G.R. No.

182748               December 13, 2011

ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
Rufino Buena and Jesus Paulite was on their way home. They stopped by the roadside
as Jesus took a leak while Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind
and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter.
Rufino fell unconscious and Jesus fled. Ananias, on her way home as well, saw Rufino
and tried to help him but someone also stuck him on the right temple, knocking him out.
The whole incident was caught by Paciano Alano, he then sought the help of the
barangay tanod and brought Rufino to the hospital. Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-
Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead,
along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and
potentially fatal, but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The RTC convicted Arnel of frustrated homicide beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced him of prision correccional, as minimum, to prision mayor, as maximum.
Arnel sought for probation but was denied since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years. Arnel appealed to CA however the
CA affirmed the judgment of RTC but deleted the award for lost income in the absence
of evidence to support it. Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide.

RULING:
No. The Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and not frustrated
homicide. The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent
to take his victim’s life. Thus, the intent to kill is often inferred from the means the
offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a stone sizing 15 ½ inches in diameter, the
forceful blow knocked Rufino out. Considering all of these, court is convinced that he
intended to kill him. However, in Palaganas v. People, it was ruled that if the victim’s
wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. More
so, Rufino had only two lacerations on his forehead and these wounds were not so
deep, as testified by Dr. Belleza Rufino’s wounds in this case were categorically not
"fatal”. Therefore, the court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide, not frustrated
homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
G. R. No. 160188              June 21, 2007

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS
NACHURA, respondents.

FACTS:
Aristotel Valenzuela hauled a pushcart with cases of “Tide” detergents from Super Sake
Club, a supermarket within ShoeMart (SM), and unloaded these cases in an open
parking space where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela went back inside and after five
minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open parking space. A security guard named Lago saw
this happening and eyed the acts of Valenzuela and Calderon, as the two was about to
leave the parking space thru their boarded taxi, security guard Lago proceeded to stop
the taxi. The two flee on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot and alerted his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene,
and the stolen merchandise recovered.8 The filched items seized from the duo were four
(4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional
cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft.

RULING:
No. The petitioner is not guilty of frustrated theft, thus, the crime was charged with
consummated theft. The moment the petitioner obtained physical possession of the
cases of “tide” detergents, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without
need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
Moreover, to ascertain whether the crime committed is consummated and not frustrated
theft, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced" -Article
308 provides that theft is already "produced" upon the "taking of personal property of
another without the latter’s consent." It is immaterial if the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of
execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Hence, it can be concluded that theft cannot have a frustrated stage; theft can only be
attempted or consummated.
G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant.

Ariston Estrada for appellant.

Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

FACTS:
The house of M.D Lewin (No. 328), located at San Rafael Street, San Miguel was seen
with smoke coming from the lower floor of their house. Alerted by the situation, Mrs.
Auckback, a resident of the neighborhood, ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for
the fire. Banal found, a kerosene oil placed between a post of the house and a partition
of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which were burning. At that moment
Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while, the other defendant
Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.The police arrested both of
them; Valdes admitted that he had set the fire on the sack and the rag, but later on
denied his statement claiming that it was servant Paulino who had done the acts. He
further alleged that he had only set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he had
gathered, which is contrary to the statement he made in the police station. For lack of
evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the other
defendant Hugo Labarro.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendant committed the crime of frustrated arson.

RULING:
YES. Valdes committed the crime of frustrated arson and not of consummated one.
Inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the burning of said
house, the felony was not consummated owing to causes independent of the
defendant’s will. The criminal act which he intended was not produced, thus, it cannot
be classified as consummated arson further it was only frustrated for the reason that no
part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the
rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition
might have started to burn if the fire had not been put out on time.
G.R. No. 129433             March 30, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.

FACTS:
Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan went down from the second floor of their house to prepare
Milo chocolate drinks for her two children. Primo Campuhan, a helper of Conrado Plata
Jr., brother of Corazon, was also then at the ground floor busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Later on, while
Corazon was busy preparing the milo drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry,
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!", she immediately went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel, the four-year old daughter of Corazon, whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees. Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina but was stopped
as Corazon boxed him several times. Campuhan tried to escape but later was
apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. Physical examination of
the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was
noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its
orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter. Moreover, during the court’s examination, Crysthel
denied that Campuhan’s penis penetrated her organ but agreed that Campuhan’s penis
did touch her organ.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of statutory rape.

RULING:
No. Campuhan is not guilty of statutory rape, thus, was convicted only of attempted
rape. As provided in RPC 335(3), the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of woman below 12. Carnal knowledge is not essentially executed by full
penetration of the vaginal orifice, nor is the rupture of hymen necessary; the mere
touching of external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. Consequently, the medico-legal officer finds
no evident sign of extra-genital physical injury as her hymen was intact and its orifice
was only 0.5 cm. in diameter. Lack of evidence in showing of the slightest penetration of
the female organ, Court had anchored its conclusion that rape was not consummated
based on both the victim's testimony that she felt no pain, and the medico-legal finding
no evident sign of extra-genital physical injury. Even though Campuhan was not liable
for consummated or statutory rape he was still convicted by the court of attempted rape
since he had already commenced the commission of rape directly by his overt acts and
did not perform all the acts of execution to produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, which is the interruption
of Crysthel’s mother, Corazon.