G.R. No.

179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Bersamin, J.:

Facts:
 February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco
The Latter then filed an application for land registration covering the property in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
Malabanan claimed that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
OCENCO of the property for more than 30 years.
 June 11, 2001
Malabanan presented during trial a certification issued by CENRO, proving that
the said property is part of the A & Lands.
 December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for
land registration.
 February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application for registration of Malabanan.

Issues
Whether the Petitioner or his predecessors in interest had been in OCENCO as
prescribed by law to acquire ownership of the subject property?

Held
The court ruled in negative.
 Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy
the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
An examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means
that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point
at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of
the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation
that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land
cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State,
such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
 G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

TINGA, J.:

Facts:
 January 5, 1993
Naguit married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-
Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated
in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.
The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title
over the aforesaid land.
 February 20, 1995
Initial commenced, the Government and Jose Angeles, representing the
heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition.
The court issued an order of general default against the whole world
except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition.
 The evidence presented, showed that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945
under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.
 July 9, 1992,
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato
Maming (Maming), sometime in 1955 or 1956.
The heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
Naguit assigned Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator.
 The administrator in his capacity, introduced improvements to the subject
property (Fruit trees, etc.).
 September 27, 1997,
MCTC rendered a decision favoring the respondents, and ordered that the
property be brought under the operation of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.
 The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration.
 On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
Whether the respondent Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept
of owner for the required period?
Held:
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
On the other issue on whether the petitioner’s claim of ownership fall within the
prescribed period, the court irritated that “Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
 ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands"
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.”
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent
can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945
or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has
acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens
system.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs
 G.R. No. L-67399 November 19, 1985

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (The Director of Lands), petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AVELINO LEYCO, LEANDRO LEYCO, ZARA LEYCO,
JUSTINA LEYCO and FELIPA LEYCO, represented by LEANDRO LEYCO, respondents.

MAKASIAR, C.J.:

Facts:
 Avelino, Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa all surnamed LEYCO applied for
judicial confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with a combined area
of 138.5413 hectares in CFI Marinduque.
 The Director of lands for the Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition.
 Petitioner asserted that the subject property does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership so as to entitle the respondents to a State grant under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141), as amended.
 It was averred by the petitioner, that the respondents failed to establish
conclusively that they and their predecessor-in-interest were in continuous
possession and occupancy of the lots in question under bona fide claim of
ownership.
 The respondents presented their evidence of tax declaration (earliest tax dec.
was on 1927) as to prove that they have been in OCENCO of the said property.

Issues:
Whether the respondents established that they have been in concept of an owner of the
subject property.
Held:
Upon a cursory look at the exhibits (tax declarations) presented by respondent
applicants herein reveals a number of discrepancies that cast serious doubts on
respondents' claim over the lots in question.
 The foregoing disparity in the size of the land as declared in the two tax
declarations is a clear indication that respondent applicants herein and their
predecessor-in-interest were uncertain and contradictory as to the exact or actual size of
the land they purportedly possessed.
The record shows that even the taxes due o the litigated lots were not paid
regularly. As per certification of the municipal treasurer of Buenavista, Marinduque, it
was shown that the taxes due on the land registered in the name of Fausta de Jesus were
paid only from 1949 until 1957 — an indication that respondent applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest did not pay taxes to the government from 1928 to 1940, and
from 1958 until July 6, 1978 when the respondent applicants closed their evidence — a total
of 32 years.
Finally, this is a clear case of land-grabbing of over 100 hectares of land, which
could be divided among the landless and the poor to defuse the seething unrest among
the underprivileged. At this point in time in our country's history, land-grabbing by the
powerful, moneyed and influential absentee claimants should not be tolerated nor
condoned if only to avoid fanning further the fires of discontent, dissidence or
subversion which menacingly threaten the very survival of our nation.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED. THE DECISION OF THE
RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. NO COSTS.
 G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:
 It was presented that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had been in
OCENCO of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death,
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio).
 27 September 1960
Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of
his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato).
Later, Antonio gave another piece of land to Fortunato.
 April 6, 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land
was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting)
 August 8, 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent T.A.N Properties.
Issues:
Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an
owner as corroborated by testimony of witness as well a tax declaration.
Held:
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista
and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista’s statement that the
possession of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than
factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to
 establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and
exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony
of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelista’s
uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres
testified primarily on the fact of respondent’s acquisition of the land. While he claimed to
be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay.
He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes
were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in
possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives
rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land
only in that year.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We
DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
SO, ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-17652             June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

Fact:
 This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, et al. from the decision of
the CA dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of
land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
Petitioners Ignacio, et al are the owners of a parcel of land by inheritance
from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her
parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by OCT issued on June 9, 1934).
 When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many
years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place,
by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958,
the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its
original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters, more or
less, had been added to the registered area.
 Petitioners instituted an action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion, alleging in their complaint that they and their predecessors-in-
interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof,
until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under
claim of ownership. Respondents claim ownership in themselves,
asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed
possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
Issues:
1. Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot
which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible.
Held:
An unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not,
by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under
the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have
been provided. Here, petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property up to the
time they instituted the action in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of Imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 2. This
is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of
such possession. The CA found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot
since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the
filing of the action in 1958. The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act
190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when
the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the CA that the respondents acquired alluvial
lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners. So, ordered.
 G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
Facts:
 Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied
with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of
a 33-hectare land situated in Barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao.
 Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed
bids for the purchase of the subject land.
 Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award.
 Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed, the Bureau
of Lands conducted a survey, the plan was approved and the land
awarded to Eugenio de Jesus.
 Director of Lands ordered an amendment that "a portion of the land
covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E -3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is
needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site... purposes, the said
application is hereby amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A".
 The area excluded was identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in
question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
 President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing Lot
No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for
military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of
Philippine Army.
 On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th
to 10th installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his
sales Application was amended. This payment did not include the military
camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded
from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made.
  President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared
the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach,
Davao City.
 President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the
same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the
administration of the Director of Hospital... on December 6, 1969,
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of
the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of
Davao.
 The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength
of Proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes.
 Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sales
applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration on the ground that
his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired a vested right
 Court of First Instance of Davao in the name of the Mindanao Medical
Center. Court of Appeals appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as
it denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo.
 Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us
thru the present appeal.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full
12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for
medical center site purposes.
Held:
We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious.

Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a
portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appurtenances.
 Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, certainly, Proclamation No. 350 is
free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the President
to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific
public use or service.
Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio
de Jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2
because the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands
Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares the
very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with
an area of 22 hectares. This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares
upon actual survey.
Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Award, Order for Issuance of Patent, and
Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus as
20.6400 hectare
The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award cannot be licitly seized upon as
basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the
applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail
over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Government,
and most strongly against the grantee.[18] Any doubt as to the intention or extent of
the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor.
In general, the quantity of the land granted must be ascertained from the
description in the patent, because the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of
the land conveyed.
In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty
may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution and
subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved.
For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of such document. And the due execution of the document would be proved
through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and
saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and... delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof. None of these modes of proof was
execution ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus.

This is especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires
the accomplishment thereof in a public document in order to be valid.

First, none of these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them
saw the document after its execution and delivery and recognized the signatures of the
parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the
execution. Second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" is ambiguous as to be
synonymous with a "deed of donation; And third, the persons who showed the deed,
Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus, were not parties to the instrument.

Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss of the

document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that
the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle,
Sesinando de Jesus, in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared
that his copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation.
The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Acting Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed for military purposes" and
may not therefore be released from the reservation cannot substitute the proof so
required. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much
fewer official admissions thereof.
 G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

LAUSAN AYOG, et, al. (petitioners)

vs.

JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF DAVAO, and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Facts:

 On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to

Biñan Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application
No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No.281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga
(Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty
hectares.
 Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale.
 The Director of Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed the
protests and ordered the occupants tovacate the lot and remove their
improvements.
 No appeal was made from that decision. Because the alleged occupants
refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on
February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No.
3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana).
Issues:
Whether or not Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private
corporation from purchasing public lands) is applicable in the case at bar.
Held:
NO. There is no merit in the instant prohibition action.
The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop
the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to
that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.