and the m ost appropriate for latecomers. It was also considered a result
o f “weaknesses” or peculiarities in the first steps taken by some countries in
their way towards economic development and a m odern industrial structure.
The assumption adopted here is different: it regards the existence o f certain
traits in all m odern social structures, which under given circumstances may
originate totalitarian solutions.
A second assumption regards the problem posed by the great variety of
theories concerning authoritarianism in its nonm odern and modern forms.
INTRODUCTION ix
The many contrasting interpretations reflect the variety o f totalitarian or

authoritarian regimes, no less than opposed ideological orientations. But
often the contrasting approaches may be at least partially integrated when
perceived from a broader perspective. Divergences will remain, but some may
be attenuated or disappear once it is recognized that they are the consequence
of different levels o f analysis. The distinction between them according to
degree o f generality in terms o f time and sociocultural settings presented in
chapter 1, has the purpose o f establishing the limits of the validity of the dif
ferent theories and hypotheses on the nature and causes of modern forms o f
authoritarianism. An illustration o f this may be found in the hypothesis of
the relation between structural contradictions inherent in modern society and
the propensity toward totalitarian outcomes at times of crisis. Such a hypoth
esis may be valid and useful only at the most general level, but it is of limited
help in studying specific cases o f totalitarianism . This more general hypothesis
must be combined with shorter-range theories, both with regard to historical
epoch and to specific countries and sociopolitical cultures. In this book the
general assumption on totalitarianism and modernity is combined with hy
potheses on the role o f stratification structure, particular classes, and other
social groups, within more specific sociocultural contexts, and degree and type
of modernization processes.
A third theoretical and methodological assumption is used at the interme
diate and short-range levels o f generality: the theory o f social mobilization,
conceived here as a special form o f social change linked to sudden accelera
tion or deceleration o f com ponent processes, and to the consequences of
traumatic events. Though the discussion o f social mobilization is far from
complete, the second chapter provides the necessary introduction to its appli
cation to the Argentine and (partially) the Italian cases.
Finally I must m ention some implicit theoretical orientations regarding
the notion o f evolution, or more generally, history and social change under
lying (at all levels o f generality) the analyses included in the book. This is not
the place to provide even a summarized discussion of this subject, and I will
restrict this mention to a few brief remarks. The concept o f social change im
plicitly adopted is not determ inistic, or its determinism is only partial. At
the macro level social change may be perceived as a set of partially correlated
(or even uncorrelated) com ponent processes whose convergence at a certain
point in history (within the sociocultural unit assumed in the analysis) may
generate a new (partial or total) sociocultural form ation (one or more institu
tions, social groups, entire subsystems, or a new type o f global social struc
ture). Such a new form ation becomes in turn part o f the basic background
out o f which a new historical trend may be initiated. This is a turning point,
an “ em ergent” in history which cannot be explained in terms of separate
com ponent processes. It is the particular gestalt formed by component proc
esses which may originate new sociocultural configurations, the turning
points in the global historical process. It seems impossible to ascertain whether
X AUTHORITARIANISM, FASCISM, AND NATIONAL POPULISM
such a combination is the only one capable o f generating the particular new
historical trend observed. But more specific hypotheses may be suggested on
that question, and the nature o f the change may be considerably clarified. On
the other hand, the peculiar com bination of com ponent processes is the result
not only o f the nature o f the preceding turning point (usually assumed in
concrete analyses as the “ starting point” ), but also o f the nature, rates, and
sequences o f the single com ponent processes themselves, and quite often also
of traum atic events produced by the sudden acceleration and/or deceleration
of such processes and by accidental causes. {Accidental refers to events or
processes which cannot be explained solely on the basis o f the factors and
variables taken into account in the analysis.) Finally causality is always un
derstood as a circular process, th at is including all kinds o f reciprocal effects
among factors assumed as independent or dependent variables.1
Another im portant feature of the analysis o f change regards the relation
between social and cultural dimensions. The former include mainly the
economic, demographic, and ecological aspects o f the global social structure
(approximately what in Marxist terms is usually called “ infrastructure” ; the
latter consists o f attitudes, feelings, and behavior patterns o f individuals and
social groups. The distinction is obviously analytical. In the analysis of
change I gave methodological priority to the structural dimension, but took
very much into account the cultural dimension. In many cases the particular
form assumed by the total process cannot be explained w ithout the interven
tion o f the cultural dimension, since the form assumed by events and proces
ses in turn becomes incorporated into the new configuration determining a
novel historical trend. In this sense no causal priority is im puted a priori to
the structural (or infrastructural) dimension, but a continuous reciprocal in
fluence is assumed between both. Most o f the analysis in this book is devoted
to the Argentine case, Italian fascism being taken as a contrasting example to
highlight the peculiar nature of national populism. At the theoretical level the
first part o f the book attem pts to provide a more general model designed to
contribute to an explanation o f both similarities and differences between the
two types o f authoritarianism. The discussion o f Italian fascism is then re
stricted to these limited purposes, except for the analysis of the peculiar form
of m obilization which I call “ mobilization from above,” where attem pts to
create a fascist political culture among the young in Italy and Spain are com
pared, I believe for the first time.
The book was made possible by the support and cooperation o f several
persons. Among them I want to m ention in the first place Irving Louis
Horowitz, w ithout whose intellectual encouragement I would never have
given final form to the materials gathered and the many notes whose publica
tion I was procrastinating about for too long. The cooperation o f Professor
Malvina Segre made possible the analysis and the use o f demographic and
other statistical data on Argentina. Katherine Williams and Danielle Salti
worked very hard in editing a difficult m anuscript, originally w ritten in
INTRODUCTION xi
different approxim ations o f Spanish, English, and Italian. Special thanks

must also go to my secretary, Seddon Johnson.
NOTES
The research conducted on Argentina and Italy were made possible by the support of
the National Science Foundation and the Ford Foundation, the latter through the
Comparative Program on Latin Societies, conducted at the Institute for Social
Research, University o f Michigan, Ann Arbor. Only part o f the research material
gathered in the program is used in this book. 1
1. See G. Germani, “Stages o f Modernization in Latin America,” Studies in Com

parative International Development 5 (no. 8, 1969-70): 155-74.
PART I
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER ONE
AUTHORITARIANISM IN MODERN SOCIETY
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
In this book I intend to examine some aspects o f recent and contemporary

political authoritarianism , using primarily a theory of social mobilization and
stressing the role o f the classes and the characteristics of stratification in the
genesis of such movements. The historical and empirical material has been
taken from a case o f national populism (Argentina) with comparisons with
“classic” fascism (Italy). Both countries provide examples and illustrations
highly useful for a preliminary test o f some hypotheses relevant to a better
understanding o f these forms o f contemporary authoritarianism.
The theory o f mobilization and the hypotheses on the role o f social classes
do not exhaust the analysis o f the genesis o f authoritarian movements and
regimes in the modern world. O ther alternative or complementary hypotheses
and theories should be used and the studies here exposed, needless to say,
do not pretend to be but a partial contribution to the examination of political
authoritarianism .
The theoretical analysis developed here is placed at a specific level o f gen
erality, both in terms o f sociocultural contexts and o f historical epoch. Most
of the theoretical and interpretive contrasts concerning authoritarianism, as
well as other social and political phenomena, derive from the use o f theoreti-
3
4 AUTHORITARIANISM, FASCISM, AND NATIONAL POPULISM
cal fram eworks whose validity is lim ited to particular sociohistorical areas.
So, for exam ple, fascism was initially interp reted as an expression o f charac
teristics peculiar to Italian society, or as an alm ost accidental phenomenon
created under exceptional historical conditions. Later, o th er interpretations
o f a wider range o f generality were form ulated, n o t bound to a single national
society b u t to a type o f society and to certain stages in its developm ent (cap
italist society and its “ m onopolistic” phase), or to the form assumed by this
type o f society in a particular national setting (thesis o f the “ more vulnerable
spot” o f the capitalist system). With the spreading o f totalitarian movements
and regimes in the w orld, especially after the advent o f Nazism and the emer
gence o f the Stalinist form o f the Soviet regime, the discussion was consider
ably enlarged: there appeared hypotheses based on the role o f the middle
classes, mass society, psychosocial changes induced in all industrial societies,
and other theorizations o f a much wider range o f application. Above all, the
theme o f m odernization appears in various ways, in which it is assumed that
the causes for authoritarianism may be found in particular conditions charac
terizing the transition to a m odern structure, as well as in the characteristics
o f the “point o f departure” in preindustrial society, e.g., in the types o f ab
sence o f feudalism and other features o f the “ initial” social context. Finlly, in
this widening o f the explicative schemes, the historical specificity o f fascism or
o f modern authoritarianism may become com pletely lost, as for instance when
the repressive character o f culture or even hum an nature is considered the es
sential factor underlying every kind o f authoritarianism .
To the extent to which these interpretations reveal real aspects o f the
phenom enon, they are valid w ithin different levels o f generality. The peculiar
characteristics o f a given national society exercise a rem arkable influence on
the rise o f authoritarian m ovem ents and regimes, or on the form s they assume
and their developm ent. This notw ithstanding, underneath the specific histor
ical determ inants (or conditions) o f a single social context may be acting fac
tors o f a more general order, th at is, related to a type o f social structure
comprising various national societies, even those different in their historical
and sociocultural peculiarity. The notion o f “ ty p e,” then, also comprises
levels o f generality. For instance we may distinguish successive phases in the
developm ent o f a given type, and/or different varieties o f the same type. With
the developm ent o f capitalism (and its transform ation) and w ith the appear
ance o f a variety o f noncapitalist forms, the notion o f m odern industrial so
ciety as opposed to other types o f society remains useful as a necessary
analytical instrum ent, but it is to be applied only at a wide range o f generality.
Conversely, it is less useful or even misleading when one deals w ith a more
specific area at a given historical or sociocultural level. Table 1.1 summarizes
these considerations. In it, like in all schemes, one simplifies (and thus de
forms) the extrem e com plexity o f analyses and theories. But the scheme
helps to clarify the level at which we place the present studies.
The theories on authoritarianism which emphasize the role o f social classes
AUTHORITARIANISM 5
TABLE 1.1 LEVEL OF GENERALITY IN TERMS OF SOCIOCULTURAL

CONTEXT AND HISTORICAL TIME
Level o f Generality in Level of Generality in Terms o f

Terms of Historical Time Sociocultural Context
Specific
Generic Sociocultural
Type of Society Characteristics
long range Structural contradictions Cultural area or nation

in modern society
medium range Stage and forms of the Specific configuration

process of transition for a given country of
from nonmodern to the stage of the process
modern o f transition (including
the state of the inter
national system)
short range Cycle o f mobilization Cycle o f mobilization

(general characteristics) and nature o f the trau
matic changes that have
initiated it
are placed in the medium range, here identified with the process of national
development o f the countries used as an illustration. It must be noted that in
the case of Italy the nature o f the process is only briefly described. The
scheme of social mobilization regards instead the short range; that is, it tends
to supply the theoretical instrum ents for a comparative analysis centered on
the period in which the authoritarian movements and regime emerge or im
mediately preceding it, attem pting to explain their form, success, or failure.
With respect to the degree o f generality o f the sociocultural context, the ex
amination o f both cases refer to national peculiarities (both in terms of social
change and structure, and in terms of culture). The whole analysis is based on
the assumption o f the specificity of modern authoritarianism, which at a level
of wider generality is considered different from nonmodern authoritarianism.
Analyses conducted at a given level cannot neglect the factors and their
consequences to be observed at other levels. In this sense the analyses inter
twine, and considered separately they would be quite partial. Within the limits
of the subject m atter I shall therefore m ention some components related to
different levels and correspondingly different analytical schemes. For this
purpose in the following sections of the present chapter I shall be concerned
with a distinction corresponding to a more general level of analysis: the na
ture o f modern versus traditional authoritarianism . This is necessary to clarify
some general premises on which the theoretical schemes and analyses are
based. Special chapters will consider the theo ry o f social m obilization and the
hypothesis on the role o f social class in the rise o f fascism.
AUTHORITARIANISM AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF

MODERN SOCIETY
My definition o f m odern society is based on the concept o f secularization
in the sociological sense (which I shall define shortly), referring to other writ
ings for a m ore exhaustive ex p o sitio n .1 In synthesis it is this: Modern society
differs from all o th er types o f society in th a t there is a predom inance—or at
least a very vast area—o f behavior regulated w ithin the norm ative framework
o f elective action, or by individual choice rather than by prescriptive action
prevailing in nonm odern societies. To this characteristic we m ust add two
others derived from it: (1) in stitutionalization o f change (in lieu o f institu
tionalization o f tradition); and (2) the increasing specialization o f institutions
(therefore o f roles, values, and norm s) and the autonom ization o f values of
the various sph eres o f action and partial structures or subsystem s. Action by
choice is still a form o f socially regulated behavior, b u t it differs from pre
scriptive action in th a t w hat the norm s indicate are criteria o f choice and not
models o f behavior assigned in a rigid m anner to every “ socially defined situa
tio n ” (to use T hom as’s famous expression). The criteria o f choice may be ra
tional (in an instrum ental sense) or em otional. Thus in science, the econom y,
and technology we find choice w ith “ instrum entally” rational criteria, but in
o ther choices rational criteria are often com bined w ith em otional ones (for
example in the choices for marriage, or in occupational vocations, where cri
teria include the effort to reach, given certain conditions, the m axim um ex
pression o f individuality, o f w hat one w ants to do and w hat one is capable of
doing). We m ust also rem em ber th at the three principles o f action, change,
and increasing specialization constitute a description o f m odernity which in
different expressions and concepts is found in the classic sociological tradi
tion and generally in social thought from Marx to D urkheim , Toennies,
Weber, and others, and adopted by contem porary sociology in its diverse and
frequently contrasting interpretations. These characteristics (translated ab
stractly into the three “ principles” ), are the outcom e o f the confluence, at a
certain point in time and space, o f a series o f single or analytically distin
guishable processes, which though they may be to a certain extent intercor-
related do not always or necessarily converge. In some historical epochs the
convergence was only partial, and the particular configuration o f structural
and psychosocial traits found in the West, particularly since the Renaissance,
failed to crystallize. These are the cases o f “ unsuccessful” m odernization,
such as “ ancient” capitalism or the Italian communes.
The m inim um requirem ent for the rise and developm ent o f m odern society
is the extension o f secularization to three areas: knowledge, technology, and
the econom y. A lthough traditional traits usually remain or may be fused with
m odern structures, it is still true th a t secularization tends to be extended to
AUTHORITARIANISM 7
the rest o f a society, to all areas of behavior and all subsystems. No society
can do w ithout a certain central prescriptive nucleus to ensure a minimum
but sufficient basis for integration: a core of values and norms in which are
rooted the criteria for choices and those regulating change. Even the central
core, however, according to the logic intrinsic to m odernity, could be changed;
but then mechanisms should exist to carry on such changes w ithout destroy
ing the society itself. From this basic condition springs a potential factor (at
a level of maximum generality) for the rise o f authoritarianism in its modern
sense. Modern society is characterized by a tension intrinsic to its particular
form o f integration. This tension is the consequence o f the conflict between
the expansive character o f secularization and the need to maintain a univer
sally accepted central core w ithout which the society ceases to exist as such.
It is not surprising that the philosophy o f history usually locates the begin
ning o f the fall o f the great civilizations exactly in the phases of acute secu
larization. Toynbee, Spengler, and Sorokin give the clearest examples of this.
Historically, modern societies o f Western or non-Western origin have found
the basis o f their stability in the conservation or transform ation o f preexisting
prescriptive nuclei, or sometimes in the creation o f new ones. Such stability
was always interrupted by acute conflicts when some aspect o f the prescrip
tive basic nucleus required for social integration was weakened or dissolved.
For instance, in political m odernization the nation, and the values, norms,
and symbols related to it, turned out to be one o f the essential prescriptive
nuclei. And in the crises of modern or modernizing societies, even where the
predominant ideology was strongly internationalist, modern authoritarianism
always tended to be rooted in the nation and in nationalism (while the class
element, which according to the ideology should have replaced the national
one, played a secondary role or combined in different ways with nationalism).
One can hence formulate the hypothesis that the structural tension inherent
in all modem society between growing secularization and the necessity o f
maintaining a minimal prescriptive central nucleus sufficient fo r integration,
constitutes a general causal factor in modem authoritarian trends. Such trends
and the historical processes leading to them , as well as the manner in which
societies confront these crises, will depend on a series of other conditions
studied at medium-range level, in terms o f epoch, time, and sociocultural
specificity, that is, within given sociohistorical contexts. As an example we
may mention theories imputing authoritarian propensities in a society to the
nature o f the preindustrial structure, or to the characteristics of the transition,
or to the class structure and its changes. At the short range, theories explain
ing the process directly related to authoritarian attem pts (and possible “ solu
tions” ) would be required. The theory o f social mobilization is an illustra
tion. As we shall see in another chapter, social mobilization may take the
form o f a cycle, whose outcom e may be the reestablishment, modification, or
creation o f new prescriptive nuclei, capable of obtaining consensus at least
within the limits necessary and sufficient for the functioning of a modern
society. A uthoritarian “ solutions” are possible, and under certain conditions

probable, in any o f the crises generated by structural tensions inherent in
m odern society. Their outcom e will depend upon the medium- and short-
range causal and conditioning factors.
MODERN AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM

The notion o f secularization enables us to distinguish between traditional
and modern authoritarianism . In the different areas o f activity, or in the sub
systems, in which the prescriptive kind o f action prevails, human behavior
will follow internalized models for which alternative or different answers are
“unthinkable.” Authoritarianism is therefore implicit in culture, and is not re
garded as such by the subjects, for whom the behavior patterns they follow in
their actions remain beyond any possible doubt or discussion. To take an ex
treme example, the taboo o f incest is not perceived as an im position by an
external authority, but as an “ instinct,” “ law o f nature,” or other similar
attitudes. In contrast, where elective action predom inates (even if prescrip
tive elements, such as criteria o f choice, persist), any coercion that tends to
hinder it and is felt as an imposition from an external authority will be con
sidered as an expression o f authoritarianism . In the prescriptive situation,
social control takes place “ naturally” by means o f models o f behavior in
ternalized mainly through primary socialization. In this case authoritarian
ism expresses itself through “ spontaneous” mechanisms, even when external
social control remains necessary to deal with deviations. In the elective situa
tion, as we defined it, internal control is limited to the criteria o f choice, not
to the choices themselves. Increasing specialization and autonom y o f the in
stitutional spheres and subsystems, the legitimacy o f change, and the dynamic
character o f the technological society often interfere with the internalization
of basic norms and values or make them problem atic. The very processes of
socialization in the various spheres become less spontaneous and more delib
erate (choice with rational or other criteria). What used to occur naturally be
comes subject for handbooks (a typical example is the handbooks for m other
on child rearing). Under these conditions authoritarian solutions, which tend
to reestablish or create new prescriptive nuclei, cannot avail themselves—or
only in p art—o f the spontaneous mechanisms o f preindustrial society. External
controls must be used, in two different ways: (1) violent repression, but this
cannot be normally exercised on the mass o f the population; (2) forms of
“artificial” socialization (or resocialization), that is, in forms deliberately in
duced, using the means provided by modern science and technology. The po
litical socialization o f the young in totalitarian regimes is an example o f this
kind. And the creation o f “ total psychological and ideological clim ates” in
which the individual is submerged in his everyday life, also belongs to the
same kind o f planned reconstruction o f prescriptive behavior patterns. Some
times the result o f such “ to tal” climates may turn into a “norm ality” th at to
an external observer seems an illusion or madness.
AUTHORITARIANISM 9
What is essential in modern authoritarianism , above all in its “ pure” form

(totalitarianism proper), is that the aim of this planned socialization and re
socialization is the transform ation o f the population into ideologically “ mili
tan t,” active participants. This derives from the fact that the modern indus
trial structure, in its several varieties, requires a level o f active participation of
all the inhabitants o f a country. Growing specialization and the high degree of
interdependence generated by it finally involve the whole population in areas
of activity which tend to increase continuously.
Political participation is not excluded from this process. While in the pre-
industrial structure the great majority o f the population remains outside
politics, which for the common man is still regulated by prescription, in m od
ern society secularization and elective action have a strong tendency to be
extended to the masses and their participation in politics. Such extension is
perhaps not functionally required for the operation of a modern economy,
but the concrete historical processes leading to the rise of the new industrial
cultural complex, under the form of capitalism, and having as its main actors
the bourgeoisie, was bound by necessity to include the extension o f political
rights to the new emerging ruling class, and this was done in the name of uni-
versalistic principles,that is, choice in the political area: freedom and equality.
On the other hand, both the process of increasing individuation (as an histor
ical psychological development) and individualism (so basic to the ideology of
the new capitalist order) also have an intrinsic tendency to be extended to all
areas of behavior. If religion and revelation could interfere neither with
knowledge nor with the econom y, it is very difficult to imagine how the di
vine rights of kings or any other equivalent could be maintained. Also, we
have seen that the nation and loyalty to it became the new prescriptive nu
cleus on which most norms and values were built, and as a consequence, par
ticipation in the nation’s life (mostly expressed through politics and military
action) became an essential part o f the new cultural model. Perhaps in the in
terest o f the ruling class political participation could be limited by excluding
part of the population from full citizenship. And this in fact occurred. But
such an exclusion itself became much more difficult to maintain once all the
population was required to actively intervene in the nation, not only as sol
diers but also in increasingly differentiated and qualified occupational roles.
This meant the need for more education for all, which in turn eliminated
most of the justification for excluding the lower classes. The history of the
progressive extension o f rights (civil, political, and social) with all its conflicts
is well known, and it confirms that many factors, all o f them inherent in the
structure and ideology o f the emerging industrial society, contributed to the
enlargement o f political participation. In any form of modern society the in
dividual ceases to be considered a “ subject,” or a nonparticipant. He is sup
posed to have opinions based on rational choice (or at least on individual de
liberate choice), while the subject o f nonmodern society has beliefs based on
faith, religion, revelation, etc. Consensus is beyond any discussion; it is
“naturally” there, w ithout possible alternatives. The legitimacy o f the rulers

need not be formally approved by the subjects. Insofar as the nation becomes
the prescriptive nucleus on which social integration rests, and the active pres
ence o f all members o f the national com m unity is functionally necessary be
cause o f the connection with many other forms o f participation in most areas
o f social life, some form o f active political participation will also be required,
even if to some extent it remains purely formal or symbolic.
Here we find one o f the most paradoxical aspects o f the totalitarian sys
tem. Modern authoritarianism in its pure form does not reduce individuals to
passive subjects; in a sense, it wants them to be citizens. Its aim is not depo
liticization (though this may occur), but politicization according to a certain
specific ideology. The citizens have political opinions rather than beliefs.
They must exercise choice and reach a certain conviction, but its content
must correspond to the official ideology. There is choice, but it is openly
manipulated. The external controls, repression and terror, are also necessary,
but when the totalitarian state is successful, they are mostly applied to a re
duced part o f the population, mainly the intellectuals. It is true th at this de
scription may fit totalitarian communism more closely than fascism in its
various forms. But it is certainly correct for some cases o f classic fascism.
The difference may be due to the historical roots o f the ideology and the his
torical meaning of each regime, both o f which are considerably different in
the two types o f authoritarian systems. In the definition o f fascism I have
distinguished between the historical meaning and the basic aims o f the regime
and the political form it may assume. This is a confusion often made and
which introduces serious consequences in the interpretation. Fascism may as
sume two political forms: authoritarian and totalitarian. The form er achieves
the demobilization o f the lower classes through their depoliticization, their
reduction to subjects (as in traditional society); the latter tends to transform
the m entality, to resocialize individuals making them active participants w ith
in the limits o f the official ideology. It is also possible for communism to as
sume one o f these two forms. In the Soviet Union the totalitarian model was
adopted, but because of the high degree o f traditionalism in society the re
gime became a mix o f traditional (or cultural) authoritarianism (for the large
mass o f population), and totalitarianism based on resocialization along with
external controls (repression and terror) for intellectuals and other actively
participating sectors. The mix o f the two forms is common to all empirical
cases, and the proportion o f one or the other may vary according to degree
and form o f modernization in society.
In national populism we may find that to the extent that it is based on
the spontaneous mobilization o f the lower classes, representing a majority
o f the population, there will be no need for totalitarian resocialization and
control. The political form will tend to be authoritarian, insofar as it is solely
aimed at keeping the opposition within certain limits. Nonetheless, it will
not lack totalitarian elements, though these will be limited not only by the
AUTHORITARIANISM 11
existence o f a supporting mobilized mass, but also by the traditionalism o f

the society, which is often likely to be relatively high, since the national-
popular form o f primary m obilization is more viable where modern political
participation is relatively recent.
The subject o f this chapter will not be examined further. I considered it
necessary for the understanding of the studies included here to state some o f
the assumptions on which they are based, at the level o f higher generality.
The studies themselves are concerned with medium- and short-range analysis.
NOTES
1. G. Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicion (Buenos Aires: Paidos,

1962); idem, Sociologia de la modernizacion (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1969); idem, Urbani
zation, Modernization, and the Urban Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); idem, Indus
trialization and M odernization,” Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 3rd ed. 1974.
CHAPTER TWO
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE
The term social mobilization is quite popular in contem porary social sci
ences. Its meaning, as is usual in these disciplines, varies a great deal. Probably
the most diffused is the definition used by Karl Deutsch, as the process by
which the old social, psychological, and political loyalties and commitments
are broken, causing people to become available for the acceptance o f new
forms o f behavior.1 In this sense social mobilization is considered a central
aspect of m odernization, one o f its most im portant components. The indica
tors of m obilization, according to the same author, are the same as those usual
ly adopted to measure or define m odernization, or at least its social dimen
sions (as distinguished from the purely economic ones). Processes o f mobili
zation are part o f the “great transform ation,” insofar as they represent a
mechanism o f rapid incorporation o f large sectors o f the population into the
modern way o f life. The definition presupposes the coexistence o f a modern
with an archaic sector, m obilization consisting o f the passage o f large masses
from the latter to the former. At the same time the concept possesses other
meanings and can be enlarged to cover a more general set o f processes. In
its origins we may find three main roots.
1. The process o f successive extension o f legal, social, and political rights
to all inhabitants o f a state, that is, their incorporation into the nation
as citizens rather than subjects. The word itself is part o f this tradition:
13
the m obilization o f all men into the arm y, as part o f their obligations
and rights toward the nation as a symbol and an essential fact of
their participation in national life. From this perspective the concept
o f mobilization corresponds to what Karl Mannheim called “funda
m ental dem ocratization” and to M arshall’s extension o f civil, political,
and social rights.2 Such rights also include access to goods and services
and to material and nonm aterial cultural objects. All o f these rights
and obligations, and access to goods and services are reflected in the
usual indicators o f mobilization as defined by Deutsch.
2. The frequently conflictive nature o f m obilization. The extension of
rights and forms o f participation is not the result o f a process o f mere
cultural diffusion. Certainly it was in some cases. But m ost often the
extension was the result o f a struggle, violent conflicts, or even revolu
tions. Rights were conquered against the interests o f ideologies of
powerful social groups, against the will o f ruling elites, higher strata,
or other privileged or previously established sectors. In any case, they
were obtained under the threat o f conflict or as part o f a compromise,
through class alliances, and in general through some type o f confron
tation and risk-taking, to achieve the integration o f the marginal group
through cooptation into the system.
3. Social mobilization constitutes a very complex process involving the
disintegration of a preexisting structure, some kind o f response or re
action to it, availability o f people for new forms o f behavior, the act
ing out o f such readiness, and finally reintegration into society. It may
be perceived as a change in the nature and extent o f participation de
fined as the role-set that an individual fulfills by virtue o f the status-
set in which he finds himself placed in society. These roles include not
only those corresponding to structural positions in various institutions
and groups, but also those defining the individuaTs access to consump
tion o f goods and services and the exercise o f rights and fulfillment of
obligations.
Though D eutsche definition and indicators are very helpful in describing
the level of modern participation at a given m om ent in time, and for a sim
ple static comparison o f different societies in term s o f proportion o f partici
pant or nonparticipant population in the m odem sector, they do not repre
sent analytic tools for the study o f processes o f m obilization, its causes, con
sequences, and particular nature, which may be very different under varying
social and historical conditions. T o achieve this purpose, the three aspects
mentioned above should be taken into account, considering the complexities
o f each and always emphasizing discontinuities in the process. This is im por
tant since the uneven, asynchronous nature o f change3 may create the co
existence not only of different degrees o f m odernization at the ecological or
geographic level (modern and archaic regions within the same nation), but
also among, and within social groups (more or less m odernized), among and
MOBILIZATION AND CHANGE 15
within institutions (some aspects o f the same institutions more modernized

than others), and even within the same individual (some area of behavior or
aspect o f the personality more archaic or more modern). The concept o f mo
bilization or analogous constructs have been used in connection with processes
of change not directly included in the “archaic to m odern” transition but
which involve relevant modifications in the nature and extent o f the partici
pation o f groups, social categories, and individuals. That is, mobilization may
affect sectors o f the population already totally or partially participant in the
modern structure. Furtherm ore, it may affect masses and elites and may be
caused by a variety o f factors—structural, psychosocial, or cultural. The
phenomenon o f disintegration and successive reintegration in different struc
tures, with changes in the form and extent o f participation, takes place in all
types o f societies—modern or traditional—and the process presents many
common elements which may help to clarify its nature, while making possible
useful comparisons. Also, to define mobilization in terms of level, form, and
nature of participation, or as modification, actual or desired, o f the norma-
tively regulated role-set o f social groups located in given positions within the
social structure has many advantages, the most im portant o f which is to
highlight the fact that changes in the participation of one group may deeply
affect others, for instance through invasion o f status, relative deprivation,
and the like. In this way, the frequently conflictive nature o f the process can
not be ignored, as occurs when using a purely descriptive definition.
Since the term social mobilization is usually employed in connection with
the archaic-modern transition, it is necessary to introduce some distinctions.
First, between primary and secondary m obilization, the former to be used to
indicate the process associated with m odernization; the latter, the process
affecting already modern or modernized sectors. Second, between modern
and nonm odern types. A form o f nonm odern or traditional mobilization may
occur within nonm odern, nonindustrial societies, when the process is not
part of the transition towards m odernity or directly or indirectly related to it.
This case corresponds to changes in the participation of groups, occurring in
historical epochs preceding the first rise o f modern-industrial society, or in
regions completely isolated from areas already affected by the transition.4
In this chapter I shall deal mainly with primary mobilization, although the
concept of secondary mobilization will also be used and considered in another
section.
INTEGRATION, DISINTEGRATION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
An integrated society has the following characteristics: (1) The various

portions o f the normative structure, i.e., the systems and subsystems o f norms,
statuses and roles, are in a state o f relative reciprocal adjustment. There is a
certain degree o f com patibility among the various parts, sufficient to assure
the normal functioning o f a society (there may be conflicts, but these are
either foreseen and resolved w ithin the structure itself, or else they are not so
intensive as to prevent such functioning). (2) The expectations, roles, and atti
tudes are internalized, corresponding to w hat is dem anded and foreseen by
the normative structure (there is thus a degree o f reciprocal compatibility
and congruence among the various internalizations o f individuals and between
such internalizations and the norm ative fram ew ork. (3) The circumstances
within which the individual behavior takes place correspond sufficiently to
the predictions, expectations, and definitions o f the situations, as they arise
from the system o f social norm s and their related internalization in the in
dividuals. (These circum stances result n o t only from interaction between
members o f society, b u t also the physical and environm ental facts and proc
esses, and from any interference by other relevant external societies and
subsystems w ithin the same society.) To understand this we shall call the first
aspect o f integration normative integration, the second aspect psychosocial
integration, and the third environmental integration. The last category is re
sidual, and it depends on the boundaries o f the society or subsystem as
sumed as the unit o f analysis (in this sense all th at which is generated by the
action o f other societies and/or subsystems is included in environment).
We shall define disintegration as any situation in which it is possible to
observe a degree o f adjustm ent to one or more o f the three aspects which
fails to reach at least the minimum level o f com patibility m entioned above.
The concept o f an integrated society is an ideal construct. All real societies
display a certain degree o f disintegration or nonintegration. There will be
periods in which it becomes particularly intense, or affects essential areas
of human activity, and other periods in which the lack o f integration, or
disintegration, remains restricted to smaller areas.
Every social change, defined as a transform ation o f the social structure,
implies a certain degree o f disintegration. This is due to the asynchronous
nature o f change in various parts o f the structure. This is the phenom enon
of cultural and social lag, understood in broader term s than in Ogburn’s
original formula. Only if all parts o f the social structure were to vary at the
same time and in the same direction, would it be possible to maintain the
adjustm ent or congruence at the normative and psychosocial levels. The phys
ical circum stances within which the social structure operates would also have
to undergo congruent transform ations. The m ost frequent situation is asyn-
chronism , the loss o f adjustm ent on some or all three levels, causing disinte
gration.5
This disintegrative process may be perceived from a num ber o f conflict
ing perspectives; the conflict may concern both the mere diagnosis o f the
process (meaning and orientation o f change) and its valuational (or ideologi
cal) analysis (the m ost desirable type o f social change). Two opposite points
o f view may arise: (1) that o f the structure from which the change operates;
and (2) th at o f the structure toward which the change is oriented. Each of
these perspectives gives rise to attitudes o f acceptance or rejection o f the proc-
ess. When change is viewed from the point o f view o f some future structure,
other divergencies may arise: different diagnoses regarding the orientation of
the process itself (i.e., what type o f society or partial structure is going to re
sult from the change), and different concepts concerning the structural model
toward which the tendency ought to lead. These are precisely the divergent
points o f view which occur in the form o f contrasting political ideologies.
THE CYCLE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
Mobilization is defined as a cycle o f rapid social change constituted by sev

eral analytically different moments, but which empirically may occur succes
sively or simultaneously. The moments are: (1) a state o f integration (within
a specific structural pattern); (2) a process o f breakdown or disintegration (af
fecting some aspect o f the existing structure); (3) displacement or release of
individual (and social groups); (4) response to the release (withdrawal or avail
ability, i.e., psychological mobilization); (5) objective mobilization (actual
manifest behavior); and (6) integration, which may occur within a modified
structure differing to some degree from the preexisting structure. When the
modification is slight, and it is the mobilized groups which adjust to the exist
ing dominant structure (normative and environmental levels), we can speak o f
reintegration through assimilation. When it is the previous dominant structure
(and its hegeonomic groups) which changes considerably, then reintegration
has occurred through major social change. In both cases the mobilized groups
are legitimately integrated into society. Finally, if the mobilized group is force
fully obliged to accept or comply to the preexisting normative structure and
be satisfied with the preexisting environmental level, then a more proper term
would be reintegration through demobilization.
The cycle o f mobilization is com pleted when from the initial integration
and beginnings o f disintegration a state o f reintegration is achieved in one
way or another (often a com bination o f the possibilities m entioned above).
Other types o f phases may also be distinguished in the cycle: phases o f differ
ent intensity and/or speed in the structural change, preceding or accompany
ing social mobilization, or differing intensity and speed of psychosocial change,
in terms o f rise o f awareness, ideologization (if any), overt behavior modifica
tion, and organized or nonorganized action. Taking into account the contin
uous flow o f change going on in every society and the acceleration charac
terizing the cycle o f m obilization, we can usually distinguish a first phase of
preconditioning, during which structural changes occur at a faster rate than
usual but are not clearly perceived. During these phases the majority o f con
temporary actors are not aware that fast and im portant cultural and/or social
changes are taking place and that major societal modifications are building up.
These will be dramatically perceived in a successive phase, perhaps triggered
by a traum atic event, in which the rate o f change is even more accelerated,
particularly at the psychosocial and behavioral levels. In this phase social and
political action becomes p rom inent; religious or ideological conflicts explode,

followed or not by violence b u t nearly always by institutional change. We
may call this second phase (or phases) o f overt psychosocial and behavioral
m obilization the “ acu te” phase, in contrast w ith the “preconditioning” one.
Both types o f phases may differ greatly, or even be interrupted by periods of
stasis (very slow or norm al social change) caused either by the particular his
torical course or by the outcom e reached by the process (i.e., demobiliza
tion). There may be overlapping o f phases, such as a psychosocial acute phase
taking place sim ultaneously with an acute phase o f structural change. In any
case, discontinuities between phases, changes in rates o f acceleration or in
their intensity as well as the scale o f changes will significandy affect the nature
and outcom e o f the process.
Before considering other aspects o f the process, some clarification should
be introduced regarding the causes o f social m obilization. A satisfactory analy
sis o f this problem would be beyond the scope o f this discussion, since it
would involve a com plete theory o f social change. I shall lim it myself to
state that both structural (cultural and social) changes and psychosocial ones
must intervene. The process is best described as a chain o f interrelated factors
in which none o f them taken in isolation can be considered the cause. It is not
only a question o f generic m ulticausality, b u t o f specific configuration of
com ponent factors which may vary under different historical (cultural and
social) conditions. Structural changes may generate m odifications in the
condition o f life (role-set) o f large sectors o f the population; but a rise of
awareness m ust take place for behavior changes to occur. Such changes do
not necessarily or autom atically follow structural change: ideologization
(diffusion o f new ideas and attitudes) may be another precondition. Converse
ly, propaganda, indoctrination, education, deliberate resocialization (as in
the case o f mobilization from above) are n o t likely to be transform ed into
powerful psychosocial drives towards new form s o f behavior, organized or
unorganized, or into collective action endow ed with the necessary strength
and persistence to produce institutional changes, w ithout the basis o f struc
tural change. These changes may have occurred w ithout individuals* awareness
—as during the preconditioning phase—but it m ust be sufficient to create a
strong propensity for new ideas, attitudes, m otivations, and behavior patterns,
so that when an external stimulus is received, it will generate a dynamic re
sponse. O ften a traum atic event constitutes the precipitating factor in the
onset o f the acute phase o f m obilization, usually at the psychosocial level,
but sometimes at the structural level as well. In Argentina and elsewhere, the
crisis o f 1929 and the Great Depression represented a traum atic event which
created a strong acceleration o f both structural and psychosocial changes.
World War I had similar effects in Europe, particularly in Italy and in Central
and Eastern Europe. In any case, both the structural and the psychosocial
levels m ust be deeply affected, but the patterns o f the process will depend
on the particular sequence, delays and discontinuities, and overlappings in
which these changes occur. At the present state o f knowledge no generaliza

tion may be advanced, except perhaps that the lower the awareness during
the preconditioning period, and the less expected and the more intense the
change in acceleration, the more traum atic the precipitating event is likely to
be. In such a case, m obilization is likely to take some form o f collective behav
ior-m ajo r historical revolutions have been characterized by these conditions.
In another case, such as the structural and psychosocial changes causing mass
migration, the rate o f m obilization may be much slower and the changes less
cataclysmic, but a process o f disintegration and reintegration will nonetheless
take place. In the course o f national development o f most if not all societies,
several cycles o f m obilization occur, and in analyzing any one o f them it is
necessary to take into account the preceding one, if any.
ASPECTS AND FORMS OF MOBILIZATION, DISINTEGRATION,

AND INTEGRATION
When a group is integrated it will function in a normal manner within so

ciety; its participation will be that predicted and expected in line with the
normative structure. In view o f the internalized expectations and as a result
of environmental circumstances, the roles, expectations, and attitudes within
various spheres o f behavior will be legitimized and will be so perceived by
the other groups in society. Such normality does not imply absence o f con
flicts. It means that the conflicts will be those predicted and expected by the
normative and psychosocial structure. Different types o f social structures may
be characterized by different degrees and forms o f participation of the var
ious groups in multiple spheres o f human activity. In particular, in traditional
societies participation o f a m ajority o f the population is restricted with re
spect to: (a) geographic location (limited to small communites); (b) occupa
tion (isolation in the economic sector); (c) power (e.g. nonparticipation in
political decision making); and (d) access, in terms o f knowledge, experience,
and enjoym ent, to the material and non-material culture o f the larger society
(as occurs when a considerable portion o f the inhabitants is limited to the
confines o f their respective folk cultures).
Industrial society is characterized by a high and increasing degree o f mass
participation in many social activities at the national level. Traditional and
industrial societies, therefore, have different kinds o f integration. But in both
cases the extent and nature o f participation will correspond to role expecta
tions and will be legitimate and accepted by the various groups. In both types
of societies environmental circumstances will be sufficient to ensure the de
gree o f participation normatively and psychologically expected.
It is im portant to distinguish this type o f integrated participation from
nonintegrated participation. The former takes place under conditions o f nor
mative, psychological, and environmental integration. The latter occurs when
there is no correspondence between the degree, form, and extension of par
ticipation required or tolerated by prevailing norms (and powerful sectors o f
society), and th at which actually takes place. This lack o f correspondence

may result in tw o opposite situations, either one o f excess or one o f deficien
cy, in term s o f norm atively and psychologically expected participation or the
participation which is possible in term s o f existing environm ental circumstan
ces. The concept o f m obilization results from the application o f this distinc
tion together with the ideas developed in preceding paragraphs.
All social change, to the ex ten t th a t it is characterized by lags or asynchro-
nisms, implies disintegration or loss o f integration, perceptible both from the
point o f view o f the preceding structure and from th a t o f the desired or anti
cipated structure. The process o f participation implies th a t groups affected
by change relinquish the level, degree, or form o f integrated participation, and
move on to other types o f activity n o t dem anded or tolerated by the norma
tive and psychosocial structure o f society prior to the change, or by groups
which have n o t been affected or have been affected in a different way by the
process. Change in participation may im ply either a reduction or an increase
in its level and extension. A group may find itself displaced in relation to a
preexistent structure. This displacem ent m ay initiate withdrawal, apathy,
abandonm ent o f activities, or on the contrary, availability for increased par
ticipation or for changes in its nature. O f special im portance in the analysis
o f social transition is the increase an d /o r change in the nature o f participa
tion. This process we call “m obilization,” defined as the excess (in degree,
extent , or form ) o f group participation in relation to the level considered
normal by the old society.
There is an im portant distinction betw een psychological and objective
mobilization. The first is w hat is really im plied in the concept o f availability,
that is, readiness for an active response, in term s o f an increase or change
in participation. In more general term s it could also be defined as an active
propensity to reestablish the equilibrium betw een the psychosocial and the
normative and environmental levels, which m ay involve a change in social
structure (in its norms and environment). Objective m obilization is the ex
pression o f the active response in term s o f actual behavior (for instance mi
gration to the city, participation in a new political or social movement).
Objective and psychological m obilization often occur sim ultaneously. But
psychological mobilization may precede its objective expression. An opposite
phenom enon may also take place: environm ental changes may produce a dis
placement in the group, which is forced to some objective m obilization (for
instance, emigration from a rural area). Only later, insofar as the group reacts
with changes in attitudes to the physical displacem ent, does psychological
m obilization take place (as a kind o f new awareness). In any case the distinc
tion is necessary insofar as objective and psychological m obilization may occur
at different times. In some cases psychological m obilization is translated into
action (objective m obilization) only if and when another active stimulus in
tervenes, for instance an elite, which gives expression and leadership to a so
cial movement.
The term excess is used not only to emphasize that the change in role-set
(participation) implies a substitution o f some roles for others, but above all
includes the invasion o f roles which had been reserved for other sectors of so
ciety. Change in the degree and com position o f participation (like the role-
set) could be expressed in a more general and neutral way w ithout emphasizing
the aspect o f invasion in the exercise o f roles thus far denied to the group be
ing mobilized. It is preferable to use a more highly loaded concept, to high
light two im portant facts in the analysis o f the process o f transition: (1) the
expansion in participation and (2) the fact that expansion frequently appears
as invasion o f roles and statuses previously reserved to other groups.
The notion o f defective or negative participation in relation to expected
and normatively legitimate participation is used in the present scheme to point
out the possible anomic effects o f disintegration on certain groups and in
certain aspects o f behavior manifested in terms of withdrawal or apathy.
This defective participation can be observed (1) from the point o f view of
the level o f participation normatively expected in the disintegrating social
structure or (2) in relation to new types o f participation which could be
expected in terms o f the emerging social structure. An example o f the first
case could be a lack o f religious participation. An example o f the second is
found in the delay with which recent immigrants, transformed from peasants
into industrial workers, participate in labor-union or political activities.
The process o f m obilization is closely related to social mobility. In cer
tain circumstances some types o f m obility can be considered as special forms
of mobilization. But this concept is much broader and implies a different per
spective. First, while m obilization includes any form o f displacement—hori
zontal, vertical, etc.—social mobility only refers to a displacement—ascending
or descending—in the system o f stratification. In this sense the concept of
social mobility is much more restricted than mobilization. Second, upward
or downward m obility implies the abandonm ent o f a certain status and the
acquisition of a new one, corresponding to positions higher or lower than
those occupied before. In mobilization a new status can be acquired with
out loss o f the old, or a previous status can be lost w ithout acquiring a new
one. Third, there are certain forms o f mobility clearly different from mobili
zation, as in the case o f individual m obility. Let us remember the distinction
between exchange m obility (or m obility by replacement), in which some in
dividuals ascend replacing others who are descending, and collective mobility,
the mass mobility which affects entire strata, ascending or descending. The
first is a phenom enon clearly different from mobilization. In the second,
collective mobility can in certain circumstances be considered a special
form of mobilization. More specifically, collective mobility can be thought
of as mobilization when we are dealing with an intragenerational process
(and in some cases an intergenerational one) which occurs very rapidly and
which was neither expected nor predicted by the normative structure of
society or by the internalized attitudes o f other groups, especially hegemonic
groups. When a stratum , because o f stru ctu ral alterations or psychosocial

changes, is displaced rapidly (w ithin one or tw o generations) from its posi
tion inside the system o f social stratificatio n , and this displacement is not
part o f a legitim ate m echanism for change, then vertical m obility presents a
special case o f m obilization. If collective vertical m obility is normatively ac
cepted, we cannot speak o f m obilization. This w ould be the case with mobility
by growing participation, a norm al process in developed countries, where
social m obility has acquired the character o f a self-sustained mechanism.
(We are dealing here with integrated m obility, which occurs in the type of
society which includes it in its norm ative system , internalizes it as an attitude
and m otivation, and furtherm ore provides real o pportunities for its realiza
tion.)6 In contrast, de facto m obility, which is n o t legitim ized by operating
social norms and is n o t integrated, co n stitutes a phenom enon o f mobilization
when it is collective m obility, rather than merely a case o f individual devia
tion.
Analogous distinctions may be applied when considering ecological
m obility (i.e., migration). Certain forms o f m igration are clearly a form of
m obilization, while others are norm al processes, th at is, they do not involve
rapid change. The form er are those forms o f mass m igration involving the
abandonm ent o f the preexisting way o f life and the acquisition o f a different
one. This is typically the case in rural to urban m igration. Som etim es this type
o f demographic m ovem ent takes place w ithout the in tention on the part of
the emigrant group to change its way o f life. For instance, in the past the
overseas emigration o f rural population from Europe had as the main or only
purpose to earn enough money to buy land in the m other country and resume
the traditional way o f life. However, the psychosocial displacem ent caused by
the emigration itself operated as a traum atic event conducive either to social
m obilization or to personal disorganization. In the form er case the emigrant
experiences a psychosocial, change, is m obilized into new forms o f participa
tion, and may even turn out to act as a dynam ic agent o f change for the host
society, as occurred in some Latin American countries. W hatever the initial
intentions and expectations, mass migration represents a form o f mobilization.
The impulse to recover the traditional way o f life, the decision to emigrate in
a social setting where emigration is not an established p attern , is always a
sym ptom o f some breakdown in the traditional structure, displacem ent and
availability for new behavior (emigration being a form o f nonhabitual behav
ior). A different situation occurs with forms o f m igration institutionalized at
the normative level, expected at the psychosocial level, and possible and re
quired at the environm ental level. These are the cases o f nom adic people, o f
seasonal migration, and m odern geographic m obility. With the latter, the
physical space which the individual considers his natural, legitim ate, or ex
pected habitat is now much larger than the local com m unity, being instead
the whole nation, and for an increasing variety o f occupational groups, other
larger supranational areas, whose limits and scope are given by occupational
or professional networks. In this sense individuals are located in a profes

sion or occupation rather than in a city or even a nation. Their base may
be in one place or another, but they are always ready to move, and their
personal life is adjusted to it. This case is similar to the self-sustained social
mobility discussed above. It does not involve structural change, since it is
one of the characteristics o f the structure o f this particular society that in
dividuals and groups cease to be rooted in a limited geographical space to
become located in a functional network covering a very large space, national
or international.
As an ideal type mobilization is a cycle, starting with original integra
tion in a given type o f social structure and ending with reintegration in a
new type o f social structure, passing through stages o f disintegration, avail
ability and readiness for new forms o f participation, and achievement of such
new forms both actually and normatively. However, reintegration may fail
because o f successful opposition by other groups, so that mobilization is
canceled through demobilization. Or, reintegration may be achieved with
minimal changes through assimilation. Any other legitimate, expected, and
normally recurrent changes in type o f participation do not constitute mobili
zation as defined here.
The cycle of mobilization is characterized by an initial disintegration
of the preexisting structure, or by a traum atic event causing the displace
ment of entire social groups or sectors (of masses or elites) with regard to
the social space (role-set) previously allocated to them. When such displace
ment results in availability and this turns into a different kind of participa
tion-m o re intense or in spheres previously closed to them —can we speak
of mobilization. When changes have occurred which permit legitimization
and also offer effective possibilities for the realization of this increased de
gree of participation o f the mobilized groups, we can speak o f integration.
Reintegration may result from assimilation (modification o f the mobilized
sector so that it acquires the necessary traits to win the acceptance of the
hegemonic groups, and be legitimized in the social structure) or from struc
tural change (modification of the social structure to make the new partici
pation possible, that is, viable and normatively and psychosocially legitimate).
But it may also fail and the whole process be closed by demobilization.
We have distinguished various “m om ents” of the process. They may take
place in a temporal sequence (and frequently do). For instance, first a struc
tural change (or traum atic event), then displacement, etc. But there will
always be overlapping, delays, sim ultaneity, and other variations. They must
be considered analytical m om ents rather than empirical stages. In any case,
in accordance with the general phenom enon o f asynchronism, simultaneity
occurs very rarely. In the first phase, some groups become available through
the partial disintegration o f certain sectors of the preexisting society, and
when they respond with additional active participation in any sector not
corresponding to their sphere o f participation in the previous structure,
we can say th at they have been m obilized. This active response will not
necessarily occur, and another possible alternative is apathy.
Because o f the asynchronous nature o f change, displacem ent, mobiliza
tion, and integration m ay n o t occur at the same time in all sectors of be
havior in the same social group (or in all sectors o f the structure in which
the group participates). The result is th a t very different situations may co
exist: displacem ent with apathy in certain sectors, m obilization in others,
integrated participation in some spheres o f action, and persistence of the
previous pattern in the rem ainder. This scheme simplifies the actual proc
esses th at occur, because even w ithin w hat we consider analytically as a
given area o f behavior (such as w ork, the fam ily, political activity, recrea
tion, etc.), one may have com binations o f old and new elements. This phe
nom enon, which has elsewhere been term ed the “ fusion effect,” 7 is present
in many transitional situations.
This variety o f possibilities is influenced by the causes o f and forms
taken by availability and m obilization (when and if the form er leads to
the latter). In principle, availability arises from the loss o f integration in one
or more o f the three levels m entioned in the definitions: (1) alteration in
the internal correspondence among socially valid norm s; (2) alteration in
the correspondence betw een norm s on the one hand and internalized atti
tudes on the other; (3) alteration betw een norm s and attitudes on the one
hand, and effective possibilities o f application on the other. The specific
forms which these phenom ena may assume are extrem ely varied, and al
though the process may begin on any o f the three levels, it will always tend
to extend to the others.
In each instance there are tw o essential aspects which should be men
tioned. In the first place, availability will always imply th at somehow a
loss o f correspondence has directly or indirectly affected the level of at
titudes; and in the second place, whatever may be the particular sector
o f attitudes in which the loss o f adjustm ent has taken place, it will tend
to extend more or less rapidly to other fields. These m inimal and generic
assertions merely indicate th at the groups affected m ust notice the change
and perceive it as an alteration which makes form ed prescriptions inap
plicable. Such an alteration can be m atched by form s o f anom ic and in
dividual disorganization or by attitudes which tend to construct new roles
implying participation, and it is this active response th at we call mobili
zation.
Within this scheme we do not necessarily assign causal priority to objec
tive changes (in the normative system or environm ental circumstances)
over subjective ones (alterations in attitudes or internalized roles). An in
creased level o f com m unication o f ideas may become one o f the causal
factors no less than objective alterations in the population equilibrium ,
economic structure, etc. These are always circular processes in which changes
on one level stim ulate and facilitate changes on other levels, which may in
turn react on the former. These reactive processes can facilitate or inhibit
further circular causation o f changes with in the social structure.
MOBILIZATION AND CONFLICT:

COUNTERMOBILIZATION, SECONDARY MOBILIZATION,
DEMOBILIZATION, AND MOBILIZATION FROM ABOVE
The notion o f secondary m obilization—mobilization within already

modernized structures—as well as the concept o f demobilization are particu
larly related to conflicts originating from mobilization processes during the
transition towards m odernity or in already advanced societies. Secondary
mobilization often occurs as a reaction to the primary mobilization o f ex
cluded or partially marginal sectors. That is, it corresponds to counterm o
bilization. The classic case is the displacement affecting the European middle
classes in the 1920s due to inflation and proletarianization. Their active
answer to the impact o f displacement was a form o f mobilization which
originated a new political movement: facism. O ther illustrations are the
reaction o f an already established working class to newcomers, immigrants
from abroad or other ethnic groups from different regions o f the same
country, or the activation o f marginal sectors which had hitherto passively
accepted exclusion, segregation, or discrimination. The reaction does not
always develop into a process o f full m obilization: this depends a great deal
on the nature o f the society, historical epoch, rate o f assimilation o f sectors
in the process o f primary m obilization, and/or the rate o f creation o f the
necessary symbolic and nonsymbolic resources to make viable new forms of
participation. Also, counterm obilization is not always antidemocratic in
ideology or conscious intention. The counterm obilization of the Argentine
middle class against the primary m obilization o f the lower class was be
lieved to be, and in a certain sense really was, ideologically democratic.
However, to use a term o f Marxist jargon, it also partly served antidemocratic,
elitist interests. Because both types o f mobilization belong to the same
general category, many writers have failed to introduce the distinction,
considering primary and secondary m obilization to be the same. This may
lead to very serious errors o f judgm ent. Movements generated on the basis of
primary m obilization are very different from those caused by secondary
mobilization.
Demobilization m ust also be defined in terms o f conflicts. In the course o f
the process some social groups may oppose the m obilization of others, or
even feel threatened by their already legitimized participation in certain areas
of the social structure. If they succeed in the struggle they will try to reestab
lish the status quo, that is, to demobilize recently mobilized or participating
sectors. This has occurred several times in recent history in Europe and Amer
ica. Fascism based on the secondary m obilization o f the middle classes (and
the power o f the elite) achieved the dem obilization o f the lower classes. In
Latin America, many m ilitary m ovem ents after the 1930s were aimed at the
dem obilization, in one way or anoth er, o f the m iddle or lower classes, depend
ing on circum stances. (For instance, the m ilitary coup o f 1930 in Argentina
was an attem p t to dem obilize the m iddle class, as was the military interven
tion against APRA in Peru. The 1945 coup against Vargas, the 1955 coup
against Peron, and m any successive m ilitary coups in both countries were
staged as attem pts to demobilize the w orking class.) Particularly since the mid
sixties, m ilitary dem obilizing coups sup p o rted by secondary mobilization
(counterm obilization) o f the m iddle classes and established elites, became
again particularly frequent: such are the cases o f the Ongama regime in Ar
gentina (which failed), the 1964 coup in Brazil (which succeeded), and the
Chilean coup o f 1973, which m ost closely resem bled the classic fascist case,
particularly in its Spanish version. Elsew here8 I have advanced the hypothe
sis th at many Latin American countries are passing through a stage o f nation
al developm ent similar to the situation o f Europe betw een the two world
wars. In th at epoch the middle classes, under the double th reat from below
(rising m obilized working classes) and from above (increasing economic
concentration and capital m onopoly), becam e the basis for countermobili-
zing regimes, or at least provided civilian support.
A nother form is m obilization from above: the deliberate attem pt to in
duce large sectors o f the population, or all o f it, in to some form o f social,
often political, participation. This is so w idespread, particularly in develop
ing countries, th at the term m obilization regimes is often used. This is not the
place to elaborate on such a com plex phenom en o n ;how ever, it is essential to
note th at two different meanings may be found in it. The first is direcdy re
lated to the will to m odernize: this is the case o f m odernizing authoritarian
regimes in very traditional countries, where m odern nation building must
start from tribal society or from advanced cultures which differ considerably
from Western culture and m odern society. The second purpose is to signifi
cantly or radically modify the ideological orientation, and even the basic per
sonality, o f large sectors o f the population or even its totality . Its first appear
ance came with the fascist totalitarian regimes, where the essential aim of a
stricdy controlled m obilization from above was to generate an active con
sensus in those groups whose dem obilization had been violendy imposed.
That is, the aim was to transform the lower classes from a M arxist antination
al, anticapitalist ideology to a nationalist one, with some kind o f participa
tion aimed at increasing productivity and obedience, with a rigid or militaris
tic hierarchical subordination to the upper classes and under the total control
o f the state. Certainly in some cases fascism took authoritarian rather than
totalitarian forms; that is, it was more concerned with the neutralization of
the rebellious lower strata, trying to achieve their reconversion from citizens
to subjects. This was the case o f Spain, for instance, and some o f the military
bureaucratic regimes in Latin America (no-party system ).9 Typically, fascism
takes a totalitarian form , th at is, a new kind o f authoritarianism (quite differ-
ent from the traditional one) in which the functional requirements of an in
dustrial structure demand the active intervention o f many people in the com
plex machinery of the technological society. From these demands stems a
contradiction: on the one hand, the need to demobilize and control the pop
ulation, while on the other, the need to obtain the active and creative coop
eration o f many people in activities requiring some autonom y, choices, and
decision making. Hence the attem pt to resocialize adults (and socialize the
young), radically transforming their personality, creating the “fascist m an.”
In this respect totalitarianism as a sociopolitical form o f organization may be
applied to a variety o f ideological orientations: fascism, national socialism,
soviet type o f communism, and others, though the raison d ’etre, o f these
regimes may vary a great deal and even be opposed to one another. What
they have in common is the totalitarian form and the attem pt at mobilization
from above.10
DISPLACEMENT, AVAILABILITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF ELITES
The terms elite and mass are imprecise, and a detailed analysis would re
quire a rigorous definition. But for present purposes, let us simply state
that by the first term we mean the groups and individuals at the top o f the
various institutions and hum an activities, and by the second term, the bulk
of the people. Perhaps this distinction could be given a simple statistical ex
pression, such as referring to the top 10 or 15 percent as opposed to all the
rest. In any case, it is understood that the “ to p ” does not necessarily coin
cide with the higher levels in the stratification system. Some persons or
groups may be at the top o f given activities or institutions and at the same
time fail to belong to the higher social classes. Furtherm ore, in the defini
tion we include potential elites and counterelites, that is, groups which in
the present structure are not located in privileged or top positions, but
which because o f their leadership o f some segment o f the population, may
eventually reach those top positions, or at least attem pt a collective action
to reach them . We are pointing here to a very im portant factor in the behav
ior o f elites: their congruent or incongruent position within the system of
stratification (the well-known case o f the successful businessman deprived
of political power or prestige, the impoverished aristocracy, the proletari-
anized intellectual, and so forth).
With this definition in m ind we see that the mechanisms o f release from
the previous social structure, availability, apathy, mobilization and rein
tegration apply both to masses and elites. It is true that in many discussions
of mobilization the term seems to be specially used in relation to the former;
however, the disintegration o f the preexisting structure may well affect elite
groups; they may find themselves displaced and react by withdrawal, apathy,
or by different forms and extent o f participation. Such participation may be
legitimate or not, accepted or conflictive.
The role o f a displaced or partially displaced elite in social change and es
pecially in the process o f m odernization has been emphasized in various
theories. Blocked m obility, status incongruency, w ithdraw al o f status respect,
are assumed to create in one way or an o th er partially subordinate groups.
These well-known concepts refer to the same processes o f displacement, avail
ability, and m obilization discussed here. B ut we m ust rem em ber that leader
ship may also be provided by integrated elites, by groups fully established
w ithin the existing social order.
In the process o f m obilization (and som etim es also in the stage of release
and disintegration) elites generally assume th e m ost active role; theirs is the
initiative, leadership, and eventually the organization (when the process has
an organized expression at all). B ut this statem en t is still imprecise and ambig
uous; it is based on the assum ption o f the functional necessity o f an innova
tive elite, or o f leaders for any change to occur, failing to clarify the origin
and nature o f such an elite, its specific role and its relations to the mass of
the followers. Also the very assum ption o f the functional requirem ent of an
elite could be questioned. A related problem here concerns the induced, spon
taneous, or m ixed nature o f the whole process or o f some o f its stages. The
role o f elites will be quite different in a situation o f spontaneous change than
in one caused by varying degrees o f planning or deliberate inducem ent.
One o f the m ost com m on situations is the release and availability o f large
sectors o f the population as a consequence o f spontaneous changes in society;
th at is, a situation in which whatever the factors o f change may have been, its
consequences on the release and availability o f certain groups were neither ex
pected nor foreseen. In such a situation we may distinguish three different
forms in which conversion from availability in to m obilization may occur:
(1) through the intervention o f an external elite; (2) through the generation
o f an internal elite; or (3) as a leaderless process.
In the first case the elite is provided by outside groups or categories of the
population (that is, not belonging to released sectors) which assume the leader
ship and the necessary ideological weapons inducing m obilization among the
available masses. The elite itself may be a displaced group in a situation of
availability, b u t in any case its differentiation from the available masses ante
dated the situation o f release and availability. Or the external elite could be a
well-established group, which may find it convenient to lead the mobilization
o f the displaced large sectors in order to integrate them into the status quo
and/or use them as an instrum ent in their conflicts with other groups.
In the second case no outside elite will intervene and the leadership which
will activate the released and available large sectors into m obilization is gener
ated from inside. Here the elite is differentiated after or sim ultaneously with
the process o f release, possibly as another consequence o f this same process.
Finally, certain forms o f mobilization may occur w ithout the intervention
o f a clearly differentiated leadership, Rural-urban m igrations—som etim es con-
sidered a substitute for revolution—or a good illustration of such a leaderless

process, as are the rise o f new aspirations, strivings for social m obility, needs,
attitudes, and behavior patterns which provide some concrete orientation for
the displaced masses, giving them the means o f expressing in a structured way
new participation patterns and channeling them into positive reaction instead
of withdrawal and apathy. Even in this case the process requires the media
tion of innovators, the personal influence o f informal leaders, but we do not
refer to them as an elite insofar as they are not clearly differentiated and still
operate at the primary group level. Similar situations may be found in the case
of other types o f nonpolitical m obilization, such as social banditry, millenar-
ian or other religious movements, and forms o f collective behavior (insofar as
they may be an expression o f social mobilization).
In any process o f mobilization the three forms will combine in different
proportions and some im portant aspects o f the process itself will vary accord
ing to the type of com bination. The nature o f such a process will be condi
tioned by the existence, nature, and availability o f elites in relation to the
existence, nature, and availability o f larger sectors o f the population. The
combination o f available (and mobilized) elites and o f available (and at least
mobilizable) masses seems to provide the most favorable conditions for the
appearance of radical anti-status quo political movements. For example, it
has been argued, according to a well-known thesis, that a truly revolutionary
movement will always require the intervention o f an outside elite provided
by intellectuals, “ the educated representatives o f the propertied classes.**
Even this thesis does not deny the alternative o f an internal elite, but the
movement arising from it will be quite different.11
The requirement o f an outside elite for channeling a process o f mobiliza
tion into a political movement will vary according to the characteristics o f
the mass sectors involved and the speed o f the process. This may explain
differences between lower-class movements in countries industrialized earlier
and those presently developing. In the former, the importance o f internal
elites was perhaps greater, even if outside leadership was provided and did
have a role. In the latter, the internal differentiation o f a “working-class
aristocracy** becomes very difficult because o f the more traditional char
acter of available sectors and the speed o f the process. Also, the existence of
an available elite ready to assume leadership o f available large sectors may
speed up the crystallization o f a political movement, and prevent the spon
taneous form ation o f an internal elite which otherwise could have occurred
much more slowly in the absence o f external intervention.
While under certain conditions the existence o f available elites is not a
necessary requirement for the political mobilization o f the larger strata in a
situation o f availability, the opposite situation—available and mobilized elites
without potential masses o f followers—is not likely to give rise to large ideo
logical and political movements. The political action o f the mobilized elite
must take some other form , if any at all. An im p o rtan t aspect is the ability of
elites to perceive the situation correctly, their realism or utopianism. Utop
ian approaches to political action may tu rn o u t to be the m ost realistic ones
under certain circum stances. But in a situation in which m ost o f the popula
tion is still integrated in to the existing social order, the political possibilities
of a displaced and m obilized elite group will be lim ited. The only realistic
procedure to originate a large mass m ovem ent w ould be to induce the dis
integration o f the existing social order and cause the release o f large sectors.
Illustrations o f these various cases are found in m any guerrilla movements,
particularly when they acquire considerable im portance, as in the case of
Argentina since 1973.
Even in the absence o f an available and m obilized elite or o f other leader
ship groups provided by an established elite, the m obilization process may
well originate an internal leadership or assume some other spontaneous lead
erless form.
CONDITIONS FO R POLITICAL O R NONPOLITICAL

EXPRESSION OF MOBILIZATION: THE ROLE O F IDEOLOGIES,
STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR
In the preceding sections m ost o f the discussion was conducted on the im
plicit assum ption o f the political m eaning o f social m obilization. While it is
true that this process, whichever its kind or form , always has direct or indirect
political im plications, in some cases social m obilization acquires a dominant
and direct political expression, while in other instances this will be lacking.
Given the very general definition I have adopted and the abstract level of the
present approach, it would be difficult, if n o t im possible, to form ulate a con
ceptual framework sufficient to clarify under which set o f possible conditions
a process o f social m obilization will be translated in to direct political expres
sion, and under which different conditions the process will assume other
forms perhaps indirectly related to politics. Therefore this section will be
limited to a few general observations on the topic.
It has long been recognized, by politicians and political scientists that a
mobilized or mobilizing group can be neutralized or deviated from direct
political expression by providing it with alternative outlets. T hat is, the readi
ness for different forms o f participation may be absorbed into nonpolitical
channels by offering the possibility o f acting o u t new roles adequate to the
new expectations. Emigration is perhaps the best o f such alternate channels,
particularly rural to urban m igration. Spain, Italy, Ireland, and other Euro
pean countries found in overseas emigration the safety valve to release the
pressure o f actual or potential m obilization o f large sectors o f marginal
“surplus” population. In the present Latin American situation as well as in
several countries in post-World War II Europe, large m igration from less de
veloped to more advanced areas was one o f the major expressions o f mass
social mobilization. The recently inmigrated sectors in the urban centers

may provide the social basis o f im portant political movements, but this
outcome is not autom atically caused by migration. O ther essential con
ditions must obtain, and the nature and scope o f the political expression to
be taken by the m obilization process will depend on these conditions.
The urban migrant is not particularly prone to participate in political move
ments or to express politically his propensity for increased participation.12
Closely related to migration and in conjunction with it, various forms of
mass social m obility may function as adequate channels for the absorption
of mobilized sectors. Here the structural change is provided by the produc
tive system, and often by some redistribution o f income. Through increase
in the access to goods and services and to status symbols (through consump
tion and/or educational and occupational upgrading), the mobilized masses
are absorbed into the national society. Here integration occurs through as
similation, which in turn is made possible through the expansion of society,
which often assumes the form o f a veritable change o f scale. The whole pro
cess will have political implications, but not necessarily direct political ex
pression, such as a new movement, party, or regime, or a drastic change
in political alignments. Before coming to a brief analysis o f the conditions
required to transform these types o f social mobilization into political mo
bilization, it is convenient to m ention two other forms of the process
which lack direct political meaning. They are found most often in nonmodern
societies and are the outcom e o f traditional m obilization, typically occurring
in rural settings, b u t also to be observed sometimes in urban areas. I refer here
to millenarian movements or other similar religious or quasi-religious phe
nomena, as well as to social banditry. Both may turn into full-fledged politi
cal movements, which often include religious or millenarian components,
as well as expressions which could be compared to social banditry. The same
process o f social m obilization under different circumstances may turn into a
political movement, a millenarian cult, or give rise to forms o f social banditry.
There are examples o f mixed types in which all these components coexist.
What makes the difference, in addition to the general nature o f the historical
and social context, is the presence and characteristics o f two key factors:
elites and ideologies.
Often the process o f mobilization, especially when following a precipitating
event, may originate various forms o f collective behavior. This phenomenon
is closely related to social m obilization as defined here, and for some authors
it seems to coincide with it as a process o f déstructuration and restructuration
of social action,13 that is, o f behavioral and institutional innovation. How
ever, collective behavior usually refers more directly to the m om ent o f acute
behavioral mobilization (political or nonpolitical), through a wide range o f
observable phenom ena. Their m ost typical traits are: large number o f people
involved (crowds, mob action, panic,riots, fads, fashions, etc.);overt behavior
sharply deviating from institutionalized norms and values and causing wide,
highly visible social disturbances o f short d u ratio n; although indirectly they

may originate new institutions or new form s o f social structure, their outcome
is not structural change unless through the m ediation o f an organized political
movement. Collective behavior per se is n o t a cause o f social and cultural
structural innovation or social change as defined here. Social mobilization,
instead, is conceived here both more restrictively and more extensively than
this definition o f collective behavior. It is m ore comprehensive insofar as it
includes the m om ent o f structural changes, both as a cause and as conse
quence, b u t it is more restrictive because it always involves demands for the
institutionalization o f new forms o f participation or the legitimization of a
different role-set allocated to some sectors o f the national society. Its conse
quences are more enduring, while such collective behavior as m ob actions or
riots may remain sporadic events which do not introduce any noticeable
change in the social structure as a whole or in to partial structures, nor cause
institutional changes unless they give rise to a political and social movement
firmly based on the stable psychological and structural form ations preceding
and accompanying the m obilization process.
The theoretical framework o f social m obilization m ust include explicit
references to collective behavior, since in its acute phase it will originate phe
nom ena o f this type;how ever, to produce lasting effects in the social structure
and the institutional configuration, these phenom ena m ust evolve into social
and/or political organization and action; th at is, they m ust become institu
tionalized. And finally, such institutionalized action m ust give legitimization
to the new role-set and new types o f participation.
The political culture o f the country is an im portant determ ining condition
for the form to be assumed by mobilization (psychological and behavioral)
and its outcom e (be this assimilation, reintegration, or dem obilization). No
abstract generalization may be advanced at this point. It can only be stated
that with the same type o f structural changes and psychosocial mobilization,
quite different political expressions may be originated depending on the nature
o f the preexistent (and still operating) political culture, both in the mobiliz
ing groups and other relevant sectors o f society.
MOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION AS SOURCES O F TENSION

(WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE LATIN AMERICAN SITUATION)
The three phenom ena which we have endeavored to define—availability,

mobilization, and integration—may now be taken as starting points for the
analysis o f tensions, to the extent that they center around the fact o f a sudden
active participation o f groups formerly characterized by their passivity, (or
routine conform ity to their normatively patterned and expected role-set).
This awakening is perceived (and received) by the various sectors o f the pop
ulation in different ways, and in their attitudes in this respect—often in vio
lent contrast or opposition to one another—one main source o f tensions is
found. The term revolution o f growing expectations refers to facts o f this

type. The analysis thus far has been aimed at formulating the meaning o f this
process with a certain am ount o f precision, and relating it to change as a
whole. Our purpose has also been to stress th at this revolution o f expectations
is by no means restricted to economic sectors, to a demand for higher levels
of consum ption. It is all o f this, b u t much more: it is a new attitude o f gen
eralized participation which enters into conflict with preexisting attitudes,
and also with the empirical possibilities o f finding relatively adequate satis
factions. Interpretation in the strict economic sense o f growing expectations
of large sectors o f the population in Latin America is a source o f serious
misunderstanding and error, not only by dom inant national elites but also by
many foreign observers. This m isunderstanding leads to the appraisal o f the
success or failure o f a m ovem ent merely on the basis o f what it offers in terms
of economic im provem ent. However, what might be term ed an “experience
in participation ” in other spheres (often a mere illusion o f participation) may
be as effective in assuring the support o f recently mobilized groups as an
expansion in consum ption.
Intergroup tensions and conflicts depend upon two kinds o f variables. The
first is related to group structure, including the system o f social stratification,
ethnic structure (if any), population distribution throughout an area, and the
central or peripheral position occupied by various groups. This position is re
lated to the hegemony o f certain areas within the national territory, and the
distribution o f power. As regards the second kind o f variable, aspects o f a dif
ferent kind should be listed: (1) the sphere o f human activity within which
availability, m obilization, and possible subsequent integration take place; (2)
the rate o f the process o f change; (3) the existence o f mechanisms o f integra
tion within society which are adequate for the groups in the course o f mobili
zation; (4) independent o f the above, existence o f possibilities making inte
grated participation viable. These last tw o aspects also include the rate at
which mechanisms o f integration, where nonexistent, may be created on the
basis o f transform ation o f the existing structure and the social cost o f such
mechanisms. The same applies to the creation o f circumstances perm itting
such participation. Finally, there is (5) the proportion o f the populalation al
ready mobilized, still to be m obilized, integrated, or in the course o f integra
tion, that is to say, the stage o f the overall process in which the various groups
comprising the population are engaged.
Latin American countries present considerable differences with respect to
the above, which makes it difficult to lay down precise propositions applicable
to all. The causes which have produced the breakdown o f the traditional pat
tern are well known and m ight be m entioned in passing. They consist o f the
growing division o f the national population into isolated layers; breakup o f
local communities, disappearance o f the closed-in or isolated economies, and
their growing incorporation into the national and international econom y;
transform ation o f traditional forms o f work into wage labor, either by the es-
tablishm ent o f industries or by changes in the prim ary agricultural or extrac

tive sector, and hence the disappearance o f the old prim ary or community
forms o f social relationships in the sphere o f w ork as well as in other sectors
of com m unity life, such as recreation ; grow th o f m eans o f transportation and
greater accessibility o f “cen tral” zones from “peripheral” areas ; universal pen
etration o f mass media o f com m unication; increasing educational facilities
and their dissemination am ong larger sectors o f the population; disequili
brium in population, caused by the persistent high birth rates and falling death
rates. These and other phenom ena disrupt the traditional order on a scale not
comparable with what has occurred in past centuries. During the struggle for
independence and throughout the nineteenth and p art o f the present century,
with but a few exceptions, m odernization affected only small groups o f elites,
in central areas o f each country. The process o f developm ent today affects
the entire population and invades the whole national territory. Furthermore,
the process has acquired unprecedented velocity.
Conflicts and tensions arise as a consequence o f the incongruence in aspira
tions, attitudes, m otivations, and corresponding behavior o f each group com
prising the social structure. The m ost evident conflicts are those between re
cently mobilized groups in the middle and low er strata, and groups possessing
political and economic power, inasmuch as the new found attitudes o f partici
pation on the part o f the form er are n o t accepted as legitim ate by the older
elites, which continue to follow an orientation in line w ith traditional expec
tations. Resistance to change by traditional families and their allies, the army
and the church, was presumably the classic form o f conflict in Latin America
in the past, and is m anifested in innum erable ideological form s. As the tran
sition proceeded, conflicts and tensions became far m ore com plicated than
one simple model can indicate. There are a num ber o f aspects which make
the situation far more com plex:
1. The incongruences—and hence the conflicts—do not arise merely be
tween groups located in different situations within the hierarchy o f power,
prestige, and econom y, but sometimes occur within the same elite.
The role of the nascent bourgeoisie and other middle-class strata in con
fronting groups which formerly m onopolized pow er is well know n. In many
cases, new entrepreneurial groups oriented tow ard industrizlization challenge
traditional families, whose power and vitality are based on the concentra
tion o f land or export of raw materials. Similar conflicts are faced by the
church and army. Different sectors within the bourgeoisie and the higher
middle classes may take conflicting positions. Such is the case betw een older
sectors o f the middle class and new industrial entrepreneurs. In emerging
configurations o f sectors, a growing im portance is acquired by foreign eco
nomic, political, and military sectors.
The position o f the middle classes in the m ost advanced countries in the
region is approaching now a condition similar to th at o f their European coun
terparts during the first half o f the century. The am biguous position of
these strata—captured between the growing forces o f the organized lower

classes and the m onopolistic national and foreign bourgeoisie—originates am
bivalence, contradictions, and fragm entation. In some countries, the military
coup, as a functional substitute o f fascism, is supported by the middle classes,
though these seldom reach the intense condition o f secondary mobilization
which provided the social basis o f classic fascism.
Situations created by rapid change may produce all kinds o f lineups, not
only among various groups but also intram ural conflicts. It would be a mis
take, for example, to consider the army as a monolithic sector favoring or
committed to one solution; quite the contrary, in may countries (excepting
Brazil and Peru) the army is fragmented into a num ber o f factions which to
some extent reflect the cleavages existing in the society (although in gen
eral the intervention o f the army has favored the preexisting order rather than
opposed the existing socioeconomic status quo).
The same can be observed in relation to the church, which in most coun
tries has been affected by new currents oriented towards radical social re
forms. New motives for conflict usually become superimposed on former
struggles between factions o f a purely personalistic type which characterized
the early political history o f most Latin American countries.
Nor would it be correct to speak o f the lower strata as a m onolithic
block facing the holders o f power. The process o f transform ation into an in
dustrial social structure tends to differentiate, within these strata, certain
sectors with special characteristics, such as different educational levels,
roles in the productive process, and living standards. Mobilization occurs at
different rates in the various groups, which introduces another differentiation
between more and less m odernized sectors. To all this must be added ethnic
differences which sometimes play a role in the conflicts, particularly within
the lower strata, in addition to being an im portant aspect o f interclass conflicts.
Finally, there are conflicts which arise outside the system o f social strati
fication. Such is the case o f the conflict between generations, which obvious
ly becomes more acute in times o f rapid change. In Latin America the high
degree o f political involvement o f university students has made them a source
of im portant leadership in movements aimed at providing revolutionary an
swers (often contradictory ones) to new situations created by the process o f
transition. Here may also be found one o f the roots o f widespread guerrillas
in Latin America.
There is another source o f tensions and conflicts inside the different groups,
classes, strata, and social sectors, partly related to generational conflict. This
is the differentiation created by the fact that the processes o f mobilization
and integration usually affect the different sectors o f the population in suc
cessive cycles. For example, the m obilization o f sectors o f the working class
can take place in various stages which may be two or three decades apart.
When a second cycle in the m obilization o f the working class is taking place,
the sectors affected by the first cycle some thirty years earlier are in some
ways already integrated in to the system . There will thus be tw o modern pro
letariats: an old one, resulting from the first cycle o f m obilization and already
totally or partially integrated, and a new one whose m obilization is just be
ginning and w ho will n o t necessarily ad o p t the same channels o f expression,
especially in regard to political p articipation, as did previously mobilized sec
tors. Depending on the existence o f a valid political tradition for the working
class, the existence o f these tw o stages in the form ation o f the proletariat can
cause tensions and internal conflicts w ithin the group. Similar processes can
take place in the m iddle sectors and the bourgeoisie. When these strata have
emerged in different and successive phases, sectors o f the middle class (or of
the bourgeoisie) already integrated can coexist w ith newly emerging and mo
bilized sectors not yet integrated. This will n o t be a peaceful coexistence, since
the process will cause tensions and conflicts w ithin each stratum .
Elsew here,14 I have n oted th at tw o principal cycles o f mobilization have
taken place in Latin America, in addition to those peculiar to each national
society. The first cycle, less im p o rtan t from the p o in t o f view o f extension
and penetration, occurred in several countries as a m odernizing effect of the
prim ary export econom y during its period o f dom inance. The second and
more extensive cycle began in w hat I have called the period o f mass mobiliza
tion (usually after 1930), under the im pact o f the collapse o f the interna-
national m arket and the rise o f industrialization maigre soi, with the great
internal m igrations, the demographic explosion, and o th er related phenomena.
Each o f these stages stim ulated the grow th o f m odern sectors in the cities,
the proletariat, the middle classes, and the bourgeoisie. Frequently the older
strata had already been partially assimilated in to the system while the appear
ance o f a newer proletariat was taking place, as well as new m iddle sectors and
a new bourgeoisie. Many sociopolitical phenom ena which took place after the
G reat Depression and World War II should be explained in light o f these strata
o f differing age and historical form ation. Many ambivalences and contradic
tions o f the Latin American middle classes are n ot only a response to their
interm ediate position in the stratification system (sim ultaneously facing the
urban proletariat and traditional elites), but also to their heterogeneity of
com position regarding age o f form ation and e x ten t o f integration into the
system.
2. Incongruences arise not only among and w ithin groups, but also at a
psychological individual level, where certain “mobilized*’ traits m ay coexist
with persisting traditional attitudes. For instance, the rural im m igrant may
become transform ed into an industrial w orker, b u t the paternalistic or partic
ularistic orientation which defined his form er situation may continue to in
fluence his relations tow ard the firm or labor union. Equivalent asynchron-
isms may occur between entrepreneurs, politicians, old and new governing
elites, the emerging middle class, and emerging industrial bourgeoisie.
3. Aspirations tow ard participation in consum ption often do n o t encoun
ter adequate possibilities o f satisfaction within existing circum stances. The
prevailing degree o f economic development does not allow for a higher stand
ard of living; and distribution o f the national product is very unfavorable to
mobilized groups o f the lower strata. The well-known demonstration effect
affects the lower strata ju st as much as the middle and upper strata. It leads
toward a consum ption orientation imitative o f highly developed countries,
under conditions in which the productive machinery is still underdeveloped.
These aspirations correspond to a stage o f mass consumption in a period in
which takeoff has not yet occurred. This dem onstration effect, as far as it
concerns attitudes of the higher strata, implies emphasis on consumption
rather than production. Here we find an inversion o f the order observed in
the historic development according to the Western model (capitalist asceti
cism and the Protestant ethic in the stage o f accumulation, according to
Weber’s form ulation). The backwardness o f economic development or the
acceleration o f the processes of social modernization also lead to this situation.
These asynchronisms cause conflicts to the extent that they produce con
trasting expectations among groups and stimulate certain desires not comple
mented by an acceptance o f the corresponding costs. Similar considerations
might be made regarding ideological expressions adopted by movements aris
ing among the recendy mobilized middle and lower strata. One o f the charac
teristic features of these expressions is the adoption o f unrealistic and intern
ally contradictory attitudes. Overexpansion o f the urban middle classes, par
ticularly pronounced in Argentina and Uruguay,15 is closely related to their
contrasting social and political expressions, including the high propensity to
become a preferential basis for the recruitm ent o f urban guerrillas. An analy
sis of the ideologies o f development o f differing or even contrary orientation
might lead to the discovery o f such internal incoherences. This makes it pos
sible to relate them to contradictions inherent in the position o f groups
sustaining them.
The above provides a partial explanation of a rather diffused characteristic
of social conflict in Latin America: the extreme fragmentation o f the various
groups, strata, and sectors o f the population. This is observed not only in the
field of political struggle but also in many others: a multiplication of factions
with varied and even incoherent features.
We have seen that integration o f mobilized groups may occur by assimila
tion or change in the social structure. These forms are not mutually exclusive
but may be combined in various ways. In Latin American countries the
latter form predom inates; through mass mobilization o f large strata of the
population, the structure o f society is subm itted to radical transformation.
Whereas the general direction o f the process is toward m odernization, that
is, toward some form o f industrial society, there are three aspects which vary
fundamentally: (1) the type o f industrial society assumed as a goal by the
various groups; (2) the type o f industrial society actually possible in view of
existing conditions; and (3) the form, gradual or revolutionary, o f the process
itself.
1. This aspect involves on the one hand the real goals o f the different
groups and sectors involved in the process, and on the other their ideological
expression. The two do not necessarily coincide. An analysis in terms of real
goals is difficult both theoretically and em pirically. The notion o f real goals is
extremely com plex. Most often such goals will n o t reach a conscious expres
sion and can only be inferred from the g roup’s actions. Or they may be ex
plicitly or implicitly stated by the leaders. Finally, the group may not have
any real goals, its actions being quite inconsistent. The distinction between
goals and their ideological expressions is necessary because the possibility al
ways exists o f a purely instrum ental use o f ideologies. I do not accept the
Paretian notion o f a universal and necessary hiatus betw een ideologies and the
real purpose o f concrete action; in fact, such a contrast may vary a great deal
according to different historical situations and groups. In Latin America the
degree o f deliberate m anipulation is often quite high, though I do not assume
that the choice o f ideologies is arbitrary. Furtherm ore, the ideologies used are
not irrelevant to the course o f action. First, there is the problem o f choosing
appropriate ideologies for achieving certain purposes and the possibility of a
wrong choice; second, once p u t into operation, the ideology itself may affect
the course o f action, causing it to deviate from the original real goals as en
visaged by the mass or elites.
Major factors determ ining the existence and nature o f real goals will be the
group position within the social structure: its central or peripheral location,
how it has been affected by the process o f release, availability, and mobiliza
tion, and the historical conditions characterizing the social co n tex t in which
it occurs. These factors will probably put some limits on the choice o f ideolo
gies, and the choice itself will probably be affected by three other conditions:
first, the nature o f other available and mobilizable groups or sectors o f the
population; second, the nature and content o f available ideologies; and third,
the political culture o f the society and the m obilized sector. O ften the politi
cal expression o f the m obilization process in Latin America gives rise to im
plicit or explicit alliances between different groups and sectors, as well as the
use and m anipulation o f one sector by another. The anlaysis o f these phe
nom ena will require the distinctions I have tried to indicate.
2. We will not explore the question concerning the type o f industrial so
ciety viable within the existing historical conditions o f each country. There is
a definite range o f possible outcom es determ ined by the preceding historical
process and the general international context. The fit between viable changes
and the ideologies assumed by mobilized groups is one o f the determ ining
factors shaping the consequences o f their social and political action. Also
relevant here is the existence o f both elites and masses, whose m obilization is
expressed in the chosen ideologies and proper goals. Utopianism o f the elites
may work insofar as it interprets the needs o f m obilized masses and adopts
realistic goals. The case o f urban guerrillas in Argentina and Uruguay is an il
lustration o f failure in terms o f realistic goals, since the countries’ historical
development and present social structure do not satisfy the requirements of

a drastic socialist revolution. The relatively widespread diffusion of the phe
nomenon (for a guerrilla m ovement) is a sym ptom o f a serious process of
displacement within the middle classes (particularly the highly educated sec
tors), which failed in the choice o f goals and their ideological expression.
3. Regarding the nature, violent or otherwise, o f the process of mobiliza
tion and reintegration, the faster the phase o f release and the greater the
proportion o f the population which becomes available and mobilizable, the
fewer the possibilities o f channeling mobilized sectors through legitimate
mechanism o f participation, the deeper the tensions, and the higher the
probability o f open and violent conflicts. These may reach their highest
intensity when the power elites and other groups threatened (subjectively
and/or objectively) by the newly mobilized sectors attem pt their violent de
mobilization. In these cases counterm obilization (or secondary mobilization)
of the threatened group will occur, and the more likely outcome is dictator
ship and dem obilization o f the losing sectors.16
Other essential aspects are the respective proportions between that part of
the total population o f a country which is wholly mobilized and integrated
into modern forms o f life, the segment still submerged in the traditional order,
and finally, those in the actual process o f mobilizing. One im portant element
for determining the character o f conflicts consists o f the possibility of long
term social change taking place in successive cycles. In other words, is their
sufficient time and opportunity between one cycle and the next to integrate
those sectors o f the population which have been mobilized? Such time and
opportunity did exist in many countries in the West, both with respect to
political integration and other forms o f participation. In each cycle the exist
ence or rapid form ation o f legitimate and adequate channels o f participation
makes it possible to integrate th at part o f the population which is going to
be mobilized. The equilibrium o f the system at the end o f each cycle o f mo
bilization is assured by the fact th at the population not yet included does
not exert pressure (or at least not a dangerous amount) because it remains
passive, and the sequence is such that when it later becomes active, there
should be existing mechanisms capable o f chaneling participation without
causing catastrophic disturbances to the system (although obviously not with
out relatively sharp conflicts and structural changes). A channel may be
considered adequate when it expresses at least symbolically the new forms of
participation, or gives the mobilized sector a legitimate way o f expressing its
demands and obtaining some satisfaction from them. The typical case of
adequacy is offered by a political party accepted by the newly mobilized
masses as a viable expression o f their aspirations and attitudes (meaning that
it must be compatible with their political culture) and legitimate in terms
of the existing social and political structure (accepted or tolerated by the rul
ing elites and other relevant groups in the society).
Finally, the degree o f discontinuities in the structural and/or psychosocial
process o f change is o f great causal relevance. These discontinuities are related

to the rate o f release (availability) and acting o u t. High rates o f change, sud
denness in tiie m odification o f such rates, trau m atic events—all o f these may
have disruptive consequences in a process o f m obilization, with a high inci
dence o f violence.
This m odel has been applied to the fo rm atio n o f the political structure of
the m ost advanced countries o f the W estern w orld. It could be applied to
other form s o f m obilization and in teg ratio n ; n o tab ly , the consequence of ex
pansion o f the technical and econom ic apparatus for mass production and the
aspirations to mass consum ption follow ed precisely this setup in the countries
which industrialized early.
The sequence o f cycles m entioned above (low rate o f m obilization com
bined with a m arked elasticity in the social stru ctu re, dem onstrated by the
willingness o f the governing class to accept change and the attitudes of the
lower classes tow ards m odifying their dem ands) has been an essential feature in
the developm ent o f several countries in the West and also in several major
Latin American nations, (mainly under lim ited o r enlarged democracy but
n o t total or mass participation) although transition has also been characterized
by serious conflicts, some o f a revolutionary n atu re. In others, the rigidity of
the preexisting structure m anifested itself through massive attem pts at demo
bilization, which became stabilized during various periods and led to pro
longed interruptions in the process o f m odernization.
NOTES
1. K. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political D evelopm ent,” American Political

Science Review 55 (1961): 493-514.
2. K. M annheim, Man and Society in an Age o f Reconstruction (New York Harcourt
Brace, 1940), pp. 44-49; T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1950).
3. G. Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicion, ch. 3.
4. In Latin America some cases o f caudilloism may be based on this type o f mobili
zation.
5. This interpretation was first applied by the author to the rise o f Peronism: cf.
Germani, “Algunas repercusiones de los cambios econom icos y sociales en la Argentina,
1940-1950,” Cursos Conferendas 40 (1952): 559-78; idem ,Ld intergracion de las masas
a la vida politica y el totalitarismo (Buenos Aires: C.L.E.S., 1956)? and later expanded
on a broader interpretive level in idem, “Social Change and Intergroup C onflicts,” in
The New Sociology, ed. I. L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 3 964).
6. Self-sustained mobility occurs when continuous technological change and con
tinuous increases in productivity and per capita GNP generate a flow o f occupational
upgrading (lower prestige and less paid tasks are taken over by m achines, or migrants
from more depressed areas), and on a process o f consum ption upgrading (creation of
new needs and new products which circulate from top to bottom o f the stratification
pyram id). This continuous upgrading involves the circulation o f status sym bols and
ersatz satisfactions which give the majority o f the population the experience o f upward
m obility, or at least the illusion o f it. This is the model o f consum er society reached
under neocapitalism and in the more industrialized areas o f the Third World. See G er
mani, “Social and Political Consequences o f M obility,” in Social Structure and M obility
in Economic D evelopm ent, ed. S. M. Lipset and N. J. Smelser (Chicago: A ldine, 1966).
Also chapter 3 below.
7. Germani, Politica y sociedad, ch. 3.

8. See chapter 3 and Germani, Sociologta de la modernizacion, ch. 7.
9. See Juan Linz’s definition o f the authoritarian regime in “ An Authoritarian
Regime: Spain,” in Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems, ed. Erik Allardt andY rjo
Littunen (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964).
10. A typical case o f mobilization from above is the political socialization o f youth in
Italy and Spain. For a case that failed see chapter 9.
11. V. I. Lenin, What Is to Be Done? (New York: International Publishers, 1929),pp.
32-33. Lenin states that the history o f all countries shows that the working class, by its
own and isolated efforts, is only capable of developing a syndicalist consciousness, a type
of political organization which is reformist and gradualist; but not an ideological move
ment with real class-consciousness (in the Marxist sense). Some sectors o f the nationalist
Left have recognized that because o f the dependent situation o f new nations, by they
colonial or neocolonial, the only group capable o f assuming the leadership o f liberation
movements is the petitie bourgeoisie o f each country. (See Amilcar Cabral, “ L’Arme de
la theorie,” Partisans, nos. 26-27. This singular thesis, as it is termed by Luis Mercier
Vega, has also been adopted, with reservations, by orthodox communism (in Problemas
de la paz y del socialismo 9 (no. 1, January 1966).
12. See the comprehensive review o f the literature on this topic by Joan M. Nelson,
Migrants, Urvan Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations (Harvard University;
Center for International Affairs, 1969).
13. N. J. Smelser, Theory o f Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press o f Glen
coe, 1963).
14. Germani, “Stages o f Modernization in Latin America,” Studies in Comparative
International Development 5 (no. 8, 1969-70).
15. See on overexpansion, Germani, Sociology o f Modernization, ch. 7.
16. A scheme o f the possible configurations o f established, apathetic, available, and
mobilizing sectors may be found in Germani, Hi concepto de marginalidad (Buenos
Aires: Nueva Vision, 1973), p. 90.
CHAPTER THREE
MIDDLE-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM AND FASCISM:

EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
SOCIAL CLASSES AND CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF FASCISM
Within the general framework set forth in the Introduction, the purpose of
this chapter is to examine the role o f middle-class authoritarianism and sec
ondary mobilization in the rise o f fascist movements and regimes under dif
ferent historical and sociocultural conditions. Fascism is not the only possible
expression o f middle-class authoritarianism , but in the first half of the tw enti
eth century it turned out to be the most typical reaction of these social
strata.
The discussion requires first a brief survey o f the changing interpretations
of fascism, which may provide a broader background for its definition from a
comparative perspective. The level o f analysis regarding the role of class is
mostly located in the medium range of generality in sociocultural context
and historical epoch, though references will be made to the other two levels,
particularly to the short range (social mobilization and traumatic event) in
the case o f historical fascism (European fascism of the twenties and thirties).
To focus attention on the role o f the middle classes does not mean excluding
the intervention o f other factors in the complex causality o f this social phe
nomenon. We know that within the medium level of analysis fascist move
ments and regimes result from the convergence o f a set of trends within which
43
changes in the structure o f stratificatio n is only one o f the components

(though a very im p o rtan t one).
In terp retatio n s o f fascism have developed over tim e from the more specific
sociocultural co n tex t (the “ u n iq u e ” historical case) and the short temporal
range (the “ accid en t” ), tow ard a m ore general and widening perspective:
from one country to entire categories o f societies; from a few years to an en
tire epoch.
This can be clearly seen in the “ first” case o f fascism: Italy. To the great
m ajority o f its contem poraries, Italian fascism appeared as an unexpected and
unforeseen pro d u ct o f the w ar, a com plete deviation from the main stream of
history. It is true th at the faith (or the illusions, as Sorel put it) in unending
progress had been shaken n o t only am ong intellectuals b u t also in the larger
public by the outbreak o f the first w orld conflict and even earlier. However,
the possibility o f a perm anent or prolonged breakdow n o f democracy and
freedom in a European country was considered m ost unlikely by the great
m ajority o f people in the W estern countries. The intellectual climate of
Europe had been changing since the beginning o f the century. The well-
known “ prophecies” o f B urkhardt or Tocqueville, approaches as those of
Pareto, Mosca, or Michels, and some theories elaborated by m odern sociology
included many elem ents which threw a disturbing light on the future shape
o f m odernity, as contrasted w ith the popular dream s o f the tim e.
In the 1920s when fascism first came to pow er, Soviet communism had
not reached the totalitarian stage, and G erm an nazism was still in the making,
many politicians and intellectuals both in Italy and abroad tended to inter
pret fascism on the basis o f either accidental or relatively tem porary factors
(early versions o f the so-called parenthesis hypothesis), or o f the peculiar
traits o f Italian history (the historical hypothesis).1 Even the M arxists, though
interpreting fascism as an expression o f class struggle w ithin capitalist society,
did not fail to stress the specific historical conditions o f capitalism in Italy.2
In m ost explanations, specific sociological and psychosocial approaches were
insufficient, and political and econom ic theories or history o f ideologies pre
dom inated. This does not mean that Italian classes were n o t m entioned or
specifically analyzed, as in Cappa and Salvatorelli.3
In the thirties, especially after the rise o f the T hird Reich, new dimensions
were added to these earlier interpretations. It was recognized th at the crisis of
dem ocracy was an expression o f the more general crisis o f our times, per
haps the breakdow n o f the m odern world. Such new approaches provided
psychosocial explanations, often strongly influenced by Freudian or neo-
Freudian psychology, as well as sociological hypotheses stressing particular
structural traits and historical trends in m odern society. T heoretical con
structs such as the authoritarian personality, social disintegration, anom ie, dis
placem ent o f large sectors o f society, breakdow n o f com m unity, the changing
position o f elites and the rise o f the masses, became the more strategic tools
in the analysis o f all kinds o f totalitarianism . Psychological theories o f the
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 45
authoritarian syndrome, sociological and psychosocial theories of mass so

ciety, and formal definitions and typologies of the totalitarian state were
applied to a variety o f cases, from fascism or nazism to communism and mass
regimes in developing nations.4 The role of class as an explanatory factor,
either in the origin or developm ent and maintenance of totalitarianism, was
not denied but often occupied a secondary place in such general analytical
frameworks. Totalitarian societies and movements were interpreted as a result
of widespread disintegration o f processes really involving all classes alike,
thereby attributing lesser meaning or in some cases even accidental im por
tance to class recruitm ent, class orientation, and class interests. Historical ex
planations emphasizing national peculiarities also followed new approaches.
Such peculiarities tended to be interpreted in psychosocial and cultural-
anthropological terms, as expressions o f a national character or as specific
cultural com ponents.5 Finally, the historical analysis of ideologies provided
a different perspective, by which the rise o f totalitarianism was interpreted
in light of the development o f European social and political thought, espe
cially since the French Revolution.6 Many new approaches stressed similari
ties between different brands o f new states by constructing a model o f totali
tarianism which included both Right and Left. Though the identification of
Soviet communism as just another type o f totalitarian state was partly
induced by the changing pattern o f foreign alignments and international con
flicts (especially the cold war), it may be considered nevertheless as a pre
dominant trend among non-Marxist writers. In the fifties this interpretation
was extended to the new mass states which had emerged in developing coun
tries. It was especially the Latin American cases which, given certain similari
ties in cultural traditions, seemed to conform more closely to such generali
zations. The interpretation o f fascism and totalitarianism then tended to merge
with the broader problem o f the conditions for the existence of representative
democracy and the relations between m odernization, economic development,
and political change. The whole problem o f mass regimes and monolithic
versus competitive party systems could then be seen in the context of political
development.7
STRUCTURAL (MARXIST) VERSION OF THE CLASS HYPOTHESES
One may distinguish at least two major orientations in the use of the class
hypothesis: the purely Marxist, and what for lack of a better term we may
call “ psychosocial.” This categorization is a gross simplification. Not only are
there many other variations o f the same basic orientations, but Marxist and
psychosocial theses may also be used either as contrasting or as mutually
complementary approaches. Theories o f mass society have also used and rein
terpreted in various ways the contribution o f class theories, especially the
psychosocial variety.
The Marxist approach was perhaps the first attem pt to explain fascism on
the basis o f a general theory. Such au th o rs as F. N eum ann, Μ. B. Sweezy,

R. A. Brady, P. T ogliatti, and o th ers,8 considered fascism (and nazism) as
the final stage in the evolution o f capitalism —an outcom e deterministically
conditioned by the internal dialectics o f the system itself. In one of the earlier
and more com prehensive discussions o f this ty pe, G uerin9 tried to relate
fascism directly to some classic M arxist notions, such as the fall o f capitalist
profits. In its ascending stage, capitalism could find dem ocracy advantageous,
but such favorable conditions sharply change in the m ore advanced stages of
the system , in its descending phase. The need to counteract the increasing fall
o f the rate o f profits and the ever m ore severe cyclical crises demanded
drastic reduction or w ithdraw al o f all the “ concessions” made to the working
class. Such political, econom ic, and social concessions were granted at a time
when they were both possible and necessary. T hey were possible since the
econom y was growing, and necessary as a pow erful m eans for the stability of
the system under representative dem ocracy. But the drastic reduction or
elim ination o f political, econom ic, and social rights could n o t be accomplished
under a regime o f free political participation; hence the need o f some form
o f dictatorship or “ strong state.” Though G uerin observed divergences of
interests among different sectors o f the bourgeoisie (nam ely between heavy
industry and light, or consum er goods industry), he concluded that class
interest w ould finally prevail. However, fascism, even where it remained a
m inority as com pared w ith the to tal p opulation, was nonetheless a mass
movem ent counting on the active participation o f a considerable sector of
society. Where could the bourgeoisie find its “ tro o p s” ? An easy answer
could be given w ithin the fram ew ork o f M arxist th eo ry . The lower middle
classes and certain deteriorated or too traditional sectors o f the proletariat
could provide the hum an basis for fascism, to serve the interests o f capitalists.
The middle classes, according to Marxism, are n o t real classes. Under the
threat o f proletarianization (an unavoidable outcom e o f capitalist evolution)
they were exposed to opposing pressures, and false consciousness could be
invoked to explain their alliance with capitalism , despite their anticapitalist
leanings (mostly inspired in precapitalist attitudes am ong the old middle
classes or in resentm ent among the new white-collar categories). As for the
proletarians attracted by fascism, such “ deviance” could be explained in
terms o f factors which in one way or another prevented the form ation o f a
class consciousness among them . In this respect, the M arxist notion of
lum penproletariat could be usefully integrated to the analysis.
Marxist writers did not fail to notice a num ber o f additional im portant
traits, not to be directly deduced from orthodox assum ptions, and which
were greatly stressed in non-Marxist theories. It is w orthw hile to m ention
some o f these traits. In the first place, the com ponent sectors o f both fascism
and nazism could not be reduced to lower middle classes and lum penprole
tariat; an assorted variety o f categories took an active part in it: veterans,
unem ployed, young people, peasants. For all these groups a com m on trait
was recognized: their uprootedness. That is, the human basis of fascism was
provided by a process o f displacement, caused by the deterioration o f the
capitalist system and accentuated by the upsetting conditions o f the w ar.10
The role o f displacement could hardly be overlooked. Even in the popular
image in Italy, for instance, we find a word which clearly describes such con
ditions: fascists were seen as spostati , literally “ displaced” persons. Further
more, it was recognized th at uprootedness, both among fascist leaders and
masses, could not be regarded as a mere accident. The specific totalitarian
solution could not have been generated by the preexisting capitalist estab
lishment. A body o f outlaws, to use Laski’s term, was required for that
task.11 This led to two further observations, not uncommon among Marxist
writers: first, that fascist rule achieved a degree o f independence and auton
omy vis à vis the old ruling class, th at it m eant at least the partial removal of
the established political elite;12 and second, that fascism originated an un
precedented type o f state, the totalitarian state. The central role o f charisma
and other peculiar traits o f the new regimes were also clearly recognized by
several authors.13 In the long run, fascism was nothing more than the last de
fense of capitalism in its advanced and declining phase, but both the means—
the displaced sectors—and its immediate outcom e—the totalitarian state—
went beyond the initial purposes o f the bourgeoisie and could not be fully ex
plained in Marxist terms. Finally, Marxist interpretations of totalitarianism
involved a sharp differentiation between fascism and nazism on one side and
communism on the other, and this occurred even for the noncommunist
analysis.14
PSYCHOSOCIAL VERSION OF THE CLASS HYPOTHESIS
Participation o f the lower middle classes in totalitarian movements o f the

Right, which played a complementary role in the Marxist interpretation, was
turned into a central factor in the psychosocial version o f the class hypothe
sis. Resentment, moral indignation, envy and insecurity, fear, were the most
common notions used in connection with psychoanalytic mechanisms. The
whole construct o f the authoritarian personality was formulated mostly in
relation to lower-class behavior. The psychosocial approach was comple
mented by sociological analysis. The process of displacement, uprootedness,
anomie, were more precisely analyzed and refined, also in connection with
basic historical trends inherent in modern society since the Renaissance. The
role o f other sociological factors, such as status incongruency, status panic,
and status deprivation, was also noted.
The notion o f resentm ent as an im portant com ponent o f attitude and
value form ation, as well as a m otivation and a behavioral factor, has a relative
ly long history in European thought. Slave morality as described by Nietzsche
was further elaborated by Scheler. In his phenomenology of resentment
Scheler suggests a num ber o f typical roles and social situations likely to gen-
erate resentm ent: women (especially “ the spinster,“ the “ mother-in-law“),

the older person, the priest, and the declining traditional interm ediate class,
such as artisans (in contrast to the modern proletarian, w ho has far less pro
pensity to resentm ent). Translated into present-day sociological terminology,
these social roles and situations are characterized by Scheler as particularly
unbalanced in terms o f present status versus unrealistic aspirations. In the
thirties, these suggestions were further elaborated and developed by Svend
Ranulf and others. Ranulf built on the classic contributions to the history of
capitalism by Weber, Sombart, and G roethuysen, but he also conducted a
series o f more detailed and systematic case studies o f different groups to de
termine the nature and social conditions o f resentm ent. Resentm ent ex
presses itself as a “disinterested tendency to inflict punishm ent,“ and has
always been especially strong in that social class which may be loosely de
scribed as small bourgeoisie or lower middle class.15 Resentm ent is related to
the stresses, conflicting reference groups, inferiority feelings, and basic inse
curity originated in the intermediate position o f these social strata. Though
resentment and its expression is endemic to lower-middle-class positions, it
may be greatly activated in times o f crisis. In Italy and Germany they were
threatened by the rising proletariat and increasing concentration of power
and wealth o f the bourgeoisie. As indicated by Lasswell,16 such a threat was
not identical to the objective proletarianization seen by Marxist writers. It
is not necessarily caused by reduction o f income and economic security, but
by psychological impoverishment due to decreasing distance in relation to
both the lower and upper strata.
Perhaps the most complete and integrated formulation o f this approach
has been given by Erich From m .17 His interpretation is based on assump
tions involving an analysis o f the long-range level, at the root o f modernity.
At the middle range, his model o f social character in dynamic interrelation
with social structure and change is also a powerful analytical tool. It provided
the framework to unify in a coherent form ulation the structural and psycho
social approaches as well as some contributions o f classic sociological theory,
such as the transition to new forms o f integration (from com m unity to soci
ety or from mechanic to organic solidarity) and its consequences in terms of
social and individual disorganization. It also incorporates an analysis of dis
placement, atom ization, and other processes emphasized by the mass society
hypothesis. The crisis o f freedom in the contem porary world is examined
within a broad historical context. The growth o f rationality and individuation,
the two essential traits of the “great transform ation,“ are at the origin o f the
psychological strains inherent in modern society: alienation, isolation, inse
curity, and fear. Breakdown o f the primary links of the traditional pattern
originates a higher level of individuation and freedom, but at the same time
deprives the individual of any sense o f belonging and its em otional support.
It leaves the individual in isolation and insecurity. The emergence o f a society
increasingly dom inated by huge organizations, and the decreasing importance
or disappearance o f interm ediate structures, tends to intensify such feel

ings.18 To confront this threatening situation, the individual may develop
various defense mechanisms: authoritarianism , destructiveness, and autom a
ton conform ity. The form er two correspond to the well-known model of the
authoritarian personality, later used in empirical research by Adorno and
many others.19 Which defense mechanism will be activated depends on the
particular social conditions prevailing in the different social classes. Such
conditions will pattern a typical social character. In the case o f the lower
middle classes, the tendency will be authoritarianism and destructiveness,
the psychology o f resentm ent here being reinterpreted in terms of psycho
analytic mechanisms. The whole process is highly intensified in a time o f crisis
because of the consequences o f displacement, normlessness, and the resulting
mass insecurity and fear. Within the working class, the predominant mecha
nism is autom aton conform ity, a character structure which also prevails in
advanced modern society. A utom aton conform ity represents a form of aliena
tion and partial loss o f identity, a tendency to conform to the expectations
of others, in a fashion quite similar to the other-directed personality later de
veloped by Riesman.20 Fromm reconciles the Marxist interpretation with the
psychosocial approach, not only by integrating structural and psychological
levels, but also in the specific historical interpretation o f nazism as an expres
sion of class struggle in a period o f declining capitalism. This process becomes
more specific in certain countries, to the extent to which underlying psycho
social processes are a universal condition patterned by the specific social
structure o f each modern industrial society.
The authoritarian personality trend became fashionable in the late forties
and fifties, especially after publication o f the series on that subject by Adorno
and his group.21 This later development, however, failed to represent a sig
nificant advance. In the first place, the conceptual framework became frankly
psychologistic, losing From m ’s more productive approach. Further, despite
its highly sophisticated m ethodology and techniques, it did not escape ideo
logical distortions. Especially noticeable was the unilateral emphasis on right
ist authoritarianism . As Shils pointed out, the authoritarian syndrome could
also be expressed in extrem e leftist ideologies.22 In this sense too it repre
sented a step backward, since Fromm had clearly perceived the general nature
of the process in modern society.
MASS SOCIETY AND THE RISE OF TOTALITARIANISM
Theories o f mass society have a prom inent place in contemporary soci

ology; the contribution of the classic sociological tradition in its origins has
also been outstanding, and critical literature on the subject is abundant. Ref
erences will be restricted, therefore, to what is most relevant to the present
discussion. Many themes considered in the preceding review will appear again
in the context o f this theory. Once more, assumptions are expressed in
terms of the long-range level of analysis, though distinctions in levels are

neglected, thus introducing misunderstandings in interpretation. The starting
point is the transition from traditional to m odern, with its familiar implica
tions in terms of growth o f rationality and high individuation. As usual, nega
tive consequences are emphasized, such as individual and social disorganiza
tion, anomie, alienation and isolation, weakening o f primary links and in
creasing deterioration of intermediate structures. These processes, together
with the growth of monolithic organization, bureaucratization, forms of
standardized mass leisure and mass consum ption, lead to the massification
of individuals; that is, to their atom ization, deindividuation, and loss of
identity. These traits o f advanced modern society are paradoxical in that they
represent the very opposite of the individuation process characterizing the
rise of modern society, and the denial o f its higher values: reason, freedom,
and individuality. To these traits, stressed also by the psychosocial hypotheses,
must be added another central theme: the changing relationship between
masses and elites. There are two sides to this process: increasing participation
of the masses and decreasing isolation of elites. The former corresponds to
what Mannheim called “ fundamental dem ocratization,” a process by which
“modern industrial society stirs into action those classes which formerly
played a passive part in political life.” Fundam ental dem ocratization brings
into the forefront groups characterized by a lower level of rationality and at
the same time threatens the exclusiveness o f elites. Fundam ental democrati
zation, along with other trends in modern society, tends to modify relations
between elites and masses. Multiplication of elites and forms o f recruitm ent,
changes in their composition, and destruction o f their exclusiveness deteri
orate the conditions required to maintain their proper function, that is, cre
ativity and a higher level of rationality.23 The invasion o f elite roles by the
masses had been noted since the nineteenth century, especially by conserva
tive and “elitist” writers.24 Mannheim was more concerned with the break
down o f democracy and liberalism as a consequence of massification than
with the maintenance of aristocratic values. Fundam ental democratization,
when it reaches the point of massification, will be turned into its very oppo
site, negative democratization, that is, an inversion of modernization. Its typ
ical form is the totalitarian state.
Mass society may be considered a necessary but not sufficent pre
condition for the rise of totalitarian movements and, eventually, totalitarian
regimes. We again find here the notion of displacement as another required
factor. Masses and elites must be available for action.25 Kornhauser, in an
illuminating systematization o f mass theory in relation to totalitarianism , sug
gests that release and high availability are originated by “major discontinui
ties in social process” due to a high rate o f change.26
Later reformulations o f the mass society hypotheses, as in the case
of Kornhauser, could enlarge their generalizations to mass movements in
developing societies. Some of the previous concepts acquired additional
meanings. The notion o f social m obilization, interpreted as a release from

the traditional pattern and the entrance into modern forms of behavior,27
was closely related to M annheim’s “ fundam ental dem ocratization.” It could
also be interpreted as a form of displacement and a factor for availability,
under conditions o f rapid change and lack o f proper channels for integra
tion.28 This concept, in turn, evoked another im portant trend: the analysis
of the extension o f civic, political, and social rights to the lower classes, and
finally, to the whole population, as described for England in the well-known
article by Marshall.29
A rapid rate o f m obilization was not in itself a sufficient cause for dis
placement and availability: lack o f or inadequate channels for integration was
also a necessary condition. Such channels are provided not only by legitimi
zation of rights, but also by the existence o f parties or other organizations
able to absorb the newly mobilized masses within the broad context of the
political and social order, whatever the manifest ideology o f such organiza
tions may be. These considerations have now provided a suitable framework
for interpreting mass movements and regimes in developing countries.30
The partial or total rejection o f the class interpretation is a common fea
ture of mass theory. Mannheim, for instance, recognizes the role of the mid
dle classes in the rise o f fascism, but stresses much more the general trends
and conflicts inherent in modern society. Lederer and others grant a nearly
exclusive emphasis to the role o f the masses. One class or another may pre
dominate in the first stage o f the movement, but the regime itself is a domi
nation over the masses by the masses.31 The facts o f differential class re
cruitment in the various fascist and totalitarian movements could hardly be
denied.32 However, this could be interpreted in two ways. First, one could
look at the other com ponents o f mass movements. As usually happens, in
“normal” political parties as well (even in a society with high class cleavages
in political life), there is always a proportion o f supporters with deviant so
cial origins. This is true for fascist, nazi, communist, and other mass move
ments.33 Or, one could recognize the difference in composition but consider
that “mass society theory is not contradicted by this class difference be
tween fascism and communism. . .since common mass characteristics may
subsist along with different class characteristics. On the contrary, just because
fascism and communism are not similar in class composition, we cannot use
class theory to account for their similarities, especially their totalitarianism .” 34
We mention elsewhere working-class authoritarianism as linked mostly to
a traditional social setting. In another direction, Lipset, using data for a vari
ety of nations, has shown that authoritarianism is not necessarily a middle-
class phenomenon. Specific environmental conditions (e.g., family structure,
early socialization, isolation, lack o f intellectual stimulation) may explain
authoritarian attitudes among proletarians. Lipset does not conclude from
this a deterministic propensity among the lower classes for totalitarian move
ments. Living in a simplified, rather inarticulate mental environment, the
worker is likely to choose the less complex alternative, which may or may
not be a totalitarian movement.35
Another variety o f theoretical approach, also related to mass society
theory, has focused on the common formal characteristics o f the totali
tarian state. Here, class is not considered relevant to the problem. The
differences observed in movements based on contrasting class bases fail to
establish im portant differential traits. Even if leftist and rightist movements
are not alike, “ they are sufficiently alike to class them together and contrast
them, not only with constitutional systems, but also with former types of
autocracy.” 36 The problem is not purely one o f definition or classification:
this approach leads to blurring all differences in terms o f economic, social,
and political impact as well as its historical meaning. Mass theory does not
necessarily rule out a more appropriate position regarding the general
relationship between class and authoritarianism. Lipset, for instance, accepts
that under given conditions, all classes alike may turn authoritarian; but he
does not deny class as a meaningful factor since it would be “impossible to
understand the role and varying success o f extremist movements unless we
distinguish them and identify their distinctive social bases and ideologies
much as we do for democratic parties and movements.” 37
Finally, another criticism must be mentioned: mass theory has exaggerated
the “loss of com m unity” effect. Both theoretical thinking and research findings,
especially in the Field o f urban sociology, have shown that primary links subsist
to a great extent in urban or metropolitan society. They are certainly modified,
but do not fail to perform the same functions in giving emotional support and
feelings of belonging to individuals. This is true not only of countries which have
resisted totalitarianism, but also of those in which it has trium phed. In the
latter, most of the impact of displacement was created by specific conditions
affecting particular classes and not by general conditions o f mass society.
Mass theory may provide an im portant and necessary theoretical frame-
work for the analysis o f totalitarianism. But it is incomplete, and its main
shortcoming does not lie solely in its relative neglect o f class, but also in the
fact that it fails to distinguish between different forms of mobilization and
displacement, especially between social processes occurring in the context of
modernized societies (or some of their com ponent sectors) and those taking
place in developing countries. Perhaps class and mass theories should be re
considered in a different theoretical framework. First, they should be based
on a broader view of the structural changes experienced by the stratification
system in connection with the successive transformations of capitalism, if,
as Barrington Moore has shown, the nature o f class formations in the transi
tion from feudalism to capitalism was certainly a most significant factor in es
tablishing different propensities towards democracy or authoritarianism, no
less relevant is the changing nature of classes (and of the stratification system
as a whole) from early capitalism in its first takeoff in England (to use Ros-
tow ’s doubtful but useful terminology) to present-day neocapitalism.
Second, the role o f the middle classes in the onset and growth o f a fas
cist movement cannot be explained only in terms of their changing situation
within the social structure. A political movement may result merely from a
long slow growth, in connection with structural and psychosocial changes in
the social group or groups constituting the social actor, protagonist of the
movement. But this was not the case o f classic fascism: here some sort o f
social mobilization seemed to be a necessary condition. When this did not oc
cur, the typical form o f classic fascism failed to crystallize, and if a fascist
like phenomenon nevertheless did take place, the dynamic actor was a differ
ent social sector—usually the arm y—while the role o f the middle class was
more that o f a passive supporter. Certainly such support is always a necessary
component, but so are others—in particular the ruling elite (or more generally
the essential sectors o f the establishm ent)—necessary ingredients if a fascist
movement is to succeed or a fascist-like regime be established.
In the next sections, I shall suggest some elements which could be useful
in constructing a middle-range theory o f fascism, focused on the role o f the
middle classes and social m obilization processes. The conceptual framework
proposed has comparative purposes, particularly for possible application to
the most developed Latin American countries. It is based on a stage scheme
of the evolution o f the class system under capitalism. At the short-range level,
the theory o f social m obilization already discussed seems to be the most ap
propriate, and no further elaboration is needed, since there are examples of
its application in other chapters. In the final section, I shall advance a defini
tion of fascism, for the purpose o f locating the role of the middle classes in
relation to the total configuration o f factors and conditions likely to crystal
lize in fascist (or fascist-like) movements and regimes.
STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF STRATIFICATION

AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN CAPITALIST SOCIETIES
In analyzing the role o f the middle classes in the rise of fascism, I shall use
a conceptual scheme based on three stages in the transformation o f the strati
fication system: palcocapitalist, transitional, and neocapitalist, a process
which includes the usual unevenness and asynchronies which are a universal
feature o f social change. Such unevenness involves the coexistence of social
formations o f different periods, a phenom enon often called “dualism.” In
this sense, the history o f all presently developed societies includes a phase of
structural dualism, which may have disappeared or decreased during the
process, but which reappears under new forms in the future. For this reason,
notions similar to those o f declining or archaic classes and new, modern, or
emerging classes have been used currently (with the same or other terms) in
the analysis o f the transform ations o f presently advanced societies.
Some clarifications should be added. The term dualism should be under
stood in a broad sense as the coexistence of two or m o re s tru c tu ra l fo rm s
(strata, characteristics of the system, such as norms, values, etc.) correspond

ing to classes of different ideal-typical societies. Usually, this differentiation
exists by virtue of the asynchrony in social m odernization; for this reason
archaic (declining) forms are spoken o f in contrast to modern (emerging)
forms. Nevertheless, it may be convenient to introduce a tripartite classifica
tion: declining, basic, and emerging forms. Within a scheme o f analysis which
supposes (1) asynchrony, (2) permanent change, and (3) rapidity of change,
we may distinguish three coexisting forms corresponding to societies (or
structural configurations) o f different ideal-typical models; the declining forms
correspond to the remaining archaic or traditional society, the basic form to
modern society as it can be defined in a given m om ent of the transition, (in
the present), and the emerging form to the society towards which present
society seems to be oriented, its following stage (the future modern society).
This terminology supposes the contemporaneity o f past, present, and future.
We should also show that the terms declining, basic, and emerging do not
necessarily refer to decline, hegemony, or emergence, in terms o f numerical
proportions. They are used here to indicate an orientation o f the historical
course in the sense of transformations which the society (and the
stratification system) are experiencing. This orientation is deduced or inferred
by means of a model (or system of hypotheses) constructed by the observer
(social scientist) carrying out the analysis. Its pertinence, objectivity, and
predictive capacity are in great part determined by the general state o f theory
and the quality and quantity of data used at the time o f form ulation, which is
to say by the historical level achieved by the discipline at the tim e.38 For this
reason, the situation o f the observer is different when he analyzes a process
which has already taken place than when he is confronting one which is
occurring: in the first case, in attem pting to explain what happened he
already knows what specific orientation the transform ation assumed. He can
identify more clearly, for example an emerging class, if it has come to affirm
itself in successive epochs. His predictions about the future are more un
certain than his retrospective predictions.
In referring to the meaning o f the terms declining, basic, or emerging sec
tor within each class these, according to the case, can include estimations in
regard to future growth or decline, in number, or in position o f power, wealth,
or prestige, or several o f these attributes at one time. A declining upper class
may have been the basic class in a previous phase, but may maintain great
power for a long time in its declining phase, including a hegemonic power
seriously threatened in the declining phase. In the future, however, continu
ing the tendency in function o f which the distinction has been formulated
between basic and declining upper class, the latter should experience a lessen
ing or even disappearance, through fusion with the basic class, because of
processes o f descending m obility, individually or o f the entire strata. Ana
logously, an emerging class can grow in number and/or power (prestige,
wealth, etc.) and eventually be transform ed into the basic class, in a succes
sive stage, to the extent th at the foreseen tendency is effectively realized.39
The distinction between basic, emerging, or declining classes tends to disap
pear, and there is a tendency towards the fusion o f these groupings. Fusion
means here a loss o f identity, or sufficient loss so that the distinction be
comes unim portant from the analytical point o f view.40 This means that it
should be ignored as an instrum ent o f analysis in those cases where the dis
tinction between emerging, basic, or declining classes has little explanatory
power. Taking into account these tw o observations—of substantive and m eth
odological order—we will speak o f declining, basic, or emerging sectors within
each class, leaving open the possibility o f fusion or identification for certain
aspects or circumstances, and remembering the analytical convenience o f
maintaining the distinction or not.
In the description o f the three stages, I shall first be concerned with the
occupational structure and then focus the analysis on changes in the stratifi
cation system.
The Occupational Structure from Paleo- to Neocapitalism
I shall follow here the well-known model suggested by Colin Clark, distin
guishing among prim ary, secondary, and tertiary activities. Whatever its short
comings, it offers a suitable scheme for present purposes. #
1. In the paleo capitalist stage, the primary sector is declining but still in
volves an im portant proportion o f the active population. For example, Eng
land in 1841 still had more than one-fourth o f the economically active popu
lation occupied in agriculture and mining; in 1870, the United States re
corded more than 52 per cent in these primary activities. The secondary
sector, industry, is basic for this phase, insofar as it represents the central ele
ment of the economic-industrial system. Statistically, it is growing, and it is
in this sector (and corresponding social sectors) in which the technical-
economic transform ations are operating which will produce the fundamental
characteristics o f paleoindustrial society. This society or phase o f industrial
development can be called “ secondary,” and applies also to the socialist
type of industrial development.
2. In the transitional stage, the primary sector has decreased statistically,
but still has a certain im portance, as in the case of the United States in 1920,
when it included one-third o f the active population, in Germany between
1910 and 1930, when it included a little more than one-fifth, or in the Euro
pean countries developed under the capitalist system but with a later or slow
er transition, where the primary sector maintained a major proportion (for
example, in France we find nearly 30 per cent in the 1920s, and in Italy from
46 to 40 per cent in the same period, despite the heavy industry developed
before the turn o f the century). In this phase, the secondary sector has al
ready reached its peak and tends to stabilize. But it has experienced (and
continues to experience) strong internal transform ations following the same

basic tendency observable in the paleocapitalist stage, a tendency towards
greater technical-economic concentration. Finally, the phase of transition
registers a notable increase in the tertiary sector. For example, in 1871 Eng
land had almost 36 per cent working in commerce, transportation, and vari
ous services, while 30 years earlier this proportion barely surpassed 30 per
cent. In the United States, the difference is more pronounced, from 23.3 per
cent in 1870, to 37.7 per cent in 1920. The internal com position of the sec
tor was fully transformed: accelerated reduction of traditional services (do
mestic and others) and increase of modern services.
3. In the neocapitalist stage, the primary sector is reduced to a minimum,
the secondary sector has diminished or stabilized at the level achieved in the
preceding phase, and the tertiary sector expands until it becomes the largest
sector in the composition of the active population. Production of goods and
services follows the tendency towards high technical-economic and financial
concentration. It is the period o f great corporations, conglomerates, and
multinationals.4 1
The Changing Class Composition from Paleo- to Neocapitalism
Changes in class structure follow a parallel pattern o f stages, but several

different*aspects must be considered: on the one hand, the composition of
the various classes in terms o f occupational sectors, their proportions, their
socioeconomic and cultural traits; on the other hand, the nature o f stratifica
tion as a whole, that is, its systemic characteristics. The latter task will be un
dertaken by using a scheme to be introduced later.
1. In the paleocapitalist stage, we find in the upper class the declining
sector, connected with primary production and the preexisting class system
(the aristocracy). It is considered declining in relation to its historical destiny,
although it may continue to exert considerable economic and political power
during this and following phases, and may still enjoy predom inant prestige.
Sharing this hegemonic position we find the bourgeoisie as the basic sector in
the sense of historical future, that is, as a protagonist of the industrial trans
formation of the economy and society. At the other extreme o f the system,
in the lower positions, we observe a rural declining sector (which can still be
preponderant in numerical volume) composed o f small tenants, poor propri
etors, and landless peasants, as well as surviving pockets of the subsistence
economy which have still not been integrated into the national market or are
partially connected with it. In some countries there can be sectors radically
excluded from national society, as in the case of Negroes (during slavery)
and other marginal sectors, as occurred later with this and other ethnic
minorities. The basic sector of the lower class is formed by the urban prole
tariat, but their degree of social and political mobilization is still low and
partial. Even if industry and the new modern services have already created
an occupational working-class sector (also modern) numerically im portant in

many spheres o f life, its members may still continue to be socially tradi
tional during the paleocapitalistic stage. Whatever violence or intensity of
social protest has taken place at certain times, the politically mobilized or
unionized portion o f the working class remains very small. We can consider
it as the emerging sector o f the lower strata in paleocapitalist society, a sec
tor which will grow and becom e basic in the following stage o f transition.
Finally, in the interm ediate strata o f the paleocapitalist stage there is a de
clining and an emerging sector, b u t it is less easy to identify its basic sector.
Declining in volume and power is the segment o f the middle strata con
nected to primary production (where it exists). This is true even where, as in
the United States, the rural middle class represented one of the most power
ful actors in the political scene in the beginnings o f industrialization. Even in
this case, its decline will be inevitable. Also declining are intermediate sectors
connected with archaic form s o f production o f smaller middle-sized business.
In the emerging sector we find categories o f public and private function
aries, white collar, and dependent professionals, who were then perceived as
one stratum under the term new middle class. This segment of the active
population, still very small in the paleocapitalist stage, is destined to grow in
cessantly through the three phases. Old middle class was the name to be given
in following periods to the basic sector o f the intermediate strata in paleo
capitalist society. In reality, they belong to the same occupational cate
gories of the bourgeoisie: they are industrial entrepreneurs, businessmen,
self-employed professionals. But economically and technologically they
should belong to the basic sector only when their activity is modern. Thus,
small and middle industrial entrepreneurs constitute a typical element o f this
group. Two other characteristics are o f interest. On the one hand, we are deal
ing with individuals (or families) o f descending or ascending mobility. The
great industrial, commercial, and financial bourgeoisie will find in this sector
one of its most im portant bases o f recruitm ent. But at the same time, they
occupy a social place which is seriously menaced; they also can become pro-
letarianized. “The members o f the middle classes,” writes Geiger, “ can be
defined as persons who fight to arrive at being capitalists.”42 Though this
definition is applied with greater exactitude to the transitional stage, it can
also be appropriate for the preceding one. This sector of the modern middle
classes, while not growing in proportion or in their position (according to
income, power, and status), does not decrease either, except at times of
crisis. The great corporations (public and private) may occupy a more
hegemonic position in the economy but still will leave space for (or will re
quire) the existence o f a num ber o f small enterprises, mostly as subsidiaries
or complementing the operation o f the giants.
2. In the transitional stage, while most general characteristics of the strati
fication system have remained unchanged, the trends already visible in the
previous phase are intensified: increase in technological-economic concentra

tion at the top, with growing predominance of large financial and industrial
organizations, and a retreat of landed interests, which are losing economic
and political weight, though retaining sufficient power to continue to repre
sent a threat to the other components o f the elite. At the bottom , the urban
working class, both in industry and services, is increasing its organizational
force through massive unionization and political parties, and often the same
process is occurring among rural labor (though steadily declining in size). The
middle strata also continue to be modified in the same direction as in the first
stage: continuous proportional growth of the dependent (or new) middle
classes and some decrease in the independent sector, with im portant changes:
(a) more widespread modernization of small and middle enterprises in all
branches o f activity; (b) lower degree o f autonom y vis a vis big business,
insofar as the small firm tends increasingly to become a subsidiary of the
giant corporation in many fields, and technological advances and the logic of
economies of scale tend to greatly threaten the independent survival of small
business even of the modern type.
3. In the neocapitalist stage, a new kind o f dynamic equilibrium is reached,
in which the whole stratification systçm seems to be continuously upgraded,
and some tensions o f the transitional stage to be alleviated. But a meaningful
description o f it requires a more holistic approach.
The Changing Nature o f the Stratification System

from Paleo- to Neocapitalism
To analyze changes in the stratification system in the neocapitalist stage

and compare it with the preceding stages, one should look more to the na
ture o f the system than to the composition and traits of each single stratum.
To this purpose, we will consider the structural properties o f the stratifica
tion system, following the indications given in Table 3.1.
1. In paleocapitalism, the profile of stratification is significantly deter
mined by the fact that a large part o f the population is located in the lower
classes. A conjectural typical distribution, carried out based on various his
torical studies,43 assigns to the upper class 4 per cent o f the total, 11 per cent
to the urban middle class (secondary and tertiary), and 35 per cent to the
lower urban strata. The remaining 50 per cent is rural, and the structure of
this sector will depend upon the existence and size o f a middle rural class.
The system is also characterized by high degrees o f discontinuity among
strata, hierarchization, interpersonal relations, and consequently high insti
tutionalization o f the stratification system’s image. The manual/nonmanual
line is profoundly marked, and the restricted middle urban class (old and new)
tends to identify with the upper classes. (This is the false consciousness
which Marxism attributes to it, especially to the dependent middle class.)
Although the possibilities of mobility are now considerable (also because of
TABLE 3.1 STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES

OF THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM*
1. Profile o f stratification: proportion o f the population located in each

stratum.
2. Degree o f discontinuity between strata: ranges from maximum discontinu

ity, with clear cleavages between strata coupled with gross differences and
inequalities in all dimensions, to minimum discontinuities in all dimensions
and a stratification continuum .
3. Degreee o f hierarchization o f interpersonal relations: ranges from maximum

to minimum emphasis (overt or covert) on status inequalities in most or all
social situations.
4. Degree o f institutionalization o f the image o f the stratification system:

ranges from maximum to minimum degree o f institutionalization involving
also maximum to minimum clarity o f the image o f each stratum , and of ideal
congruence.
5. Mobility norms: predominance o f inheritance or o f achievement among

stratification dimensions, with various intermediate possibilities.
6. Mobility values, beliefs, and attitudes: ranges from a maximum emphasis

on stability and inheritance to a maximum emphasis on mobility and
achievement (combined with varying degrees o f consensus in the different
strata).
7. Real possibilities o f m obility: ranges from very few, unequally dis

tributed among the strata, to many, equally distributed among the strata.
*G. Germani: “ Social and Political Consequences o f Mobility,” in Social Struc

ture and M obility in Economic D evelopm ent, cd. N. J. Smelser and S. M. Lipset
(Chicago: Aldine, 1966).
structural changes, ascriptive norm s o f mobility and corresponding attitudes

and aspirations continue to be diffused in a great part o f the society, coexist
ing with emerging norm s and attitudes favorable to mobility and to criteria
of success.
2. In transitional capitalist society the systemic traits o f stratification are
the same as in the preceding stage, but there are changes in the profile o f the
system and com position o f the strata, and above all in the rate of mobility
and the process o f primary social m obilization o f the lower classes.
There is a continuous dim inution o f all rural classes, but in this transitional
stage the great landowning interests may continue to share power with the
bourgeoisie (in a situation o f partial fusion, alliance, or conflict). Interm edi
ate rural strata can still play a significant role in national politics, and typical
ly display the reactive or defensive actions o f sectors in retreat. The basic
sector of the upper classes is the same as in the preceding stage, but now the
managing and bureaucratic elem ent acquires im portance. The process of
concentration continues. More im portant changes can be found in the urban

lower and middle classes. In the first, the urban proletariat has been con
solidated and is now completely mobilized and organized and has increased
in power; it can now be identified as a new emerging sector o f a “working
aristocracy,” which through its income, level o f consum ption, and integra
tion in national life, announces the new working class characteristic of the
neocapitalist phase. While numerically the lower class has decreased (chang
ing nevertheless its composition; less rural and more secondary and tertiary),
the middle class as a whole has increased considerably. But the entire change
corresponds to the new middle class, the dependent bureaucratic, profession
al, and technical sector, while the urban independents of the old middle class
have decreased in proportion and are located in the economic structure in
positions of growing dependence relative to the large enterprises and the pub
lic sector o f the economy. The considerable growth o f the middle strata has
modified the profile o f the system, but this continues to be highly stratified,
with deep cleavages among the classes, particularly along the manual/non-
manual line. The persistence o f marked discontinuity between classes, high
hierarchization o f interpersonal relations, strong institutionalization of the
image of the stratification system (corresponding to the paleocapitalist
stage), and most im portant, of ascriptive values and norms regulating access
to statuses and classes, all enter now into conflict with the rising rate of mo
bility from the lower strata and the acceleration o f their primary social mobil
ization. Social mobility is likely to assume in this stage different forms simul
taneously. There will be more exchange mobility (upward mobility, inter-
generational and in trage ne rational, from the working class, and downward
mobility from the middle classes), structural mobility caused by enlargement
of the middle positions (because it requires recruitm ent from the lower
classes), and mobility by growing participation (an aspect o f social mobiliza
tion), that is, increasing standard o f living o f the urban lower classes, which
are now given access to forms o f consumption hitherto restricted to the mid-
cle classes. Such increase in the access to goods and services (particularly edu
cation) which were also status symbols particularly im portant for the lower
layers of the middle class, was assured fairly rapidly in certain countries, and
should be considered one aspect o f the primary mobilization of the lower
classes, along with their increased political power, through extensive unioniza
tion and electoral strength. Such changes are perceived as highly threatening
by the middle classes, who still cling to the old sharp hierarchical distinction
from manual workers, and still identify with the bourgeoisie and reject
unionization as a respectable means to defend or increase their real salary and
social benefits. The intermediate strata, in all its sectors, feel most affected
by the rising proletariat. Such is the crisis o f the middle classes. They feel
threatened from above by the growing concentration of economic and polit
ical power, and from below by the advances o f the organized working classes,
and even though close to becoming proletarianized in relative and absolute
terms, they still m aintain the old aspirations and cultural com ponents typical
of intermediate strata in the highly stratified paleocapitalism. They are par
ticularly exposed in this stage to status panic, that is, the threat o f depriva
tion of status. This was in some cases intensified by particular situations of
displacement produced by strongly traum atic processes such as World War I
inflation, or the Great Depression.
3. In the third stage, neocapitalism, manifest tendencies in the transi
tional period reach their maximum expression. Besides the processes already
indicated referring to drastic reduction o f the primary sector (in some coun
tries to under 3 or 4 per cent and the lessening or stabilization of the second
ary sector, changes in the upper class include the extension o f so-called sep
aration of property and control, accentuated concentration, and the follow
ing advance o f the technocratic element (civil and military, public and private).
There are other m odifications interesting to the present analysis. Non-
manual strata are now half or more o f the total active population; internal
heterogeneity o f the strata has increased considerably in occupational terms
as well as in terms o f social and ecological origins (with a great increase of
status incongruence, now transform ed into a characteristic of the system);
the manual/nonmanual cleavage tends to lose importance or at least visibility,
and the whole system o f stratification now tends to be perceived as a con
tinuum rather than a hierarchy o f well-differentiated strata. Although the
underlying reality can be different, this is the image which predominates in
the consumption, or neocapitalist society, as it is called here.
Finally, the whole system is dom inated by what we have called “self-
sustained m obility,” through continuous circulation o f status symbols from
above to below (relative to occupational and consumption symbols). Not
only do these changes increase consensus and social integration, they also
tend to stabilize the middle classes. All the strata, propelled by the mecha
nism of self-sustained m obility, perceive themselves as in a forward move
ment or, more precisely, this collective process is experienced as an individual
ascent. It is possible th at a real decrease in inequality is taking place, especial
ly in the middle range o f the stratification profile, which now includes the
majority; but this is not as im portant as the fact o f self-sustained mobility.
This forward m ovem ent—real or apparent—gives stability to the middle strata.
The continual invasion o f status by the lower strata ceases to generate status
panic, since the middle strata is compensated by its own ascent. Two other
components contribute to this stabilizing effect: on the one hand, the
changes already shown, the decrease o f visible cleavages in the “great gray
zone” of urban society, the generalization of the incongruence of status and
the experience o f m obility, the diffusion o f ideologies and more egalitarian
attitudes; on the other hand, the fact that in this phase the situation of real
economic dependence—whatever its legal definition—has been institution
alized, tends to be more a guarantee than a menace to middle-strata security.
The middle class is composed on the one hand largely o f salaried workers,
and these dispose differently of means o f defending their interests (in
particular trade unions for the lower levels). On the other hand, the sur
viving sector of businessmen and independent professionals has found
subsidiary roles in an economy dom inated by great conglomerates, which
permit them to subsist, although sometimes directly dependent upon them.
But this very dependence has been transform ed into a mechanism of
security.
The stability o f the middle class in the neocapitalist phase depends on
the stability of the stratification system, and obviously, on the global
social system. A first menace to the stratification system resides in
the persistence and actual or potential im portance o f marginal sectors
which have remained marginal both to the system and to national society.
The most typical example is that of the United States, with a sector
of its population below the poverty line, and its Black, Puerto Rican,
and other categories mostly enclosed in the cities. A nother example
is in underdeveloped areas in various European countries, or in foreign
immigrant workers which in countries like Switzerland are replacing
the national working class. In all these cases, the marginal sectors
are to be incorporated, but under certain circumstances the process can be
highly conflictive.
Much more decisive for the stability o f the stratification system is the
maintenance of the process o f self-sustained m obility and the possibility of
indefinitely continuing the forward movement. Both processes are condi
tioned by the capacity o f the global social system to follow w ithout appre
ciable interruptions a continual process o f technological innovation, growth,
and diversification o f production. We are not dealing only with the long-run
viability of the economic neocapitalist system, but with a set o f economic,
social, and political circumstances on the national and international level. The
existence o f an external proletariat which takes in the great m ajority of the
population o f the planet is one o f the significant elements o f this configura
tion of factors.
We have om itted all reference to the socialist systems, but it may be
mentioned that although their evolution and present situation is obviously
different, it may be possible to distinguish in them different successive
phases, and their future stability depends on the capacity o f the global
system to secure processes of self-sustained mobility and an uninterrupted
forward movement.44 This continuous growth, both in socialist and
neocapitalist societies, should not take place only in terms o f goods and
economic services, but also as a function of the satisfaction of preexisting
needs and the creation and satisfaction of new and nonm aterial ones; in
socialist societies—and in a different form also in neocapitalist ones—the
problem o f liberty and individuation, creativity and self-realization, are
assuming central importance.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN MIDDLE CLASSES

IN THE RISE OF CLASSIC FASCISM
In the second or transitional phase o f capitalist development the middle

classes go through their greatest period o f instability. It is the epoch in which,
especially in Europe, the crisis o f the middle classes is spoken o f (from the be
ginning o f the century through World War II). If in all countries this crisis has
originated im portant sociopolitical movements, it was not always expressed in
classic fascist forms, and only in a few o f them did such movements reach
power and establish a relatively stable regime. For the rise o f a massive fascist
movement several conditions are necessary, and I shall enumerate them in
terms of social mobilization theory.45 First and most im portant, the crisis
must be deep enough to generate a strong displacement of a sizable portion
of the middle strata, so th at these masses (that is, a considerable number o f
individuals even if they are a m inority o f the population) become available to
participate in some new form o f political action, for which no suitable,
legitimate channel (such as an established political party) exists. The dis
placement is usually, on the one hand, the consequence of structural changes
such as those so prom inent in transitional capitalism, while on the other it is
triggered by some traum atic event involving an immediate social and political
threat, real or so perceived. The traum atic event itself (World War I, rapid in
flation, the Great Depression) is expressed in terms of the political activa
tion of the lower classes or some im portant segment of them. In Italy and
Spain for instance, there was clearly a form o f primary mobilization. In Ger
many the integration o f the lower classes—particularly urban—into the na
tional society was at the time larger than in Italy, with the Socialist party
channeling the political participation o f the industrial proletariat. Similar
consequences as those in Italy were induced by the extraordinary new con
ditions following World War I: military defeat, the fall o f the monarchy, and
the spread o f leftist upheavals among urban and rural masses, as in the Russian
Revolution, and—though unsuccessfully—in most of Central and Eastern Eur
ope. New groups were affected by primary mobilization, or this process was
greatly accelerated, and extrem e leftist factions and revolutionary attem pts
coupled with the rise o f a strong Communist party were the typical expres
sion of such new conditions. With the Weimar Republic democratization and
secularization reached their highest point in German history up to that time,
and both were experienced and feared as the dissolution o f national society
and the breakdown o f essential values deeply rooted in the traditional elites
and among those who identified with them , particularly the established mid
dle classes. The conditions were set for secondary mobilization or counter-
mobilization, aimed at reestablishing the threatened values through what was
regarded as a new social order. A social order which could be seen quite dif
ferently—and even in contradictory ways—by the various social groups inter
vening in the fascist movement. In most o f them , anti-big business populist
components were strong or relatively strong, though with the institutionaliza

tion of the regime they usually turned out to be a mere propagandists ap
pendage.
To these conditions and determinants regarding the role o f the middle
classes many others must be added in order to explain the rise and eventual
success of fascism. In the first section I have examined several theories em
phasizing the meaning of such factors, and in the final section a definition of
fascism will be suggested which includes a brief enum eration of most of
them. For the moment, let us state that the role of the middle classes in
classic fascism is to provide the main social basis for the recruitm ent of a
mass movement and for a significant majority o f its elite. But the rise of a
movement, and eventually a party, is a necessary but insufficient condition
for the establishment of a fascist regime. Many other internal and external
factors must also converge to make this outcome possible. Among the former,
the coalition of the various components of the hitherto ruling class is particu
larly crucial; a coalition whose essential purpose is to curb the political and
social mobilization o f the lower classes. Among the latter, an attitude o f the
ruling classes of the hegemonic countries favorable to a return to “ law and
order” is also a significant factor, particularly for the survival o f the new
regime.
LATIN AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES AND

THE FUNCTIONAL SUBSTITUTE OF FASCISM
After this rather long excursion on the evolution o f the European middle
classes, we can turn to the consideration o f similar processes occurring in
Latin American countries, as they may be perceived in light o f the European
experience: how and to what extent the changing nature and conditions of
the middle classes in that region may be considered a determining factor in
recent forms of authoritarian regimes.
Several observers have spoken about a crisis o f the middle classes in Latin
America. Graciarena has provided an excellent description o f it,46 and I
interpret this process as similar to that experienced in Europe during the
transitional stage. This does not mean to ignore that great differences do
exist between the Latin American experience and that of the Western coun
tries of earlier development. However, there is a common pattern with regard
to the location of the middle classes within the national society and in the
structure of the stratification system. Despite the differences, which are
many and arise both from external and internal factors, certain equivalences
can be found. In particular, the stage o f outward economic development in
Latin America should be compared with the paleocapitalist stage, and the
stage of inward development (after 1930) with the transitional stage. Some of
the differential features are obvious. Latin American paleocapitalism was not
founded on industrial development but on the production o f primary prod-
ucts (food, tropical crops, minerals, oil) for export. Instead, the onset o f the
transitional stage in Latin America coincided with the new industrialization
induced after 1930 by the breakdown o f the international market, the stage
of inward development. (I am referring here to a scheme of stages of m od
ernization in Latin America published elsewhere and whose political aspects
will be further examined in connection with the role of the lower classes in
national populism.)47
The stage o f outw ard developm ent marked in Latin America the begin
nings of economic and social m odernization through its insertion in the in
ternational m arket. It corresponds roughly to the period in which a viable
national state was established, in some countries under a unifying autocracy
while in others under a regime o f limited democracy (or an enlarged one),
and in both cases with the effective control o f a ruling oligarchy. It was de
pendent development heavily conditioned by the requirements o f the inter
national m arket and the central industrial economies (particularly Great
Britain, at that tim e). It held back industrialization, since manufactured
products were to be provided by the latter. But depending on the nature of
primary production, natural resources, the previous colonial society, and the
existence o f a large overseas immigration, the consequence of the primary ex
port economy on the total social structure could vary a great deal. In all
countries it induced a dualistic society and economy, differentiation be
tween a center (more urban, absorbing most o f the national income, socially
more modernized) and a backward periphery (regions o f internal colonialism),
since dualism must be understood more in terms o f asymmetrical relation
with the center than as a mere juxtaposition o f modern and archaic. But dual
ism could take different forms and extent depending on the various factors
indicated above. The center could be restricted to a leading city, usually the
capital, sharply contrasting with an interior o f extreme backwardness, whose
population would be hardly marginal to the market and the national society
(as in the case o f subsistence agriculture) and usually represent a source of
cheap labor and the provider o f additional surplus for the center and its
network of interm ediary groups. Or, on the contrary, the center could be
extended to a sizable part or even a majority o f the national population—as
in the case o f Argentina and Uruguay—or if remaining proportionally a minor
ity, it could still be politically and socially highly relevant when representing
a concentration o f many millions o f inhabitants, a sort of developed or m od
ernized country within a large area o f backwardness, as in the case o f Brazil
or Mexico. In this sense, we may speak o f the rise of relatively modern mid
dle classes as one o f the social modernizing effects o f the primary export
economy, effects which remained restricted in some countries but were wide
ly diffused in others. The dependent primary economy caused changes in
social structure analogous though different from those induced by industrial
development in Europe. It also induced some growth o f the industrial sector,
but this was limited mostly to perishable consumption goods, except where a
large concentration of urban population and a less unequal distribution of

the national income permitted a higher level o f industrialization. The enlarge
ment of the market induced by increased demand for consumer goods was
often sufficient to sustain a medium- to small-scale or artisanal local industry
in the large cities, causing a first wave o f industrialization at the turn of the
century. This further added to the expansion o f the middle classes and the
first appearance of a small segment of industrial proletariat in the lower
classes.
Urbanization and the expansion o f modern or modernized middle classes
are the two modernizing effects48 which most concern us in this discussion.
Both processes went beyond what could be expected in terms o f the level and
nature of economic development. What must be emphasized is that socially
there was in the more advanced and larger countries an im portant mass of
urban middle classes and sometimes the beginnings o f an industrial prole
tariat. While the latter was far smaller and less politically relevant than in
European paleocapitalism, the urban middle classes turned out to be a highly
significant factor in the political development o f those larger and more ad
vanced nations in the region.
There have been long discussions about the nature of the Latin American
middle classes. A number of writers are inclined to consider them very differ
ent from their North American and European counterparts. The cultural
components (prestige, identification with higher classes, etc.) so heavily im
puted to the middle strata in Latin America were no different from what
could be found in all the bourgeois nations o f the West, particularly in paleo-
capitalist and transitional societies.49 Differences in intensity could be ob
served, but the range of such variations was certainly larger among countries
within the same cultural area (Latin America, the United States, or Western
Europe) than among these cultural areas themselves. In the Latin American
immigration countries (such as Argentina and Uruguay) the cultural compo
nents were far less prominent than in Latin Europe. But because o f the par
ticular type of national and political development in Latin America, the over-
expansion o f the middle classes, and their basically modern nature, their role
during the primary export economy was somewhat different from the Euro
pean case. This may be explained to a great extent by the conditions under
which most Latin American countries became national states. Though we
may not speak o f a violent rupture with the traditional past, a sort of revolu
tion from below may be noted at the source o f their nationhood. The parti
cipation o f the lower classes in the wars of independence was certainly more
prom inent than in the creation of the national state in some European
countries, as in the case o f Italian or German unification. Independence did
not destroy the archaic and hierarchical social structure, but the breakdown
of colonial rule often involved a sort of traditional mobilization of large
masses o f the population. There were exceptions, such as Brazil, where con
tinuity with the colonial era was not abruptly and violently destroyed, but it
is certainly true o f the most important former Hispanic colonies.
The transition to m odernity was largely initiated under the protection of

modernizing oligarchies, in the form o f autocracy or restricted democracy (as
in the European case), but always within the rigid limits o f their class hori-
zons. These limits were to a considerable extent determined not only by their
own position as m onopolizers o f power and the desire to maintain themselves
as such, but also by a form o f development based on the primary export
economy and not on industry. This is an almost complete inversion o f the
European situation. We are also dealing with a bourgeoisie whose interests
were closely tied in a relationship o f dependence to the interests of the indus
trial bourgeoisies o f the central countries. Although their desires for political
and social m odernization were generally sincere, they inevitably had to ex
perience the double lim itation o f their position in the social structure and in
the historical situation on the international level. The Latin American modern
middle classes were first a subproduct o f this special type o f modernization
based, as was upper-class prosperity, on the fruits of the primary export
economy. As a group situated in a given position in society and within a given
(and dated) historical situation, their horizons were equally limited. The pro
gressive enlargement o f political participation was the outcome of their social
and political action to gain pow er—they had to fight the ruling oligarchy
which had excluded them . Their ideological expression did not differ substan
tially from the one manifestly professed by the oligarchy itself, and especially
during the phase o f the primary export economy, it only proposed to realize
the constitutional model form ulated by the ruling class. They created and
developed multiclass movements o f the populist type; this was possible be
cause they did not have a threatening organized proletariat under them. It
was easy at that time for the middle classes to function as a progressive sector
of society. From this purely political point o f view, the Latin American mid
dle class was perhaps more democratic and progressive than its European
counterpart (especially in Latin European countries). Although in Europe
many leaders o f the new working class movement in the paleocapitalist phase
were of middle-class origin, no widespread multiclass populism was induced
by the middle classes themselves. This sharply contrasts with the progressive-
democratic multiclass parties with strong populist components that the mid
dle classes were able to generate in many Latin American countries. Only in
other new Western countries (like the United States and Canada) do we have
a similar phenom enon (but with less populism). Though the middle classes
limited themselves in Latin America to the affirmation of formal democracy,
they never lacked com ponents o f social justice, and these tended to become
accentuated towards the end o f the outward development and affirmed above
all during the following stage (after 1930), characterized by mass mobilization.
In the same way as occurred with the modernizing oligarchic elites, the
middle classes never perceived clearly the limits of the economic structure
that facilitated their own existence and expansion until this same structure
collapsed under external impacts. The industrializing impulse was generated
from outside by the Great Depression and most o f the middle class supported
it, but then even the old landed oligarchy led in some countries the first
phases o f the process of im port substitution, through support o f domestic
enterprise.
During the stage of outward expansion (primary paleocapitalism), the mid
dle classes in Latin America were an emerging class being rapidly transformed
into a basic one. Declining intermediate strata were not lacking, particularly
the archaic artisanships destroyed by the im port o f manufactures from indus
trialized countries. Nor was absent a declining segment o f the upper class,
such as the marginal sectors of latifundists who could not adapt to commer
cial agriculture and export economy or who remained marginal to changes in
precapitalist or “ feudal” conditions (as they were called at the time, using
the term feudal loosely). Aside from the aforem entioned declining sector, the
Latin American middle classes were in ascent during primary paleocapitalism;
ascent both in sociopolitical and numerical terms. There was not in this
stage a middle-class problem in Latin America, and their position appears
firmer and less ambiguous than in Europe, where even in the paleocapitalist
phase, within and outside of Marxism, these strata were discussed as proble
matical and of ambiguous and contradictory political behavior. This does
not imply that in Latin America their identification as a class was not strong
ly influenced by cultural components o f prestige and identification (aspira
tion) with the upper class, as occurred with the European middle class. The
stratification system in Latin America approxim ated the paleocapitalistic
stage, especially in central and southern Europe, in regard to the degree of
hierarchization and distance of cleavages among classes. But these elitist fea
tures of the system did not necessarily limit the progressive political orienta
tion of the Latin American middle class, since in its confrontation with the
ruling elite it could make use of the support o f the popular urban classes.
Such support was possible because at this time the industrial proletariat was
still in a process of formation and constituted an even less mobilized and
organized sector than its European counterpart during the phase o f industrial
paleocapitalism, or, as in Argentina, was mostly foreign-born and could not
exercise direct political influence. The working class was not large and mature
enough to organize into a class-oriented party. During this phase the urban
middle class began to overexpand in Latin America; a continuing process that
was accentuated during the following stage of industrial development. This
overexpansion was caused in part by general factors which affect most coun
tries of later transition: increase of services, the necessities o f organization,
public and private bureaucracy, and technocracy, to an extent unknown in
the history o f European paleocapitalism. Expansion also resulted from other
causes. In part, it was a consequence of the middle class’s success in incor
porating itself into national life; recent power was used to favor its own
quantitative expansion and open new channels o f mobility, especially through
secondary and higher education. In part, it was a result of the flexibility
shown by the oligarchic upper class; it was a form of cooptation, not delib
erate and in many cases not desired, but perhaps more or less clearly per
ceived by some o f the m ost foresighted and realistic groups of the oligarchy.
This cooptation paid o ff through the reformist m oderation o f the movements
and regimes o f the middle class.
After 1930, Latin America entered a new stage of modernization. It was
determined by many different trends which converged in one o f the central
traits characterizing the new epoch: the era of mass mobilization. Breakdown
of the primary export economy and World War II fostered the upsurge o f in
dustrialization, in some cases at a very accelerated rate. Demographic change
(itself an expression o f the modernizing process o f previous decades) brought
high birth rates with a rapid lowering o f death rates. It was the beginning o f
the population explosion in the region. This demographic increase, the push
factors from rural areas, the onset o f industrialization, and the awakening of
long-ignored and -suppressed needs and new attitudes in at least a substantial
portion of the still marginal rural population, brought a sharp acceleration in
urban growth. Urbanization (which had always preceded industrialization in
Latin America, contrary to the European model) advanced at an increasing
rate and originated large masses now available for the Erst time for political
participation. Though the revolution o f rising expectations was not a real
threat to the established social order, since the all too recent urban lower
class was neither ready nor had a particular propensity for revolutionary ac
tion, still it was a socially mobilized mass which could be politically activated
through some sort o f populism, supported by the appeal of charismatic
leadership. Under given circumstances it could be perceived as a serious threat
by the middle classes and ruling elites.
The middle classes benefited from the new course taken by the economy
with industrialization, particularly during the rapid economic growth induced
in certain periods. They provided a considerable proportion of the new man
agement, the executive bureaucratic and administrative sector required by in
dustrial activity from its very first phase of im port substitution. This demand
was not limited to the historical level observed in the first phases of industri
alization in Europe, but w ent closer to the structure of the bureaucratized
industrial enterprise o f advanced capitalism. Industrialization, accelerated
urbanization, and other changes accentuated the necessity for services,
contributing even more to the expansion o f the middle class, increasing their
possibilities o f mobility and their participation in consumption. At the same
time, the whole process was likely to produce new tensions, internal conflicts
within the class and conflicts external to it, insecurity and threats from above
and below.
In the stage o f the primary export economy, the middle class was not
more homogeneous than its European counterpart. It was a conglomerate
of heterogeneous sectors with contrasting economic interests. Nevertheless,
perhaps even to a greater extent than in various European countries, the mid-
die classes of many Latin American countries showed a degree o f political co
herence. It was not only the consequence o f their common location within the
social structure, or their common cultural com ponents, aspirations, and identi
fications, but above all the experience o f common struggles against the ruling
oligarchy, their capacity to achieve significant participation in national life and
the nation’s political leadership. But the heterogeneity and internal contradic
tions which could remain partially latent during the period o f ascent tended to
erupt in times of crisis. Even during the expansion o f the middle sectors induced
by industrial development, other divisive elements were added to the old ones.
The entrepreneurial-industrial component o f the middle classes had to confront
the now unionized white collars; chronic inflation accompanying economic
growth caused transfers of income among the various occupational groups of
the middle strata, since their corresponding sectors were differentially af
fected by the decline in purchasing power o f the currency. The dependent
lower middle classes in large cities could defend themselves much better in
Latin America than their counterparts in Europe, since while the former were
unionized, the latter were not: here the old pattern of purely individual rela
tions with the employer persisted (an expression o f their identification with the
bourgeoisie still predominated in the European transitional stage). The relative
ly higher political autonomy o f the white collar vis a vis other components of
the middle classes was then another source o f internal cleavage.
The internal fragmentation and threatening pressures from above and be
low combined in a very similar form to that observed in the transitional phase
of European capitalism. Certainly, at both extremes the composition and na
ture o f the upper and lower strata in Latin America present different aspects.
But the structural situation o f the middle classes was still analogous, con
fronted with this double pressure o f groups whose power was growing. Par
ticularly after 1930, the upper classes in Latin America became increasingly
heterogeneous, a conglomerate formed by the old landholding oligarchy,
the old established industrial bourgeoisie (to the extent that it was con
nected with primary production), and the newly formed bourgeoisie risen
from recent industrialization. The internal cleavages of the upper class did
not necessarily work in favor o f the no less fragmented middle classes. Be
sides, in Latin America there was an im portant com ponent: a considerable
part of the larger of the more modernized industries was under foreign con
trol, and this is a current and potentially menacing circumstance for the na
tional middle sectors. At the other extreme, the urban working class, al
though (with exceptions) not yet able to form working-class parties, was ac
quiring considerable strength, not only through its unions but also through
the new populist formations of national-popular type, which though includ
ing middle-class elements, were far more affected by the influence o f working-
class components than had occurred in preceding populist parties, where the
lower strata formed a smaller proportion and remained much more subordi
nate to middle-class orientations and goals.
There is also a constitutional problem o f the middle classes in Latin

America: their existence and expansion was partly due to a policy of com
promise with the existing order. This policy under certain circumstances can
be convenient and favorable for ordered change, but in the long run diminishes
the potential for change in these sectors which benefit from this for too long
or under less appropriate conditions. All these and other factors configure the
crisis of the middle classes in Latin America. Their contradictions, ambiguity,
backslidings, and more generally in recent times, reactions o f apathy and
alienation, are the expression o f such a crisis.
In Europe during the transitional phase, the conjunction o f various cir
cumstances—stagnation o f the econom y, struggles among sectors of the upper
class, mobilization of the working class, and highly traum atic events which
led to the displacement and secondary mobilization of the middle classes—
originated the fascist regimes and other authoritarian escapes from the im
passe created by the many conflicting groups. In Latin America, since the
crisis of the export econom y destroyed the bases of the old equilibrium,
there have not lacked attem pts at classic fascist solutions. But all these have
failed until the present, due to various factors. In the first place, the ideo
logical climate was no longer favorable to this type of solution, and the cor
responding ideologies ceased to be viable. Second, the Latin American middle
classes were still perm eated in the more modernized countries with demo
cratic beliefs. Third, they did not have to confront or were not affected by
traumatic events o f the scale that occurred in Europe, particularly the World
War I. And where comparable events did take place, like in Chile, fascist-like
regimes did arise. We may rem em ber that in the thirties fascist attem pts oc
curred in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, but the middle classes failed to be mo
bilized and provide sufficient support. The crisis o f the middle classes assumed
the form o f a slow deterioration, interrupted by periods o f recovery, rather
than o f precipitous decline. It tended to follow the stop-and-go course typ
ically taken by the econom y, particularly after the phase of import-substitu
tion industrialization had been exhausted and a higher and more complex
stage was to be reached. An entirely different kind of dilemma was to be con
fronted by the middle classes with the crisis o f the national-popular regimes.
These movements and regimes, resulting from the alliance (virtual or ex
plicit) between the new industrial bourgeoisie, some segments of the de
pendent and unionized middle classes, and the new urban proletariat found
their structural base and raison d ’etre in the requirements o f the rising in
dustrial econom y, particularly in the phase of im port substitution. Per capita
GNP was improving fast; new consumers created a demand for the kinds o f
manufactures the society had the technical and economic capacity to gener
ate; therefore, the national-popular solution benefitted even if in different
degree a large proportion o f the population with the exception of the landed
interests (urban and rural) and some sectors o f the old middle classes. The
rest of the middle classes, particularly the lower dependent and unionized
sectors, did not fail to increase their standard o f living, even if often such in
crease was comparatively lower than among industrial workers. The national
popular movements thus found a divided middle class. Even in Argentina,
where historical circumstances gave a fascist-like image to the Peronist version
of national populism, middle-class opposition to it was not monolithic and
tended to decrease with the clarification of the historical misunderstanding of
the real nature of the populistic movement, as in fact occurred after the
downfall of the first Peronism (1946-55). The rise of the industrial and serv
ice sectors and the expansion in consumption created in the more urbanized
areas some effects of the self-sustained mobility we have described as typical
of neocapitalism. The invasion of status by increased social and political par
ticipation of the urban lower classes was at least partially compensated for by
a feeling of generalized upward mobility and increasing opening up o f society
and new opportunities for the middle classes. Nonetheless, there was fear and
opposition among them vis a vis the social and political rise o f urban workers.
This opposition did not assume the classic fascist ideology of hierarchy and
law and order, but while still using a democratic and liberal language, it ex
pressed a sort of incoherent resistance to the threat perceived in the new
emerging urban groups.50
Once the potentialities for economic growth provided by the phase of im
port substitution were exhausted, when new challenges were posed by the
need to advance to a more mature form o f industrial structure, old and new
economic and social problems, internal and international, cropped up, intro
ducing considerable instabilities in the economies of most Latin American
countries. At this time the underlying middle-classes crisis reached a deeper
level, intensified by changes and events occurring in the region and the world.
At the international level, the establishment and consolidation of the first so
cialist state in the subcontinent, the rise of a highly m ilitant extreme Left in
most countries, and the renewed open or secret political and military inter
vention by the United States were the most obvious political symptoms of
rising tensions and conflicts. The internationalization o f national markets
also modified the conditions under which the higher stages o f industrializa
tion were to take place, also shaping the role o f the local bourgeoisies and the
state. Other crucial factors in the changing scene were the high demographic
increases, failure to absorb the rapidly expanding labor force and consequent
growth o f marginal population (rural and urban), the continuation of mass in
ternal migration, the urban explosion, and the deteriorating balance of pay
ments and lower import capacity, at a m om ent o f high need for foreign cap
ital goods and raw materials induced by the requirements of a more advanced
industrial economy. The acceleration o f inflation greatly intensified internal
sectoral clashes at the socioeconomic level, shattering the party system, and
highlighting the insecure position of the middle classes, whose heterogeneous
composition and particular location in the socioeconomic structure made
them especially vulnerable to internal and international impacts. Although
one cannot speak o f a mass m obilization of the middle classes as a conse

quence of the stress and displacement caused by these processes, they created
to a varying extent, depending on national historical conditions, a propen
sity for authoritarian solutions. The beginnings of a middle-class mass mobili
zation could be observed in Brazil in 1964, when the dying national populism
of Joao Goulart was perceived as a potential threat to the social order. Much
more prominent was the reaction o f a portion of the middle class in Chile,
confronting the leftist coalition in government. In both cases the decisive fac
tor in achieving the violent demobilization o f the lower classes was the army
(with the open or secret encouragem ent and concrete intervention o f United
States political and econom ic interests), while middle-class civilian groups,
though approving and accompanying in different ways and degrees the mili
tary action, were not directly involved in it.
The main difference betw een the Latin American variety and the classic
type of fascism consists in the fact th at the active role in promoting and even
tually establishing an authoritarian regime was usually assumed by the mili
tary, not by the middle classes, which, however, under certain conditions
gave their support to it. This would not be sufficient to classify Latin Ameri
can military regimes as forms o f fascism. We may distinguish at least several
types of authoritarian outcom es stemming from participation crises. We may
speak of a fascist-like regime only when it is established in a modernized so
cial context, and confronting (as a reaction) a sustained primary mobiliza
tion of the lower classes, th at is, during the stage o f mass mobilization initi
ated in Latin America roughly after the Great Depression and in correspon
dence with drastic structural changes in Latin American societies.
The examples given above—Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile—best fit
the model o f w hat I call “ functional substitutes of fascism /’ insofar as while
they all show significant differences with the classic ideal type, they have in
common what is at least one o f its basic aims, namely, the forced demobiliza
tion of the recently mobilized lower classes. Here, as in the classic case, other
factors are essential, such as the decline of the old oligarchy, the struggle be
tween industrial and nonindustrial sectors, and the coexistence of various
economies: the m onopolistic or nonm arket economy composed of both
public and foreign m ultinational corporations intermingled in various fashions,
the market economy o f middle-size modern or modernized national enter
prises, and the marginal or hidden economy based on large urban marginal
population, which is blended with the surviving rural subsistence sector, and
reaches in some countries a high proportion o f the national population. In
the particularly delicate transition to a more mature industrial economy and
under the constraint o f foreign dependence—in economic, military, and tech
nological term s—the sectoral clashes plus the threat (often more perceived
than real) o f rising m obilization o f the lower strata and o f urban guerrillas
create a power vacuum which reinforces propensities for an authoritarian
solution. Increasing fragm entation o f society caused by pressure on the state
by organized interests and their high diversification and conflictuality has the
same consequences. Here the functional substitute o f the middle classes is the
army, as the active agent in bringing about the violent demise o f representa
tive democracy and the installation of the new regime. Mobilized middle
classes not being available (or insufficiently so), military intervention repre
sents the natural agent. Political participation o f the army is a deeply in
grained trait o f the Latin American culture, and this facilitates its new role
(these interventions and the resulting regimes are quite different from the
traditional stereotype o f South American military rule). The army may offer
the illusion o f a stable technocratic-bureaucratic solution, seemingly neces
sary to achieve “development w ithout breakdown” 51 o f the existing status
quo. Such a solution suits not only the internal establishment but also U.S.
interests and the type o f international equilibrium m aintained by world
powers since the cold war.
The construct o f a functional substitute of fascism finds some confirma
tion of its usefulness when one compares aspects of Latin American cases
with their European counterparts. In both regions fascist (or fascist-like)
regimes came into power after the failure of a real (or perceived) threat of
leftist revolution. The more the political situation leading to the crisis preced
ing the breakdown of democracy resembled the European cases, the more the
authoritarian solution approximated classic fascism. I will leave aside the Bra
zilian Estado Novo and the failed fascist attem pts of the thirties in Chile,
Argentina, and Uruguay, which I believe tend to confirm the hypothesis but
whose analysis would take us too far from the present concern. Taking in
stead more recent cases, we may note that Chile in 1973 was the only coun
try to have strong Marxist parties, and a considerable portion o f the middle
classes were ready for mobilization against organized urban and rural prole
tariat. The military intervention went very near to triggering a civil war. Had
the portion o f the armed forces opposed to the coup been able to initiate a
resistance, civilian participation on both sides could have exploded. That is,
the middle classes would have participated in a similar fashion as in Spain,
where organized fascist movements were too weak, but the failure o f the mili
tary rebellion and the ensuing civil war unleashed the participation of most of
the middle classes on the Franco side. There is an inverse relationship be
tween the role of organized middle classes and that o f the military. Every
where the army supported the rise of fascism. This is true o f Germany and
Italy, where military participation was disguised or indirect; of Spain and
Chile, where it was manifest and decisive; and in Brazil (1964), Uruguay
(1966), and Argentina (1976), it was the only visible active agent. Similarly,
the middle classes everywhere supported the fascist or fascist-like regimes,
but the degree o f their intervention varied in inverse proportion to the role
of the military: central in Germany and Italy; complementary in Spain and
less so in Chile; and mostly passive in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina in that
order.
ELEMENTS FOR A DEFINITION OF FASCISM
The preceding discussion, as well as the theoretical framework suggested in

the first chapters, provide a basis to formulate a definition of fascism whose
main purpose is not merely taxonom ic, but aims at offering a useful theo
retical orientation in the comparative study of this political phenomenon.
The general assumption adopted here is to consider fascism as one o f the pos
sible forms o f m odern authoritarianism , that is, authoritarianism considered
as specific to m odern society, rooted in some o f the contradictions inherent
to its typical structure. These contradictions, which derive mainly from the
process o f growing secularization, can be translated, in a given historical con
text, into conflicts among classes or among sectors o f the same class, and
they often generate—sometimes with the intervention of external traumatic
events—cycles o f m obilization. N ot all forms of modern authoritarianism are
the direct result o f class struggles and mobilization processes, but a theoretical
scheme o f this kind seems particularly useful for the study o f classic fascism
(1919-45) and other similar phenom ena, particularly the more recent func
tional substitutes o f fascism.
The definition underlines the conditions necessary for the emergence of
fascism, the basic aims (the historical, social, and political meaning o f fascism),
and the form or political regime it can assume—in terms o f a model general
enough to cover the classic types and several other variants. The definition is
synthetic, and therefore om its essential distinctions such as those between
regime and movement and a detailed analysis o f political form as distinct
from the content or basic aims.
Conditions. Fascist movements (or their functional substitutes) are likely
to acquire a mass basis and eventually develop into a regime when all or most
of the following conditions are met:
1. The transition towards m odern industrial society has been initiated
under some sort o f capitalist form.
2. The process has advanced beyond the initial steps and the society
is located within the middle range o f modernization. Such a range
is conceived here as rather large, including both more and less ad
vanced countries, and a variety o f possible configurations resulting
from the coexistence within each society o f more and less
advanced stages, in terms o f the partial processes which
compose the total process o f economic, social, and political
m odernization.
3. In terms o f this com ponent, the society must have been, at least for a
period o f time, under a regime o f representative democracy (at least
from the legal or formal point o f view).
4. The process o f m odernization was initiated more on the basis o f a rev
olution from above than under conditions created by a revolution
from below (of the bourgeois-democratic variety).
5. The process of national integration has been delayed, or at least has

failed to reach an adequate degree o f consolidation.
6. The interclass and intraclass conflicts related to stresses and strains in
duced by the transition have reached a high level o f intensity, or at
least their resolution has become exceedingly difficult.
7. Primary mobilization o f the lower classes is advancing at a fast rate
and is perceived as a serious threat (real or not) beyond democratic
control, by the various sectors of the elites.
8. The crisis of the middle classes is reaching a most acute phase, as these
strata feel particularly threatened by the rise of the lower class, the
danger o f material and/or psychological status loss, and growing con
centration o f economic power in the upper class (such as big business
and in certain cases big landowners).
9. In countries where the middle classes have suffered the effects of par
ticularly traumatic changes, their displacement and availability may
cause their mobilization (secondary mobilization) through political
movements which provide a mass basis for fascism. Where this process
is lacking, the rise o f a fascist regime will require the intervention of
other forces, usually the military. But the middle class will still pro
vide substantial support (perhaps through acquiescence) for the emer
gence o f the regime and its consolidation.
10. The state o f the international system and particularly the interests of
the hegemonic powers are opposed to radical changes in the preexist
ing social order and to a real modification of the economic and po
litical establishment. Such opposition may be rooted in ideological
interests and/or in foreign-policy strategies.
Basic aims. Under these circumstances, some form o f fascist regime is like
ly to be seen as a solution to the threatening and unresolved conflicts. Typ
ically, the classic solution (but not necessarily some o f its variants) consists
of a compromise between the declining rural sector and the emerging indus
trial bourgeoisie. Other powerful sectors composing the establishment also
intervene: the church, the military, the aristocracy and the monarchy, and
segments of the intellectual and professional elites and o f the political class
more closely connected (in terms of common ideologies, life styles, and so
cial origins) with the other components of the establishment. Though the dy
namic factor in their alliance is the aim to induce forced demobilization of
the lower class, the compromise also tends to reach a truce (and if possible a
lasting peace) in intraelite, intra-upper-class conflicts. The basic raison d’etre
of the regime is to consolidate a state of affairs able to enforce, for a consid
erable period o f time, both lower-class demobilization and a moratorium on
all aspects o f modernization that may threaten the interests of the coalition,
even at the cost of prolonged economic and social stagnation. Since this ar
rangement may fail to protect the interests o f the middle classes or help solve
their “problem” in a rational way, some substitute satisfactions may be given
them, in terms o f stability, nationalist goals, prestige symbols, and rituals.

Another com ponent which in certain cases may assume real importance, or
may in others be reduced to a mere ideological appendage, is the technocratic
orientation proclaimed as the more effective answer to the dilemma o f m od
ernization, capable o f giving the best solution to the interclass or general in
tergroup conflicts posed by economic and social development. Finally,
among the basic aims we must remember protection of the economic, polit
ical, military, and ideological interests o f the hegemonic nations which have
directly or indirectly supported the rise o f the regime. Changing international
conditions may alter this role.
Political form. Fascism, defined here in terms of its main functions in a
given social context, may assume different political forms compatible with
such functions. The specific kind o f political system and its ideological ex
pressions will be determ ined by several internal (national) and external (in
ternational) factors:
1. The ideological climate predom inant at the national and international
level in the period in which the regime is established.
2. The position o f the country within the international system, the
characteristics o f this system in terms o f economic, political, and mili
tary power differentials among nations, and current international
cleavages and conflicts.
3. The degree o f m odernization (economic, social, and political) achieved
by society (within the middle range broadly defined above).
4. The characteristics o f the culture, social structure, and especially of
the stratification system, as it has emerged from the previous transi
tion, and as shaped by other long-term historical factors.
5. The nature and composition o f the coalition among various segments
of the upper class and elites.
6. The role o f the middle classes (varying from a dynamic one, as a mass
basis for the fascist movement, to a rather passive participation in
support o f the regime).
7. The role o f the army (to a great extent determined by historical socio
cultural factors m entioned in [4 | above).
Classic European fascism, in the countries where it succeeded in consoli
dating itself over a relatively long period, has assumed the form of a one-
party totalitarian state. Such was the case in nazi Germany and fascist Italy.
Another form assumed by fascism is the authoritarian state. Other European
cases of aborted or short-lived fascism may have assumed peculiar variations
of the authoritarian form. Finally, in Latin America, since the 1930s (and
with increasing frequency in the last decade), another form of a military func
tional substitute for fascism has been attem pted. This type of regime, if it
achieves some stability, may assume an authoritarian rather than totalitarian
form.
A suitable definition o f the totalitarian state (as an ideal type) has been
proposed by Friedrich and Brzezinski. It consists of a syndrome of six inter

related traits: (1) an official ideology “ covering all vital aspects of man’s
existence, to which everyone is supposed to adhere, at least passively;” (2) a
single mass party typically led by one man, the dictator; (3) a system o f ter
roristic police control; (4) a complete or nearly complete technological
monopoly o f control over all effective means o f mass communication; (5)
similar control o f all effective means o f armed combat; (6) central control
and direction of the econom y.52 A nother aspect, especially im portant in the
context of this analysis, is the type of consensus demanded by the system.
Although for the masses passive conformity may be acceptable, active ideo
logical identification and participation is required o f a minority within the
party, especially the elite and the segment of the population from which the
future elite will be recruited. In adopting this definition it is of the utmost
importance to stress the distinction between historical meaning, that is, the
substance of fascism, and the political form it may assume. On the one hand,
fascism may assume forms other than the totalitarian w ithout losing its sub
stance; on the other, regimes with an entirely different historical meaning
may adopt the totalitarian form.
Franco’s Spain presented some traits o f the totalitarian state. However,
many observers are convinced that this regime cannot be considered totalitari
an, or at least that in its evolution since the end o f World War II the totali
tarian components were increasingly obliterated. At the theoretical level,
Linz has advanced a model of the authoritarian state which in his opinion is
much more valid for the Spanish regime than the totalitarian model. Authori
tarian regimes—in Linz’s form ulation—“are political systems with limited, not
responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but
with distinctive mentalities); w ithout intensive nor extensive political mobili
zation (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or
occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits
but actually quite predictable ones.” 53 This model may prove very useful in
the analysis o f other regimes as well. But the same provisos emphasized re
garding the distinction between substance and form must be observed. The
basic aims and the historical meaning o f Franco’s regime are typically fascist.
That its political form may be characterized as authoritarian is certainly rele
vant, but no more (and perhaps even less) than its fascist substance.
Authoritarian forms may also be assumed by the functional substitutes of
fascism. We find a good example o f this in many Latin American countries
and their military bureaucratic regimes. However, the different structural con
figuration characterizing Latin American societies, the differences in ideo
logical climate and other internal and international factors are likely to gen
erate other—as yet unknown—forms o f fascism or some functional substitute
for it. Until now, though the crisis o f the middle classes remains a key factor
as much as it was in the European cases, lack o f highly traum atic experiences
has prevented the occurrence o f secondary mobilization o f these strata and
their role in a mass fascist-like movement. Nonetheless the middle classes,

through their present ambivalence and incoherence, are contributing, in con
junction with the Latin American equivalent of the conditions enumerated in
the text, to the required political and social context favorable to the emer
gence of some sort o f fascist solution. The dynamic factor here is provided
by the military, and their intervention replaces the mass movements o f classic
fascism in establishing regimes likely to achieve and maintain lower-class
demobilization and protection o f the higher class from the risks involved in
certain aspects o f m odernization.
Not having recognized the distinction between the basic aims or historical
raison d ’etre o f fascism and the political form assumed by it, some theories,
especially those that place the totalitarian political model in the center of
analysis, assign very different socioeconomic systems to the same category,
for example, systems whose aim is the demobilization of subordinate classes
and systems th at represent the primary mobilization of these same classes.
Even if the totalitarian form is the most typical of modern authoritarianism
insofar as it constitutes one o f the possible answers to contradictions inherent
in modern society (and in this sense is connected to the causes of the phe
nomenon over a long period o f tim e), the confusion implies a serious error
from the point o f view o f evaluation of the historical meaning over a short or
a medium-range period.
NOTES
1. This terminology is used by some writers in Italy. See Costanzo Casucci “ Fascis-
mo e storia” in II Fascismo, ed. C. Casucci (Bologna: II Mulino, 1961), p. 425. Croce
called fascism a parenthesis o f twenty years (in C. Casucci, p. 174). However, Croce
also saw the implications of fascism. The historical interpretation was stressed by most
Italians. G. A. Borgese, though he recognized the universal implications o f fascism, inter
preted it within the context o f the historical development of the Italian spirit since the
Middle Ages in Goliath, The March o f Fascism (New York: Viking Press, 1937). “Fas
cism was Italy’s autobiography” wrote G obetti in 1922, and the same words were re
peated a few years later by Rosselli, who considered fascism a “gigantic return to the
Italian’s past.” See P. G obetti, La rivoluzione liberale (Milan: Einaudi, 1949), p. 185;
and C. Rosselli, Socialismo liberale (Roma: Edizioni U, 1945), pp. 109-12. Along with
this emphasis on the historical characteristics of the Italian nation, other aspects o f its
long history were mentioned. A common theme is the weakness o f the Risorgimento in
terms of economic and social modernization.
2. See P. Togliatti, “ A proposito del fascismo,” in Λ fascismo, ed. C. Casucci (Bolog
na: II Mulino, 1961). Both Togliatti and the Communist party rejected the thesis o f the
last stage of capitalism (as in Guerin and others). They accepted the idea of the weakest
link in the capitalist world. See “Theses o f the Third Congress o f Italian Communist
Party in 1926,” Rinascita (1951): 94-98.
3. Until recently, the contributions o f Italian scholars to the study o f fascism re
mained in the field o f history. The lack o f sociological dimensions was noted by Renato
Treves, “ Interpretazioni sociologiche del fascismo,” Occidente (1953) : 371-91. This situ
ation is changing now, more by a sociologizing of history than by sociology itself. For
these and other pioneering interpretations in terms of class (specifically the crisis of the
middle class), see Renzo De Felice, Le interpretazioni del fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1972),
pp. 157-67.
4. Bibliographic references regarding these contributions will be given in the second

section.
5. An illustration of this trend is P. R. Viereck, Metapolitics (New York: Knopf,
1941) , tracing the historical origins o f the two souls o f Germany. An analysis of ideo
logies may be found in F. R. Stern, 'Die Politics o f Cultural Despair (Berkeley: Univer
sity of California Press, 1961).
6. See for instance J. L. Talmon, The Origins o f Totalitarian Democracy (London:
Seeker and Warburg, 1951).
7. In the thirties, the problem was posed in the context of modernization in Western
countries, and in terms o f the conflict between rationality and irrational and traditional
trends. A more complete example o f this approach was given by K. Mannheim in Man
and Society in an Age o f Reconstruction. The problem of the economic and social con
ditions required for the emergence and maintenance of representative democracy, and
new formulations o f totalitarianism both in earlier industrialized (Western) areas and in
presently developing ones, became prominent in the late fifties. Lipset, Political Man
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1960) is one o f the central contributions along this line. At
this stage of world history and scientific knowledge (or at least intellectual awareness),
the totalitarian oligarchy (to use Shils’s term) was seen as an alternative to moderniza
tion in underdeveloped countries. See E. Shils, “ Political Development in the New
States,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (1959-60).
8. In “The Decay o f German Democracy,” Political Quarterly (1953), F. Neumann
states: “German National Socialism is nothing but the dictatorship o f a monopolized
industry and of big estate owners, the nakedness of which is covered by the mask of a
corporative state.” But his Behemoth: 'Die Structure and Practice o f National Socialism,
1933-1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942) gives a more elaborate view.
Other illustrations of this trend are Μ. B. Sweezy, 77ie Structure o f the Nazi Economy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941); and R. A. Brady, 'Die Spirit and Structure
o f German Eascism (New York: Viking Press, 1937). In Italy, a formulation o f the class
hypothesis inspired in the Mosca-Pareto tradition but also similar to the Marxist ap
proach, can be found in G. Dorso, Dittatura, classe politica, e classe dirigente (Einaudi,
1949); and P. Togliatti, Lezioni sui fascismo (Rome: Ed. Riuniti, 1970); and many pres
ent writers.
9. Daniel Guerin, Fascisme et grand capital (Paris: Gallimard, 1945).
10. Guerin, ch. 2.
11. Harold Laski, Reflections on the Revolution in Our Time (London: Gollanes,
1942) . f
12. Guerin, ch. 6. Guerin sees the process occurring in two stages: the first in which
the “ plebeians” (an equivalent o f Laski’s outlaws) conquer all power and at least partial
ly remove the old ruling class, and a second stage characterized by the elimination of
plebeians and the rise o f a bureaucratic-military dictatorship. This change in fascist
leadership in Italy and the trend towards a bureaucratic and police dictatorship has been
recently documented in an excellent study by Alberto Aquarone, L ’organizzazione dello
stato totalitario (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), ch. 3.
13. The role o f charisma was stressed by F. Neumann, Behemoth. The evaluation of
early Marxist thought on fascism has been described and analyzed by John M. Cammet,
“Communist Theories of Fascism, 1920-1935,” Science and Society 31 (1967): 149-63.
14. I have omitted here an explicit reference to Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) mainly because I have lim
ited my interest to middle and short-range levels o f analysis. Moore’s central concern
lies in the long range, in the forms o f transition from feudalism to capitalism. The hy
potheses formulated by Moore seem compatible with the theoretical orientations adopted
here. Conditions characterizing the first steps in modernization as studied by Moore in
troduce predispositions favorable to either democratic or authoritarian solutions to the
dilemma o f modernization. However, they are not sufficient. Such predispositions will
be translated into historical reality only through other factors working at middle and
short range, such as those analyzed here. The entire process takes place in the context
o f structural contradictions inherent in modern society.
15. Max Scheler, El resentimiento en la moral (Buenos Aires: Espasa Calpe, 1938),
esp. pt. 1. For Scheler, situational factors are only one condition o f resentment; race
and heredity are the main determinants. In this as in other works, Scheler shares, along
with other representatives o f the German irrationalist orientation, many traits of nazi
ideology. Svend Ranulf, Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology (Copenhagen:
Levin and Munksgaard, 1938), introduction. Ranulf and the predominantly German
tradition are not the only source o f this type of analysis. One may mention Eugene
Raiga, L ’Envie: son role social (Paris: Alcan, 1932), who drawing mostly on French in
tellectual background, described a variety of social settings originating resentment.
16. Harold D. Lasswell, Ih e Analysis o f Political Behavior (London: Routledge &c
Kegan Paul, 1947), pp. 235-45 (from an article published in 1933 in Political Quarterly).
17. Erich Fromm, Ih e Pear o f Ereedom (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1942),
published in the United States in 1941 as Escape from Ereedom.
18. The im portant distinction between total fear and diffused anxiety, as opposed to
ordinary fear, was noted by K. Riezler, “The Social Psychology o f Fear,” American
Journal o f Psychology 40 (1944): 489-98. See also G. Germani “Anomia y desintegracion
social/‘Boletm del Instituto de Sociologia 4 (1945): 45-62.
19. T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).
20. D. Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
Riesman related this type to the marketing orientation described by Fromm in Man fo r
Himself
21. Adorno and some of his collaborators and Fromm belonged to the same scien
tific tradition. With Horkheimer, they were at the Institute for Social Research in Ger
many, where Fromm first conducted an inquiry into the German middle and working
classes. His whole theory o f authority stems from these early studies. The research was
published later in France: M. Horkheimer (ed.), Autorität und Eamilie (Paris: Alcan,
1936).
22. Edward A. Shils, “ Authoritarianism: ‘Right’ and ‘Left’,” in Studies in the Scope
and Method o f the Authoritarian Personality, ed. R. Christie and M. Jahoda (Glencoe:
Free Press, 1954). An attem pt to operationalize the distinction between right-and left-
wing authoritarianism was undertaken by H. J. Eysenck, dividing authoritarianism into
two dimensions: tendermindedness/toughmindedness and radical/conservative. H. J.
Eysenck, Ihe Psychology o f Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954). In the
literature on the psychology o f authoritarianism, another interesting attem pt may be
found in the studies published by Milton Rokeach et al., Ih e Open and Closed Mind
(New York: Basic Books, 1960).
23. K. Mannheim, esp. pt. 1, sect. 3 and pt. 2.
24. In the twenties, one o f the earliest versions was La rebelion de las masas, first
published by Jose Ortega y Gasset in 1926, in a series of articles. This, as did other works
of Ortega, exercised a deep influence in Latin America. In Italy at that time theories of
mass society were not frequently discussed in these terms. One may mention G. Perti-
cone, “Osservazioni sul regime di massa,” Rivista internationale di Eilosofia del Diritto
19 (1939); and idem, Studi sul regime di massa (Milan: Bocca, 1942).
25. R. Aron, L'H om m e contre les tyrans (New York: Maison Française, 1944).
26. W. Kornhauser, The Politics o f Mass Society (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959).
27. W. K. Deutsch, “ Social Mobilization and Political Development,” ch. 2, n. 1.
28. Germani, “ Algunas repercusiones” ; and idem, “La integracion de las masas,”
ch. 2, n. 5.
29. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1950).
30. An interpretation o f political development in Latin America based on this model
may be found in Germani, “Démocratie representative et classes populaires en Amérique
latine,” Sociologie du Travail 3 (1961): 96-113 (now incorporated in a revised version in
ch. 4).
31. E. Lederer, Ih e State o f the Masses (New York: Norton, 1940).
32. For a comparison between the composition o f the Nazi party in 1933 and 1935
and the occupational distribution o f the population, see H. Gerth, “The Nazi Party: Its
Leadership and Composition,” American Journal o f Sociology 45 (1940): 517-41. The
only figures available for the Fascist party are those given in a report to the party con-
gress in November 1921. These have been published by many historians, from Rossi,
La Naissance du fascisme (Paris: N RF, 1938), to the recent biography o f Mussolini by
R. De Felice, Mussolini il fascista (Turin: Einaudi, 1966). The works of Kornhauser
and Lipset provide information concerning different countries. For Peronism, see Ger
mani, Estructura social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1955), ch. 16, and ch. 6
in the present volume. On the Italian elite see H. D. Lasswell and R. Sereno, ‘T he Fas
cists: The Changing Italian Elite,” American Political Science Review 31 (1937): 914-29;
on the Nazi elite see D. Lerner et al. The Nazi Elite (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1951). Both studies indicate the middle- and lower-middle-class origins o f these elites.
The conclusion cannot be invoked by the class hypothesis since middle-class intellectuals
were also the predominant sector in communist elites. An im portant conclusion of the
Nazi study was the high proportion o f marginal men in the elite—both socially and
ecologically.
33. This is the thesis maintained by R. Bendix, “ Social Stratification and
Political Power,” in Class, Status and Power, ed. R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (Glencoe:
Free Press, 1953). Bendix also points out that most o f the support for the Nazi party
could have come from persons who in previous elections were nonvoters (younger
persons and “alienated individuals” ). The social background of these persons, however, is
not known.
34. Kornhauser, pp. 179-80.
35. Lipset, ch. 4. Also, S. M. Miller and F. Riessman, “Working Class Authoritari
anism: A Critique of Lipset,” The British Journal o f Sociology 12 (1961): 263-76, and
Lipset’s reply in the same issue.
36. C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).
37. Lipset, pp. 175-76.
38. Germani, La sociologia en America Latina (Eudeba, 1964, last chapter).
39. The distinction between sectors of a class as a function o f its historical future is
partly inspired by the principle of “ fundamental stratification” o f Theodor Geiger. See
Paolo Farneti, Theodor Geiger e la conscienza della societa industriale (Turin: Giappi-
chelli, 1966, pp. 76ff.).
40. On this fusion effect, see Germani, Politica y sociedad, ch. 3, sect. 10.
41. All preceding data are taken from C. Clark, The Conditions o f Economic
Progress (London: MacMillan, 1957); and R. Girod, Etudes sociologiques sur
les couches salariées: ouvriens et employes (Paris: Riviere, 1961). According to
Girod, in the middle of the nineteenth century (in correspondence with the phase
we have called paleocapitalist), distribution in the three sectors was the following: 50 per
cent primary, and the other half secondary and tertiary (but with strong predominance
o f the former).
42. Quoted by Farneti, p. 79.
43. R. Girod, p. 102 (Girod’s estimates are only applicable to the paleocapitalist and
neocapitalist phases).
44. This was written in 1968 (Sociologta de la modemazacion, p. 216). The oil
crisis and the recession after 1973 are putting on trial this requirement o f the uninter
ruptedness of growth as a condition for the stability o f the industrial system in its pres
ent advanced stage.
45. See ch. 2.
46. J. P. Graciarena, Poder y closes sociales en el desarrollo de America Latina
(Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1968).
47. Germani, “ Stages of Modernization in Latin America.”
48. By “ modernizing effects,” I refer to the acceleration o f different aspects of
social modernization under the impact of economic growth. Such acceleration
may, under some circumstances, cause a different sequence among the various
component subprocesses o f modernization and development. Decline in the death
rate, for instance, induces great population growth, which in turn causes internal
migration and urban growth. Higher urbanization will then precede industrialization,
contrary to the “firstcomers” experience in Europe and the United States. See “Stages
o f Modernization.”
49. Germani,Sociologia de la modernizacion, ch. 7.

50. For an analysis o f this phenomenon see Germani, “ Social and Political Conse
quences o f M obility,” in S. M. Lipset and N. J. Smelser.
51. I am using here Oscar Lewis’s well-known expression “urbanization w ithout
breakdown.”
52. C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy,
pp. 9-10. The definition has been summarized.
53. Juan J. Linz.
CHAPTER FOUR
LOWER-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM AND

NATIONAL POPULISM
LOWER-CLASS POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
The main purpose here is to analyze the role o f lower classes in national
populist movements and regimes both in the Latin American context and in
comparison with the European experience.
As in the case o f the middle classes, whose authoritarianism takes differ
ent ideological forms, national populism is only one ideology which may have
authoritarian com ponents. Also, it represents one of the channels through
which primary m obilization may be expressed.
At the more general level, analysis must also deal with the peculiar location
of lower-class ideologies both in the European historical context and in Latin
America. The present discussion will be conducted at the middle range of
analysis.
In the Western European tradition—at least up to the 1930s—urban lower
classes, particularly industrial workers, were considered the natural social
basis o f the Left. The com m on notion o f such a left wing included socialism
(of Marxist and non-Marxist orientation), internationalism, and often l ib e r
tarian (but not necessarily liberal) attitudes. Political apathy was widespread
not only within rural lower classes, but also among urban groups. In the
former, revolts occurred, but more often as in southern Italy,social protest
85
took the form of millenarian movements or social banditry. In the latter,

political mobilization o f lower classes proceeded slowly. Not only was the
right to organize in unions not recognized and had to be won through long
struggles, but also ideological social protest and political activism required
first the formation o f a working-class culture. This means the development of
a new type of social character, adapted to respond dynamically to the struc
tural conditions o f urban industrial life under capitalism. This process involves
much more than the resocialization o f the peasant migrant to the city, since
it must be rooted in the primary socialization o f two or more successive gen
erations o f workers’ children.
The urban working-class culture created under early capitalism was alien
ated from national society; socialism, internationalism, and anarchism were
the most appropriate ideologies for the more advanced sectors o f the working
class. Even for the less politicized, the dichotom ous vision o f the social struc
ture, the deep cleavage between “us” (the poor, the working class) and “them ”
(the rich, the bourgeoisie, the authorities), made the rising political and syn
dicalist organizations o f the Left the natural political expression o f the lower
urban strata and the awakening rural worker. Maybe the complex ideologies,
Marxist and non-Marxist alike, were not understood by the less educated or
by most o f the lower class, but they were still perceived as representing the
parties o f the poor rather than o f the rich. Centrist and rightist ideologies
and parties were considered the normal political choice for middle and higher
classes. A powerful image of class political alignments was thus incorporated
into the political culture o f many European countries.
How much this stereotype corresponded to the actual distribution of
political attitudes and behavior cannot be precisely established. The meaning
of class as a determinant o f political orientation varies according to social
structure and political culture. It also changes in relation to historical epoch
and ideological climate. But it is plausible that while European working
classes tended to be politically leftist or supported movements so considered,
the middle and higher classes leaned mostly towards parties and ideologies of
the Right.
Two observations must qualify the preceding statem ent. First, it is com
mon among social scientists and historians to im pute certain ideologies to
given social classes. This assumes that class is a historical actor, a unified sub
ject, not a nominal category of concrete individuals. This assumption involves
serious methodological problems which will not be considered here. When
class is considered as a category, then the statistical distribution o f opinions
among the members of each social category must be taken into account. Often
the political opinions o f a majority o f the category will coincide with the ide
ology im puted to it by the social scientist. But there will always be im portant
deviations from the modal opinion. These must be interpreted either as collec
tive phenomena (for instance, as peculiar to a specific segment o f the class) or
as individual deviations.
LOWER-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM 87
Second, the meaning o f the terms Right and Left is not clear. In the first
place they m ust be perceived in relative terms, on the basis o f national politi
cal culture. Also, there have been im portant changes in the last seventy years.
At the beginning o f the century, those terms seemed sufficiently clear. Since
then, changes have considerably blurred a distinction which seemed so evi
dent, above all the appearance o f movements and ideologies which included
elements typical o f opposite tendencies. Let us examine the most im portant
cases.
Authoritarianism o f the Left. This includes totalitarian movements and
regimes. Although tradition dating from the eighteenth century connects the
Left with the affirm ation o f liberty, authoritarian forms o f the Left, even
when they have kept the same terminology, adopt a very different orientation.1
Such an orientation is evidenced on two levels: first, in relation to indivi
dual rights (liberty o f thought, o f expression, etc.); second, in relation to
methods o f delegating and controlling power. Citizens within party organiza
tions or within the state where these movements have gained power, lose the
powers accruing to them in the scheme o f democratic organization.2
Nationalism o f the Left. Until World War I, the more leftist an ideology,
the more it appeared linked to internationalism . Since then not only have
movements appeared connecting the classic postulates o f the Left (especially
in the socioeconomic terrain) with nationalist positions, but also most move
ments o f the Left have lost their internationalist connotations and become
more nationalistic. We are dealing with a new type o f nationalism, which on
the Left and Right profoundly differs from nineteenth-century nationalism.
Ideologies o f the Right with socialist content . Movements otherwise con
nected to the rightist tradition have adopted socioeconomic ideologies o f a
socialist or collectivist nature. Here also a long series o f reservations and clari
fications are necessary in relation to the real character o f this socialism
(pseudosocialism according to some). Nevertheless, where it has triumphed, it
has given rise to social regimes very different from those postulated by what
we identify as the traditional Right.
The use o f the expression “ideologies considered to be leftist” in the main
statement on working-class ideologies was intended to allow for the possibili
ties indicated briefly in the above paragraphs. There are many more, o f course.
To clarify this expression, it can be said that the empirically observed propen
sity in working classes is to adopt ideologies and movements considered leftist
(usually classified as leftist in the European political culture), although they
may contain elements (at times o f major significance) assignable to the tradi
tion of the Right. All this makes classification difficult. In any case, it is based
more on the concrete political history o f each movement and its social mean
ing than on its ideological content.
Changes over time within the same ideology and political organization.
As sociostructural conditions change, internally as well as internationally, a
given ideology and its party organization may substantially modify their politi-
cal practice while still maintaining the same name and manifest content. Such
was the case of socialist parties and most labor unions organized in pre-World
War I Europe. More recently, this process has culminated with Eurocommu
nism. The phenomenon is an im portant aspect o f the increasing incorporation
of lower classes into national society and a result o f modifications in the stra
tification system (from paleo- to neocapitalist structure). New conditions are
created which facilitate the democratization and liberalization o f hitherto
more authoritarian ideologies and parties.
Populism and the Right/Left dichotomy. It is in populist movements that
the coexistence of opposite Right and Left ideologies are more prominent.
But populism has a relation to pure rightist or leftist ideologies different
from the mixed cases enumerated above. The difference lies in the fact that
populism often becomes a mass movement only in societies where typical
Western European leftist ideologies o f the working class fail to develop into
mass parties.
Populism itself tends to deny any identification with or classification into
the Right/Left dichotomy. It is a multiclass movement, although not all multi-
class movements may be considered populist. Populism probably defies any
comprehensive definition. Leaving aside this problem for the m om ent, popu
lism usually includes contrasting components such as a claim for equality of
political rights and universal participation for the common people, but fused
with some sort o f authoritarianism often under charismatic leadership. It
also includes socialist demands (or at least a claim for social justice), vigorous
defense of small property, strong nationalist com ponents, and denials of the
importance of class. It is accompanied with the affirmation of the rights of
the common people as against the privileged powerful interest groups, usually
considered inimical to the people and the nation. Any o f these elements may
be stressed according to cultural and social conditions, but they are all
present in most populist movements.
GENERAL CONDITIONS AND DETERMINANTS OF

LOWER-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM AND NATIONALISM
The connection often established between lower classes and leftist and in
ternationalist ideologies is a historical product peculiar to certain Western
European countries and not to a universal law. This does not prevent the
possibility o f a useful comparison between nineteenth-century European
experience and other social and cultural contexts. The following statem ents, to
be considered no more than plausible conjectures, are mostly originated from
that European perspective.
First in the urban-industrial societies whose transition from the preindus
trial stage took place in the past century, the working class prefers parties
placed to the Left. When a distinction is made between a democratic and an
authoritarian Left, the latter is adopted by sectors located in lower and more
disadvantaged positions within the lower strata.3 The expression “more to

the Left” alludes to the relative nature o f this political classification. In the
United States, where im portant parties equivalent to European socialism or
communism are lacking, the Left is replaced by the Democratic party.
Second, in the same category o f societies, when the social composition o f
the leftist party includes a diversified gamut o f positions, the modal attitude
of subgroups socially lower than the party mass is comparatively more author
itarian than that o f better situated groups. These propositions are fundamental
for mass parties or significant national groups, and not for small parties in
which different phenom ena can be observed.
The rise o f nationalist authoritarian movements (classifiable as rightist)
characterized by collectivist or socialist positions in the socioeconomic sphere
(at least within egalitarian or pseudoegalitarian connotations), has usually oc
curred in countries in which: (1) industrialization and urbanization came later
or is in the process o f development; (2) the working class or large sectors
thereof are acquiring political significance ; and (3) the achievement o f nation
al independence is relatively recent or in the process o f development as regards
the formation o f a national consciousness as well from the legal or economic
viewpoint.
It is not possible to cite here organized or relatively systematized empirical
evidence. The generalization is supported, however, by well-known examples
of countries in Europe, Asia, and, with certain reservations, Latin America. In
these regions, movements have arisen supported by different ideological tradi
tions which nevertheless united the features o f authoritarianism and national
ism with partially or totally collectivist or statist forms o f economy. In all
these cases, antibourgeois, anticapitalist, and antiimperalist positions have been
adopted, whose meaning can vary considerably in the different movements.
Before continuing, it is necessary to point out other im portant circumstan
ces regarding the countries which have developed more fully and earlier the
urban-industrial type of society.
The incorporation o f the working class into the national society did not
occur (de facto or de jure) at the same time for all subgroups. By virtue of
mechanisms which were not specifically political (especially union organiza
tions), and in part through formal and informal political mechanisms, the
political integration o f the working class took place gradually, first for the
better situated groups (specialized workers, etc.), the so-called working-class
aristocracy, and only later for lower groups. The process passed through sev
eral stages whose characteristics and duration varied according to the country.
As described in another section, the sequence is often the following: first, a
period o f lim ited democracy in which effective rights were exercised only by
the upper class and the old middle class; the mechanisms o f public opinion
correspond m ost closely to those postulated by the rationalist ideologies o f the
eighteenth century.4 Then, the rise o f the elite o f the working classes; and
finally, the universal extension o f political rights, which were not always ef-
fectively exercised at the same time by all groups. This process o f fundamental
democratization (Mannheim) occurred in some cases slowly and at other times
quickly. In some countries it occurred after a tenacious resistance on the part
of the upper class, and in others by successive concessions, more or less paci
fic. At times, the transition was made w ithout excessive traum a, at other
times, in an almost explosive manner that accompanied or immediately fol
lowed profound socioeconomic changes, as for example an immediate reper
cussion of a transformation o f the social structure due to an accelerated
process of urbanization and industrialization.
In Europe, nationalist attitudes and even the sentim ent o f belonging to a
nation were initially characteristic o f upper and middle classes (explaining
their traditional linkages with positions o f the Right). Only later did nation
alist sentiments spread among working classes (in accordance with Tarde’s
principle o f downward diffusion o f cultural patterns and in connection with
changes in the domestic and international situation). This coincided with the
beginning of world conflict and the twilight o f the extrem e internationalist
stance o f nineteenth-century leftist movements. This process o f nationaliza
tion is another aspect o f fundamental dem ocratization similar to the political
integration o f the masses.5
There is a third circumstance which occupies an essential place in this at
tem pt to explain certain aspects o f working-class authoritarianism. We are
referring to the change o f ideological climate between the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. During the period o f the rise o f democratic regim es-
corresponding to certain structural changes in urban-industrial societies—
the ideological climate could be defined as prevalently democratic. But since
World War I and the violent forces produced by that conflict, the dominant
ideology o f the previous period suffered a major decline. In countries where
democracy was more firmly established, it could resist this decline, even when
authoritarian or totalitarian movements appeared and when political phe
nomena were produced which signified changes and adaptations in pre
existing forms. But in other countires, democratic institutions were in open
crisis and were replaced by regimes which constituted their negation.
This change in ideological climate to which we alluded did not represent
merely a modification of the psychosocial order or an alteration o f attitudes,
but rather it was correlated to profound changes in social structure. It
would be impossible to attem pt to describe these changes; we will only note
that the great transformation which led to the present mass society funda
mentally changed the relation between the elites and the rest o f the popula
tion, accentuating the separation between both. This was joined with the
growing depersonalization and instrum entalization o f interpersonal relations,
the correlated tendency to consider them a technical problem o f manage
ment or manipulation, and the change in the meaning and function o f ideolo
gies used increasingly by the elites as technical means to facilitate or carry
out such manipulation. We may recall here the im portance o f advertising and
propaganda, and the technical changes in mass communication which m odi

fied persuasion techniques. N othing was more significant in this respect than
the evolution o f the concept o f public opinion—a reflection o f changes in the
social reality.
While the eighteenth century postulated that political attitudes were the
product o f individual rational and reflexive thought, many twentieth-century
theories (the sociology o f Pareto, psychoanalysis, etc.), perceived them as ra
tionalizations o f unconscious impulses, whose real purpose escapes the subject
himself. The totalitarian current o f the Right, in its first doctrinal phase, and
also in the affirm ations o f its leaders, frankly adm itted this situation; remem
ber as typical the use o f m yths to channel the action o f the masses according
to Sorel or Mussolini; and Pareto’s theory o f derivations.6
Although a certain degree o f Machiavellianism, a certain distinction be
tween means and ends, is typical o f all political activity, the above elements
contributed to a greater accentuation o f such a tendency, leading to an abso
lute distinction between the tw o. It is significant that this indifference to the
means with respect to the ends reached maximum intensity in the totalitarian
movements o f the Right and Left. These events made possible the appearance
of political movements in which the purposes o f the elites and those o f the
masses they led could differ very greatly at times. We even find the affirma
tion—with extreme clarity in totalitarian doctrines o f the Right—that the goal
of political activity for the leader is simply to command. Power appears then
as an end in itself which does not need another justification, and ideology
thus reveals its role as a pure instrum ent for the domination or management
of the masses. This change in the attitudes o f the elites also responds to modi
fications in their sociological and psychological characteristics. This is clear in
respect to rightist totalitarianism ; the social origin and other characteristics
of these movements differed profoundly from previous conservative or right
ist elites. It is not equally clear in leftist totalitarianism; perhaps this is due to
its connection with political traditions o f the democratic Left.
These changes in the elites depended to a high degree on changes which
occurred in each national society. Democratization variously affected the po
liticization o f both the masses and elites. Where the rise o f a mass society did
not rupture or displace entire sectors o f the population (such as occurred in
Germany and Italy), it did not lead to radical changes in the nature of elites.
In many cases, especially when this process o f structural change coincided
with the accentuation o f nationalism in the masses, or was combined with
colonial or semicolonial situations in the economic or juridical spheres,
change in the elites also exhibited some characteristics pointed out by Mann
heim with reference to prenazi Germ any.7 For example, the process of coun
tercolonization (M. J. Bonn) by which part o f the local elites (especially the
intellectuals) isolate themselves from universalist cultural tendencies and in
so doing abandon values typical o f modern thought for so-called local tradi
tions. The proclam ation o f the principles o f race, blood, and soil, so charac-
teristic of the totalitarianism o f the European Right, is not exclusive to them.

In colonial or ex-colonial countries with leftist or rightist ideologies very simi
lar principles appear, although the manifest expressions vary.
The affirmation o f local values and traditions at the expense o f and in
contrast to values of modern society provides another essential element to
comprehend the nature of authoritarianism in certain elites and lower classes,
particularly in areas o f delayed m odernization. Modern society is the only
one to include as a central ideology the affirm ation o f the individual, of
liberty, and other contents found in democratic forms o f government. Among
these, the inclusion of the ideology o f change as a normal social process is of
particular importance. Two illustrations are found in the development o f sci
ence (the temporary character o f its propositions and the existence o f a mech
anism for change) and in the sociopolitical sphere (with the affirm ation and
recognition of change in the organization o f society).
The opposite often holds in other cultures. In them we do not find com
parable affirmations about individual liberty or the legitimacy o f change. On
the contrary, the affirmation of tradition, very strong even in the West before
the Renaissance and the appearance o f modern urban-industrial societies, is
an essential element for securing social stability. And the traditional in all so
cieties includes a strong authoritarian com ponent. In denying m odern culture
or some of its central values (perceiving it not as a universal acquisition, but
as an alien cultural form which has predom inated by political, military, or
economic means), and in affirming their respective national traditions, elites
inevitably incorporate authoritarian elements o f tradition. Preexisting cul
tural authoritarian features fuse with ideological authoritarian elements arisen
from the processes indicated above.
This mechanism is also observable in countries long incorporated to the
West. Here, as was shown by Mannheim, the process is borne out by the ac
centuation o f national peculiarities (including local folklore) and the return
to pre-Renaissance forms, thereby idealizing traditional society and its af
firmation o f stability, authority and individual submission.
This phenomenon not only throws light on authoritarian attitudes as
sumed by certain national elites but it also illuminates similar tendencies in
the masses. Here too the dominance o f tradition is connected to preindustrial
life forms. The transition to urban industrial society, especially it it occurs
brusquely or with serious conflict, does not modify attitudes appropriate to
the new way o f life. The old authoritarian cultural patterns viable in tradi
tional society subsist in the new situations, but cannot be applied to appropri
ate objects since the context has changed. Here authoritarian tendencies
which arise in mass society can combine attitudes and m otivations o f the elites
with the traditional authoritarian predispositions o f the lower classes. The
authoritarianism which we term “traditional·* is fused here with ideological
authoritarianism. If the former is in a passive or latent state—due to social
changes—the latter can reactivate it and generate movements which tend to
implant non democratic forms. Similarly, ethnocentrism proper to a tradi

tional society fuses with ideological nationalism. In this case, lower-class
nationalism is not m ediated through the democratic nationalism of leftist
parties inherited from the nineteenth-century liberal tradition.8
A last consideration involves a general characteristic o f contemporary
political behavior. Numerous studies have proven the strength of political
traditions in determ ining ideology. A party or political orientation which has
been accepted by certain social groups and also becomes identified as an ex
pression o f these groups, after a period o f time, usually more than a genera
tion, acquires stability. It can resist even modifications of the social structure
that change the social characteristics o f the groups with which it is identified.
One essential mechanism in* this phenom enon is that, with time, political be
havior acquires the same character—and stability—as cultural norms. This
mechanism involves primary groups, in particular the family, that is, those
which carry out the endoculturation o f individuals. The same political behav
ior acquires the habitual forms appropriate to irreflexive cultural norms.9
This phenom enon is observed not only in given political orientations, but
can refer to the ideology underlying the system o f political institutions. It is
probably in this way that a democratic tradition is formed through which
this generic political attitude becomes a part o f the culture. This throws light
on the apparent paradox where, for example, psychologically authoritarian
individuals in the United States or Switzerland appear to uphold democracy.
Here we are dealing with a value inherent in the national culture, such as the
“American way o f life,” for example.
CONCLUSIONS ON LOWER CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM

AND NATIONALISM 1
1. The integration o f the masses into politics was not carried out at the
same time in all countries, nor for all subgroups o f the working class within
a single country. In some cases the transition was brusque and traum atic, in
others it was more gradual.
2. In Europe (and other firstcomers), nationalism diffused from the upper
and middle classes to the workers. Consequently, internationalism o f the Left
lost importance.
3. The ideological climate prevailing during the past century was demo
cratic. It was later m odified, resulting much more favorable—under conditions
of mass society—to authoritarian orientations.
4. The elites increased their separation from the masses. They increasingly
tended to manipulate them employing ideology as a mere instrum ent of dom
ination. A gap was created between the aims o f the elite and those o f the
masses. Relations between ends and means became purely instrum ental, with
an extreme Machiavellianism in political action.
5. The social and psychological characteristics o f the elites change. In a

parallel process to that o f change in the masses (available masses, available
elites), there are now groups psychologically and socially disposed to carry
Machiavellianism to its ultimate limits. Furtherm ore, through the process of
countercolonization, these elites base their national peculiarities on values of
the local traditional society. This applies to the Left and Right.
6. In traditional societies, authoritarianism is also an essential element.
The process o f modernization is largely one o f W esternization (as it was called
in the nineteenth century). Modern values, insofar as pertaining to Western
culture, are considered alien to national culture, and are rejected. This process
takes place both in the masses and the elites; traditional values subsist (among
them, authoritarianism), which through the effect o f the creation o f mass
society and the political action o f the elites fuse with authoritarian ideologies.
Thus, traditional authoritarianism and ideological authoritarianism reinforce
each other in the lower classes.
7. In formerly colonial or dependent countries, the use o f nationalism to
appeal to the masses was possible and highly effective insofar as the foreign
dominant power could be singled out as a sort o f class enemy o f the common
people. Class and national loyalties could be fused and rooted in the tradi
tional ethnocentrism diffused in the society.
8. Finally, we must remember the strength o f political traditions, and the
fact that once established a political culture becomes very stable.
With all these elements, we are ready to examine certain authoritarian
attitudes in the lower classes. The lower class in a country—or certain sub
groups thereof—will be more disposed to support movements o f an authori
tarian and nationalist orientation (rightist or leftist) the later their political
integration and the more traumatic the transition from a preindustrial to an
industrial society and the process o f fundamental dem ocratization has been.
In countries in which democratic mechanisms started to function earlier and
in a favorable ideological climate, these values were incorporated into the po
litical tradition and maintained relative stability even when other transforma
tions took place. In countries in which the incorporation into politics took
place, later, the elites' character had changed and the ideological climate was
very different. Consequently »authoritarianism and nationalism were used in the
ideological struggle. This occurred not only due to structural changes in the
society, changes in the elite, etc., but also because the preexisting authoritari
an attitudes of masses, still impregnated by traditional culture, could be used.
Thus, while in the case of firstcomers the political integration o f the masses
helped transform the old attitudes rooted in traditional structure, in societies
in which the process of democratization occurred later, the opposite process
took place. Ideological action tended to reinforce and to fuse with cultural or
traditional authoritarianism.
This same scheme explains the differential political behavior o f working-
class subgroups in the same country. As m entioned above, the more authori-
tarian positions were usually adopted by sectors located in lower and more
disadvantaged groups in the social structure when they achieved political rele
vance. Their admission into national political life took place in an epoch in
which the unchallenged predominance o f a democratic climate was a thing o f
the past.
Finally, let us rem em ber that an abrupt or traum atic transition process
impedes the form ation o f a democratic tradition. It accentuates the problems
of a mass society and makes adaptation to change difficult.
POPULISM AND LOWER-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM
On the basis o f the previous discussion and the provisional definition o f

populism already suggested (a multiclass movement expressed in some sort o f
Left/Right heterogeneous ideology), we will now consider at a very general
level the conditions under which the political participation o f the lower class
is channeled through a populist movement.
Some o f these conditions appear identical to those which prevent the lower
class or some part thereof from being politically mobilized through a class-
based movement or party or union organization. We may remember that the
development o f a class consciousness capable o f being politically expressed
is rooted in the form ation o f a working-class culture, a process that takes two
or more generations. Rapid structural changes and/or traum atic events may
trigger or accelerate the displacement o f large masses making them available
for m obilization when a new social character has not yet developed and no
working-class based political organization has attained enough visibility to be
come the only or natural channel to express the political activism o f new mo
bilizing masses. In a situation o f this type, lower-class mobilization may be
expressed through a m ultiparty and populist movement. If this actually hap
pens, the kind o f populism it will be depends on other conditons. Among
those, I believe three are very im portant—at least if we take into account the
Latin American experience.
The first is the antagonism between the middle class (or im portant sectors
of them) and the upper class (upper bourgeoisie or aristocracy) for control
and participation in social, economic and/or cultural power.
The second is the relatively recent form ation o f middle classes, particularly
the urban middle class. Even if a small urban middle class existed for a longer
time, along with archaic interm ediate strata, the growth o f its modern sectors
must have proceeded at a fairly fast rate. That is, the stratification profile
must have changed rapidly with the enlargement o f the middle positions in
the social pyram id. This m odification necessarily causes a high rate o f upward
mobility from the lower strata. High m obility in turn has a double effect. On
one hand, middle classes are o f fairly recent origin and feel displaced and in
an incongruent position within the society (i.e., higher education and occupa
tion, low political power and prestige). On the other hand, lower classes (also
of recent origin as lower urban strata) are less isolated in a more open and
less stratified society, both in terms o f opportunities for upward mobility and
in terms of hierarchization of interpersonal relationships. The latter phenom
enon is a side effect caused by the rapid ascent o f lower-class persons into
middle-class positions. This means that most family and friendship networks
continue to extend across class lines, and neighborhoods are less segregated
and more heterogeneous in terms o f class.
A third condition is that the original culture includes some more egalitar
ian patterns, as compared with Western Europe. In most cases, this trait may
be caused or reinforced by the weight o f mass foreign immigration in the
formation of the national society, for example, the European (immigrant)
colonies in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, some Brazilian
states, and Australia. The crucial factor is the uprootedness o f the population
coupled with the open social and physical space which provides many op
portunities to participate in the building o f a new society. The availability
and propensity for an active and creative answer to existing challenges is
matched by actual and concrete possibilities in social and economic activities.
Given these three conditions, the rise o f multiclass populist movements is
greatly facilitated by two factors. First by the isolation o f working class which
prevents or delays the formation o f a well-structured social and political con
sciousness of their own, and secondly by the rising middle class’ need to obtain
mass support in their struggle against the ruling class and to win a larger and
more egalitarian share of power, or satisfy their social, cultural or economic
demands (that is, to obtain status reequilibration).
All multiclass movements that include large lower-class support usually in
clude specific populist ideological traits. These vary in weight and nature ac
cording to the relative strength and weight o f the various class com ponents
within the movement, the nature o f the demands, the historical epoch, and
the peculiarities of the national social structure and preexisting political
culture.
In Latin America several types o f populism have occurred, but I will men
tion here only liberal populism and national populism. Liberal populism,
occurred when middle classes demanded political participation and urban
lower classes were weak both in number and degree o f mobilization (or in
some other way restricted in their political weight, as in the Argentine case),
National populism evolved when demands were not only political but social
and economic as well and the weight o f lower classes was m uch higher in
number, degree of mobilization, and capacity to organize. The first type of
populism was typical of the liberal historical epoch, that is, pre-World War I,
while the second form occurred mostly after 1930 in the epoch o f mass
mobilization.
There are other kinds o f populism and national populism as well, partic
ularly if we consider the potential for rural lower-class participation and the
varying composition o f middle*class and elite com ponents. A very im portant
case o f agrarian participation is the Mexican Revolution o f 1910-20, in which

middle class demands for political power coincided with a peasant rebellion
for land, and the populistic coalition included the traditionally mobilized
rural lower class. A nother illustration o f nonrural and rural lower class parti
cipation would be the Bolivian MNR. A more elaborate analysis o f national
populist movements requires clarification o f the diverse empirical cases, »but
since the concept is discussed in the following sections and in the analysis of
the Argentine case, the foregoing considerations are limited to the purpose of
a general introduction to the subject.10
ENLARGEMENT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND
PARTICIPATION CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA
This and the following sections will analyze the place o f national populism
in the political mobilization of Latin American lower classes and compare it
to the analogous process in Europe. Lower-class mobilization must be per
ceived within the context o f political development. In Latin America we may
use a scheme o f transition that entails six successive stages. There are intrinsic
limitations in this procedure. N ot only does it oversimplify a complex proc
ess, but also it ignores many im portant differences and contrasts in the transi
tion o f individual countries. For instance, while in some cases we may observe
a clear succession o f the six stages, others overlap considerably. Furtherm ore,
the fact that transition occurred under different historical conditions intro
duces other im portant m odifications. However, provided one remains fully
aware o f its lim itations, a construct o f this type provides a synthetic picture
of the total dynamics o f the process. When comparing national historical
processes it is useful in highlighting differences and similarities. Further
more, these stages provide a basis for describing the present situation of var
ious countries, which differ widely in their degree of political modernization
and have reached one or another o f the different stages.
Our analysis herein refers to the extension o f political participation. We are
not dealing with the whole process o f political and social m odernization.11
The conceptual scheme regarding release, m obilization, and reintegration
form ulated in a previous chapter will be applied here to the extension o f polit
ical participation. We m ust also m ention as relevant the uneven nature o f tran
sition. In Latin America, the phenom enon o f geographical and social asynchro-
nism is great. The dual character o f the countries is expressed in the contrast
between the socially developed higher and middle strata and the backward,
more primitive, lower strata. It is also evident geographically by the cleavage
between certain areas in which m ost o f the urban population industry, edicat-
ed people, wealth, and political power are concentrated, and the rest o f the
country, predom inantly rural, that is economically subsistent, illiterate, and
politically inactive and powerless. In Latin America the transition cannot be
understood w ithout taking into account the repercussions o f this dual structure.
Social development involves first, the extension o f the m odern way o f life
to a growing proportion o f the people living in the most favored areas. This
entails the emergence o f an urban middle class and a modern industrial prole
tariat in the “central” region o f a country. Second, development entails the
incorporation of the marginal population living in “peripheral” areas by mas
sive mobilization either in the form o f internal migration or through geo
graphical diffusion of modernization. This tem poral succession involves that
at any given m om ent different “geological” strata coexist within each given
social class, formed by the successive waves o f mobilization. This geological
stratification can be observed both within the middle and upper classes and
in the proletariat. The degree o f homogeneity to be reached within each stra
tum will finally depend on the historical and social conditions under which
the mobilization and reintegration o f each successive wave occurred.
The circumstances o f the process and especially its speed are o f the utm ost
importance for the political equilibrium o f the country. The six stages which
may be distinguished in the extension o f political participation are the following.
1. Revolutions, liberation wars, and formal proclamation o f independence.
2. Civil wars, caudilloism, and anarchy.
3. Unifying autocracies.
4. Representative democracies with limited participation (oligarchy).
5. Representative democracies with enlarged participation.
6. Three main alternative forms o f total participation may appear: (a)
representative democracy with total participation, that is, effective
voting o f at least 60-70 percent o f the adult population; (b) national
populist movements and regimes, that is, some form o f plebiscite de
mocracy under a charismatic leader with strong com ponents o f the
old caudillo political culture; (c) authoritarian socialism under a char
ismatic leader, with the same cultural com ponent.
Stages i and 2. During the first two stages, o f different duration in differ
ent countries, the traditional social structure tended to predom inate; a subsis
tence economy largely isolated and a dual strata system characterized by little
mobility and caste-like relationships. In the cities, some interm ediate groups
perhaps did exist. However, their importance at the level o f the larger society
was small. Spaniards and Portugese were the ruling group. Immediately below
them we find the small creole elite o f European descent and mainly urban,
who while deprived o f political power still belonged (subjectively as well as ob
jectively) to the higher stratum and retained a dom inant economic and cultural
position. This creole elite brought about the revolutions and achieved national
independence with the support o f the lower strata, including the mestizos
and even part o f the outcast group o f Negroes and Indians who filled the arm
ies o f the independence wars. The creoles were inspired mainly by the Ameri
can Revolution, the French Revolution, and eighteenth-century Enlighten
ment. They attem pted to establish modern democratic states with their corres
ponding symbols: the constitution, parliament, elected rulers.
There were two basic limitations to their action. The first may be found in
creole elite itself. It was the expression o f a traditional structure, which des
pite its ideology still perceived itself as an aristocracy widely separated from
the popular strata. They dreamed o f a limited democracy o f wealthy, edu
cated, well-bred men o f proper origins. On the other hand, the prevailing
social condition was scarcely adequate for establishing representative demo
cracy. Powerful geographic as well as ethnic, cultural, and economic factors
made such an undertaking utopian.
The outcome was that even before the end o f the long and harsh wars o f
independence against the Spaniards, the constitutional fictions created by the
urban elites broke down. The political and institutional vacuum resulting
from the disappearance o f the colonial administration and the failure o f con
stitutional fictions resulted in a geographic fragmentation o f political power:
the rise o f local caudillos, often o f mestizo or even Indian or Negro origin,
frequent local wars, and a rapid succession o f military coups. When compared
with the autocratic and even monarchist tendencies of the liberal elites, the
caudillos represented a form o f elemental democracy. It was based essentially
on personal loyalty and admiration for the virtues o f the chief (frequently o f
common origin and often belonging to the deprived ethnic groups—mestizos
Indian, m ulatto, or Negro). This regime o f caudillos implied the maintenance
of the traditional social structure: a primitive state o f economy and social
isolation o f m ost o f the population.
The army o f the caudillos was seldom more than an armed band under the
leadership o f a self-appointed general. At this stage we do not find any pro
fessional army in Latin America. The political position o f the caudillos often
compelled them to adopt the symbols both o f an army and democratic re
gimes. Geographic fragmentation took the form o f a federal state; the rule of
the caudillo was absolute: he was both president and general o f the army.
Stage 3. The struggle among caudillos within a country was replaced by
the hegemony o f one o f them . The unity o f the state was restored and a de
gree o f order and stability achieved. However, the character o f these unifying
dictatorships differed very widely. For our purpose they may be classified in
to two main categories: regressive dictatorships, which maintained the tradi
tional pattern intact, and enlightened dictatorships, which introduced some
modernizing measures. The most im portant difference between the two lies
in the economic sphere. The former maintained their countries isolated from
the world m arket, and the old subsistence economy continued to predomi
nate. The latter fostered a minimum degree o f economic development through
the construction o f means o f transportation and communication, moderniza
tion o f agriculture, educational innovation, organization o f the public bureau
cracy, etc.
Generally, it was these enlightened authoritarian regimes and the limited
democracies which marked the beginning o f the transformation o f Latin
American countries into producers o f raw materials and their integration into
the world market. Foreign capital was introduced, the beginnings o f industri-
alization took place, and these changes began to produce some im pact on the
social structure. While they left untouched the main features o f the traditional
pattern—the concentration o f land ownership, the two-class system, the isola
tion of the great majority o f the population—they introduced dynamic fac
tors which produced further changes. The integration o f the country into the
world m arket and the degree o f economic m odernization often fostered the
emergence of new urban middle occupational strata. While they remained a
relatively small proportion o f the total population and continued to be iden
tified with the traditional upper class, these urban strata also represented an
essential precondition for further changes.
Stage 4. The changes in the social structure under a lim ited democracy
were often only slightly more pronounced than those introduced by the en
lightened dictatorships. In other cases the m odification was more substantial.
This happened chiefly when the modernizing attitudes o f the elites were
bolder and the resulting economic and cultural changes more profound. In
some cases, the contribution o f massive immigration from Europe (a part of
the modernizing policy o f the elite) was a decisive elem ent in the transfor
mation of the social structure.
The most significant features o f this stage are the formal functioning o f
democracy, the existence o f a party system, the periodic replacem ent o f the
government through elections, and freedom o f the press and other constitu
tional guarantees. A distinctive feature is the lim itation o f democracy to only
a fraction o f the total population. This lim itation is tw ofold. On one hand,
the existing deep cleavage between developed and backward areas within a
given country involved the exclusion o f a substantial proportion o f the popu
lation, practically all those living in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, a
similar cleavage existed within the central areas, between elites and emerging
middle strata in contrast to the lower groups. Often the cleavage had an eth
nic basis (even if we cannot speak o f racial discrimination in Latin America).
Both kinds o f cleavage, geographic and social, m eant the lack o f a common
basis for real national identification on the part o f a substantial proportion
of the population, and a lack o f cultural and economic participation. In
consequence, the functioning o f democracy was lim ited in the sense that
only the higher strata and the small newly form ed middle groups, living in
the central areas identified themselves with the elite, and were able to par
ticipate in the political process even at the level o f voting. The lower classes,
even those living in urban areas and in the central regions, were still mostly
traditional (or non-participating in national politics as in the case o f first
generation immigrants).
Stage 5. In some countries, the middle classes were able to originate po
litical movements which fought for an enlarged democracy. This was possi
ble when such strata had expanded to a larger proportion o f the total popu
lation and had acquired a greater psychological and social autonom y. They
no longer identified with the elites but became conscious o f their own
identity, even if sometimes such identity was based only on antagonism.

Often these enlarged middle classes had different origins than the restricted
middle classes o f the previous stage. O ften, their economic basis was differ
ent, for example, industrial instead o f commercial activities or new types of
manufacturing industries. But by far the largest increase in the middle classes
was from the expansion o f the public and private bureaucracies and the ser
vice sector, th at is, white collar employees.
Enlarged participation was usually expressed by populism o f the type men
tioned previously, that is, o f multiclass com position, including middle strata
and the recently mobilized sectors o f the urban lower class (or in some coun
tries, o f the rural population), and emphasizing the value o f the people as
the repository o f higher values, rather than the oligarchic ethos. The people
were considered more nationally authentic than the Westernized and cosmo
politan upper class. At the same time, these parties and movements fully ac
cepted the liberal-democratic ideologies usually embodied in the nineteenth-
century constitutions, formally accepted and proclaimed (although not prac
ticed) by the ruling oligarchy. It was in this epoch, before the age o f the crisis
of Western dem ocracy, that a sort o f liberal populism, endowed with strong
nationalist propensities developed. Often it had the authoritarian traits linked
to charismatic leadership.
The typical structure corresponding to this stage is still that o f the dual
society. The “central” region comprises most o f the urban population, indus
try, literate people, the middle strata, and the modern urban proletariat, es
pecially the industrial workers. This region contrasts sharply with other re
gions which still remained outside o f this development. Democracy, and
social and cultural participation, as well as national identification, mostly
include people residing in advanced areas. The difference from the previous
stage o f lim ited democracy is that now not only can the middle strata partici
pate directly in the government or even control it, but the urban proletariat
of the central region can also be included through unions and political parties.
The spread o f nationalism —Right and L eft—and o f different ideologies of in
dustrialization are also characteristic o f this phase.
Stage 6 (Type A). The stage o f full nationhood is reached under the follow
ing conditions: the growing integration o f previously marginal social groups;
the incorporation o f new geographic areas into the cultural, economic, and
political life o f the nation as a whole ; the acquisition of national loyalties and
identification by all the inhabitants; and the resulting higher degree o f cul
tural and economic hom ogeneity o f the various social groups. This stage is
also characterized by a high degree o f urbanization, literacy, diffusion o f sec
ondary and university education, and finally, occupational differentiation
(the proportion o f the urban occupational middle strata may reach nearly
40 percent or more o f the active urban employed population).
Mass consum ption, that is, mass participation in the material culture of
the industrial society, may also be regarded as characteristic of the stage of
total participation democracy. From a political point o f view, it means effec

tive full citizenship for the entire population, irrespective o f area o f residence,
socioeconomic levels, or ethnic affiliation. As a result, an im portant indi
cator of this stage is political participation at the voting level by a substantial
majority of the adult population o f both sexes. Lower electoral participation
even in advanced countries indicates the persistence o f large pockets o f mar
ginal populations (as the blacks and minorities in the U.S.), along with par
ticipant but apathie or alienated citizens.
Stage 6 (Type B). This alternate form o f political participation is an
effect o f delayed social m odernization. As we shall see, national populist
movements and regimes are the outcome o f a configuration o f factors differ
ent than the one which characterized the transition process in countries
which industrialized at earlier periods. This is true o f the form, the rate, and
the sequence of changes as well as the historical conditions under which
the transition occurred.
While the national populist regime has often denied the very values which
are at the basis o f representative democracy, such as civil liberties, it does
incorporate the old marginal strata into the national economic, cultural, and
political life. It induces their compulsory participation in the nationalization
process and results in a change from passive acceptance to active participa
tion. These regimes adopt a model o f development through central planning
and extensive if not total nationalization. They tend toward forced moderni
zation. National populist regimes may emerge, under certain conditions, in
countries which have reached the stage o f enlarged participation under repre
sentative democracy. Often, but not always, they appear in countries whose
social modernization is still low and where representative democracy even
with limited participation did not succeed in reaching a certain level o f sta
bility. In such situations, any increase in the rate o f release from the tradi
tional pattern may originate a rate o f political mobilization far exceeding the
capacity for legitimate participation. Institutional channels for such partici
pation which were not formed during the previous stage will not exist or will
be inadequate to absorb the newly mobilized masses.
One crucial factor here seems to be the proportion and the size o f the
nonparticipant sector. Thus, advanced nations like Argentina have produced a
national populist movement (Peronism) at a time when a substantial propor
tion o f the population was still not incorporated (it was about one-third, and
a previous demobilizing regime had excluded large sectors o f the middle class
and proletariat, who were politically active in the previous enlarged partici
pation stage). Brazil is another example o f a country with a relatively large
modern sector and a relatively long experience of national populism. Here
the m odem sector—though large in size—was small in percentage and coexist
ed with a very large (both in percentage and in absolute size) excluded sector.
Even the participation o f the modern sector had remained limited for a long
time (until the 1930 revolution), and the participation crisis triggered an auton-
omous mobilization o f the lower strata which was perceived as threatening by

the middle class—the main actor in the struggle for the enlargement o f politi
cal participation. This threat had some role in the breakdown o f representative
democracy, as with the Estado Novo and the 1964 military revolution.
Another im portant and necessary factor in the emergence o f nation
al populism is a class alliance between the urban non agricultural proletari
at and new or emerging sectors o f the industrial bourgeoisie. Such alliances
may take different forms such as occurred in Europe. But when the forma
tion of the m odern urban proletariat is relatively rapid and a proletarian po
litical tradition such as a Marxist or working-class party is lacking, the chances
of a national popular solution are much higher.
Stage 6 (Type C). Under certain conditions, movements and regimes shar
ing many o f the characteristics o f national populism may acquire a clearly
socialist nature while retaining some o f the features o f populism, mainly the
support o f the masses. The only example o f this type in Latin America
is Cuba.
Participation Crises and Authoritarian Alternatives to Mass Political

Participation
Depending on the characteristics of each country, the level of economic and

social m odernization, the existing political culture, and the historical epoch
(ideological climate, political model in the central or hegemonic nations), the
succession o f stages may be altered. Following Stage 3, one or more cycles o f
participation crises may occur in which some form o f limited, enlarged, or
total participation is established for a short time, followed by an anarchic
period or a period o f high instability that is finally closed by an autocratic
regime of some sort. However, the nature o f these crises and the types o f
participation or autocratic regimes will vary considerably according to two
main factors m entioned above: economic and social modernization and his
torical epoch.
The failure to establish a relatively stable representative democracy at a
higher level o f participation, or the transition from a more restrictured to an
enlarged level (as well as attem pts to extend participation into economic
and social areas considered threatening to the established social order by the
ruling sectors o f the society), may result in various types o f autocratic re
gimes whose common feature will be some form o f demobilization o f the
social sectors attem pting to gain new areas o f participation or to retain those
recently obtained. In recent times, in the more advanced countries in Latin
America, these forms may be described as military functional alternatives of
fascism (i.e., Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, Uruguay 1972, Argentina 1966-70,
and from 1976). Prior to World War II, the most common form was a re
lapse to the typical military caudillo, but in the most advanced nations
fascist regimes or systematic electoral fraud could be used to demobilize the
threatening sectors. In the age o f mass mobilization (after 1930), military

bureaucratic-technocratic regimes could replace in less or partially modernized
nations the caudillo type. The major differences with the former were not
only the reduced role o f the caudillo political culture, but also the deliberate
attem pts at modernization (particularly oriented towards increasing the feel
ing o f national identification). A summary o f these alternatives to political
participation are presented below :12
TABLE 4.1 ALTERNATIVES TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
HISTORICAL EPOCH
PRIOR TO MASS
MOBILIZATION MASS MOBILIZATION
i<nn i<no
•Systematic electoral fraud • Functional substitutes o f

or indirect mechanisms of fascism (usually a military
disenfranchisement, while regime with civilian
Relatively retaining the appearances support and often techno
High of representative democ cratic components).
Moderni racy.
zation
• Provisional emergency
military regimes.
• Fascist attempts.
• Military caudillo •Military caudillo regimes

Relatively regimes. (with attem pts at
Low modernization).
Moderni
zation • Military bureaucratic-
technocratic regimes
With few exceptions, Latin American countries reached their formal inde
pendence during the first decades o f the nineteenth century, but their tran
sition varied considerably. Many o f them were still in the first stages o f social
and political modernization while others were entering the last stages. Limited
democracy was reached early in Chile, after Portales in the first half o f the
nineteenth century, while in Argentina it was accomplished after Rosas in
the second half of the same century. In Uruguay, the process was completed
only at the beginning o f the tw entieth century after a series of three dicta
tors (1870-1903). We can also speak o f an analogous transition in Brazil—with
framework o f limited participation presupposes that sectors of the population
o f the crowned democracy represented by Don Pedro II, and the establish
ment o f the Republic in 1889.
The case of Costa Rica, an exception in Latin America by virtue o f its
agrarian structure based on a large stratum o f land-owning peasants, also shows

a similar transition toward a stable form o f representative democracy, especi
ally after 1889, the time o f the first free elections. Finally, we should men
tion Colombia, which also succeeded in establishing a regime o f limited de
mocracy at the end o f the century, although with occasional disturbances.
But in many countries of the Caribbean, Paraguay, Bolivia and others in South
America, the vicious circle of autocracy, crises o f succession and abortive
attem pts at a democratic regime, and finally new autocracies, was sustained.
Only in the last three decades have there been stronger attem pts based on mass
mobilization for more advanced forms o f government. These recent political
changes are a clear expression o f the substantial modifications occurring with
great rapidity in the social structure o f all Latin American countries. These
have led to the disappearance o f most old style autocratic regimes.
In the post-World War II period, attem pts at representative democracy in
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and other nations have been confronted with seri
ous internal threats. Paradoxically, instability—although o f varying extent—
also affected countries which enjoyed relatively long periods of stability at
the level o f limited or enlarged democracy. Many o f them have experienced
authoritarian regimes with a recrudescence o f military intervention and func
tional alternatives to fascism. These demobilizing regimes have even replaced
old established representative democracies, such as Uruguay and Chile. But
the significance o f dictatorships or instability in countries now entering the
representative democracy phase, as well as those that have fallen back into
military dictatorships after a long period o f normal democratic government,
is completely different from the habitual military “pronouncements” char
acteristic o f the second and third stages o f our scheme. The new element is
the appearance for the first time of the great common mass as active partici
pants in the political process. The consequences o f this fact are linked with
the process o f mobilization under contemporaneous historical conditions and
with the peculiar tensions o f the transition from the stage o f limited partici
pation to the stage o f enlarged participation.
Representative democracy with limited participation is stable in countries
whose economic and social structure have matured enough to require and
originate a middle urban layer. Even where it represents a small proportion o f
the population (but no less than 10-20 percent) the urban middle layer has
acquired some political weight. This is because o f its ecological concentration
(in small cities or in one primate city) and its specialized functions in national
economic and social organization. This middle strata has sufficient weight to
share or support the power o f the oligarchies (classically composed o f big
landholders). This diminishes the instability due to the intervention o f other
forces (particularly the military) or at least reduces their negative impact on
the functioning institutions o f a modernizing society.
These middle strata grow with increased urbanization and industrializa
tion. Although in the beginning they identify with the oligarchy, they acquire
a consciousness of their own existence and potentials. The functioning o f rep

resentative democracy in the normal institutional game, according to a well-
known political slogan, is based on the fact that participation in the normal
game embraces only a minority o f the population. The country can be sche
matically divided into two parts: “central” areas in which there is a certain
process o f modernization, the formation o f great cities, and the rise o f the
middle strata, and “peripheral” regions which include the majority of the pop
ulation. This last is characterized by the traditional social pattern or by sur
viving archaic traits: a subsistence economy and attitudes based on prescrip
tive mechanisms and norms o f social control. In this way the majority o f the
population remains passively alien to the political process, not because of
exclusion by law or force, but primarily because its m entality, aspirations,
and expectations are still adjusted to the level o f traditional passive belong
ingness, that is, to the possibilities and conditions concretely offered by the
structure in which they live. They are in the integrated prerelease and premo
bilization stage.
The limitation on the functioning o f democracy at this stage o f limited
participation not only implies nonparticipation for the inhabitants o f the
peripheral areas, it also signifies the relative political marginality o f the lower
strata living in central areas, i.e., the nascent urban proletariat. These, ac
cording to the particular nation and history, are mobilized and advanced in
the process o f transition to a modern m entality. They exert pressure on the
leading groups and powerful strata through protest movements, union organi
zation and political parties.
The transition to the next stage o f enlarged participation is produced
when, through an alliance between middle and lower strata, the former achieve
major power and the latter real possibilities to participate in and influence
the political process. In the same way that the regime’s stability within the
framework o f limited participation presupposes that sectors o f the population
will remain outside the political process, the regime with an enlarged partici
pation rests on the exclusion o f the peripheral population and the existence
o f a latent consensus among all groups within the central regions—upper, mid
dle, and lower—for the maintenance o f the rules o f the game within its geo
graphic and social limits.
MOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
Let us return to the meaning o f social m obilization, as discussed in chapter

2, in terms o f political change. Political mobilization is an aspect o f a broader
process o f social mobilization. In the traditional society, the expected politi
cal participation o f the majority o f the population is either low or nonexistent.
In any case, participation is not based on the choice o f the individuals in
volved. They belong to the society, generally through attachm ent to the
local com m unity, but they do not participate in it. This is especially so at the
level o f the larger society. With the breakdown o f traditional patterns, many
individuals and groups are released from the traditional prescriptive social
structure; they now become available for political participation. However,
availability may or may not result in actual political participation. When
availability is translated into participation, we will speak o f political primary
m obilization.13 Political mobilization is to be distinguished from release or
availability. While the latter may result in apathy, or individual and social
disorganization, the former involves an active response to the new situation;
a channeling o f released energies towards specific political purposes.
We have defined as integrated or relatively integrated that participation
which: (1) is carried out within institutional channels provided by the ruling
political regime (and such intervention is somewhat effective, aside from form
al recognition); (2) is perceived and experienced as legitimate by both the m o
bilized groups and powerful groups. This sense o f legitimacy is global, and in
cludes the institutional framework as a whole, i.e., the political regime or cer
tain basic values which assure minimal integration into the social structure. It
is a question o f an attitude o f legitimacy not legal legitimacy.
The process is extremely complex, and the attitude of legitimacy can eas
ily be combined with profound divergencies. It can coexist with grave con
flicts and cleavages between the social groups comprising the global society.
Beneath these conflicts there is a minimum accord over the rules o f the game.
This is based on mechanisms o f social control not entirely dependent on re
pressive external force; rather, they possess some o f the spontaneity o f in
ternalized norms. These attitudes can accommodate extreme verbal attitudes
that totally reject the existing order when the realization o f such goals is impli
citly postponed.
In our general analysis o f social mobilization, we have emphasized that this
process may affect both masses and elites. Traditional elites may be released
and find themselves available. Further, the incipient breakdown o f the pre
existing social order and the emergence o f modem institutions and activities
may generate new leading groups whose position within the social structure
is ambiguous or unsettled. Partially deprived groups may be created by par
tially blocked m obility.14 They may have acquired wealth and economic
power through the first spurts o f economic development, while remaining de
prived because political power is still monopolized by older traditional elites.
The displacement o f elite groups may also take place because o f other modi
fications in the social structure. Whatever the causes, this process creates
groups with a high propensity to participate in political activity in an unor
thodox manner, both with respect to their aspirations and their ideological
orientation.
At times the larger displaced sectors o f the population, released by the
collapse o f the traditional order, will achieve a degree o f mobilization w ith
out the stimulus and leadership o f an external elite, i.e., an elite provided
by another displaced group existing within the same society. In this case
they generate their own leadership by an internal process o f differentiation.
This occurs rarely. Most frequently it is the combination o f large available
sectors of the population, with elites likewise made available for political ac
tion, which is necessary to effectively mobilize and canalize mass participa
tion into powerful political movements. Otherwise, the available masses may
remain apathetic, or dissipate their pressure in disorganized protest move
ments that result in individual or social disorganization.
This conceptual scheme may help us understand why some Latin Ameri
can countries have achieved periods o f political stability at different stages of
the transition process. Leaving aside the unstable first two stages, equilibrium
and stability were maintained under both autocratic regimes and limited or
enlarged representative democracies. The basic mechanism has been the main
tenance o f a close correspondence between the degree of mobilization and
the degree of integration and reintegration. In the old autocracies, generally
under military rule, the level o f participation was for the majority still de
fined by the traditional pattern. When representative democracy achieved a
fairly high degree of stability and duration, it was due to a similar balance,
though with a higher degree o f political participation, and with the coexistence
of modernized and archaic social sectors.
The possibility o f minimizing conflicts during the transition from one stage
to another would have required the maintenance o f this correspondence be
tween release, mobilization, and reintegration; that is, the capacity o f institu-
tionaling channels o f political participation while maintaining a basis for
political consensus during the process o f mobilization by which new groups
were drawn into active political participation. These processes are closely
related to changes in other subsystems o f the society, particularly in the
socioeconomic structure and the international system. But their relation is
reciprocal, not deterministic.
This broad scheme may also be applied to the advanced Western world.
The progressive broadening o f its political basis was achieved through the in
tegration of the lower strata; not only by the gradual extension o f civil and
political rights, but also by the creation o f social rights, that is social legis
lation, welfare state, mass consumption and mass social mobility. All o f this
was made possible by an advanced degree o f economic development. The
emergence and expansion o f industrial society requires that social mobiliza
tion be gradually extended to all the inhabitants o f each country. This is
what has happened in the advanced societies; both in the Western model of
early industrialization and in the Russian socialist model. Social mobilization
involves political participation. However, the mode o f transition and the
type o f participation will be very different under the general historical
conditions which characterize delayed modernization and economic devel
opm ent.
The basic differences between the Western experience and the Latin
American situation may be summarized under three main headings:

1. Differences between social structure, culture, and personality types
in the countries o f early industrialization and in the presently develop-
ing countries.
2. Different sequences o f change in the different sectors of the social
structure and differing rapidity of the process.
3. Differences in historic epoch and social circumstances, that is, in the
global context in which the transition process developed early in the
West and late in Latin America and other regions.
The first point has been greatly elaborated in the literature on develop
ment and does not need further comment. It is enough to remember that
divergencies can embrace values, attitudes, personality type, institutional fea
tures, stratification systems, distribution o f political power, and economic
conditions, and they can lead to a relative inapplicability o f the Western
model.
As for the second, uneven change also characterizes the Western model.
Consequently, discontinuities and unequal levels were produced, and in part
subsist, as much on the geographic level as in institutions, groups, and atti
tudes in countries o f early industrialization. In order to follow the classic
paradigm o f Western development, we should recall that the successive ex
tension o f civil, political, and social rights stretched over three centuries. The
extension o f political participation, for example, was extremely gradual.
Typically, participation entailed, as Marshall emphasizes, the successive
extension o f the political rights o f previously excluded groups. In England,
with the reform o f 1832, which signified an advance over the previous situa
tion, only some 20 percent o f the adult population won the right to vote.
Almost ninety years passed in order to perfect universal suffrage.15 Although
at the end o f the century the proportion o f voters had grown considerably
above the 1832 level, it continued to be less than 50 percent of the popula
tion. What is most im portant here is not so much gradualness but the sequence
between mobilization o f the lower strata and the formation o f channels o f
participation.
Although the first epoch o f industrialization in England was characterized
by deep social conflicts, the rhythm o f mobilization of the traditional popula
tion, its slow emergence from the state o f passivity typical o f the preindus
trial situation, may have kept a certain correspondence with the development
of legitimate mechanism (formal and informal) o f participation in the na
tional com m unity, as much on the political level as on the others. For exam
ple, union action so im portant in the general integration process, subsisted
and in some cases developed, despite the worst persecutions in the first quart
er o f the nineteenth century. On the other hand, it is necessary to show that
in the English example the beginning of the economic process of develop
ment tended to precede mental and material mobilization o f the lower strata.
It was not simultaneous or ensuing, as in the presently developing countries.
We can hardly speak in England o f overurbanization with respect to the level

of industrialization, such as seems to occur in the majority o f underdeveloped
countries.
Urbanization is one o f the central aspects o f social mobilization; the m o
bilization o f great masses, o f mental changes affecting the majority o f the pop
ulation, not the formation o f vanguard groups within the lower strata. The
difference between the English example and other Western countries, and the
case o f Latin America, resides in the different degree o f correspondence be
tween the gradual mobilization o f an increasingly greater proportion o f the
population and the emergence o f multiple mechanisms o f integration—union
ization, education, social legislation, political organization, suffrage, mass
consum ption—capable o f absorbing these successive groups and shaping their
means o f expression.
The extraordinary growth o f a middle occupational stratum displaying
an intense degree of upward m obility, the proportional diminution o f the
proletariat (first the peasants then the factory workers), the gradual increase
in the participation o f wage earners and salaried people in the national product
with the consequent improvement in the standard o f living, the diffusion of
education and forms o f consum ption, which at some other time were symbols
of the middle and upper strata, initiated a broad process: upward mobility
by growing participation. Similarly, during the period o f limited participa
tion in representative democracy, and paired with the progressive broadening
o f participation in many fields, there arose formal mechanisms and substan
tial capacities for assuring political intervention on the basis o f shared norms.
There also developed a basic consensus among participant groups. Finally, the
diffusion o f national consciousness, at first limited to the bourgeoisie, then to
include the lower strata, was both an effect o f and an underlyying factor in
integration.
In Latin America the sequence o f transition was different. In general, the
earlier the initiation o f transition, the smaller the divergence in comparison
with the Western model. Such countries as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil,
Costa Rica, and Columbia achieved periods o f stability under regimes o f lim
ited or enlarged democracy, and such stability was largely based on a relative
equilibrium between integrated nonmobilized, mobilized and reintegrated
sectors o f the population. But even these countries share with most o f Latin
America a different timing in the mobilization o f large strata that tended to
precede rather than follow the stage o f economic development which in
Europe characterized the equivalent extent o f social mobilization. In the
more advanced Latin American nations, such early extension was an impor
tant factor in the conflicting nature o f the transition from democracy to
total participation. In those countries where the beginning o f the transition
was delayed, the applicability o f the Western political model was consider
ably jeopardized. In other cases, not only did the social mobilization o f the
lower strata proceed at a faster rate than economic development, but many
other aspects o f social modernization did as well. The resulting co-existence

of an advanced social structure with insufficient economic development had
far reaching political consequences.
The position and attitudes o f recently mobilized lower strata are likely to
be different not only because o f the rapid rate o f the process, but also due
to the different kind o f social structure in which such a process occurs. As in
many Latin American countries where mobilization is taking place at a fast
rate in an archaic social structure, it involves the sudden transfer from tradi
tional passivity to total m obilization.
In these situations it would be utopian to repeat the historic succession o f
the progressive broadening o f the bases o f democracy as occurred in some
countries o f the region. Today the alternative to limiting participation is im
possible. This fact is closely related to the third indicated difference between
development o f the Western model and Latin American countries: the his
torical climate.
The global context and the historical climate in which the emergence o f
Western industrial society took place, substantially differ from the present.
The first countries that successfully entered the process encountered a unique
situation. We also find within Latin America comparable differences between
the countries whose transition started in the second half o f the nineteenth
century and those where it was delayed until the last three or four decades.
Differences in global context and historical climate are exemplified by five
categories. All o f them indicate differences in the position, attitudes, and ex
pectations o f the lower classes.
First we should point out the internal evolution experienced by capitalist
countries. On the one hand, there is the process o f techno-economic concen
tration, the appearance and development o f great corporations, the substitu
tion o f the entrepreneur by the manager, and bureaucratization. On the
other, there is the process o f mobility by growing participation: the expan
sion o f mass consum ption (and consequently the “bourgeoisification” o f the
urban proletariat in the most advanced countries), and the displacement of
the ethos o f production by the ethos o f consumption. In other words, the
affluent society predom inates.
Second, with the appearance o f the welfare state and the perfection o f citi
zenship rights in developed countries, there has been a substantial change in
the position o f the lower strata everywhere. There is the recognized need to
universalize such rights to all individuals and to all countries.
A third change is the emergence o f alternative models o f development: in
particular, totally or partially socialist forms, or authoritarian regimes o f
nonsocialist varieties.
The fourth is the alteration (in part connected with the previously indi
cated changes in relations between the ruling elite and the masses), the emerg
ence, or the accentuation o f ideologies and techniques o f manipulation ap
plicable to populations in the course o f rapid mobilization. The fifth trans-
form ation is the profound change in the ideological climate prevalent from
the eighteenth century to World War I. This change can be summarized in the
phrase “the crisis of dem ocracy.”
After World War I, there appeared totalitarian ideologies o f the Right and
Left, or o f an ambiguous location in the traditional political spectrum. These
forms o f mass political participation diverged from the model of representa
tive democracy. An im portant factor in this was the loss o f confidence in this
regime, which persisted even after the smashing o f fascism and nazism. The
new national elites who assumed leadership o f developmental and m oderniz
ing movements after World War I did not conceive o f liberal democracy as an
ideal, as did the progressive movements in the previous century. We must re
member here that different elites came to the forefront at the various stages
of transition. This is a universal process, but the sequence and the nature of
the changing elites vary according to the historical conditions of each country.
In Latin America we have first the “independence” elite, inspired unrealistic-
ally by the Enlightenment and the French and American Revolutions. After
the civil wars and the caudillo autocracies, the efffective start towards m odern
ization came through a new type o f leadership: the more realistic elites of the
postrom antic era, who provided the national organization o f the country,
generally under limited democracy. Nineteenth-century bourgeois democracy
was their ideal. The next two stages o f enlarged and total participation de
mocracy involved new types of elites mostly recruited from the successive
waves o f newly formed middle classes. These elites sought the support of the
successive waves o f recently mobilized lower strata, and this required new
ideologies. The demands for a larger social and economic participation and
the new conception o f full citizenship introduced an emphasis on social jus
tice which overshadowed the classical nineteenth-century demands for polit
ical equality and formal democracy. The need to industrialize and the new
models of induced development under state centralization involved the rejec
tion o f an economic structure based on the export o f a few raw materials and
an allegedly spontaneous growth. In brief, liberal economy and formal
dem ocracy—both nineteenth-century ideologies—failed to provide a valid
model for modernization as they had in the past.
Paradoxically, nineteenth-century liberalism became a conservative ideol
ogy. It was perceived as tending towards the maintenance o f obsolete social
structures based on economic dependence on foreign imperialist powers allied
with the oligarchic elite, who had controlled the previous stage o f limited
democracy. The change was related both to a consciousness o f the profound
differences which distinguish the cultures o f the majority o f nonin dustrial-
ized countries from the Western pattern, and to the fact that modernization
must be fulfilled against Western hegemonic countries characterized by a
democratic regime. This is the case in Latin America, where, for geographic
and historical reasons, the problem o f Russian domination does not exist,
or, at least is not perceived, while the hegemony of the Western powers,
especially the United States, is experienced as an ever-present fact. Under

the new conditions o f the international system, participation crises and their
outcome also became part o f international politics—as much as industriali
zation and other economic changes are part of a world economy. Both politi
cal and economic processes are deeply and directly influenced by the struc
ture o f international power, m onopolized by a few centers, which use the
problems and conflicts o f the dependent countries as instruments in their
game for political, military, and economic hegemony.
PRIMARY MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL POPULIST

MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
The major consequence o f this contrast o f historical situations and ideo

logical climates lies in the type and orientation o f protest movements and
parties which develop among channelized groups of the lower class. In coun
tries which industrialized earlier, this process took place within ideological
orientations, which, irrespective o f their manifest m ilitant attitude against
the democratic order, did accept many o f its ideals. In fact, such orientations
aspired to bring them into actual practice, to reach their ultimate logical
consequences. Such was the orientation o f the intellectual elites and o f the
workers they led and organized. This was so despite the fact that the masses
might preserve authoritarian attitudes derived either from traditional auth
oritarianism or from a psychological state within the lower class.
Structural changes within capitalist society, as well as the progressive ac
quisition o f new political and social rights, a more egalitarian distribution
of the national product, and effective participation in power, all contrib
uted to a high level o f integration o f these groups within the representative
regime. But in countries where mobilization o f the lower strata occurred
after the emergence and affirm ation o f industrial states with authoritarian
communist regimes, the orientation and problems o f the leading elites o f the
populist m ovem ent were very different. This is especially so because these
less developed countries were economically and politically dependent upon
countries with representative democratic regimes. Foreign dom ination and
imperialism became then associated with democracy of the Western (and
bourgeois) type, and ceased to be a symbol o f progress and an acceptable
goal for political action.
This is reflected in ideologies o f industrialization, whose characteristics
are essentially authoritarianism , nationalism, and some form o f socialism,
collectivism, state capitalism or at least central planning and state inter
vention. They are movements that have combined various ideological contents
corresponding to opposing political traditions, leftist/authoritarianism , left
ist nationalism, rightist/socialism, and a myriad o f hybrid formulas or even
paradoxes from the point o f view o f the European Left/Right dichotomy.
As I have indicated, these forms, despite their many meanings and opposing
varieties, can be subsumed under the generic term national populist move
ments. They represent the intervention by the traditional strata in national
political life in the course o f rapid mobilization in countries o f delayed in
dustrialization.
These movements, and the regimes that grow out of them, present signifi
cant divergences between the process o f progressively widening political par
ticipation, which occurred in the Western model, and the type of transition
observable in countries presently emerging, or at least in the phase o f over
coming their traditional structures. In order to explain such divergences we
should bear in mind all three factors enum erated—differences in the pre
existent culture, in the rhythm and sequence o f the processes of change, and
in the contrasts in the global context and in the historical and ideological
climate in which both take place.
These national populist movements have appeared at one time or another
throughout Latin America in the last forty years. In all Latin American na
tions the mobilization o f the lower layers in marginal areas exceeds or threat
ens to exceed the natural channels o f expression and participation that the
social structure offers. The situation varies greatly with the particular cir
cumstances in which the process occurs. It is different in countries where it
is a m atter o f getting beyond partial mobilization: nations already integrated
into some form o f enlarged democracy. This is related to the degree o f eco
nomic development attained. Thus, the group o f countries more advanced in
this respect, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay, are also
the most economically developed. But even in these nations, the impact of
rapid mobilization was conflictive. With few exceptions, mobilization is tak
ing place rapidly everywhere. This implies a sudden amplification o f political
intervention, from a minimal proportion (which may be less than 10 percent
o f the adult population) to the totality. The form such mobilization takes is
im portant. In many cases it involves physical displacement—urban-rural mi
gration. But analogous psycho-social processes may take place in rural areas
themselves, that is to say, without physical displacement. Such is the case
with Bolivia, Cuba (in the outbreak o f the revolution that overthrew Batista),
and elsewhere. Another example may be found in the Mexican Revolution—a
national populist movement avant la lettre —which later evolved into an en
larged democracy, but really a disguised authoritarianism, based on a one-
party system.
An im portant distinction must be made between social mobilization con
fined to rural areas and the same process expressed through rural-urban mi
gration, especially when the latter is accompanied by economic development,
modernization o f the occupational structure, increasing demand for industrial
labor, and other employment in dynamic sectors o f the economy. The exper
ience o f some Latin American countries shows that when social mobilization
of the lower strata occurs under those conditions, the widespread chances of
upward mobility (even short distance mobility such as from unskilled to skill-
ed level) and the general upgrading o f standards o f living, consum ption pat
terns, and education, coupled with the feeling o f involvement in national
growth and nation building, are powerful factors in the rapid integration of
mobilized sectors. Under these conditions, revolutionary potentials are much
lower in the urban areas than in the more backward and rural regions within
the same country. The urbanized rural migrant, once he becomes accultur-
ated and attains political experience, is likely to turn towards reformist, grad
ualist movements, than to be attracted by extreme ideologies opposed to the
social order.16
Regarding political participation, it must be said that integration in differ
ent aspects o f society may not necessarily be accompanied by political inte
gration. In fact, such integration involves the existence o f legitimate and
specific channels for political expression and participation. These may be
lacking or inadequate even when economic growth and other aspects o f mod
ernization are progressing at a rate sufficient to absorb the mobilized masses.
The attitudes o f the elites vis-a-vis the extension o f participation is o f para
m ount im portance. It may occur, as in Argentina and in parts o f Brazil, that
the m ost conservative sectors o f the elites, while unable to check other aspects
of m odernization, strongly oppose such political extension delay the process.
At the same time, other elites, oriented by anti-status quo purposes and atti
tudes, may find it convenient or necessary to seek the support o f the mobil
ized masses, thus providing themselves with the required leadership and the
means for political expression and participation. The resulting political move
ments may be m oderate in terms o f changes in the basic social order, or they
may assume a different political orientation,even one opposed to the prevailing
political order and institutions.
The outcom e o f the rapid social mobilization of large strata depends on
the kind, social origin, and composition o f available elites, or more specifi
cally, on the nature o f the particular sector which captures the support of
the majority o f the mobilized strata. We are confronted with a phenomenon
which is difficult to understand from the point o f view o f the nineteenth-
century European experience. Different political groups—extreme nationalists
of the Right, fascists and nazis, Stalinists, Trotkyites, and other varieties of
communists—as well as all social sectors—intellectuals, modernized working-
class elites, professionals and politicians o f petit bourgeous origin, military
officers, and downwardly mobile and decaying sectors o f the old traditional
landowning oligarchy—and the most unusual combinations among them, have
attem pted, sometimes successfully, to find support from recently mobilized
strata.
Such ends do not always coincide with the aspirations of the mobilized
lower strata themselves, although there may be an identity o f aspirations and
objectives between elites and masses. Regarding this vast gamut o f possibilities
for the elites and their relations with the masses in national populist move
ments, it is necessary to keep in mind three aspects. First, the social origin
and real political ends o f the elites limits the action o f these movements, es
pecially their capacity to transform the preexistent social structure. Conserva
tive elites, for instance, however demagogic are not likely to deeply and radi
cally transform the social order. Second, whatever the degree o f manipula
tion of the masses by the elites, that is to say, the degree of coincidence in
real political aims between one and the other, the masses should be able to
achieve an effective degree of participation. The third limiting factor, seldom
considered, is the type o f available ideologies. Even if these elites create their
own ideological tools, their choices will be limited by an existing ideological
market.
As an illustration of the first aspect, it is interesting that in the last four
decades there have been numerous military takeovers which tried to become
perm anent regimes, resting on the recently mobilized available masses. Never
theless, there are no examples o f substantial transformations o f the social
structure caused by such military regimes, whatever their success and stabil
ity.It is significant that not only has no regime of military origin attained
any substantial modification o f the latifundist concentration, but that the
only regimes which achieved large-scale agrarian reforms did not come out of
military revolutions. In Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba the preexisting army was
replaced by the one created by the revolution. The only exception seemed to
be the Peruvian military regime in its first years, but while its real achieve
m ent in bringing about social revolution remains highly controversial, later
changes revealed its limits.
Although the armed forces can turn up in movements o f opposite orien
tation, there are limitations to their political action (as a social group, not as
isolated individuals). Analogous limitations exist for groups o f other social
origins. That is, the class alliance at the basis o f national populism has a struc
tural lim it to its potentiality for reforms. Also, it must be remembered that
the survival o f national populist regimes depends on the persistence o f such
class alliance. When the structural conditions for it disappear, the very basis
of national populism fades as is shown by the Argentine and Brazilian cases.
With respect to the second condition, the degree o f political m anipula
tion, another example may be taken from a movement of military origin.
Peronism is a case o f m anipulation which succeeded since it shaped a degree
of effective participation o f the mobilized strata. It abstained from social
reforms, or always kept them within limits acceptable to powerful economic
and social groups. Peronism presents an extraordinary theoretical problem,
since it was initiated and led by a group o f fascist or nazi oriented generals.
Nevertheless, since the sociohistorical circumstances o f Argentina did not
provide the support o f the middle class as in the European model, they had
to use the lower sectors recently mobilized through the great internal migra
tions. To obtain their support required more than a change o f terminol
ogy, myths, or surface ideology. It was not just a question o f substituting
fascist slogans o f “ order, discipline, hierarchy” for populist ones of “ social jus-
tice” or “government by the shirtless ones.” The manipulation o f the masses

had reciprocal effects. Peronism differed from European fascism in that it
allowed effective, albeit limited, participation in order to gain support
from a popular base. It is this participation that makes the Latin American
national populist regimes unique.
Mass participation in national populism does not take place through the
mechanisms o f representative democracy, i.e., individual political rights and
free opinion through legal elections (though free voting was not suspended in
some cases, as in Argentina, and under the second Vargas presidency). Nor is
such participation brought about by the bureaucratized and militarized or
ganization of leftist or rightist totalitarian regimes. Not only is its spontaneity
im portant, but also participation implies a degree of effective liberty complete
ly unknown and impossible prior to the establishment of the national populist
regime. Liberty is exercised at the level o f immediate personal experience ; it
is implied concretely in the daily life o f the individual. It is a question o f per
sons having recently emerged from the traditional rule of prescriptive action
being able to become aware o f decision-making possibilities in areas which
were previously fixed. To participate in a strike, to elect a union representa
tive from the factory, to speak face-to-face with the boss, to alter the level of
individual behavior and equalize master-slace relationships still so common
in Latin America, helped make real a positive orientation toward change. The
mechanisms o f participation o f representative democracy do not exclude
these immediate forms; on the contrary, they can constitute an experience
which may give a fuller meaning to the formal mechanisms, and it is possible
that a process o f this type may have occurred in the Western model o f de
velopment.
If formal dem ocratic institutions do not exclude an immediate experience
of freedom, neither do they necessarily include it. In Latin America, even in
the countries with representative democracy, many archaic elements of the
social structure exclude any possibility o f immediate participation. At the
same time the regime fails to provide formal channels for the political ex
pression and participation o f the recently mobilized lower strata. The ruling
groups have decided to maintain the status quo, in one way or another.
Usually this means restriction o f further political participation by the lower
strata. While the lim ited democracy o f the past rested on the passive belong
ingness o f the traditional m ajority, it now has to confront mobilized sectors
which may support anti-status quo political movements.
Frequently, the gamut o f existing parties fails to offer adequate possibili
ties for expression. Thus, a truly anomic situation arises for those groups
whose availability can nourish new movements, directed by elites with the
flexibility to utilize them , or which may coincide with their aspirations.
There are additional powerful reasons why the immediate forms of parti
cipation can exert influence. For the majority o f Latin America countries,
especially for recently mobilized sectors, the symbols o f democracy have
either lost, or never had positive significance. Due to the political tradition of
these nations, they tend to possess a negative value. No dictatorship or abso
lute autocracy ever failed to employ the symbols and terminology of democ
racy. Dictators and generals were always considered popularly elected as con
stitutional presidents. All had parliaments and constitutions that espoused
political, and recently, social rights. But there was a profound chasm between
reality and legality. For the emergent groups o f backward areas, even the
limited democracies functioning with a certain regularity appear to be an in
strum ent o f domination on behalf o f minorities. In some countries o f long
standing democratic tradition, such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and others,
the only way o f obtaining legitimacy is through elections. Dictators may rule,
but their regimes are always considered provisional. In the majority of the
less developed nations, especially outside the cities, the vote lacks this sym
bolic value. When Castro asserts that Cubans have more than the vote, they
have the rifle, he does not express a conception o f democracy acceptable to
urban workers or middle classes o f the most developed countries o f Latin
America. He does probably reflect an attitude that can be extended to a great
part o f the population recently mobilized or in rapid process o f mobilization
throughout the continent.
The existence o f this feeling o f participation is not necessarily related to
the effective influence that the popular strata can exert over the government.
As was already pointed out, manipulation has limits, although the limits are
flexible. There is no close relation between popular support for the regime
and the economic advantages which the regime can effectively provide for
the lower strata. Contrary to the widely held opinion that the adhesion of
the lower classes to the government is obtained through demagogic promises
in the economic realm, the real base o f support is the experience o f partici
pation which we have attem pted to describe.
These movements and their resultant regimes have an authoritarian charac
ter. The existential situation, the life of recently mobilized groups, favors such
regimes, but there are forms o f authoritarianism that affect only the indivi
dual rights o f the middle class or the intellectuals. If freedom o f expression
is limited or suppressed, it is the intellectual who feels injured (it is a con
crete liberty for him), but what are the repercussions for peasants and
workers? For them , limitations o f liberty o f expression can coexist with
meaningful experiences o f concrete liberty in the sphere o f their individual
lives. Obviously we are speaking o f authoritarian forms which have not
reached the technical perfection of totalitarianism. This regime supposes an
industrial structure and a relatively advanced technology. Even in Russia,
where the Bolsheviks built on the foundations o f traditional autocracy, it
reached real totalitarian organization only with the introduction o f the first
five year plan.
Until now we have referred only to the populist aspect o f national popu
lism. The national requires only a short reference. The same conceptual
scheme and the same factors we have discussed help explain the nationalistic
orientation o f national populist movements. There are both parallels and
differences in the evolution o f lower classes in Western countries. For Euro
pean workers, feelings o f national identification came late. They started their
political participation and integration through movements which rejected
not only the prevailing social order, but also the nation. Social justice was
first associated with internationalism. With their growing participation in
all the spheres o f modern life, with the extension o f their rights and the
achievement o f full citizenship, the nation came to be accepted by the lower
class. This was also the result o f the transference o f loyalties from the local
to the national com m unity. But in any case, we must not forget that they
belonged to a culture which was unified over the course o f many centuries.
In developing countries, the transference o f loyalties from the local
com m unity to the nation was usually not mediated by a stage o f ideological
internationalism. This was the consequence o f the conditions in which their
political m obilization occurred: different ideological climate, and different
economic, social, and political contexts.
In Latin America we may observe both processes. For the urban lower
strata formed by the earlier waves o f mobilization—before World War I—
social protest was associated with internationalist ideology. Only in a few
countries did working-class movements reach some importance in this early
period. In m ost cases, even where there had been anarchist and socialist
movements, the largest proportion o f the lower class started to mobilize
much later, after the World War II and the Great Depression, under com
pletely different conditions. The leadership was assumed by the more re
cent waves o f middle classes and was directed against the old elite, the
classical Latin American oligarchy. The new middle classes had an entirely
different conception o f national development. The old elite was considered
the representative o f colonialism, and o f interest groups associated with
foreign economic dom ination and was therefore antinational. The new
elites, whatever their orientation, tended to interpret the aspirations of the
mobilized lower sectors in terms o f national interest. We find here the same
contrast we have observed between nineteenth-century progressivism based
on liberal democracy, and tw entieth-century social justice ideologies.
While in Europe, the nation was for the emerging working-class ideolo
gies, “leur p atrie,” the fatherland o f the exploiting bourgeoisie, in Latin
America both national interest and social justice are claimed as an expres
sion of the people, while foreign interests are attributed to the ruling olig
archy. The dependence on foreign exports, on foreign capital and often on
foreign entrepreneurship only reinforced the im putation o f the antinational
nature o f those sectors associated with alien economic interests.17
Another powerful factor determining the strength o f nationalism among
the mobilized lower strata was their recent traditional origin. The sentiment
of national identification may be considered an adequate response to the
need for both social cohesion and ego identity in persons recently released
from the traditional structure. Under conditions o f economic growth, indivi
dual m obility is associated with the feeling o f participating in a collective ef
fort to transform the nation, and both contribute to integrate the individual
into the modern social setting.18 Furtherm ore, in societies lacking cultural
homogeneity, as in the Latin American Indian mestizo countries, nationalism
plays an essential role in national integration.
NOTES
1. J. L. Talmon pointed out the distant origins o f these tendencies from the Illumi
nist period. See Los ortgenes de la democracia totalitarista (Mexico: Aguilar, 1956).
2. We do not refer directly to the oligarchic tendencies within democratic parties,
as analyzed by R. Michels, G. Mosca, Ostrogorski, and others, but more concretely to
authoritarian forms such as the so-called centralized democracy.
3. S. M. Lipsetand J. Linz, “The Social Basis o f Political Diversity in Western Democ
racies” (unpublished ms., 1956); systematized data related to France, Finland, Italy, and
Germany in pre-Hitler times show that the composition o f the communist parties differ
ed from that of the social-democratic parties.
4. See a brief description o f the change in the reality and notion o f public opinion
from the epoch o f limited democracy to that o f mass opinion in G. Germani, “ La crisis
de la opinion publica: ‘nocion y realidad*,” Imago Mundi (June 1956).
5. See data and considerations formulated by E. H. Carr, Nationalism and A fter
(London: MacMillan, 1945) esp. pp. 1-391. First the nation was made up o f the sover
eign and the nobility; then by the bourgeoisie (which also possessed the right to vote
by virtue o f its economic status. Carr quotes: “ It was said o f a Croatian landowner o f
the nineteenth century that he would be more disposed to recognize as a member o f the
Croat nation his horse than one o f his peasants.” ).
6. See, Germani, “ La crisis de la opinion publica.”
7. K. Mannheim,Man and Society m an Age o f Reconstruction, pp. 92-96.
8. Extensive empirical evidence exists about the authoritarian tendencies in certain
working-class groups. These tendencies should be distinguished from those which char
acterized, for example, European middle-class attraction to authoritarianism o f the Right.
Working-class authoritarianism, which appears above all in the study o f attitudes by in
struments such as the F Scale (created by Adorno and others), really measures tradi
tional authoritarianism; it differs in this sense from the authoritarian syndrome ob
served in members o f the middle class. Research conducted in Buenos Aires by this au
thor seems to confirm this hypothesis. See Germani, “Antisemitismo ideologico y
antisemitismo tradicional,” Comentarios (no. 34, 1963).
9. Analyzed in extraordinary cases o f political stability by political sociologists in
France. The family influence has been proven in detail by Lazarsteld et al., The People’s
Choice (New York: Duell Sloan, Pearce, 1944).
10. Torcuato di Telia has examined the possible compositions o f populist move
ments in Latin America and their consequences. See his “Populism and Reform in Latin
America,” in Obstacles to Change in Latin A m erica,ed. C. Veliz, (London: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1965). For a general view on populism see E. Gellner and G. Ionescu, eds.,
Populism (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1969).
11. The stages of political participation presented here have been expanded to de
scribe the total transition in Germani, “ Stages o f Modernization in Latin America,”
Studies in Comparative International Development 5 (no. 8, 1969-70): 155-74.
12. The conditions under which functional alternatives to fascism may arise are de
scribed in the preceding chapter, and in Germani, Soliologta de la modernizacion
ch. 7.
13. Stokes has described this process among Guatemalan Indians. See N. Stokes,
“Receptivity to Communist Fomented Agitation in Rural Guatemala,” Economic De
velopment and Cultural Change 5 (1957): 338-61:
An awakening o f profound meaning did take place for many o f the members o f
the sample, but it was not what usually has come under the rubric o f “ideologi
cal.” It could be better called a “sociological awakening,” for it amounted to the
realization that certain previously accepted roles and statuses within the social
system were no longer bounded by the same rules, and new channels were sud
denly opened for the expression and satisfaction o f needs. . . .The heretofore es
tablished series o f relationships between political leader and countrymen, between
employer and laborer, between Indian and landowner was not suddenly changed
but it abruptly became possible to introduce some change into them. This was a
sociological alteration o f first im portance, and it was to a few of the ramifica
tions of this, that they awakened. . . .This awareness o f a new sociological poten
tial had its distinct ideological aspects; the sociological changes themselves involv
ed vast alterations in the traditional ways o f thinking. It was probably o f little
importance to the countrymen involved in this process whether it was done under
one name or another; what was im portant was that there was, for the first time, a
series of channels o f communication and permissive activity between themselves
and authority. . . .
In the sense indicated above, mobilization is a concept quite different from Deutsch’s.
For a theoretical scheme on this subject, see Germani, Sociologta de la modernization
ch. 4.
14. See Marion Levy, “Contrasting Factors in the Modernization o f China and J a
pan,” Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. Wilbert E. Moore, Joseph J. Spengler,
and Simon Kuznetz (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955); Everett E. Hagen, On
the Theory o f Social Change (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1962).
15. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, ch. 1
16. This process has been observed in some Latin American countries: Fernando H.
Cardoso, “ Le Proletariat brésilien,” Sociologie du Travail 4 (1961): 50-65; Alain Tou
raine, ' “Industrialization et conscience ouvrière a Sao Paulo,” pp. 389-407; Germani,
“Social and Political Consequences o f Mobility” in Lipset and Smelser; Joan Nelson.
17. The nationalist component in current political ideologies in Latin America has
changed in accordance with what we have called in the text the world ideological climate
as well as with the changing nature o f the successive elites, and the rate o f mobilization
of the lower strata. Universalist nationalism, rooted in basic liberal democratic princi
ples of the nineteenth century, was the type espoused by both the independence elites
at the beginning o f the century and the modernizing elites since the second half. It de
viated slightly from this ideal with the first political movements led by the middle class
at the beginning o f the twentieth century. For instance, an isolationist attitude may
be discovered among the Argentine Radical party, prominent during World War I. Popu
list movements since the twenties have deviated even more from universalist national
ism. As in the case o f the Peruvian APRA, practically all o f them emphasized economic
independence, and antiimperialism (especially anti-U.S.). As their strong social compo
nent merged with nationalism, many strange ideological admixtures (from the European
point of view) came to be very frequent in Latin America. Finally, after World War II,
even the extreme Marxist Left became national and in various countries incorporated ele
ments o f the old extreme right-wing nationalism. This change is most striking in Argen
tina, where before the thirties the European ideological tradition was very strong.
18. For the relationships among mobility, development, and national identi
fication, see the article by Touraine; and by the same author, “ Social Mobility, Class
Relations, and Nationalism in Latin America,” Studies in Comparative International
Development 1 (no. 3, 1965): 19-25.
PART II
A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL POPULISM

AND A COMPARISON WITH CLASSIC FASCISM
CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICAL TRADITIONS AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

AT THE ROOT OF A NATIONAL POPULIST MOVEMENT:
ARGENTINE PERONISM
THE ARGENTINE CASE AND ITS THEORETICAL RELEVANCE
It is usual to refer to Argentina as a paradox in political development: a very

rich country, whose per capita GNP was in 1930 among the first six or seven
top countries in the world, quite advanced in terms of social modernization,
whose constitutional democratic stability, uninterrupted for seventy years,
was suddenly broken by its first military coup in 1930 to be followed until
the present, now for almost half a century, by an era of troubles: restrictions
of political participation through systematic fraud, several fascist attem pts,
the rise o f a paradigmatic national-popular movement and regimes, failed at
tempts at returns to representative democracy, widespread guerrilla warfare,
and endemic military intervention. Today the fact that Argentina belongs
geographically to a region o f the Third World, and its chronic political trou
bles, have created quite a different image compared with the one predominant
since the last century, and well into the first half o f the present one. The lat
ter was for foreigners and Argentines both an image o f a developed and so
cially advanced, homogeneously European country, comparable to Canada or
Australia; the former, the present image is undistinguishable from that of
most underdeveloped nations, and this is also true for Argentines themselves.
Though all cases are peculiar, since history never repeats itself, the nature
125
and degree o f deviation presented by this case are o f unusual interest for com
parative studies within a sociohistorical perspective.
The peculiar nature o f Argentine politics became particularly salient with
the rise of Peronism. This movement and the regime issued from it were
deeply confusing and contradictory not only to social scientists, but also to
those directly involved in it, Peronists and anti-Peronists alike. One o f the es
sential factors explaining the rise and persistence o f this national populist
movement lies in the misunderstanding o f its nature and the contradictory
images held by the historical actors involved in it. Now, thirty years after its
first appearance this ambiguity is still with us. In the social sciences and in
history interpretations o f Peronism have originated a large variety of labels:
classic fascism, phalangism, left-wing fascism, totalitarianism , Bonapartism—a
variant o f the usual Latin American military caudilloism—authoritarian popu
lism, national populism, Mediterranean corporativism—centered on corpora-
tist and hierarchical aspects allegedly typical o f Latin American societies—
national socialism (derived from a fusion o f right-wing nationalism and
left-wing socialism), and many others.1 These labels, even when they rely on
complex and articulate analyses, reveal the difficulties involved in determ in
ing the nature o f Peronism and placing it in relation to formulas and inter
pretive frameworks applicable to other political phenomena.
In the extensive literature on Peronism one discovers that it often either
lacks any scholarly basis altogether or is based on insufficient or unreliable re
search in the areas o f history, sociology, and political science. Even aspects
which are clearly visible and o f great im portance—for example, the charac
teristics and composition o f the social base of Peronism or its leadership, and
the attitudes o f other classes and social sectors during the first Peronism
(1945-55)—continue to remain unclear, while docum ented research in these
areas is scarce. The same can be said about other essential aspects o f the his
torical and sociological interpretations o f Peronism. At least part of the rea
son for the multitude o f diverging interpretations can be attributed to the
dearth o f knowledge on this subject.
Yet the contradictory interpretations are much more than the conse
quence of insufficient research. They reflect real contradictions in the histor
ical process—in the changing social structure o f the country and in the peculiar
circumstances which have conditioned its m odernization. Incongruences be
tween the nature o f economic development, the degree o f social moderniza
tion, and the peculiar course o f political development, as well as the variety
o f political experiences through which Argentina has passed—from democracy
to attem pted fascism, national populism, bureaucratic military rule, to ex
treme Left guerrilla warfare—all this offers unusual possibilities o f analysis.
The scholar must certainly not forget the human suffering and national tragedy
behind the interesting unusual case, but if his work has any value at all, it
must help understand the nature and cause of such human suffering.
The term deviation in describing the peculiarities of Argentine political
ARGENTINE PERONISM 127
development is based on the hypothesis that economic development and so

cial modernization are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a stable
representative democracy. But there are many restrictions and qualifications
to such an assumption. First, they are not sufficient conditions. And not all
types o f development and modernization necessarily lead to representative
democracy. This outcom e will depend mainly on the nature o f the preindus
trial society, the way in which the modernizing process was initiated, and the
historical epoch under which it took place. In preceding pages I have m en
tioned these and other conditions also required for the stability o f a dem o
cratic representative regime. Scientific interest in the Argentine case lies in
that most o f these requirem ents are present in Argentina and its national de
velopment. The question is to know the reasons for breakdown o f the m od
ernizing process, the failure o f representative democracy and classic fascism,
and the success o f national populism and its later dissolution. I shall not try
to analyze here all these aspects o f the Argentine paradox.2 Instead I shall at
tem pt to interpret the political development o f Argentina in terms o f theoret
ical constructs already considered regarding cycles of social mobilization, and
the role o f the middle and working classes in the rise of national populism
and classic fascism. On such a basis a comparison with a case of classic fascism
will be presented in a following chapter.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
At the simplest level, the political changes that took place during the 1940s
can be explained by taking into consideration two main processes. First, the
country’s national development since the middle of the nineteenth century,
that is, changes in social and economic structure, as well as in the institutions
and political culture which crystallized in a long era o f stable democracy. It
will include the crisis o f 1930, a historically precipitating factor whose politi
cal expression was the first military revolution. The other component consists
of the social changes which resulted from that crisis. It is im portant to distin
guish different aspects o f those changes, in particular, their structural aspects
on the one hand, and on the other, psychosocial components and the cultural
and political practice involved. The former not only created the possibility
for an expansion o f the national society, but also made it a necessary condi
tion for its further development, or at least a requirement to maintain the
existing level. Thus, interruption o f overseas immigration, transform ation of
the agricultural econom y, and industrialization paved the way to a geographic
redistribution o f population and high rate o f u rb a n iz a tio n ^ well as to changes
in the occupational structure. These changes implied not only economic
growth, but a qualitative jum p in scale of the society: on the one hand, inte
gration into the system o f those social sectors which had remained marginal
to the national society during its form ation; on the other, a general modifica-
tion o f participation that involved, although in different ways, all classes and
social sectors o f the country.
Sectors with differing degrees o f marginality—the popular classes in gen
eral, but especially the urban proletariat and the new industrial middle
class—increased their effective participation (in production) and/or potential
participation (i.e., in the areas o f consum ption, education, prestige, power,
and politics). Other sectors were less favored or even negatively affected, but
in general this occurred only in relative terms (although in a few cases it did
in absolute terms as well). The psychosocial components and cultural politi
cal tradition help explain the form under which these structural changes ex
erted their influence. Such forms, far from being reduced in this theoretical
framework to a mere epiphenomenon, possess an importance equal to that of
structural changes. Certainly the level o f capitalist accumulation, industrial
development, and the improved position o f the rural and urban proletariat in
the labor market, not only made possible but necessitated expansion of the
internal market, and therefore some redistribution o f the GNP in favor o f the
working classes. The continuity o f industrial development, threatened by pos
sible resumption o f the agricultural export economy, created a strong propen
sity for explicit alliances between the new industrial middle class, the new ur
ban proletariat (including the existing one), and all others (especially the
military) who for ideological convictions or other reasons were willing to
prom ote a policy favorable to industry. These class alliances tend to be
rather common in certain phases o f modernization. The shape that they as
sume may be quite different, and in turn the particular form becomes one of
the main conditions in shaping the political process. In Argentina, this process
could have taken place through implicit or explicit agreements among politi
cal parties already integrated into the system o f representative democracy; for
example, between a working-class or labor party, or a party of Marxist origin,
and middle-class parties; or through a liberal populism like that of the Union
Civica Radical in alliance with the unions. Instead the class alliance came un
der the form of national populism, whose most dynamic forces emerged from
the recently established urban proletariat, whose leadership in turn included
a com ponent with fascist origins and a charismatic leader, and whose emer
gence was strongly affected by the previous military government (and the
failed fascism). National populism was the result not only of structural
changes, but also of these political-historical conditions, and this fact has
grave consequences affecting the nature of the regime that followed, its eco
nomic policy, and the shape and problems of its later development, as well as
other social structures, the party system, and the political culture and politi
cal setup which characterized the country for the following three decades.
My proposed goal for this study is to consider only a portion of the vast
subject presently alluded to; namely, the role of the popular base in the
Peronist movement. Even a general discussion o f other themes would involve
a different level of analysis and the utilization of other methodological and
theoretical tools, all o f which is beyond my more limited purposes. Those as
pects concerning class alliances will only be considered superficially, since I
shall be especially concerned with only one o f the elements involved, namely,
the working class and popular classes in general. I shall analyze the participa
tion o f other significant sectors insofar as necessary to understand the role of
the popular base in the Peronist movement.
The greatest attention will be directed to the cycle o f social mobilization
generated by the economic and social changes which occurred as a result o f
the international and national crisis o f 1930. This was a second mobilization
cycle. The first took place after the organization o f the national state (1880)
along with structural changes created by the great outward expansion (devel
opment of a modern agrarian economy centered around exportation). This
cycle, which affected mainly the “ central” region and the population of
European immigrants and their descendants, also generated some o f the con
ditions which made the second mobilization cycle possible. Between the two
cycles there was a phase o f stasis and one o f demobilization, which involved
the same social sectors as in the first cycle. The subsequent cycle of 1937-45
expressed itself politically through Peronism and involved the whole country,
not only those regions and sectors that had remained excluded during the
first process and were the new protagonists, but even the demobilized sector
of the interm ediate period, despite its differing forms and contrasting politi
cal expressions.
THE ARGENTINE PARADOX AND ITS EXPLANATORY PROBLEM
The political development o f Argentina can be described as a series of

stages, in accordance with a scheme generally applicable to the rest of Latin
America (see Table 5.1). This process is part o f a more general change, i.e.,
the transition from one type o f traditional structure to some form of indus
trial society. The process o f modification o f the political structure has points
in common with processes occurring in the West in early industrializing coun
tries. It departs from these depending on the peculiarity o f change in each
country, the m om ent at which the transition is begun (and the prevailing
ideological and social climate at the international level), the velocity o f the
transition itself, and other factors. In the case o f Argentina, Uruguay, and
Chile, the transition was more similar to that of early industrializing coun
tries, the so-called Western model, than was the case in the rest of Latin
America. Yet it is Argentina which presents certain paradoxical deviations.
And the profound political crisis which has affected the country for more
than forty-five years constitutes an enigma for those studying the sociology
of development. Comparing the countries o f Central and South America,
Argentina appears the m ost modernized. And in an international comparison
the country is situated in a kind o f “middle class” o f nations, certainly far
above the so-called underdeveloped countries in terms o f social indicators. A
complete analysis o f the Argentine paradox is beyond my present aim. How

ever, some factors may be indicated that probably play an essential role in
the political process and make the Argentine situation extremely rare.
First is the rapidity of growth o f Argentine society. This involved a change
o f scale occurring in a short period and with a velocity unequaled among the
countries in which the transition took place in a spontaneous manner (not in
duced by planning) and along the lines of the Western model. The Argentine
population increased 1,500 percent in 100 years (1870-1970). Compare this
with other countries o f rapid growth: in the United States the population in
creased 400 percent in 80 years (1870-1950); in Brazil 600 percent in 90
years; in Chile 400 percent in 110 years.
Second, m odernization o f essential aspects o f the social structure also oc
curred with extraordinary rapidity. The dual stratification pattern, still clear
ly visible around 1860-70, was succeeded by a multiclass pattern, or a more
highly differentiated and complex stratification (characteristic o f modern so
cieties) some thirty years later. In 1900 the middle class already represented
an economic force (especially in the sense o f a consumer market) as well as a
political one, inasmuch as it constituted one-fourth o f the population. Its
concentration in the more developed areas (the littoral) gave it economic
and political weight greater than its numerical proportion. A m odern urban
proletariat had formed, and by the end o f the nineteenth century the country
was already highly urbanized. In 1895 more than 24 percent o f the popula
tion was living in cities o f 20,000 or more inhabitants, and this proportion
rises to 37 percent taking as limits urban centers of 2,000 or more. These
proportions correspond exactly to countries undergoing or beyond the in
dustrial revolution. O ther parts o f the structure remained backward. All the
provinces and territories away from the littoral region remained underdevel
oped in terms o f land tenancy, the persistence o f a traditional elite, etc. But
disequilibrium in development is typical o f the process and in no way peculiar
to Argentina. Here the distinctive element was the rapidity o f change.
While the class structure was being modified and the country urbanized,
the social structure was becoming secularized. Not only physical urban con
centration, but also modern life styles were transforming the behavior o f the
population. A valid indicator here is the gradual decline o f the birth rate, ow
ing to voluntary birth control, in urban areas of the littoral—first among the
middle strata and later spreading rapidly to the lower strata. This process has
placed Argentina and Uruguay among countries exhibiting “ industrial” birth
rates, although the crude birth rate represents an average between the low
rates o f more modern areas and the still high rates o f the provinces less af
fected by the change.
The third factor, the proportion o f foreigners in the population, is indeed
unique. Argentina is probably the only country in the world (except perhaps
Australia, but here the “ foreigners” were citizens o f the British empire) the
majority o f whose adult population remained foreign during several decades.
Of course, if gross percentages are taken, the foreign proportion o f the popula
tion, although one o f the highest in the world, will not surpass a high of 50 per
cent for the whole country and for all age groups. (In Argentina this proportion
was always two to three times greater than in the United States.) But the im
portant factor here is the proportion of foreigners in areas and groups most sig
nificant in the life of the nation. The proportion of foreigners among adult
males in the littoral region greatly exceeded that of Argentines for more than
fifty years. There were four foreigners for each Argentine in Buenos Aires and
some six for each four in the littoral provinces, including rural areas.
Another im portant factor was the sudden cessation of population growth
that occurred in 1930 and, almost contem poraneously, other drastic changes
in numerous significant aspects o f the social structure. The uninterrupted
demographic growth o f fifty o f sixty years was arrested in 1930 with the
elimination o f overseas immigration and drastic reduction in the urban littoral
birth rate. Economic growth was slowed down in the twenties, and finally
political development suffered a setback o f incalculable consequences with
forced regression to a lim ited-participation democracy and the systematic
fraud that followed the revolution o f 1930. The effects of this growth stop
page were not clearly perceived until much later, but many indications point
to this circumstance as a fundam ental feature in explaining the present situa
tion. Obviously this arrest was a result of processes generated much earlier;
but when it occurred, it became a new independent factor added to others at
that m om ent, and must therefore be distinguished from its own origins.
What did these four factors imply for Argentina—especially when consid
ered as events integrated into a system accounting for their reciprocal effects?
In what m anner and measure did the rapid expansion and extraordinary rate
of social m obility contribute to the creation o f certain features, attitudes, and
expectations o f Argentines? In what way was this same experience differen
tiated within the various groups and strata composing society? How did the
assimilation o f th at enorm ous mass o f immigrants take place? And above all,
was it assimilation, or rather syncretism, with the development o f new cul
tural forms, in the anthropological sense? What happened and is happening to
the first, second, or third generation o f immigrants? What repercussions did
the growth stoppage have? When and how was it perceived?
And finally in w hat way did these four factors—peculiar to the Argentine
situation—combine with the general circumstances o f development and transi
tion? There are other factors to be considered, such as the unequal transition
in different regions o f the country, massive migration from the interior after
1930, dependence upon dom inant countries, and the persistence o f tradition
al structures and its consequences for the political and economic order—all of
which Argentina shares with many Latin American countries and other parts
of the world. While not new, these questions have never been answered. Al
though it is not possible to cover them all here, a summary analysis o f the
political process is herein presented.
INDEPENDENCE AND FAILURE IN ESTABLISHING

A MODEN NATIONAL STATE
Independence was inspired in the ideals of eighteenth-century rationalism

and the Enlightenment. Its models were the revolutions of France and, even
more, o f the United States. But if an independent state was constituted out
o f the old colony, its conversion into a modern state based on the cherished
ideals failed. The reasons for this failure may be reduced to two. The first
was a structural limitation to the program o f reforms the elite was able to ac
complish. This limitation was rooted in the group’s own position in the social
structure and its nature as a social group. The democracy to which it aspired
could only be a liberal democracy, in which the effective exercise o f power
would be restricted to this very group. Popular participation (necessary for
carrying out an independence movement) was impossible in the economic,
social, and political sphere. This limitation on the achievement of possible re
forms produced an irremediable contradiction between proclaimed goals and
effective policy, between ideology and action.
Such a contradiction was further reinforced by the second cause of failure:
the persisting colonial social structure and the profound misconception o f its
nature on the part of the elite leading the independence movement and build
ing the new nation. A modern nation-state was impossible insofar as it lacked
the required social basis. A glaring example o f it was the civil wars following
the attainm ent o f independence. The elite wanted a unified, centralized state,
organized according to a liberal-democratic ideology, but in fact controlled
by the elite itself, as the only modernized and educated group in the country.
This was true, but the social reality would not permit such a solution. The
large and quasi-desert national territory could not be unified, for cultural,
social, technological, and economic reasons. Regional autonomies were solid
ly rooted both in the ruling landowning class and the populace. Such was the
basis o f the caudillos. Certainly from the point of view o f the Westernized
modern elite o f cosmopolitan Buenos Aires, they could be seen as “barbari
ans,” but they comprised the nation, and modern institutions could not be
imposed on them , except by sheer force, which the elite lacked. And yet with
the breakdown o f colonial rule and the independence war the lower strata
had been mobilized, and while remaining mostly traditional, it no longer ac
cepted the passive submission o f the subject under a traditionally legitimized
authority.
Three paradoxes must be underlined in this process. The popular stratum,
which participated enthusiastically in the independence movement and fought
for it, also represented in its way a democratic beginning. The kind o f individ
ual who represented the lower-class creole did not correspond to the image of
man subjected to a traditional authority, even though in most aspects o f his
life he was the standard-bearer o f the traditional culture. Because o f the pecu
liarities o f his way o f life, he was a somewhat anarchic individual: individu-
alistic, loving his personal independence, and disposed to recognize the

authority only o f those who excelled in the qualities he most admired—
valor and personal skill. The autocratic authority of the caudillos was not
maintained through traditional legitimacy but through its acceptance on the
part of these groups who recognized in the leaders their own image and an
exaltation o f their own values. Jose Luis Romero called it “inorganic democ
racy /’3 and it is probably an acceptable term so long as it is recognized that
there also persisted all the remaining attributes o f traditional man: social and
ecological isolation, ethnocentrism , religiosity (not exactly the religion o f the
cities), resistance to change, dominance o f custom and traditional or pre
scribed action, a subsistence economy and corresponding attitudes related to
work and economic activity. But the essential fact remained that the caudillo
regime was based on a sort o f m obilization, a traditional more than modern
social mobilization to be sure, but still involving political choice, an active
consensus, an active political role by the lower classes, which formed the so
cial basis o f caudillo power. The caudillo needed the active cooperation of
large strata o f the population, a cooperation which often took the form of
participation in armed conflicts, in local wars against caudillos of different
provinces, or against rivals within the same province. Many caudillos were
large landowners, but only a few o f this stratum would achieve power, and
this meant a capacity to attract the masses, charismatic qualities sufficient to
obtain the enthusiastic support o f mobilized sectors. This form of mobiliza
tion was the result o f the traum atic event o f independence and the active par
ticipation o f the popular strata in the insurgent, antimonarchist army. Disin
tegration o f the political colonial order and the rise of an independent state
were achieved through this mass popular participation, in which most of the
traditional hierarchical order was, if not suppressed, at least suspended.
Out o f the characteristics o f creole man arose the first paradox: the demo
cratic and republican solution to the institutional problem was imposed by
the presence and action o f this population that could not accept the monarchic
coquetries of the educated elite who sometimes dreamed of establishing a
monarchy as a sort o f guided liberal democracy. The second paradox has an
exactly opposite meaning: this creole stratum generated the dominion o f the
caudillos, in particular Juan Manuel de Rosas, and provided the basis for a
type o f autocracy consisting in the restoration—where possible—o f colonial
society and the denial o f democracy in a modern sense. The culture and so
cial structure o f Argentina in the years prior to 1850 were very close to the
traditional pattern o f the colonial period.
The third paradox may be seen in the following: the popular stratum and
the caudillos represented the trium ph o f the provinces and of the interior and
an affirmation o f the localism of the most limited small community; they
were incapable o f the ideals o f the “enlightened” minorities of the city, o f
extending loyalty to what is, in a modern sense, the great national commu
nity. The result o f the authority exercised by Rosas and by Buenos Aires, the
TABLE 5.1
STAGES OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN ARGENTINA
PRINCIPAL STAGES POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
I. Traditional Society 1. Colonial Regime
II
Beginning o f the collapse 2. Revolution o f 1810

of traditional society Wars of Independence (1810-20)
(oligarchic populism) 3. (1820-29) Failure o f the attem pt to
establish a modern national state ;
(traditional social mobili anarchy and civil wars.
zation) 4. (1829-52) Regimes o f the provincial
caudillos, unifying autocracy based
on the supremacy o f the strongest
province and a central caudillo.
(oligarchic populism)
III
Emergence o f modern 5. (1853-80) National organization under

society the direction o f oligarchic elites.
(Evolution of the liberal 6. (1880-90) Restricted democracy under
regime: from restricted the supremacy of the landowning class,
participation to an (oligarchic liberalism)
expanded one) 7. (1890-1912) Emergence o f the middle
(oligarchic liberalism) classes and second generation of immi
grants. Struggles for the expansion o f
(liberal populism) political participation.
8. (1912-30) Democracy with effective
(first cycle o f mobiliza universal suffrage. Enlarged political
tion: mobilization o f participation. Regime based on the
the “ center”) middle and popular classes with the
persistence of oligarchic economic
power (1916-30). (liberal populism)
IV
Mass social mobilization 9. (1930-43) First military revolution

(crisis in the liberal re and failed attem pt to establish a fascist
gime and national regime. Return to restricted democracy
populism) (political demobilization by means o f
fraudulent elections).
(second cycle o f mobili 10. (1943-44) Second military revolution.
zation: mobilization o f Second fascist attem pt.
the “center” and 11. (1944-46) Failure o f the second fascist
“ periphery”) attem pt. Birth and development o f the
Peronist movement, (national popular
movement)
12. (1946-55) National popular regime.
STAGES OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN ARGENTINA (Continued)
PRINCIPAL STAGES POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
Crisis of national 13. (1955-66) Third military revolution.

populism Mass demobilization. Failed attempts
Mass demobilization at reestablishing representative democ-
through attem pts at func cracy. Endemic military intervention.
tional substitutes o f 14. (1966-72) Failed attem pt at establishing
fascism. Endemic military a stable military-bureaucratic regime
intervention. Endemic (functional substitute of fascism).
m iddle -class-based 15. (1973-76) Return to power o f the na
guerrilla activities. tional popular movement, with a large
working- and middle-class coalition.
Crisis and disintegration of Peronism.
Widespread middle-class urban guerrilla.
16. (1976- ) New military revolution.
Mass demobilization. Endemic guerrilla
and drastic repression.
so-called federal regime, was an effective authority of Buenos Aires centra

lism, which ultim ately facilitated the process of national organization based
on a compromise between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies.
An im portant general consequence o f these three paradoxes was that the
caudillo regimes introduced a model o f political culture which, because o f its
success during the first part o f the nineteenth century, and the national goals
reached by the Rosas dictatorship (even if malgré soi), tended to persist, al
though in a latent way, particularly in those areas and social settings un
touched or relatively untouched by the great overseas immigration. It was an
aspect o f political behavior which could be observed in a curiously trans
formed guise in many traits o f the two great mass movements which followed
in the tw entieth century: radicalism and Peronism.
Caudillo politics was unmistakably a form of populism, with the authori
tarian traits so common in this type o f political movement. Because the
caudillos and their economic and social policies were fundamentally oli
garchic one may call this regime “oligarchic populism.”4 Still, it was popu
lism and it involved forms o f active and direct political participation on the
part o f the lower classes.
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION

OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The generation that assumed the task o f building Argentina as a modern

nation-state was aware o f the contradictions between the simple rationalism
of the independence elite and the true nature of colonial society as it was per
petuated through the first half o f the nineteenth century by the autocracy
and authority o f the caudillos. They understood that no political reform would
be possible which was not founded on radical changes in the social structure.
They were social realists, and they used the philosophic and sociological ideas
o f the times to understand the native national situation, and they arrived at
a true plan, a deliberate action directed toward a substantial m odification of
Argentine society.
Education, overseas immigration, and economic development: these were
the three pivots o f the nation-building plan o f the “Generation o f 1837,” as
it was called, the group including Sarmiento, Alberdi, and the others who for
mulated the plan and partially carried it through. But the action of the leaders
in this program was no less contradictory than had been that o f the earlier
revolutionary elite. They were a part o f what later came to be called the
“oligarchy,” a landholding bourgeoisie, in spite o f a liberal m otivation and a
sincere preoccupation with transforming Argentina into a modern state. Their
position in the social structure provided the main source of contradiction in
their efforts toward reform.
In the immigration program the objectives were two: first, “ to populate
the desert,” according to a well-known phrase; second, to change the social
character o f the population in order to give it those features considered neces
sary for the development o f a modern nation. They tried to substitute the
modern industrial structure for the traditional social form. In that period this
was viewed as a racial change and not as the effect of transition from one so
cial structure to another. In the parlance of the times, they were trying to
“bring Europe to America,” to Europeanize the interior population, consid
ered to be the principal factor in the political instability and economic back
wardness.
For this purpose it was necessary above all to “colonize,” to insure the
rooting to the land of European immigrants. Although the rise o f urban ac
tivities—in industry, services, etc.—was also desired, immigration was mainly
oriented “ toward the desert,” the countryside. Certainly the population was
radically altered, and as will be shown later, one o f the features essential to
the understanding o f present-day Argentina is its migratory origin. The tradi
tional social and economic structure was also transformed through the emer
gence o f Argentina as one o f the world producers o f grain and meat. But the
social structure o f the rural regions was not changed as had been hoped. No
large, strong, agricultural middle class, rooted in land ownership, emerged.
Instead o f “ colonization,” what has been termed a colossal land speculation
succeeded in increasing and reinforcing the influence of the latifundists. When
massive immigration began, most land accessible and adaptable to cultivation
was already held by a few proprietors. In 1914, after the middle period o f im
migration and with foreigners composing no less than half the total active
population, immigrants represented only 10 percent o f the owners o f landed
property (Table 5.4). The traditional families had maintained and substantial
ly increased the latifundist regime; in 1947 three-fourths of the land was still
concentrated in little more than 20,000 agricultural holdings, less than 6 per
cent of the to tal.5
The legal pattern o f land use was land rental, or other less favorable
forms, and the place o f a rural middle class was occupied in large measure by
renters and small proprietors, highly exposed to all the risks of climate and
the national m arket. Even though some prospered, the low economic condi
tion of the majority obliged them to move continually in search of better cir
cumstances and subjected them to all kinds o f restrictions. In still worse con
dition were the landless peasants, wage earners exposed to seasonal labor
needs, low levels o f em ploym ent and low standards of living. One o f the prin
cipal and undesired effects o f this situation was the concentration o f foreign
ers in the cities and an extraordinary urban growth.
Massive immigration and the rest o f the innovations sought by the elite
who directed “ national organization*’ from the second half of the past cen
tury meant a profound change in the country. But the social structure that
arose therefrom clearly deviated from the ideal o f establishing a stable base
for a democracy. The m ost consequential deviations were the unfavorable
rural structure, the population distribution, the obstacles to industrialization
created by the high vulnerability o f the economy after its entry into the in
ternational m arket, and the peculiar problems created by absorption of such a
large mass o f foreigners.
To populate the desert was desired, and in a certain sense achieved. But
the population remained concentrated in the cities, and disequilibrium be
tween the underdevelopm ent o f the interior and the development of the lit
toral was further accentuated. The consequences o f this were evident by the
middle o f the century. The process o f urbanization in Argentina developed in
two great phases: the first, 1869-1914, was affected by massive European im
migration; the second, corresponding approximately to the period 1935-60,
was sustained by massive internal migrations.6
The role o f foreigners in the formulation o f Argentina’s urban structure
is shown very clearly in Table 5.2. Not only in cosmopolitan Buenos Aires,
whose population was 50 percent foreign during 1869-1914, but also in the
remaining cities this proportion was exceptionally high. Also of significance is
the direct correlation between population size and proportion of foreigners.
Thus in cities o f 100,000 or more inhabitants during 1895-1914, more than
one-third had been born abroad, while in the Buenos Aires area the propor
tion was 50 percent.
To this urban concentration was added another of a regional type. All
large cities were situated in the littoral zone, and in general foreigners were
located therein. Thus the Buenos Aires m etropolitan area and the provinces
of the littoral always retained about 90 percent of the immigrants. This
concentration had profound effects on the social structure and the political
TABLE 5.2
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN TOTAL POPULATION

OF EACH CATEGORY OF COUNTIES CLASSIFIED ACCORDING
TO SIZE OF URBAN CENTERS, 1869-1960*
Zone 1869 1895 1914 1936 1947 1960
Greater Buenos Aires 47 50 49 36 26 21

Other cities o f 100,000 or more 9 34 35 15 11
Urban centers of 50,000 to 99,999 8 18 22 7 6
Urban centers of less than 2,000
and populations outside o f urban 3 9 19 9 9
centers.
*Counties classified according to size o f major urban center, taking the population
existing in 1947 (uniform areas).
Source: G. Germani, “ El proceso de urbanizacion en la Argentine,” Revista

Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Washington, D.C. 1963), and analysis o f a
sample of the 1960 census.
life, particularly when combined with the expansion and transform ation of
the economy. By the beginning o f the present century the traditional pattern
had been destroyed and replaced by forms closer to the m odern model. Also,
as a result o f measures aimed at the economic development o f the c o u n try -
attraction o f capital, construction o f railroads, legal reform s—the country be
came a great grain and meat exporter. New demands o f foreign commerce,
the needs o f the great urban concentrations, and the increased wealth o f the
country gave an impulse to the first industrial development. Since the last
quarter of the century modern industrial activity had appeared and expanded
through the country, replacing the old surviving artisan forms, and although
continuing to be centered in agriculture and livestock, already reached a re
spectable volume o f production in the first decade o f the present century. At
the same time the popular strata of the old society—largely rural—were re
placed by an urban proletariat and a rapidly expanding middle class. Thus the
dychotom ic stratification pattern (an upper stratum o f the landed estate
holders versus a lower stratum composed o f a m ajority of the population,
with an intermediate traditional stratum and a middle class of minor im
portance, usually identified with the upper stratum) was replaced by a tripar
tite (upper, middle, and popular classes) or even multiclass system. The dif
ferentiation between classes, especially in the cities, became blurred, and the
structure assumed the form o f a stratification continuum .
The emergence o f a middle class o f sufficient demographic, economic,
and social importance for achieving political influence occurred between
1869 and 1895. By the last decade o f the nineteenth century it had become
a group o f great weight. In evaluating Table 5.3 it should be kept in mind
that the data are concerned for the most part with an urban middle class
concentrated in the littoral zone. Its influence was greater in those areas
playing a central role in national life. Also essential are the qualitative changes
produced by the transition from the traditional pattern to more modern
forms. While the upper class, the traditional families, retained broad control
in agriculture until the beginning o f the century, the middle class was com
posed of self-made men who prom oted the new activities, small and average
entrepreneurs consolidating commercial activity and nascent industry. A
smaller rural middle class, peasants o f some prosperity or economic stability,
was also formed. But this was a small group in comparison to the foreign im
migrant masses and the rural native population. Later, particularly after 1910,
the middle class owed its growth to the expansion o f its dependent sectors,
white-collar workers: employees and functionaries, professionals and techni
cians of public and private bureaucracies. This successive change in the com
position of the middle class also has its political significance. From the popu
lar strata, rural laborers, people w ithout a trade, old skilled artisans, and do
mestic servants were transform ed into urban workers in industry, commerce,
transportation, and services, i.e., in activities characterized by the typical re
lations of m odern business enterprise and concentrated in the cities.7 Condi
tions existed for the rise o f proletarian movements which, in the typical pat
tern of early stages o f industrialization and urbanization, appear as movements
of social protest. The peculiarity o f Argentina was in the fact that this new
social stratum was virtually form ed only by the foreign immigrants.
The huge proportion o f foreigners (three times greater than in the United
States), and more im portant, their extreme concentration in the “ central”
region and big cities, placed the country’s national identity in danger. If, by
means o f a cultural miracle no less astonishing than the economic miracle
which also took place at the time, the Argentine nation reemerged from the
great flood o f im migration, this was made possible thanks to a social and cul
tural change, a real identity crisis whose repercussions exerted a strong influ
ence on the cou n try ’s political development. The identity crisis took place
primarily for two reasons: the form assumed by integration, and the ecological
concentration o f immigrants. In order to understand this situation one needs
to remember that in some areas, and among the adult group (20 years and
over), foreigners constituted (in 1890-1920) more than half o f the popula
tion. In Buenos Aires their num ber fluctuated between 70 and 80 percent.
Considering this fact, it is surprising that the economic, social, and cultural
integration o f the mass o f immigrants occurred more rapidly in Argentina
than in the United States, and w ithout creating lasting ethnic subcultures in
which national origin remains part o f the identity as happens in the United
States. In Argentina there were, and are, no Italo-Argentines, Hisp an ©-Argen
tines, or Polish-Argentines, comparable to the Italo-Americans or Irish-
Americans which continue to exist in the United States even after three or
four generations. Even urban ecological segregations did not exist for as long a
TABLE 5.3
MIDDLE AND POPULAR OCCUPATIONAL STRATA

IN ARGENTINA, 1869-1960
Occupational Strata 1869 1895 1914 1947 1960
Middle strata* (owners of business,

industry, agriculture; white collar
employees, professionals) 11 26 32 40 45
Popular strata (urban workers,

rural laborers) 89 74 68 60 55
^Including a small proportion (around 2 percent) o f the upper class.
period as did U.S. “ Little Italys” or “ Little Spains,” despite the fact that the
great European immigration continued in Argentina until 1930, while it had
ended ten years earlier in North America. Right from the start foreigners in
tegrated themselves economically: although the access to land ownership was
limited, most of the modern urban economic sectors were developed by the
foreigners themselves. From a sociocultural perspective (including marriage
and family practices, interpersonal relations, behavioral patterns, and language)
the integration process took place with exceptional rapidity. Sons o f foreign
ers, and in general foreigners themselves (especially the more numerous
groups o f Italian and Spanish immigrants), were assimilated more rapidly in
Argentina than in other countries which experienced immigrations, especial
ly the United States. However, the society and culture involved in this assimi
lation process were quite different from that which existed prior to the mas
sive immigration. When referring to the specific region where foreigners con
centrated, it would be more appropriate to speak o f synthesis than assimila
tion. The language, cultural models, and personality types o f the immigrants
modified considerably the original creole society, creating a new one with its
own characteristics and in which all the composing elements became fused in
a relatively short time. Assimilation gave way to an altered identity, because
while the sons o f immigrants considered themselves to be Argentine and com
pletely disregarded their different national origins, their cultural traits were
different from those o f the creole Argentine identity which existed prior to
the great immigration. This transformation took place only in the most de
veloped areas and in the central region. In this area—around Buenos Aires and
in the littoral provinces—foreign immigration and socioeconomic moderniza
tion and development joined forces and strengthened each other. This process
involved about two-thirds o f the population but excluded two-thirds o f the
national area and a third o f its inhabitants, with the resulting geographic
exclusion of the peripheral region and the underdeveloped pockets inside the
“central” region—not to mention the social exclusion o f the more archaic
TABLE 5.4
PROPORTION OF FOREIGNERS IN D IFFEREN T CATEGORIES

OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION: FOREIGNERS PER 100 PERSONS
OCCUPIED IN EACH LISTED CATEGORY, 1895-1914
Strata Econom ic and occupational 1895 1914

categories
Some sectors o f the Owners o f landed property* No data 10

middle classes Owners and managers in industry 81 66
Owners and mnagers in com
merce and services 74 74
Professionals 53 45
Commercial employees
(white collar) 63 51
Public employees (white collar) 30 18
Some sectors o f the Industrial workers 60 50

popular classes Domestic servants 25 38
Laborers in domestic and
craft industries 18 27
Total active population 30 47
Source: Second and third national censuses.
* Excluding owners in the Federal Capital.
sectors o f the econom y, the marginal agriculture, traditional artisanship,

small business and the nonm odern services (such as domestic services), and
the underem ployed or unem ployed laborer. The geographic and occupational
concentration o f foreigners was responsible fo ra cultural differentiation which
affected the social and econom ic balance. Such was the resulting synthesis:
the new im m igratory Argentina dom inated the “ center,” th at is Buenos Aires
and the littoral, while the old creole Argentina survived in the “ periphery”
and the isolated sectors o f the littoral. This fact, more than the mere presence
of an enorm ous mass o f foreigners, had im portant sociopolitical effects, ef
fects which were not felt until much later, with the beginning of a new period
in the history o f Argentina, that is, after 1930.8
Although the first industrial development which took place during this
period was sufficient to give life to an im portant sector of the middle class, it
was economically weak, and above all it was incapable o f developing an en
trepreneurial middle class aggressive enough to win the necessary state sup
port. Agrarian exporting interests were readily supported in view o f the suc
cess o f the economic choice which had been made by the oligarchy in the
preceding period, and the fact that the benefits of that success had been
shared, although in a smaller way, by the majority of the population in the
socially central areas.
LIBERAL OLIGARCHY, LIMITED DEMOCRACY, AND

THE FIRST CYCLE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
From a political point o f view, the period begins with the high point of
“ oligarchic liberalism,” whose stability was based on an extremely restricted
political participation. Electorally, these restrictions were not based on the
law, but were the result of violence, systematic fraud, and corruption. Be
cause of an absolute lack of guarantees, elections were controlled by one or
another of the various well-established political factions at the provincial and
national levels. These factions were mostly an expression o f internal conflicts
within the same oligarchic class. Soon the social modernization process gen
erated a strong and increasing pressure for the expansion of political partici
pation. The middle class and the modern urban proletariat, both in full ex
pansion from a purely quantitative point of view, constituted a mobilized
social force and were transformed into effective political actors in the nation’s
life. Their activity—by way of legal means and revolutionary attem pts—finally
led to a new law which perm itted the real application of universal suffrage, in
1912. Two mass-supported parties emerged in the 1890s: Radicalism (Union
Civica Radical) and Socialism, but while the former rapidly acquired national
importance and secured the absolute majority o f the electorate in all the free
elections up until 1946, the latter only became im portant in the Buenos
Aires area and in a few cities of the interior. Radicalism was above all an ex
pression of the newly formed middle sectors (the first generation and their
descendants) whose leadership was characterized by an oligarchic com ponent,
but which had also considerable support from the lower classes. In the new
party there were sectors linked to the traditional political culture of the
caudillo regime. These com ponents could be found in the oligarchic elements
of the leadership and in some sectors of the popular element where traces of
continuity with the Rosas regime could be noted—this both with regard to
the social base and the political culture. At the popular level, although there
were many regional variations, the original creole element coexisted with the
immigrant elements; the radical middle-class sectors originated instead almost
entirely from immigratory Argentina. This particular composition reflected
differentiations in terms of culture and economic integration which the great
overseas immigration was introducing in Argentine society. Radicalism was
ideologically liberal and democratic, in the modern sense, and the traits con
tinued from the creole past affected the visible aspects o f the political style
more than the ideological orientation and practices o f the government. None
theless, Radicalism was particularly strong in its nationalism, which even if
sincerely democratic, still contrasted noticeably with the cosmopolitan char
acter o f the oligarchy in power. The movement was really a form o f populism,
because it added to its multiclass base a certain emphasis on the old m yth of
the people as bearers of particular virtues, and attem pted to recreate this
image by salvaging elements from popular tradition. By this time such a tradi-
tion was disappearing or being transformed by the synthesizing process

already m entioned. The charismatic element also played an im portant role,
and indeed Radicalism's principal exponent was a charismatic leader (Irigoyen).
But it was a liberal populism, because the core of its ideology and political
action consisted o f the effort to achieve the real functioning o f the constitu
tional order based on principles o f freedom and democracy. The Socialists,
instead, had to be—and in the beginning w ere—a working-class party; but as
such it failed, not only because it remained restricted to a few areas o f the
country, but also because in less than three decades its composition became
socially heterogeneous, and even though it had a predominance o f modern
urban proletariat, this sector was mainly composed o f the “labor aristocracy.”
The victory o f populism —under whose sign the first participation crisis
took place, with the introduction o f new social strata in the political life and
the failure o f the class parties—c^n be explained by the confluence o f several
factors. First, at the origin and during the ensuing development o f this phase
of extension o f participation, m ost o f the urban proletariat mature for politi
cal mobilization was concentrated in the Buenos Aires area and in a few cities
of the interior. This restricted the expansion of a working-class party at the
national level. Second, in those areas where this social basis existed, effective
political participation through elections was even more restricted, not only
because o f fraud and violence but due to the fact that in those cities almost
all the modern proletariat was foreign born and little inclined to acquire Ar
gentine citizenship. This would have been very simple legally, but besides not
being indispensable for the exercise o f any activity except electoral participa
tion as a candidate or voter, it was very far from the patterns o f political be
havior with which the urban proletariat entered national life in those days.
The proletariat either reproduced the apathy and political nonparticipation
which had prevailed in the original countries (especially Italy and Spain), or,
when it was politicized, it expressed itself through unions and with forms of
direct social protest like strikes and riots, while in its earliest stages, it had fo
cused mainly on the total rejection o f the political order, including elections.
The anarchist influence, strong until the 1920s, powerfully contributed to
this orientation. In addition to these reasons for the failure of electoral parti
cipation, there was the particular structure o f the political forces of th at peri
od and the little meaning given to voting under the conditions of fraud and
violence so common before the Saenz Pefta law (1912). Among the various
parties only the socialist movement could have had a direct interest in m o
bilizing the foreign vote, since foreigners constituted the vast majority o f the
social sector to which the party addressed itself. In fact, the Socialist party
did carry out attem pts in this direction, but while on the one hand there was
a lack o f power and organization necessary to carry out massive campaigns
for the naturalization o f foreigners, on the other hand, as long as the voting
conditions were m aintained, the incentive to work in this direction did not
seem great. With regard to the radicals it should be remembered that although
they represented the immigrant middle class (specifically the sons and grand
sons o f foreigners), their group was not immune to linkages with the old tra
dition of the caudillo’s oligarchic populism and that o f Rosas in particular.
Radicalism could therefore count on the support of politicized sectors o f the
popular classes with creole origins. This strange m ixture, which was also re
flected in the composition o f its leadership, was possible because o f its strong
ly nationalistic character, which satisfied not only the creole com ponent, but
also the lively patriotic enthusiasm of the new Argentines who belonged to
the recently formed middle classes. For these the general tendency, unusually
pronounced in Argentina, was for the second generation o f immigrants to for
get the national origin of their parents; this tendency was reinforced by the
social ascent that placed them in a different class from their fathers. (The ty p
ical ambition of the immigrant who wants his son to be a doctor and its con
sequences are treated extensively in the literature o f the period.) Electoral ab
stention, employed as a form of protest against the lack o f voting guarantees,
constituted another obstacle to any systematic attem pt towards nationaliza
tion o f immigrants. Later on, free elections dem onstrated that Radicalism
had a strong and stable m ajority, thanks to which there was no need to under
take campaigns in this direction. The third im portant political force—the con
servatives—was naturally opposed to any effective extension of suffrage in
favor o f the middle or lower classes, since it would be to their disadvantage.
What consequences did electoral nonparticipation of foreigners have on
the formation o f popular parties, and on the political processes o f that period
and their later consequences? The issue has not been studied enough, but
many facts support the hypothesis that there were three main effects.
The first was to limit the pressure on the social order and the political sys
tem exercised by the intense social mobilization of the lower classes in 1880-
1910. The foreign masses, available for new forms o f participation as a result
o f displacement due to structural changes and their own uprootedness, chan
neled their mobilization through social protest and unionization. But they
were not able to exert direct pressure on the political order since they lacked
voting rights (and did not demand them). The pressure was intense, and social
protest assumed even violent overtones involving direct action, conflicts, and
strikes whose greatest intensity was only equaled in the 1940s, with a much
larger urban working population. The threat this situation represented for po
litical stability as well as the social order itself was clearly felt by the ruling
class, which responded with repressive measures (such as the famous law on
the expulsion o f foreign agitators). What weighed heavily in the decision to
finally permit universal suffrage was the intention of widening the system’s
base by incorporating into the country’s political life those sectors which
though exercising a revolutionary pressure to obtain political participation,
still did not constitute a threat to the social order. Neither the radical elite o f
oligarchic origins, the middle classes of immigrant origins, nor, even less, the
popular sectors o f creole origins or of early immigration presented any danger
from this point o f view. All these sectors had become incorporated into the
existing social order, with the sole exclusion o f electoral participation. From
the point o f view o f their position in the economic and social structure, the
recent middle-class com ponent was as incorporated as the oligarchy. From
the point o f view o f political culture and ideological orientation, even the al
ready established popular sectors could consider themselves to be in this sit
uation.
The second consequence of electoral nonparticipation of foreigners in
volved limiting or preventing the formation o f a workers’ party with consid
erable strength in the big cities, which would probably have been endowed
with a revolutionary potential much more significant than the timid reform
ism o f the Socialist party along most o f its course.
The third consequence was the formation o f a union tradition, with parti
cipation models suitable for the urban way o f life and work, and essential for
the creation o f an organizational basis for the formation of its own leader
ship. All these elements turned out to be im portant in the following period
during the second cycle o f m obilization, especially as a powerful instrum ent
for the rapid acculturation o f the large rural or nonindustrial sectors being in
corporated into national life.
To the above must be added another fact, which both minimized the pos
sibility for the development o f a strong working-class party at the national
level and contributed significantly to absorb—through nonpolitical channels—
the pressure o f the mobilized foreign masses and to curb the class struggle.
This was the high rate o f upward social mobility that characterized the whole
period and continued even later. Because o f this mobility only a minority of
urban workers remained in the same class position for more than one or two
generations. A considerable proportion of sons o f laborers and often laborers
themselves joined the ranks o f the middle classes, while their place was filled
by foreign immigrants whose rural origin, or at least whose unfamiliarity with
the modern urban political culture, retarded their participation in social pro
test movements and other active forms of response to their displacement.
This heterogeneity of the working class (in that it included sectors which
had just been incorporated and others with longer experience) was also rein
forced by com ponents of petit bourgeois origins, since there was also a sig
nificant flux o f downward m obility, especially from the lower ranks of the
middle classes. The high level o f fluidity in Argentine society not only pro
duced a high degree o f heterogeneity in the composition of the working class;
it also prevented the crystallization o f an ideological consciousness in the So
cialist party, as well as among the syndicalized foreign masses, which very
well might have followed other orientations (anarchism, for example), and in
the nonparticipating masses. The m aturation of a working-class subculture
with a m entality suitable for the political action typical of the urban prole
tariat, requires a relatively extended period o f psychological and social isola
tion, and this cannot be reached w ithout a certain stability, for example when
at least three generations remain in the same class position. This did not take
place in Argentina, a fact which puts Argentina in a similar category with the
United States and Canada. Thus the Socialist party gained a considerable
number of petit bourgeois supporters, as the sons of once militant workers
climbed one or two steps in the social hierarchy while still maintaining the
paternal socialist tradition. This was the effect o f a rather common pattern:
the formation of a family tradition of political affiliation. The militants them
selves were frequently involved in the same process: common laborers in their
youth, and small owners, manufacturers, or businessmen at middle age or
later in life. In the rest of the proletariat the high degree o f social fluidity,
causing its heterogeneity and aspirations for mobility (frequently fulfilled),
provided an excellent mechanism to channel the mobilized sectors by offer
ing them a real or symbolic form o f greater participation in the social system.
This process also helped minimize considerably the visible inequality and the
possibility of developing a class consciousness, thus toning down the harsh
ness o f the conflicts. The multiclass character of the big political groupings in
Argentina found its roots not only in the old tradition o f populism, but also
in some of the characteristics of the nascent modern social structure. The po
litical struggles took place only in a limited way along class lines (except with
regard to the liberal oligarchy), and the only exception is to be found in the
Peronist movement of the 1940s, when an unprecedented degree of polariza
tion along class lines was reached. This polarization subsequently subsided.
Since the mobilization of the new urban proletariat was not expressed
through parties or elections, political polarization based on class did not oc
cur, while the integration mechanisms set in m otion by social mobility could
fully exercise their influence and absorb the mobilized sectors, integrating
them into the system. The rate o f structural changes, the traum a o f displace
ment, and the mobilization which followed were also lessened by the fact
that the integration o f the newly arrived took place much more gradually
through their sons.
Reintegration processes following mobilization do not always or necessar
ily express themselves through political or, more specifically, electoral chan
nels. Unionization and protest movements were an immediate manifestation
o f mobilization, but individual ascent or its expectation worked as an effec
tive substitute for political and electoral participation. The contemporaries
attributed a great deal o f the foreigners’ political disinterest to their ambi
tions and individualistic interests. In fact, participation in terms o f greater
consum ption, better work, higher prestige and respect, and higher hopes for
their own future or that o f their sons, did constitute the right answer for those
who had emigrated from their fatherland because of their hopes for personal
improvement, per far VAmerica (to make it in America), as the Italians said.9
The extension of political participation to new social groups—Argentina’s
second-generation immigrant sector above all—took place as a result o f a
decision made by a segment o f the oligarchy who saw in the effective applica-
ARGENTINE FERONISM 147
tion of universal suffrage a viable means to absorb the new middle-class urban
masses (mostly o f immigrant descent), which for more than two decades had
been exerting increased pressure coupled with revolutionary attem pts. At that
time such pressure appeared too strong to be further resisted. But there was
also a need to widen the system ’s social base to increase its ability to confront
the foreign urban proletariat, whose mobilization was threatening (or ap
peared to be) the stability o f the social order and the survival o f the oligar
chy. This plan was carried out with great success since it maintained the so
cial order and the stability o f representative democracy, and it achieved the
integration into the political system o f major sectors of the population, while
preserving the status quo in its essential aspect: the economic hegemony of
the oligarchy. On the other hand, even the great mass o f foreigners found ef
fective mechanisms o f social reintegration in the permeability o f the class
structure and through their own gradual incorporation into the national soci
ety through generational replacement. There was, however, a price to be paid:
the persistence o f the economic status quo and the old and new social, eco
nomic, and political problems linked to it (both internal and international)
introduced intrinsic weaknesses into the new (mildly reformed) system,
which had fatal consequences when confronted with the severe test of 1929:
collapse o f the international market, the crisis o f the European democracies,
and the change o f international equilibrium among the major powers. All this
created the conditions for new processes whose outcome was the overturning
of the liberal political order and beginning o f a new cycle o f structural trans
formations and social mobilization.
Among the various factors that weakened the political system that emerged
after the extension o f voting rights, it is im portant to remember those whose
weight was felt most directly during the subsequent period and the new cycle.
The economic bases that had allowed for the country’s expansion and its high
level o f social m odernization did have limits. The high vulnerability o f the ex
port economy vis à vis the international market and the unpredictability of
agriculture, plus the fact th at at a certain point no new lands would be availa
ble for economically sound exploitation, were bound to require a change
eventually from the existing type o f agricultural economy to a different one,
based on a greater diversification o f production. Sooner or later the country
would have to face the problem o f industrial development. Despite the fact
that the negative social effects of the high concentration of land ownership
were minimized by the rural exodus (but only in the central areas), this solu
tion did not eliminate the serious economic problems concerning the need
for a national use o f the land and higher productivity. Above all, the con
centration o f land ownership left the decisive economic power o f the coun
try in the hands o f the same small group, and this situation was aggravated
by the fact that the group shared with a foreign power (the British) essential
financial and economic interests, an alliance likely to be prejudicial to the na
tional interests.
With the broadening of political participation, the responsibility for gov

erning the country passed into the hands of the middle classes, even though a
certain amount of oligarchic participation was still maintained. Economic and
political power, which during the preceding period had been in the hands of
the same group, was now divided among different groups. Although the
middle-class governments did not introduce modifications in the economic
and social setup, this split between the two forms o f power could become
dangerous during a time of crisis, as it did when the collapse o f the interna
tional economic system jeopardized the export economy and more so the in
terests o f the big landowners.
The presence of a large mass of foreigners who did not participate elec-
torally has often been singled out as another weak point in the representative
system. For the reasons illustrated herein, this does not appear to be valid.
But the great immigration, with the accentuated imbalance between peripheral
and central regions, and the cultural contrast between the two Argentinas—
the immigrant and the creole—and their own political cultures, heavily influ
enced the following period, when even the underdeveloped part o f Argentina
became displaced and available, giving way to mass internal migrations and so
cial and political mobilization.
To these economic and social factors must be added two more distinct
ly political components. The first refers to the unforeseen results of the
extension of voting rights participation. In the eyes of the oligarchy that
extension represented a calculated risk. Supporters o f the reform had high
hopes o f maintaining control over political power at the federal level, or at
least o f continuing to represent a valid political alternative in the context of
free elections. What happened instead was precisely the opposite. With the
new law, the conservatives were defeated forever as an electoral force. This
consequence contrasted with what happened in many countries, where
universal suffrage did not lead to such a complete and definitive overturning of
the electorate.10 Right from the first presidential election, the conservatives
lost forever the possibility of regaining power through free elections and
representing a feasible alternative to Radicalism: the split between economic
and political power thus became final, as long as the political institutions
remained unaltered or the essential aspects of the economic structure were
not changed.
The second weakness o f the system was less visible but not less real. It in
volved the latent persistence, as a com ponent o f the ruling class’ political cul
ture (of all ideologies), o f the propensity to utilize force as a means o f settling
struggles. For about seventy years the constitutional continuity had not been
formally interrupted, and in the incidents o f violence during the period of
national organization and the subsequent struggle for increased electoral par
ticipation, one cannot speak o f distinctly military interventions. These had
not been lacking but were only individual or quasi-individual participation in
civilian movements, under the direction of politicians. This military presence
and some o f its consequences with regard to relations between the govern
ment and the armed forces had contributed to keep alive—although in latent
form—the possibility for parties to use the army as an instrument o f political
struggle. Accidental facts were added later to the elements contained in the
economic, social, and political structure o f the country, and their weight
should not be underestim ated. These factors were: the age o f President Iri-
goyen—the charismatic leader who had led the movement for a long tim e—the
administrative disorder o f his second presidency, politically arbitrary acts,
and the resulting decrease in the regime’s popularity, as was demonstrated in
the legislative elections o f 1930. This was in itself very im portant since one of
the persistent traits o f Argentine political culture is that legitimacy is achieved
and maintained only by the electoral consensus of the absolute majority of
the electorate.
In September 1930 internal pressure was joined to the dramatic situation
the country was approaching because of the great crisis of 1929 and the
widespread lack o f confidence in a democratic system. Together these factors
managed to create a break in the constitutional order by means of a
military coup that encountered no resistance and was supported by almost all
parties, including the Socialists, other democratic organizations, and an
im portant segment o f the Radical movement. All of these parties called for a
“return to the constitution” and for free elections to be held as soon as
possible. This was w hat happened, but since the first partial elections were
won again by the Radical party, the presidential elections were manipulated
through violence and fraud as in the pre-1912 period. In this way the gov
ernment fell into the hands o f the oligarchy. Democracy was reestablished
but it operated on the basis o f a partial demobilization of large sectors of the
middle classes and the popular classes due to fraudulent elections. The link
between economic and political power in the hands of the oligarchy was
reinstated, following its earlier interruption caused by widening electoral
participation. But such reunification took place when the economic and
political upheavals at the international level caused the acceleration of
economic and social changes, leading to a decline in economic power of the
landed interests and initiating drastic transformations of the stratification
system.
In 1912 the first mobilization cycle came to an end. With the revolution
of 1930, the return to power o f the Conservatives, and a partial demobiliza
tion process, a new phase o f disturbances was initiated—while the economic
system and the liberal political system headed for crises. From then a second
social mobilization cycle was to emerge along with a second crisis of forced
entries which brought to the forefront the remaining marginal sectors. Once
again, the process manifested itself in the political arena under a populist
cover which did not lack a certain latent continuity with the populist move
ment o f the preceding period: the liberal populism o f the Radicals was fol
lowed by Peron’s national populism.
NOTES
1. A collection of many interpretations can be found in Carlos S. Fayt, La naturaleza

del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Viracocha, 1967). Other more recent interpretations are:
Peter H. Smith, “The Social Base of Peronism,” Hispanic American Historical Review 52
(1972): 55-73; Peter G. Snow, “The Class Basis o f Argentine Political Parties,” American
Political Science Review 63 (1969): 163-67; P. H. Smith, “Social Mobilization, Political
Participation, and the Rise of Juan Peron,” Political Science Quarterly 84 (1969): 30-49;
Eldon Kenworthy, “The Function of the Little Known Case in Theory Form ation,”
Comparative Politics (1973); Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre
los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1971); Monica Peralta Ramos,
Etapas de acumulacion y alianza de closes en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI,
1972) ; Dario Canton, La politica de los militares argentinos (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI,
1971); idem, Elecciones y partidos politicos en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI,
1973) ; Howard J. Wiarda, “Towards a Framework for the Study o f Political Change in
the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporation Model,” World Politics 25 (1973): 206-35;
idem, “The Latin American Development Process,” Western Political Quarterly (Septem
ber 1972): 464-90; Ronald C. Newton, “On Functional Groups, Fragm entation, and
‘Pluralism’ in Spanish American Political Society,” Hispanic American Historical Review
(February 1970): 1-29. An overview and evolution o f different theoretical frame
works on political development in Latin America is given by Philippe C. Schmitter,
“Paths to Political Development in Latin America,” Proceedings o f the Academy o f
Political Science 30 (1972): 83-105. With regard to earlier studies by this authorjon the
same subject see: G.Germani, “Algunas repercusiones sociales de los cambios economicos
en la Argentina, 1940-1950,” Cursos y Conferendas (1952): 552-79; La integracion
politica de las masas y el totalitarismo (Buenos Aires: CLES, 1956); “Social and Political
Consequences of Mobility,” in Lipset and Smelser; and “ El surgimiento del peronismo:
el roi de los obreros y de los migrantes internos,” Desarrollo Economico (1973). See
also the answers and comments published in Desarrollo Economico (1974) by Tulio
Halperin-Donghi, P. H. Smith, E. Kenworthy, and P. G. Snow on “ El surgimiento del
peronismo.” All these social scientists agreed on its main thesis.
2. The breakdown of modernization and development has caused a real identity
crisis in Argentina. It is one of the factors in the frantic search for a quick solution, a
new miracle such as the one which transformed the country at the dawn o f the twentieth
century into one o f the most successful new nations, comparable to the United States,
Canada, and Australia. After 1930 and particularly after the middle 1950s the image o f a
modern advanced country, predominant among Argentines, was replaced by its oppo
site: a Third World backward, semicolonial nation. Especially in the last decade, indis
criminate usage o f the term underdevelopment has induced m any—particularly intel
lectuals and pseudointellectuals o f the Left (and pseudo-Left)— to assimilate tout court
Argentina’s case with ex-colonial countries presently beginning the first phases o f transi
tion in Latin America, Asia, or Africa. This image is as deformed as the former (that of
Argentina as an economically developed and socially advanced country, subsequently
destroyed by statist experiments) and leads one to accept ideological and political ori
entations that are not viable for a country whose social structure is different from that
o f countries in initial phases o f the transition. It is worthwhile to record some recent
data. In two international typologies concerning economic and social development
and based on a large number of economic, demographic, educational, sanitary, and other
indicators, Argentina is in an intermediate position, closer to countries o f advanced
development. In a typology prepared by the United Nations, based on a series o f socio
economic indicators relating seventy-four countries, Argentina is in the third category on
a scale o f six. See, United Nations, Report on the World Social Situation (New York,
1961), ch. 3. In another work (presented at an international conference at Yale in Sep
tember 1963) Professor K. Deutsch places Argentina, among a total o f ninety-one coun
tries, in a second category on a scale o f five. The five categories are: traditional primitive
societies, traditional civilizations, transitional societies, societies in industrial revolution,
and societies o f high mass consumption. In this last category, to which pertain the
countries of highest economic development, there are thirteen nations, large and small.
See K. Deutsch, “ Yale Political Program: Preliminary R eport,’’ March 1963. In the four
years after the return o f Peronism to power, that is since 1973, the Argentine economy
declined precipitously.
3. Jose Luis Romero, Historia de las ideas politicas en la Argentina (Mexico: Fondo
de Cultura Economica, 1960); T. Halperin Donghi, “ El surgimiento de los caudillos en el
cuadro de la sociedad argentina postrevolucionaria,” Estudios de Historia Social no. 1
(Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, 1965); idem, Argentina: De la Revolucion
de Independencia a la Confederacion Rosis ta (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1972).
4. Ruben H. Z orrilla,Extraccion social de los caudillos, 1810-1870 (Buenos Aires:
La Pleyade, 1972).
5. Germani, Estructura social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1955), ch. 10.
6. Ibid.
7. Germani, “ La movilidad social en la Argentina,” in La movilidad social en la
sociedad industrial, ed. Lipset and Bendix (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1963).
8. On the synthesis process in the great European immigration, see Germani, “Mass
Foreign Immigration and Modernization in Argentina,” Studies in Comparative Inter
national D evelopment 2 (1966): 165-82. Contrary to the opinion presented by Oscar
Cornblit in “Inmigrantes y empresarios en la politica argentina,” Documento de Trabajo
no. 20 (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Telia, 1966), it does not seem that lack o f
political participation among foreign industrialists was a very im portant factor in the de
lay of industrial birth. It was the success o f the outward expansion model and the typical
dynamism o f open area economies that led to a prolonged export economy o f raw ma
terials. See (among others) G. Di Telia and M. Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo
economico argentino (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1967).
9. Among Argentine citizens as well there was little interest in voting so long as
fraud and violence persisted. In fact, nonvoting was an indicator of political protest.
Prior to 1912 in Argentina, the correlation between percentage o f voters and indicators
of social modernization (i.e., literacy) was inverse: the higher the proportion of literate
male adults, the lower the electoral participation. See D. Canton, “Universal Suffrage as
an Agent of Mobilization,” Documento de Trabajo no. 21 (Buenos Aires: ITDT, 1966).
The correlation became positive when effective free voting was established; for this
reason Cornblit’s position on foreigners is not acceptable. This author(“ Mass Foreign
Immigration”) and others refer to the contrast between low political participation of
foreigners in Argentina and their higher participation in the United States. The compari
son is not very meaningful for various reasons. First, in the United States foreigners, es
pecially those from Southern and Eastern Europe, were socially and economically segre
gated for a number o f generations, and their place in American society was for a long
time limited to the lowest levels o f the social hierarchy (if they were not outcasts alto
gether). For these groups the political system—particularly the clientelistic politics of
local administrations with all their corruption—was the only defense mechanism, the
only access to power, and the quickest way to social ascent. Argentine society was open
(except for restrictions on land ownership) and practically all modern urban activities
were soon dominated by foreigners. Foreigners represented almost 60 percent o f the
middle class in 1895 and more than 50 percent in 1914; businessmen were about three-
fourths foreigners, and industrialists between 80 and 66 percent in the two periods,
(see notes 6 and 7). Second, in the United States naturalization o f foreigners (which was
very high for Anglo-Saxon immigrants but fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent for
others) contributed to the electoral machines. This applies not only to the clientelistic
political system, but also to corruption and electoral fraud which were widespread and
often decisive in elections. Tammany Hall became a synonym for electoral corruption.
This corruption continues in present times. The political participation o f those born in
foreign countries was at best a mechanism for economic and social integration, but not
political integration. Political integration took place in Argentina in a direct and ex
tremely fast way. The political sign of its rapidity is represented by the number o f im
migrants’ sons who achieved the highest governmental positions, including the presidency.
10. In the 1910 elections, the last before the new law, the Conservatives received 96
percent of the votes. They fell to 38 percent in 1916, and to 21 percent in 1924, and
they never topped this proportion in succeeding liberal elections.
CHAPTER SIX
STRUCTURAL CHANGE, FASCIST ATTEMPTS, AND

THE RISE OF LOWER CLASSES AND NATIONAL POPULISM
CHANGES IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The military revolution o f 1930 and political demobilization achieved by

systematic electoral fraud and repression, created a deep political and moral
crisis. Alienation and skepticism pervaded public opinion. Nationalism arose
in response to an economic policy subordinated to the interests o f the English
and their allies in the Argentine oligarchy. The collapse o f the international
market had economic effects that transform ed the social structure o f the
country and substantially modified the sociocultural composition and geo
graphic distribution o f the population. Structural displacement generated a
rapid process o f social mobilization whose political expression was later mani
fest through Peronism. These phenom ena are well known; what is missing are
systematic studies o f the period’s social history.
Although internal migrations and industrialization are often mentioned,
their varying size, the speed o f the process, and their role as political phenom
ena often are ignored or distorted. Other essential facts, such as the sudden
disappearance of mass European immigration in 1930, have also been over
looked. Furtherm ore, there is inform ation today, not available in the past,
which can clarify im portant points. A ttem pts have been made in recent years
to question or underestimate the decisive impact o f structural changes and
153
their consequences for social class composition and mass mobilization, es
pecially within those sectors which had remained outside the nation’s life.1
What follows is a brief examination o f this process.2
Changes in Socioeconomic Structure and Occupational Stratification

in Peripheral and Central Regions, 1936-46.
The lack o f population censuses between 1914 and 1947 is a serious ob
stacle, but special censuses and existing studies—particularly by econom ists—
provide a basis for a reconstruction o f the situation.3 Two modifications
occured in the economically active population (EAP) : a massive transference
from the agricultural to the industrial and the tertiary sectors, and an inter
nal transformation of all of them . Both qualitative and quantitative changes
were the consequences o f two external and several internal factors. The
former are the Great Depression (from 1930) and World War II. The latter
range from long-term historical trends, such as the land tenure system and
circumstances delaying industrialization, to conjunctional ones, such as the
overextension of cultivated land in the 1920s and early 1930s, and the evo
lution o f wheat, corn, and meat prices in the international m arket. What con
cerns us here is their combined impact on the economy and social structure.
The great world crisis caused the breakdown o f the primary export economy
and created a natural protection for the national industry already existent
since the beginning o f the century. This process, intensified by World War II,
depressed agricultural prices, and increased the value o f meat exports while
boosting the need for im port substitution and industrial growth.
The impact o f the 1930 depression, though producing a crisis in export
prices, was delayed in terms o f em ploym ent in agriculture. The same occured
with the acceleration o f industrial development. Thus, the area devoted to
agriculture (as opposed to cattle breeding) continued to increase until 1937,
a year which marked an all-time record level.4 This expansion, accelerated
during the 1920s, explains the increase in agricultural em ploym ent since the
pre-World War II period. Primary activities—31 per cent in 1914—increased in
intervening years, absorbing more than 40 per cent o f the EAP annual increase
until 1935 and an even higher proportion in 1936 and 1937 ;5 But from 1938
on, a shift from agriculture to cattle breeding and industrial crops caused a
precipitous decline. The former absorbed much more labor than the latter;
hence, the change involved a massive expulsion o f agricultural labor, not off
set by the growth o f other rural activities.6 The magnitude o f the shift is
given by comparing 1937 and 1947 agricultural censuses. The total labor force
in agriculture and cattle breeding (including seasonal workers and family aids
below age 14) declined by 660,000 workers, th at is, 25 per cent o f the total
agricultural work force according to the 1937 census. Even if we neglect
family aids, not counted by standard EAP criteria, the decline was still more
than 20 per cent.
LOWER CLASSES AND NATIONAL POPULISM 155
A better indicator o f premigration life and work experience is given by

figures on persons working in agriculture—even as seasonal workers or family
m em bers—since a comparison o f these figures indicates the proportion ex
pelled from this type o f work and lifestyle. The tem porary and seasonal work
ers category is particularly interesting. Part o f them were subsistence farmers
or peasants working tem porarily for others, but some were day laborers work
ing in the secondary and tertiary sectors when they were not unem ployed.7
Also im portant are the differences between the 1937 and 1947 censuses.
Most changes occured among self-employed peasants and their family aids; 18
per cent o f the wheat and corn farms disappeared. While this decline was off
set by new establishments in industrial crops and cattle breeding, involving a
slight increase in wage earners, this growth was insufficient to compensate for
the heavy losses in the small peasantry. This implies that the shift to cattle
breeding was accompanied by a considerable narrowing of the surviving sub
sistence sector and less capitalist farms. While in 1937 agricultural wage earn
ers comprised a little over one-half o f all those working in the primary sector,
this category increased to 78 per cent ten years later.
Both processes—expulsion o f agricultural labor and o f noncommercial or
less commercial farming—were more pronounced in peripheral regions; 62 per
cent o f the expelled agricultural population came from the latter. The pro
portion o f salaried workers in peripheral areas climbed from 47 per cent in
1937 to 84 per cent in 1947, whereas this change was from 59 per cent to 74
per cent in central regions. Most o f the production o f the Argentine primary
export sector was already characterized by commercialized and capitalist
economic organization ; but the modernization o f agriculture and husbandry
in the last decades of the nineteenth century left a sizable proportion o f the
rural population still working in small and backward farming, partly o f the
subsistence type.
During the interwar period until 1938, the agricultural boom involved an
increase o f this sector, with the occupation o f less productive lands and the
creation o f subeconomic units. During this period (1914-37) the number of
establishments increased 18 per cent, mostly among the minifundia (47 per
cent o f the total increase was in farms under 25 hectares, and another 18
per cent was in those from 25 to 50 hectares). These small farms were sub
familiar, that is, below the requirem ent for family subsistence, technically
backward, and lacking capital investment for economic exploitation.8
Widespread tenant farming, sharecropping, and other archaic land tenure
systems, coupled with the deterioration o f land (in part an effect o f the tenure
system), contributed to the vulnerability o f small farmers. Large estates
could convert part o f their land to the now more profitable cattle breeding,
and other farmers to industrial crops, but the marginal sector o f agriculture
suffered a catastrophic decline. A considerable proportion had to leave the
land. While these changes modified the primary sector, a qualitative and
quantitative leap took place in industry.
Industry was not new in the country. The first wave o f industrialization
TABLE 6.1
WORKERS IN AGRICULTURE AND CATTLE BREEDING,

CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL REGIONS (1937-1947)
WORKERS IN
AGRICULTURE TOTALS FOR CENTRAL PERIPHERAL
AND CATTLE THE COUNTRY REGIONS REGIONS
BREEDING
1937 1947 1937 1947 1937 1947
Proprietors, tenant
farmers, administra
tors, etc; and active
family members*
(thousands) 1218 439 647 336 571 103
(%) (46%) (22%) (41%) (26%) (53%) (16%)
Salaried **
(thousands) 1418 1537 919 978 499 559
(%) (54%) (78%) (59%) (74%) (47%) (84%)
Total (thousands) 2936 1976 1566 1314 1070 662
(%)
Index Number
(1937=100) 100 75 100 84 100 62
Source: CIDA, Tenencia de la tierra (Washington, D.C.: Union Panamericana

1965), table 5 (adapted). Figures for 1947 were obtained from unpublished
information contained in the IV National Census (agricultural); INDEC AR
CHIVES.
* Includes persons under 14 years o f age.
** Includes permanent and seasonal help.
occured in the last decade o f the nineteenth century. During the 1920s, after
World War I, industry continued to grow although at a slower rate. Its pro
portion of the EAP declined, but the number o f industrial factory workers
increased. In the decade 1935-46 industrialization accelerated enormously.
Comparing the industrial censuses (which underestimated secondary activities
and excluded building), the rate o f absorption during that period was 62 per
cent o f the total annual increase in the EAP. A sharp difference between the
Erst half and the second half o f the decade occured: in the former the rate of
industrial absorption was 46 per cent, while in the latter it was 72 per cent.
Two observations are in order. First, there is a clear synchronization be

tween growth and agricultural decline; second, since the industrial censuses
include all factory workers (and underestim ate artisan and hom ecraft activi
ties), it is modern industry that grew. It may be estim ated that all increases
in the secondary sector occurred in factory industry, whose workers went
from 30 percent (of the whole secondary sector) in 1936, to 50 percent in
1946. Artisans (enterprises with one to ten workers) shrunk from 52 to 30
percent, and hom ecraft activities (only self-employed and family aids) were
reduced to 14 percent.
TABLE 6.2
DIFFERENCES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECONDARY SECTOR,

1935-1946 (thousands)
COMPOSITION OF SECONDARY DIFFERENCE % OF TOTAL

SECTOR 1935-46 CHANGES
Factory workers 434 +81
Nonfactory workers, self-employed, -38 -7

and family aids
Owners and white-collar employees 141 +26

(factoyr industry)
Total increase in secondary sector 537 100
Source: Industrial Censuses o f 1935 and 1946, Population Census o f 1947, and
CEPAL estimates (1958).
Similar changes occurred in the tertiary sector. Though here some quanti
tative evidence could be gathered, this would require special studies unavail
able now. Until the 1930s growth was slow, but it increased considerably in
following years. At the same time it experienced a substantial internal trans
form ation as occurred in the secondary sector: technological and economic
concentration, w ithin the forms and limits characteristic o f services and com
merce. G row th and m odernization o f the internal m arket, with rapid urbani
zation and mass consum ption; the new roles o f the state, with increased in
tervention, enlargement o f the public sector (which had already grown since
1930), and greater bureaucratization ; and high growth in education and other
services (such as mass tourism and working-class vacations) all change the scale
o f society. It was translated into the growth o f a m odem tertiary sector re-
placing the traditional, nonm odern, and pseudotertiary sector so common in

developing economies.9
The End o f European Immigration and Its Impact on the Sociocultural

Composition o f the Population
Drastic and rapid changes in the quantity and quality o f the EAP required
extensive redistribution o f the population. But the extent, shape, and nature
of the redistribution cannot be understood w ithout considering European im
migration, its ecological and occupational distribution, and the cleavage be
tween “central” and “peripheral” regions.
Mass European immigration suddenly ended in 1930. Until that year, net
immigration from Europe annually averaged 88,000 (mostly young and adult
males).This was as high as the total increase in the Argentine working force.
In the next decade it dropped to 7,000 per year, and to 5,000 in 1940-46.10
Until 1930 Europeans composed most o f the population working in industry
and services, particularly in the modern sector (in 1914, from 50 to 70 per
cent of those working in these activities, but probably still high in the 1920s).
Immigrants helped establish modern agriculture, but even at the peak o f im
migration their proportion in this sector was lowest; later it declined further.
The trend was reinforced in the 1920s, when demand in the secondary and
tertiary sectors was filled by Europeans. Europeans were also concentrated
geographically in “central” regions (80 percent lived in the “center” in 1947)
and in large cities. 11 Furtherm ore, in the “periphery” the proportion of
Europeans was lower than in the rest o f the country (less than 5 percent).
Finally, the “peripheral” provinces, because o f their high fertility, provided
more than their proportional share of the natural population increase. When
the inflow from Europe ended, their contribution became crucial.
These circumstances determ ined occupational and ecological redistribu
tion. It involved a high proportion o f the Argentine lower strata, but more in
tensely, those living in the backward regions and in the remaining traditional
pockets o f “central” regions, whether in developed or surviving archaic areas.
The composition o f the working class and its migrant elements in Buenos
Aires and other urban centers—particularly the large cities— as well as the
pattern o f expulsion from agriculture and the growth and qualitative changes
in the secondary and tertiary sectors, combined with drastic m odifications in
the recruitm ent o f the labor force in 1930. All these processes—structural
changes in the economy and in occupational and ecological distribution, and
the end o f overseas imm igration—took place simultaneously. When the de
m and for m odern industry and services increased, the reservoir o f labor usually
provided by foreigners disappeared. Internal migration replaced overseas im
migration. Both normal replacement o f those leaving the labor force and ad
ditional demand generated by growth and change in industry and services had
to be filled with the natural demographic increase and the excess population
displaced from agriculture—particularly its archaic com ponents and the in-
ternal transference from the less developed or traditional portions o f the

secondary and tertiary sectors.
We have examined changes in economic structure. Let us now observe what
occurred in the socioeconomic and cultural composition o f the population,
particularly in the lower class.
EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON THE COMPOSITION

AND CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN LOWER CLASSES
Structural changes from 1936 to 1946 had repercussions on the entire

Argentine society. They affected institutions, classes, geographic distribution
of the population, demographic characteristics, and indirectly culture and its
political and nonpolitical behavioral models. We will now consider the m or
phological aspects o f the urban lower classes. Such aspects and their psycho
social correlates are extremely im portant with regard to the origins o f Peron-
ism. Some diverging interpretations stem from contrasting judgm ents on the
characteristics o f those classes. Although the great internal migrations which
took place after 1930 played a role, their significance is still disputed. Some
minimize the effects o f the new proletariat (formed as a result o f the shift)
either by affirming that it constituted a m inority, or by pointing out that the
majority o f the migrants had already acquired an urban experience in smaller
cities. Others claim, according to the so-called classic hypothesis, that the
influence o f new urban lower classes played a decisive role not only because
they were numerically significant, but above all, because they (as a new pro
letariat) determined the political form assumed by the process: a national
populist movement and not a working-class party.
The validity o f social mobilization theory (which insists on the importance
o f displacement and the consequent mobilization o f new sectors) depends on
the verification o f the existence, volume, and behavior o f nonurban masses
(not in terms of residence but in regard to lived experiences and behavioral
models in work, family, politics, etc.)12 The divergence among the charac
teristics o f the urban population does not exhaust discussion on Peronism.
The characteristics, the meaning and importance o f the alliance and class
conflict are also im portant. However, the shape assumed by the new move
ment depended on the characteristics o f its social basis. This form had great
consequences for the subsequent process.
To examine the consequences o f structural changes affecting the compo
sition and characteristics o f urban lower classes, one needs to refer to condi
tions between 1945 and 1947, and to consider the following three aspects:
(1) the proportion o f internal immigrants in the urban proletariat; (2) the
length o f residency in the city; (3) the proportion o f workers with rural or
more traditional experiences, or, to be more precise, the proportion o f in
dividuals whose experience prior to migration had been nonmodern or less
modern. The relative contribution o f migrants from developed as opposed to
backward regions must also be considered. The problem is to determine the

relative size of the recent urban proletariat, their social and economic back
ground, and their degree o f political acculturation in the urban setting.
Proportion o f Internal Immigrants in the Lower Urban Classes
This type o f inform ation cannot usually be obtained from the census and
therefore requires special investigations. Since for the period under considera
tion population censuses are incomplete, it is necessary to rely on indirect
procedures and inferences based on various data and inform ation. It is possi
ble to reach estimates which are confirmed by the results in the preceding sec
tion, obtained by the analysis o f economic structural changes.
For the year 1947, in addition to the published volumes o f the IV Nation
al Census, there is abundant unpublished data which allows for a reconstruc
tion of both the socioprofessional stratification o f Argentina (but without
any differentiation as to place o f origin or sex), and the migrant, nonmigrant,
and foreign composition o f the population at the county level. This inform a
tion is essential, but unfortunately it does not allow one to combine the two
series o f data.13.
Thanks to a special elaboration prepared on the basis o f a sample o f the
1960 census and survey studies of the Buenos Aires m etropolitan area
(BAMA) conducted during that same year, it is possible to establish the mi
grant or nonmigrant composition o f the native population for various socio-
professional strata existing in 1960 (see Table 6 .4 ).14 In the first place we
have to examine if, and to what degree, it is possible to reconstruct from
that information what the composition was in 1947. What most interests us
is to estimate the minimum level o f the proportion o f internal migrants in
the various socioprofessional strata; that is, to find out if at this minimum
estimate the number o f migrants is still sufficiently large to influence politi
cal participation (street action and other forms, particularly elections). Since
aliens did not vote, and generally abstained from participating in political
activities, what matters is the composition o f the native population. There
fore, all percentages are calculated on that basis.15 Table 6.3 shows that in
1947 the general level o f internal migration was higher than in 1960, and es
pecially in more urbanized areas. For example, in BAMA in 1947, internal
migrants were 38 percent of the total native population living in the area
(male and female o f all ages) whereas in 1960 they were only 32 percent;
in other areas the difference was similar, sometimes even greater. One may
infer that in 1947 the proportion o f internal migrants in Argentina was larger
than in 1960 in all urban areas. It must be added that demographic studies
show that the 1947 census underestim ated considerably the number of in
ternal migrants, particularly in urban areas and especially in BAMA.16
Statistics refer only to internal migration between different provinces and
not within each province. Intraprovincial migrations can have the same effect
TABLE 6.3
INTERNAL ARGENTINE MIGRANTS BORN IN OTHER PROVINCES

FOR EVERY 100 NATIVE ARGENTINE RESIDENTS. BAMA AND
COUNTIES CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO LARGEST URBAN CENTER
WITHIN EACH COUNTY, USING AS CRITERIA POPULATION FIGURES
FOR 1947 (PERIOD COVERING 1895-1960)
Areas 1895 1914 1936 1947 1960
M etropolitan area o f
Buenos Aires 16.4 21.4 18.9 38.0 32.0
100,000 and more 16.8 16.3 - 20.0 19.0
50,000 - 99,999 11.0 14.6 - 19.0 12.0
20,000 - 4 9 ,9 9 9 7.8 10.5 - 19.0 14.0
less than 20,000 10.5 12.6 - 16.0 12.0
Source: See Table 1.
as interprovincial migrations on both the behavioral level and the level o f

acculturation to urban industrial lifestyles. What m atters m ost is the differ
ence between the original sociocultural environment and the new one.17
The difference in the degree o f m odernization and development between
“central” and “peripheral” provinces was very pronounced, especially during
the 1940s. Within the “central” region the difference was less, yet there were
still imbalances. F urtherm ore, it is necessary to take into account the fact
that the migrants were especially concentrated among the young and adults.
Thus in 1947 in BAMA, 64 percent of internal migrants were above age
tw enty, com pared to 54 percent among natives. In the interior the difference
was even greater: 46 percent among the natives and 65 percent among the
internal m igrants.18 In Argentina sex is not an im portant selection factor for
internal migration and can therefore be om itted in the first approach. The
concentration by age is also reflected in the composition of the various
professional levels.
Once it has been established th at the situation in 1960 with regard to the
general level o f internal migration gives a reliable estimate o f the minimal
proportion o f migrants in 1947, it still remains to be proven whether these
conclusions can also be extended to the levels within each o f the socioprofes
sional strata under consideration. Two observations can be made. There are
no factors during the intercensus period (1947-60) that might have modified
the socioprofessional selection o f internal migrants in their place o f origin,
as well as at their arrival in their place o f residency. If anything, changes dur
ing this period only raised the original professional qualifications o f the mi
grants. While the general educational level in the country increased, the
population o f the small rural centers and the less developed areas decreased,
so that the basis for the selection o f migrants from the lowest professional
category became progressively smaller. Furtherm ore, during the period be
tween the two censuses, the high degree o f upward social m obility typical of
Argentina continued. Research conducted in the BAMA and elsewhere shows
that this process was noticeable even among internal migrants, (whose up
ward mobility is less than among the natives o f the area), especially within
the working-class strata (from unskilled to skilled), but even with regard to
the crossing o f the manual/nonm anual line, that is, the access to the middle
strata.19 As will be shown, there was a constant process o f upward mobility
combined with internal and external migration (only Latin American in ori
gin). As migrants climbed the social hierarchy, they were replaced by the
newly-arrived lower stratum , first from the peripheral provinces and then
from neighboring countries (Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile), which in the
1970s became an im portant source to fill the need for less qualified labor.
One must keep in mind that Argentina has long since reached the phase
of low demographic potential: its growth is similar to that o f the United
States, and in the urban centers, especially in the middle class, it does not
reach the reproduction level.20
In 1960 more than half (56 percent) o f the working-class strata in the
Buenos Aires area was composed o f internal migrants (Table 6.4). This
proportion reached three-quarters among the unskilled, and almost two-
thirds among the semiskilled. In the other large urban areas the com position
was similar. Even in interm ediate counties (with cities o f 20,000-100,000
people), two-fifths o f the lower strata were internal migrants. With these
estimates o f the occurrence o f migration in the various strata, one should
also take into account that the general level o f the 1947 migrations was prob
ably higher than that o f 1960. If the observed proportions for 1960 were ad
justed to the known general level o f 1947 (Table 6.3), the percentage o f in
ternal migrants in all working-class strata in 1947 would rise to 73 percent
for the Buenos Aires area, and even higher for the less skilled. But this is not
necessary: our purpose is to approxim ate the incidence o f internal migrations
in the lower strata. The preceding considerations imply that the incidence was
higher than half o f the total number o f individuals belonging to those strata,
with strong internal differences according to the degree o f professional quali
fication. As seen in Table 6.4, the incidence o f migration in the middle
strata, although to a lesser extent, is also noticeable. If, however, one considers
that in 1960 in the Buenos Aires area 39 percent o f the members o f these
strata originated from lower-class families which were partly composed of
internal migrants, and that the intergenerational m obility was coupled with
intragenerational m obility,21 one can estim ate th at in 1947 middle strata in
cluded a lesser proportion o f internal migrants than in 1960.
What remains to be seen is what political meaning—in the com position of
the middle classes—internal migration had with regard to the social basis of
Peronism. The electoral array and other aspects o f political participation were
aligned according to class cleavages, but the migrant origin might have affected
sectors of the lower-middle strata, especially when class interests ran along the
same lines (consider, for example, the newly emerged small and average indus
trial entrepreneurs).
TABLE 6.4
PERCENTAGES OF INTERNAL MIGRANTS OF NATIVE ARGENTINE

POPULATION BELONGING TO EACH SOCIOPROFESSIONAL
LEVEL, 1960
SOCIOOCCUPATION AL METROPOLITAN ALL OTHER COUNTRIES

STRATA AREA OF CLASSIFIED BY THEIR
BUENOS AIRES MAJOR URBAN CENTER
100,000 20,000 LESS
AND TO THAN
MORE 99,999 20,000
Agricultural workers - - 37.7 39.4
Unskilled workers 76.9 65.5 47.2 36.7
Semiskilled workers 57.8 57.1 44.1 40.2
Skilled workers 44.6 53.3 41.3 41.6
Self-employed farmers - - 20.2 25.2
All popular strata 56.0 50.2 40.7 36.3
Middle strata 44.6 41.2 38.0 38.6
Higher middle and

high strata 25.7 41.0 42.9 45.7
Source: Special elaboration of data obtained from an unofficial sample of

the 1960 census (see note 14).
As noted in the preceding section, structural changes between 1935 and

1945 were added to the cessation o f the overseas immigration. This m eant
the internal migrants replaced the foreigners. In 1895 two-fifths of the EPA
was foreign; in 1914 almost half was foreign. By 1947 this proportion had de
creased to a little over 21 percent. There is no inform ation regarding inter
mediate dates but, until 1930, the num ber o f foreign immigrants among the
general population remained at practically the same level as in 1895 despite
the fact that it decreased from the maximum reached in 1914 (see Table 6.5).
If one considers the triple concentration o f foreign immigrants (in the
“central” region, in the big cities, and in the industrial or modern activities),
the sudden disappearance o f European immigration reveals its full importance
(see Table 6.6).
TABLE 6.5
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND

IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1895-1947
YEARS % OF FOREIGNERS % OF FOREIGNERS

IN THE TOTAL IN THE ECONOMICALLY
POPULATION ACTIVE POPULATION
1895 (census) 25 38
1914 (census) 39 47
1930 (estimate) 24 37
1947 (census) 15 22
Sources: Second, third, and fourth national census, and estimate o f the total
population by the Direction Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, Inform e
Demografico de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1956), Table 3.
The inference based on demographic data leads to the same conclusions

already reached through the analysis o f the structural changes. From the mid-
1930s to the mid-1940s the composition o f the economically active popula
tion and o f the lower classes in particular underw ent a radical transform ation.
Foreigners were substituted by internal migrants. As a consequence, the new
urban proletariat had political rights, but it lacked the political culture o f the
foreign immigrants, that is, a working-class tradition.
Residential Seniority in Modem Activities
Acculturation to urban life and to the industrial type o f work, or to m odem

work in general, requires many years. The form ation o f a syndicalist working-
class political culture necessarily extends over more than one generation.
Such was the European experience and the experience o f other Latin Ameri
can countries.22 The length o f this process for migrants depends on condi
tions at their destination and origin, not to m ention the characteristics o f
migrants themselves. The last aspect will be considered later, now we shall
consider what was the modern experience o f the internal migrants in the
cities, in terms o f work and/or place o f residence previous to the m igration.23
Structural changes effecting displacement gained m om entum in the mid-
1930s. Therefore the beginning o f the great internal migrations must be set
around that period. Demographic studies and the inferences based on other
data confirm this statem ent. In 1936, the internal migrants in the Buenos
Aires area still composed less than 19 percent o f the native population (Table
6.3). This proportion doubled in the following decade. The percentage of
internal migrants in the total population remained stable between 1914 and
1935: 11 percent in 1914 and 12 percent in 1936.24 There is no reason to
TABLE 6.6
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN-BORN IN SOME SPECIOPROFESSIONAL STRATA.
ARGENTINA AND BUENOS AIRES METROPOLITAN AREA, 1895-1960.
SOCIOPROFESSIONAL STRATA 1895 1914 1947 1960

**
ARGENTINA
♦
A. Lower strata (in general) 34 45 15
B. Secondary and tertiary laborers 36 47 23 15
C. Factory workers 60 58 21 -
D. Craftsmen 18 27 23 -
E. Household service workers 25 38 14 -
BUENOS AIRES AREA
Lower strata (in general) 76*** 7 2 **» 29** 24
Secondary and tertiary laborers 7 9 *** 89**. * 24
Sources: Elaboration on data o f the second, third, and fifth census; industrial
censuses o f 1895, 1 9 1 4 ,1 9 3 5 ,and 1945 ; unpublished data o f the fourth
census; and sample data o f the fifth census (sec Table 1). For 1895 and
1914 (Data A and B), unpublished elaboration o f S. Torrado (1964).
* No figures exist
** Estimates
— Figures not elaborated
*** City of Buenos Aires
believe that the process in urban areas differed. Although the lack of censuses
between 1914 and 1947 prevents direct proof, the analysis o f the age compo
sition o f the migrants for this last decade, and other data, confirm the hypo
thesis that the expansion o f internal migrations took place during
the last third o f the inter-census period (1914-47). It began around 1935-
36 coinciding with the expulsion from agriculture, the great jum p in the de
mand for industrial labor, and the end o f the overseas immigration.25 We
may estimate that between 1936 and 1947 the internal migrants in the
Buenos Aires area increased from a total of 400,000 (for all ages) to 1.5 mil
lion. Considering age distribution, the survival rate, and the number o f 1936
migrants who entered the work force after that date, we can infer that the
migrants in the active segment o f the population with ten or more years of
residence did not exceed 150,000 in 1947. Taking into consideration their
distribution among the socioprofessional strata in the Buenos Aires area,
it is obvious that the majority o f lower-class migrants had less than ten years
of residence in the area, and many had fewer than five.26 In other big cities
the situation must have been similar, even if the proportion o f interprovincial
migrants affected was smaller (the intraprovincials must have been more nu
merous considering the common migration pattern, involving two or more
steps: the first towards the closest city, then towards the larger ones).
Previous Modem and Industrial Background o f Migrants in Life and Work
Let us consider the relative modernity or traditionalism o f the regions of

origin, and the rural background and agricultural or nonindustrial working
experience previous to migration. We will analyze first the question of m od
ernity and traditionalism in the regions o f origin. The imbalance between
“center” and “periphery” in Argentina was already mentioned. Most o f the
wealth, industry, the GNP, literacy, etc. is located in the “central” region.
Most o f the underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy, unem ploym ent, margin-
ality, and archaic economic structure is in the “periphery.” The “periphery”
is also the less modern in terms o f education, stratification, mobility and in
terclass relations, size and type o f family, interpersonal relations, and vital
rates (in the 1950s they reached Latin American levels, as compared to the
low modern levels in the “central” region). The periphery had also main
tained most o f the remaining pre-European immigration society.
In 1947 most internal migrants in the Buenos Aires region (Buenos Aires
City and province) were from less developed provinces and territories (62
percent), and this proportion was considerably higher than at the beginning
of internal m igration.27 Before 1930 the majority o f native migrants came
from a short distance, but subsequently mass internal migration became long
distance. The highest emigration rates in the country, observed in 1947, oc
curred in the “peripheral” region, from where one-third to 45 percent of
those born in them had emigrated elsewhere in Argentina. 28 Migrants from
the central region were creole because persons o f this origin were overrepre
sented in the surviving archaic productive enclaves, agricultural and non-
agricultural, where expulsive factors were stronger, and emigration higher.
With respect to life and work experience previous to migration, most
migrants came from small towns and villages. In 1960, 72 percent o f the in
ternal migrants in the Buenos Aires area were bom in counties whose major
urban center had less than 20,000 inhabitants (32 percent in totally sparse
population counties, or including centers with less than 5,000, and 40 percent
in counties including small towns). This composition was more pronounced in
other large or medium sized cities. In 1947 the rural or small-town origin o f
migrants was considerably higher due to the lower degree o f urbanization at
that date.
One should not equate rural residence with agricultural occupation. In a
study o f a shanty town where only 14 percent o f the inhabitants (in the work
ing force) had an originally rural residence (a place o f origin with less than
2,000 inhabitants according to the official census definition), no less than 39

percent had worked prior to migration in agricultural activity—as a farmhand
or day laborer or in alternating agricultural and nonagricultural activities.
This case was an exception in terms o f previous residence, because in similar
shanty towns the proportion o f internal migrants with previous agricultural
work was 42 percent.29
TABLE 6.7
URBANIZATION AT BIRTH OF ARGENTINE INTERNAL MIGRANTS

BY DEGREE OF URBANIZATION OF PRESENT RESIDENCE, 1960
RESIDENCE IN 1960
100,000
AND
MORE
URBANIZATION BAMA 20,000- LESS THAN
AT BIRTH* BAMA EXCLUDED 90,000 20,000
BAMA - 6.3 3.6 1.9
100,000 and more 7.2 - 2.0 2.7
50,000-99,999 5.2 13.9 - 1.6
20,000-49,999 14.6 12.1 - 3.6
10,000-19,999 16.1 12.6 3.8
5,000-9,999 25.5 22.6 22.6
2,000-4,999 17.8 22.4 17.8 90.2
Less than 2,000 13.6 10.1 22.2
* Born in counties classified by major urban center.
The Buenos Aires survey (1960), covering the whole m etropolitan area,
confirms these proportions among family heads. The last occupation o f some
40 percent o f the migrants’ fathers was in agriculture or cattle breeding. This
proportion reflects the occupational com position and sociocultural back
ground of the migrants in earlier generations (1930-35), but at a lower level,
since in 1937 the agricultural sector in the EAP reached its highest peak in
Argentine history, and its drastic and rapid reduction occurred in the follow
ing seven years. Studies conducted in the early 1960s at the place o f origin
set at more than 50 percent the emigration rate o f children (fourteen to
thirty years old) from rural families living in different regions.30 The high
proportion o f former agricultural workers in 1946 is not surprising consider
ing the heterogeneous occupational com position o f counties o f different de
grees o f residential urbanization. Still, in 1947 the primary sector in counties
including centers from 2,000 to 20,000 absorbed 52 percent o f the EAP, and
TABLE 6.8
INTERNAL MIGRANTS WHOSE FATHERS’ LAST OCCUPATION WAS

IN AGRICULTURE. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MIGRANTS AND
MIGRANTS FROM “CENTRAL” AND “ PERIPHERAL” REGIONS
(BAMA 1960)
MIGRANTS MIGRANTS MIGRANTS

SOCIOECONOMIC FROM ALL FROM FROM
STATUS COUNTRY “CENTRAL” “PERIPHERAL”
REGION REGIONS
(LITTORAL)
50% with lower SES 38.1 35.3 40.0

(lower class)
50% with higher SES

(middle and upper 24.6 27.9 24.0
class)
Total 33.0 32.9 33.1
Source: Sample survey of BAMA (2,100 cases, 1960). Sec note 16.
even in counties containing towns and cities from 20,000 to 50,000, nearly
40 percent o f the population was involved in agriculture.31 In the mid 1930s
and in the early years of the process, these proportions were necessarily higher.
Agricultural work is not the only nonindustrial or nonm odern work exper
ience. Nor is agriculture necessarily nonm odern. Wage earners in advanced
capitalist agrarian economies may not differ from urban industrial workers
with respect to their proletarian consciousness. The problem, then, is to de
termine the development of the socioeconomic setting o f premigration jobs
in all activities. The regional origins o f the migrants have already shown a high
proportion o f premigration backwardness. In the primary sector the change
from agriculture to cattle breeding involved the disappearance o f a high num
ber o f self-employed farmers. Thus, along with landless laborers, rural migrants
included a large sector of former small independent peasants—owners, tenants,
sharecroppers, and other backward forms o f peasantry and land tenure.
Though most o f the agricultural sector was commercial, labor relations were
often archaic, and this determined the work experience o f the wage earners.32
A majority o f migrants previously working in the secondary and tertiary
sectors had similar origins in terms o f the level o f modernization in life style
and work experience. They were small artisans, shopkeepers, all sorts o f petty
intermediaries, self-employed, working alone or with their family, salaried
workers in homecraft, small industries, or small family-owned and based
LOWER-CLASSES AND NATIONAL POPULISM 169
commercial and service firms, domestic servants, day laborers or peons work
ing alternately in agricultural and nonagricultural jobs, seasonal migrant
laborers, and the like.
In a rich country like Argentina, whose income distribution was more
egalitarian—even at that tim e—than other Latin American countries, some o f
the wealth generated by the primary exports filtered down to these urban
groups. But they, as the whole econom y, were vulnerable to the behavior of
international trade and to agricultural crises. With the breakdown o f 1930,
and the drastic reduction in agriculture after 1938, the situation of this sur
viving archaic sector suddenly worsened. Both factors restricted the internal
market and caused high unem ploym ent. In the Buenos Aires area and two
other Littoral provinces in 1940, several years after the industrial upsurge,
there were 181,000 registered unem ployed, probably more than 10 percent
of the wage earners in the area, one-half o f them in agriculture. The fore
going considerations lead one to conclude that in the years 1935-46 the great
majority o f the internal migrants were drawn from persons whose previous
situation was characterized by a less m odern and a nonindustrial life style
and work experience, both in the agricultural and in the nonagricultural
sectors.
Structural and Sociocultural Changes
Analysis o f the com position o f the urban lower classes leads us to conclu
sions analogous to those obtained by observing changes in the economic
structure. Various aspects must be emphasized. The transformation and dis
placement affected not only urban places and the “central” area, but also
the whole country. Preexisting urban workers were replaced by internal mi
grants. In 1947 between one-half and 70 percent o f the former had been re
placed by new workers in the Buenos Aires area. This proportion—equally
high in other big cities—was still around 40 percent in intermediate centers.
Replacement took place through upward social mobility (and lower fer
tility rates). In 1960 one-half o f the urban born of working-class fathers had
become middle class and another 40 percent had passed from unskilled to
skilled positions. The change occurred both through individual mobility
and generational succession. One-third o f the family heads in 1960 had moved
from the manual strata into the middle class in their lifetime. Upward mo
bility rates for nonmanual sons o f manual fathers entering the labor force
in the 1930s and the 1940s was more than 50 percent. Even migrants exper
ienced upward m obility, but this was restricted mostly to the manual strata,
from unskilled to skilled. This contributed to the high percentage o f mi
grants am ont the skilled.33 The replacement o f the old working class in
volved another transform ation o f Argentine society. Because o f the geograph
ic and occupational concentration o f immigratory Argentina (within the
working class, in more m odern activities, and in “central regions” —Buenos
Aires and other large cities), migrants came mostly from areas less modified
by mass overseas immigration: the periphery, parts o f the rural area, and
towns and small cities which had maintained to a higher degree the original
culture o f preimmigrant society. Immigratory Argentina had emerged from
the cultural and ethnic melting pot created by mass overseas immigration.
The creole com ponent o f the new working class was so prom inent that it
caused the appearance o f a stereotype: the cabecita negra (little black head),
which also became a synonym for Peronist. As all stereotypes it was distorted,
but it had a basis in reality. It was equally accepted by the working and
the middle classes, the Peronists, and the anti-Peronists, albeit with opposite
emotional reactions. Right-wing nationalists and part o f the Peronists perceived
it as a return to authentic Argentina and a trium ph over alien and cosmopoli
tan Buenos Aires and the Littoral. Old-style liberals considered it a return to
nineteenth-century “barbarism ,” supposedly erased by European immigration.
In a country remarkably free from ethnic prejudice, the stereotype acquir
ed em otional weight because o f its political and ideological meaning. It dis
appeared in the post-Peronist period with the emergence o f middle-class Per-
onism, ideological alliances, and cultural changes in the society. Nonetheless,
at that time it reinforced the traum atic effects o f structural displacement and
the crisis o f the admission of a hitherto marginal sector into national society.
It was a further consolidating stage in the process o f nation building. It fused
creole Argentina, or whatever remained o f it, with immigratory Argentina and
the interior with the Littoral. Argentine culture was modified by the incor
poration o f creole society, and the newcomers were prom ptly absorbed into
the melting pot and the national culture. Their divergent political culture was
also fused and absorbed, but it left a lasting impact on the political life o f the
country. Its expression was Peronism and its successive evolution.34 The
review o f existing evidence shows that rapid socioeconomic and sociocultural
changes caused a major displacement in the population, substantially modify
ing the composition o f the lower classes, and throwing them into new work
experiences, life styles, and social settings.
POLITICAL DEMOBILIZATION, MILITARY INTERVENTIONS,

AND FAILED FASCIST ATTEMPTS, 1930-1945
At the same time that the material and psychosocial standards o f living o f
large sectors o f the population were being modified by structural changes
described earlier, and the readiness for new forms o f participation was trans
lating itself into social mobilization (such as in the massive migration from
the periphery towards the big cities, likewise creating a potential for political
participation), the government that emerged from the revolution o f 1930
was attem pting to close or neutralize access to participation. They especially
tried to neutralize that channel for political integration which in the past had
absorbed the middle classes and lower strata, particularly the old immigrant
classes or those whose cultural traditions were closest to that o f creole Argen
tina, namely, the Union Civica Radical.35
To fully understand the contrast between the new demands that social
changes placed on the political system and its partial closure, it is necessary
to keep in mind the character o f the new government and the overall ideo
logical climate. First, the military revolution o f 1930 had fascist elem ents;in
fact, it was an unsuccessful initial trial o f fascism. The visible military chief
(General Uriburu), who was politically incapable, favored a fascist corporate
solution, especially under the influence o f a group of right-wing intellectuals
and oligarchic elements. The ideological convictions o f the first group were
closer to Maurras’s doctrine than to Mussolini’s, and their orientation was
more right-wing nationalist than fascist. But the success o f the Italian regime,
the dictatorship o f Primo de Rivera in Spain, and the climate o f crisis that de
mocracy was experiencing all over Europe reinforced the hostility that a
number o f big landowners had for mass democracy and government by
majority rule. The Argentine experience seemed to find its confirmation
in the course o f world events, but this involved only a minority. The coun
try ’s social structure did not allow for fascist, or even nationalist and openly
antidemocratic solutions. This was illustrated in the economic and politi
cal forces o f the day, particularly in the most powerful group, the old liberal
oligarchy.
We see, then, an attem pt to restore the order that existed before the exten
sion o f participation: formal democracy, legitimized by opposition parties
and a free press, but in fact restricted, with the national executive power
firmly controlled by the oligarchy. Restoration was also applied to the eco
nomic system with the reestablishment o f the national economy on the same
base as before, the great crisis o f 1929. Had it been feasible, the preservation
of the electoral guarantees would have been preferred. But, an experiment in
the key province o f Buenos Aires proved that the radicals could still not be
defeated.
Another path was then taken. First, a coalition dominated by conservatives
was formed, including some radical sectors (those socially closest to the oli
garchy), dissident socialists, and others. However, since this was not enough
to insure an electoral victory, fraud and violence were employed in those areas
o f the country where it seemed practicable or where it was absolutely neces
sary in order to attain a majority in the presidential elections. In the federal
capital and in various provinces electoral rights were respected, but in many
others and especially in the largest and most im portant (the province o f
Buenos Aires), the violation o f voting rights was scandalous. Even in other
areas, while respecting all appearances and proclaiming its democratic charac
ter, the government dem onstrated reactionary tendencies, especially with
regard to the unions, whose activity, if not outright repressed, was certainly
made difficult. This led to the demobilization o f vast segments o f the popu-
lation o f the “central” region which until then had participated in the coun
try ’s political life.
In the economic sector, the interests o f the huge landowners prevailed.
The price of their traditional alliance and shared interests with the British
deeply offended the lower and middle classes and strengthened nationalist
feelings, spreading them under the form o f antiimperialism among leftists
and even among democrats. The m ajority’s resistance to imposed dem obil
ization made it clear that restoration was no longer possible. In 1938 the
second constitutional president elected by the coalition (a radical from the
dissident antipersonalista sector), under pressure from this resistance, initi
ated a return to electoral legality, while seeking some compromise with the
forces of opposition. The resistance o f the conservatives and the death o f the
president, who was substituted by the vice-president (a typical representative
of the oligarchic class) ended this attem pt.
Meanwhile, international events were exerting a strong influence on the
country. World War II turned the country into a battleground between belli
gerent countries. Opposing economic ideologies and the competence o f the
political classes decreased confidence and deprived the government o f legit
imacy. In the end government was defended only by the declining oligarchic
class. A second military revolution in June 1943 interrupted the attem pted
oligarchic restoration begun in 1930. The revolution was a confused move
ment in which the political elites o f various and opposing tendencies took
part and in which the military was heterogeneous.
Soon, military and civilian nationalists or those with strong pro-Nazi feel
ings took over and a second fascist solution was attem pted. All parties were
dissolved; freedom o f the press was suppressed; the syndicates, especially the
Communist and Socialist ones, were persecuted; and political intellectuals and
opposing syndicalist leaders were sent to concentration camps, imprisoned,
or exiled. Proclaimed Fascists took over im portant governmental positions at
federal and provincial levels. Public education, including the university and
the general organization o f the country’s culture, was controlled by national
ists and “clerical fascists” . The Franco influence predom inated among poli
ticians, while national socialism carried more weight among the military.
This was in accord with the arm y’s tradition, since it had been organized pro
fessionally under strong German influence.
Once more the attem pt failed. The course o f the war and internal resist
ance marked its destiny. As early as the end o f 1944, the military regime could
be considered liquidated, even if political repression continued until June
1945. It was subdued and then resumed briefly during the O ctober crisis, after
which freedom was reestablished and presidential elections called for (Febru
ary 1946). The failure o f the military regime was caused not only by the un
favorable international situation, by its own incapacity, and by its internal
division; but more directly by the active opposition o f the middle classes,
coupled with elements of the proletariat.
Between 1943 and 1945 there were two mobilized masses: one composed
mostly of the new proletariat, and the other formed mostly by the urban
middle classes. A secondary mobilization was involved (“secondary” since
these sectors were already integrated into national society). Their mobiliza
tion was political and not provoked by social descent or loss o f prestige as
in the case o f the European middle classes. At stake was the recovery o f polit
ical freedoms and democratic institutions according to the traditions expres
sed above all by the Radicals and Socialists. Their members were n o t—or
thought they were n o t—antiworker. In fact, they often considered them
selves leftists. Their opposition was extremely effective in that it forced the
regime to return to the constitutions by means o f street dem onstrations, se
cret resistance, and activities sponsored by class and professional organiza
tions. Their activities were carried out in the most visible segments of national
life, such as in the universities, schools, in institutions and groups representing
intellectual activity (lawyers, doctors, technicians, and all other professional
sectors), and wherever possible in local and national organizations, the press,
and in any other state or private institution to which they could gain access.
Their activity seemed to fill the main streets and squares in the Argentine
cities, but in reality it was centered around the downtown streets and squares,
or the middle-class and elegant sections o f the cities. This mass, their parties,
and their leaders were convinced that they represented the country. As late as
October there were few—not only among the public, but also among the
elite—who realized that there was an opposing mass movement, invisible and
ignored since its expression was less spectacular. It was restricted to the o u t
skirts o f cities and industrial belts, far from the well-to-do and downtown
areas.
Most scholars have emphasized the mobilization o f the lower classes.
However, the political mobilization o f the middle classes is also im portant in
order to understand the process. Conflict and class polarization were the re
sult of this double mobilization and o f the ideological shapes which they as
sumed. It is useful in evaluating both the triumph o f national populism and
the political development during and following the first Peronist regime.
Although democratic opposition thought itself trium phant, power did not
fall into its hands, but into the hands o f the new mass movement which had
emerged and developed in less than a year. It was born out o f the union o f
the new mobilized urban proletariat and a governing elite with various ele
m ents—Right, Center, and L eft—whose catalyst was the charismatic leader
J uan Peron.
Peron was an im portant com ponent o f the revolution o f 1943. Although
his ideological leaning was fascist, he was endowed with an uncommon politi
cal sense which led him to notice th at the formulas o f the Argentine national
ists were incompatible with the social structure and the political traditions o f
the country. He realized that the stability o f any regime in Argentina depended
on the adherence o f the majority and that no military or civilian leader could
hope for success w ithout a popular base. Rejected by the middle classes but
w ithout giving up on them completely, Peron set out to conquer the one
human base which seemed available: the proletariat in the big cities, es
pecially the newly formed sectors, and the lower classes in general.
In order to realize this goal he used the tools o f attraction and repres
sion which his im portant and powerful position in the military regime placed
at his disposal. The movement which followed was not, however, a result of
mere manipulation. It contributed to creating political channels for the
available and mobilized masses (and even for a part o f the demobilized sec
tors created as a result o f the restoration o f 1930). This participation gave
Peron a strong personal image quite different from the one generally pre
ferred by the ruling elite and perhaps from what the leader himself really
wanted. Peron was a vehicle not only for the mobilization o f the masses, but
also for the alliance between the different social sectors required by the
changes. The history o f the origins o f Peronism is the history o f the conver
gence o f many and different trends, some o f which date far back in the his
tory o f the country.
THE SYNDICALIST TRADITION, THE MILITARY REGIME,

AND THE NEW WORKING CLASS
The strong syndicalist tradition in Argentina has already been considered

along with its urban character and immigrant origins.36 The movement had
always been characterized by internal struggles, first between the socialists
and anarchists and later between socialists and communists. There was also
a syndicalist tendency which leaned towards autonom ous political parties. The
revolution o f 1943 came at a critical moment for the unions. The Confedera-
cion General del Trabajo (CGT) had split into two factions with differing po
litical orientations (socialist and communist) while at the same time there were
autonom ous unions and a syndicalist sector in the sense already m entioned.
In the pre-1930 period the size o f organized labor—still the largest in Latin
America—was comparatively small in relation to the num ber o f the wage
earners in the EAP. This reflected an economic structure in which industry,
though im portant, was at a much lower level than later. The Great Depres
sion and widespread unem ploym ent after 1930 weakened labor, and when
industrial growth created more favorable conditions for it, the hostile policy
o f the conservative regime created many obstacles to the expansion o f its
organization.
The structure o f such organization was in a transitional state—from craft
to industry, from a lower complexity to a much higher degree o f bureau
cratization, from a small size to a large one. Concurrently, new types o f union
leaders were emerging, more oriented toward the political autonom y o f labor
than to a dependence vis-a-vis the leftist parties. This attitude included in
some cases vague desires to create an independent political organization.
But the degree o f unionization o f the working class continued to be relatively
low despite the increased size o f affiliation.
Factory industry, the more dynamic sector, remained a m inority in or

ganized labor. Taking as a basis the total wage earners in the EAP, union affil
iation in 1941 was about 11 percent (for all the country), although this level
was higher in the urban industrial centers. In the secondary sector union
membership reached about 13 percent, but considering only factory industry,
unionization runs as high as 23 percent, if all members o f industrial unions
are allocated in this sector. Among the unionized, industry represented 36
percent o f the affiliates, while the other two-thirds represented the services
(mostly transportation and commerce). The total increase in the period from
1936 to 1941 was 19.3 percent, a modest one given the high rate o f internal
urban migration and occupational displacement towards the secondary and
tertiary sector.
In the following period with an intensification of both processes the situa-
tion did not change much. The general level o f affiliation remained at 12 per
cent o f the white collars and workers in the EAP, but there was an increase
among those employed in secondary activities. These figures are provided
by noncompulsory surveys among union officers and representatives conduct
ed by the Labor Office. They do not necessarily represent fee-paying mem
bers and there is evidence o f a wide gap between what was declared in the
survey and the actual situation, since there was a tendency to inflate the
membership figures.37
To consider this level o f unionization high or low depends on the criteria
one uses. Most o f the working class was not unionized and, more im portantly,
many newcomers stayed outside the unions. There were many reasons for
this: First, their recent admission into the urban economic and social setting.
Second, their regional origins and their culture. And third, both characteris
tics created a barrier for their contacts with the typical union leader of the
central region, who was ideologically oriented, and often more interested in
political and international issues than in ameliorating labor conditions. A new
type o f leadership was emerging, more directly interested in autonom y, less
preoccupied with ideology, and more concerned with actual working class
conditions. Nevertheless, only a fraction o f the new working class became
unionized. A fourth powerful factor, which existed before and after the
military coup of 1943, was the climate o f repression or at least hostility creat
ed by the government. Prior to 1943 hostility was generalized against all
union activities. After 1943 it became selective: only the politically dan
gerous unions—particularly the Communists—were repressed.
Before Peron attem pted his penetration campaign, the military regime fol
lowed a policy o f repression which favored the ideology of the extreme Right.
The military suppressed one o f the two CGTs, placed many syndicates under
the control o f governmental commissioners, and imposed direct and indirect
controls on the other CGT. Leaders, officers, and syndicalist activists were
particularly hard hit by the policing measures, especially communists and
leftists.
A very restrictive law regulating unions was established in October 1943,

and it was strongly resisted by labor leaders. Though in December Peron
suspended it (as part of his penetration campaign), its basic purpose re
mained: only unions officially recognized by the government could repre
sent the workers in collective bargaining. (It was formally reestablished in
September 1945 and became the legal basis for the Peronist political organi
zation in that it authorized the unions to become the basis o f a political
party.)38
Later, Per6n followed a highly flexible policy toward the organization
and leaders using both repression and attraction. Those unions which opposed
his purposes could be cancelled as legal representatives o f the workers (per-
sonerta gremial), or even dissolved or suppressed (this varied according to the
political climate, the ideological orientation, the degree of political threat,
etc.). In any case, no union which failed to dem onstrate its willingness to
cooperate could obtain any gain in labor disputes, legislation, welfare bene
fits, etc. A leader’s success in achieving better conditions for the wokers de
pended on his attitude towards the political goals o f the secretary o f labor
(that is, Peron himself).39 This policy allowed for different degrees o f inde
pendence and relied heavily on the internal cleavages—ideological, organiza
tional, and personal—o f the old leadership. But, flexibility could turn into
ruthless repression whenever the political conjuncture, ideological orientation,
or connections with the political opposition demanded the use o f strong
measures.
O f great importance to the penetration policy followed by Peron through
the Secretariat of Labor was the establishment o f a huge number o f new
unions. Unfortunately this aspect has not been studied, but there is no doubt
that most o f the increase was due to this fact. In any case, while there were
356 unions in 1941, in 1945 the total reached 969, almost three times as high.
Most o f the increase was the result o f parallel unions, which were organized
in com petition with those opposed to Peron’s political policies, in addition
to the new unions, which were concerned with new industrial activities, and
with those sectors which had remained w ithout union organization. In both
cases the leaders were pro-Peron and the Secretariat o f Labor intervened di
rectly with material and personal means.
Equally im portant was the fact that while the number o f organizations
tripled, the number of members increased very little, well below what could
be expected considering the expansion in the industrial and tertiary sectors
and their new composition in terms o f more modern activities. The increase
between 1941 and 1945 was only 20 percent (the same as it had been for
the previous five years). This means that a small minority of the new prole
tariat was unionized. Even those who had the state’s support and could avail
themselves o f the means which it placed at their disposal were unable to or
ganize most o f the newcomers. Without further research it is impossible to
establish what proportion o f the newcomers had joined the unions in 1945,
and more difficult still is the attem pt to discover their degree o f participation
in specific union activities.40 Nonetheless, since the replacement o f those
who left the labor force as well as the expanded demand for modern second
ary and tertiary activities had to be met mostly with internal migrants,
there is no doubt that a portion o f them became union members. However,
this was only a tiny proportion. If this inference is correct, most o f the mem
bership, even in 1945, was composed o f the old urban proletariat o f foreign
immigrant origin including a number o f foreign born.
The low unionization o f the new proletariat and the large number of or
ganizations whose existence was often purely formal helps explain the nature
of Peron’s penetration in the working class and the following which he
gathered. The new organizations had three essential goals: (1) to create a legal
organ for the signing and legitimization o f collective labor contracts; (2) es
tablish an organizational network within the working class, to propagandize
(along with the mass media) the achievement o f Peron’s labor policy, and
particularly to stimulate direct contact (through mass rallies) with the leader;
and (3) to increase the number o f Peronist representatives in the Central
Committee, the General Assembly, and other organs o f the CGT.41
Low unionization is essential in understanding the workers* participation
in the rise o f Peronism. Although union participation was nonexistent among
the nonorganized, these workers still benefited from favorable labor contracts
and social security laws and were fully informed o f the decisive role played
in all this by the coronet who defended them from the Ministry o f Labor.
Some may have participated in strikes, but while the industrial labor force
and working class had increased by 246 and 137 percent respectively since
1914, the number o f strikes was higher in the first two decades of the century
than in 1940-44 and 1945-49. In 1940-44 the number o f workers participat
ing in them was the lowest in Argentine labor history, and in 1945-49 it in
creased by only 31 percent over the maximum level reached in 1910-14. The
hostile conservative government in the first three years o f the 1940s, the pol
icy o f repression conducted by the military in 1944-45, and the Peronist con
trol after 1946 explain in part the low level o f organized labor resistance dur
ing 1940-43, and the m oderate increase in the following period.
Also significant is the comparison between the low number of strikes and
the high num ber o f labor contracts. In 1944, 548 contracts—all favorable to
the workers—were signed, and 364 in 1945. The contrast with the preceding
period is striking: between 1936 and 1940 only 46 contracts were signed.42
The different economic conditions o f the two periods, the double contrast
between the low level o f strikes and the labor disputes won in 1944 and 1945
and the situation in 1935-40 is illuminating. Union affiliation and participa
tion in strikes were not necessary for the advancement of labor, since most
benefits were obtained by pressuring the Secretariat o f Labor. Salary increases
were possible because o f structural changes in the economy, but peaceful
solutions and absence o f strikes involved labor advances w ithout rank and file
TABLE 6.9
STRIKES, STRIKERS, AND WORK DAYS LOST.

FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES, 1907,1949
PERIODS NUMBER OF NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

STRIKES STRIKERS (000) LOST (000)
1907-09 162 62 345
1910-14 132 187 422
1915-19 164 123 1568
1920-24 116 115 1397
1925-29 92 30 290
1930-34 73 20 568
1935-39 71 43 994
1940-44 66 15 247
1945-49 78 245 1939
Source: “El proceso de urbanizacion
participation. This process was essential in shaping the direct relationship

between newcomers and the charismatic leader.
Peronist unions, or those who collaborated with them , were instrumental
simply because they provided the administrative and legal framework for the
collective bargaining. More im portantly, they provided the setting necessary
to facilitate personal ties with the leader through visits to the plants and
unions and frequent mass rallies in which the conquests o f labor were pre
sented by Peron directly to the workers, member and nonmember alike.
This procedure—coupled with the widest use of mass media, particularly
radio—was one o f the central factors in building the image o f Peron as “the
m an” and the only one who could help the workers (who incidentally were
called “the hum ble”) by Peronist propaganda. The term reveals the traditional
dichotomous image of stratification between the rich and powerful, and the
poor and humble.
Direct access to the mass o f workers was a basic goal o f P e ro n i strategy.
This was later recognized by union officers who thought that access was a
small price to pay for the benefits achieved by their unions. It m eant, par
ticularly in the case o f the nonunionized workers, that victory was obtained
by the leader’s personal action. The union was no more than an administra
tive instrum ent and could be bypassed.43
In 1941-45, and under the Peronist regime as well, a segment o f the new
workers participated to some extent in union activities and strikes. Contact
with the old urban proletariat (or what was left o f it), and their daily exper
ience helped migrants acquire the attitudes and behavior patterns required
to exercise their working-class and citizen’s rights both within the union or
ganization and in local and national politics. This was a longer process, con
tinued during and after Peronist rule.
At the job level workers obtained experience through their involvement in
struggles concerning problems at the plant level: by redressing grievances
through their elected representatives, participating in organized strikes, or more
frequently under the Peronist regime, in wild cat strikes. Labor in the Peronist
era lost its autonom y among the top leadership, but it continued to exercise
significant pressure at the grass roots level, a pressure which sometimes im
posed limitations on the top CGT leaders. Under the post-Peronist regimes
this experience was intensified. The new workers central role in the collective
movement o f 1944-45, which culminated in the October events and in the
electoral victory, gave them a sense o f their ability to effect political change
and made them aware o f their national political force. However, the direct link
established earlier with the leader, and the fact that admission into the politi
cal arena occurred under collective movements headed by a charismatic leader,
remained com ponents of Peronism. The link was generally represented by the
core Peronists (as they were identified by some observers),44 but it weakened
over time. Only the negative experiences under succeeding military and
civilian governments preserved Peron’s regime beyond what would have nor
mally occurred. The leader became a powerful symbol o f a mythical era.
COLLECTIVE MOVEMENTS OF THE LOWER URBAN MASSES AND

THE WORKING CLASS AT THE BEGINNING OF NATIONAL POPULISM
The analysis in the preceding section emphasizes the role o f the new urban
proletariat and its adherence to Peron. There appears to be a direct relation
ship between head and mass, a relationship which is not mediated by an or
ganizational structure.
This is only a one-sided view o f the process. The role o f the preexisting
union apparatus, the role of its leaders, their contribution to the success o f the
movement, and the shape which it assumed have been questioned. From the
point o f view o f class alliance, one wonders whether the process involved a
conscious choice by union leaders and whether they represented the working
class as a historical actor. Recent interpretations emphasize these aspects and
play down the weight o f charisma and the mass collective behavior which pre
cipitated the form ation o f Peronism as an organized political force.45 These
questions are legitimate and contribute to a more balanced perspective of the
problem, but the answers are limited not only by the observed deficiencies
in the historiography o f Peronism, but also by the methodological difficul
ties created by this approach, especially those which imply that the class is
engaged as a unified historical actor.
Within the limits set at the beginning, we will attem pt to examine the role
of pre-Peronist union organizations and their leaders who were involved in
forming national populism, their behavior, and the degree to which one can
speak o f a deliberate choice by the union leadership responsible for determin
ing the orientation o f the working class. An examination will also be under
taken to determine if, and to what extent, the form ation o f the new move
ment and the character which it assumed was a consequence o f a collective
movement o f the new proletariat (available and ready for mobilization).
The movement must be distinguished from the organized political party but
it was essential for enabling and accelerating the form ation o f institutional
ized channels for the expression o f mobilized masses. The movement also de
termined modifications o f the political system by providing legitimate means
of participation for both newly emerging sectors and those demobilized by
the restoration o f the 1930s.
We have already considered changes in the composition o f the lower urban
sectors, levels o f participation in the organizational structures of the working
class, and the general outlines and results o f Peron’s attraction/repression
policy. This process must now be examined under two distinct aspects. First,
the situation of union leaders must be described with regard to changes in
the composition of the working class, with respect to pressures from the
secretary o f labor, and with regard to the democratic opposition’s struggle
against the military regime which emerged from the revolution o f 1943. This
must then be related to the collective movement which culminated on October
17, and its immediate and long-term consequences. The nature o f this study
and the lack o f basic research do not permit more than a schematic considera
tion o f those hypotheses.
Union Leadership and the Working Class as a Unified Actor
The military revolution o f 1943 and the fascist regime’s support o f the Axis
powers led to active resistance by both the parties (they had been dissolved,
but were still active) and the politicized sectors o f the population, especially
the urban middle classes. The parties and a large portion o f immigratory Ar
gentina, both middle and lower class, identified the regime as pro-fascist and
fought it. The middle and lower classes, although mostly composed of first
and second generation immigrants who opposed the Axis, did not favor the
decision to give up the policy o f neutrality which the country had followed
since World War I.
Radicalism had followed a policy o f national isolationism which reflected
the feelings o f the majority o f the native population, be it o f creole or of
immigratory culture, and both found democratic nationalism a powerful ele

ment of fusion. The same tendencies predom inated during World War II, al
though anti-Nazi feelings were widespread. The upper middle class, the oli
garchy, other cosmopolitan sectors o f Buenos Aires, and the parties (from
the Conservative to Communist) were all pro-allies. This contributed to the
fascist image o f the military regime, and later o f Peronism which was con
sidered a continuation o f that same regime.
The image was realistic, although stereotypical. One factor which contri
buted most to this image was that despite Peron’s populist policy and his
search for an alliance with union leaders, Socialists, and Communists (the
latter two refused), he continued to avail himself o f fascists. These fascists
provided the nucleus o f his political elite; other parties and union elements
joined the central core at a later date. Furtherm ore, Peron continued to play
up to the bourgeoisie and middle classes, insisting on the need for class collab
oration, stressing the dangers o f communism, and offering his political
program as the safest way o f insuring social stability. This only reinforced
the conviction that Peron’s program was another fascist attem pt which not
only went against democratic tradition and lacked social basis, but also was
on the losing side in the international arena.
While this climate predom inated in the political class and in vast sectors
of the population, different feelings appeared. Increasing nationalism was felt
among some radicals, the unions, and even among Marxist groups. Its origins
are tied to the strong antiimperialist reaction resulting from the conservative
policies o f the 1930s. This was felt by the middle and lower classes, the demo
cratic parties, certain groups o f the radical party, and leftist organizations. The
new attitudes were reinforced by the decreasing number o f foreign born im
migrants (even in the “ central” region) after the interruption o f immigration
in 1930, and by the internal migrations and the increasing number o f partici
pants whose foreign origins were removed. Creole Argentina, although pre
ponderantly lower-class, also included middle-class elements. Antiimperialism
and nationalism introduced a particular way o f perceiving fascism and the
war. Although it did not increase sympathy for nazism and fascism, it did
tone down the ideological meaning o f the struggle by making it remote and
alien to the country’s national interests, and by creating a common enemy
known as the English and American plutocracy. The war could be considered
a struggle between opposing imperialisms.
After the fall o f the first Peronist government these tendencies had an
impact on groups which belonged to the extrem e Marxist Left and the right-
wing nationalist movement. This aspect was an interesting theoretical mean
ing. It involves the fusion o f socialism and nationalism which appears to be
typical of peripheral or relatively peripheral countries. Such was the case o f
Italy during the early tw entieth century and later with the m utilated victory
after World War I, or the heterogeneous political formations which charac
terized pre-Nazi Germany during the 1920s and which finally exploded on
the universal level with the nationalist socialism o f Third World countries.46
The projection o f the class struggle internally, with its variations on the theme
o f the proletarian nations, found its own expression in Argentina, both in the
birth o f national socialism, a conglomeration o f nationalist theses held by
groups who shared a common Marxist origin and form ation, and in the social
demands o f right-wing nationalism which called for anticapitalist and anti
bourgeois measures.
All these elements played a part in the emergence o f European fascism and
nazism as social and political movements. Both movements tried to maintain
some populist elements, but in both cases (and in Spain as well), once they
became regimes, they had to do away with those factions th at continued to
believe in the socialist side o f the ideology. This process frequently called for
violence. Incidentally, the reappearance o f these old populist com ponents in
the Republic of Salo in Italy, might have affected the image that Argentina’s
emerging and diversified national socialism was forming with regard to fascism.
These tendencies also influenced the younger movement o f the Radical party
which provided Peronism with many leaders.47
The contradictory tendencies were reflected in the unions. Although the
movement was troubled by internal divisions, there were those who were wil
ling to accept the possibility o f a nationalist syndicalism. Even though one of
the two factions o f CGT was clearly socialist,,it could still be considered more
loyal to the syndicalist goals than to the party. This supported the aspirations
o f those leaders who were thinking o f creating a working-class political organ
ization. Other political and social factors encouraged labor organizations to
integrate in the national society : the tendencies in favor o f the popular front,
the internal political situation, the exigency o f the antifascist struggle, all led
to a national political orientation which, if not nationalist, certainly contrast
ed with the internationalism that predom inated until 1930.48 It was a demo
cratic and liberal nationalism based on the political culture o f immigrant Ar
gentina and ideologically oriented towards Europe, regardless o f its orienta
tion, be it socialist, communist, or autonom ous syndicalism. Although by the
end o f the 1930s the situation had progressed from the almost exclusively
foreign trade-unions o f the first decade o f the century, this politicocultural
tradition still did not facilitate the assimilation o f internal migrants.
The attraction/repression political policy utilized decisive elements in this
complex situation. The repression o f the 1930s, the internal difference, the
autonom ous tendencies, the ongoing integration process, and, above all, the
leaders’ difficulties in accelerating the modern-industrial acculturation of
the recent working class (and their unionization), all favored Peron’s politi
cal policy o f penetration. In the face o f this policy, union leadership was
split so that a new divisive factor combined itself in different ways with those
already in existence. The leaders’ political policy was incoherent, with fre
quent changes among sides. They were compelled to take into account not
only the alternatives to union and government actions, but also the changing
internal political situation, that is the respective positions o f the government

and o f the democratic opposition. The uncertain outcome o f the struggle be
tween the latter and the military regime was singularly im portant, especially
as the opposition proved its capability to win the struggle.
Although to an observer the urban working masses’ support o f Peronism
may be seen as an implicit alliance with the industrial bourgeoisie and other
sectors favoring industrial development, it was not the result o f a deliberate
choice by workers’ organizations to favor such an alliance as an alternative
to the continuation o f the export economy. National populism resulted from
the convergence of different and sometimes opposing processes in which the
deliberate choices o f union leaders (insofar as they were made) carried little
weight. Instead, the structurally determined factor of a mass available
for a collective movement represented the decisive and precipitant agent. All
this gave the process a peculiar orientation very different from what it might
have been had the alliance been forged in another way: i.e., through an
accord between parties or leaders, through a coalition, a union of groups
and people, or a slow integration through the gradual extension o f various
forms o f participation.
Implicit or explicit social pacts or class alliances o f this type have occur
red in most industrial countries, but these different forms caused short and
long-term social and political consequences which differed from those o f the
populist movement under charismatic leadership. This means that the form
assumed by a class alliance is equally or more im portant than its structural
basis.
Let us now consider the union leader. Although he was limited by the ac
tions o f the state which was controlled by Peron, he had to face the condi*
tions imposed upon him by his constituency, both union members and the
unorganized workers. Opposition to Peron either had to be purely ideologi
cal or it had to dem onstrate that in the long run the benefits o f the regime
would be illusory because o f corruption, mistakes, or a lack o f freedom and
control over the rulers.
Both alternatives were impossible. The first was attem pted by communist,
socialist and democratic leaders. The fact that they had to work underground
was a big obstacle, but it was not the only one. On various occasions purely
ideological strikes had failed completely, even in periods in which there were
objective possibilities o f success. The ideological language o f Marxism or dem*
ocratic socialism, mostly in terms o f exotic conflicts such as fascism/antifas-
cism, simply had no appeal to the new working class whose political culture
was far removed from these questions.49
The other way was equally difficult. To be understood it required a highly
sophisticated political mind, but the w orkers’ past experiences led to the con
trary. Those who opposed Peron were perceived as friends o f the bosses, or
bosses themselves. Often this was in fact the case. Particularly in 1945, and
especially during the O ctober crisis, every time the military regime or Peron
weakened (there were many ups and downs during that year), there were en
terprises (nobody knows how many) which cancelled the social benefits, fired
the workers* representatives, and the like. Several times the CGT (including
independent or non-Peronist unions) felt threatened by the hostile and retal
iatory attitude of some business organizations (though many industrial entre
preneurs—and the new industry in general—favored the regime).50
The union leader who wanted to remain a union leader had little or no
choice. If he opposed Peron he would lose the workers* support and run
many personal risks including the loss o f his benefits.51 Still there was oppo
sition, the only kind possible under the circumstances. It was demon
strated by refraining to give open political support to Peronism. Some mem
bers of this opposing movement were nationalists, others had chosen the
easiest and most convenient way o f action.
This situation led to fragmentation and incoherence among union leader
ship. The tension created by this complicated political process combined
with the old divisions. The leaders were caught in the midst o f opposing
forces: the military regime, the personal policies o f Peron, the democratic op
position (from communists to conservatives), the old ideological loyalties,
and the new proletariat that either rejected or did not understand them yet
clamored for the advantages offered by Peron. The leaders had to resort to
a two-sided game or try to involve themselves as little as possible with Peron
and the opposition (as many chose to do). Some switched from one side to
the other according to political circumstances (this happened frequently, even
in cases like the one involving the socialist Borlenghi who later became minis
ter o f the interior in the Peronist government), others switched to the side of
open opposition (this happened as frequently for the leaders as for entire or
ganizations), and all others sided militantly with the Peronists. The latter po
sition involved only a minority. What is o f interest to this study is that this
latter group had above all a syndicalist origin which in the past had cherished
the creation of a party based entirely on unions, a labor party. However, in
the situation just described this was impossible. Even with the powerful sup
port o f the secretary of labor and the state organs controlled by Peron, it
was impossible to organize a party with a divided or vacillating leadership and
with masses which, although available, were ineffectively organized and in
capable o f pressuring for advantageous collective contracts by labor organiza
tions whose existence was often nominal.
The situation changed suddenly with the events o f O ctober 17 which
triggered the explosion o f a collective movement whose protagonist was the
new working class. This was the decisive turn in the political crisis. It demon
strated to the union leadership that the majority o f the urban proletariat
supported Peron and left anti-Peronist leaders isolated. At the same time it
forced all of those who were undecided which constituted the majority to
end their vacillation: if they did not want to end up as leaders w ithout an
army, they had to assume the political direction and organization of the
masses following their spontaneous orientation. In other words, the events

o f O ctober 17 made possible—and even necessary—the creation o f a workers*
party. Indeed, the following m onth saw the birth o f the Labor party, the
basis for the electoral campaign that led to the Peronist victory in the elec
tions held in February 1946.
The collective movement o f O ctober 1945 is im portant not only as a caus
al factor in that it represents the decisive solution o f a long political impasse,
but also because it expresses the essential aspects o f early Peronism: the
spontaneous participation typical o f creole political culture, which was also
manifest in the liberal populism o f the radicals, but which acquires greater
importance in Peronism. National populism includes other components
above all the labor union tradition and certain models o f political behavior
peculiar to modern Argentina. It would be a mistake, therefore, to reduce it
to the mere institutionalization o f a collective movement guided or manipu
lated by a charismatic leader. It is precisely this movement which not only
determined its trium ph b u t also decided the first shape that the regime was
to assume.
NATIONAL POPULISM AS A COLLECTIVE MOVEMENT
A brief analysis o f the October events—the collective movement and the

birth (and prem ature death) o f the Labor p arty —will shed light on the man
ner in which these different com ponents weighed in early Peronism. It is
necessary, first o f all, to remember some facts preceding the October
crisis.52 The democratic opposition had by now almost achieved its goal to
overthrow the military government. One o f the last attem pts at violent re
pression, aimed at the universities, the students, and which involved massive
arrests among the anti-Peronist political class, was followed by a palace re
volt in which Peron was arrested while the military government offered to
form a cabinet o f notables that would organize the elections. The opposi
tion, still unsatisfied, continued to pressure for the transferral o f power to the
constitutional court and for the immediate fulfillment o f elections. Neither
the military leaders nor the politicians were united; they were divided in
many functions and lacked a clear orientation. These events took place in a
climate o f intense and violent tension. The democratic opposition, the middle
classes, and the elite were convinced that the whole country, especially the
real working class, was united against the military and Peron. At the same
time, while the antifascist unity was being proclaimed (it stretched from the
Communist party to the conservatives and the organizations o f the bourgeoisie
and the landowners, the ones responsible for the restoration in the 1930s),
the reaction o f many firms to the news o f Peron’s arrest was to refuse to ap
ply existing social legislation and to take other repressive acts against the
workers.
All o f this took place within a few days. A week after the arrest, a general
strike paralyzed the country and the descamisados, converging from the im
mense industrial belt of Buenos Aires, gathered in Plaza de Mayo demanding
and obtaining the release o f their leader. During the next three m onths the
elections were organized and they took place freely for the first time in six
teen years. Contrary to all expectations, the results gave the presidency to
Peron with about 55 percent o f the votes.
The origins of the October 17 events are still the object o f controversy.
There are no detailed studies, although they would be quite possible.53 Leav
ing aside the ideological interpretations that see those events as either a repe
tition o f the March on Rome or the miraculous resurrection o f the authentic
antiliberal and rosista Argentina, it remains to be seen what part was played
by the various organized forces, particularly the CGT, the unions, the police,
and other central and peripheral organs o f the State. As was m entioned, recent
interpretations place a great deal o f importance on decisions o f the managing
organs o f the CGT. Others have pointed out various elements such as the or
ganizational intervention o f the small group o f nationalist or Peronist union
leaders, the intervention o f state controlled organs such as the police» and
local organs at the municipal and provincial level.
The hypothesis which attributes a decisive role to the CGT needs to be ex
amined insofar as it is the one which most directly supports the thesis o f a
deliberate choice by the organizations o f the working class. The answer ap
pears indisputable. The CGT had nothing to do with the events o f October
17. The Comité Central Confederal (CCC) o f this organ held a meeting on the
afternoon o f the 16th and after a long session which lasted more than ten
hours, until the dawn o f the 17th, it voted (21 versus 19) in favor o f a general
strike for the 18th. When the members o f the committee left their meeting
place they discovered that the workers had already turned to the streets, con
verging towards the Federal Capital and the center o f the city. They had
been on strike since the 16th, and in certain regions, two days before that.
Other similar attem pts had taken place during the week.
There are also other aspects worth mentioning. The CGT and its Comité
Central Confederal had no infrastructure, no organization, and no resources;
it was simply formed by individuals representing unions. Furtherm ore, in the
meeting the old unions voted against the strike. Had it not been for the re
shuffling introduced by Peron in the CCC in September, in order to strength
en his control, and the fact that three o f the old unions (among them the
powerful railways union, one o f the oldest) had left the CGT in protest against
collaboration with the military, the strike would have been voted down.54
The contrast between the cautious declaration o f the CGT and what was
happening in the streets is revealing. The declaration studiously avoided men
tioning Peron’s name. It spoke only o f the defense o f w orkers’ rights and the
need to defend their recent gains, the social legislation, and salary benefits;
But the workers’ general strike had another goal: Peron’s freedom. The peo-
pie in the streets only shouted for him: they demanded his freedom and his
presence among them , and obtained both. The CGT declaration passed prac
tically unnoticed, as did most declarations in those days. The reason for such
caution, even on the part o f pro-Peronist members, was due to the uncertain
ty o f the situation. Nobody wanted to commit himself to a cause that per
haps had already been lost. At a time when the situation appeared so con
fused, many people, including the Democratic and Conservative parties, the
Communists, and the middle and upper classes believed that Peron was doom
ed and that the military would return the government to civilian hands.55
It is thus impossible to avoid the conclusion that the CGT not only had no
part in the general strike and in the dem onstrations that took place in the
public squares, since it did not even have enough power to carry it out, but
that voting in its favor was above all a means o f responding to a situation of
extreme uncertainty while avoiding dangerous political commitments.
No m atter what the position o f the leaders might have been, their decisions
would not have changed the course o f events. It remains to be seen what part
was played by the organizations and the leaders who were more decidedly
Peronist, and by the state at the local or central level. There is unanimity
today among observers and scholars o f different orientations with regard to
the impact o f the w orkers’ initiative.56 Differing importance, however, is
attributed to the role o f the organization, and there is no agreement as to
which groups were more influential.
The organization was a necessary element w ithout which the collective
movement could not have succeeded. But all evidence indicates that its role
was minimal. The organization was able to physically channel enthusiasm,
safeguarding its dispersion in many local demonstrations, and facilitating
the concentration in the center o f the city. There were also spontaneous ten
dencies and the great strength o f the historical tradition which made Plaza
de Mayo the scenario o f the decisive episodes in the country’s history from
independence on. With regard to the groups, there were perhaps two: the
one formed by Eva Peron and Mercante, more personal and political and
based on labor support; and the syndicalist group o f Cipriano Reyes.57 The
latter, probably the most im portant, is also o f interest because it was made up
of syndicalists that soon afterwards set up the Partido Laborist a. The group
involves those who sought the autonom ous political organization o f the work
ing class.58 Curiously, Peron was not behind the organization o f October 17
and he seemed resigned to abandon political life and go abroad with his
wife Eva.59
It is probable th at the parallel unions which were mentioned earlier and
which had no adherents might still have been able to cooperate with their
inform ation netw ork; and it is plausible that municipal organs in the Buenos
Aires area might have offered logistical cooperation. Finally, the police acted
ambiguously, and it is probable that its troops, composed o f internal migrants
who came from the same peripheral regions as many o f the new proletariat,
sympathized with them. These factors are im portant, but the fact remains
that the leaders and the organization itself were swept away by the action of
the masses. The October episode was a typical expression o f collective enthu
siasm, a channelled but spontaneous action endowed with that strength which
is the only factor capable o f elevating events o f this kind to the role o f myth
and long enduring collective traditions. Those who took part in it were exclu
sively, or almost exclusively, recent migrant workers.60
October 17 also had a traum atic effect on the middle and upper classes,
the political parties, and intellectuals. Immigrant and European-educated
Argentina suddenly discovered a new world. As was mentioned earlier, the
general opinion held by the members o f these classes was that the whole
country was opposed to Peron, and that the working class was especially
opposed to him.
In a country which was occupationally and socially 40 percent middle-
class, this opinion can be easily understood since the social and ecological
environment o f most middle-class people confirmed such a perception. In
addition, the preexisting working-class parties were anti-Peronists. This creat
ed the stereotype of the real versus the lumpen worker. The former were
the foreign immigrant or his children and the latter were the cabecita negra
and the creole. Few realized that the latter constituted the majority o f the
1945 working class and more im portantly, the voting worker.
The foreign-born com ponent was still relatively high among the working
class. This sector together with the Argentines born in the area composed 48
percent o f the working class in the Buenos Aires m etropolitan area and, to a
lesser extent, in other big cities. The proportion was high enough to give some
objective basis to the stereotype o f the real w orker—educated and “obvious
ly ” democratic, socialist or communist, who was never to be seen in the
Peronist street action. These workers were more visible in everyday life be
cause of their predominance among skilled and high positions and their more
frequently personal contact with technicians, professionals, managers, and
businessmen.
No one realized that although the foreigner was completely assimilat
ed, looked like an Argentine, and might have the same ideological orienta
tions, he was not relevant politically and did not vote. The same situation had
occurred during the acute social troubles o f the first decade o f the century.
But at that time he was correctly perceived as a foreigner, because o f his re
cent migration, his low level o f assimilation, his different language (most of
the leftist press was in Italian or German), and his extrem ist ideology which
was regarded as alien infiltration. There is, unfortunately, a lack o f studies
on the role and attitudes o f foreign workers who participated in the unions
from 1940 to 1945. Once undertaken, these studies could provide some an
swers regarding the vanishing old union members. Their children, who gener
ally had a higher educational level, were achieving white collar, technical, or
professional jobs. The foreign-born moved up within the manual occupations
and were considerably older, on the average, than the newcomers flooding
in from the provinces. They were not likely to be active in union politics as
in the past.
This evidence illustrates the different political culture and the contrasting
work and life experience o f the various com ponents o f the working class. It
involves political culture and not just the traditionalism o f the migrants. Their
background did not prepare them for the demands o f an industrial and urban
life. Their immediacy and spontaneity in political behavior were im portant
factors in the collective movement, and also contributed to the effectiveness
of Peron’s charismatic attraction. The October 17 event was not a new phe
nomenon in Argentine political history. Though this type o f collective be
havior is universal, direct political participation—under a caudillo or some
times w ithout one—was an integral part o f the creole political culture. This
interpretation, emphasized by right-wing nationalists, revisionist antiliberal
historians, and national socialists o f Marxist extraction, has been reelaborated
by serious scholars. They perceive such participation as a form of inorganic
democracy, based not only on the passive acceptance o f an authoritarian
ruler, legitimized by tradition, or even accepted because of charisma (though
this quality was necessary), but also rooted in the feeling o f one’s own rights
to participation. The historical background, the strong influence of an old
union, and the political tradition predom inant in urban centers among Argen
tine and foreign workers accelerated the newcomers* assimiliation o f urban
tradition and the political practices consonant with unionized labor. It ac
celerated the fusion o f both the creole and the modern-industrial political
cultures. But, whatever the nature o f the social movement, the type o f col
lective action, and its impact on political culture, its protagonist was the new
working class, with little intervention from other agents, except in the
necessary role o f leader.
National Populism as an Organized Party
To reach power, a social movement needs not only a leader but also a
political elite and a political organization. The old union leaders played a
crucial role by providing a portion o f the cadres o f political organizational
channels needed by the mobilized masses and their caudillo. They were not
the only union leaders; there were others, new ones, who came from
different ideological and sometimes social origins. The Peronist political elite
was larger than the union leadership and included not only a splinter radical
group but also fascists, extreme Right nationalists, Catholics, falangists, and
former communist Trotskyites and other Marxists (the latter were a small
minority usually found among the union leaders).
Although the creation o f a political party based on organized labor was
an old idea, and the new law regulating the unions explicitly allowed for this,
its creation and success was only made possible because o f the existence o f a
mass social movement. It was no accident that the party was founded as an
immediate afterm ath o f the October 17 events. The new situation, crystal
lized by the popular uprising, convinced many hesitant union officers to fol
low the few top leaders who had decided to organize the Labor party. The
majority felt that their main purpose was the creation o f a genuine and inde
pendent political organization based on the mobilized masses. Their naivete
became evident a few m onths after the elections when the Labor party was
dissolved and replaced by a Peronist party under the absolute control o f Peron.
This event is the counterpart o f the famous O ctober day. It illustrates how
mass support was given to the leader, not the organization. It might have been
possible at that early stage to resist the dissolution o f the party. Party author
ities and officers rejected at first the decision to merge with the Partido Unico.
The Laborists had obtained 85 percent o f the Peronist vote, they controlled
the majority in Congress, and were supposed to have direct contact with the
workers through their unions. No one in the party favored its dissolution and
the regime still lacked repressive mechanisms.
Nonetheless, the great majority o f the cadres were quickly convinced to
reverse their opinion, and only a few o f the small group o f founding leaders
remained to fight for the independence o f the organization. Although corrup
tion was used, it is difficult to believe that everyone, at all levels, was bribed.
If this were the case, their motivation to support and work to build the party
would seem strange, especially since they were the same people who had or
ganized the party a few m onths earlier. The only alternate hypothesis is that
they lacked effective control o f the workers, or were aware o f how impos
sible it was to arouse resistance for an issue as abstract as the defense of an
organization. Nothing similar to the events o f October 17th occurred; even
the more popular chiefs were unable to mobilize the support o f the workers.61
The new working class still maintained a direct link with the charismatic
leader. The situation changed slowly and, paradoxically, this process began
as the unions subm itted more and more to the state. The loss o f autonomy
occurred at the higher levels o f the organizations and much less so at the
plant level. The rank and file continued to exert pressure and whenever
necessary they went on strike, regardless o f the will o f the union and the
state. They were also able to exert pressure at the top, particularly during
the renewal o f the national labor contract. But they only fought for im
proved working conditions, not for political reasons. They engaged in wildcat
strikes, but they had no intention o f fighting Peron or Peronism, even if the
rigidity and repression they were experiencing came from the Peronist govern
ment. Through resistance they developed a working-class consciousness (a
reformist one) and absorbed the preexisting tradition o f labor activism, al
though with different political implications. In this process o f acculturation
and fusion, the older union cadres and the surviving rank-and-file members
played an im portant role. This is the difference between this and similar
national populist movements and regimes, like the ones in Brazil, where the
organized labor tradition was weaker and the organization from above pre
ceded the form ation o f a modern urban working class.62
CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE PERONIST ELECTORATE
In the presidential elections held in February 1946 two political coalitions

intervened: Union Democratica, composed o f all preexisting parties, from
the Communists to the Radicals and Conservatives; and the Peronist coali
tion, whose principal com ponent was the Labor party supported by a dissi
dent faction o f the Radical party. The Laborists claimed 85 percent o f the
votes obtained by Peron. This would have meant a victory for him (since it
constituted an electoral majority) even w ithout the other contributions,
which consisted primarily o f marginal radical elements and their electoral
machine. In a few areas o f the province o f Buenos Aires, the Peronist move
ment utilized some members o f the conservative apparatus. In addition
there were the nationalists and fascists, whose electoral contribution was
less than 1 percent, although they represented a significant proportion o f the
ruling class o f the Peronist regime. Peron gathered 55 percent o f the votes,
and since his adversaries had been divided over the elections for representa
tives, senators, and governors o f the provincial and local administrations, he
received the majority in almost all the provinces and in parliament.
For the first tim e, in 1946, the vote was polarized according to class lines.
Until that time, Argentina had been a country in which class, although in
fluencing the outcom e o f the vote, still represented only a component o f
it. As was pointed out earlier, during the preceding period the majority party
was a form o f populism. The Socialist party, although it included a greater
proportion o f the working class in its electorate, was also heterogeneous.
The Conservatives were more closely aligned according to class lines, al
though they too, in Buenos Aires province, had clientelistic electoral machines
capable o f recruiting the lower class votes. They could also achieve this in a
few peripheral provinces where they had not completely lost the traditional
vote o f the less modernized sectors. Moreover, despite the decline o f federal
ism, local and provincial traditions maintained some electoral weight. In the
metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, the most industrialized center o f the
country, the polarization was more extrem e. This proves that the Peronist
movement was associated with the urbanized areas, and, in general, those areas
with the greatest proportion o f workers and lower classes.
The first studies regarding this subject were conducted in the Buenos Aires
area. They showed a radical change in the electoral composition o f the var
ious parties. However, those inferences are based on ecological correlations.63
The Peronist votes correlated positively with the proportion o f workers and
other sectors o f the lower classes, and correlated negatively with the percent
ages o f businessmen, white-collar workers, professionals, and other categories
of the middle class. The ecological units were counties: those with a high
proportion o f workers had a high Peronist vote, and vice versa.
This cannot prove what proportion o f the workers voted for Peron since
this type o f correlation says nothing by itself with regard to the distribution
o f the vote among individuals.64 But, when the proportion o f votes for a
given party, and the proportion o f individuals who belong to a certain socio-
professional level are big enough, and there are other independent observa
tions and indications that confirm the same tendencies, it is legitimate to in
fer that there is a negative or positive association between the vote and a given
class or strata. The contrast between the low correlations o f the elections
preceding 1946 and the much higher ones for later elections (Table 6.10)
underscores the change in the degree o f class polarization in the two periods
in the city of Buenos Aires. These results were confirmed for the entire metro
politan area by studies conducted on the counties included in that urban re
gion. Later researchers obtained similar results for other areas (such as Cor
doba or the counties of the provinces and Buenos Aires).65
Recent studies on all counties seemed to indicate that the contribution of
the lower classes, particularly the blue-collar workers and the internal mi
grants, to the Peronist victory in 1946 was more restricted than previously
believed. They claimed that only after the fall o f the first Peronist regime
(1955) did working-class support for justicialismo become more accentuated.
But this research is unreliable since the social indicators utilized have little or
no connection with the social composition of the electorate.66
O ther studies conducted on the basis o f census data that more faithfully
reflect this composition confirm that Peronism found its principal basis in
the urban working-class sectors, among internal immigrants, the rural workers,
and in the lower classes in general. Table 6.11 lists the main results o f a mul
tiple regression analysis conducted on the electoral results in 144 counties.67
In the columns corresponding to the socioeconomic variables, the coeffi
cients for each one are listed. The higher these coefficients are, the greater
the association between the socioeconomic variable and the Peronist vote
(which in this case represents the dependent variable). The square o f the mul
tiple correlation indicates in what measure these factors explain the total var
iance o f the Peronist vote.
The results included in Table 6.11 refer to the 144 Argentine counties that
include at least one urban center o f no less than 5,000 inhabitants. These
counties also include im portant and extensive rural areas whose largest urban
center has less than 20,000 inhabitants. The counties represent 80 percent of
all the votes, but they do not give inform ation for the more homogeneous
rural areas (that is, the counties with no urban center or with centers smaller
than 5,000 inhabitants). Though the results o f the study are valid for about
80 percent o f the voters and most o f the country, they could differ for the
highly rural counties. Although they are unim portant for a global view of
electoral results, an analysis o f these areas could indicate the orientation of
the vote in those areas where the Conservatives as late as 1946 could have
maintained control of their peons. This does not seem probable because
TABLE 6.10
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGES OF VOTES OBTAINED BY

VARIOUS PARTIES AND PERCENTAGES OF LOWER AND MIDDLE
CLASSES OUT OF THE TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
OF THE 20 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS OF THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES
CONSER
PERONIST SOCIALIST RADICAL VATIVE FASCIST
M
c
.2 lH JU jj lx JU u
υ T3 h3 V
« Ϊ T3 t "Ό Ï T3 i *T3 »
53 s 2 5 2 S 2 2 2 2
1940 -0.17 +0.20 +0.35 -0.24 +0.10 -0.08
1942 — — -0.23 +0.39 +0.45 -0.12 +0.29 -0.64 - -
1946 -0.65 +0.97 +0.57 -0.82 +0.69 -0.91 __ _ +0.49 -0.83

1948 -0.58 +0.90 +0.37 -0.67 +0.66 -0.95 - - +0.60 -0.87
1957 -0.55 +0.66 +0.10 +0.02 +0.73 -0.82

1958 -0.66 +0.85 -0.31 +0.56 +0.55 -0.95
Sources: G. Germani, Estructura Social de la Argentina, pp. 254-54 (for the elec
tions from 1940 to 1948); idem, Politica e massa (Belo Horizonte, University
of Minas Gerais, 1960), p. 150. Correlations with Spearman’s coefficient.
Party not presented, or correlations not calculated. 1940, 1942: elections

preceding Peronism; 1946, 1948: elections at the beginning o f and during the
Peronist regime; 1957, 1958: elections following the fall o f Peronism.
the more rural municipalities included in the study show strong positive
correlations between Peronist vote and agricultural workers.
The districts have been classified in various categories according to the
level o f urbanization. The m etropolitan area o f Buenos Aires is kept sepa
rate in many o f the regression equations because the indicator related to
internal migration is not valid in this area due to technical characteristics
of the census data.68 The degree o f urbanization has been measured in
two ways: size o f urban centers, and percentage of those involved in second
ary and tertiary activities (or in agriculture) in the total EAP of each district.
1. When the multiple regression is calculated for all districts and counties
which contain an urban center with 5,000 or more inhabitants, the
strongest contribution to the Peronist vote comes from the industrial,
the agricultural, and the tertiary workers. All the other coefficients
U
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LOWER CLASSES AND NATIONAL POPULISM
homogeneous urban categories).

The represents a variable used in the computation of the equation, but excluded from it because its inclusion had little impor
tance (it added less than 0.10% to the explanation of the variance).
195
Significance: It depends on the number o f units. It is lower for the categories with fewer cases, but questionable if it is applicable
when the analysis is conducted on all the units which make up each category, and not a sample o f them.
are weak and the factors taken into consideration account for about
44 percent of the variance.
2. In the m etropolitan area o f Buenos Aires the only significant elements
are the industrial and tertiary workers ; taken alone they explain most
of the variance (about 89 percent). But internal migrants are not in
cluded in this equation although they constitute the majority of the
working class in that area. One reason is that the migration indicator
is not valid due to census definitions.
3. In all the equations the workers (agricultural, industrial, etc.) con
tribute most heavily to the Peronist vote. But among the counties
with an urban center o f 50,000 or more inhabitants, more specifically
in the big cities, not including the Buenos Aires area, the sector which
carries the heaviest weight is the internal migrant (while the workers
disappear from the equation. In this case the migration indicator is
valid and most o f internal migrants are workers (there is a strong cor
relation between workers and internal migrants).
4. The owners and managers in industry, commerce, services, and agri
culture always represent a negative factor for the Peronist vote.
5. White collars exert an increasingly negative influence as the level of
urbanization goes up. This influence becomes slightly positive in the
more rural (or less urban) areas and it is slightly accentuated in the
case o f farm white collars.
6. Internal migrants represent a factor whose im portance increases in re
lation to the degree o f urbanization. In the more rural areas the mi
grants lose their weight or invert the tendency.
7. The socioeconomic variables explain m ost o f the variance in the more
urban categories (and in some cases almost all o f the variance) ; but in
the more rural areas (in the counties th at have urban centers whose
total population ranges from 5,000 to 19,999 and whose labor force
has more than 40 percent agricultural workers), the percentage of the
explained variance reaches the minimum (36 percent for that cate
gory). This may be a result o f the high heterogeneity o f the category
and o f other factors which may have affected the vote (such as the
local culture, the traditional vote, etc.). In the counties where 50 per
cent or more o f the workers are farm laborers, the weight carried by
these workers is very high. This might indicate th at the heterogeneity
of these counties does not allow one to observe the im portance of the
different factors. A detailed study o f hom ogenous rural counties and
those with m inor centers might clarify some o f these aspects.
The study must be extended to all the counties and incorporate correla
tions with other elections, while considering the local peculiarities o f the
culture and the political tradition as well as other procedures. For the time
being, the results agree with the structural analysis, with the modifications
o f the composition o f the social classes, and with the data regarding the
form ation o f National Populism in the preceding sections.
Peronism is a multiclass movement, but the working element, the lower

class in general, predom inates. Furtherm ore, its birth and the shape which it
assumed were precipitated and determ ined by the participation o f the recent
ly formed working class. The com position o f the urban proletariat and the
weight carried by the proportion o f internal migrants (in the centers where it
is possible to recognize the proportion more accurately), confirm this hy
pothesis.
In addition, even the more homogeneous parties from the point o f view
of class composition include com ponents o f different social strata, as in the
case o f the Italian Communist party, or the already classic one of the Tory
worker in England. In reality, especially in 1946, Peronism was a multiclass
movement which was affected by elements o f other sectors and whose own
birth was made possible due to the structural necessity o f an alliance between
the new industrial bourgeoisie, the new and old proletariat, and the military.
THE ELITES OF NATIONAL POPULISM
Although this study concerns the social basis o f the movement, its nature
and the nature o f the regime could not be understood w ithout reference to
the elite, and its characteristics. These elements were im portant not only in
determining the political shape assumed by the mobilization o f the new
sectors, but also in allowing the expression to take place. Social mobiliza
tion does not always, nor does it necessarily lead to political mobilization.
In Argentina it was possible for this not to happen because the same struc
tural changes created integration channels (such as social mobility or higher
consumption) capable o f absorbing the emerging sectors without creating
the need for political expression, or at least not in such a direct and immedi
ate manner as happened in the case o f national populism. Nonpolitical
absorption was achieved during the first cycle o f social mobilization with
regard to the foreign urban proletariat (as well as the foreign middle classes).
Neither o f the two mobilized sectors achieved direct political expression.
Instead, they were incorporated into civil society through channels provided
by the production and consum ption structure, through social mobility, ac
culturation and through their contribution in the synchresis from which
immigratory Argentina was bom .
These factors also existed during the second cycle of mobilization. How
ever, structural displacement and the corresponding availability o f excluded
and marginal social sectors (or sectors marginalized by the Great Depression
and the demobilization o f the 1930s) had already triggered the phase of mo
bilization with the massive migrations towards the cities. Migration itself is
a form of mobilization by virtue o f the fact that it constitutes an active an
swer to the m odification o f the style o f living and a symptom of readiness
for new forms o f participation.69 The economic expansion and the acceler-
new jobs, the increased upward mobility, and the diffusion o f modern con
sumption within social strata hitherto deprived o f it made the achievement of
these new forms possible.
With regard to consum ption, what was required was the consensus of the
owners. But at this point it is necessary to remember that in Argentina there
was no unlimited supply o f labor as in Brazil, for example, a case which was
not too different from the Italian one during certain periods. In 1943 full
employment was reached, particularly in the more qualified categories, and
salaries were often superior to those which had been fixed by collective con
tracts.70 Furtherm ore, the ease with which increases were being granted was
due not only to the state’s political pressure (and even less—as was earlier
dem onstrated—to the pressure o f the unions), but also to the job market situ
ation and to the expansion o f consum ption.
The implicit class alliance between the developing industrial bour
geoisie (led by the production of durable consumer goods, other goods, and
modern services) and the recent proletariat was based on increased consump
tion. On various occasions the hostility o f several sectors o f industrial man
agers toward the extension o f social legislation became apparent. This type
of behavior was considered a violation o f the work discipline and a dangerous
interference on the part o f the workers. Examples o f this interference were
the presence and the action o f workers’ representatives and internal commit
tees. These attitudes confirmed and strengthened the fears o f the unions that
once the political support o f the military government had been withdrawn,
the benefits which they had obtained would be the last. But, if these mani
festations were visible, it is impossible to know how widespread they actually
were and in what proportion they were to be found among the new firms and
the already established ones. Furtherm ore, it seems—but is yet to be proven—
that the problem involved more the defense o f job authority than the de
fense o f benefits.71
Increase in consumption and expansion in em ploym ent along with the
opening o f channels o f upward mobility were probably adequate and suffi
cient mechanisms to socially and culturally integrate the mobilized sectors,
without allowing them to press—at least for the time being—for their own
means of political expression. This has been proven in Argentina and else
where. It is an accepted fact that the recent proletariat, produced by in
ternal migration, has modest aspirations and is satisfied with very little.
The mere fact o f migrating to the big city and, moreover, the fact o f finding
work even in the less qualified positions o f modern urban activity, are con-
siafcretLsQcial ascent, an improvement.
The recentty^formed lower urban strata (involving at least the first genera
tion), including the mai^pnaLmasses characterized by living conditions which
are inferior to those of the estaBIishedr-wetkiug^dass, lack revolutionary po
tential and maybe even the aspirations o f political pärticipation as long as
no other factors are involved.72 In order for mobilization to assume «η
explicitly political expression, other conditions must be present. Either there

are already adequate political channels (for example, parties which are cap
able of absorbing the new sectors because according to the dominant political
tradition they appear to be a natural expression o f the working class, and
possess the means and the mechanisms for attraction: language, community
and welfare activities, patronage machines); or there are mobilized elites, that
is, displaced and available for new forms o f political action, in other words,
desirous of prom oting and heading new parties or movements.
Sometimes these elites can emerge from inside the mobilized masses. This
took place in the case o f the European proletariat; but only in part, because
the intellectuals contributed to both the revolutionary and reformist move
ments. Nonetheless, the form ation o f internal elites took various generations.
In Argentina the originally internal contribution (with regard to the emerg
ing sectors) was minimal, if it existed at all, considering the speed of the pro
cess. The internal elites—especially in the unions—formed in the following
decades, during and after the fall o f the national populist regime.
Particular pressures for direct political expression did not exist. Neither
the preexisting syndicalism nor the one organized from above were able to
obtain, in the period preceding the institution o f the regime, the institutional
ized participation of the recent workers. This fact and the absence of a reac
tion to the dissolution o f the Labor party confirm their lack o f modern polit
ical training. Furtherm ore, the existence o f alternative channels for social in
tegration made the politicization of the new sectors less necessary. This
would have been possible and attainable only had there been an adequate
elite. Therefore, it is legitimate to formulate the hypothesis—according to so
ciological theory, and not historical reconstruction—that in the absence of an
external elite, the newly arrived would have remained for a more or less leng
thy period of time w ithout any direct or political expressions o f their own.
Structural changes and the displacement o f large sectors o f the population
had to be expressed in political forms, but the process could have been less
rapid and it might have been achieved through substantial and gradual modifi
cations o f the political forces already organized and relatively integrated in
to the system. It is thus possible that the preexisting political formation which
was best suited to channel them was to be found in personalized Radicalism,
headed by the old charismatic leader deposed by the revolution of 1930. It
is also probable that admission o f the new strata would have divided the
Radical movement. Conjectures o f this sort are not arbitrary considering that
the new m ovem ent’s elite ended up including elements o f this origin (some
of which were very im portant from an ideological point of view, as in the
case o f the young Radical movement previously m entioned. Further, one of
the essential com ponents o f Peronist ideology was the vindication o f the he
redity o f personalized radicalism incorporating in a sole image both Peron
and Irigoyen.
It has been illustrated that the political initiative o f the new proletariat
was not manifest until it could be expressed according to the model for ac
tion inherent in the political culture o f which it was the bearer, and thus,
after the penetration and the affirmation o f the caudillo’s figure as a charis
matic leader. From this point on there is an accentuated feeling of spon
taneity, and a collective movement which culminates in October. In the ab
sence o f this type o f leader, and in the absence o f an elite to comply with
him, social mobilization would have had political repercussions, but perhaps
of a different nature.
If the presence o f a mobilized and available elite constituted a necessary
(but not sufficient) condition for the fulfillment o f all that was only possible
or potential, the characteristics of this elite were also a significant component
of the shape which the movement assumed. The characteristics of the mass
and the contextual circumstances were decisive.
Not all of the elites would have been able to enlist and head this type of
mobilized mass (as was proved conclusively by the ideologically European
ized left-wing groups, especially the Communists). Furtherm ore, among the
contextual circumstances, the type o f operative basis from which they could
develop their action was im portant. This basis had to be adequate with re
gard to the needs, the material means, and the penetrative capability in psy
chosocial terms. It is difficult to imagine the success o f Peronism without
the power basis provided by the military regime, or, alternatively, in a demo
cratic setup, w ithout some structure (political or syndicalist).
Let us see briefly what constituted the elite and the bases from which it
developed its course o f action. (Consideration o f the elite will be limited to
only one of the contextual circumstances.) There were essentially two bases.
The base of the state was derived from Peron’s role in the military regime. It
allowed him to avail himself o f the material and power necessary to build
the legal organizational basis (the Secretariat o f Labor and the Social Security
Agency), to utilize local and peripheral instrum ents o f penetration (including
the media o f mass communication), and to influence the syndicalist penetra
tion. The syndicalist base was obtained through the control o f preexisting or
ganizations, and by the creation o f a new netw ork which although purely
formal, did have a role of its own. These two operational bases correspond to
the two principle origins o f the leadership o f national populism: on the one
hand, the charismatic leader and his entourage (military, but especially polit
ical, involving the nationalists); on the other, the new and old syndicalist
leaders. To these two groups one must add elements o f various parties—es
pecially left-wing groups and the radical faction.
Directly or indirectly, these elites have their roots in the military revolu
tions o f 1930 and 1943, the second being largely a consequence o f the first.
At the root o f the three types o f elite (military, syndicalist, and political) it is
easy to find the effects o f the 1930 coup and the demobilization. The former
led to direct military intervention, and the latter made the action o f the mid
dle and lower-class parties, along with the action o f the syndicates, difficult.
The undoing o f the conservative restoration, which also involved the Radical
party and the Socialists led to a crisis. It was characterized by many divisions
and conflicts, and by an atmosphere o f disillusionment and alienation which
was especially felt among the younger generations.
The military regime o f 1943 introduced new elements of confusion among
the elites. It provoked the mobilization o f the middle classes in a democratic
and antifascist sense. Although this might have proved to be enlightened, it
was based on a false premise. Additionally, the anxious search for political
allies created new divisions and alignments. The same thing took place in the
syndicalist area. Structural changes were also influencing the composition
and orientations o f the elites; but it remains to be seen to what degree this
phenomenon was felt among the political elite.
It is probable th at one element common to the disparate components of
the national-populist elite was their marginal or relatively marginal position
with regard to the political and social membership structures: parties, classes,
unions, and other organizations or groups. Marginality would explain theo
retically the displacement and availability o f elites. Among the old syndicalist
leaders, marginality might have been derived from their subordination to the
Socialist and Communist parties, whether they participated in these currents
or n o t.73
The attraction/repression policy availed itself o f the internal conflicts.
Many parallel syndicates were organized by leaders who had been left in the
minority or had been expelled from preexisting organizations. Those who
came from the parties were also marginal. Thus, from the Left came Trot-
skyites, those expelled by the Communist party, and anarchists; from the rad
ical side came marginal elements who carried little weight in the party, but
who had collaborated with the military regime.
It is more difficult to prove the hypothesis o f marginality with regard to
the military, including Peron, and the nationalist component (among the civil
ians in its group). There is no doubt that the direct political intervention cre
ated an anomic situation in the army. It is often claimed that the nationalists
preferred to recruit among the declining oligarchic families, frequently among
those in the interior o f the country. If this were the case, it would have in
volved marginalized elements from the point of view o f class position. Peron
himself does not seem to have been a marginal figure with regard to social ori
gin or organizational affiliation. Peron was considered different from his
equals, a kind o f intellectual.74 In his case it is possible to speak o f margin
ality not in terms o f structure, but on the personality level; those same ele
ments which made him an acceptable caudillo for the descamisados were op
posed to the type o f personality molded by the military. Not that there was
a lack o f potential politicians among the military (even if they were very rare),
but they were incapable o f assuming the role o f a populist leader. These char
acteristics created difficulties for him and opposition within the army.
Structural and possibly psychological marginality explain the composition
of the Peronist elite, the form under which it was organized, and its social
and ideological origins. This composition contributed to the molding of the
movement, the characteristics o f the regime, and to the image o f the regime
and movement as perceived by other elements, particularly the middle classes,
the political parties, and international public opinion. The elite with nation
alist origins and the elite originating from the state basis o f the movement
exerted their greatest influence on the public, national, and international
image o f the movement, and on the regime.
It is from its nationalist and military origin that Peronism acquired its
fascist character. Some o f the regime’s institutions were designed after the
Italian fascist examples, even though they never functioned in the same way.
In culture, education, propaganda, and control o f mass media, an attempt
was made to follow the Italian model, within the limits set by Argentine so
ciety. Even in the party organization that replaced the electoral coalition, and
especially in the Labor party, an attem pt was made to move towards fas
cism.75 The chief political roles in education, culture, and propaganda were
entrusted almost exclusively to the nationalist element.
The m ovem ent’s early base was very different from its base during the
regime and especially after its fall. The political organization precipitated by
the October collective movement gave rise to the Labor party, essentially
a reformist w orker’s party. When this was suppressed by creation o f a single
totalitarian party the movement lived on in the unions. Workers continued
acts of vindication and protest against the companies, even when the politi
cal system and the state dem onstrated their opposition or went so far as to
repress them.
The head of the syndicalist organization was controlled and manipulated
by the leader, but it was limited since even the leaders o f the CGT could not
ignore the pressure generated by the base. As the acculturation process be
gan, the new urban proletariat became accustomed to the organizational
forms and struggles which are typical o f an industrial society. Proof of the
strength o f this training came after the fall o f the regime, when the syndicalist
organization emerged as the sole force capable o f facing the military power. It
is interesting to note the contrast afforded by the Brazilian case in which the
unions have never represented a serious problem for the military regime.
Peron’s image is composed o f two different elements which are the root
of the Peronist elite. On the psychological level, Peron’s role as a profession
al soldier and a populist leader required not only very diverse, but also direct
ly opposing qualities. On the political level his military training—in an army
with a Prussian background—and his ideological preference for fascist solutions
had to be transformed in the face o f demands made by the sole power base in
civilian society. Peron’s intuition, his flexibility, and his political pragmatism,
together with his qualities as a charismatic leader (with peculiarities especially
suited to stimulate and express the creole spontaneity) allowed him to co-
trol and profit from these contrasting elements. The military and the available
mass were necessary for his ascent to power. This contradiction (the same
duality was later responsible for the collapse o f his first regime), inherent in
the movement's own constitution, had wide-ranging consequences for the
regime’s organization, its political policy, its public image, and even the in
ternal heterogeneity and the intrinsic ambiguity o f Peronism which has sur
vived until today.
NOTES
1. See ch. 5, n. 1 ; Murmis, Smith, Kenworthy, and others.

2. For previous analyses see also: G. Germani, Estructura social de la Argentina;
and idem, “ALgunas repercusiones sociales de los cambios economico en la Argentina.”
3. The existence ot agricultural and industrial censuses in 1935, 1937, and 1947
facilitates the task. The former censuses do not underestimate the economically active
population (EAP) in the agrarian sector. In fact, they include family workers not usually
counted in the EAP. The industrial censuses, however, comprise only portions o f the
secondary sector represented mostly by factory industry. Artisans and homecraft are not
enumerated. This is im portant in order to observe the changes in the composition o f the
sector.
4. Between 1937 and 1947 the cultivated area for wheat, corn, and industrial crops
decreased 21.3 percent (from 22,226 hectares to 17,500). If one considers only wheat,
corn, and linseed, the decline was 36.5% percent. Most of these areas were converted
into pasture for cattle breeding. See Jaime Fuchs, Argentina; su desarrollo capitalista
(Buenos Aires: Cartago, 1965), pp. 254-55. All the growth occurred between 1922 and
1937.
5. The reconstruction of the EAP for the 1935-37 period is particularly difficult,
not only because o f the lack o f general demographic censuses between 1914 and 1947,
but also because of difficulties inherent in the reconstruction itself. The estimates used
in this text are based on figures and information from special censuses (published and
unpublished figures of the INDEC archive) and in various works: A. Ferrer, La economia
argentina (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1963);G. Di Telia and M. Zymelman;
L. Pornoy, Analisis critico de la economia (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica,
1961); Fuchs; A. Dorfman, Historia de la industria argentina (Buenos Aires: Solar,
1968); A. Bunge, Una nueva Argentina (Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1940); Germani, Estructura
Social. More extensive details regarding these estimates can be found in this author’s
article in Desarrollo economico, mentioned in note 1.
6. Horacio C. E. Giberti, El desarrollo agrario argentino (Buenos Aires: Eudeba,
1964), p. 42.
7. Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle (New York: Day, 1944), ch. 4.
8. In many places peasants had small lots, insufficient to make a living, and work
ed as seasonal laborers for the harvest in other areas; in 1960, 26 percent of the peasants
still worked in farms insufficient for their subsistence: see, Comite Interamericano de
Desarrollo Agricola, Tenenda de la tierra y desarrollo socio-economico del sector agri
cola (Washington, D.C.: Union Panamericana, 1965) Tables lOff. The distribution o f
land and the system o f tenure were the same or worse in previous years. See Germani,
Estructura social de la Argentina, for land distribution in 1937 and 1947, ch. 10.
9. For the concept o f pseudotertiary see Germani, Sociologta de la modernizacion,
chs. 5 and 7. The existence o f a floating working force in Argentina, as noted above,
indicates the existence o f a marginality which was rather high in the 1930s, a period o f
crisis. See Weil on unemployment in 1914.
10. Germani, Estructura social.
11. Germani, “ El proceso de urbanizacion.” Table l;a n d idem, Estructura social
12. The text refers to the interpretations mentioned in note 1, ch. 5.
13. For the unpublished figures, consult the INDEC archive, especially the figures
on professions and internal migrations.
14. The 1960 census is an unverified sample o f census modules recorded especially
for this analysis. The sample includes 10,000 families with about 43,000 individuals. The
survey was undertaken in BAM A (1960-61) by a random area sample o f 2100 fami
lies. Regarding stratification and social mobility, see Germani, Caractensticas generales
de la encuesta sobre estratificacion y mobïlidad social (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Socio-
logia, 1961).
15. If the number o f internal migrants were calculated on the basis o f the total
population, their actual proportion would be altered.
16. The gross underestimate is documented in Alfredo Lattes, Migraciones en la
Argentina (Buenos Aires: ITDT, 1969) esp. p. 66 which compares the migration rates
estimated through the survival rates method with those from the census. For Buenos
Aires (city and province) the underestimate is around 90 percent, the highest for all
other provinces, and for all periods. The fact that BAM A includes 17 counties o f this
province complicates the estimate o f internal migration, because birth place is not given
by county, but by province. There are migrants from the rest o f the province who are
not included in BAMA (circa 100 counties). Lattes also proves that all the migration to
the province, and within the province, was concentrated in the counties o f BAMA
(p. 206).
17. In 1960 about one-fifth o f internal migration was intraprovincial. It often in
volves the first migration step towards the biç city.
18. Germani, “El proceso de urbanizacion en la Argentina” , Table 1.
19. Germani, “La mobilidad social en la Argentina” .
20. In 1936 the net rate of reproduction was 0.56 in Buenos Aires. In I960, after
the great internal migrations, it went up to 0.79. This can be explained by the fact that
migrants from the peripheral regions and Latin American migrants have fertility rates
which are much higher (even if acculturation to birth control is rapid). Z. Recchini, La
poblacion de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: ITDT, 1971), p. 63.
21. In BAMA, 13.5 percent o f the heads o f family between 21 and 28 years o f age
moved from lower-class professions to middle-class ones; the proportion increased to 28
percent for those between the ages o f 21 and 45. See, “La modilidad social” .
22. For the Latin American experience see, for example, the studies in Sociologie
du Travail 6 (no. 4, 1961), a special issue on syndicates and the workers.
23. The minimum time required for adjustment to the urban environment, begin
ning with situations which are not radically different, should not be less than 10-15
years. It is greater when attitudes acquired during primary socialization are involved.
For political behavior (and syndicalist participation) much depends on the political
culture o f the place o f origin, and on the existence o f adequate integration channels in
the place o f arrival. In the Buenos Aires area, the period o f adjustm ent in 1958 seemed
very short (10-15 years); see G. Germani, “ Inquiry into the Social Effects o f Urbaniza
tion in Working Class Sectors o f Greater Buenos Aires,” in Urbanization in Latin Amer
ica ed. Philip Hauser (Paris: UNESCO, 1961).
24. As seen in Table 6.3, the proportion o f internal migrants decreases between
1914 and 1936 (from 21.4 percent to 18.9 percent). Similarly, another figure which
depicts the rhythm of increase o f registered voters in BAMA shows th at between 1910
and 1930 they increased by 18,600 per year, while in the period from 1930 to 1946
there were only 31,700. Taking into consideration the natural rate o f increase, the rate
resulting from immigration should have doubled after 1930. Voter registration is
automatic in Argentina.
25. Lattes, pp. 130, 234-35.
26. These estimates are based on G. Germani, “El proceso de urbanizacion” along
with the census o f the City o f Buenos Aires, (vol. 4, 1936), and the census o f the Pro
vince o f Buenos Aires (1938) a preliminary report, and the only one published.
27. Unpublished figures o f the Fourth National Census (1947), INDEC Archive,
and Informe demografico de la Republica Argentina (Direccion Nacional de Estadis-
tica, 1956).
28. Pre-1936 migration was from short distances according to an early study by C.
Moyano Llerena, “Las migraciones internas en la Argentina,” Refista de economta Ar
gentina (1943): 263-66; this has been confirmed by the Lattes study. Data on origins
of the migrants by province, from Fourth National Census, Informe.
29. Germani, ‘‘Inquiry into the Social Effects.”

30. Floreal Fom i and Lelio Marmora, Migration diferendal en comunidades rurales
(Buenos Aires: CEUR, 1967), p. 53. More than half o f the males emigrated to big cities.
Mario Margulis, Migration y marginalidad en ία Argentina (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1968,
ch. 6; A. H. Garcia Aller, “ El hombre y el suelo en tres provincias andinas,” Anales del
Instituto Etnico National 6 (1951): 53-58. This author gives an impressive description
of the “ghost farms” and “ghost villages” in these provinces.
31. Germani, “ El proceso de urbanizacion.”
32. See note 8.
33. Germani, “La mobilidad social,” note 7, and Tables 5 and 7.
34. There are several descriptions o f the impact o f internal migrants on immigratory
Argentina, but most are highly partisan. Seç among others, J. Luis Romero, Argentina:
Imagenes y perspectivas (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1956); Felix Luna, El cuarenta y cinco
(Buenos Aires: Alvarez, 1969); Arturo Jauretche, El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina
(Buenos Aires: Pefta Lillo, 1966); Jose Peter, Cronicas proletarias (Buenos Aires: Esfera,
1968); Angel Perelman,Como hicimos el 17 de Octubre (Buenos Aires: Coyoacan, 1961);
Alberto Belloni, Del anarquismo al peronismo (Buenos Aires: Pefta Lillo, 1960) ; Juan J.
Hernandes Arregui, La form ation de la concientia national (Buenos Aires: Hachea,
I960).
35. On the Radical party: Com blit; E. Gallo and S. Sigal,“La formacion de los par-
tidos politicos modernos: la UCR,” ed. in Argentina sociedad de masas ed. Di Telia,
Germani and Graciarena (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1965). On the crisis o f 1930: D. Canton,
J. L. Moreno, and A. Ciria, La democracia constitutional y su crisis (Buenos Aires: Pai
dos, 1972), and R. Potash, The A rm y and Politics in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford Uni
versity Press, 1969), chs. 2-4. On the nationalists: M. Navarro Gerassi, Los nacionalistas
(Buenos Aires: J. Alvarez, 1968).
36. On the syndicalist movement, R. Rotondaro, Realidad y cambio en el sindica-
lismo (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1971); S. Baily, Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in A r
gentina (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967).
37. Weil analyzed these surveys and pointed out that the unions, the Ministry o f
Labor, and private organizations all shared an interest in exaggerating the number o f
members. The author offers im portant testimony concerning these situations. See F.
Weil, p. 83 ff. The participation percentages have been calculated on the figures o f the
studies mentioned above, reported by Rotondaro and Murmis and on the estimates o f
the corresponding categories o f EAP.
38. Peronist union leader Luis Angeleri insists on the continuity o f the Law on
Professional Association. This decree was suspended by Peron as a gesture towards
organized labor. See L. Angeleri, “Los sindicatos y el peronismo” in La naturaleza del
peronismo, ed. Carlos S. Fayt, note 1. On the repression o f the working class movement:
Rotondaro, p. 85 ff; Baily, p. 73 ff.
39. On the repression/attraction policy: Rotondaro, p. 185 ff.; Baily, ch. 4. An
understanding o f this policy may also be gained through the ideological literature (which
is the more common); see, for example, Rubens Iscaro, Origen y desarrollo del movi-
miento sindical argentino (Buenos Aires: Ateneo, 1958), ch. 13 (communist); Rodolfo
Puiggros, El peronismo: sus causas (Buenos Aires: J. Alvarez, 1969), chs. 2 and 5 (Marx
ist pro-Peronist) ; Luis B. Cerrutti Costa, El sindicalismo, las masas, y el poder (Buenos
Aires: Trafac, 1957) (right-wing Peronist). Also many o f the documents and interviews
included in Fayt.
40. Until very late the CGT did not place a great deal o f importance on the mi
grants: between 1938 and 1943 the problem posed to the unions by internal migrants
was only mentioned twice. Baily, p. 81. The communists were the most active organizers
of the new workers, but their efforts were obstructed by their ideological commitments
(particularly rigid during World War II) their rejection by the migrants, and the strong
police repression.
41. With regard to the last point, see Murmis, p. 103; Baily, ch. 4. The Secretary o f
Labor provided materials, services, and personnel for the establishment o f parallel syn
dicates. See the unquestionable testimony o f Cerruti-Costa.
42. Fayt, p. 108-9; Murmis, p. 89.
43. In the interviews with old union leaders, Alexander reports that they quite
frankly admitted that by the time they realized what they had done, Peron had taken
their followers out from under them , and there was little they could do to alter the
situation. Other factors contributed to this as well, such as political culture and repres
sion. See, R. J. Alexander, The Peron Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951),
p. 28.
44. As shown by Kirkpatrick in the 1960s, core Peronists and what Imaz calls
“a Peronist forever” were stül composed mostly o f old creole stock. They were the ones
who still maintained the personal mystique o f the “m an” while other Peronists followed
either an ideological or a pragmatic orientation towards the movement. See J. J. Kirk
patrick, Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971), ch. 5
and passim; Jose Luis de Imaz, M otivation electoral (Buenos Aires: IDES, 1962).
45. See note 1.
46. An analysis o f the origins o f national socialism in Italy can be found in E. San-
tarelli. Origini del fascismo (Urbino: Argalia, 1963) pt. 2; Germani, A. Aschen and G.
Lenz, “ National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany” Social Research 23, (1956), 450-80.
On the union between nationalism and Marxism in Argentina there is a vast militant
literature, but no studies; a few documents are presented in M. Ferre, La izquierda na
tional en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Coyaocan n.d.). The best known authors are those
o f Marxist origin, like R. Puiggros, and J. Abelardo Ramos.
47. Referring to FORJA see M. A. Scenna, F.O.R.J.A.: una aventura argentina
(Buenos Aires: La Bastilla, 1972), 2 vols.
48. For different perspectives on these internal conflicts during the thirties and
the early forties, see among others, Rotondaro, Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in
Argentina, Brazil and Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962); Sebastian Marotta, El
movimiento sindical argentino (Buenos Aires: Calomino, 1970); Iscaro; Martin Casa-
retto, Historia del movimiento obrero argentino (Buenos Aires: Lorenzo, 1947) ; Jacinto
Oddone, Gremialismo proletario argentino (Buenos Aires: Vanguardia, 1949); Angel
Ponce, Historia del movimiento obrero argentino (Santa Fe: Universidad del Litoral,
1947); Baily treats the birth o f nationalism among the syndicates with a democratic
orientation and then the emergence o f Creole nationalism in the w orker’s movement.
49. See Baily, chs. 2, 4, and 5; Rotandaro, and from opposed ideological perspec
tives, Iscaro; and Puiggros, El peronismo: sus causas (Buenos Aires: Alvarez, 1969),
particularly ch. 2 and p. 126ff. Peronists frequently accused socialist, communist,
and democratic union leaders of elitism.
50. Industry was divided in two main sectors. The old and established industry,
organized in the Union Industrial Argentina, represented pre-1930 industry and support
ed the democratic coalition against Peronism. The new industry, created after 1930,
and greatly reinforced by the war, depended on the continuation o f protection from
foreign imports. In this sector, the component from the interior was considerable.
^Later this sector was organized under the denomination Confederacion General Econ
omica.)
51. Rotondaro and others refer to the change in status o f the union leader, pro
moted by the attraction policy o f Peron; others indicate widespread bribery, such as
systematic offers o f good jobs at the Ministry o f Labor, to all influential union leaders,
see Alexander, p. 29ff. Corruption occurred and on a large scale, but it was not the only
or even the most important factor in the role o f organized labor. Another important
factor was the political marginality in which the syndicalist leaders found themselves
with regard to the parties to which they belonged. Concerning this, see A. Halperin
Dongui, La democracia de masas (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1972) p. 35-36.
52. A day-by-day account o f these crises is to be found in Luna, El '45.
53. The two most detailed chronicles are to be found in Luna; and H. Gambini,
El 17 de Octubre de 1945 (Buenos Aires: Brujula. 1945). Among the various testi
monies o f workers o f leftist origins see: Perelman, Como hicimos el 17 de Octubre. Bel-
loni, Del anarquismo al peronismo; and Fayt, p. llO ff.
54. Baily, 85ff, Luna and other sources listed in note 53.
55. For the CGT declaration, see Luna. During the discussion in CCC many argued
that if Peron disappeared they would still find some other colonel. At that time the
middle and upper classes, and most o f the military and the political class believed that
the government would soon be in the hands o f the democratic coalition. Peron himself
had given up all hope, as he made clear by his letter and his explicit declarations.
56. All sources attribute the October 17 event to the spontaneity of the masses;
see Luna, pp. 307-428; Gambini p. 53ff; and the other listings in note 53. For oppos
ing versions on this them e, see J. R. Barager (ed.), Why Peron Came to Power (New
York: Knopf, 1968). The ideological material on this theme is enormous. Luna pre
sents an acceptable examination o f it.
57. In general more importance is attributed to Reyes’ group. See Baily, ch. 4.
58. Fayt, p. 112ff.
59. Luna, pp. 416-21.
60. There is agreement among the sources. It is acknowledged even by the inter
preters who assign the greatest importance to the preexisting workers’ organization.
See Murmis, pp. 121-22.
61. On the formation and dissolution of the Labor party: Fayt, p. 151 ff; Alexan
der, p. 55ff; Bailey, ch. 6.
62. Even in Brazil, where unionization started early in the century, the working-
class tradition was weak. Union expansion took place under the second and third Vargas
regimes (the Estado Novo and later the constitutional presidency) and it consisted o f
bureaucratic organization created from the top. Often the workers were unable to
distinguish between the state and the union. The clientelistic system o f coronelismo was
transferred in the unions through the pelego. See bibliography in note 2 o f ch. 6. This
also explains why, in Argentina, the hostility against and even the repression o f the
working-class organizations after 1955 only strengthened the unions. In Brazil, under
the military government (from 1964 on), there was no working class opposition.
63. Germani, Estructura social, ch. 16, and idem ,Politica e massa (Belo Horizonte:
U. de Minas Gerais, 1960), ch. 6.
64. For a discussion o f this problem see V. Capecchi, et. al.. Il comportamento
elettorale in Italia (Bologna: II Mulino, 1968), appendix C.
65. Among others, P. Huerta Palau, Analisis electoral de una ciudad en desarrotto
(Cordoba: XX Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Sociologia, 1963); D. Canton,
Elecciones y partidos politicos en la Argentina, chs. 5 and 6.
66. Smith, Kenworthy and Snow.
67. Details on this procedure can be found in Capecchi.
68. See note 18.
69. As Galtung rightly asserts, emigration is a substitute for revolution. See J. Gal-
tung, “Componenti psicosociali della decisione di emigrare’’ in Emigrazione e industria
ed. idem (Milan: Comunita, 1962). For an application o f mobilization theory to migra
tions, see G. Germani, “Migration and A cculturation,” in Handbook fo r Social Research
in Urban Areas, ed. Philip Hauser, (Paris: Unesco, 1965).
70. Salaries (at constant prices) rose from 1936-37, more than compensating the
descent experienced after the 1930 crisis. (Figures from the National Bureau o f Statistics).
71. The vote o f the industrial owners had neither a negative nor a positive correla
tion with Peronism in 1946 in the Buenos Aires area (source, note 63). Those who re
acted most violently to the social legislation were the agrarian sectors and the industries,
such as the canned meat industry, closely linked to the primary export economy and in
which very authoritarian labor relations still existed.
72. Comparative examination o f a great quantity o f monographic studies under
taken in many countries and conducted by John (Joan) Nelson, leaved very few doubts
on the subject: J. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Na
tions , op. cit. Studies on the working class in the Buenos Aires area confirm this same
fact.
73. T. Halperin Donghi, La democracia de masas, p. 36.
74. Luna, p. 74ff. The author presents an interview in which Peron remembers (in
1969) that his Italian experience, as a military aide during fascism, had opened his eyes
to the great changes that were occur in g in Europe, and that later these ideas o f his were
not understood by his military colleagues, a fact which alienated him to some extent.
75. The new party called itself Parttdo Unico de la Revolucion Nacional, with ob-
vious totalitarian influences. Even its internal organization—in theory at least—drew its
inspiration from that model. The name was later abandoned in favor o f Partido Peronista,
in order to avoid those affinities. A totalitarian party was impossible. See, among others,
Alexander, p. 6Off.
CHAPTER SEVEN
POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES

IN THE RISE OF LIBERAL POPULISM
AND NATIONAL POPULISM
ROLE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND MOBILIZATION

IN LIBERAL POPULISM AND NATIONAL POPULISM
Insufficient data and the fact that essential aspects of structural changes and
mobilization cannot be expressed through quantitative indicators make the
comparison rather difficult. However, the effort is worthwhile since it can
shed considerable light on the meaning of structural changes and the use
fulness as well as the limitations o f mobilization theory. Selected quantita
tive indicators, sym ptom atic of structural changes, will be analyzed with
regard to their occurrence in shifts o f population and o f certain sectors,
and in qualitative changes within these sectors relevant to the purposes of
this investigation.
The first problem is the question of time settings for the two processes
involved. The evaluation o f essential aspects depends on the dates selected to
mark the beginning and the end o f each process. We must compare the scale,
velocity, and duration o f structural changes and the degree of discontinuity
they cause with regard to preexisting trends. For the sake of simplicity, the
term mobilization will be used as a synonym for structural change. It should
be understood, however, that mobilization properly refers to a different
process within the entire cycle: readiness for new forms of action and partici
pation.
209
The dates have been set in order to include, as far as possible, the most
acute period, in terms o f either political m obilization or the structural
changes o f greatest intensity, and the period immediately preceding, which
allows for a comparison o f the time o f greatest intensity with the preceding
one. As concerns the time setting of the second cycle of mobilization, it is
quite apparent that the structural changes take place after 1930 and that the
most im portant ones occur after the middle o f the decade (1935-37); it is at
this point that the great industrial expansion, internal migrations, and the
drop in cereal production all begin. Furtherm ore, there are partial censuses
which cover these years and allow for estim ations.1 As mentioned earlier,
1930 also marks the occurrence of im portant events: the Great Depression,
the disappearance of European immigration, and the first military revolution.
The structural effects of the first two were only felt after 1935, and the third
event is political in nature and its consequences cannot be measured. The
period which precedes the one under consideration extends from 1914 to
1930 (or 1935-37). The 1914 date is arbitrary: one could just as easily have
chosen 1912 (the effective establishment of universal suffrage) or 1916 (the
first presidential elections after the Saenz Pena law was enacted). The year
1914 is an intermediate date which coincides with the existence of good
census information. 2 As far as the mobilization process is concerned, there
are greater difficulties with regard to time settings as well as the related
figures. The period o f greatest political mobilization is undoubtedly 1890-93
(political crises, revolutionary attem pts o f 1890 and 1893, and the establish
ment o f the Union Civica Radical) to 1914. From a political point of view,
1880 can w ithout question mark the beginning of the immediately preceding
period, since by this time the gravest problems involved in the creation and
national organization o f the state had been resolved. There is greater un
certainty concerning the structural changes: although economic expansion,
strictly speaking, did not begin before 1880, and structural changes (especially
agricultural and industrial development) accelerated after 1890, one of the
most im portant variables—foreign immigration—first soared in the decade of
1870-80, and in general there is a noticeable continuation o f this trend
between the phase of greatest acceleration, which began after 1880, and the
preceding decade. As illustrated in Table 7.1, for three phenomena (immigra
tion, railway systems, and cereal exports) there are jum ps caused by varying
political and economic trends. These factors make it much more difficult to
identify the periods o f acceleration o f the general trends. Furtherm ore, there
are the usual time lags for such phenomena. (Immigration and investments
require a certain period of time before they yield increases in cultivated areas,
exports, extension o f railways, etc.) Political phenomena, though they may
be tied to structural changes, have a dynamic system and a chronological
development o f their own. The year 1880—selected by many economists—can
be regarded as the beginning o f the period preceding the acute phase, but this
date presents a problem with regard to the availability of figures related to
POPULISM AND CHANGE 211
the social structure (active population, social classes), which, considering the
continuity between periods, leads one to choose 1869 as the date for the
beginning of the process and 1895 as the date for the acute phase, for which
population censuses are available. This choice tends to accentuate the dif
ference between the acute phase and the preceding one: yearly averages are
diminished, since when analyzed over a longer period of time, the effects of
the major increases which took place during later years of the period are
decreased. And the choice of these dates increases the annual averages for the
acute phase by shortening its duration. There is a tendency, then, to over
estimate the differences between the two phases. It will be demonstrated,
however, that such a distortion does not alter but rather lends increased
support to the hypothetical conclusions—which must still be verified by more
accurate research.
TABLE 7.1
SOME INDEXES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

YEARLY AVERAGES FOR 1870-1914
(in thousands)
Periods Overseas Immigration Railroad System Cereal Exports

Annual Average Total Existing Km. (Tons)
1857-1870 11
1870-1879 28 2.7 -
1880-1884 41 3.3 -
1885-1889 128 6.5 389

1890-1894 21 12.7 1038
1895-1899 54 15.0 1711
1900-1904 48 17.7 3011
1905-1909 154 22.2 4825
1910-1914 185* 31.1 5294
Sources: M. Zymelman and G. DiTella, Table 2.2; and General Board of Migrations.
* Average 1910-13.
Keeping in mind these limitations and the relatively arbitrary nature of the
dates, the time settings are established as shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. Each
table supplements the other: the first gives the absolute figures of yearly
average increases (positive or negative) for six changes affecting particular
sectors o f the population; the second gives the rates, that is, yearly averages
in comparison to either the total population, urban population, or active
sectors o f the population under consideration in each case. The rates allow
for a comparison o f the^cbanges which take place during different periods,
pven if th e base population has increased significantly. The use of rates, how-
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1 9 1 4 , 1 9 3 5 , an d 1 9 4 7 ; for o verseas im m ig r a tio n , G . G e r m a n i, E s t r u c t u r a So c ia l, p. 8 2 ; for in tern a i m ig r a tio n s and u r b a n iz a tio n , id e m ,
El p r o c e s o d e u r b a n i z a c i ô n ; for th e s o c io p r o fe s s io n a l stra ta , id e m , La m o b i l i d a d so ci al.
T h e r e are n o d a ta a v a ila b le for e s tim a te s .
ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE AND DECREASE FOR INDICATORS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES, 1869-1947
(percentage of the average yearly increase or decrease of the average population
of each period are specified for each indicator)
POPULISM AND SOCIALISM
Sources: see table 14.

213
ever, often conceals the meaning of population shifts (geographic, profes

sional, or class displacements), which, considering the numbers involved and
their concentration in certain areas, activities, or strata, have effects inde
pendent o f the proportion they represent (in percentage o f the population
taken as a base) and which are instead more directly tied to absolute volume.
It is necessary to emphasize that the figures presented are estimates which
offer an idea o f the scaled sizes o f the phenomena, and not their precise
measurement, which with the inform ation available would be very difficult
to obtain.3 The three tables (7.1-3), with the limitations indicated, facilitate
comparisons involving: (1) differences between the acute phase and the pre
ceding one in each of the two cycles; (2) accelerations or rates o f change in the
two acute phases; (3) length o f the phases in the two cycles; (4) taking into
account nonquantitative considerations as well, it is possible to compare
scaled sizes of the structural changes.
1. Despite the underestimation that distorts the averages of the period
1869-95 (recall that it increases the distance between the acute phase
and the one which precedes it), the period from 1935-37 to 1947
shows certain leaps which are much more pronounced than those
occurring during the first mobilization. In fact, in the second mobil
ization almost all the rates are radically modified, and this is also con
firmed by the absolute figures.
The rate o f internal migration increases about four and one-half
times, the international immigration rate goes down almost to zero,
industrial employment increases approximately nine and one-half
times, and the increase in agricultural workers completely inverts and
becomes negative. Moderate changes occur in the rates of increase in
urbanization and the middle socioprofessional strata. However, both
cases involve phenomena already quite advanced at the beginning of
the acute phase and whose increase has some absolute limits (for
example, as the population that is already in the category under con
sideration increases, it becomes more difficult to maintain the rhythm
o f increase since it is approaching the maximum possible). Nonethe
less, the rate o f urbanization increases by more than 40 percent with
regard to the preceding period. There is, then, a marked discontinuity
between the acute phase and the preceding one. In contrast, the acute
phase o f the first cycle (1895-1914) shows an accentuation o f the
structural changes, which continue, however, in the same trend and
with a rhythm not very different from that o f the preceding phase,
which is why the preceding phase can be described as a preconditioning.
The principal factor in the political mobilization o f the masses—the
middle class—shows the highest rates of increase precisely during this
phase (4.8 percent annually), an increase that then continues at a very
high rhythm (4.0 percent), though inferior to the 4.8 percent maxi
mum. In terms of relative increases, foreign immigration rises only
slightly (from a rate o f increase o f 1.7 percent to one of 1.8 percent

annually o f the average total population), but in absolute terms it
increases from 49,000 per year in the preconditioning phase to 106,000
in the acute phase, and a further intensification takes place in the
period 1901-13, reaching a figure o f 131,000 per year. It is also
im portant to note the great increase in internal native migration.
Though small in comparison to the rates in the second cycle, this
internal migration o f popular classes may be interpreted as the creole
base o f Radicalism. The increase in absolute figures of overseas im
migration, the percentage increase in internal migration, and the con
siderable difference in urbanization justify the division between the
acute phase and the preceding one.
The annual rate o f increase o f urban population rises from 4.7
percent (25,000 people per year) in the preconditioning phase to
10.5 percent (97,000 people per year) in the acute phase. The number
o f workers in the industrial sector (which includes only the nonartisan
sector and the less artisan one with still a low concentration) increases
at a high rate (4.5 percent per year) during the acute phase; however,
the absolute increase is only 13,000 per year. Although there are no
census figures with which to compare the two periods, all existing
data indicate that the rate o f increase in the preceding phase was very
similar, if not greater. The 1895 census registers 167,000 workers in
this sector, and it is known that the majority of nonartisan or less
artisan industries had emerged only during the last ten years.4 In
absolute figures, the rate o f increase could be set somewhere between
12,000 and 17,000 workers per year. As in the case of the middle
classes, here too it is impossible to speak o f a break: a new social
sector is developing at a high rate, but the process involved is a pro
longed one which began around the 1880s and intensified after
1895-1900. The stasis which precedes the acute phase of the second
mobilization process contrasts with this continuity. In the period
from 1914 to 1935-37 all the rates o f increase are modest, and they
follow the trends o f the preceding periods with a much less accel
erated rhythm . The only exception is the increase in the number of
workers in the industrial sector, which decreases to a minimum. How
ever, there were internal changes in the industrial sector less visible
than those involving numbers o f workers—for example, a greater
technical-economic concentration and a higher level of technology.
The m aintenance o f the rate o f increase o f workers in the agricultural
sector is also w orth noting (in absolute terms as much as 43,000
people per year: more than twice the figure for the period 1895-1914),
along with the related decline in the urbanization rate (to 3.7 percent
annually, a little more than one-third o f the figure for the preceding
period), which m eant that the cities continued to absorb the same
number of people in absolute figures (97,000-100,000 per year) but in

proportion to a much larger base. The traum atic effects of the Great
Depression on Argentine society are clearly revealed in the strong
break which takes place between the equilibrium phase (stasis or slow
down) and the phase o f highly accelerated changes, the acute phase,
of the second mobilization process. In this case it is impossible to
speak of even a relative continuity or preconditioning, because the ac
celerations and reversals take place abruptly over the course of a few
years. A comparison in terms o f absolute figures gives an idea of the
scale of these changes: internal migrations increase from 33,000 to
200.000 people per year, urbanization increases from 100,000 to
230.000 people, workers in the agricultural sector, which had been
increasing by 43,000 per year, decrease by the even greater figure of
46,000, and industry—which is by now largely a factory in d u stry -
increases from 3,000 to 51,000 workers per year.
This examination leads us to our first conclusion: The degree o f
discontinuity between the acute phase and the preceding one was
noticeably higher in the second mobilization than in the first. The
second mobilization cycle involves a real break with the preceding
period, and it contains reversing tendencies; the first mobilization
cycle is characterized by continuity, and represents an acceleration
of phenomena which were taking place at a fairly similar rhythm
in the preceding period except for immigration (in absolute figures)
and urbanization (in relative and absolute figures). The distortion
which decreases the rates of the preceding phase in the first cycle of
mobilization does not alter this conclusion, since w ithout it, the rates
of increase and the absolute figures would be even more similar in the
two phases involved.
2. Insofar as it is possible, a comparison between the rates o f the
phenomena which took place during the two acute phases leads to
conclusions similar to those reached in the preceding analysis. The
second mobilization is characterized by either a much more accel
erated rhythm (almost three times higher for internal migrations, and
an almost 50 percent higher rate o f increase of workers in the industrial
field) or by a reversed trend (a negative process, as in the case of
foreign immigration and the number o f workers in the agricultural
sector). The rate o f urbanization decreases markedly (one-third of
what it was during the first mobilization) and the rate of increase of
the middle strata diminishes slightly. Thus one arrives at a conclusion
similar to the preceding one: The rate o f change during the acute
phase was generally higher during the second mobilization cycle.
3. Duration is defined as the period between the beginning o f the process
and the time o f integration (or the time o f demobilization of the
mobilized sectors). In this case it is dependent upon the dates
adopted, and thus on the validity o f these choices. In the first mobili
zation cycle integration was affected by the new law o f universal suf
frage and the first elections; in the second mobilization cycle it took
place with the advent o f the first Peronist regime. The acute phase of
the first cycle took place over a period which was somewhat longer
than it was in the second one: between 17 and 26 years, if the begin
ning date is set between 1890 and 1895 and the end between 1912
and 1916; while the duration o f the acute phase in the second cycle
can be estim ated to be eleven years at the most (1935-46), but
probably considerably less. The first mobilization was preceded by a
long period o f preconditioning which ran approximately from a mini
mum o f 10 years (1880-90) to a maximum of 25 (1870-95), while in
the second m obilization this phase does not exist. The period between
1914 and 1935-37 is only a continuation of the preceding changes at
a much slower rhythm , a “ norm al” process, based on the current ex
pectations, and not a phase o f structural displacements. This con
clusion coincides with the one offered by economists: even if change
was occurring, it involved a stasis phase or a long delay.5
4. Figures alone cannot offer much with regard to the scale of changes
because they are part o f a gestalt. During 1870-1914 there is a transi
tion from a predom inantly traditional society to a relatively modern
one (in the central areas). The second cycle represents a transition
from one type o f economic development to another (commercial
export agriculture to industry), and a further extension of modern
ization to the excluded areas and sectors. In this light it would be
possible to say that the scale o f changes was greater during the first
cycle. This conclusion can also be confirmed by considering changes
in the cultural sphere: the great European immigration created an
Argentina which was different from the preexisting creole society.
A similar process took place in the second mobilization thanks to the
renewed encounter and the new fusion between the remains o f the old
society and immigrant Argentina. But the distance between the two
sectors was less and their integration (cultural, not political) into a
single national culture took place with greater facility and speed. To
summarize, the scale o f structural changes (in the society and culture)
was greater in the first mobilization cycle, but these changes were
compressed into a shorter period of time in the second cycle. The
second cycle was characterized by a strong discontinuity with the
preceding phase and a greater speed in the rate of change.
According to the political aspects o f mobilization theory, the greater the
scale, discontinuity, and speed o f change, and the shorter the duration of the
process, the more conflictive it will be and the more difficult the integration
and achievement o f a relatively stable and lasting equilibrium. Political
integration occurs when there are adequate organizational mechanisms for

channeling mobilized sectors. We define adequate in terms o f (1) the ability to
represent and express the sectors involved, and (2) acceptance (or legitima
tion) by society (ultimately, by the most powerful groups). The probability
that these mechanisms already exist will be less, the greater the discontinuity
and the rate o f change. The facility with which they can be created after the
emergence and acceleration o f mobilization (in terms of readiness for politi
cal action) will decrease as the velocity o f the process increases and resistance
on the part o f power groups and other politically significant social sectors is
more intense. This resistance also depends on the degree of discontinuity and
on the scale of change. All these elements also affect the deviation of the en
tire process, which may include phases o f imposed integration and demobili
zation. This occurs when mobilized sectors oppose the will o f the other
groups and sectors, violently or otherwise, and when it is impossible for a
consensus to be reached, either by implementing further changes in the social
and political structure or by setting up an adequate government. In this case
integration is transitory, and the cycle initiated by structural changes and
political mobilization is not really completed. A lengthy duration tends to
lessen resistance, especially through generational replacement, whereby the
shock of the changes is more easily absorbed by the new generations.
Application of this scheme emphasizes the role played by structural
change and political mobilization in the two cases under consideration. In
both cases there were no preexisting channels (for expression or representa
tion); they were created after the beginning o f the process and during its
development. However, the degree o f discontinuity and the acceleration of
structural change (and the availability for political action) were considerably
higher during the second mobilization. Furtherm ore, the second mobiliza
tion was o f much shorter duration, and although success was achieved
through legitimate procedures (as in the first), there was no time for adapta
tion, nor did the new regime follow a policy capable o f obtaining the con
sensus or acceptance o f the elite and opposing sectors. Resistance to the
national populist movement began almost im m ediately, and the totalitarian
aspects which it exhibited from the start only increased opposition, while,
on the other hand, there were no structural changes that modified the power
base o f opposing elites or that were able to obtain the consensus or neu
tralization o f vast sectors (particularly the middle classes). In the first case,
instead, there was no mass opposition to Radicalism and the peaceful
acceptance o f three successive presidential elections showed that a large part
of the oligarchic elite accepted by now the participation of the middle classes
and the lower sectors which accompanied them. Although an im portant com
ponent in the interruption of constitutional continuity in 1930 can be found
in the fact that political exclusion o f the most powerful economic sector was
by now definitive, there were other determining and precipitating factors,
w ithout which there may not have been a rupture. In this sense the cycle be-
gun with the structural changes that occurred after 1880 and intensified in
the 1890s can be considered closed around 1912-16, with the political inte
gration of the middle class and the lower sectors of the central areas which
took place through the legitimization o f the Union Cfvica Radical, their
channel o f expression and political representation. In this light, the first
Peronist regime (1946-55) constitutes only one phase of the political inte
gration o f the new sectors. The dem obilization, the conflicts, and the politi
cal instability which followed are all part o f the same cycle.
A comparative analysis o f other aspects leads to the same conclusions.
First, availability for political action was slowed down considerably during
the first process, because it took place as the sons of immigrants began
appearing on the scene. In contrast, in the second process the internal
migrants could become ready for political action almost immediately after
displacement. The foreigners themselves were either absorbed through non
political channels (m obility, etc.), or they expressed themselves through
social protest and syndicalist organizations. Thus the slower rhythm of
structural change was slowed down even further by this freezing process of
the new masses that began to enter the national society. Second, resistance
was less in the first cycle, for three reasons. (1) The objective of the mobili
zed sectors not only failed to threaten either the social order or the economic
position o f the elite, but it was consistent with the ideology proclaimed by
the elite itself and accepted the adopted model o f development. (2) The long
duration o f the process allowed for the creation of new generations and facili
tated the adaptation o f power groups to the request for political participation.
(3) There was no mass opposition. The mobilization of the 1935-37 to 1946
period differs on these three points: despite the fact that it was an exag
gerated perception, the aim o f the mobilized sectors was viewed as a real
threat by the landowning elite and a few sectors o f the middle classes. Fur
thermore, the immediate success of the mobilized sectors allowed no time for
more flexible attitudes to be established on the part o f the elite and opposing
sectors. Finally, a mass opposition to the new regime existed; almost half of
the native Argentines were opposed.
In both cases nonpolitical mechanisms for the absorption of mobilized
sectors functioned, and it is impossible to evaluate if—and to what extent—
they differed in the two cycles. Nonpolitical channels (such as social mobility)
require even longer periods o f time, and often the replacement of more than
one generation. Although the internal migrants did not possess a revolutionary
potential (this characteristic was probably higher among the foreign pro
letariat o f the first mobilization), their social and cultural absorption certainly
required more than the extremely brief period during which the institution
alization o f the new regime took place. This success was therefore premature,
not only in relation to the acceptance o f political participation, but also in
terms of reciprocal social and cultural acceptance of opposing masses, and
this accentuated—for a while—the cleavage between them, which diminished
gradually with time, but especially after the fall of the first regime.
The above illustrates the role o f structural change in the two processes.
The structurally derived traum atic effect was much stronger in the formation
of national populism in the 1940s than in the case o f liberal populism fifty
years earlier. But the structural changes are not the only influencing factors.
Some cultural components have been singled out, especially political tra
ditions. These too are transformed by the actions and political practice of
succeeding generations. But the existence o f historical continuity derives
from the fact that the two big political movements through which national
integration was achieved have in common their populist nature and are linked
with very old expressions of the political tradition. To these cultural com
ponents other internal and external contextual factors must be added, and
finally one must not forget accidental circumstances. All this becomes fused
into a global configuration which is only partly determined by the flux of
preceding structural changes. Within this configuration the actions of real
men unfold, actions that ultimately determine the future course of events
by helping to shape the global context within which future generations will
have to act.
ROLE OF NATIONAL POPULISM IN NATIONAL INTEGRATION
In the preceding analysis we have determined the principal components

which can explain the emergence and establishment o f national populism and
which conditioned its nature and development. In this section we shall
analyze aspects o f national development that seemed especially significant
with regard to the main theme, and in particular the period following the
achievement of national organization.
Seen over a long period of time, Peronism represents the second o f the two
major participation crises which Argentina has gone through in the course of
its development as a nation-state. Both these crises were caused by the
demand for political integration into the life o f the country on the part of
vast social sectors which until then had either been almost marginal or com
pletely excluded. In both cases the process was conflictive and characterized
by interruptions and retrogressions.
In Argentina more than in other Latin American countries the successive
integration o f new strata and social sectors follows a course not very different
from that o f the Western nations established under the model of capitalist
development and liberal democracy. The process was always characterized by
conflict, and in the long run (taking into account developments since the be
ginning o f modern times), the more delayed the process, the more profound
it turned out to be—not only with regard to duration or revolutionary
trauma, but also with regard to changes in the social order (the difference, for
example, between the English revolution and the Chinese).6 Even starting
with the time when liberal democracy with restricted participation was
effectively constituted or relatively stabilized, the progressive integration of

new sectors—their cultural assimilation, the extension o f civil, political, and
social rights, and their participation in modern culture and national life—was
interrupted at various points by periods o f demobilization, often achieved by
means of violent repression. Perhaps the only exceptions to this are the
Anglo-Saxon democracies and the Scandinavian countries. Even the differen
tiation between central and peripheral regions (in terms of development and
modernization or o f delays in the extension o f political participation) is in
accordance with the model, particularly in the most peripheral countries
and those that have experienced a delayed modernization, such as Italy.7 This
scheme o f development is only a general outline, a thread that can be gleaned
beneath the many and im portant modifications which make Argentina (like
any other individual case) a peculiar case. The general scheme certainly has
comparative value, but it cannot be expected to explain the specific develop
ment of a particular country. This involves taking into account the elements
peculiar to each case. For Argentina these are to be found in: the type of
national development, including economic development and above all the
essential role o f foreign immigration and o f the export economy, with its
repercussions on the social structure and national culture; preexisting tradi
tions and political culture and their subsequent transformations, hence the
forms o f spontaneous participation; the model o f political intervention by
the military (which had remained latent for a long time, but whose reacti
vation was also a determining factor); and finally, the historical era and
changing international context in the political and ideological spheres.
If integration is considered as a global process—including not only politi
cal aspects but cultural and social ones as well—the significance of the first
mobilization was the achievement o f such integration in the central areas.
From the cultural and social point o f view it took place for all inhabitants—
Argentines o f many generations, native Argentines o f recent foreign origin,
and foreigners by birth. All participated effectively in the life of the country,
and their participation was accepted and considered legitimate (despite the
fact that political integration was limited to native Argentines). Foreigners
were absorbed and they refrained from exerting any pressures; their request
was fulfilled with social and cultural integration. Integration itself led to some
changes: in the cultural sphere, to the formation of immigratory Argentina;
in the social sphere, to a new structure o f stratification; in the political
sphere, to the widening o f electoral participation and the formal exercise of
power on the part o f a new class.
This integration still remained incomplete because, among other reasons,
it left out a considerable proportion o f the inhabitants, at least one-third of
the country’s population. In the political, social, and cultural context, this
vast marginal sector was then quantitatively increased (in political and
partially social terms) by the demobilization o f the 1930s and the traumatic
break created by the structural changes which followed the Great Depression
and the first military revolution. The second mobilization cycle, insofar as it
involved above all this part o f the population, constituted a subsequent step
toward national integration in the ways mentioned. From the social and cul
tural point o f view the cycle can be considered completed. With the usual
slowness of these phenomena, but rapidly in comparison to other countries,
the cultural cleavage created by overseas immigration disappeared through the
fusion o f the two Argentinas—creole and im m igratory—following a process
very similar to the one which took place between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. It is even possible to speak o f social integration: the lower strata
found their own recognized and legitimate place, in the manner customary
for an advanced class society. Not only the civilian governments, but the
military ones as well which followed the collapse of the first Peronist regime
had to grant legal and effective recognition to the rights and participation of
the lower strata in the social order.8 In political terms the cycle was longer
and more conflictive: only after about thirty years can it be considered
closed, with the return o f the justicialista coalition to the government. It was
made possible thanks to the withdrawal o f the military government, the
acceptance of strongly opposed sectors and parties, and the collaboration and
active support of other political and social forces. Neither political problems
nor instability are over for Argentina: history will follow its course, the
future appears to be more conflictive than the past. The conflict between
Peronism and anti-Peronism, however, is a fact o f the past.9
NOTES
1. Agricultural Census o f 1937, Industrial Census of 1935, Census o f the City of

Buenos Aires, 1936.
2. First and second national census, respectively. They contain the censuses of pro
fessions, and the second also contains the special censuses for agriculture and industry.
3. The estimates could be checked by using fragmentary inform ation—provincial cen
suses and other statistics—available for the intercensus periods 1869-95 and 1914-47; in
the case of the second, the three censuses mentioned in note 1 were used above all
others, as well as information utilized and mentioned in sections 4 and 5 and in G.
Germani, “ El surgimiento del peronismo,” note 1.
4. Adolfo Dorfman, Historia de la industria argentina, ch. 7; and Roberto Cortes
Conde, “Problems del crecimiento industrial, 1870-1914’’, in T. S. Di Telia, Graciarena,
and Germani, Argentina sociedad de Masas.
5. The word is used by G. Di Telia and Zymelman to indicate the period 1914-33.
6. See the revolutionary break with the traditional order in the famous theory of
Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy.
7. A synthesis of the differences and similarities between the countries with early
modernization and Latin America, in Germani, “Classes Populaires et Démocratie.”
8. There was a redistribution unfavorable to salaried workers after the collapse of the
regime, but social legislation and actual salaries continued to rise in almost all categories.
9. In the March 1973 elections and in the following ones in September of that year
the Peronist coalition had the support of various minor left-wing and middle parties. This
support was even greater in September. In the more urban areas (in the March elections),
according to electoral findings, Peronism received at least 20 percent o f votes from the
middle class. In contrast, the working class voted about 35 percent in favor of other
parties (from a study in “ El surgimiento del peronismo” ). Even more important: (1) an
entente between Radicalism and Peronism was established and the apparent intention
of the second Peronism was to achieve a vast coalition (electorally speaking, the
Peronists and Radicals represented about 70 percent o f the voters); (2) the integration of
Peronism—if not the return o f Peron himself—was called for and organized not only by
the moderate Peronist forces—such as the Radicals—but above all by the military and the
strongest sectors o f the industrial and agrarian bourgeoisie. Contrary to some interpreta
tions which are still circulating (only outside of Argentina), although in 1946 there really
was a limit to the number o f possible class alliances which forced the landed oligarchy
into an anti-Peronist position, this limit no longer existed and there was a new situation.
The problems which the country had to face in 1973 were completely different, and
among the most immediate were Peron’s succession, the internal conflicts o f jus ticialismo,
the economic debacle, and extended guerrilla warfare. These problems though o f a
different order are also rooted in the political, social, and cultural processes we have
examined. But their analysis would also require a detailed study of changes occurred in
Argentine society since 1955. These changes, along with a different international con
text, made impossible the success o f another populist solution, and therefore caused the
failure of the second Peronist regime. Such failure was probably part of the design of
some im portant sector o f the ruling elite—military and civilian—but certainly not to the
extent to which it took place. The use o f political assassination, violence, and terror,
which for more than a century had disappeared from the political culture o f the country,
is the most serious and unpredicted result o f the events of the last decade. The causes
are likely to be found not only in the peculiar Argentine conditions o f the late sixties
and seventies, but also in the general crisis o f modern industrial society everywhere, a
subject well beyond the scope o f the present chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT
MIDDLE CLASSES, WORKING CLASSES, AND SOCIAL

MOBILIZATION IN THE RISE OF ITALIAN FASCISM:
A COMPARISON WITH THE ARGENTINE CASE
THE CRISIS O F THE MIDDLE CLASSES: THE TRAUMATIC EVENT

AND RISE O F ITALIAN FASCISM
The emergence o f fascism in Italy was characterized by two processes of

mobilization: (1) prim ary m obilization o f large sectors of the lower classes;
and (2) secondary m obilization o f large sectors o f the middle classes. Both
processes had been originated by the consequences o f the war. However, the
nature o f the im pact was very different for each o f them.
A first cycle o f primary m obilization had occurred in Italy since the last
decade o f the nineteenth century assuming the same pattern as in other
Western countries. Great protest m ovem ents—such as the Socialist party and
the CGL (Confederazione Generale del Lavoro)—provided political expression
to the mobilized sectors. Though there were serious conflicts, the mobiliza
tion found legitimized or tolerated channels, especially after the turn of the
century, thanks to G iolitti’s deliberate policy o f pursuing the integration into
the national society o f the m odern or modernizing proletariat o f Northern
Italy and o f the Catholics, who had refused to accept the solution given by
the new Italian state to the question o f Rome and the papacy. But the war
was responsible for the second cycle o f primary mobilization. This cycle was
much more acute and the displacement it involved took place very rapidly
and affected even those larger sectors (farmers in particular) which had been
225
left out o f the first cycle.

While in the first cycle one o f the main causal factors had been the mod
ernization o f im portant sectors o f the economic and social structure, during
the second cycle military mobilization and the terrible experience of the war
caused a deep trauma both domestically and on the front. The war was the
immediate cause o f displacement o f the lower classes, whose effects caused
the acceleration of primary mobilization and especially its extension to new
strata of the population, making their political expression more extreme. In
ternal political and syndicalist conflicts and the Caporetto defeat on the
front—despite differing interpretations o f this event—represent a clear symp
tom o f the traumatic effects o f displacement and its role in the acceleration
of primary mobilization of the popular classes. The pressure exerted by these
classes, together with other economic and social effects of the war, seriously
affected the middle strata, intensifying the crisis they experienced as a con
sequence of the capitalist development o f the two preceding decades. Many
expressions o f primary mobilization in its second cycle did not differ from
those o f the first. Their acceleration and expansion, however, changed the
nature and meaning o f the second cycle. Unionization (in the CGL) jumped
from approximately 200,000-300,000 members in 1911-17, to 1,150,000 in
1919 and 2,200,000 in 1920. Another large mass (1,500,000) was concen
trated in the Catholic federation.1 Electoral participation also expanded
rapidly. Italy had passed from a regime o f limited to one of enlarged parti
cipation in 1913. It climbed from approxim ately 1,800,000 voters in 1908
to over 5,000,000 in 1913. In the 1919 election (the first after the war), the
Socialists emerged as the largest party, followed by the Popular (Catholic)
party. Simultaneously with the primary m obilization o f the lower classes,
particularly in the North, another social and political com ponent of crucial
importance in Italian history became an open, explicit, and mass-based
political actor: the Catholics, who had hitherto been officially self-excluded
from the political arena and therefore had not participated electorally,
abandoned their abstentionist stand under the agreement with Giolitti (the
so-called Patto Gentiloni) and played an essential role as a moderate counter
part balancing the integration o f the newly mobilized leftist proletariat. In
this way the Italian political system experienced a major change: on the one
hand, it passed from the stage o f limited democracy to one of enlarged
democracy, quite similar to the transition we have described elsewhere,
which took place in Argentina with the Saenz Pena Law o f 1912. In both
countries, however, the enlargement of participation still excluded a con
siderable part o f the national population: the peasant South in Italy and the
less developed provinces and territories in Argentina. This usual center-
periphery dichotomy would later become an im portant factor in the politi
cal and national development o f the two countries, although with signifi
cant differences. On the other hand, the extension of participation caused
the transition from a party system based on parties of notables to one of mass
ITALY AND ARGENTINA 227
parties. The latter were the Catholics and Socialists, who appeared in their
real strength in 1919, in the second elections based on universal suffrage, that
is, only after (and in relation to) the traum atic event of World War I and its
mass mobilization which politically activated large sectors of the hitherto
marginal population. The Socialists became the largest political force in the
country, followed by the Catholics. None o f the preexisting parties were
ready to become mass parties, to change their organization, type of leadership,
and form o f propaganda and penetration in the electorate. Thus the urban
and rural middle classes, particularly the lower and weaker strata which repre
sented their more likely social basis, were really left without direct or suf
ficient political expression.
The two mass parties lacked revolutionary potential. This was obviously
true of the Catholics, whose left wing was only moderately reformist. But it
was also true o f the Socialists, despite the ideology they openly proclaimed,
the overt behavior, particularly in the streets, in mass manifestations, and in
strikes, and the purely verbal extremism o f a considerable part of the leader
ship and most o f the rank and file. Neither the Socialist leadership, most of
the intermediate level o f the party structure, nor the type of organization it
self could be considered revolutionary by any stretch of the imagination. The
Socialist political elite at the highest and intermediate level was not marginal.
On the contrary, it was a legitimate or quasi-legitimate group—if not in the
eyes of certain groups o f the ruling elite and o f the lower middle classes, cer
tainly in their perception of themselves in the way they intended to orient
and conduct their political action.
The Socialist leadership o f all tendencies, whatever the ideology it pro
claimed, was virtually absorbed into the system. Progressive extension of
rights, effective participation at the parliamentary level, and a deliberate
policy favoring integration o f the party into the system2 had reduced or
eliminated its revolutionary potential. This factor prevented seizure of power
by the organized working class. The displacement effect caused by the war in
terms of a very rapid and extensive mobilization could not be turned into a
revolutionary movement for lack o f an available elite.3 Instead, it was quickly
dissipated into what in many cases was purposeless social unrest. There were
also other mechanisms o f integration: mobilization, in terms of increased
aspirations, to new forms o f participation and consumption had been
partially absorbed by the extension of social rights4 and increased real
salaries.5 Contem porary observers, as well as many historians, consider that
the workers’ tensions had begun to decline by 1920. The peak of fascist
violence followed this decline, thus interrupting a process of integration not
dissimilar to the Western European experience and which in fact was resumed
successfully after World War II.
The acute phase o f primary mobilization of the lower strata and the col
lective movement which followed did not evolve as a revolutionary activity,
since the organizational structure through which it was channeled was not
revolutionary in nature. It dissipated itself in a series o f demonstrations

viewed as inoffensive with specific regard to the established social order, yet
which were also considered extremely dangerous by the ruling class and
especially the middle classes. This situation contributed to the start of the
latter’s secondary mobilization and the strengthening of their nationalist and
antiproletarian ideology.
Middle-class secondary mobilization took a very different course. It was
not absorbed by preexisting mechanisms o f integration and could therefore
exercise its full impact. In the first place, there were no channels for political
expression: no tradition linked uprooted sectors to any specific existing
parties or organizations (as in the case o f the working class). Second, a new
equilibrium could only be reached through dem obilization of the lower
strata, which would be a very im portant element in the satisfaction of the
middle classes. It is widely recognized that disequilibration had caused status
loss (in terms o f prestige, power, and wealth) among the urban middle class.6
Such loss had occurred in both relative and absolute terms: decreasing dis
tance from the advancing working class, in relative terms; and in absolute
terms, caused by unemployment, inflation, and decreasing income and politi
cal influence. Loss of status in relative terms was particularly important be
cause o f the predominantly elitist stratification system. The advance of the
working class was resented as an invasion or usurpation o f status. Third, a
displaced elite was available. Furtherm ore, the ideology finally adopted by
the movement was well suited for satisfying the aims o f the mobilized sec
tors: it satisfied their need for reequilibration through emphasis on order,
discipline, and hierarchy, and through the demobilization of the lower classes;
it displaced frustrations from an individual or class level to a national level in
terms of such things as territorial claims and dreams o f imperial power. All
these factors account for the formation and growth o f a mass movement with
a high revolutionary potential and an extreme authoritarian nature.
This mass movement did not find existing organizational mechanisms for
its political expression as the popular classes had succeeded in doing. The
movement therefore had to create its own political mechanisms, and those
that it created—from the squadre d ’azione to the movement and the party-
reflected (during the first years) its nature as a collective phenomenon much
more accurately than any preexisting structures, especially those already in
corporated into the political system, such as the working-class unions and the
Socialist party. The movement’s success and its transform ation into a totali
tarian state were made possible thanks to other elements, above all the main
interests o f the ruling class. The establishm ent’s direct responsibility in having
actively or passively supported fascism is no longer seriously denied by any
one. The subversive aspects o f the movement (in its populist elements) were
eliminated or neutralized by effective dom ination of these ruling elites which
had been used in the movement primarily as a means of demobilizing the
lower classes. This occurred later, with the expulsion from the Fascist party
of the “ plebeian” elements (to use Guerin’s effective expression), the bureau
cratization o f the party, and the construction of the totalitarian state once
the subversive elements o f fascism as a collective movement had served their
purposes creating the conditions for a takeover—an achievement which still
required the support o f the m onarchy, the church, the military, and a wide
spectrum o f the political class. In any case, the course of events would cer
tainly have been very different if the middle classes’ collective movement had
been channeled through a right-wing party already integrated into the political
structure whose activity would have been limited (perhaps very strictly) to
forms of negative reaction and thus would have contributed to a simple
restoration o f the m onopoly o f political power by a restricted bourgeoisie.
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN

FASCISM AND NATIONAL POPULISM
The Argentine case presents a num ber o f similarities and certain crucial
differences which explain the repeated failures to establish a classic fascist
regime, and the success o f Peronism.
There have been four attem pts to establish fascism in Argentina in the past
half century. The first occurred in 1930-32, when a military coup interrupted
some seventy years o f constitutional government under representative democ
racy. The second took place in 1943-45; the outcome was Peronism. The
third was in Septem ber-O ctober 1955, when the Peronist regime was over
thrown by a civilian-military coup. Finally, in the military takeover of 1966,
there was another attem pt to establish a corporate state which also failed.
These reputed failures to set up fascist regimes (or functional substitutes
for fascism) in Argentina point to the existence of im portant differences with
regard to Italy’s social structure, despite the fact that there are other elements
common to both countries. These differences become clearly visible in the
case of Peronism in particular. The basis for the situation in both Argentina
and Italy is the existence o f two mobilized and conflicting masses: the first
belonging to the popular class—in primary m obilization—and the second be
longing to the middle class—in secondary mobilization. Their respective
political orientations, however, are inverted in the two countries. Thus, early
Peronism (1945-55)—which emerged from the primary mobilization of the
lower classes—was viewed by many as a form of fascism (“left-wing fascism” ),
while the middle classes belonged to a coalition that proclaimed democratic
and liberal principles. In a previous chapter an attem pt was made to demon
strate that in reality the situation was quite different: the goal of Peronism
was not to demobilize the lower classes (the raison d’etre of fascism), and
whatever its lim itations with regard to structural reforms, it implied pre
cisely the opposite: the incorporation into the national political life of those
masses that until then had remained marginal or had been demobilized by the
preceding conservative restoration o f the 1930s. The middle classes, although
subjectively democratic and predominantly Left o f Center, found themselves

limited maigre soi in their choice of alliances to the very oligarchic sector that
had been its traditional opponent and which was strongly opposed to the ex
tension of political participation and clearly exhibited a conservative orienta
tion. Despite the fascist origins of a portion o f the national populist leader
ship and the initial ideological preferences o f its own leader, the urban and
rural working masses succeeded in instilling a popular character in the move
ment and to a large extent in the entire regime, while still maintaining a cer
tain degree o f autonomy. These masses acquired a working-class union tradi
tion that was able to resist the military regime after the fall of Peronism.
From the point of view o f the attitudes (democratic or nondemocratic) of
the two masses, although the popular classes included a certain authoritarian
element, it probably involved traditional forms o f authoritarianism, con
siderably weakened by the participatory tradition (or inorganic democracy)
of the caudillo-like political culture. With regard to the middle classes—and
the oligarchy—the authoritarian element (be it traditional or ideological,
according to the definition given earlier) must have been smaller. From this
point o f view, the components of the two situations appear singularly over
turned, at times they are actually inverted, while at others they are strangely
different.
STRUCTURAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS IN THE

DIFFERENCES IN THE POLITICAL PROCESSES
OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
Consider the most salient contrasts between the two countries: the social
structure and the stratification system, the position o f the middle-class and
lower-class masses, the nature o f the traum a at the beginning o f the acute
phase o f mobilization characteristics o f the structure and the political cul
ture—especially the party system organization, and, finally, the nature and
objectives o f the alliances or coalitions at the level o f the ruling classes
(bourgeoisie, oligarchy), the political and power elites, the masses (middle or
lower), and their leaders.
1. The most general element o f contrast can be found at the level of
society, in the diversity o f the stratification system: open or rela
tively so in Argentina, a frontier country characterized by massive
immigration, lack o f labor supply, and high urbanization, and a
country in which—in addition to the other reasons for class permeabil
ity -o n e can include the extraordinary expansion o f the middle urban
sectors, which grew extremely rapidly and lacked the elitist cultural
tradition and the deference pattern always associated with subordinate
classes. All this was partly the result o f the rapidity of social develop
ment and the experience o f various generations which had demon
strated th a t—especially in the big cities—even the most prestigious
goals, such as power and riches, were accessible to go-getters. These

effects o f the structural changes were reinforced by the old cultural
tradition o f a pastoral society (the pampas), a situation in which the
power o f the landowner is limited by the impossibility of effectively
controlling the lands and herds. This permitted anyone with the
courage to do so to forge a life for himself without depending on any
one. Italy, from this particular point of view, presented a completely
opposite picture. It is also essential to remember that the urban mid
dle classes were proportionally much larger in Argentina than in Italy.
Their position in the country’s social structure was not yet threatened:
the dependent sector (the white-collar group in general) proved to be
as willing as the working class to utilize the union organization for
salary and working conditions demands. They did not feel downgraded
or proletarianized by utilizing such collective mechanisms instead of
maintaining an individual relationship with the company. On the
other hand, small and middle industrialists and salesmen did not feel
threatened by the increasing economic concentration or by big capi
tal. Land and oligarchy m eant big capital, but it did not directly influ
ence the nonagricultural sectors, with which—until the collapse of the
exporting econom y—it had found a modus vivendi, although both
sectors still remained enemies in the political sphere. After the Great
Depression, the new industrial bourgeoisie was fearful of a return to
the agrarian model dom inant until 1930. Because of this, neither the
predominant egalitarian culture, the recently emerged middle classes
—tied to lower-class sectors by an intricate pattern of relationships,
friendships, and often by neighborhood alliances—nor the threats
from below (organized labor) or from above could favor the status
panic or the attitudes o f desperate defense of their economic posi
tion so characteristic o f the Italian middle classes and the European
ones in general. Argentina was not completely free of an element of
resentment in a num ber o f middle-class circles that did not look
favorably on the “invasion” of cabecitas negras in downtown and
resort areas, and generally in the consumer practices of the petite
bourgeoisie. But for them , class resentment could hide behind the
distinction between real and lumpen proletariat, so that the demo
cratic and vaguely left-wing tradition which generally predominated
in those circles could somehow be saved. Though this particular ele
ment was numerically limited, it could conceivably have played some
indirect role in the type of alliances that the leadership of the mid
dle-class parties accepted in their fight against Peronism.
An im portant difference can be found in the type of trauma at the
base of the displacement and mobilization in the two countries. In
Argentina there were the effects o f the extraordinary acceleration of
economic development and change from a society based on agricul-
ture to an agroindustrial one. The growth that took place in those

years did not create any losers (in absolute terms), since all sectors of
the population moved ahead, although with differences regarding the
sectors and categories involved. The new industrial bourgeoisie could
have felt threatened, but certainly not by the workers, with whom it
shared the defense of the sector, which led it to side with the descam-
isados, spearating itself from the preexisting and already integrated
industrial sector which had originally sided against national popu
lism. In Italy, instead, the insecurity o f the middle sectors in this
phase of development of the capitalist economy was compounded by
the effects of the war, which produced a great traum atic shock not
only economically (inflation, unem ploym ent) but psychologically as
well, with the abrupt shift from war to peace which affected the mid
dle and lower strata in contrasting ways.
3. There is a decisive difference in the nature of the culture and the
political structure, particularly in the party system. With regard to the
first, in Argentina the practice and value o f the representative system
had been important to the middle classes and the lower incorporated
sectors during the first cycle o f mobilization, which took place between
the end of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the present
one. Universal suffrage had been obtained after a long battle in which
an active part was played by a noticeably high proportion of the
middle and lower sectors, at least in the “ central” areas. It had also
acquired a symbolic meaning for the majority of the population. This
fact was tied on the one hand to the inherent characteristics of an
originally immigrant population characterized by upward social
mobility (making it therefore doubly uprooted), and on the other to a
political tradition of participation from below, which went back to
the revolution and the wars o f independence (in whose armies the
lower sectors contributed actively and in great numbers). This con
trasts with the Italian case in which the basis for the political sys
tem, during the unification process as well as after it, remained ex
tremely limited, and whose extension was not the result of pressure
generated by the excluded sectors. A comparison o f the effects of the
introduction of universal suffrage in both countries gives us a fairly
clear idea of the differences. In Argentina, after the first presidential
election through universal suffrage, the Conservatives, who had up to
then monopolized power, definitively lost all possibilities of a re
turn to government. In Italy, with the introduction o f the Catholics
and the widespread electoral frauds, an equilibrium was maintained
that was only perturbed when the effects were felt of the big trauma
of the war and of the primary mobilization of the popular classes.
The same contrast, in fact almost a complete inversion, can be seen
in the party structure with regard to the existence o f organized means
of political participation capable of channeling the two mobilized social

sectors. While in Italy a lack of preexisting channels of expression was
a factor in the secondary mobilization of the middle groups, in
Argentina it was the popular masses, displaced and made available by
structural changes, that shared this same fate. In Italy the availability
of the collective movement of the popular class was linked to organi
zations already integrated in the political order and directed by an
elite which was also integrated therein, while the secondary mobili
zation o f the middle classes had to create its own means of expression,
utilizing even marginal elites, which resulted in the birth of a new
organizational instrum ent very different from both the mass parties
and the old parties o f those formerly in power. In Argentina the
collective movement o f the lower classes gave rise to a new party,
marginal to the existing system, while the mobilization of the mid
dle classes was channeled through parties which had always been con
sidered an inherent form o f their expression (especially the Radical
party, but the Socialist as well).
For the lower classes in Argentina, the lack of mass parties with
proletarian traditions capable of incorporating the newly formed
group o f workers meant that the only movement possible—in an
extremely limited span o f tim e—had to involve some form of popu
lism. Given the less modern origins o f the newcomers and the type
of elite available (whose ideology was in part originally fascist), it was
inevitable that it contain authoritarian elements incongruent with
forms o f representative democracy. The tradition of unionization
and all that survived from the old political culture of participation
prevented the emergence of any type of rigidly hierarchical structure.
As far as the middle classes are concerned, the fact that their
mobilization had to be expressed through parties which were totally
integrated into the preexisting social order not only reduced its
intensity, but went so far as to alter the real political orientation, as a
result o f the type o f alliances made by the leadership of the demo
cratic parties—including the Communists—who in the struggle against
Peronism (identified with nazi-fascism) joined the side of their long
time enemy: the landowning oligarchy. The predominantly European
perspective o f the middle classes and all their leaders also affected this
situation, along with the international setting in which popular fronts
and united action against fascism were seen as the only possible
answer. The ambiguous and contradictory position of numerous mid
dle-class groups which although on the one hand opposed the fascist
elements o f the Peronist regime (especially in the Field of education
and culture) and its authoritarian aspects (the leader’s charisma in
particular), on the other hand they could not disavow the social
policy nor oppose the increased participation of the lower classes in
the nation’s life. Another reason for these ambivalent attitudes was
the presence o f some antiproletarian resentment in particular middle-
class settings. Thus was created what might be called the great “his
torical misunderstanding” of the generations that were politically
active in 1945, a misunderstanding whose unfortunate consequences
affected the next two decades after the fall o f the first Peronist regime.
4. The class alliances which characterized both Peronism and fascism are
substantially different. They are the result o f the two countries’
different patterns o f economic development and the stage attained at
the time of mobilization. In Italy, primary mobilization of the lower
classes—both rural and urban (as expressed by the syndicates of the
Socialist party)—was repressed by a coalition composed of practically
all the dominant sectors with the support o f the majority of the
middle classes, which constituted the masses. In Argentina, the domi
nant classes were divided in two sectors: on the one hand, the army
(or an important fraction of it) and the new industrial entrepreneurs;
on the other, the former landowning oligarchy. The first sector
claimed its natural allies from among the ranks o f the working classes,
especially the urban ones, and it was in both parties’ interest to avoid a
return to an agrarian-controlled economy and maintain the state’s
support, to insure job opportunity and an expansion o f the market
for the industrial bourgeoisie, to secure material, psychological, and
political advantages for the working classes, and as far as the military
was concerned, to insure that the new civilian government would not
make reprisals against them, since the Peronist coalition included mili
tary members (like Peron himself) and was not opposed to them, as
was instead the democratic coalition. The second sector o f the domi
nant classes, largely composed o f the oligarchy, found its allies among
intellectuals, the navy, students, the lineup o f existing parties, and
hence, the middle-class masses. This coalition was even more hetero
geneous. From a structural point o f view, there were no common
interests, since most middle-class groups—practically all urban—sup
ported industrialization, which was opposed to the interests of the
landowning oligarchy. It was at the ideological level that a mis
understanding was created: the middle classes opposed national popu
lism, mistaking it for a sort o f fascism. Had this “ historical misunder
standing” not occurred, they could have accepted and even supported
it—an ideological conversion which in fact took place for a large sector
o f the middle classes after the Peronist regime was overthrown in 1955.
In the Italian case, the common objective o f the dominant sectors
was the demobilization o f the popular classes and stabilization of the
social order (namely their own) which they felt was being threatened.
All these goals were reached at the price o f abandoning the formal
aspects o f representative democracy (which perhaps they wanted to
maintain) and sharing their power with people whom many considered
to be adventurers, or at least parvenus. In most cases, what the middle
classes obtained were psychological, ersatz satisfactions (prestige,
respect, “law and order” ), more than concrete gains. In both cases
there were “ errors,” and this may point to certain common elements
in the political choices o f the middle classes.
SIMILARITIES IN THE TWO CASES
This sketchy outline obviously distorts the much more complex reality,
but it underscores the differences between fascism and national populism,
both in structural and psychosocial terms. It also clarifies certain similarities
which appear to be more significant than the few shared elements with
fascism in the first Peronist regime, the fascist elements in its leadership, or
even its authoritariansim . I am referring to two aspects above all: populism,
and the role and position o f the middle groups. Elements of national popu
lism are clearly evident in early fascism and, in general, up to the takeover, or
even as late as 1925. Although after the organization of the totalitarian state,
the populist com ponent and the interpretation of the corporative system in
the light of national socialism were reduced to mere elements of propaganda,
such as manipulation especially o f the young, before 1925 populist and
socialist elements were clearly present and active in the fascist movement. For
this reason they were prom ptly eliminated. They were viewed with alarm by
the dominant sectors incorporated in the coalition, since they could represent
a threat to their main goal—demobilization o f the lower classes. In Argentina,
where the mobilization o f these classes had not been channeled through class
parties, a populist movement not only became possible, but in fact necessary
for the three-way coalition between the industrial bourgeoisie, the military,
and the workers, since it placed effective limitations on the political activity
of the proletariat, thus placing it within the existing social structure and in
collaboration (albeit conflictive) with the industrial bourgeoisie. What be
came superfluous and thus had to be aborted was the fascist solution. The
type of development and the structure of the stratification system, which had
lessened considerably the class struggle (at least with regard to urban society),
together with the political culture and the peripheral situation of the country
(which thanks to antiimperialism, favored nationalistic attitudes among the
Left), explain in part the opposite outcomes for populism and fascism in
Argentina. With respect to the position of the middle classes, despite their
diametrically opposed alignments in the two countries, there are very sig
nificant similarities. First, these sectors find themselves in the same con
flictive situation with the ascending popular classes, in one case in the name
of a return to order, hierarchy, and nation, in the other in the name of a
return to democracy. Second, the alliances are similar in both countries,
since in each the middle classes align with sectors of the dominant classes.
The difference is really in the latter, since while in Italy those sectors were
united in their resolve to demobilize the popular classes, in Argentina there
was a deep split that divided the establishment. As we have seen, many cir
cumstances help to explain the opposite political behavior of the middle sec
tors in both countries. Yet there still remain the resemblances just pointed
out and above all their ambiguous and equivocal position in both cases. In
Argentina they only discovered the popular and democratic aspect of Peron-
ism after its downfall, and in Italy after fascism they split into the most con
trasting political orientations (though the comparison may become dubious
on this point). If we adopt a Marxist scheme we might speak of a false con
sciousness, derived from their ambiguous position in the productive structure
and from the fact that their identity does not depend on that position but on
the various social sectors and classes adopted as a reference group. If on the
one hand their historical origin (in the context of capitalist development)
makes them identify with the bourgeoisie and the upper classes in general,
on the other hand their interests and structural position frequently push
them in the other direction. Later, with the multiplication of professional
roles generated by technological progress, this structural ambiguity in
creases constantly. But an analysis of this kind is not among the objects of
this study, and these considerations, as well as those on the rationality of
the middle and popular classes in fascism and national populism respectively,
are intended to pose questions rather than provide answers.
Fascism and national populism, while remaining essentially distinct phe
nomena with regard to the position of the lower classes, especially when one
considers their function or main objective, emerge together from socio-
historical backgrounds that have many similarities and thus endow them with
shared elements. A more attentive examination o f the social and cultural con
texts in which they appeared, conducted with a comparative historical ap
proach, might provide further elements for a more general theory which
would clarify their role in the process o f political modernization and national
development. Despite everything that has been w ritten thus far, such a theory
has yet to be developed.
RATIONALITY IN THE FASCIST MIDDLE-CLASS MASSES

AND THE LOWER-CLASS MASSES IN NATIONAL POPULISM
One o f the aspects o f middle-class behavior which has especially drawn the
attention o f scholars is its “irrationality” with regard to fascism and nazism,
particularly in the petite bourgeoisie. The whole psychosocial theory of the
authoritarian personality refers to this irrationality. With regard to Peronism,
attem pts have been made to apply similar explanations. The political policy
of the regimes which followed early Peronism was based on the possibility of
a de-Peronization o f the popular masses, similar to the denazification that the
allies had planned for Germ any.7
From all that has been stated in this chapter, it does not seem that the
hypothesis o f irrationality is applicable in the case of national populism. To
decide on the rationality or irrationality of an action (especially a political
action) always requires assumptions whose own rationality is arbitrary,
meaning that it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape value judgments. In
the following presentation, attention is paid to a series of concepts which
have never been clarified with regard to this issue: rationality or irrationality
of an action, real interest, objective conditions, substitute satisfactions, etc.
These concepts are integrated in a general theory concerning the rationality
of action, which would be too long to expound here. We will simply state
that all these concepts imply a comparison between the subjective point of
view (of the actor) and the objective point o f view (of an observer placed in
a more privileged perspective than the actor). This comparison extends from
the perception o f external conditions, to the subjective conditions of the
acting group, to its real (sometimes unconscious) motivations, in comparison
to the conscious, experienced motivations, etc.
Three major elements must be considered in the analysis: (1) the real
interests o f both social groups within their respective historical situations;
(2) the degree to which both totalitarian regimes actually satisfied them in
each case and the scope o f the divergence between real and substitute satis
factions that fascism and Peronism could offer their followers through the
myths inherent in their respective ideologies (nationalism and racism on the
one hand, and “social justice” on the other); and (3) the media of informa
tion and the degree o f understanding o f the sociohistorical situation by both
groups, taking into account their level o f education, degree o f participation in
national life, and their previous political experience.
When we compare the attitudes o f both sectors in relation to these ele
ments, we come to the conclusion that the irrationality of the European
middle classes was w ithout any doubt greater than that of the Argentine
popular classes. Let us see what was the origin of the severe frustrations to
which the European middle classes were subjected, as indicated above. The
objective problem they were confronted with can be found in the socio
historical changes which tended to proletarianize them. Their mental makeup,
lifestyle, and expectations had been adjusted to a situation that had assured
them of economic, vocational, and psychological fulfillment. Then the
possibility o f seeing these expectations fulfilled was destroyed by a series of
profound changes: transform ation o f the technical-economic structure
(transition to a m onopolistic stage with high concentration of capital); emer
gence of a proletariat which not only exerted a growing and dangerous force
in politics, but also threatened to equal or surpass the traditional positions of
minor privilege (in economic level and prestige) that up to then had been
peacefully enjoyed by the lower middle classes (also due to technological
changes that upgraded the qualifications and social significance of jobs which
had traditionally been “ proletarian” ); the catastrophic effects of the war, and,
above all, extreme inflation with the resulting destruction of savings and of
existential expectations; unrestrained com petition in the liberal professions or
their disappearance by reduction to mere bureaucratic posts. These are some
aspects o f the crisis that the middle classes o f Germany and Italy (and of
other European countries) were confronted with in a period of time shorter
than a generation, that is, in a span too short to allow them to adjust gradually
through the mechanism of successive generational replacements which is the
usual process in less critical times. Facing this crisis, the petite bourgeoisie did
not perceive the real significance o f changes taking place around them, nor
did they understand their own peculiar situation amidst them. They remained
attached to their attitudes of prestige and decorous living, their class privileges
(which were in great part illusory), their social “superiority” over manual
workers; that is, they maintained their traditional identification with the
mentality of the upper bourgeoisie. To sustain these attitudes they not only
had to reject any possibility o f aligning with the workers (or even with part
of them) in favor o f a program of moderate reforms aimed at improving their
situation, but they also had to clearly differentiate themselves from the pro
letariat and thereby adopt an opposite political stance (contrasting with the
moderate position o f democratic socialism), w ithout taking into account the
possible coincidences (which did exist) between their real interests and those·
of the groups that expressed the political position o f the socially “inferior”
classes. It is true that in the ideology they embraced, in the contradictory and
incoherent programs o f the nazi-fascist parties,8 there were some issues that
could be interpreted as reflecting more directly some of the problems of the
middle classes. We note as a typical example the struggle against big business
and monopolistic concentrations (above all in their commercial form, chain
stores, etc.). But even in these attacks the objectives were significantly dis
torted by the peculiar nationalist and racist interpretation: it was not big
business they attacked but Jewish or foreign big business. The defects and
contradictions o f the socioeconomic structure were thus interpreted as the
work o f people who were really strangers to the national com m unity, against
whom the hatred and resentm ent o f the “little people” o f the middle classes
was directed. Besides, as we have already pointed out, the fascist antibourgeois
attitude merely opposed proletarian nations to bourgeois nations.
In this way their frustration was properly channeled, and it was possible
to differentiate them from the traditional proletarian position. As a conse
quence o f this blindness, the Italian and German middle classes, instead of
adopting the positions that, according to a rational analysis o f the situation,
offered the best chances to save them economically and spiritually (of course,
on a different level than their former social position at the end of the nine
teenth century), they construed their problems and redemption in terms of
nationalism, racism, and imperialism, serving thus as a mass that could easily
be manipulated by the elites whose political success placed them in much
worse situations than those from which they had to escape. There were also
the other consequences o f transition to a mass society, some of whose charac

teristics have already been m entioned, which greatly facilitated the success of
totalitarian movements. But since these factors do not really represent a dif
ferentiating feature between the Argentine and European cases, we shall
merely bear them in mind as part of the general background.
To complete the picture we must add that had it not been for the inter
vention of irrational factors that distorted their perception of reality, the
means of inform ation and political preparation of the middle classes would
have been sufficient to help them adjust to the distressing problems they had
to face.
Instead o f modifying the objective situation and the structural changes
that had ruined the middle classes, the triumph of the totalitarian regime
tended to reinforce them (increase o f monopolistic concentration, of
controls, etc.); it only offered them certain substitute satisfactions which
could appease the irrational (subjective) expression of the crisis they were
undergoing: affirm ation o f national pride, military conquests, legal inequality,
hierarchy, and, in particular, racism. In terms o f real salaries, their situation
was better than the w orkers’, but this only means that their losses were smaller.
Let us turn now to the situation of the Argentine popular masses. Recent
ly urbanized and industrialized, with no union experience and with limited
possibilities o f obtaining one, with a union movement battered by internal
struggles and police repression, with social legislation totally inadequate for the
degree of industrialization achieved (and mostly inoperative), they had to con
front the no less new managerial class, characterized by all the improvisation
and defects o f a speculative and adventurous capitalism and no awareness of the
social problems o f labor. This same ignorance existed in the majority of the
leading groups, including several which considered themselves sincerely demo
cratic. Serious journalism reflected a similar attitude. In such a situation, the
popular classes had to first acquire a consciousness of their power and
become integrated to all aspects o f national life as a category of fundamental
significance; second, it was in their interest (and still is) to achieve structural
changes that could ensure a more complete and harmonious development of
the economy and their more adequate participation in the results of such a
development; and lastly, it was essential for the popular classes to obtain a
clear recognition o f their individual labor rights, which not only had to be
sanctioned by laws and agreements, but also by daily social relations, in the
consciousness o f entrepreneurs and their agents, state representatives, the
bureaucracy, police, justice, etc., as well as the middle and ruling classes in
general and the press and other media.
To what degree did the first Peronist regime fulfill these objectives of the
popular classes? Certainly nothing was done in the way of structural changes.
On the contrary, in this area it not only caused a worsening of the existing
situation, but with its mistakes, squandering, and corruption, it put in real
danger the economic stability of the country. From this point of view, popu
lar adherence to the dictator produced consequences contrary to popular
interests. A different appraisal can be made with regard to the other two
points. Thanks to Peronism the popular masses acquired a consciousness of
their own significance as a category o f great im portance in national life, a
force capable o f exerting power. This happened because the popular classes
felt that the conquest o f power by the regime and its permanence in power
depended on their own adherence and active participation. Though many of
the workers’ achievements and improvements gained in private enterprises
(psychologically as im portant or more so than the rights sanctioned in general
laws and agreements) were not obtained by means of real union struggles, the
presence o f the workers in the streets in Peronist rallies and the strikes in
which they participated were highly im portant. Let us recall that to a worker
a strike means an affirmation o f his autonom y and his value as a social being.9
The experience of having participated in some successful strikes under Peron
ism could alone suffice (especially for a mass unaccustomed to exercising its
union rights) to give them the sensation of power, meaning, and of active
participation in the country’s political changes. Lastly, there is the crucial
experience o f October 17, immediately transform ed into a myth, when
popular participation was felt to be entirely spontaneous by the participants.
October 17 is frequently compared to the March on Rome (1922) or to
analogous actions in Germany. This is a gross error. The March on Rome, as
well as the assumption o f power by the Nazis, were a result of perfectly
militarized formations, in large part o f professional or quasi-professional
origin. The permanent forces o f Fascism were not composed of citizens
who pursued their normal occupations and dedicated their free time to
political activities, but by persons who had been building up their skills in
those small private armies that were the Fascist or Nazi gangs. This situation
did not comprise all the supporters of fascism as a collective movement, but
refers mostly to the crucial role of the organized and professional private
army.
This picture contrasts with what we observe in Peronism: its followers
were laborers, and although there were numerous professional agents, they
were characterized by spontaneous or improvised participation with neither
training nor discipline, a much less militarized organization. These features
of spontaneity and immediacy o f popular participation are repeated in many
episodes that undoubtedly left a deep impression in the popular soul. A typi
cal example was the occupation of shops and workshops at the end of 1945
in order to obtain the compliance o f the decree on the aguinaldo (Christmas
bonus). All these experiences contributed to the form ation in the popular
classes o f a clear consciousness of their power and meaning; their attitude was
not, as many claim, one of gratitude to the dictator for his “gifts” (although,
of course, this kind o f feeling was not totally absent in many of them), but
rather one o f pride for having achieved (imposed would be the psychologically
more correct word) their rights in the face of the managerial class, and of
having “conquered pow er,” according to the slogans of official propaganda.
Not only did the popular classes acquire an awareness of their strength, but
they also achieved a unity that other parties, considering themselves to be
proletarian in their traditions and planks, had never attained. The electorate
was polarized along class divisions, which had never before happened in the
country. Whether this circumstance should be evaluated positively or nega
tively depends on the particular political philosophy one adopts; however, it
cannot be denied that this fact attests to a significant homogeneity of the
popular masses, and can be considered, within limits, as a proof of the re
cently achieved awareness o f their significance as an essential part of Argen
tine society.
The third objective was also achieved, at least in part. For clear evidence of
the changes on the managerial level, in the ruling class, the press, or more
generally, in the public consciousness with regard to workers’ rights, it would
suffice to compare the attention conceded to these matters in the years prior
to 1943 with that afforded after the September 1955 revolution. This is a
political problem that emerged as a legacy of the ousted regime and its totali
tarian union organization. Even if this were so, the fact remains that in
marked contrast with the period prior to 1943, those rights and in general
the social problems o f labor occupy a place of essential importance in the
political leadership o f the country, and their adequate solution constitutes
one of the principal tasks for the government. The real achievements of the
workers in that decade should not be looked for in the area of material ad
vantages, but in the recognition o f their rights, in the fact that now the popu
lar masses have to be taken into consideration.
Drawing up a balance o f the real objectives attained by the popular classes
during the regime, we must admit that even if the result of the balance is
completely negative with regard to structural changes, we cannot say the
same as concerns the affirmation o f those classes vis-à-vis the others and
themselves. In this case one cannot speak, as with regard to the German and
Italian middle classes, o f substitute satisfactions, since these achievements—
although of a psychosocial nature—corresponded to real objectives in their
sociohistorical context. One could object that these achievements—acquisition
of self-awareness and recognition by all other classes—might have been
reached through different ways. By no means was an institutional, moral, and
economic subversion, and much less an authoritarian regime, necessary in
order to obtain both things. The appearance o f the popular masses in the
political scene and their recognition by Argentine society could have been
achieved through a democratic education and its means of expression. The
way chosen by the working classes must be considered irrational; the rational
way would have been the democratic method. But at this point one should
ask oneself: Was the democratic mechanism feasible in the condition in which
the country was left after the 1930 revolution? The answer is clearly negative.
Therefore, if we take into account the subjective characteristics of the lower

classes in the early 1940s, their recent introduction into urban life and indus
trial activities, their scarce or nonexistent political training, their low level of
education,· their deficient or inexistent means o f inform ation, and above all
the strict limits that objective circumstances set to their possibilities for
political action, we must come to the conclusion that the course they chose,
which transformed them into the human basis o f an authoritarian movement
destined to serve ultimately interests that were partly alien to them, cannot
be considered blindly irrational under such historical conditions.
A different judgm ent must be issued with regard to the German and Italian
middle classes, whose level o f education, political traditions, and means of
inform ation qualified them for realistic political action, which, moreover, was
much more feasible in terms o f objective conditions.
The different degrees o f irrationality express certain im portant differences
in the two forms o f authoritarian pseudosolutions we have compared. In the
nazi-fascist system, the greater irrationality implies that particular imperme
ability to experience observed in the authoritarian personality structure typi
cal o f European lower middle classes.
NOTES1
1. D. L. Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1963), pp. 75, 124.
2. This trend is best represented by Giolitti.
3. As an American scholar has indicated, the socialist elite failed in assuming leader
ship: “When it appeared that the government forces might not be able to cope with the
situation, the Socialist Party sat back and applauded, but offered no leadership or
direction, either back to legality or toward insurrection,” Horowitz, p. 139.
4. These rights, among others, were the eight-hour day, collective bargaining, repre
sentatives in industrial plants (internal commissions in the firms), and certain participa
tion in the control of enterprises. The peasants also achieved im portant advances.
5. In 1921 and 1922 real salary reached the highest level of the century, which was
reached again only in 1948-49. A. Fossati, Lavoro e produzione in Italia (Torino:
Giappichelli, 1951), p. 634.
6. The im portant role of agrarian fascism has been noted by several authors. The
motivations and attitudes of this sector resembled the reactionary conservative pattern
more than the typical fascist (or totalitarian) pattern. It was absorbed, however, in the
latter. See M. RossiDoria, “ L’agricoltura Italian a, il dopoguerra, e il fascismo” ; De Felice,
ch. 1.
7. This author was consulted in 1955 by President Aramburu and by three heads of
the armed forces (of the revolutionary government that had toppled the Peronist regime)
on the possibility and form in which a de-Peronization campaign might be organized. A
summary o f the answer given was later published as part o f a pamphlet. Sec Germani,
La integracion polîtica de las masas y el totalitarismo (Buenos Aires: CLES, 1956).
8. This incoherence was a recognized characteristic of Nazi-Fascist programs.
Mussolini repeatedly eulogized it.
9. A strike, says Simone Weil, means “standing up, finally speaking up. Feeling like a
man for a few days,” p. 169.
PART III
MOBILIZATION FROM ABOVE

CHAPTER NINE
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH IN FASCIST

REGIMES: ITALY AND SPAIN
We have already m entioned in previous chapters mobilization from above as

one of the possible forms o f m obilization. In the present chapter we will
examine and com pare tw o cases o f this process. They refer to fascism in
Spain and Italy, which presents a type o f forced mobilization very different
from the m obilization regimes o f some countries of the Third World, and
also from national populism. The analysis may underline some of the limi
tations o f these attem pts when the requirements for a successful mobiliza
tion process clash with the basic and essential aims of the regime—whether its
form is authoritarian or totalitarian.
One o f the characteristics o f modern society is the substitution of
deliberate, program m ed behavior for that which in nonmodern societies
occurs naturally and spontaneously. In modern forms of authoritarianism—in
totalitarian regimes—this substitution becomes one of the most significant
instruments, placed at the service o f aims that deny the very values at the
origins o f m odern society. Totalitarianism requires fanatic and “ persuaded”
soldiers rather than passive non-participant subjects. There is an attem pt to
mobilize the entire population, transforming all roles and forms o f partici
pation according to a precise model. This is what the planned “building of
fascist m an” is about. That is why it is necessary to resocialize adults, and
above all socialize the young according to the new model. A planned pro-
245
gram o f socialization and mobilization is not a question o f mere technique (or

at least not yet, at the present technological level): certain conditions and re
quirements are also necessary. We propose to examine to what degree the
basic aims o f fascism (as already defined) may facilitate or contradict certain
conditions and requirements o f mobilization and programmed socialization.
Special attention will be paid to university students, a strategic sector for the
continuity o f the regime (that is, the form ation o f a new ruling class), and a
sector particularly sensitive to the recruitm ent and indoctrination involved in
the creation o f a political elite. The Italian case will be examined and com
pared to that o f Spain, a country in which, especially after the first years of
the regime, the political form assumed by fascism was authoritarian more
than totalitarian.
In both regimes there was a deliberate effort to socialize1 the youth ac
cording to values, attitudes, beliefs, and models o f behavior considered essen
tial to the preservation and the future o f the system. This can be done using
available agents o f socialization to the extent to which they can be effectively
manipulated: the family, the educational system (from grade school to
university), physical and military training, leisure time, sports, and all other
voluntary or compulsory forms o f association, some o f them actually orga
nized for political indoctrination. All this in addition to control of mass
media and to the predom inant climate in a fascist regime, no m atter what
political form it may assume. The scope o f these efforts and their effective
ness are much wider in totalitarian than in authoritarian systems. They also
vary between countries with similar political forms. But in fascist regimes,
the raison d ’etre and its totalitarian or authoritarian form reinforce each
other and introduce conflicting demands on the process o f political socializa
tion. These contradictions usually do not emerge at the earlier stages of the
individual’s developmental process, that is, in childhood or adolescence. In
stead, they emerge when political socialization becomes conscious; when in
doctrination and political training are more open and deliberate. Conflicting
demands on youth are likely to initiate stresses and strains usually leading to
apathy. Individuals with a propensity for political involvement actively or
passively deviate from, or totally reject the system ’s ideologies and aims.
Two closely interrelated aspects o f these internal contradictions are the
conflict between proclaimed ideals and the aim o f lower-class demobilization,
and the conflict between the intent to foster an active participation of youth
and the necessity o f totalitarian controls. The basic aims of lower-class de
mobilization and status quo protection on behalf o f the ruling coalition clash
with the proclaimed revolutionary ideals o f the regime, especially social
justice, good jobs and welfare for all members o f the national community,
and the construction o f a new order far superior to liberal capitalism or
materialist communism. This is true not only in the totalitarian form, where
an elaborate ideology is formally enforced, but also in the authoritarian state.
In both cases the regime must use all available means to exalt its alleged
ITALY AND SPAIN 247
achievements and impress on the population the magnitude of the benefits it

bestows upon them . Even if the regime’s ideology is not as elaborate as it is
in the totalitarian case, the same themes are stressed and, especially in dealing
with youth, revolutionary slogans are emphasized. In Spain the official party
played the most im portant role in the political indoctrination o f university
students. Emphasis on the social goals of the movement (or the single party)
was similar to the Italian example, even if the party played a comparatively
minor role within the institutions and politically powerful groups of the regime.
The second aspect is more clearly seen in the totalitarian form, although
it also exists in the authoritarian. It stems from the clash between the
methods required to induce youth mobilization and the need to maintain a
strict control on all dangerous deviations; deviations not only from the party
line, but also from the basic aims o f the regime. Although passive conformity
is often sufficient for the mass o f the population, leaders and potential lead
ers—such as university students—mush show an active ideological identifica
tion and a genuine political consciousness. In order to reach this goal, con
siderable scope must be allowed for youth’s spontaneity and creativity.
These, however, may lead to deviations, heresy, and even rebellion, especially
in conjunction with the contrast between the facts of life under the regime
and its proclaimed achievements and ideals. Hence, there is a permanent con
trast between an instrum ental liberalization limited to students’ political
expression and the control and repression o f heresy and deviation.
In the authoritarian case, although mobilization was not a basic require
ment for the maintenance o f the regime—at least after consolidation—a simi
lar internal contradiction could be observed with regard to the political so
cialization o f students. Two factors intervened in the Spanish regime. In the
first place, because the official party was in charge of the political social
ization o f the student, some efforts at mobilization were made. The resulting
dilemma o f criticism versus discipline showed a striking similarity to the
Italian case. Second, the limited pluralism o f the authoritarian regime (such
as monarchic, Catholic, and falangist tendencies) introduced some liberaliz
ing effects which stim ulated deviation and heresy. This contrasted with the
official image upheld by the regime and its basic aims. Even if the more
heterogeneous com position o f the ruling coalition determines the limited
pluralism which defines in Linz’s terms the authoritarian version, such
pluralism cannot exceed the limits and interests of the coalition. It still
must operate within the system. Outside it, the rigid suppressive controls of
the authoritarian regime operate as efficiently and oppressively as any totali
tarian type o f control.
Such inner contradictions in the political socialization of the young lead
to a typical pattern in the development o f individual political attitudes and
a progressive change in the reactions o f successive generations. The regime
becomes older and its revolutionary origins retreat into a distant past. Indi
vidual idiosyncratic traits and biographic events play a role in this process at
the personal level. Likewise, internal and external changes and events exercise
an impact at the system ’s level. Most o f the analysis will be devoted to
describe the processes in a fascist-totalitarian regime: Italy. An illustration of
the fascist-authoritarian case will be provided by a brief consideration of the
Spanish regime.
TOTALITARIAN ORGANIZATION OF YOUTH

UNDER ITALIAN FASCISM
In contrast with nazism and other forms o f totalitarianism both Left and
Right, Italian fascism has been studied more from the historical viewpoint
than from that of the behavioral sciences. Sociological analyses o f fascism
are very scarce, and the same is true with regard to political science. Recently
contributions by historians have been somewhat enlarged with a sociological
approach both in terms of facts and conceptual framework. It remains true,
however, that the rich empirical material offered by two decades of fascist
rule has seldom been used by sociologists or political scientists. This is even
more so o f the specific aspect considered in the present chapter—which so
far historians too have neglected.2
Although interpretations o f fascism by Italian and foreign scholars vary
widely, the facts themselves as described in most historical accounts fit quite
closely the fascist model used in the present analysis. The reader is therefore
referred to the relevant literature on the subject.3
Perhaps even more than other similar systems, Italian fascism shows a
central concern for youth. In Italy, not only was the mobilization of youth a
basic requirement for the continuity o f the regime itself, but the ideological
content and the tradition o f the fascist movement incorporated the glorifica
tion o f youth as one o f its essential myths.
The first youth organizations were created by the Fascist party in Octo
ber 1922, long before its accession to power. A fter its consolidation in 1926
the regime transformed them into an official institution o f the Italian state,
by creating the so-called Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB). In 1929 the ONB
was placed under the jurisdiction o f the Ministry for National Education. This
change was more formal than real, since the same person remained leader of
the organization, and the party was able to maintain effective control.4 Eight
years later another reorganization placed the ONB (now called Gioventù
Italiana del Littorio, GIL) under the direct control o f the party national
secretary.5
Since its creation, the youth organization attem pted to invest all aspects of
life with the party creed. Physical and military training were given special
emphasis, but thorough ideological indoctrination by the deliberate and sys
tematic attem pt to shape the young m entality according to fascist ideals, was
the essential purpose o f the youth organization. The whole educational sys
tem had been changed in content and m ethod to serve the same purposes
ITALY AND SPAIN 249
from kindergarten to university, but the ONB and GIL were the more special
ized organs to create fascist man and replace the old-fashioned mentality with
a new fascist style, according to the widely diffused expression of the party
jargon. This unity o f purpose was enforced through the continuous and ef
fective interaction between state and party, the mobilization and ideological
indoctrination o f teachers at all levels o f the educational system, and the
efficient operation o f negative and positive controls. The formal organiza
tional structure underw ent several changes reflecting the underlying inter
penetration o f the educational system and youth formations. The School
Charter (Carta della Scuola), issued as a parallel to the Labor Charter (Carta
del Lavoro, the basic docum ent o f the corporate state), simply gave a more
thorough expression to this unity, which in any case had been enforced with
all the means at the disposal o f the regime, since the period of its consolida
tion in the middle 1920s.
The youth form ations included children, adolescents, and young adults
of both sexes, from ages six to twenty-one (or up to a maximum of twenty-
eight for university students and graduates), classified in various special
formations by age and sex groups. As in all totalitarian parties, membership
in the Fascist party was not open6 and all new members were recruited
through youth organizations. These also operated as a mechanism for the
training and selection o f new party members. In an annual ceremony per
formed with the usual “ Rom an” ritual—the so-called Fascist Levy (Leva
Fascista)—all members o f youth organizations moved a step up in the age-
graded units, and those who had reached the maximum age within juvenile
formations were prom oted to party membership.
Of the various form ations and components of youth organizations I am
concerned here only with those more directly related to the political educa
tion of young adults and elite training and selection. The specific institutions
involved in these tasks were the Fascist University Groups (Gruppi Univer-
sitari Fascisti, GUF), and to a lesser extent the Young Fascists (Fasci Gio-
vanili de C om battim ento, FGC). The former included university students
from age eighteen to graduation, or even after that, but up to a maximum
age of twenty-eight; the latter received all the Avanguardisti (at age eighteen
and passed them to full party membership at age twenty-one). Other central
institutions which intervened directly in the political training and selection
of the elite were the Littoriali, the schools for political training, and the
National Institute for Fascist Culture (Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista,
INCF). Less directly involved but still participating—in addition to the whole
school systems at all levels—was the Ministry o f Popular Culture. Finally there
was the press published by and for youth, especially college students.
The Littoriali were similar to a congress or convention coupled with a
competition, held every year in a different city, attended by students repre
senting all Italian universities (that is their respective GUF), the representa
tives themselves being selected through local competitions and meetings (the
pre-Littoriali). Both at the national and local level, competitions were con
ducted through oral and w ritten presentations to be discussed by all partici
pants under the leadership and supervision of special committees o f “experts”
in the various fields. These committees were usually composed o f university
professors and also o f nationally known artists, writers, and journalists. The
topics covered the humanities, art, and natural and social sciences. But in all
topics, the accent was on politics and ideology, w hether from the point of
view o f the organizers, the party leadership, or the young participants them
selves, and this coincidence, as will be shown later, occurred to some extent
for different purposes. Though Young Fascists were also adm itted and later
the Littoriali del Lavoro (labor Littoriali) provided a parallel institution for
young workers, the importance o f the Littoriali was restricted to the intel
lectual and political elite, specially recruited among university students.
The Schools for Political Training (Corsi di Preparazione Politica per i
Giovani) constituted the highest and most official training and grounds of
selection for party and government leadership. Less specific methods of
selection took place from the very first year o f a youth’s admission into GIL
among children and adolescents evaluated and selected for special training
within various organizations. Another form o f selection took place within
the Littoriali. To the schools was reserved the function o f producing grad
uates established by the party in all provinces. There were strict standards
for admission, which was open—at least in theo ry—to members of Young
Fascists and o f GUF (that is, persons w ithout college education were also
eligible). Enrollment was limited to a maximum o f 100 students for each
provincial school. Courses lasted two years and included both theoretical and
practical training, through visits, participant observation, and work in pro
vincial party and state organizations. The “decisive characteristics for admis
sion” —indicated the party directives—“will be a passion for politics and a gift
for organizing, previously shown by aspirants.” 7 Finally, in Rome, a National
Center for Political Training was organized for those who demonstrated
higher capacity for command. Again a limited number was adm itted (100),
through very strict selection, and the center was considered the highest stage
in fascist political education. Among other schools and courses, which were
highly diffused among universities and other institutions, mention must be
made o f the Scuola di Mistica Fascista (School o f Fascist Mystique), created
in Milan, under the sponsorship of GUF, which occupied an im portant place
in the educational system’s leadership training.
Aimed primarily at the fascistization o f higher culture and the permanent
mobilization o f intellectuals, the National Institute for Fascist Culture also
had an im portant role in the shaping and selection o f political elites during
the regime’s existence. It was a subsidiary organization o f the party and main
tained sections in all Italian provinces, with some 100,000 members. It con
trolled a number o f organizations and institutes for cultural activities, higher
learning, scholarly research, and a considerable array o f publications.
ITALY AND SPAIN 251
The entire school system had been transformed to serve the purpose of a
totalitarian education. In addition to this general penetration of fascist ideol
ogy, and the attem pt to politicize all aspects of the curriculum, many courses,
lectures, and seminars specially devoted to political training were included at
all levels o f education, but especially in the universities. An entirely new type
of school was added to those already existing in Italian universities: the
Department o f Political Sciences (Facoltà di Scienze Politiche.).8
Another im portant mechanism for elite training was the student press.
GUF had its own national magazine, but in addition to this, provincial
branches had their own organs. A considerable number of journals and small
publications o f different kinds mushroomed everywhere in Italy, in formal or
informal connection with youth formations. Obviously, the whole press was
completely fascistized, both in terms o f personnel and orientation, with very
efficient internal and external controls. The small magazines of fascist
students did not escape this general framework. However, they were in a
rather special situation, probably because they were considered “safer,” being
under the direct supervision o f the party and GUF and also in view of their
functions in elite training and form ation. This function was never formally
recognized but it was clear enough to the party leadership. For these reasons,
although there were rigid limits (which sometimes led to the suppression of
certain publications), the range o f possible variations was somewhat larger
than for the rest o f the press.9
The various special organizations and institutions enumerated were created
at different times and underwent several reforms during the two decades of
fascist rule. The very first to appear were the GUF. Created in 1920, they
were never formally included in ONB or GIL, but constituted a special branch
of the party, under the direct supervision o f national and provincial party
secretaries. This was a special situation expressing the privileged position of
students within the fascist system. The Young Fascist groups were created in
1931, under the direction o f the party. Later they were incorporated into
GIL. The first Littoriali met in 1934, and the Schools for Political Training
in 1935. The Institute for Fascist Culture had existed since 1925, though its
scope was considerably enlarged in following years. As will be shown later,
these successive additions, expansions, and modifications not only expressed
the regime’s growing concern for the effectiveness of elite training and
selection, but were also the consequence o f the fascist leadership’s dissatis
faction with the results o f their efforts. It was an expression of their partial
failure in building a fascist elite.
EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS

OF TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION
The failure o f totalitarian education could not be seen at the open

behavior level, but only at a deeper level, and in relation to the purpose of
obtaining not only conform ity or even some enthusiasm but also active par
ticipation involving initiative, spontaneity, and sincerity. Obviously this
failure was never recognized as such by the regime or its leaders, but it can be
observed clearly enough from discussions conducted among fascists, and on
the basis o f their evidence.
These limitations, which showed clearly some o f the strains inherent in a
totalitarian system, will be considered in the last section o f this chapter.
Some mention must be made first o f the more manifest results. The fascistiza-
tion o f young generations appeared as accomplished not only in the official
image maintained by the fascist leadership but also to neutral, outside ob
servers, and even antifascist emigres, during the regime and after its down
fall. This is true both in terms o f size and o f organizational membership, and
of open behavior and surface attitudes.
From the point o f view o f statistical growth, prior to 1939 (when mem
bership became formally compulsory), the party never achieved the affilia
tion o f all individuals within the age groups covered by youth formations.
But the proportion affiliated was very high and reflected the degree of in
corporation o f the population into a modern urban structure more than it did
the efficiency of the party and youth organizations. In the mid-1930s, affil
iation for all age groups (between six and twenty-one years) varied from more
than 70 percent in the more modern and urban N orthern provinces, to above
30 percent in the less urban and more traditional provinces of the South.
However, percentages were much higher for younger age groups everywhere
in the country. For instance, among those six to fourteen years old, the pro
portion affiliated was as high as 90 percent in the North and 50-60 percent
in the S outh.10 For Italy as a whole in 1937 the Balilla (six- to thirteen-
year-olds) represented nearly 70 percent o f the age group, and the Avanguar-
disti (fourteen to seventeen), some 60 percent. But as one fascist observer
remarked, in separating those who attended school from those who did not,
it was precisely among the latter that most nonaffiliation occurred. More than
90 percent of individuals enrolled in schools were also affiliated with the
corresponding youth formations. These figures include both sexes, and female
affiliation was much lower, especially in the higher age groups.11 After the
late 1920s, affiliation o f children and young people to party organizations
had become automatic, even if in theory it was not yet compulsory. This
was especially true for the middle and higher social strata, where affiliation
was considered absolutely normal among those attending high school and
college, and certainly approached the 100 percent level. When compulsory
membership was established, it was perceived by all as a normal fact of life,
in the same way as primary education (which had always been compulsory
under the law in the prefascist era). The same attitude was held regarding
the existence o f compulsory military training, which as established by fascist
law, began at age eight. In agreement with the central principle of the School
Charter, the obligation to attend school and participate in GIL applied to all
ITALY AND SPAIN 253
individuals from their childhood, and was considered a public service or duty
inherent in their status as citizens o f the fascist state. It was recognized that
public and political orientations of juvenile life represented the basic instru
ment for building the whole personality according to national values.12
From the point o f view o f ideological, political, and psychological char
acter building, no less than in terms o f simple numerical affiliation or phy
sical and military training, fascism had succeeded in the goal of shaping the
nation’s youth in its own fashion. “ Most com petent observers . . . today
agree that the youth emerging from these groups in the 1930s were enthu
siastically Fascist, and that the younger generation was one of the bulwarks
of Fascist strength.” 13 Italian historians and other scholars unanimously
recognize the im pact o f fascism on youth. The penetration of the regime and
its ideology among youth is considered as a most serious achievement in fas-
cistization, which had a series o f consequences for the future.14 Even those
who think that this task was only partially successful among the older genera
tions, regard the result obtained among the young as a remarkable success.15
It is more difficult to speak, on the basis o f available documentation, of
the nature o f the process o f fascistization. However, even though no system
atic research is available, it is possible to advance some tentative generaliza
tions on the basis o f literary materials and autobiographic accounts. These
generalizations are limited to youth belonging to urban middle strata, espe
cially students, since very little or nothing has been published concerning the
working class and rural sectors.16
Two aspects emerge as main components o f the process of fascistization
among youth: negative factors inducing conformity, and positive factors
generating active response. Among the first is the fact that the totalitarian
way o f life was perceived as normal by the new generations, including those
born around 1910 or later. This normality meant that the regime was taken
for granted and th at for most youngsters the question o f alternatives was the
result of a discovery reached after years o f slow maturation. The realization
that fascism “could have not been,” coming as a result of a long critical pro
cess, is a common theme in these autobiographical accounts. It was not a
mere question o f inform ation. Getting inform ation, o f course, was not easy;
this depended a great deal on the family background of each individual. But,
with some exceptions found among those born in families of opposition
leaders or activists, it seems that the older generations did not communicate
with the younger ones. The general climate o f fear and conformity was the
main reason. A nother factor is that by the large the middle-class social en
vironment was not particularly hostile to fascism; on the contrary, it was
this sector which provided the movement with most of its mass basis.17
More im portant than lack o f inform ation was a general negative attitude
towards the “ old” world contrasting with positive attitudes towards the
“new” world o f fascism.
The image o f the old world was one o f decadence, sickness, weakness,
national humiliation; the image o f the antifascist—if it existed at all—was one

of an old person, defeated and trying to disguise his dissent under a thin veil
of superficial conform ity. Militant antifascism and the underground move
ment, which existed and was operating, failed to reach the great majority of
the population. “ Antifascism was archeology,” and the general crisis of
democracy, the attitudes o f European powers towards fascism, and the
critical years following the Great Depression were a confirm ation of these
feelings. Moreover, the normality o f being a fascist and behaving according to
the expectations and requirements o f the regime, was greatly reinforced by
the fact that all careers, even the more modest jobs, depended on member
ship in the party or in one of its subsidiary organizations. In an age of wide
spread unemployment, especially among white-collar workers and profes
sionals, the need for a job was one o f the most powerful mechanisms of
totalitarian control. This control was probably much more powerful than
fear o f repression, or police terror. In most cases it did not operate simply
under the form o f a direct threat—though this threat was always present and
certainly felt by everybody—but as something beyond discussion, as natural
and normal as registration in school or any other bureaucratic requirement.
The family operated here as a powerful instrum ent o f conform ity, even when
the older members were not fascist. Normal preoccupation for the future of
the children involved pressure for conform ity in so vital a m atter as their
future work. The value system, according to which family solidarity has
higher priority than political duties or abstract ideological principles, was
certainly another factor generating conform ity.18
Among the positive factors o f youth fascistization, the most obvious is
monopoly by the party o f all political activity. The party became the only
channel for political expression for those who felt the call o f politics. On
the other hand, because o f pervasive politicization generated by the total
itarian system, other callings removed from politics but involving some type
of organization also had to be expressed through quasi-political channels. For
this reason not only the urge for political expression and the potentialities for
political leadership, but also any other strivings towards self-realization in the
fields o f literature, the arts, journalism, and the like, had to be expressed
through the organizations o f the party and the regime. The party (and its sub
sidiary organs) represented all forms o f association and public life. But
monopolization by itself could have done little more than attract ambitious
young men in search o f a rapid career. A num ber o f young fascists fell into
this category, and the accusation o f careerism («arrivismo) returns again and
again in the discussions o f the “ youth problem ,” as it was called at the time.
More im portant for the active mobilization o f youth was the promise of
fascism as a revolution. Fascism was asserted to be a movement whose final
goals were not definitively stated, but could be redefined by new generations.
Fascism had to be something alive and not crystallized, and youth represented
the dynamic factors for permanent renewal or better, for permanent révolu-
ITALY AND SPAIN 255
tion. As presented to the young generations, fascism was not reaction or tra
dition, but future. This future was presented in terms of social justice, o f a
change o f economic system to replace capitalism, and even as a form of
freedom far superior to democratic pluralism. The theme of nationalism was
also im portant but operated more in terms of conformity and superficial
rhetoric than as a dynamic factor. Social justice, the development of the cor
porate state, the building o f a new society, along with freedom and choice,
were the themes that most attracted the young. Because of these promises
many believed themselves fascists, only to discover later that “their fascism”
did not really exist. This is the process found most often in autobiographical
materials, and it coincides with the development of the youth problem as
seen by contem porary fascist sources.
It is here that fascism’s contradictions emerge. The basic mechanisms used
by the party to insure the continuity of the regime by generating the crea
tive participation o f the young and by promoting the emergence of an
authentic political elite (that is, not merely bureaucracy of careerists),
included two main com ponents: on the one hand the promise of a social
evolution o f the regime in terms o f social justice and drastic changes in the
economic order; on the other, the promise to the young generations that they
could exercise an innovative role through criticism, circulation of ideas, and
actual change o f institutions and men. But both components—social change
and liberalization—contrasted sharply with the basic aims of the regime. The
former was blocked by the persistence o f its initial raison d’etre, the defense
and preservation o f the major vested interests in the existing social order and
the demobilization o f the lower classes. Once this possibility was eliminated,
any liberalization would become the source of dangerous deviations and an
immediate threat to the stability o f the regime. Thus through all its history
the party policy towards youth never managed to escape this inner contra
diction. The more successful the “ dynamizing” mechanisms, the more the
party was compelled to restrict or eliminate them. As incoming generations
successively discovered that the promised future did not really exist and be
came aware o f this inherent limitation, their “longjourney through fascism” 19
came to an end: passive conform ity or open rebellion were the only out
comes o f the process, and which was chosen depended on the interplay
between personal circumstances and external historical conditions.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES

OF DISSENT AND MILITARY RESISTANCE
Militant antifascism and underground activities were always very much

alive under the totalitarian regime in Italy. Though until 1941 or 1942 their
effectiveness in penetrating the majority of the population was checked by
the positive and negative controls o f the regime, they provided the basic
cadres and ideological motivation for the military guerrilla resistance from
1943 to 1945. The Resistance resulted from a mass mobilization involving

hundreds o f thousands of partisans in the mountains, the countryside, and
the cities.20 This popular uprising, which in its guerrilla units was composed
mainly o f young people, would not have been possible w ithout the increasing
alienation and active disaffection created under fascism not only among the
older population—survivors o f the prefascist era—but also, and above all,
among those born (or at least politically socialized) under the new regime.
I have indicated in the inner contradictions o f the regime a source of what
could be called the internal origins of dissent among youth. These were not
the only factors which fostered opposition. O ther factors, external to the
totalitarian system, were also in operation. Both sources tended to interact
and combine, especially at the final stage o f each individual evolution from
alienation and dissent to the discovery o f antifascism and the transition to
militant opposition. External factors, which were usually neutralized by the
totalitarian climate, could be transform ed into a precipitating factor in the
awareness leading to antifascism only after the internal contradictions had
induced some m aturity and a realistic approach in terms o f political awareness.
Before we proceed further some attention must be devoted to these exter
nal factors and the way they operated among the young. Only in a minority
of cases did these factors operate alone, w ithout a period of maturation
within fascism, at least during the “ norm al” totalitarian rule, before 1943 and
the beginning of armed resistance. It is impossible to assess their respective
weight as causal factors in generating dissent. Family background is fre
quently mentioned in autobiographical accounts as having been very impor
tant. But we have seen that family influence operated in both directions
(dissent and conform ity), and in some cases even a family tradition of active
opposition and leadership was not sufficient to prevent an initial acceptance
of fascism among the young. Another source was religion, not in terms of
Catholic organizations or the church as an institution,21 but in terms of
religious beliefs. School also seems to have operated, though only occasional
ly, as a vehicle o f the old intellectual tradition, so inimical to any form of
autocracy and oppression.22 And the other “ islands o f separateness”23
surviving in Italy from the prefascist past—the monarchy, the army, the
church, and whatever was left o f the old bureaucracy—operated mostly in
generating conform ity, not dissent. It is true that their interests did not
coincide completely with those of the regime, and that fascism, which they
had considered a weapon useful for attaining lower-class demobilization,
went beyond their initial intention. But up to the last moment they were
clearly aware that their own fate was linked to that o f the regime. In any
case institutions like the army or the monarchy could produce a palace
coup—as they did in 1943—when everything was lost, but were completely
unable and unwilling to generate resistance when the regime seemed strong
and successful.24
An im portant source o f deviance is to found in individual idiosyncracies.
ITALY AND SPAIN 257
Any peculiar trait strong enough to produce a feeling o f being different

could, in the overwhelming climate o f conformity, generate one o f two
opposite reactions: deviance or overconformity. In the autobiographies there
are many instances citing dislike or unfitness for sports, physical disabilities,
or a particularly strong introversion or shyness as an initial factor which in
time would result in some sort o f political dissent.
So far, I have discussed factors external to the regime but internal to the
social structure. O ther im portant sources o f dissent were also originated by
external events. The most im portant are the Spanish war, the persecution of
Jews, the alliance with Nazism and World War II. The intervention in Spain
made a deep impression on youth. For the first time anti-Fascism presented a
very different image, that o f a fighting force, openly defying the regime. For
the first time also, radio broadcasts from Spain and other places abroad could
break the com plete isolation in which old and young Italians alike had re
mained for a long tim e.25 Anti-Semitism contrasted with basic values in the
culture; and the alliance with the Nazis was perceived as a tremendous threat
to the integrity o f the nation, and went against deeply felt national traditions.
Paradoxically, the alleged contrast between Fascism and Nazism (especially
in 1934 and 1935) favored fascism. All these events were précipitants in the
transition towards conscious dissent and active opposition. The palace coup
and outbreak o f guerrilla activities must be considered the final blow that
triggered mass mobilization against Fascism and its Nazi ally.
THE YOUTH PROBLEM
Within the restricted scope o f the present chapter, I will attem pt now to
summarize a process which provides a vivid illustration of the contradictions
between participation and control in the framework o f a totalitarian structure
rigidly limited in its further evolution. This process is the history o f the so-
called youth problem , which made its appearance soon after the consolida
tion o f the regime and the emergence o f the totalitarian organization, and
persisted under different labels, throughout and well to its end.26
The youth problem involved, in the first place, the need to create a new
political elite. But how was this possible under the conditions of a totalitar
ian state? The danger o f alienation was perceived as soon as the first crop of
young people educated under Fascism began to appear. In 1927 a fascist
writer observed an alarming decrease o f political interest among youth.27 A
few years later, in 1930, apathy and indifference were seen as a major trait
among Italian youth. Ju st as in Moravia’s first novel, Gli indifferenti (The
Indifferent Ones), a serious moral crisis was affecting the young.28 At the
same time a well-known writer (also fascist) imputed aestheticism, epicurean
ism, sadness, lack o f enthusiasm, to the typical young man o f his day.29
Despite the great interest o f the regime in the new generations, they main
tained their “ bourgeois” style.30 Again, in the years following, the same
accusations return: apathy, indifference, conform ity, senility. “Today’s

youth only aspires to imitate the old man: its rebelliousness has dis
appeared” ;31 “ Italian youth sleeps. Everywhere apathy, degeneration,
nihilism.” 32 Or perhaps anti-Fascism? “Those who work within fascism
especially in close contact with the young cannot avoid a persistent frightful
doubt, the doubt that the older ones, those who have remained farther away
from fascism, are not the remnants o f the pre-fascist world, but are to be
found among the young generations, of those who should have acquired a
fascist mentality . . . . Though a m inority has acquired a real fascist style of
life, the great majority is submerged in apathy and lack o f interest in all the
im portant national problems. And this apathy is made much deeper by the
fact that it is disguised under a completely different appearance, as pure faith,
discipline, perfect political orthodoxy.” 33 This contrast between appearance
and reality was seldom perceived by foreigners, or even by anti-Fascist
émigrés. Yet it was one o f the most striking symptoms of the inner contra
dictions o f the state. A nother common accusation concerned careerism as
the only, or the predominant, motivation among the young.34 On the other
hand it was recognized that the youth problem was to a great extent a
problem o f unemployment. The unrest observed among y o u th —their gen
eralized protest—stemmed from their marginality with regard to the party
and the regime leadership, because o f the m onopoly o f the old in all offices.35
This problem was seen as closely connected with the need to modify the com
position of the bureaucracy, which despite the extensive purge, was com
posed mainly o f personnel trained in the old days. More generally, the
question was one of gradually easing out the old generation, socialized under
the past order, and replacing it with the “ new fascist m an.” 36
It was recognized that all these problems (except the question of unem
ployment, which was mentioned but never discussed, as it was a consequence
o f economic stagnation) were really aspects o f the central issue: how to
generate the active mobilization of youth and their creative participation in
the regime. Confronting the problem o f alienation and the difficulty in
molding an adequate educational policy, Critica Fascista correctly identified
the cause as an “ingrained defect of our political structure.” This was written
in 1932.3 7 Whereas even the United States and Latin America had a system
for elite replacement (the spoils systems), fascism had none, despite the
hierarchic principle.38 Many solutions were considered and rejected, but the
need for some type of liberalization and mobilization through free choice and
limited elections from below was again a recurrent theme. Periodic meetings
were proposed but severely criticized.39 But that discussions in one form or
another were essential was generally recognized. The need for the circulation
of ideas, for free criticism, was reiterated for many years, after its first ex
pression in the late 1920s. An underlying ambivalence between the realities
of totalitarianism and the need for real dynamism characterizes many of these
expressions. The comparison o f Italy to a Prussian barracks, an imprudent
ITALY AND SPAIN 259
remark even for a Fascist, was severely condemned by Amaldo Mussolini

(brother o f II Duce) in Popolo dItalia .40 Another article on the conformity
predominant in the press, suggestively titled “The Kingdom of Boredom,”
generated a storm o f replies and counterreplies.4 1 Though nobody
questioned the need for a strict control of the press and its complete fas-
cistization (which was, o f course, achieved), many wanted the press to offer
some variety and some positive functions o f criticism and control. A curious
theory was suggested by a well-known journalist, Longanesi, who considered
that it was within the spirit o f fascism “ to take the risk of criticism,” that is,
to risk jail if criticism was not accepted by the party.42 The permanent
dilemma between freedom and discipline, although disguised under the usual
jargon, was clearly recognized as the central issue in the problem o f youth.
“Hierarchic discipline does not exclude personal responsibility” —especially
at a time when the regime has been consolidated.43 Discussion is a “fascist
obligation.” 44 Those who oppose discussion and interpret discipline too
narrowly are an obstacle to the development o f the revolution.45 Discussion
is a mechanism for developing m aturity in the young and for fostering their
dynamic role in the party.46 Conform ity and alienation can only be avoided
by discussion, by heresy.47 The claim for an “ orthodox heresy” provides an
amusing illustration o f the ambivalence and confusion of these polemics.48
And the jargon o f “ pure act idealism” would have permitted worse contra
dictions. Others saw discussion as a means of propaganda.49 The need for
higher intellectual culture and a reorientation o f the university was also
stressed.50 But how could this need for discussion be satisfied within the
totalitarian framework? There was some request for a return to “ fascist
normality,” to forms o f “ legitimate” discussion.51 But though Bottai and
other leaders had sometimes spoken o f a new deal and a revaluation of indi
vidualism possible after the regime’s consolidation,52 nobody dared approve
the kind o f “ norm ality” implied in that request. Discussion was to take place
only within the party and among real Fascists, under the “supreme guidance
of the Duce and the S tate.” 53 Other types o f discussion with non-Fascists,
or (even worse) with anti-Fascists, were barred forever. It was really a
problem for police control. Such was the opinion o f the “liberals” among
Fascist intellectuals. Freedom o f the press was just “ fantasy,” an idle dream
of unrealistic people.54 What then? A certain awareness of the lack of rea
listic solutions did exist, as in a candid article published in 1932: it is im
possible to return to liberalism, but the young need an alternative solution
to the now obsolete liberal system. The only suggestion to reduce marginality
and apathy was in terms o f occupational opportunities within the party.55
The other aspect o f the problem o f youth, the one related to the circulation
of elites, the participation o f youth as a rejuvenating and dynamic factor in
the life o f the party to avoid sclerotization and bureaucratization,56 revealed
analogous ambivalence and inner contradictions.
The appeal for a return to normalcy was expressed again in relation to the
system o f elite selection. The dictatorship was necessary but it was also
“ necessarily transitory,” and to solve the problem of youth there would have
to be a return to elections within the party. This extraordinary thesis (in
Fascist times) was followed by an editorial com m ent stating: “ Everything
authorizes [us] to believe that this state of necessity which from 1925 on,
led the organs o f the regime to adopt authoritarian forms and methods, no
longer has cause to exist, and ought, today, to be replaced by a system in
which political forces have a wider range o f movement (un piu largo respiro)
and a wider range of options (un piu amplio g io co )”57 This type of expres
sion may have been related to recurring rumors o f a possible liberalization of
the regime. However, not only did such liberalization never materialize (the
contrary was true), but the same sectors gave a very different meaning to
these aspirations. The return to electoralism was considered completely alien
to fascism; instead, the idea o f extending the “aristocratic” principle of
hereditary succession combined with the “ hierarchic” principle of selection
from the top was seriously proposed. In any case choice from below should
be limited to “ minor offices.” This request was usually linked to a possible
development o f the corporate state, which would allow direct elections for
workers’ and owners’ representatives at the plant level.58 But again this quite
modest suggestion—though formalized in the law—was never put into prac
tice. It went well beyond the ideological and structural possibilities of the
system. This playing with several possible developments in terms o f liberali
zation and social justice functioned as a useful m anipulating mechanism for
the mobilization o f the young. The principle o f the single party, the elimi
nation o f any possible sources o f pluralism even within the party, were re
affirmed both in discussions and in the concrete steps taken to solve the
problem o f y outh.59 The totalitarian form o f fascism was solemnly reaf
firmed by Mussolini and the party secretary. Criticism had to be “well
inspired” and the role o f the single party was strengthened.60 The concrete
steps taken aimed more at the appearance than at the substance of the
problem, with the exception o f the Littoriali. Thus the creation o f the Young
Fascists (as a subdivision o f the ONB) had the purpose o f recreating the spirit
o f “ squadrism,” a return to the origins. But this was more in the uniforms
than in anything else. The problem of participation was “solved” by issuing
party instructions to the press to accept the collaboration o f youth.61
The only solution offered by the regime was the creation of a special privi
leged situation for students through the Littoriali, more tolerance for the
small journals, combined with a mixture o f police repression and integration
by cooptation into jobs and minor offices. But it was a short-lived solution,
because these ersatz concessions could not provide a lasting expression to the
mobilization o f youth.
Certain consequences o f the first Littoriali, in 1934, came as a real shock
to party leaders. The spontaneous reemergence o f pluralism added several
contrasting qualifications “ to the pure and clear simplicity o f the term ‘fas-
ITALY AND SPAIN 261
cism,’ belonging to different and opposing orientations.”62 The old parties

seemed to reappear: collectivists versus liberals, Catholic versus free thinker
and atheist, monarchists against communists.63 Nonconformist tendencies
appeared even clearer in discussions on arts and literature. The magnum opus
of the corporate state (the Labor Charter) was declared obsolete.64 In the
following years the situation, at least during the formal sessions, tended
gradually to change, perhaps because of increasing controls by the com
mittees. But in 1935 the same deviations were noted in the fascist press,
with discussions between Catholic, collectivist, and other orientations. Pre
ference for a leftist answer in terms of social justice, and even drastic reforms
concerning private property, were observed with apprehension.65 This ten
dency was also noted in the pre-Littoriali, in the provinces.66 In later years
a considerable decrease in deviance took place. Though the students seemed
to be fascist, they lacked “ passion,” their fascism was “different” ; “a cold
rationalism and a certain ironic skepticism” were clearly observed. A ten
dency towards surface conformism, especially through an escape into tech
nicalities, could be noted. Other observers noted considerable lack of interest
and inform ation on political problems.67 But it is known that most of the
more significant activities occurred behind the scenes, in informal contacts
between participants. In this sense the Littoriali involved a real mobilization
of young elites, but a mobilization which did not favor active incorporation
into the party and the regime, but precisely the opposite, since it operated as
a precipitant in the anti-Fascist awareness. All the available evidence con
firms this generalization, and in this respect Fascists and anti-Fascists seem to
agree. “They [the Littoriali] were the occasion for the first spontaneous
emergence o f a critical consciousness, and of opposition,” and the meeting
ground for potential and actual anti-Fascists; they were deliberately used
both by those who still believed in the possibility of an internal evolution of
the regime, and by the underground.68 Within the anti-Fascist movement the
only groups that became interested in the new generations were Giustizia e
Liberta (a liberal socialist movement) and the Communist party. But until
the mid-1950s, there was a great resistance, based on ethical reasons, against
underground members’ joining Fascist organizations. However, in many cases
the students themselves formed their own clandestine groups and tried to
contact the underground.69
The Schools for Political Preparation met with complete failure. One year
after their creation they were considered nearly useless and demands and sug
gestions for reform became very frequent.70 They could produce only
bureaucrats, not leaders. The creation o f a political consciousness was beyond
their reach.71
The privileged position enjoyed by the youth press was another factor fa
voring active participation, but as in the case of the Littoriali it could lead to
unacceptable deviations, and in fact the suppression of small magazines
became very frequent. Their orientation was ordinarily “leftist,” that is, they
attem pted to bring to the extreme logical consequences the social elements
apparently included in the official ideology. A return to “origins,” to the
initially “ leftist” party program o f 1919 (soon abandoned), was also used by
the communist underground, and naively by young fascists. But the corpora-
tivist promise failed completely, and instead o f real reform the regime could
only provide verbal attacks against the bourgeoisie and its style. At the end
of the 1930s and in the early 1940s the external factors accelerated the con
version o f the young generations, a process which finally resulted in fusion
with the underground movement in the great popular uprising o f the armed
resistance in 1943-45.
It is impossible to affirm that w ithout the defeat the Fascist regime could
have been destroyed. The evidence shows, however, the existence of strong
disintegrative factors whose impact cannot be evaluated on the basis of in
formation currently available. These factors were the expression of inherent
contradictions between mechanisms for control and mechanisms for elite
mobilization. The contradictions might have been neutralized if the structural
and ideological framework of the regime had perm itted an evolution in terms
o f social goals. But this was impossible, given the persistence of vested inter
ests inimical to any attem pt to eliminate the lower-class demobilization and
given the protection of the interests o f the coalition o f elites which had been
the prime movers in the rise o f the new regime.
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH IN FASCIST SPAIN72
Spanish society in the early 1930s had most or perhaps all the traits re
quired for the emergence o f a fascist regime, as enum erated in the first
section. These facts, described by many writers, led to a typically fascist
solution.73 The main differences with classic fascism were the role of the
army, the nature and composition o f the established elites* coalition, the
form acquired by the mobilization o f the middle classes, and the Hispanic
historical-cultural setting.74
These peculiarities probably contributed to the regime’s evolution toward
the authoritarian form, although during the first decade the totalitarian com
ponents were much more pronounced.75 During this early period the
regime’s youth organizations were established and the educational system at
all levels thoroughly reformed in accordance with proclaimed totalitarian pur
poses. The formal institutions followed the Italian pattern rather closely.
The first youth organizations were organized by the Falange, before the Civil
War. The Falange and its student sector, the SEU (Sindicato Espanol Universi-
tario) were, in the words o f one of its prom inent leaders, one and the same
thing, since the Falange was born with “the mark o f the university youth.” 76
In 1937 Franco unified the Falange—which in pre-Civil War years had merged
with another fascist party, the JONS (Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-Sindicalistas)
—with the Carlists (Comunion Tradicionalista), creating the single party (or
ITALY AND SPAIN 263
“movement,” according to official jargon) as “the basis of the Spanish state.”

One of the main tasks assigned to the new official party was the Organiza
tion of Youth (Organizaciones Juveniles Espanolas, OJE), The Militia,
including the university students’ premilitary service, and SEU, were obviously
part of the Falange.77 Soon after, SEU was reorganized in accordance with
the new legal status o f the single official party. Following the totalitarian
pattern, it was strictly hierarchical in its organization, with all authority con
centrated at the top and delegated to appointed representatives at the pro
vincial, university, school, and course levels. In 1939 SEU absorbed the stu
dent’s branch o f the Carlists and the Catholic Students Confederation, while
all other student organizations were suppressed and the creation of new ones
forbidden. As a section o f the official single party, SEU effectively monop
olized all students. A University Militia in charge of students premilitary ser
vice was also created in 1940. It included special sections, like the so-called
Primeras Lineas (First Lines), who were Falangist activists having already
completed their military service. The only difference with the Italian Uni
versity Militia was that the army maintained some control over it through
national and regional chiefs, who were regular army officers. The same year
an organization similar to the Italian GIL was also created: the Youth Front
(Frente de Juventudes). It was intended to unite all youth organizations
(OJE and SEU) under the same framework. OJE was divided into several
groups according to age, from seven-year-old boys and girls up to the age of
military service. Those adm itted to the university automatically became mem
bers of SEU. Its prime missions, as emphasized in the law, were the molding
of members to make o f them party militants, and the initiation of all the
youth o f Spain into the political doctrine o f the movement. Special schools
were established for the training o f instructors to serve in the Youth Front.
In the view o f the Falange and SEU ideologues, the Frente was intended to
increase their im pact on the population and especially “to implant a strong
national Catholic-syndicalist spirit in the new generations.” However, when
finally established, the new organization was much more limited in scope
than envisaged in the Falangists’ aspirations, and SEU remained pretty much
in the same isolation from the rest of the youth as before.78 It will be
remembered th at this situation also prevailed in the Italian GUF. In 1943,
SEU membership became automatic for all university students, and the
following year this obligation was extended to all other postsecondary edu
cation centers.
Since the very beginning o f the Civil War the regime devoted great atten
tion to education: drastic purges o f personnel continued for many years, as
well as strict perm anent control o f teachers’ recruitment and political orien
tation, censorship o f texts, and uniform adoptions of specially written tex t
books. New principles to remodel the entire educational system at the pri
mary, secondary, and higher levels, both in content and methods, and to
stress religious and political indoctrination, were for the first time formu-
lated in the 1938 law. In following years a series o f reforms was introduced
to stress the control o f teachers, the ideological content of teaching, and
other aims o f the regime. Since the end o f the Civil War the Falange and the
Ministry o f Education were expected to cooperate in the control of members
o f the youth organizations. A Falange representative was included in all pro
vincial Commissions for Education and the Falange also created its schools
and was put in charge o f student camps. In 1942 dissatisfaction with the ef
fectiveness o f political indoctrination conducted by SEU in the universities
led to the creation of Colegios Mayores Universitarios, a revival of boarding
schools existing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. “The obvious
advantage o f the system was that o f bringing all university students together
in state supervised dorm itories.” 79 Religious and political education were
among their im portant aims. The Falange was in charge o f political educa
tion. The church, the army, and the Falange were given a prominent role in
the universities. The 1942 law stressed state control and the “indoctrination
of the students in the principles o f National-Syndicalism.” SEU was also in
charge o f all the services and welfare o f students, in addition to their political
control, the University Militia, and sports. In fulfillment of the university law
o f the previous year, compulsory political indoctrination courses were estab
lished in 1944. This task was o f course assigned to SEU, and it was con
sidered a primary mission o f higher education. The Blue Division sent by the
regime to fight the Russians in 1941 was overwhelmingly composed of uni
versity students, SEU members. The large voluntary recruitm ent among stu
dents proved—in the opinion o f a Falangist w riter—that bureaucratization
had not yet suppressed the revolutionary spirit o f the Civil War, in which
some 60 percent o f SEU members had died, according to Falangist estimates.80
No one will dispute that during the first ten years, since 1936, a full-
fledged fascist totalitarian structure was being established in Spain. To the
complete control o f youth organizations and national education must be
added the no less complete control and manipulation o f all mass media and
all relevant sectors o f society, particularly the lower classes. Negative control
through police, repression, and extreme terror, during the Civil War and after,
is well known, and there is no need to describe it here. The famous Law of
Political Responsibilities and all legislation following it led to the violent
suppression o f opposition to the regime. In fact, even after the Civil War, and
for many years after its end, the degree o f terror in Spain was much greater
than at any time in Italy, except during the German occupation of 1943-45.
In the universities SEU imposed strict conform ity to the Falangist ortho
doxy.81 Despite the strict ideological control forced on professors, most of
them had Catholic origins, a fact which produced some consequences in later
years, when it helped introduce the first cracks in the monolithic structure of
the university. In any case it must be kept in mind that the church, being part
of the Fascist coalition, had a strong vested interest in the system, and these
sources o f deviance were really limited to a few intellectuals among the
ITALY AND SPAIN 265
Catholics.82 (New political tendencies in the young clergy were to appear

much later.) At the level o f higher learning, an Institute o f Political Studies
was established, similar to the Italian national center for political training. It
was at the same time a “ training school for party workers, and a general study
center for ideology and new projects of every sort.” Later, as the regime
approached authoritarian forms, the institution lost its importance, and even
became a “ center o f convert Fascistic liberalism.” 83 This was a consequence
of illusions entertained by some party ideologues of the possibility of a
Falangist Left, very similar to the Italian fascist Left, and equally doomed to
failure by the rigid requirements o f the regime’s basic aims.
The impact o f the Allies’ victory and the destruction of fascist regimes in
Europe forced the Spanish government to abandon its more visible totali
tarian traits and introduce some liberalization, which in the opinion of most
observers was mostly external, since the positive and negative controls, propa
ganda, indoctrination, and terror continued.84 The year 1945 was the most
dangerous for the regime: both the opposition in exile and the internal under
ground renewed their activities, including guerrilla outbreaks. But the policy
of the great powers was not in favor o f any positive action, and very soon the
cold war contributed to the consolidation of the regime. By 1949 the guerrilla
and other internal opposition groups were crushed, and later on the inter
national isolation o f the country came to an end, with the establishment of
American military bases in the peninsula, and the admission of Spain into
some international organizations.
From the second half o f the 1940s the new generations politically social
ized under the new order had appeared on the national scene. The effects of
the negative and positive controls operating on youth led to the same results
as in the Italian experience. Fascistization was successful.
These results seem to have been reached even if a discrepancy existed be
tween the ideal image provided by the formal system—as crystallized in
norms, regulations, ideology—and everyday reality. Most Spanish observers
emphasize this discrepancy between the appearance of the official structure
and reality; a great many legal prescriptions were systematically violated or
simply ignored in practice. There was a similar discrepancy between appear
ance and reality in the Italian case. Nonetheless the fascist climate pervaded
the whole society. The regime was now the normal, taken-for-granted social
environment o f everyday life. To accept the system as if it had always existed
was simply the obvious thing. Routinization and bureaucratization impeded
the formation o f a genuine political consciousness, ideologically oriented in
accordance with the movement. When some political awareness did arise, it
led to deviance, heresy, and final rejection. Ridruejo describes the evolution
of youth during the first decade after the end o f World War II as a succession
of four phases, which bear a striking similarity to the process incurred under
the Italian fascist regime:
In analyzing the development of an nonconformist consciousness among youth,

in its various possible expressions in the last ten years, one could observe a suc
cession o f four stages: (1) impatience to replace the various echelons of the move
m ent’s hierarchy which were filled by people no longer young; (2) disenchanted
comparison between the movement’s ideals and its concrete achievements,
especially in the social realm; (3) an attem pt to bring about a revival of these
ideals of the movement, through the formation o f informal groupings, opinion
trends, or disguised deviationist organizations; (4) an open rupture with party
discipline and its ideology, and the opening o f new possibilities, created by the
youth itself, and necessarily limited by the scanty clandestine information and a
desperate search for guidance.85
The same alternative paths appeared in Spain as had been observed among
the Italian youth: alienation for the great m ajority, expressed in apathy or
passive conform ity, and increasing deviance leading to rebellion for the few
who possessed a higher propensity towards politics. Among the great ma
jo rity —wrote Lain Entralgo in 1955—two overwhelming interests predomi
nated: “ profession and fun” ; and among the few, open differences with the
official indoctrination but still w ithout any positive content, in a state of
“ availability.” 86 Around 1946 the leadership o f SEU had to be replaced by
younger people, and the organization stressed its social service, welfare, and
students' professional needs more heartily. Politicization and strict ideolo
gical controls did remain, being taken care o f by the special section within
SEU, the Primera Linea, a “ real political police within the University.”87
The growth of youth dissatisfaction and increasing deviation within the
movement can also be observed through the student magazines, many rather
short-lived, since sooner or later they reached the limits o f ideological hetero
doxy perm itted even under the “liberalized” and “limited pluralistic”
authoritarian regime. Among the more representative small magazines may be
mentioned: La Horn, Alférez, Alcala, Juventud, and Laye. The major themes
discussed in the Falangist youth press were exactly the same as those found in
their Italian equivalents: pessimistic diagnoses o f the situation o f Spanish
youth, its apathy, hedonism, and indifference; careerism; the need for
criticism, but at the same time the strictures o f official control and the
dilemma between criticism and discipline; efforts to recapture the original
Falangist ideology, translated into two main problem s—appeal to freedom
and individual rights, on the one hand, and social justice and a new social
order on the other; boredom and weariness with the eternal stereotypes of
official propaganda; and the shocking contrast between the official image and
dire reality.88
In drawing the “ Balance o f One G eneration,” the generation o f those who
had gone through the university after the end o f the Civil War, a Jesuit priest
in 1947 sadly com m ented on the cold and egotistic alienation o f students and
graduates alike. In another article, youth's indifference and apathy and the
need for a dynamic m inority to revive the original ideals o f José Antonio
Primo de Rivera, founder o f the Falange, were pointed out. Also noted was
the “ hegemony o f the quiet ones,” the typical student, who had “all the
ITALY AND SPAIN 267
required party cards in his pocket, and refrains from any comment lest he
may offend the powerful. His only ideals are a good salary and no risks.”
Present youth, says another writer (also in 1947), has no purpose, only a
“sordid pragm atism .” 89 Five or seven years later little had changed: “Our
generation has lost all its political ideals,” and even religious ones; there is no
vitality. The students lack personality. “One must recognize,” said the rector
of the University o f Santiago in one address, “ that our movement which
began with the total politicization [of youth] has achieved their total de
politicization.” The same charge that youth had turned old—so frequent in
Italy—was heard in Spain. “Alcala is an expression of old age, not of youth.”
Boredom reigns in the “ massified, lonely, disenchanted youth,” affirms
another article, which incidentally, started a long polemic on the problem of
youth.90 The causes o f this state o f affairs were clearly recognized although
often disguised: too much propaganda, too many slogans, myths, and too
little freedom. “ If everyone is obliged to have the same ideals, all such im
posed ideals will end up being rejected.” “ Peace is not an end in itself” ; it
must be used to reach the always promised and never realized revolution.
“When parents are too bossy [literally: patrones ], the sons turn out to be
servants” ; “ Peace m ust be dialogue, not monologue.” 91 In the 1950s, the
causes o f y o u th ’s apathy were more openly discussed: “We have football
instead o f politics, because politics are not possible” ; “There have been fifteen
years o f parades, now we must start walking” ; “ It would be dishonest to talk
about things which cannot be changed,” or to talk revolution when revolu
tion is not possible. The mystique o f the past has been reduced to a series of
prohibitions and permissions; youth was always considered not a subject but
a passive object. To the charges o f lack o f clarity in youthful thinking, a pre
cise answer was given: “ If we [the young] are confused, it is because all doors
and all windows have been kept closed, thus we may only have obscurity.” 92
As in Italy the solution was to stimulate a more critical attitude among the
young, the possibility o f an internal opposition, or, in the words of a young
Italian fascist, “ an orthodox heresy.” But the same precautions had to be
observed to m aintain criticism within the system. On the one hand, criticism
had to be stim ulated. On the other, it could lead to deviance and even rebel
lion. Since the regime was now established, there were no reasons to main
tain the same prohibitions. For instance it should be permissible to admire
pre-Civil War writers and thinkers, “whom until then, it was a sin to remem
ber.” In any case, criticism was really a “ form o f collaboration.” The need
was “ to unite on the essentials, to dissent on the details.” “Heretics are
necessary” and “ the rulers must not fear youth’s lack of conformity since
this is the only way to avoid falling into a fatal stillness.” “Politics being an
eternal transition,” there was need for innovation, for more imagination.
Above all, there was “ need to recover certain eternal truths such as freedom
and individual rights, a true contact with reality, without propagandistic
inflation.” The revolution should be discussed, not merely accepted; “ the
real revolution is simply to tell the tru th .” 93 This appeal for freedom was
usually justified as a revival o f the original ideology o f the Falange. The same
support was given to emphasizing the need for social reform, presented as an
unaccomplished goal of the revolution. Alférez in 1947, and again Alcala in
1955, insisted on “ drastic solution for socio-economic problems,” “better
social distribution o f wealth and incom e,” and “ accomplishment of the
revolutionary social ideals of 1936.” 94 Finally, as in Fascist Italy, the youth
press noted the complete failure o f the “ courses for political training.”
By the mid-1950s this timid internal deviationism had been exhausted,
student politicization increased, and deviance turned into open rebellion.
Ridruejo and other observers agree that 1956 represents a key turning point
in the evolution o f Spanish youth.95 Both internal and external factors ex
plain the new trends and the growth o f open antifascist tendencies among
youth, despite the fact that the authoritarian control was still strictly en
forced outside o f the “ limited pluralism” and despite the various attempts
at “ liberalization.” I will not deny that these attem pts were a factor in the
politicization o f students and in the rise o f more open forms o f deviationism
and finally opposition. From a functional point o f view, they were the coun
terpart of the “ liberalizing” attem pts often repeated under the Italian regime.
It must be granted, however, that they were directly related to the nature of
the ruling coalition and to its looser structure in comparison with the Italian
case. For instance, the limited possibilities opened to “ liberals” to operate
within the university and to influence the new generations were a conse
quence o f the changes in the cabinet that occurred in 1951. At that tim e-
once the regime had achieved new strength, after the post-World War II
crisis—Franco’s policy was one o f equilibrium between Falangist, monarch
ist, and some liberal influence.96 But the participation o f liberals, such as
Ruiz Gimenez, minister of education, may have been an im portant factor in
widening the range o f choice among students. Quite symptomatically, a few
years later, when the first serious disruption o f discipline occurred in the
university, Ruiz Gimenez was dismissed.97
Deep changes were also taking place in Spanish society: some economic
development, internal and external migration, urbanization, changes in the
occupational structure—from a still predom inantly agrarian labor force
toward modern industry and services. These changes had their impact on
social stratification and on the volume and com position of the student popu
lation. After the experience o f the preceding decade, the new generations
could not doubt the rigidity o f the system, its impermeability to reform—in
terms o f either democracy and political freedom or in socioeconomic terms.
The original basic aims o f the regime had not changed, perhaps they were
slowly being adapted to the new characteristics o f society and to the emerg
ing power groups originated through these changes. External factors were
also im portant: Western Europe had reemerged from the catastrophe to reach
its highest levels of prosperity; Europe was moving fast under democracy
ITALY AND SPAIN 269
while Spain remained backward and segregated. The increase in international

contacts with Europe and the rest o f the Western world eased at least the iso·
ladon and obscurity which had suffocated preceding generations.
The rise and growth o f militant antifascist consciousness among Spanish
students is not easy to describe and summarize. For one thing it was an un
folding process, taking place under the permanent threat of repressive con
trols by the authoritarian state which continued to defend the system. Even
if political unrest and political and social protest had a degree of visibility un
thinkable in the past in Fascist Italy, still, it found its expression in clandestine
or semiclandestine groups and movements, when—as often occurred—their
nature and ideology went beyond the “ limited pluralism“ allowed by the
system.98 For the purpose o f the present analysis a few brief observations
may be sufficient. First, the internal evolution of some segments among
young Falangists; second, the struggle within and against SEU; and finally the
rediscovery o f the contem porary, democratic, old and new leftist ideologies.
The so-called Falangist Left turned out to be the main source of the present
most extreme leftists. This evolution went on slowly in the beginning, accel
erating in the late 1 9 5 0 s ." Given the official monopoly by SEU of all organ
izational activities in the universities, the students tried first to achieve its
democratization, gain its control, and eventually use it as a framework for
antiregime political expression and action. This attem pt failed, since despite
the frequent reorganization o f the syndicate to give it some semblance of
democratic control, the government did too little and too late. The attitude
of student activists was now one o f open rebellion. By 1964, SEU was virtually
destroyed, and the students had formed new free professional organizations
in all the universities as well as a national federation. The rediscovery of the
ideologies and the emergence o f numerous political groups occurred to a great
extent outside the old underground and the opposition-in-exile. “We had no
teachers, and the few things we managed to know, we learned directly from
reality,“ says the organ o f the new University Socialist Association, created in
1957.100 Although all the main ideologies had reappeared (from the New
Left to the Christian Democrats) an increasing radicalization to the Left
seems to characterize Spanish students, together with their connections with
other similar political groups in the country. (It must be remembered that the
student movement had, since the early 1950s, always been favorably affected
by working-class protests.)
The evolution o f Spanish students under Franco shows a process strikingly
similar to the one in Fascist Italy. The totalitarian or authoritarian form
assumed by Fascism did not alter the nature and consequences of the con
trasts between m obilization and control, or between the rise of a genuine
political involvement and the rigid defense of the basic aims of the regime.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I have attem pted to analyze the problems confronted by fascist regimes in

performing two of the functions of any political system: (1) how to generate
and maintain among youth the type o f consensus and participation required
by each particular system; and, more especially (2) how to socialize and train
that segment o f the new generation out of which the regime expects to re
cruit its future ruling elite. Since fascism has been defined as a phenomenon
which under given conditions may occur at an intermediate stage of the
transition towards m odernity, the mechanisms usually found in preindustrial
society are no longer available. The type of consensus and motivation to
participate—especially for the potential elite—can no longer rely solely on
spontaneous mechanisms of socialization into traditional beliefs. Instead,
active indoctrination into the regime’s ideologies is required.101 Passive con
form ity, although perhaps sufficient under the authoritarian form, fails to
meet the need for elite recruitm ent and training in both authoritarian and
totalitarian fascism. But if active consensus and dynamic and creative parti
cipation is required, then the kinds of mechanisms demanded by this type of
political socialization will generate an acute conflict with other requirements,
rooted in the basic aims and the very raison d ’etre of the fascist regime itself,
both under authoritarian and totalitarian forms. Conflicting demands gene
rated by these two sharply contradictory sets o f requirements may generate
different reactions: high participation actively supporting the system, or some
form o f cynical careerism and bureaucratization of leadership, apoliticism,
active or passive deviationism, and active or passive opposition to the system.
In this aspect, a typology of responses may be constructed in terms of two main
variables: propensity for political participation and acceptance of the system.
The scheme presented in Table 9.1 may be helpful in summarizing the evo
lution o f you th —successive emerging generations—in both fascist regimes
examined in this chapter.102 Such evolution has passed through four stages.
The first corresponds to the period o f the struggle to establish the regime.
During it the degree of political involvement for the young is likely to be
higher than normal (in terms of the level prevailing in each national politi
cal culture), and the population (including the young) will be highly polar
ized in favor o f or against the rising fascist movement. In the second stage,
once the regime has been consolidated and the first generations politically
socialized under the new order are emerging, propensity for political in
volvement will tend to be much lower, in fact, depoliticization may prevail.
At this level of leadership the regime will fail to create a loyal and dynamic
elite. Instead, it will recruit more and more bureaucrats and young people
motivated only by personal ambition. In the third stage, as efforts are made
to recreate the original spirit o f the movement in order to give new motives
for loyal active support by youth, the politically involved young will tend
toward some form o f deviance. In the fourth stage, many young people
finally realize that the regime cannot be changed from the inside, and the
m inority o f the young with a high propensity for politics will turn increas
ingly toward total rejection o f the system and active opposition. The trans-
ITALY AND SPAIN 271
ition from stage to stage will be accelerated or delayed according to the im
pact o f international events, changing ideological climate, and the rate and
nature o f the process o f m odernization. Other factors, such as emigration103
or degree o f political skill o f the regime’s leadership may also introduce wide
variations.
TABLE 9.1
TYPOLOGY OF YOUTH RESPONSES TO CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS

OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN FASCIST REGIMES
Degree of acceptance of the regime
Degree o f Indifference,
propensity neutrality,
for political or lack of
involvement Full ideological Partial Total
or participation acceptance commitment rejection rejection
Active
Active opponents
supporters Political (underground
Ideal careerists Active and
High leaders Bureaucrats deviationis ts resistance
members)
Low Passive3 Passive Passive

supporters Apoliticals deviationists Defeated
aThese terms were employed by Amando de Miguel, “ Institutional Norms o f the Spanish
Y outh” (unpublished). They were located, however, in an entirely different conceptual
context.
According to the assumptions on which this analysis has been formulated,

this model on the evolution o f youth should be applicable to any fascist
regime, under authoritarian or totalitarian forms. The possibility of testing it
on other cases, however, is restricted by the fact that only in the Portuguese
case has the regime lasted through a number of generations entirely socialized
under its rule. Fascist regimes in Eastern European countries either aborted or
were too short-lived for a test o f this kind. The same may be said o f nazism,
whose “ norm al” generational succession was interrupted too early by the o u t
break o f the war. As for the validity of the model in the case of the
functional substitute for fascism now emerging in some Latin American
countries, it is obviously too early to draw any conclusion. In any case, this
model should be modified on several aspects in order to describe Latin
American cases. Two main reasons suggest such modifications. First, they are
not based on the secondary m obilization104 o f an im portant sector of the
population, but on the role o f the army. Second, their goal seems to be more
the passive acquiescence o f the population than its active participation in a
political movement. In fact, the attem pt appears to be the establishment of
a no-party system. Under these circumstances, the young, particularly stu

dents, are likely to be alienated or strongly opposed to the regime from its
very start.105
The model does not seem valid w ithout im portant modifications in the
case o f nonfascist authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. The basic aims of fas
cism, its historical meaning, are the main factors in blocking its future evolu
tion and fulfillment of the social and political ideals which in the beginnings
of the movement play a decisive role in attracting youth. But authoritarian or
totalitarian systems based on the primary mobilization of lower strata,
oriented toward some model of modernization and nation building, may re
tain the enthusiasm o f youth for a longer period. They have a future, even if
such future may often involve an open conflict with the oligarchic bureau
cracy, which usually turns out to replace the founding revolutionary elite.
The potentialities of a regime as “ future” rather than anything else seems to
be the more general factor involved in the loyalty and active participation of
you th —a future, however, which cannot be conceived as a mere reiteration of
the past but as a continuous creation, as perm anent revolution.
Though I have not included in this study an analysis of youth under
national populism, I would like to m ention that this hypothesis could be use
fully applied here also, at least in the case o f Argentine Peronism. The first
Peronist regime made some timid attem pts to organize youth, particularly
students, along the same lines as Spain and Italy. In the primary schools, the
effort was more pronounced, with the compulsory use o f textbooks specifi
cally addressed to the early indoctrination of children. But Peronism failed
to establish a totalitarian regime and, moreover, did not need it, as was made
clear in the analysis devoted to its rise. The attem pts at youth mobilization
failed for many reasons. First, they took place in a social and political con
text which was very far from being manipulated under the total control
needed to create the pervasive climate characterizing the fascist experience.
Second, since both university and high-school students were mostly from
middle-class families (in the period 1945-55), they were bound to perceive
the regime as their own immediate social and family environment did: as a
fascist, rightist regime. Since educational institutions under the “ first” Peron
ism were predom inantly under the control of extreme right-wing Catholic
intellectuals and educators, this perception was greatly reinforced. Young
workers, o f course, were no different from their families, and by and large
supported Peronism. But the most relevant consideration for the hypothe
sis regarding the conditions for mobilizing youth is the process which oc
curred in Argentina after the downfall o f the regime, since 1955. The young
were undoubtedly the first to become aware o f the “ historical misunder
standing” which caused the middle classes to consider Peronism a form of
fascism. Many young intellectuals, immediately after the military revolu
tion o f Septem ber 1975, started questioning the real nature of the national
populist movement and to become disenchanted with the old political elite
ITALY AND SPAIN 273
and the kind o f democracy the military and the old parties were going to
establish. The “leftist” and populist components of Peronism turned out to
be increasingly meaningful for middle-class youth. The normal generational
rebellion against the older generations rapidly took the form of a neo-Peron-
ism. The generational gap was widened by the fact that under the national
populist regime the formation o f new leaders in the opposition parties was, if
not impeded, certainly made more difficult. The fact that the national popu
list regime had been defeated by force, not by votes, and the exclusion from
elections of the large Peronist constituency, were powerful reasons which
reinforced the new political orientation of a substantial section of middle-
class youth. Since the regime had been destroyed, its supporters could pro
claim the socialist components of its confused ideology without being con
tradicted by reality. Still more, they could emphasize them and turn more
“leftist.” The term national socialism was used by both the right- and left-
wing o f the movement, though with a very different content and meaning.
For the extreme Right, it was nacional socialismo, not very different from
nazism (and its literal Spanish translation); for the Left, socialismo nacional,
that is, a form o f socialism (often in Marxist or quasi-Marxist form), stressing
the reality and needs of the nation in terms of antiimperialism. It is not mere
chance that some guerrilla groups—in fact the more powerful among them,
such as the M ontoneros—were o f clear fascist, nazi, and anti-Semitic origins
and later blended with Marxism and other forms of leftist ideologies. The
example o f Cuba and Che Guevara attracted many new and old Peronists,
and originated a new wave mostly based on the example set by the role of
youth in the Cuban Revolution and their Argentine-born hero, Che Guevara.
But this new interpretation o f Peronism opened the door to the future, and
could not be tested against the reality of a ruling regime. It was an ideal, and
in conjunction with other structural and political changes occurring in the
country and in the world, could generate among the young a wave of mobili
zation which in the absence of a response from the larger adult population was
still able to support the most wide-based guerrilla movement in Latin America.
NOTES
1. I use the term socialization, which seems to have a stronger connotation than
education or training, to stress also the impact of the total climate pervading the society,
the subtle influences of everyday life and the various agencies of socialization operating
in youth and adult life. But, as this analysis is focused on youth, it will not refer to
family and school (except college and higher education). Also, no effort will be made to
compare the problems of political socialization in democratic or nonauthoritarian
societies, with those examined here. For an overview of the general problem of political
socialization reviewing research up to 1959, see Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socializa
tion (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959). On political socialization in children, Robert D.
Hess and Judith V. Torney, 7'he Development o f Political Attitudes in Children (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968). This research is limited to the United States. A recent
review o f the literature on political participation of youth and some findings on present
Italian youth may be found in Guido Martinotti, “ La partecipazione politica dei giovani,”
Quademi de Sociologia 15 (1966): 334-86. In recent years the literature on student

politics has been growing at a fast rate. See for instance S. M. Lipset (ed.), Student
Politics, special issue of Comparative Education Review 10 (no. 2, 1966); and Daedalus,
issue on Students and Politics (Winter 1968).
2. The regime’s contradictions inherent in the political participation o f youth were
described by this writer from the militant antifascist perspective in G. Germani, “ Dodici
anni di educazione fascista,” L ’ltalia del popolo (Italian daily published in Buenos Aires),
23 December 1934. The problem of generations in recent Italian history has received
some attention, but I know o f only one sociological contribution: Renato Treves, “ II
fascismo e il problema delle generazioni,” Quademi di Sociologia 13 (1954): 119-46.
3. Only the most im portant sources will be given here: Luigi Salvatorelli, Storia
d ’ltalia nel periodo fascista (Turin: Einaudi, 1965); Alberto Aquarone Tasca, Nascita e
avvento del fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1964); Ernesto Rossi, Padroni del vapore e fascismo
(Bari: Laterza, 1966), vol. 1; Paolo Alatri, Le origini fascismo (Roma: Editori Reuniti,
1961); Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario (Turin: Einaudi, 1965); and Mussolini
il fascista (Turin: Einaudi, 1966). See also references in notes 2 and 4.
4. There were tensions between the party and some sectors within the Ministry of
Education, but in any case these originated in the increasing role o f fascist youth organ
ization in the normal routine o f the educational system. This allocation o f jurisdiction
served the purpose o f helping the process of fascistization o f the school more than giving
it control o f youth organization.
5. For a more detailed description of youth formations under fascism, see Dante
L. Germino, 77ie Italian Fascist Party in Power (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1959), ch. 5; Aquarone, pp. 264ff.; D. S. Piccoli, The Youth Movement in Italy
(Rome: Novissima, 1936), describes the organization until 1935; Achille Starace,
Gioventù italiana del Littorio (Milan: Mondadori, 1939). For some early description, see
Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough, Making fascists (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1929); Herman Finer, Mussolini’s Italy (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
& Winston, 1935).
6. There were several exceptions to this rule, in special periods, through the two
decades during which affiliations were open to older people. Usually contingent political
reasons were the main factors which caused these temporary reopenings o f party mem
bership.
7. Piccoli, pp. 61-64.
8. Salvatorelli.
9. A list of the youth press is given inG . Silvano Spinetti, Difesa di una generazione
(Rome: OET, 1948).
10. Germani, pp. 74-75. It must be remembered that the Nazi youth organization
never reached this level o f affiliation.
11. Bernardo Giovenale, “ La gioventù italiana del Littorio,” Critica Fascista 15
(1936-37): 404-5.
12. Editorial comment, “ La Carta della Scuola e la sua ctica,” Critica Fascista 18
(1938-39): 130-31.
13. Germani, p. 82.
14. Salvatorelli, 426ff; Aquarone, 264ff.
15. Among contemporary observers, see Blondine Olivier, Jeunesse Fasciste (Paris:
Gallimard, 1934).
16. The considerable documentation existing in the archives, especially the State
Archives, has been receiving some attention in the last few years and it is being used in
the most recent historical works. A preliminary exploration conducted by the writer in
the State Archives did not reveal any im portant material on the topic. It is possible,
however, that a more systematic research could produce some relevant data. The only
possible procedure for more reliable information would be a sample survey among
people belonging to the relevant age groups. After 1945 and especially in the last few
years there have been several contributions by noted intellectuals and political leaders
through autobiographic and literary essays, novels, and, in most cases, brief answers to
inquiries made by literary or political magazines. The publications used in the present
chapter are the following: Humanitas, autobiografie digiovani del tempo fascista (Brescia:
ITALY AND SPAIN 275
Morcelliana, 1947); G. Silvano Spinetti, Difesa di una generazione; Ezio Antonini (ed.),
La generazione degli anni difficili (Bari: Laterza, 1961); Aldo Capitini, Antifascismo tra
i giovani (Trapani: Celebes, 1966); Ruggero Zangrandi, Il lungo viaggio attraverso il
fascismo (Turin: Einaudi, 1947, and second enlarged edition, Mursia, 1967); Alfredo
Signoretti, Come diventai fascista (Rome: Volpe, 1967); Luigi Preti, Giovinezza, gio-
vinezza (Milan: Mondadori, 1964); Giorgio Amendola, Comunismo, antifascismo e resis-
tenza (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1967); Eugenio Curiel, Classi e generazioni del secondo
risorgimento (Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1955).
17. The predominant middle-class recruitment of fascism, during its early years and
during the regime, is well known.
18. I am not inclined to explain these attitudes in terms of a peculiar Italian “ famil-
istic culture,” or by using the hypothesis of an ‘‘amoral familism” as advanced by
Edward Banfield in The Moral Basis o f a Backward Society (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press,
1958). To what extent is this priority of family over political values not a universal
response under totalitarian stability and normality?
19. This is the title of one of the autobiographical accounts, quoted in note 16.
20. More than 300,000 partisans participated in actual fighting. The number of
those killed in combat was 44,720, and disabled veterans numbered more than 21,000,
according to the official figures of the Italian government. See Roberto Battaglia, Storia
della resistenza italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1964), p. 561.
21. All the Catholic organizations for youth (and adults alike) had been dissolved or
neutralized by being limited to strictly religious roles. The conflict with the church con
cerning their youth formations (Catholic Action, Catholic Youth, Catholic Scouts, and
so forth) which took place between 1928 and 1931 had ended with a nearly complete
withdrawal of the church. In the following years, as in those preceding the Concordat
and the conflict, the church behaved as part of the Italian establishment, reinforcing and
using the regime. Not only the Pope but also cardinals and bishops called Mussolini ‘‘the
Man of Providence.” At the time of the Ethiopian war and even more during fascist
intervention against the Spanish Republic, the Vatican enthusiastically supported the
regime. There were even signs of fascistization of the liturgy, with the so-called Fascist
Masses. Obviously many Catholic laymen and also priests did not become fascist. Some
of them participated in the underground movement before 1943, or were active among
the emigres. But the manifest official position of the church was one of support, at least
until the outbreak o f World War II. It had been observed that the church received con
siderable advantages from the Concordat of 1929, but it is also true that its privileged
position was not used to undermine the regime while it remained strong and its end was
not in view. Catholic organizations probably exercised a role in preparing a Catholic
elite for eventual succession in the long run, but in any event this activity was encapsu
lated and did not affect the consequences of its overt action among the majority of the
population, which tended to generate conformity and consensus. See Aquarone, p.
293ff.; Germino, ch. 5; Salvatorelli, ch. 7; Richard Webster, The Cross and the Fasces
(Stanford, Calif.; Stanford University Press, 1960).
22. The regime had inherited from the prefascist era the educational system and—
what is more im portant—its personnel. All precautions had been taken to prevent any
open expression of disaffection and to control as much as possible the behavior of
teachers. Though a long-standing intellectual tradition could not be easily canceled, it
was sufficiently neutralized most o f the time. As mentioned in several autobiographies,
as perceived by the young, a gesture of conformity often destroyed years of honest, but
passive and covert, dissent.
23. This is the expression used by Friedrich and Brzezinski, ch. 6.
24. The monarchic-military coup of July 1943 found the regime already dead be
cause of the combined impact of external defeat and internal disintegration. The
attem pt by the party’s higher hierarchy to replace Mussolini occurred independently
from the crown initiative. The anti-Fascist underground was extremely active in the last
two years, and the great strikes in Milan and Turin in 1942 were a clear expression of the
changes.
25. The autobiographical reports are also confirmed by other sources. See Alberto
Aquarone, “ La guerra di Spagne e l’opinione pubblica italiana,” Π Cannochiale (nos.
4-6, 1966).
26. Most of the material for this section is drawn from Critica Fascista and some
other fascist periodicals (in addition to the autobiographical literature already quoted).
Critica Fascista was one of the most influential political journals o f the regime. Its
director, Giuseppe Bottai, an outstanding member of the Fascist hierarchy, was also its
most prominent ideologue. Bottai, considered by some observers as inclined towards the
so-called fascism of the Left, always insisted on the alleged social goals of the movement
and favored some liberalization (within the boundaries of the party line). However, his
actual political action remained always loyal to the regime, at least until its cause was
definitely lost, in 1943. See his memoirs, G. Bottai, V ent' anni e un giom o (Milan:
Garzanti, 1949).
27. Gherardo Casini, “ La classe dirigente: propositi e fatti,” Critica Fascista 5
(1927): 304, Critica Fascista will be indicated hereafter as C.F.
28. G. Lombrassa, “ L’indifferenza male del m ondo,” C.F. 8 (1930): 8-9.
29. Antonio Aniante, as quoted by C.F. 8 (1930): 130.
30. Π Tevere (Roman daily), May 1930.
31. “ Senilità,” II Saggiatore, December 1931.
32. Vampate, January 1931.
33. Giorgio Radetti, “Svecchiare,” Vita Nova, as quoted in C.F. 10 (1932): 30.
34. One of the first and most widely discussed denunciations of the entire youth
problem as a m attet of careerism among youth was published by Camillo Pellizzi, a well-
known intellectual, in the daily paper of Bologna, II Resto del Carlino, 14 December
1928. The ensuing discussions included many more themes, among others one which
again became a recurring topic in the following years: the contrast between generations
within and outside fascism.
35. An alarming unemployment among youth was denounced by C.F. 8 (1930): 69;
the same theme may be found in the publications Provincia (Aosta), Azione Corporativa
(Turin), as quoted in C.F. 6 (1928): 250, and others.
36. The party had become for the old a defense o f vested interests, criticized Ger
mano Secreti in “ 1 giovani e il partito,” C.F. 6 (1928): 282-84; the same author spoke
of a “generalized protest” generated by this “ resistance to youth.” He insisted on the
need to replace the old generation. The same stand, as a means of eliminating the rem
nants of the ancien regime, was taken by Gioacchino Contri, “ I giovani e il regime,”
C.F. 1 (1929): 211-13; Carlo Giglio, “ I giovani e l’impiego,” G F. 9 (1931): 453-54.
These requirements were reiterated in the most im portant dailies, such as Popolo d ’Italia
and VImpero, as quoted in C.F. 6 (1928): 201-2.
37. Dogana, “ Documenti,” C.F. 10 (1932): 30.
38. Gioacchino Contri in II Resto del Carlino, as quoted in C.F. 1 (1928): 250.
39. Editorial comment, “ Un regime di giovani,” C.F. 6 (1928): 201-2. G. Secreti,
“ I giovani e il partito,” C.F. 6 (1928): 282-84.
4 0 . C.F. 6 (1928): 342.
41. “ Il regno della noia,” C.F. 6 (1928): 301-2, 332-33.
42. L. Longanesi, “ Liberta di stampa fascista,” L ’ltaliano (February 1929).
43. Discussion between Bottai and Casini, “ Polemiche,” C.F. 8 (1930): 82.
44. G.D.L., “ Nécessita della polemica,” C.F. 6 (1928): 230.
45. C.F. 6 (1928): 303.
46. As quoted from L ’Assalto (Bologna), on several occasions, C.F. 6 (1928): 303;
C.F. 9 (1931): 1 7 1 ,C.F. 11 (1933): 117-18.
47. Dogana, “Conformismo e eresia,” C.F. 12 (1933-34): 330; “ Eresie di giovanie
conformismo di vecchi,” C.F. 12 (1933-34): 191.
48. Dogana, “ L’eredità del fascismo” C.F. 11 (1933): 390-91. Also a quotation
from To tali ta on the need for “ heresy.”
49. Roma Fascista, December 1929.
50. G. Bottai, “ Fascismo e Cultura,” C.F. 7 (1928): 441-43; “ Parole al vento:
fascisti si diventa,” C.F. 13 (1934-35): 89-90.
51. C.F. 7 (1929): 336.
52. Editorial comment, “ II problema de domani,” C.F. 7 (1929): 429-30.
53. G. Gamberini, “ 11 problema di discutere,” C.F. 8 (1930): 103-4, and C.F. 7
(1929): 379.
ITALY AND SPAIN 277
54. Agostino Nasti, “ Liberta di discussione e publica sicurezza,” C.F. 8 (1930): 119 ;
comments in C.F. 6 (1928): 342.
55. Ugo de Vita, “ Funzioni della gioventu: impiego dei giovani,” C.F. 11 (1933):
143-44.
56. Giuseppe Bottai, “ Funzione della gioventu,” C.F. 11 (1933): 81-82; Dogana,
“ Nécessita dei Giovani,” C.F. 9 (1931): 170 (to avoid routinization, mediocrity).
57. D. Montalto, “ La liberta e i giovani,” followed by comments, C.F. 7 (1929):
312-13.
58. Camillo Pellizzi, “ II problema dell’autorita,” C.F. 6 (1928): 202-3; Stefano
Mario Cutelli, “ II problema dei giovani,” C.F. 7 (1929): 232-34. The problem was also
discussed in many other party publications and it was often referred to as “a sort of
diffuse malaise among the more aware elements of fascist youth.” “ L’elezionismo nella
vita del partito,” C.F. 6 (1928): 302. Ten years later it was recognized that the
hierarchic system, which finally and coherently (with fascism) prevailed, “had its costs.”
Enzo Capaldi, “ II problema dei capi,” C.F. 18 (1939-40): 100-102.
59. Agostino Nasti, “ Partito unico e liberta di discussione,” C.F. 8 (1930): 179-80.
Luciano Inganni, “ II problema dei partiti nel regime fascista,” C.F. 8 (1930): 323-24;
Manlio Pompei, “ Azione dei partito,” C.F. 9 (1931): 43; Editorial comment, “ Fascismo
unitario,” C.F. 9 (1931): 161-62.
60. B. Mussolini, “ Punti fermi sui giovani,” C.F. 8 (1930): 43, “ Appunti per il
terzo tem po,” C.F. 7 (1929): 367; Circular of the Secretary of the Party on discussions
within the Young Fascist organization, C.F. 9 (1931): 66. The topic was commented by
the major press.
61. Foglio d ’Ordini del PNF, November 1934.
62. Giuseppe Bottai, C.F. 15 May 1934.
63. H Secolo Fascista, May 1934, p. 145.
64. Agostino Nasti, “ Ancora dei Littoriali,” C.F. 12 (1933-34): 212.
65. Ugo d ’Andrea, “ I Littoriali della cultura e dell’arte,” C.F. 13 (1934-35): 277-79;
Ugo Manauta, “ I Littoriali,” Lavoro Fascista, 1 May 1935.
66. Conriere Padano, 14 March 1935.
67. Agostino Nasti, “Orientamenti dei Giovani,” C.F. 17 (1938-39): 185-86; edi
torial comment, “ I Littoriali dell’anno XVIII,” C.F. 18 (1939-40): 194-95; Vincenzo
Buonassini, “ Dope i littoriali dell’anno XVIII,” C.F. 18 (1939-40): 230-31.
68. See especially, Humanitas; Antonini; Preti; Amendola; Curiel; Also, R. Rossi,
“Come si formo nei Littoriali una opposizione giovanile al regime,” Incontri (nos. 1,
2, 1954).
69. Amendola; Zangrandi; Curiel. Eugenio Curiel, a member of the clandestine
Communist party, became director of a provincial organ of GUF.
70. Gianni Granzotto, “ La formazione di una classe dirigente,” GF. 15 (1936-
37): 254-56; Enzo Capaldo, “Classe dirigente e corsi di preparazione politica,” C.F.
15 (1936-37): 370-73; editorial comment, “Il Centro di Preparazione Politica,” C.F.
16 (1937-38): 82-83.
71. Giuseppe di Nardi, “ L’ordinamento dei corsi di preparazione politica,” C.F.
16 (1937-38): 4-5.
72. This section on Spain must be considered as a first approach to a complex
problem. It is based on very limited sources—documentary material and interviews—
and lacks the first-hand knowledge of the society that provides a firmer basis to the
Italian case study.
73. A particularly enlightening interpretation of the social and political context of
the emergence of fascism in Spain is provided by Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en Espana
(Buenos Aires: Losada, 1964), esp. pp. 53-91. Ridruejo, a former prominent member of
the Falange, gives a detailed analysis of the relevant social classes, in particular elites,
middle classes, and the proletariat. The description of the special conditions leading to
the mobilization of the middle classes (what he calls el macizo de la raza, “the rock of
the race”) is very illuminating. See also Stanley Payne, “Spain,” in The European Right,
ed. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Hugh
Thomas, “ Spain,” in European Fascism, ed. Hugh Thomas (London: Weidenfeld & Nichol
son, 1968); Herbert L. Matthews, The Yoke and the Arrows (New York: George Braziller,
1957); Stanley G. Payne, Falange (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Hugh
Thomas, “ L’eroe nella stanza vuota,” Dialoghi del X X : Fascismo Intemazionale, 1920-
45 (no. 1, April 1967). This is the Italian edition of the journal Contemporary History.
74. According to Ridruejo, though the military assumed a leading role, the rebellion
against the Republic would not have been successful without the mobilization of the
middle classes.
75. That during the first decade after the outbreak of the Civil War the totalitarian com
ponents were im portant is acknowledged by Linz. For a detailed chronology of this evolu
tion after 1945 see “ El largo camino,” in Espaha Hoy, Ignacio Fernandez de Castro and Jose
Martinez, et al. (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1963). Special issue of the journal Ruedo Iberico.
76. SEU was created at the end of October 1933, less than one month after the
organization o f the Falange. It was really the same act. See David Jato, La Rebelidn de
los estudiantes (Madrid: CIES, 1953), p. 62.
77. “ Estatutos de la Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las JONS,” in The
Evolution o f the Franco Regime, Clyde L. Clark (Private Publication o f the U.S. State
Department, n.d.), Appendix 1, 67ff. Except where otherwise indicated, all factual in
formation on youth organization and the party (up to 1950) is drawn from this source.
Clark’s book consists of two volumes plus three volumes o f documents.
78. Payne, pp. 208-11; Jato, p. 308.
79. Clark, vol. 1,403.
80. Jato, p 313.
81. Antoniano Pena, “ Veinticinco anos de luchas estudiantiles,” in Horizonte
Espanol 1966 (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 170-7.
8 2 .Ibid.
83. Payne, p. 221.
84. The more im portant institutional additions were the so-called Fuero de los
Espanoles (Spaniards’ Bill o f Rights), municipal elections, law o f succession, declaration
of monarchy as the form o f the Spanish state, and the referendum. But this “liberaliza
tion” did not involve any real change in terms of individual rights, political freedom,
and democratic participation. Municipal elections and referendums were a farce (96
per cent “ yes” for the regime). The repression continued with few changes. The
influence o f the Falange, which seemed to diminish, was really increasing. For instance,
the new Law o f Primary Education, passed in 1945, defined as its primary goal infusion
o f the fundamental principles o f the “ movement” into young children. Clark, vol 2,
pp. 504ff.
85. Ridruejo, p. 216.
86. Report o f Pedro Lain Entralgo, as rector o f the Universidad Central (quoted
in Ridruejo, pp. 214-15). For the meaning o f availability, see note 2.
87. Pena, p. 171. This observation is confirmed by an orthodox Falangist, Jorge
Jordana Fuentes, who in 1952 recognized that the students perceived SEU as the
“ policeman of the university.” Appendix in Jato , p. 342.
88. The review of the Spanish youth press had been limited to two magazines:
Alférez, o f Catholic Hispanic orientation (published from 1947 to 1949) and Alcala,
published by SEU in Madrid and Barcelona (the only period considered here is 1952-55).
89. M. J. Llanos L. J., “ Balance de una generacion,” Alférez (March 1947); A. A.
Miranda, “ Figuras del patriotism o,” and J. I. Tena Ibarra, “ LLamada de Servicio,”
Alférez (April 1947); Gambrinus, “ Hegemonia del pacato y otras notas,” and J. M.
Garcia Escudero, “ La generacidn de los hermanos menores,” Alférez (September 1947).
90. Luis Legaz y Lecambra, “ Sobre jos deberes del universitario,” Alcala (August-
October 1953); J. A. Garcia Madariaga, “ En Alcala no hay jovenes,” Alcala (March
1952); J. Castex Anaya, “ Asf es nuestra generacion universitaria,” Alcala (March 1952);
Gonzalo Saenz de Buruga, “Juventud espanola,” Alcala (January 1955).
91. Gambrinus, “ La critica como colaboracion,” Alférez (July 1947); idem, “ La
juventud como obligacion,” Alférez (August 1947).
92. J. M. de Llanos, C.J., “Quie'n tiene la culpa? Alcala (November 1952); “lec-
cion del rector de Salamanca,” Alcala (March 1953); M. Ortuno “ El papel de los
jovenes,” Alcala (January 1954); Buruaga; idem, “ Algo mais sobre la juventud espanola,”
Alcala (March 1955).
ITALY AND SPAIN 279
93. R. F. Carvajal, “ Education y casticismo,” Alférez (June 1947); Gambrinus, “ La

critica como colaboracidn” ; idem, “ La juventud como obligation” ; “ Puntos de politica”
(editorial, September 1947); “ Profesio'n politica” (editorial, December 1947); G. Sanz
de Buruaga (article quote in note 98).
94. Al ferez (editorial, December 1947); J. J. Fuente (national chief of SEU), “ Lo
que esperamos de 1955,” Alcald (January 1955).
95. Ridruejo, p. 219; Pena, pp. 178-79; Payne, p. 248.
96. In the cabinet formed in July 1951, Franco used three distinct components
designed to neutralize each other: the resurrected Falangists neutralized the monarchists,
and the liberals performed the same function with regard to the Falangists. “ But this
political game—really designed to support Franco—had the consequence of facilitating
the politicization o f the University and the emergence of new political generations
opposed to the regime.” See “ El largo camino,” p. 24.
97. In 1956-57 the Falange made its last attem pt to exercise a decisive influence in
the reshaping of Spain during and after Franco. These attempts, which in the intention
of some Falangists would have produced a democratization o f the regime and a turn to
the Left, were in fact limited to establish some form of constitutional monarchy, with
limited popular participation. However, even this more modest reform was rejected, the
Falangist ministry’s Arrese had to resign, and the new government nominated in 1957
practically eliminated the Falange’s influence. See Payne, pp. 253-67; Ridruejo, pp.
117-19.
98. Despite the periodical recurrence o f highly publicized measure of “ liberaliza
tion” —freedom o f the press, individual political rights, and freedom of association were
not recognized by law until 1976, nor by the actual practice of police controls and
repression. Though some of the political crimes are now under civil jurisdiction, military
jurisdiction is still applied to a wide range o f actions considered “against the security of
the state.” Fines, obligation to live in assigned cities or places, arrests, and long prison
sentences are the risks normally confronted by political opponents, not to mention the
serious problems created by economic and social forms o f ostracism affecting them.
Even death penalties have been applied in recent years. For the years 1958-61 the
Bulletin o f the European Committee for Amnesty reported that some 600 persons had
been condemned by special political tribunals, with an average of five-year sentences.
This is only a small fraction o f all the people arrested, confined, fined, or obliged to
exile abroad. See “ El largo camino,” “ El imperio de la ley en Espana,” “Terrorismo,”
“ 1963: represion y terrorismo,” “Julian Grimau: el muerto de la paz,” in the two
volumes by I. Fernandez de Castro and J. Martinez, Espafla Hoy. See also an interesting
account o f repression and life in Spanish prisons by L. Ramirez, Nuestros primeros
veinticinco anos (Ruedo Iberico, 1964). The drastic restrictions introduced in January
1969, abolishing all the liberalizing measures o f the last decade, including parts of the
Fuero de los Espanoles, were a hard reminder o f the fascistic nature of the regime. Their
proclaimed “ tem porary” duration does not modify this meaning.
99. Pefia, p. 175.
100. Ibid., p. 179. As in the Italian case the historical opposition, the emigres, and
with some exceptions, pre-Franco parties failed for a long time to recognize the deep
changes occurring among the new generations.
101. A distinction is introduced here between beliefs and ideologies. The former are
traditional in nature insofar as they belong to a social setting that lacks controversy, not
because such controversy has been suppressed (the authoritarian or totalitarian case),
but because there is a “ natural” unanimity created spontaneously by early socialization
mechanisms. Ideologies are the expression of a climate of controversy, in which indi
viduals are required to make certain choices between conflicting opinions (ideologies).
Ideologies may appear where public opinion (defined in terms o f the eighteenth-century
model) does exist. In modem authoritarian or totalitarian society, it is this model which
prevails, though the “ choice” open to the citizen is a one-way forced choice. This
theory, based on a particular typology o f social action, may be found in Germani,
Politica y sociedad en una época de transicion, ch. 3.
102. The two variables included in the scheme are really continual. The division into
four or two values is a mere simplification.

103. The case o f Portugal gives strong support to the hypothesis o f the role of
selective emigration in diminishing the internal opposition potential o f youth.
104. See ch. 2.
105. This is the case o f the present Argentine and Brazilian military regimes.
INDEX
Acculturation, 164, 190, 198, 202 industrialization in, 153—56, 174,

Aetion, 209, 220 1 9 6 -9 7 , 234, 239
collective, 189 peasantry in, 155, 168
elective, 6 , 8 —9 political history of, 189
political, 199, 2 1 8 -1 9 , 235, 242 Rosas, 133, 135, 142, 144
prescriptive, 6—8 (see also, Creole, Middle classes,
Adorno, T. W., 47 Populism, Peronism,
“Aguinaldo” , 240 Socialism)
Allies, 265 Argentine Society, 216, 241
American military bases, 265 Army, 232, 234, 262, 264, 271
Anomie, 47, 50 Assimilation, 23, 221
Apoliticism, 270 Asynchronism, 16, 20, 24, 26, 37,
Argentina, 3 , 30, 3 7 -3 8 , 6 5 -7 4 , 54, 97
9 6 -1 0 3 , 110, 1 1 4 -1 8 , Authoritarian, 228, 230, 233, 242,270
1 2 9 -3 9 , 1 4 5 -4 6 , 169, 182, personality, 47—48, 236
192, 1 9 7 -9 8 , 2 2 0 -3 1 state, 77, 78
after Rosas, 104 systems, 10, 246, 272
agriculture in, 154—58, 165—69 Authoritarianism, 4, 26, 49, 52, 73,
anti-liberal and Rosista, 186 88, 9 2 -9 4
Buenos Aires, 160—64, 169, controls in, 247, 268—69
1 9 1 -9 3 in culture, 8 , 10
cattle breeding in, 154, 167—68 in Peronist regime, 235
censuses in, 154, 160—64, 210—11, modern, 4—10, 75
215 movements and regimes of, 4, 99,
agricultural, 203 118, 2 4 1 -4 2 , 245
industrial, 156 (see also Spain)
culture in, 172, 196, 202 traditional, 8 , 94, 230
economy from 1936-46, 153—57
education in, 172, 202 Behavior, 245
Immigratory, 170, 188, 197, 217, Behavioral sciences, 248
221 Blue Division, 264
industrial crops of, 153—55 Bolivia, 114, 116, 162
281
Bottai, Guiseppe, 259 Portales, 104

Bourgeoisie, 9, 46, 55, 181, 185, Choice, 235, 258, 268
2 3 0 ,2 3 6 action by, 6 , 10
anti-bourgeois, 182, 238 Class(es), 52, 58, 154, 1 7 0 -7 2 , 181,
haute, 237 1 9 1 ,1 9 6 ,2 0 1 ,2 2 9
industrial, 1 9 7 -9 9 , 231, 2 3 4 -3 5 alliance, 98, 234
in Italy, 2 2 9 -3 0 , 233 managerial class in Argentina, 239,
petite, 231, 236, 238 241
Bourgeois nations, 238 polarization, 173, 192
Brazil, 26, 35, 65, 66 , 71, 73, 74, 96, psychosocial version o f class hypo
1 0 2 ,1 0 3 ,1 0 4 , 110, 114, thesis, 4 7 —49
1 1 5 ,1 1 6 ,1 3 0 ,1 9 8 ruling, 9, 228, 239—40, 246
Don Pedro II, 104 upper, 187—88
“ Estado Nove” in, 74 {see also Lower class, Middle class,
Vargas, 26, 116 Strata)
national popular movement in, 190 Clientelistic politics, 191
unions in, 202 Coalition, 1 9 0 -9 1 , 2 3 4 -3 5 , 262, 264
Bureaucracy, 239, 256, 258, 272
Communism, 10, 27, 4 4 —51, 247
Bureaucratization, 264, 265, 270
Com m unist, 182—84, 188, 190, 200
Bureaucrats, 270
Trotskyites, 20, 189
Communist Party, 63, 174—76, 181,
“Cabecita negra” , 170, 188, 231
Canada, 67, 96, 146 ,n 185, 1 8 7 ,2 0 1 ,2 3 3
Italian, 197, 261
Capitalism, 4, 9, 46, 63, 239, 246
Confederacion General del Trabajo,
in Italy, 226, 255
1 7 4 -8 7
stages in (scheme) 53, 54, 68
Central Confederate Committee
neo-capitalistic, 55—62, 72
(CCC), 186
paleo-capitalistic, 53—66
transitional, 53—57, 71 leaders, 179, 202
Caporetto, 226 Confederazione General del Lavoro,
Catholic(s), 189, 247 2 2 5 -2 6
Conflict, 160, 220
in Italy, 225, 226, 235
dem obilization and, 219
intellectuals, 265, 272
internal, 201
organizations, 256
m obilization and, 25, 173
“ Caudillos” , 99, 1 0 3 -0 4 , 1 3 2 -3 5 ,
142, 144, 189, 2 0 0 - 0 1 ,2 3 0 C onform ity, 49, 264, 270, {see
also Youth)
CGL {see Confederazione Generale
Consciousness, 236, 241
del Lavoro)
class, 1 4 6 ,1 9 1
CGT {see Confederacion General
o f popular masses, 169, 240
del Trabajo)
political, 247, 261, 265, 269
Change, 6 ,1 8 , 24, 2 1 7 -1 8 , 231, 238
in Spanish society, 268 Conservatives, {see Parties)
nature of, 14, 16, 24 C onsum ption, 102, 197—98, 227
political, 273 Controls, 10
social, 14, 20 in A uthoritarianism , 247, 265—69
(see also Structural changes) totalitarian, 246—49, 254—57,
Chile, 26, 71, 73, 74, 1 0 3 -0 4 , 110, 2 6 2 ,2 6 9
1 1 4 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 9 - 3 0 ,1 6 2 C orruption, 190, 239
INWA 3*
Coup, 25, 35, 257, 272 ΕΑΡ (see Economic activities and
Creole, 98, 170, 180, 1 8 8 -8 9 , 220 Economically Active Population
Argentina, 1 4 0 -4 4 , 148, 170, Economic activities» 173
1 8 1 ,2 2 2 agricultural, 167, 193
political culture, 185, 189 industrial, 163,176
stratum , 133 modern, 1 6 3 ,1 6 4 ,1 7 0 , 176,198
“Criollo” (see Creole) non-agricultural, 167
Crisis, Great, o f 1930, (see Depression, secondary, 175, 177, 193
the Great) tertiary, 177, 193
Cuba, 103, 114, 116, 118, 273
Economically Active Population,
Culture, 4, 9, 221
original, 170 1 5 4 -5 9 ,1 6 3 6 7 ,1 7 4 = 7 5 ,1 9 3
political, 164, 1 9 6 ,2 3 3 , 235 Economy, 73, 210, 217, 240
development of, 221, 232, 234
Deference pattern, 230 export, 65, 67. 69. 218, 221.231
Democracy, 171, 220, 226, 229, inflation, 278, 231. 238
2 3 3 -3 5 , 268, 273
Elections, 192, 196,260, 273
Anglo-Saxon, 220
crisis of, 254 and universal suffrage, 232
inorganic, 230 in Italy, 226, 232
Democratic, 188 presidential, 185, 186,191,210,
leaders, 183 217,232
opposition, 184, 186 Saenz Pcfta law pertaining to, 143,
party, (see Parties) 2 1 0 ,2 1 7 ,2 2 6
tradition, 181 Elite(s), 2 7 -2 8 , 31,34, 50, 91 93.
Democratization, 269 107,112, 115=16,185, 197,
fundamental, 14, 50 1 9 9 -2 0 1 ,2 0 2 , 218 19, 228,
Demonstration effect, 36 2 3 0 ,233,238.250 5 1 ,2 6 1 -6 2 ,
Depression, the Great, 18, 36, 61, 63, 270,272
68, 7 3 ,1 1 9 , 1 5 4 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 4 , available, 29=30, 107=08,227
1 9 7 ,2 1 0 ,2 1 6 , 2 2 1 ,2 3 1 ,2 5 4 external, 28= 2 9 ,1 0 7 ,1 9 9
“Descamisados” , 201, 231 internal, 28 29, 199
Deutsch, Karl, 1 3 -1 4 leaderless, 28=29
Deviationism, 268, 270 (see also mobilized, 199=200
Youth) political, 2 0 0 -0 1 ,2 3 0 , 246, 250,
Deviationist, 266 255,257
Dictatorships, 99, 100, 105, 118 ruling, 227, 270
Discontinuities, 1 8 ,4 0 ,2 1 6 ,2 1 7 —18 Emigration, 272
Displacement, 17, 20, 22, 25, 27, 47, Employment, 198, 214
49, 5 0 ,5 1 ,6 3 ,7 1 ,7 3 ,9 5 , unemployment, 169, 228, 232, 254
1 1 4 - 4 8 ,1 5 9 ,1 6 9 - 7 0 ,1 7 5 , (see also Job(f))
1 9 7 ,1 9 9 , 2 0 1 ,2 1 1 ,2 1 7 ,
England, 52, 5 5 -5 6 , 109 = 10
2 1 9 ,2 3 1 , 233
in group, 20, 27 in Argentine oligarchy, 153
in Italy, 225, 227, 232 Tory worker in, 197
(see also Release) Entralgo, Lain, 266
Duarte. Eva (Evita), 187 Entrepreneurs, 1 6 3 ,1 8 4 ,2 3 4 ,2 3 9
Establishm ent, 228, 236 Critica Fascis ta , 258

Europe, 22, 2 5 - 2 6 , 30, 35, 43, 45, gangs, 240
5 5 ,6 2 - 7 1 ,7 4 ,7 7 ,8 5 - 8 9 ,9 3 , in Italy, 2 5 8 -6 1
1 0 0 ,1 0 6 ,1 1 9 ,1 8 2 ,2 6 8 m an, 242, 248, 258
C entral, 18 Party, 228, 2 4 8 - 6 2
Eastern, 18 political education, 2 5 0 —51
W estern, 66 , 88 , 96, 227, 268 (see also M ovements, Regimes,
European middle classes, 25, 6 3 —64 Y outh)
European powers, 254 Fascistization, 250, 253
o f press, 259, 261
Falange, 262, 264, 266 o f young generations, 251—53
student sector of, SEU, 2 62—266, (see also Youth)
269 Federalism, 191
(see also Youth) Fertility, 169
Falangist(s), 247, 262, 265, 2 6 7 -6 9 Feudalism, 4
Family, 246, 254, 256 Foreigners, 163—64, 221
Farmers, 168, 226 France, 55
Farm laborers, 196 Franco, 262, 268—69
Fascism, 3—4, 6 , 10, 26, 43, 4 5 —47, (see also Spain)
5 1 ,5 3 ,6 3 - 6 4 ,7 2 ,1 0 3 ,1 1 6 , Freedom , 266—68
128, 1 7 0 -7 2 , 1 8 1 -8 4 , 202, Freud, 44
2 2 8 ,2 3 4 - 3 5 ,2 4 0 ,2 4 6 - 4 8 , Friedrich, C. J., 78
2 5 8 -5 9 , 272 From m , Erich, 48, 49
antifascism, 184, 2 57—58, 268 Fusion effect, 24
m ilitant antifascism, 254—56, 269
underground movement, 254—56, Geiger, Theodor, 57
261 Generality, levels of, 4, 7—8
authoritarian, 10, 269—71 Generational conflict, 35
business under, 238 Generational gap, 273
classic, 3, 10, 53, 6 2 - 6 4 , 7 1 -7 5 , Generational replacement, 218—20,
77, 79, 127, 261 238
conform ity in, 256, 258, 260 Generations, 234, 247—48
contradiction in, 257, 259—71 -in Italy, 254, 258, 261—62
definition of, 75—79 in Spain, 266—70
functional substitute for, 65, 271 Generic m ulticausality, 18
Italian, 202, 225, 228, 2 3 4 -3 7 , Germany, 48, 55, 63, 66 , 74 -75
242, 248, 2 5 3 -5 9 , 260, 269 9 1 ,2 3 6
nationalism and racism in, 237— influence of, 172
3 9 ,2 5 5 Nazi, 77
liberalism in, 259—60, 268 occupation o f in Italy, 266
pluralism in, 260—61 Gimenez, Ruiz, 268
Spanish, 242 G iolitti (Patto Gentiloni), 2 2 5 -2 6
totalitarian, 10, 260, 269—71 Government, civilian, 179, 222 234
Fascist (s), 172, 181, 189, 191 Government, military, 179^ 19g 222
anti-fascist, 182,185, 201,254, 259, Graciarena, J. P., 64
261 Great Britain, 65
emigres, 252, 258 Groethuysen, 48
INDEX 285
Guerin, Daniel, 46 as Corporate State, 229, 235, 249,

Guerrilla(s), 30, 35, 3 7 -3 8 , 74, 125 254
in Italy, 2 5 5 -5 7 bureaucracy in, 256, 258
in Spain, 265 education in, 248—49, 252
Guevara, Che, 273 Fascism in (see Fascism, Italian)
Milan, 250
Hierarchization, 58, 66 , 68
military and monarchy in, 228,
(see also Stratification)
234,256
Hierarchy, 235, 239, 262
press in, 529
Historians, 189, 248
Rome, 225, 240, 250 (see also
“ Historical misunderstanding” , 234,
Church, Regimes, Vatican, Youth)
272
Jews, 256
Ideology, 16, 31 anti-Semitism, 256, 273
leftist, 269, 273 Job(s) (see also Employment)
of Christian Democrats in Spain, 269 authority and benefits, 199
right and left, 86- 88 , 9 2 -9 5 , 112 in Italy, 237, 254
Immigrant(s), 180—82 market, 198
internal, 192 proletarian, 237
foreign, 188—89 salaries, 227
sons of, 219 Kornhauser, W., 50
Immigration, 153, 1 5 8 -5 9 , 1 6 3 -7 0 ,
1 8 1 ,2 1 0 ,2 3 0 Labor, 164, 175, 179, 197, 241
foreign, 210—22 contracts, 177, 191
Imperialism, 181, 228 ministry of, 177
anti-imperialism, 172,181, 235, 273 organized, 1 74-77, 184, 189, 231
Individualism, 9, 92 party (see Parties)
Individuation, 9, 4 8 —50 policy of Peron, 176
{see also Students and Youth) Secretariat of, 175, 176, 178, 200
Indoctrination, 245—72 Secretary of, 180, 184
Industrialists, 198, 231 (see also Syndicates, Unions)
Industry, 175, 210, 215 Laborer(s), 167, 240 (see also Workers)
Integration, 1 5 -2 0 , 3 2 -3 3 , 48, 51, Labor force, 158, 169, 177, 196, 230
166, 2 1 6 -2 2 Lag phenomenon, 14
disintegration, 14—23, 108 Land, 231
in Italy, 2 2 5 -2 7 Land owners, 172, 185, 231
non-integration, 16 Landowning oligarchy, 233—34
normative, 16, 19 Land tenure system, 155, 168
political, 2 1 7 -1 9 , 222 latifundistas, 128, 136
reintegration, 14, 17, 23, 108, 146 minifundia, 154
Intellectual(s), 188,199, 201,234,272 Laski, Harold, 47
Internationalism, 182 Lasswell, Harold D., 48
Ireland, 30 Latin America, 18, 22, 25—27, 31—40,
Italy, 1, 2, 5, 6 , 30, 4 4 -4 8 , 55, 63, 4 3 ,4 5 ,5 3 , 6 4 -7 2 ,7 4 , 77, 79,
67, 7 4 - 7 7 ,8 5 - 8 6 ,9 1 ,1 4 3 , 8 5 ,9 6 -1 1 9 , 129, 131, 174,273
182, 1 9 8 ,2 2 1 ,2 2 5 ,2 2 6 ,2 3 1 , Lederer, E., 51
251, 2 5 7 -5 9 , 272 Left, 87, 269
after Fascism, 236 Leftist(s), 173, 189, 269
parties, 174, 176, 262 Military, 74, 127, 185, 187, 197, 202,
press, 189 2 2 9 ,2 3 4 , 235, 272
Left-wing groups, 200 collaborationism with, 186
Linz, J., 7 8 ,2 4 7 elite, 200
Lipset, S. M., 51—52 Fascism, 77
Littoral, 170 in Italy, 245, 248, 253
Longanesi, L., 259 intervention, 125, 170, 221
Lower class, 192, 197, 229—36 South American rule of, 74, 78
in Italy, 225—34 (see also Army, Coup, Government
urban lower, 159—69 (military), Navy, Regime(s),
Revolution)
Mannheim, Karl, 14, 50—51, 90—92 Mobility, 22, 25, 5 9 -6 0 , 162
Marginality, 201—202 collective and mass, 22, 30
Marshall, T. H., 1 4 ,5 1 , 109 exchange, 22, 60
Marxism, 26, 44, 47, 49, 58, 68 , individual, 22, 169
8 5 -8 6 , 183,273 self sustained, 61, 62, 72
Marxist(s), 25, 46, 74, 1 8 1 -8 2 , 189, social, 22—23
236 upward, 162, 169, 198, 232
version of class hypothesis, 4 5 —47 Mobilization, 10, 14, 52, 71, 149,
writers, 46, 48 197, 198, 209, 2 1 8 -1 9 , 225,
Mass(es), 27, 5 0 -5 1 , 116, 159, 179, 229, 231, 2 3 4 -3 5 , 2 4 5 -4 7
1 88,203, 229, 234,241 countermobilization, 25—26
media, 178, 200, 246, 252, 264 definition of, 20 , 25
mobilized, 189, 199, 200, 228 demobilization, 10, 23, 25—26, 73,
rallies, 1 7 7 -7 8 103, 129, 1 7 0 -7 4 , 197, 201,
peronist, 240 2 1 7 -1 9 , 221, 229, 246
theory, 52 double, 173
(see also Proletariat) from above, 25—27, 245
Mexico, 65, 114, 116 in Italy, 227, 230, 232, 234, 249,
Middle class(es), 25, 43, 53, 1 0 0 -0 1 , 2 5 1 ,2 6 9
1 6 2 -7 4 , 181, 1 8 5 -9 2 , 202, demobilization, 227—29, 234—35,
2 1 5 - 1 9 ,2 2 9 - 3 6 ,2 3 9 ,2 7 2 2 5 5 -5 6 , 262
European, 237—42 first cycle and second cycle of, 226
“ historical misunderstanding” of in mass, 227, 257
Argentina, 234, 272 military, 226, 255
in Germany, 237—42 primary, 2 2 3 -3 4 , 226, 227
in Italy, 225—42, 253 secondary, 227—29, 233
Migrants, 160—85 youth, 247—48
internal, 160—70 in Spain, 262—69
Migration, 22, 153, 159, 162, 167, mass, 3 7 , 68 , 7 3 ,1 0 4 ,1 5 4 , 172, 174
171 ,1 7 5 , 188 objective and psychosocial, 20
common pattern of, 165 o f elites, 27
external, 161 o f lower class, 95, 173
internal, 1 5 9 -6 2 , 181, 193, 198, o f middle class, 201, 233
21 0 ,2 1 6 political, 31, 107, 173, 197, 210,
interprovincial, 160 2 1 5 ,2 1 8
intraprovincial, 160 primary, 10, 1 5 -1 6 , 25, 63, 73, 75,
mass, 22, 197 8 5 ,1 0 7 ,1 1 3 ,2 2 5 ,2 2 9 ,2 7 2
INDEX 287
regimes, 26, 245 234—37, 245 (see also Peronism,

secondary, 15, 25—26, 43, 71, 76, Movements, Regimes)
7 9 ,1 2 9 , 172, 225 Navy, 234
social, 3 ,5 ,6 ,1 3 , 1 4 ,1 5 ,3 0 , 50, Nazi(s), 240
63, 1 1 4 -1 5 , 1 2 7 -2 9 , 153, 159, anti-nazi feelings, 181
1 9 7 ,2 0 0 Nazi-fascist system, 242
causes of, 18, 171 origins, 273
first cycle of, 4, 7, 17, 23, 107— Party, 238
08, 2 1 6 -1 7 , 219, 2 2 1 -2 2 pre-nazi Germany, 91, 181
second cycle of, 197, 210, 215— pro-nazi feelings, 172
17,221 Nazism, 4, 44, 4 6 -4 7 , 49, 51, 77,
traditional, 67 1 8 1 ,2 3 6 ,2 4 8 , 2 5 7 ,2 7 1 ,2 7 3
(see also Structural changes) alliance with nazism, 257
Modernity, 25, 67, 270 denazification, 236
Modernization, 4, 12—15, 67—68, 94, Neumann, F., 46
1 1 5 ,1 2 8 ,1 6 8 , 217, 220, 2 7 1 -7 2 Nietzsche, 47
in Italy, 226 Nomadic people, 22
political, 236
Oligarchy, 153, 171, 180, 201, 229,
Monopolistic concentrations, 238—39 231,234
Moore, Barrington, 52 elite of, 68, 218
Movements, 30, 197, 199, 225, 235, in Italy, 229
239 oligarchic class (sector), 271, 228
collective, 179—80, 184—85, 187— Ongania, 26
88 , 200, 202, 233 Opposition, active or passive, 270—71
fascist, 52, 235, 248, 254, 270
in Italy, 2 2 7 -2 9 , 261 Paretian notion, 34, 44, 91
in Spain, 269 Participation, 14—15, 20—23, 177,
multiclass, 197 1 7 9 -8 0 ,1 8 9,197,199,209,218,
national popular, 114, 1 2 5 -2 6 , 2 2 0 ,2 2 1 ,2 2 7 ,2 3 3 ,2 5 2 ,2 7 2
1 5 9 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 7 ,2 1 8 ,2 7 2 electoral, 221
peronist, 191, 202 in Italy, 226
political, 219, 271 non electoral, 144
revolutionary, 199, 227 political, 163, 1 7 0 -71, 189, 198,
Multinationals, 56 2 1 9 ,2 2 1 ,2 2 9 , 231,261
Mussolini, Arnaldo, 259 spontaneous, 221, 240
Mussolini (il Duce), 91, 171, 2 5 9 -6 0 (see also Youth)
Myths, 237, 240, 248, 267 Part(ies), 172, 1 80-81, 188, 1 9 7 -
202,222
Nation, 9, 235 anarchist, 175, 201
Nationalism, 7, 88 , 93, 101, 1 8 0 -8 2 , conservative, 171, 181, 184—87,
237 1 9 1 ,1 9 3 ,1 9 7
Nationalist(s), 172, 184, 191, 2 0 1 -0 2 democratic, 182, 187
isolationism, 180 alliance of, 233
Nationalization, 90 extreme right, 175
National Populism, 3, 10, 65, 67, 72— in Italy, 260—61
7 3 ,8 5 ,8 8 ,9 5 - 9 6 , 101, 113, leftist party program, 262
1 3 5 ,1 4 9 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 1 ,1 8 5 ,1 8 9 , Popular (Catholic), 226, 261
197, 200, 209, 220, 229, 232, right wing, 228
Socialist, 225—29, 234 [political image of, 201- 02 , 233, 235

elite of 227] votes, 1 9 0 -9 1 , 193, 196
Labor, 184 (see also Movements)
“ Laborist” , 185, 187, 189, 190, Persecution, 172
191, 1 9 9,202 Plutocracy, English and American, 181
reformist workers’, 202 Police, 1 8 6 -8 7 , 239, 260
liberal, 170, 261, 268 in Italy, 254, 2 5 9 -6 0
proletarian (mass), 24, 233 repression, 239
right wing nationalist, 170—71, Political Responsibilities, Law of, 264
181, 1 8 9 -9 0 Politicization, 10, 266, 268
socialist, 171, 174, 181, 191, 201 depoliticization, 10, 266
worker’s, 159, 184 Population, 158, 211, 214, 272
(see also Communist, Fascist, active, 14, 163, 166, 214
Leftist, Nazi, Peronist, Radical foreign (immigrant), 160, 232
(Party)) in Italy, 226
Party system, 230, 232—33 native, 160, 162
Peronism, 102, 1 1 6 -1 7 , 126, 146, rural, 161
159, 162, 170, 174, 1 7 6 -7 7 , shifts of, 209
179, 1 8 1 -8 5 , 191, 1 9 6 -9 7 , u rb a n ,214
1 9 9 -2 0 0 , 220, 222, 229, 2 3 2 - (see also EAP)
37, 2 3 9 -4 1 Populism, 67, 233, 235
ambiguity of, 203 liberal, 96, 143, 149, 185, 209, 220
anti-Peronism, 222 oligarchic, 135, 144
“ deperonization” , 236 (see also National Populism)
identified with Nazi-Fascism, 233 Populist, 182, 220, 235
neo-Peronism, 272 Press, 239, 241, 249, 251
October collective movement, 173, fascistized, 251
180, 1 8 4 -9 0 , 200, 202, 240 freedom of, 172
(see also National Populism) (see also Youth)
Peron, Juan Domingo, 26, 149, 173— Professional(s), 191, 236, 254, 269
202 Professions, 238
attraction and repression policy of, Proletarian nations, 182, 238
174, 176, 180, 182, 201 Proletariat, 159, 172, 197, 235, 238
charisma of, 189, 199—200, 234 European, 199, 219
Peronist(s), 72, 170, 184, 189, 193 foreign urban, 197
anti-Peronist, 170, 184, 186, 188 in Italy, 2 2 5 -2 6 , 237
coalition, 234 lumpen, 46, 231
“Core” Peronists, 179 n e w ,1 5 9 ,1 6 4 ,1 7 7 ,1 8 0 , 184, 188,
electorate, 190 1 9 7 -2 0 0
elites, 189, 2 0 1 -0 2 new urban, 171, 184, 196, 202
propaganda, 201, 240 old urban, 160, 164, 1 7 3 -7 4 , 177,
rallies, 1 8 7 -8 8 179
regime, 175, 179, 181, 201, 217, real, 231
219, 222, 234, 239, 272 (see also mass(es))
culture and education in, 234 Propaganda, 265—66
fall of, 234, 241
fascist origin and characteristics Racism, 490
of, 201, 202 Radical(s), 181, 201
INDEX 289
party, 182, 185, 1 9 0 -9 1 leftist, 74

Radicalism, 180, 199, 215, 218 of Argentine military in 1930, 131,
Argentine, 142—44, 148—50 153, 171, 19 9 -2 0 0 , 210, 222,
and Irigoyen, 143, 149, 199 229
Rationality, (theory of), 237—41 o f Argentine military in 1943,
o f facist middle class masses, 236 — 1 7 2 -7 3 , 177, 180, 200, 229
3 8 ,2 4 2 o f France and North America, 45,
of lower class mass in national 132
populism, 236—37, 241—42 permanent, 254, 272
Redistribution, 157 Russian, 63
Regimes, 244—46 Revolutionary potential, 198, 219,
fascist, 71, 74, 229, 246, 262, 265, 2 2 7 -2 8
271 Reyes, Cipriano, 187
fascist-totalitarian, 26, 248 Ridruejo, Dionisio, 265, 268
military, 78, 172, 174, 1 8 0 -8 4 , Riesman, D., 95
2 0 0 -0 1 , 229 Rights, 9, 13, 171, 179, 2 2 1 -2 2 ,
national popular, 102—03, 116—18, 239,241
1 2 7 ,1 7 3 , 199, 273 individual, in Spain, 266—67
non-fascist authoritarian or totali in Italy, 227
tarian, 272 political, 9, 13, 164
opposition to Spanish regime, 265, social, 9, 13, 221
269 workers’, 241
Peruvian military, 116 de Rivera, Primo, 171,266
(see also A uthoritarianism , Peron- Role-set, 1 4 -1 5 , 21, 23, 3 2 -3 3
ist(s) and Totalitarian) Romero, 133
Regions, 116 Rosas, (see Argentina)
central, 154, 158, 166, 1 6 9 -7 5 Russians, 264
in Italy, 226
peripheral, 154, 158, 162, 166, Salo, Republic of, 182
171, 188, 1 9 1 ,2 2 0 Salvatorelli, Luigi, 44
Release, 17, 27—28, 29 (see also Dis Scheler, Max, 47
placement) Sector(s), 1 7 2 -7 4 , 180, 209, 230
agrarian, 215
Repression, 175—77, 190, 220
political, 173 industrial, 215
Reproduction level, 162 in Italy, 232
Resentm ent, 47, 231, 234 lower, 219—32
Residential seniority, 164 mobilized, 219, 232
Resistance, 218—19, 256, 262 primary, 168
Restoration, o f 1930’s (conservative), secondary, 157—59, 168, 175
1 8 0 ,1 8 5 ,2 0 1 ,2 3 0 tertiary, 157—59, 168, 175—76
(see also Revolution) Secularization, 7—9
Revolution, 254 Socialism, 181, 273
and wars o f independence, 232 Argentine, 142—45, 149
attem pts of in 1890 and 1893 in democratic, 183
Argentina, 210 national, 27, 172, 182, 235, 273
Chinese, 220 Socialist, 182—83, 188
English, 220 Borlenghi, 184
in Spain, 267—68 party (see Parties)
Socialization, 246 (see also Class(es)

artificial or resocialization, 8—9 Stratification, 4, 178, 221
planned, 9, 245 continuum, 138
spontaneous, 270 social, 33, 35, 268
Social justice, 255, 260—61 socio-professional, 160—61, 166,
Social legislation, 198, 239, 264 214
Social order, 181, 2 1 9 -2 0 , 222, 234, system, 55—58, 6 2 ,6 4 ,6 8 , 230, 235
25 5 ,2 6 6 in Italy, 228, 230
Social security agency, 200 transformation of, 53, 54
Social security laws, 177 (see also Hierarchization)
Society, 6 , 22 Strikes, 1 7 7 -7 9 , 183, 185, 186, 187,
capitalist, 3, 44, 57 190, 240
“ creole” , 217 wild-cat, 179, 190
industrial, 9, 19, 37—38, 129 Structural changes, 17, 18, 23, 201,
mass, 4, 48, 49, 50, 52 209, 210, 214, 217, 2 1 8 -2 0 ,
modern, 7, 15, 217 2 3 3 ,2 3 9 , 241
modern industrial, 4, 15 in Argentina 1936-46, 154, 157—
pre-industrial, 4, 9, 270 58, 1 6 3 -6 4
Spanish, 268 economic, 160, 164, 169—70, 177,
traditional, 15, 19, 217 239
Socio-cultural contexts, 3, 44, 140 effects of on urban lower classes,
Soviet Union, 4, 10 1 5 9 -6 0
Spain, 26, 30, 63, 74, 143, 2 4 6 -4 7 , socio-cultural, 169—70
2 6 2 -6 5 , 269, 272 (see also Mobilization)
bureaucratization in, 264—65 Structure, 197, 232
education in, 262—65 in Italy, 226, 2 2 9 -3 2 , 252, 258
Fascist-authoritarian regime in, normative, 19—20
248, 262, 2 6 5 -6 6 organizational, 179—80
limited pluralism of, 247, 266, political, 218, 232
2 6 8 -6 9 social, 19, 211, 218, 221, 230, 235
controls of, 247, 268—69 social psychological, 19—20
fascistic liberalism in, 265 Student(s), 35, 234, 247, 250, 2 6 1 -
Fascist “ totalitarian structure” 6 4 ,2 6 9 ,2 7 2
of, 264 fascist, 251, 261
Franco’s Spain, 78 indoctrination and political control
liberalization in, 265, 268 of, 247, 250, 264
monarchy in, 247, 268 university, 246—49, 264, 272
national syndicalism in, 264 (see also Youth, Universities)
(see also Youth) Syndicalism, 182, 199
Stasis, 18, 129, 2 1 5 -1 7 Syndicalist, 176, 184, 200, 226
Status, 47, 228 organization, 187, 202, 219
panic, 47, 61, 231 Syndicates, 172, 175, 200
Strata, 169, 198 “ parallel” , 201
in Italy, 226, 228, 232 tradition of, 174—75
middle, 226, 232, 252 (see also Labor, Unions)
lower, 158,1 6 2 ,1 7 1 , 222, 228, 272
middle, 1 6 2 -6 3 , 216 Tensions, 32
working class, 162 Terror, 264—65
INDEX 291
Third Reich, 44 Universities, 185, 249—50

Third world, 245 in Italy, 2 5 1 ,263
Totalitarian, 10, 91—92, 114, 218 in Spain, 263—71
com ponents in Spanish regime, Militia, 263—64
2 6 3 ,2 6 5 (see also Student(s), Youth)
controls, 2 4 6 -4 9 , 2 5 4 - 5 7 ,2 6 2 - 6 9 Uprootedness, 47
education, 251 Urban center, 196
party, 249 cities, 163, 167
regimes, 26, 237, 239, 245, 247— Urbanization, 110, 137, 139, 167,
4 8 ,2 5 5 1 9 6 ,2 1 6 ,2 3 0
state, 1 0 ,4 7 ,5 0 ,7 7 - 7 9 Uruguay, 37, 38, 65, 66 , 73, 74, 96,
in Italy, 228, 235 1 0 3 ,1 0 4 ,1 0 5 ,1 1 0 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 8 ,
system, 9, 246, 254, 272 1 2 9,130
lim itations of, 251, 257
(see also Fascism) Vote, 192, 196
Totalitarianism , 26, 27, 4 4 —45, 4 9 — Voters, 226
52, 245, 248 War, 226, 227, 232, 237, 257
Tradition, 188, 189, 191, 2 2 9 -3 0 , Cold War, 265
233 post-World War II crisis, 268
in Italy, 2 2 8 ,2 5 6 - 5 7 Spanish Civil, 257, 262, 263, 264,
participational, 230—32 266
political, 189, 196, 198, 220 World War 1 ,18, 61, 63, 71, 8 7 -9 0 ,
Traum a, 220 112, 119, 1 8 0 -8 1 , 225, 227
in Argentina, 230, 231 World War II, 30, 36, 63, 69, 78,
in Italy, 226, 230, 2 3 2 -3 3 1 0 3 ,1 0 5 ,1 5 4 ,1 7 2 ,1 8 1 ,2 2 7 ,
Traum atic event, 17, 22, 23, 35, 63, 265
7 5 ,7 9 ,9 5 ,2 0 1 ,2 2 7 Weber, Max, 6 , 48
Trotskyites, 189, 201 Weimar Republic, 63
Worker(s), 1 7 5 -7 8 , 187, 1 9 0 -9 1 ,
U nderground, 226 1 9 6 -2 0 2 , 215, 232, 235, 238,
(see also Catholic(s) and Fascism) 2 4 0 -4 1
Union(s), 172, 1 7 5 -7 6 , 178, 179
agricultural, 193—96, 216
1 8 1 -8 6 , 1 8 9 -9 1 , 1 9 8 -2 0 2 children of, 188
activities, 177—79 factory, 216
collective bargaining, 176—77 foreign, 188—89
collective contracts, 184—98 industrial, 196, 216
law regulating, 175 secondary and tertiary, 196
leaders, 1 7 4 -7 5 , 1 8 0 -8 1 , 1 8 4 - semiskilled, skilled, and unskilled,
8 9 ,2 0 1 1 6 2 ,1 6 9
organizations, 231, 241 white collar, 175, 191, 196, 254
“ parallel” , 176, 187 Working class party, 159, 185
tradition, 145, 185, 233
working class, in Italy, 228 Y outh (in Fascist Spain and Italy),
(see also Brazil, Labor, 253, 258, 265, 266, 268, 270
Syndicates) active participation of, 246, 252,
Union Cfvica Radical, 210, 219 2 5 7 -5 8 , 260, 262, 270
United States, 25, 5 5 - 5 7 , 62, 6 6 - 6 7 , alienation of, 266
7 2 - 7 3 ,8 9 ,9 3 ,9 6 ,1 1 3 ,1 4 5 , 258 boredom of, 266—67
deviations of, 247, 255, 257, 260— Universitari Fascisti) (GUF),

62, 267 2 4 9 -5 1 ,2 6 3
dissent of, 256—57 Ministry of Popular Culture, 249
evolution of, 270—72 National Center for Political
fascistization, process of, 253, 265 Training, 250, 265
conformity, 253—55, 258—59, National Institute for Fascist
261,266 Culture (Instituto Nazionale di
fear, 254 Cultura Fascista, INCF), 249,
politicization, 254 250,251
senility, 259, 267 Schools for Political Training
formations in Italy, 249, 251 (Corsi di Preparazione Politica
Avanguardisti, 249, 251 Per i Giovani), 249, 251, 261
Fascist Levy (Leva Fascista), 249 School o f Fascist Mystique (Scuola
heresy of, 247, 259, 267 di Mistica Fascista), 250
Littoriali, 2 4 9 -5 1 , 2 6 0 -6 1 Young Fascists (Fasci Giovanili
pre-Littoriali, 250, 261 de Com battim ento, FGC), 249—
mobilization, 247—48, 255, 258, 50
2 6 0 -6 1 present Italian youth, 273
organizations, 248, 249, 262—64 press, 249, 250, 262
in Italy small magazines in Italy, 251,
[Gioventu Italiana del Littorio 260,261
(GIL), 2 4 8 -5 1 , 263; Opera student’s magazines in Spain, 266
Nazionale Balilla (NB), 248— [Alcala and Alferez, 266—67;
251, 260] La Hora, Juventud, and Laye,
in Spain 266]
[Catholic Students Confedera problem, 254—60, 267
tion, 26 3; Organization of Youth apathy, 258, 266—67
(Organizaciones Juveniles careerism (arrivismo), 254, 258,
Espanoles, OJE), 263; Youth 2 6 6 ,2 7 0
Front (Frente de Juventudes), unem ploym ent, 258
263] rebellion of, 247, 255, 258, 266,
2 6 8 ,2 6 9
physical and military training of,
{see also Falange, student sector of
246, 248, 253
(SEU)
political education, elite training
and selection of, 249—52, 260, Youth, in Cuban Revolution, 273
2 6 8 ,2 7 0 Youth, under national populism
Fascist University Groups (Gruppi (Argentine peronism), 272—73

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AUTHORITARIANISM, FASCISM, AND

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright

Library o f Congress Catalog Number: 77-80871

Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Part I: Theoretical Background

1 Authoritarianism in Modern S ociety............................ 3

Part II : A Case Study o f National Populism

5 Political Traditions and Social Mobilization at

Part III: Mobilization From Above

9 Political Socialization o f Youth in Fascist

In the social sciences the choice o f a subject—when it expresses more than a

nonm odern authoritarianism is introduced. M odernity is here defined not as a

The many contrasting interpretations reflect the variety o f totalitarian or

different approxim ations o f Spanish, English, and Italian. Special thanks

1. See G. Germani, “Stages o f Modernization in Latin America,” Studies in Com­

AUTHORITARIANISM IN MODERN SOCIETY

In this book I intend to examine some aspects o f recent and contemporary

TABLE 1.1 LEVEL OF GENERALITY IN TERMS OF SOCIOCULTURAL

Level o f Generality in Level of Generality in Terms o f

long range Structural contradictions Cultural area or nation

medium range Stage and forms of the Specific configuration

short range Cycle o f mobilization Cycle o f mobilization

AUTHORITARIANISM AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF

society. A uthoritarian “ solutions” are possible, and under certain conditions

MODERN AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM

What is essential in modern authoritarianism , above all in its “ pure” form

“naturally” there, w ithout possible alternatives. The legitimacy o f the rulers

existence o f a supporting mobilized mass, but also by the traditionalism o f

1. G. Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicion (Buenos Aires: Paidos,

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE

within institutions (some aspects o f the same institutions more modernized

INTEGRATION, DISINTEGRATION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

An integrated society has the following characteristics: (1) The various

THE CYCLE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Mobilization is defined as a cycle o f rapid social change constituted by sev­

political action becomes p rom inent; religious or ideological conflicts explode,

which these changes occur. At the present state o f knowledge no generaliza­

ASPECTS AND FORMS OF MOBILIZATION, DISINTEGRATION,

When a group is integrated it will function in a normal manner within so­

society), and th at which actually takes place. This lack o f correspondence

groups. When a stratum , because o f stru ctu ral alterations or psychosocial

or professional networks. In this sense individuals are located in a profes­

MOBILIZATION AND CONFLICT:

The notion o f secondary m obilization—mobilization within already

DISPLACEMENT, AVAILABILITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF ELITES

sidered a substitute for revolution—or a good illustration of such a leaderless

CONDITIONS FO R POLITICAL O R NONPOLITICAL

social mobilization. The recently inmigrated sectors in the urban centers

highly visible social disturbances o f short d u ratio n; although indirectly they

MOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION AS SOURCES O F TENSION

The three phenom ena which we have endeavored to define—availability,

found. The term revolution o f growing expectations refers to facts o f this

tablishm ent o f industries or by changes in the prim ary agricultural or extrac­

these strata—captured between the growing forces o f the organized lower

development and present social structure do not satisfy the requirements of

process o f change is o f great causal relevance. These discontinuities are related

1. K. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political D evelopm ent,” American Political

7. Germani, Politica y sociedad, ch. 3.

MIDDLE-CLASS AUTHORITARIANISM AND FASCISM:

SOCIAL CLASSES AND CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF FASCISM

changes in the structure o f stratificatio n is only one o f the components

authoritarian syndrome, sociological and psychosocial theories of mass so­

STRUCTURAL (MARXIST) VERSION OF THE CLASS HYPOTHESES

1. See G. Germani, “Stages o f Modernization in Latin America,” Studies in Com

Mobilization is defined as a cycle o f rapid social change constituted by sev

which these changes occur. At the present state o f knowledge no generaliza

When a group is integrated it will function in a normal manner within so

or professional networks. In this sense individuals are located in a profes

tablishm ent o f industries or by changes in the prim ary agricultural or extrac

authoritarian syndrome, sociological and psychosocial theories of mass so

or disappearance o f interm ediate structures, tends to intensify such feel

Theories o f mass society have a prom inent place in contemporary soci

(strata, characteristics of the system, such as norms, values, etc.) correspond

previous phase are intensified: increase in technological-economic concentra

2. Degree o f discontinuity between strata: ranges from maximum discontinu

7. Real possibilities o f m obility: ranges from very few, unequally dis

*G. Germani: “ Social and Political Consequences o f Mobility,” in Social Struc

components were strong or relatively strong, though with the institutionaliza

one cannot speak o f a mass m obilization of the middle classes as a conse

proposed by Friedrich and Brzezinski. It consists of a syndrome of six inter

propaganda, and the technical changes in mass communication which m odi

implant non democratic forms. Similarly, ethnocentrism proper to a tradi

total participation democracy. From a political point o f view, it means effec

a consciousness of their own existence and potentials. The functioning o f rep