13.1.larson Origins of Containment Truman and West Berlin

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Larson
The Origins of Commitment: Truman and West Berlin
The Origins of Commitment

Truman and West Berlin
✣ Deborah Welch Larson
U
ntil the 1948–1949 Soviet blockade, many observers expected
that the United States would not remain in West Berlin after the establish-
ment of a West German government. The U.S. government would have no
administrative reason to remain in West Berlin after joint occupation had
ended and the Allied Control Council (ACC) was dismantled.1 Many U.S.
ofªcials assumed that the United States would eventually withdraw its forces
to Frankfurt or some other West German city.2 During the crisis, Undersecre-
tary of State Robert Lovett afªrmed that “it is not necessarily our policy to
stay in Berlin forever.” He maintained that any pullout should be under “fa-
vorable circumstances.”3 The principal reason for U.S. hesitation about stay-
ing in West Berlin was the city’s isolated geographic position, roughly 180 ki-
lometers from the border with West Germany, surrounded by more than
380,000 Soviet troops in East Germany.
Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union cut off ground and water access
routes to West Berlin in June 1948, the United States launched a massive ef-
fort to supply West Berlin’s population by air and became committed to stay-
1. On 13 April 1948 the political adviser to the United States Military Governor of Germany, Robert
Murphy, cabled John Hickerson that he worried about the “strength of determination in Washington”
to maintain the U.S. position in Berlin “in view [of the] unfavorable logistics [of ] this situation, its ex-
penses, and assuming dissolution the Control Council, lack of speciªc purpose for our presence here.”
See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. II (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 1973) (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and
volume numbers), p. 892.
2. In 1947 the U.S. military governor, General Lucius D. Clay, asked architect Walter Gropius to draw
up a plan for establishing a capital city in Frankfurt for a future West German state. Jeffrey M.
Diefendorf, “America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany,” in Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn,
and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–
1955 (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 337.
3. Memorandum for the President, 15 October 1948, in Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secre-
tary File (PSF), Subject File, National Security Council-Meetings File, “Memoranda for the President:
Meeting Discussions: 1948,” Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Independence, MO.
Journal of Cold War Studies

Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 180–212
© 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
180
ing in West Berlin. In large part because of the airlift and the West Berliners’
stalwart resistance to Communism, the U.S. guarantee to West Berlin became
a symbol of U.S. determination to defend Western Europe and West Ger-
many.4 If there had been a U.S.-Soviet war, it would have been most likely to
ignite over Berlin.5 Why did the United States take responsibility for main-
taining West Berlin’s independence? Why did President Harry S. Truman de-
cide to stay in West Berlin “come what may” and rely on the airlift?
For all West Berlin’s symbolic importance, the U.S. commitment is nev-
ertheless puzzling, at least from the standpoint of “classical realist” foreign
policy theory. Classical realism was largely formulated during the early Cold
War to rationalize, explain, evaluate, and guide the U.S. government in its
new global role.6 Unlike the later “neorealist” theory of international politics,
which does not claim to explain foreign policy decisions and actions, classical
realism deals with both foreign policymaking and international relations.7 A
major tenet of realism is that a state should adjust its goals so that they are
commensurate with available power.8 As the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
pointed out, the local preponderance of Soviet military forces meant that
West Berlin was not defensible by conventional means. Moreover, West
Berlin’s access routes could be cut off at any time, giving the United States no
practical means of response. In short, West Berlin was a strategic liability.9
4. See, for example, Diethelm Prowe, “Berlin: Catalyst and Fault Line of German-American Relations
in the Cold War,” in Detlef Junker, ed., The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War,
1945–1990, Vol. 1, 1945–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 165–179.
5. Lawrence Freedman, “Berlin and the Cold War,” in John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake, eds., The
Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 2.
6. Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations Author(s),” Daedalus,
Vol. 106, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 47–48; and Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Intellectual and Political
Functions of a Theory of International Relations,” in Horace V. Harrison, ed., The Role of Theory in
International Relations (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 113–114. Works by classical real-
ist foreign policy theorists include Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); George F. Kennan, Realities of American For-
eign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collabora-
tion: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Henry A.
Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977). Recently, the so-called
neoclassical realists have tried to revive the earlier tradition of realist foreign policy theory. See Gideon
Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October
1998), pp. 144–177; and Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
7. For the distinction between theories of foreign policy and international politics, see Neorealist Ken-
neth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 65, 72–
73, 122–123.
8. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign
Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 117–120; and Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration,
pp. 90, 114.
9. On the political and military weaknesses of the West’s position in Berlin and the lack of practical
military options for the United States, see Kori Schake, “The Berlin Crises of 1948–49 and 1958–62,”
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Larson
To explain the commitment, this article traces the Truman administra-

tion’s decision-making process before and during the blockade. Truman
played an important role in the decision to remain in Berlin, and the evidence
suggests that he relied on his own judgment rather than policy analysis. Tru-
man’s advisers were divided and unable to reach a consensus.10 The newly es-
tablished National Security Council (NSC) was not used until later in the cri-
sis, when it mainly dealt with issues related to implementation of the airlift.
Although other scholars have provided accounts of the perceptions and calcu-
lations of U.S. ofªcials, this article places Truman’s decision in the context of
psychological theory and research on intuitive judgment.11 Recent psycholog-
ical research suggests that individuals are apt to use non-deliberative means of
decision-making when problems are complex and uncertain.12
The article begins by evaluating the U.S. commitment to West Berlin
from the standpoint of classical realist theory. The article then discusses psy-
chological theory that might explain Truman’s decision-making. A case study
of the 1948–1949 Berlin crisis analyzes four major decision points: Truman’s
initial decision to stay in Berlin, formulation of a diplomatic strategy, adop-
tion of the airlift for the long term, and augmentation of the airlift to last
through the winter. The conclusions discuss the implications of the origins of
the West Berlin commitment for understanding U.S. Cold War policy and
the decision-making process.
Realism and the U.S. Commitment to West Berlin
The Western presence in West Berlin is puzzling from a classical realist per-
spective, given the city’s vulnerability and the lack of options to defend it. Re-
alists maintain that foreign policymakers should be aware of how particular
actions will affect their state’s power position. Power is an essential means to
protect core state objectives as well as to achieve less vital goals.13 Accordingly,
in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill, eds., Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62: Thoughts for the Post–
Cold War Era (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 66–69.
10. W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1957), pp. 149–150.
11. For accounts of the perceptions and calculations of U.S. ofªcials, see Avi Shlaim, The United States
and the Berlin Blockade, 1945–1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Daniel F.
Harrington, “The Berlin Blockade Revisited,” The International History Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Febru-
ary 1984), pp. 88–112.
12. For key statements of psychological theory on intuitive judgment, see Daniel Kahneman, “A Per-
spective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality,” American Psychologist, Vol. 58,
No. 9 (September 2003), pp. 697–720; and Ap Dijksterhuis and Loran F. Nordgren, “A Theory of
Unconscious Thought,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006), pp. 95–109.
13. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 25–26; and Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration,
182
leaders think and act in terms of the “national interest deªned as power.”14
Foreign policymakers may not always act so sensibly, but their policies can be
measured against a “rational essence” abstracted from reality. A policy based
on power is not only prudent but more likely to be successful.15
Realism stresses the distinction between “what is desirable and what is
possible.”16 Foreign policymakers should ascertain whether their country has
adequate power to achieve a particular objective at an acceptable cost. Failure
to observe this principle leads to inconsistency or half-hearted measures. Ef-
forts to defend an exposed ally may be provocatively costly or lead to erosion
of the state’s credibility.17
When the Soviet Union imposed the blockade, the only means of supply-
ing the German inhabitants of the Western sectors was by air, a method that
did not have a good record of success: The Soviet Union had failed to supply
Leningrad by air during World War II, and the Germans came up short dur-
ing the battle of Stalingrad. Berlin posed especially difªcult problems because
of shortages of planes, air trafªc congestion, the narrowness of the air corri-
dors, and the lack of suitable air bases in Germany.18 At the time, military ex-
perts predicted that the airlift would be adequate for only a few months.19
If the current crisis passed, the Soviet Union could place restrictions on
access to West Berlin at any time, giving the United States few options be-
yond the threat of escalation. The Soviet government could use the vulnera-
bility of West Berlin to pressure the United States on issues related to Ger-
many. If Soviet leaders tried to annex West Berlin by force, the United States
could not defend the city without sending U.S. troops into Soviet-occupied
German territory, thereby provoking a major war. The JCS regarded West
Berlin as a strategic liability, an “exposed salient” as General Walter Bedell
Smith described it.20 The Soviet Union’s conventional superiority was bal-
anced by the United States nuclear monopoly in 1948, but this was not ex-
pp. 90–99. For realist assumptions, see Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political
Realism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 290–291.
14. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 5.
15. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
16. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, p. 117.
17. Ibid., p. 117; and Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 221.
18. Michael D. Haydock, City under Siege: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948–1949 (Washington,
DC: Brassey’s, 1999), pp. 149, 183.
19. Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University Press, 2000), p. 34.
20. Steven L. Rearden, History of the Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 1, The Formative Years,
1947–1950 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 1984), p. 298; and Policy Planning
Staff Meeting, 28 September 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 1195.
183
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pected to last for more than another few years. (As it turned out, the nuclear
monopoly lasted only one more year.)
The United States took on a commitment to West Berlin that could not
be fulªlled at acceptable cost against determined action by the Soviet Union.
To explain policy that does not ªt well with realist theory, we must examine
more closely the process by which the decision was made and the factors that
inºuenced foreign policymakers. Cognitive social psychology provides a com-
plementary theoretical perspective to realism by explaining beliefs and percep-
tions.
The Use of Judgment in Foreign Policy
A growing body of psychological theory and evidence indicates that

professionals—pilots, ªreªghters, physicians, radiologists, or business
executives—often make decisions by use of intuitive judgment rather than
analysis.21 Individuals who use intuitive judgment do not weigh the pros and
cons but decide based on what “feels right.”22
People are particularly apt to use intuition rather than analysis when the
problem is unusually complex and the outcome of alternatives is uncertain.
When each option has numerous offsetting advantages and disadvantages, the
task of weighting and integrating the information is overwhelming.23 Under
complexity, the use of intuition can lead to relatively high-quality decisions.
In one experiment, for example, subjects who were asked to choose between
four cars rated on twelve characteristics were more likely to select the “best”
car when they were distracted and forced to make a choice without deliberat-
ing.24 Information processing takes place in the unconscious, which is less
constrained by limits on attention and memory than consciousness.25 People
often ªnd that they can make a better decision after “sleeping on it.”26 When
21. Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
22. Tilmann Betsch, “The Nature of Intuition and Its Neglect in Research on Judgment and Decision
Making,” in Henning Plessner, Cornelia Betsch, and Tillmann Betsch, eds., Intuition in Judgment and
Decision Making (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008), p. 4.
23. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, “A Theory of Unconscious Thought,” pp. 97, 105, 107.
24. Ap Dijksterhuis et al., “On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-without-Attention Ef-
fect,” Science, Vol. 311 (27 February 2006), pp. 1005–1007.
25. Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).
26. Ibid., pp. 171–172; and Ap Dijksterhuis, “Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious Thought
in Preference Development and Decision Making,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.
87, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 586–598.
184
using judgment, the decision-maker should try to make use of available infor-
mation and remain open to discrepant data.27
Realism and psychological theory on intuitive judgment yield different
expectations for U.S. decision-making during the Berlin blockade. Realist
theory implies that U.S. policymakers would evaluate U.S. interests and con-
sider whether the country had adequate power to achieve them. In contrast,
psychological theory on intuition suggests that the complexity of the problem
would encourage the use of intuition in deciding between alternatives that
had signiªcant disadvantages. Indicators of the use of intuitive judgment are
relative absence of discussion and failure to weigh pros and cons. Important
consequences may be neglected, and the reasons for a decision will be largely
unarticulated or implicit.
The complexity and intractability of the issues associated with Berlin
emerge clearly in the Truman administration’s inability to establish a policy
on West Berlin despite earlier warnings that the Soviet Union might impose
trafªc restrictions if the Western occupying powers proceeded with establish-
ing a West German government.
The Origins of the Berlin Crisis
On 24 June 1948 the Soviet military administration shut down trafªc by rail,
canal, and highway into and out of West Berlin, ostensibly because of “techni-
cal difªculties.” The Soviet occupation authority also cut off electricity to the
Western sectors. At the time, Berlin was jointly occupied by Britain, the So-
viet Union, the United States, and France, with the Western powers responsi-
ble for feeding the German inhabitants of West Berlin from their own occu-
pation zones. West Berlin had a 36-day supply of food and a 45-day stockpile
of coal.28
The Soviet blockade was precipitated by the announcement of a currency
reform for the Western occupation zones. On 18 June, U.S. Military Gover-
nor Lucius D. Clay had informed Soviet Military Governor Vasilii D. Soko-
lovskii that a new currency would be issued in two days but would not circu-
late in West Berlin. The Soviet reaction was to suspend passenger trafªc by
road or rail to and from West Berlin. On 22 June the Soviet military adminis-
tration announced a currency reform for the Eastern occupation zone, includ-
27. Philip E. Tetlock, Jr., Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 21, 88.
28. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950), p. 365.
185
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ing greater Berlin, whreby the east mark would be the sole legal tender. The
following day, Clay announced that the west mark would also circulate in
West Berlin, an action that prompted the Soviet authority to halt the ship-
ment of freight, completing the blockade.29
The currency reform was a major step toward the creation of a West Ger-
man government. Germany was initially divided after World War II into four
zones occupied by the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, and France,
pending agreement on a peace treaty. The four powers could not, however,
agree on reparations, an issue that also blocked accord on German economic
policy and political institutions. At the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM)
conference from 10 March to 24 April 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyache-
slav Molotov demanded $10 billion in reparations from Germany, a portion
to be extracted from current German industrial production. Secretary of
State George C. Marshall and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin be-
lieved that if most of the proceeds from export of industrial commodities
went to the Soviet Union as reparations, Germany would not be able to pay
for essential imports of raw materials, and Britain and the United States
would have to ªnance such expenditures for their zones, indirectly paying for
Soviet reparations.30 Inferring that the Soviet Union did not want Germany to
recover economically and that Soviet interests would be served if Germany
succumbed to political chaos and economic deprivation, Marshall decided on
the way home from the CFM conference that the United States should pro-
vide economic assistance to Western Europe and the Western zones of Ger-
many.31
Although Marshall had low expectations for the London CFM, which
opened on 23 November, he refused to adopt a defeatist attitude by drawing
up plans in advance for establishing a separate government.32 But the Soviet
Union adopted a tougher position than at Moscow. Molotov offended Mar-
shall with an ideological attack on the Marshall Plan and Anglo-American
policies in Germany. Concluding that further discussion was a waste of time,
29. “Editorial Note,” in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 909–910; Murphy to Marshall, in FRUS, 1948, Vol.
II, 912–914; and Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 363–365.
30. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983),
pp. 377–378, 383–384; Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Ger-
many, 1944–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 292–293, 296, 298, 300–302;
Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 57–58; and Truman to Marshall, April 1, 1947, in
FRUS, 1947, Vol. II, p. 302.
31. John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976),
pp. 15–16, 194, 254.
32. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 491–492; and “Memorandum of Conversation between Marshall and
Bidault,” 8 October 1947, in FRUS, 1947, Vol. II, pp. 683–684.
186
Marshall adjourned the meeting on 15 December without scheduling further

talks.33
After the conference adjourned, Marshall and Bevin met with Clay and
British Military Governor Brian Robertson to decide how to proceed. At
Clay’s suggestion, they agreed that after making one last effort to reach a set-
tlement with the Soviet Union on a new currency they would go ahead with a
currency reform for the U.S.-British Bizone. Clay recommended that their
next priority should be to expand the powers of the Economic Council
(formed in May 1947) in the U.S. and British zones until it functioned as a
government in all areas except foreign affairs. Clay warned that these steps to-
ward a West German government would cause the Soviet Union to “create
difªculties for them in Berlin,” but he and Robertson intended “to put up
with minor annoyances and to hold out in Berlin as long as possible.”34
Other U.S. ofªcials anticipated that the establishment of a West German
government would provoke the Soviet Union to pressure the Western allies
into leaving Berlin. In a memorandum for Truman on 22 December, the di-
rector of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Admiral Roscoe
Hillenkoetter, warned that the breakdown of the CFM in London would in-
duce the Soviet Union “to undertake a program of intensiªed obstructionism
and calculated insult in an effort to force the US and the other Western
Powers to withdraw from Berlin.” The CIA reasoned that Soviet authorities
would regard the presence of U.S. ofªcials and troops in Berlin as an obstacle
to Communization of the Soviet zone.35 Similarly, on 26 December, the act-
ing chief of the State Department’s Division of Central European Affairs,
Edwin Lightner, predicted a “determined Soviet effort to get the Western
Allies out of Berlin” by interfering with trade, transport, and supply within
the Western zones and moving to set up a one-party totalitarian regime in
East Germany with Berlin as the capital. He contended that “withdrawal of
US power from Berlin would entail a great loss to US prestige in Central Eu-
rope” while advancing the Soviet Union’s aim of bringing Germany under its
domination.36 From Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith antici-
pated a “noisy campaign to scare us out of Berlin.”37
33. U.S. Delegation to Truman, memoranda of 5, 8, 12, and 15 December 1947, in FRUS: 1947,
Vol. II, pp. 749, 757, 767, 771
34. “British Memorandum of Conversation, Marshall-Bevin Meeting,” 18 December 1947, in FRUS,
1947, Vol. II, pp. 823, 825–826; and “Memorandum of Conversation by Murphy,” 18 December
1947, in FRUS, 1947, Vol. II, p. 828.
35. Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the President, 22 December 1947, in PSF,
Intelligence File, HSTL.
36. Memorandum from Lightner to Reber and Saltzman, 26 December 1947, in FRUS, 1947, Vol. II,
pp. 905–907.
37. Smith to Marshall, December 30, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, Vol. II, p. 908.
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In January, the U.S. Army’s Planning and Operations (P&O) Division

conducted a study of U.S. responses if the Soviet Union attempted to force
the United States out of Berlin. The army staff planners observed that “it
would be impossible for the western powers to supply the approximately
2,000,000 civilians in the western sectors of Berlin by air if ground supply
channels from the Western Zones were disrupted.” The study recommended
that if the Soviet Union imposed restrictions on the transportation of sup-
plies, the United States should make a determined effort to remain in West
Berlin, including supplying token forces by air, but should withdraw when
the position of U.S. forces became untenable.38 On 19 January, Army Secre-
tary Royall sent the study to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, comment-
ing that it was not necessary to refer the question to the NSC because the Air
Force and State Department representatives had concurred on the proposed
course of action.39
The NSC had been created by the 1947 National Security Act as part of
the effort to reshape the government to deal with the challenges of the Cold
War.40 The procedures for submitting a policy issue to the NSC as well as the
role of the new agency in the advisory process were still being worked out.
Defense Secretary Forrestal had conceived of the NSC as an advisory body
that would bring issues to the president’s attention and recommend policies,
but NSC Executive Secretary Admiral Sidney W. Souers believed that the
council should not take up policy questions without the president’s prior ap-
proval. Souers did not identify important issues for the NSC to study because
he deªned his role as a neutral manager rather than White House adviser.41 If
the NSC had not been such a new body and had been able to gain experience
in policymaking, and if Truman had been more engaged in the process, he
might have received more-systematic, informed advice on both Germany and
Berlin.
38. Kenneth C. Royall, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 19 January 1948, with revised
staff study attached, “U.S. Course of Action in the Event the Soviets Attempt to Force Us Out of
Berlin,” in Record Group (RG) 330 (Sec. of Defense), CD 6-2-9, National Archives (NARA), College
Park, MD.
39. Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, Vol. II, 1947–1949 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1976), pp. 129–130; and Kenneth C. Royall, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
19 January 1948.
40. Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State,
1945–1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 5–69, 610–615; and Daniel Yergin,
Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War, updated and rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1990),
pp. 196–200, 213–214.
41. Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 120; Anna Kasten Nelson, “President Truman and the Evolution
of the National Security Council,” Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No. 2 (September 1985),
pp. 367–368; and Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), p. 309.
188
The “Baby Blockade” and the “Little Lift”
The Berlin blockade developed gradually and was even preceded by a trial
run, later called the “baby blockade.” Soviet ofªcials evidently made plans to
restrict trafªc during a recess in the ªrst phase of the London conference,
from 23 February to 6 March, when the United States, Britain, and France,
later joined by the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg), met to discuss future political and economic institutions for a West
German state.42 On 9 March, Sokolovskii and his political adviser, Vladimir
Semenov, were recalled to Moscow for urgent discussions. In a 12 March
memorandum to Molotov, a Soviet Foreign Ministry ofªcial Andrei Smirnov
wrote that the trafªc restrictions would “actively disrupt” British, French, and
U.S. “plans to put together a Western bloc including Germany.”43 If the West-
ern powers would not make concessions on Germany, the Soviet authorities
intended to force them out of West Berlin, absorbing the city into the Soviet
occupation zone.44
Marshal Sokolovskii walked out of the ACC on 20 March, ending four-
power administration of Germany.45 On 31 March the Soviet military admin-
istration announced new regulations for interzonal military trafªc, requiring
Soviet inspection of identity papers and the baggage of personnel on military
trains and requiring Soviet permits for freight brought into Berlin for military
use. Believing that the new rules would make travel between Berlin and the
Western zone impossible for U.S. personnel, Clay proposed to Washington
that the U.S. train commander give Soviet military representatives a passenger
list and cargo manifest. “It is my intent to instruct our guards to open ªre if
Soviet soldiers attempt to enter our trains.” Clay warned that “unless we take
a strong stand now, our life in Berlin would become impossible.”46
Clay’s request for orders led to emergency high-level discussions bringing
in the secretary of defense, the acting secretary of state, the service secretaries,
the JCS, and, ultimately, President Truman. Only two alternatives were con-
sidered: having Truman send a letter to Stalin warning that the proposed reg-
ulations could create an incident that might provoke war; or allowing U.S.
42. See the documents transcribed in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 75–143.
43. Mikhail M. Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis, 1948–9,” in Francesca Gori and
Silvio Pons, eds., The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1945–1953 (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1996), pp. 62–64.
44. Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” pp. 64–65; and Gerhard Wettig, Stalin and
the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conºict, 1939–1953 (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littleªeld, 2008), pp. 166–167.
45. Murphy to Marshall, 20 March 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 884.
46. Clay to Bradley, 31 March 1948, in Clark Clifford Papers, Subject File 1945–54, “Russia [5 of 8],”
HSTL.
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trains to proceed without shooting. Truman agreed with Under Secretary of

State Robert Lovett that sending a presidential message to Stalin would add
“disproportionate emphasis” to the incident and give Soviet leaders “precisely
the effect they were after.” He approved Clay’s suggestion to send test trains
into Berlin, but stipulated that U.S. guards should ªre only if ªred upon.47
When Clay tried to send a few military trains through Soviet check-
points, Soviet occupation forces used their control of trafªc signals to prevent
the trains from proceeding any further. To avoid further humiliation, Clay
cancelled all military trains and began a small airlift to supply the needs of the
U.S. garrison, an action that later became known as the “little lift.”48 The So-
viet military’s demonstration of its control over communications increased
sentiment in Washington for pulling out of Berlin. Army Chief of Staff Omar
Bradley suggested to Clay in a 10 April teleconference that they announce
U.S. withdrawal themselves to “minimize loss of prestige rather than being
forced out by threat.”49
Clay objected that withdrawal would represent a “tremendous loss of
prestige,” and therefore he did not believe that U.S. troops should leave Berlin
short of a Soviet ultimatum to drive them out by force. The exception, he
said, would be if the Soviet occupation authority cut off supplies to the Ger-
man population in the Western sectors, an action that he did not believe Sta-
lin would take because it would “alienate the Germans almost completely.”50
The immediate crisis waned after about eleven days when Soviet forces dis-
continued their efforts to inspect Western military trains.51
This was just a temporary respite, however, because in mid-April Deputy
Military Governor Mikhail Dratvin and Semenov assured Molotov that “our
measures have dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the Americans and Brit-
ish in Germany.” They claimed that Clay’s attempts to create an “air-bridge”
between Berlin and the Western zones had failed, because the “Americans
have realized that this is too costly a venture.”52
The two Soviet ofªcials were not far off in their estimate that the Western
powers were not resolved to stay in Berlin. The State Department proposed
47. William R. Harris, “March Crisis 1948, Act II,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 11 (Spring 1967),
pp. 27–29, 31; and Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 408.
48. Clay to Bradley, 1 April 1948, in Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay,
Germany, 1945–1949, 2 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), Vol. 2, p. 607; and
Bradley to Clay, 1 April 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Vol. 2, p. 608.
49. Teleconference, General Bradley and General Clay, 10 April 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of
General Lucius D. Clay, Vol. 2, p. 622.
50. Ibid., pp. 622–623.
51. Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 135.
52. Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” pp. 64–65.
190
sending a joint U.S.-British-French note to the Soviet government afªrming

Western rights in Berlin.53 The British, however, believed that a diplomatic
note might be more likely to provoke Soviet pressure than to prevent it, and
they objected to any wording that might imply use of military force if the So-
viet Union interfered with access.54 In contrast, Winston Churchill suggested
to U.S. Ambassador Lewis Douglas that they threaten to “raze” Soviet cities
unless the Soviet Union agreed to retire from Berlin and to abandon eastern
Germany, a suggestion that was ignored by Washington.55 The French were
even more anxious about the vulnerability of the Western presence in Berlin.
During the second phase of the London conference, from 20 April to 1 June,
the French sent the United States and Britain a diplomatic note requesting
postponement of the establishment of a West German government, in part
because of the risk that the Soviet Union would retaliate by driving the West-
ern powers out of Berlin.56 Marshall replied that failure to proceed with the
London program would “appear to Soviets as a sign of weakness, and to other
peoples, including Germans, as appeasement.”57 The Truman administration
decided to assuage French security concerns by cooperating with Senator Ar-
thur Vandenberg in sponsoring a Senate resolution authorizing the United
States to participate in a collective security organization.58
The French reluctantly accepted the London conference decisions, which
were publicly announced on 7 June. The London program included a cur-
rency reform and trade pooling among the Western zones. An international
authority would distribute the resources of the Ruhr. Most important were
measures pointing toward the creation of a West German government, such as
the convening of a West German constituent assembly to write a constitution
no later than 1 September 1948.59 The French Assemblée Nationale ratiªed
the London accords on 17 June by a narrow margin over the opposition of
Communists and supporters of Charles de Gaulle.60 The French action al-
53. Lovett to Douglas, 22 April 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 896.
54. Douglas to Marshall, 28 April 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 899–900.
55. Douglas to Lovett, 17 April 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 895.
56. John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–49: French Foreign Policy and
Post-war Europe (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1990), pp. 192–194, 198; and Douglas to
Marshall, 21 May 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 266–267.
57. Marshall to Caffery, 26 May 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 284.
58. “Memorandum of Conversation, Lovett with French Ambassador,” 21 May 1948, in FRUS, 1948,
Vol. II, p. 271.
59. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, pp. 194–195; and Communiqué of the Lon-
don Conference on Germany, Released to the Press on 7 June 1948, in FRUS: 1948, Vol. II, pp. 313–
17.
60. Caffery to Marshall, 17 June 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 335–337.
191
Larson
lowed Clay to go ahead with the currency reform, precipitating the Soviet
blockade.
The Decision to Stay in Berlin
The U.S. government was strikingly ill-prepared for the Soviet blockade. De-
spite warning signs and months of increasing pressure, the Truman adminis-
tration had no policy on whether the United States should remain in Berlin
after the establishment of a West German government. Truman had to make a
clear-cut decision despite conºicting considerations and disagreement about
the consequences of different options.
At a meeting of State Department and Army ofªcials on 24 June, the pre-
vailing sentiment was that the NSC should deal with Berlin on an emergency
basis to devise U.S. policy.61 But no full-scale NSC meeting on Berlin actually
took place until 22 July, nearly a month after the crisis began. Truman pre-
ferred ad hoc, informal meetings with advisers.
In a teletype conference with Army Secretary Kenneth Royall on 25 June,
Clay suggested making a sharp diplomatic protest to Moscow followed by re-
taliation when the Soviet Union predictably refused to lift the trafªc restric-
tions. Clay stressed the need to “decide just how far we will go short of war to
stay in Berlin”—indicating that U.S. policy was still in ºux.62
Despite the crisis over Berlin, the cabinet meeting on 25 June was preoc-
cupied with domestic politics and the Republican Convention. Asked by Tru-
man to report on the “currency squabble” in Germany, Forrestal claimed that
it was not as serious as reported in the press. Secretary Royall disagreed, argu-
ing that a serious situation was developing, but Truman directed the discus-
sion to the Republicans’ nomination of Thomas Dewey the previous evening,
remarking with some satisfaction that Dewey was given a cool reception by
his own party.63
Truman reserved serious discussion of U.S. responses to the Soviet block-
ade for a small meeting afterward with Lovett (substituting for Marshall, who
was in Walter Reed Hospital for tests), Forrestal, and Royall. Truman and his
advisers concluded that Clay’s suggestion for a diplomatic protest note would
merely start a “typewriter war” unless this approach had the full support of the
61. John H. Ohly, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 24 June 1948, in Situation in Berlin,
RG 330 (Sec of Defense), CD 6-2-9, NARA.
62. “Teleconference between Royall and Collins with Clay,” 25 June 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of
General Lucius D. Clay, Vol. 2, pp. 699, 702–703.
63. Cabinet Meeting, 25 June 1948, in Matthew J. Connelly Papers, HSTL.
192
British and French, and that countermeasures such as closing off the Panama
Canal or U.S. ports to Soviet shipping would be ineffective against the self-
sufªcient Soviet economy. They agreed that “determined steps should be
taken by the U.S. to stay in Berlin.”64 But what would those be?
An Army P&O study indicated that any retaliatory measures against the
Soviet Union outside Germany would work to the disadvantage of the West-
ern states. Although the current crisis would pass, “Berlin will nevertheless al-
ways remain a source of trouble to the western nations because of their ex-
posed position and it is difªcult to envisage how its economic welfare can be
fully restored.” The Army planners recommended that the Western powers
consider whether the humanitarian factor of suffering imposed on the Ger-
man people should override the major political and prestige reverse that
would result from withdrawal.65
On 25 June, Robertson suggested to Clay that they supply the West Ber-
liners by air.66 Although Clay questioned the feasibility of an airlift and pre-
ferred to send an armed convoy, he decided to give it a try upon realizing that
support in Washington for the use of force was non-existent. On his own ini-
tiative, without authorization from Washington, Clay organized a small airlift
of 200 tons of ºour for the German residents of West Berlin, a shipment that
arrived the following day.67
British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin heartily approved of the idea of us-
ing air transport to supply the German population, telling U.S. Ambassador
Lewis Douglas that an airlift not only would be of practical value but would
serve as a powerful symbol of Western determination. Bevin declared that
abandonment of Berlin would have “serious, if not disastrous consequences in
western Germany and through western Europe.”68 Churchill publicly de-
clared at a huge opposition rally that the issues raised by the Berlin situation
were “as grave” as those at stake at Munich ten years earlier.69
On 27 June, Clay requested 50 additional planes, which he said would al-
low the United States to bring in 600–700 tons a day, an amount that would
64. “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs Beam,” 28 June 1948, in
FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 928–929.
65. Memorandum to Determine U.S. Position Regarding the Continued Occupation of Berlin,
26 June 1948, in RG 319, P&O Hot Files, P&O 381 TS, NARA.
66. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 576; and Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New
York: Henry Holt, 1990), pp. 497–498.
67. Murphy to Marshall, 26 June 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 918–919; and Miller, To Save a
City, p. 44.
68. Douglas to Marshall, 26 June 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 923–925.
69. “Churchill Likens Berlin to Munich; Vows Aid to Bevin,” The New York Times, 27 June 1948.
193
Larson
not meet Berlin’s estimated needs for 2,000 tons per day but would “increase
the morale of the German people” and “seriously disturb the Soviet block-
ade.”70 The secretary of defense ordered four C-54 squadrons from Alaska, the
United States, Hawaii, and the Caribbean to Germany, a total of 52 planes.
The C-54 was a larger transport aircraft, with a cargo capacity of ten tons. In
contrast, the older C-47s, a World War II plane already in Europe, could
carry only 2.5 tons.71
The French reluctantly went along with the U.S. and British position,
but the French air force did not have enough planes to participate in the air-
lift. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault believed that withdrawal under
Soviet pressure would damage Western prestige, but French ofªcials worried
that the Soviet Union would be able to drive the Western countries out. Pierre
de Leusse, chief of the French Foreign Ministry’s ofªce for Central Europe,
told U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery that the Western powers had made a
serious mistake in overstressing the importance of remaining in Berlin.72
Clay’s improvised airlift bought some time but did not settle the issue of
U.S. policy toward Berlin. An impromptu meeting of State Department, De-
fense Department, and military ofªcials was held on 27 June, a Sunday after-
noon, at Royall’s ofªce in the Pentagon to discuss policy options. Present were
Forrestal, Royall, and Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan; Generals Omar Brad-
ley, Lauris Norstad, Daniel Noce, Ray Maddocks, J. Lawton Collins, and Al-
fred Gruenther; and several State Department ofªcials, including Lovett,
Jacob Beam, John D. Hickerson, Charles Bohlen, and Leon Blum. Royall
started the discussion with two questions. First, was the United States pre-
pared to send armed convoys to transport food to the people of West Berlin?
If not, then the administration should not send a strong diplomatic protest
note, because the U.S. position would be worse if it subsequently capitulated.
Second, assuming that that the United States was able to stay in West Berlin,
either as a result of some agreement with the Soviet Union or by standing
ªrm, did it want to do so? Would the gradual attrition in the U.S. position
caused by future Soviet restrictions be more damaging to U.S. prestige than
leaving? Royall assumed that Berlin could hold out for 30 days with existing
food stocks plus additional supplies to be ºown in by air, and perhaps 60 days
if dried foods were introduced.
Lovett ruled out the use of armed convoys, saying that any decision to use
force to supply Berlin would require allied support, and the French would go
70. Clay to Draper, 2 June 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Vol. 2, p. 708.
71. Miller, To Save a City, pp. 41, 55.
72. Young, France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, pp. 198–199; and Caffery to Marshall,
24 June 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 916–917.
194
to any lengths to avoid provoking war with the Soviet Union. The real issue,
Lovett said, was whether the United States and its allies were prepared to go to
war or lose a little prestige for the sake of peace. He admitted that no matter
how good a case the United States made for humanitarian considerations,
withdrawal would still be a “tremendous setback.”
Royall said that he could justify withdrawal on the grounds that Berlin
was no longer of any use to the United States now that a quadripartite govern-
ment had proved to be impossible and arrangements for a trizonal gov-
ernment had been completed. They could link their withdrawal to the 1 Sep-
tember date for the convening of a constituent assembly. He was inclined to
believe that withdrawal at that time would be desirable “under any circum-
stances” because similar crises were certain to arise if U.S. forces remained. In
other words, Lovett, said, they faced the question of what would be more hu-
miliating: to stay under the probable circumstances or to leave.
Lovett asked rhetorically what would be the “real consequences of with-
drawing from Berlin beyond hurt pride.” He thought that Clay and Murphy,
who believed departure was tantamount to giving up Europe, held somewhat
“extravagant views” because of their closeness to the situation. Lovett con-
ceded that the effect in Germany would be “disastrous” and that people every-
where would lose faith in the United States. Royall argued that the extent of
the harm would depend on U.S. measures to defend the rest of Europe—and
whether they backed up their words by sending more troops and planes.
Bradley identiªed three courses of action: (1) get out now; (2) get out
short of ªghting; (3) ªght to stay. The second alternative implied staying in
Berlin as long as possible but then withdrawing. Bradley was not in favor of
ªghting the Soviet Union until the United States had rebuilt its military
strength, but someone objected that in the meantime the United States might
lose Western Europe. The group discussed various steps that might be taken
to cover a U.S. withdrawal from Berlin while at the same time augmenting
the U.S. position vis-à-vis the USSR. Royall, Lovett, and Forrestal were se-
lected to meet with the president the following day and present the major is-
sues for his decision.73 This was the only high-level meeting at which the
long-term consequences of maintaining a presence in West Berlin were con-
sidered, and the most active participants, Royall and Lovett, favored eventual
withdrawal tied to establishment of a West German government.
At the meeting with Truman the following day, 28 June, Lovett re-
counted the discussion for the president. When Lovett reached the question
73. Memorandum for the Files, The Situation in Berlin—Conference of 27 June 1948, in John H.
Ohly Papers, Department of Defense File, Subject File, 1947–1949, “Miscellaneous Defense Mate-
rials 1947–1949,” HSTL. For a summary of the meeting, see Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, pp. 452–
454.
195
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of what the U.S. policy in Germany was to be—were they going to stay in
Berlin or not?—Truman interrupted him, saying (according to Forrestal),
“there was no discussion on that point, we were going to stay, period.” Royall
expressed concern that they might not “fully have thought through” their
course of action if continued Soviet pressure made it necessary for United
States forces to “ªght their way into Berlin.”
Truman replied that they “would have to deal with the situation as it de-
veloped.” He did not think a “black and white decision [was possible] now
other than that we were in Berlin by terms of an agreement and that the Rus-
sians had no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressure.”74 Royall’s
objection that the policy might not have been fully thought through suggests
that Truman did not deliberate before making his decision. According to a
memorandum for Bradley from Royall after the meeting, Truman indicated
his “tentative approval of staying in Berlin at all costs” but stated that “this was
not a ªnal decision,” suggesting his decision was provisional.75
The accounts by Forrestal and Royall do not indicate that Truman pro-
vided any reason for his decision to stay other than that the United States was
in Berlin by terms of an agreement. This statement was correct, but whether
there were legally recognized documents guaranteeing access was disputed.
“There has been some difference of opinion as to whether the documents in
question do, in effect, contain a speciªc agreement on transit rights,” Army
staff planners acknowledged.76 The occupation protocol that placed Berlin in
the Soviet zone had been drawn up by the British for the European Advisory
Commission and approved by the three powers in February 1945. When the
protocol was under consideration, no one raised the issue of British and U.S.
access across the Soviet occupation zone to Berlin. After giving their consent,
the JCS proposed unrestricted access for the occupation troops across all zonal
boundaries but received no reply from the Soviet General Staff.77
The issue of access came to the attention of U.S. and British decision-
makers in June 1945, when Soviet Marshal Georgii Zhukov refused to allow
U.S. and British troops to enter Berlin until the United States had removed its
troops from parts of eastern Germany that had been allocated to the Soviet
74. Entry for 28 June 1948, in Diaries of James V. Forrestal, 1944–1949: Complete and Unexpurgated
Diaries from the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 15 vols. (London: Adam
Matthew Publications, n.d.), Microªlm, Reel 4, p. 2340.
75. Royall to Bradley, 28 June 1948, in Diaries of James V. Forrestal, Reel 4, p. 2328.
76. “The Berlin Situation (Notes Used for Brieªng by Gen. Maddocks),” 27 June 1948, in RG 319,
P&O Hot Files, 381 TS, NARA.
77. William M. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,” World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Oc-
tober 1963), pp. 21–23, 26–27.
196
occupation zone. In a 14 June 1945 cable to Stalin, Truman offered to with-

draw U.S. troops to the American zone on 21 June simultaneously with
movement of U.S. forces into Berlin, with provision for free access by air,
road, and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for U.S. troops. On
16 June, Stalin accepted Truman’s plan for U.S. troop movements while sug-
gesting 1 July as a more convenient date, but did not refer to the proposal for
free access rights. At the time, no one noticed this omission. On 18 June, Tru-
man ordered the movement of U.S. forces to begin on 1 July.78 After the So-
viet Union instituted a blockade that month, the legal adviser for the State
Department argued that Stalin’s failure to challenge Truman’s assertion on
14 June about U.S. rights of free access amounted to an agreement.79 A more
plausible argument was that the U.S. right of access to Berlin was implicit in
the occupation arrangements that gave the United States a sector in Berlin.80
On 29 June 1945, Clay, British General Sir Ronald Weeks, and Marshal
Zhukov agreed orally that British and U.S. forces could use one highway and
one rail line across East Germany into Berlin. Clay did not request a written
agreement because he wanted to reserve the right to reopen the issue later in
the ACC.81 The situation concerning access by air was entirely different be-
cause the Western occupying powers had signed an agreement with the Soviet
Union in November 1945 that allowed them use of three corridors.82
On the evening of 28 June 1948, Marshall cabled the U.S. embassy in
Britain that after consultation with the president, U.S. policy was to remain
in Berlin, to use the “propaganda advantage of our position,” to “supply the
city by air,” and, if Soviet restrictions continued, to protest to Moscow while
keeping the “Berlin situation before world attention” as a means of avoiding
war.83
Truman was determined to avoid any action that might escalate to
conºict with the Soviet Union, even refusing to shoot down a Soviet barrage
78. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,” pp. 28–29; and P. H. Johnston, “Origins of
the U.S. Commitment to the West Berlin Enclave,” Third Draft, Enclosure A, C. I. No. 6, 27 May
1966, in U.S. Department of Defense, Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, http://www
.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/510.pdf. The exchange of messages between Truman and Stalin ap-
pears in FRUS, 1945, Vol. III, pp. 135–137.
79. Blum to Forrestal, Extracts from Truman-Stalin Messages, 1 July 1945, in Diaries of James V.
Forrestal, Reel 4, 2338 n. 54a.
80. Blum to Forrestal, Zonal Divisions in Germany, 29 June 1945, with Attachment, “Resume: The
Zoning of Germany,” in Diaries of James V. Forrestal, Reel 4, p. 2331; and Franklin, “Zonal Bound-
aries and Access to Berlin,” p. 24.
81. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 25–27; Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, pp. 30–32.
82. Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, p. 48.
83. Marshall to Douglas, 28 June 1948, in FRUS: 1948, Vol. II, pp. 930–931.
197
Larson
balloon. On 30 June, an erroneous wire service report claimed that the Soviet
Union had launched a barrage balloon in the British corridor and that the
British had issued orders to have the balloon shot down. Forrestal convened
an emergency strategy session attended by Royall, the JCS, Admiral Souers,
Forrestal’s assistant John Ohly, General Gruenther, and Rear Admiral Cato D.
Glover, the deputy director of the Joint Strategic Plans Group. The president’s
chief of staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, reported that Truman was commit-
ted to Berlin, but not if doing so would require military action that might
start a war for which the United States did not have enough soldiers. The
president, Leahy said, “was quite positive on that.”84 The United States per-
suaded Britain not to shoot down any Soviet barrage balloons without prior
consultation and approval.85
According to Clay’s political adviser, Robert Murphy, the Berlin situation
and the tension between the Western powers and the Soviet Union were hav-
ing a “profound effect” on western German political leaders. On 1 July, the
ministers-president of the Western occupation zones were briefed by the
Western military governors on the London decisions. The acting mayor of
Berlin, Louise Schroeder, urgently requested German leaders in the Western
zones not to take precipitate action toward the formation of a West German
government that would split Berlin and provoke the Soviet Union to take
more drastic measures against the residents of West Berlin. A few weeks later,
the ministers-president expressed reservations about pursuing actions that
would be perceived as irrevocably dividing Germany, but Clay told the Ger-
man leaders in the Western zones that this was the best they could get and
they might as well recognize the division of Germany as a fact.86
The blockade appeared to be the beginning of a Soviet campaign to drive
the Western countries out of Berlin. On 28 June, based on reporting from bu-
reau in Berlin, the CIA informed Truman that Berlin’s Communists planned
strikes and demonstrations against the Western occupying powers to show
that the German population did not want the Western presence to continue.87
A CIA source in Berlin also reported a secret Soviet directive issuing instruc-
tions for the currency reform that treated West Berlin as part of the Soviet
84. Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 292.

85. Marshall to Douglas, 9 July 1948, in FRUS: 1948, Vol. II, p. 956.
86. “Editorial Note,” in FRUS: 1948, Vol. II, pp. 380–381; Murphy to Marshall, 9 July 1948, in
FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 384; and Murphy to Marshall, 14 July 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 393–
396.
87. David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in
the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 57–62; and CIA, “Memorandum for the
President,” 28 June 1948, in Dennis Merrill, ed., Documentary History of the Truman Presidency
(Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1995), p. 23.
198
zone. German ofªcials in the Soviet zone expressed conªdence that the West-
ern states would leave Berlin within three weeks.88
Truman decided to stay in West Berlin without taking into account the
ability of the United States and Britain to supply the city’s residents with food
and fuel. Nor did he reºect on the long-term implications of trying to main-
tain a Western enclave in Communist territory, far from West Germany. Tru-
man exercised his judgment and made a provisional decision to stay without
knowing whether this was even feasible. The airlift was viewed as a stopgap
until some other solution could be found.
Formulating a Diplomatic Strategy
To determine whether Soviet leaders were primarily concerned about the cur-
rency issue or the German question, Clay was instructed to “feel out” Soviet
intentions by offering a compromise agreement to Marshal Sokolovskii.89
On 3 July, at a meeting of the military governors, Clay asked Sokolovskii
when they could expect normal trafªc to be resumed. The Soviet military
governor attributed the trafªc barriers to “economic disorders” in the Soviet
zone that had been created by the London conference to which “he was not a
party.” Clay realized that Sokolovskii did not have latitude to negotiate on
transport issues and that any discussions would have to include the German
problem.90
Accordingly, on 6 July the United States joined with Britain and France
in sending similarly worded formal diplomatic notes to the Soviet Union pro-
testing that the blockade was a “clear violation of existing agreements” related
to the occupation of Germany and offering to negotiate on the administra-
tion of Berlin on condition that communications be fully restored.91 The So-
viet reply, delivered on 14 July, was uncompromising. The Soviet government
argued that four-power administration of Berlin was inseparable from that for
Germany as a whole. As a result of the decision to set up a government
for West Germany, the Soviet Union alleged, the Western powers had lost
their right to participate in the administration of Berlin. The Soviet govern-
88. Hillenkoetter to Truman, 30 June 1948, in Merrill, ed. Documentary History of the Truman Presi-
dency, p. 29.
89. Royall to Clay, 28 June 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 929.
90. Murphy to the Embassy in France, 4 July 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 948–950; and Clay,
Decision in Germany, p. 367.
91. Secretary of State to Soviet Ambassador Panyushkin, 6 July 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II,
pp. 950–953.
199
Larson
ment was open to negotiations but without preconditions (such as lifting the
blockade) and did not believe that such conversations could be limited to
Berlin.92
A CIA memorandum argued that the blockade was clearly intended to
“compel the Western Powers to agree to quadripartite negotiations with re-
spect to Germany as a whole and to render them acquiescent to Soviet terms.”
The Soviet Union hoped to “gain an effective voice in the control of Western
Germany and especially of the Ruhr” and to “prevent the consolidation of a
West German state aligned with the West.”93 Why Stalin was so strongly op-
posed to the establishment of a West German government is disputed by his-
torians. Stalin may have wanted to prevent West German industrial resources
from being integrated into the Anglo-American bloc in Europe or to maintain
some inºuence over the western part of Germany with the eventual goal of es-
tablishing a Communist regime over a uniªed Germany.94
With diplomacy seemingly having reached a dead end, the Truman ad-
ministration held a series of meetings on 19 July to decide what to do next. At
the ªrst meeting, Marshall invited the adviser for Republican presidential can-
didate Dewey, John Foster Dulles, to present his views to the State Depart-
ment working group on Berlin. Dulles argued that Soviet prestige was deeply
engaged and that diplomatic argument risked crystallization of a stronger po-
sition that might make it more difªcult for the Soviet Union to back down. In
his view, the United States should privately approach Molotov or, preferably,
Stalin with the offer of four-power negotiations on Germany without the pre-
92. Soviet Ambassador Panyushkin to Marshall, 14 July 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 960–964.
93. CIA, “Review of the World Situation,” 14 July 1948, in PSF, National Security Files, Meetings,
“Meeting 15, July 15, 1948,” HSTL.
94. Scholars who suggest that Stalin under some circumstances might have been satisªed with a
uniªed, demilitarized Germany that was not hostile toward the Soviet Union include Norman M.
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 258, 351–352; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine
Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1996), pp. 47–48; Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German
Question and the Founding of the GDR, trans. by Robert F. Hogg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998),
pp. 7–9; W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (London: Macmillan
Press, 1999), pp. 32, 68; Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the Founding of the German Demo-
cratic Republic: 50 Years Later—A Review Article,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1999),
p. 1095; Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006), pp. 350–352; and Melvyn P. Lefºer, For the Soul of Mankind: The United
States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), pp. 54–55. For the view
that Stalin aimed at Communist control of a uniªed Germany from the very start and never wavered
on the matter, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, UK: Clar-
endon Press, 1997), p. 116; Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War
from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 62–66, 70–71,
77–78, 82–83; and Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, pp. 32–35, 159–160.
200
condition that the Soviet Union lift the blockade or acknowledge U.S.
rights.95
At a meeting with Truman and Forrestal shortly before noon, Marshall
stated that the United States could either follow a “ªrm policy in Berlin” or
accept the failure of the administration’s European policy. Marshall thought
there was still some chance of containing the Soviet Union in Europe.
Forrestal demurred, arguing that there was a “deªnite limitation” on the U.S.
ability to respond to Soviet aggression. Total U.S. reserves came to only a little
over two divisions (about 30,000 troops), of which only one could be com-
mitted with any speed. Truman concluded by saying that U.S. policy would
remain ªxed: “We would stay in Berlin until all diplomatic means had been
exhausted in order to come to some kind of an accommodation to avoid war.”
Marshall then outlined certain steps that were being considered by the State
Department, principally to have the U.S. ambassador inform Stalin that the
Western powers’ aversion to war would not inºuence them to recede from
their Berlin position.96
The discussion had little impact on Truman. That evening, referring in
his diary to the meeting with Marshall and Forrestal, Truman wrote, “I’d
made the decision ten days ago to stay in Berlin.” Of Forrestal’s warnings, Tru-
man observed, “Jim [Forrestal] wants to hedge—he always does.” Truman
had no doubts about what to do: “We’ll stay in Berlin—come what may.”97
Truman later attended another informal meeting with Bradley and Un-
der Secretary of the Army William Draper, as well as Forrestal, Royall, Lovett,
and other State Department ofªcials. Draper relayed the recommendations of
Averell Harriman, the president’s representative in Europe for the Marshall
Plan, whom Draper had met in Paris. Harriman had urged the administration
to dispel any doubt that the United States, along with the British and French,
would not be forced out of Berlin by any measures short of armed conºict. In
response, Truman made clear that “the decision to stay in Berlin even at the
risk of war had already been made.” Truman appeared to agree with Harri-
man’s suggestion that any diplomatic approach should be made directly to
Stalin rather than through Molotov, who appeared to distort, suppress, or
otherwise misrepresent communications made to him through Western dip-
lomats.98 Truman’s terse comments did not encourage dissent or discussion.
95. Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: The Free Press, 1982),
pp. 375–376.
96. Entry for 19 July 1948, in Diaries of James V. Forrestal, Reel 4, p. 2369.
97. Truman diary, 19 July 1948, in Robert Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S.
Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 145.
98. Memorandum of Conversation with Averell Harriman, 17 July 1948, in RG 335 Under Secretary
201
Larson
This may have been his intent. Later that day he complained in his diary
about having to “listen to a rehash of what I know already and reiterate my
‘Stay in Berlin’ decision. I don’t pass the buck, nor do I alibi out of any deci-
sion I make.”99
Marshall informed Douglas that “high-level conferences over the week-
end and today” had resulted in a ªrm determination of U.S. policy on Berlin.
The United States was “resolved to maintain its position in Berlin and to take
all measures necessary for the exercise of its rights.” On the other hand, the
United States government did not believe that the Soviet government had
“committed itself so irretrievably” as to “preclude the possibility of some face-
saving retreat on their part.” Accordingly, before sending a formal diplomatic
note, which might “elevate the matter further into the realm of prestige con-
siderations,” an effort would be made to approach Stalin directly.100
The outcome of the meetings on 19 July was that Truman reafªrmed his
earlier decision to stay in Berlin. Although Truman endorsed diplomatic ef-
forts to persuade the Soviet government to lift the blockade, the discussions
on 19 July concerned how to stay in West Berlin rather than the desirability or
feasibility of the commitment. The administration hoped that Stalin might be
more ºexible if approached privately and informally so that he could concede
without losing face.
Decision to Increase the Airlift
As it became clear that negotiations would be prolonged, opposition to the

airlift grew among U.S. military ofªcials in Washington. According to the
military, the airlift concentrated valuable U.S. transport aircraft in a vulnera-
ble location and diverted substantial assets to a location of little strategic im-
portance.
At an NSC meeting on 15 July that Truman did not attend, Cornelius V.
Whitney, assistant secretary of the Air Force for materiel, gave a pessimistic as-
sessment of the outlook for the airlift. (Until the Korean War, Truman did not
regularly attend NSC meetings, having been warned by the Bureau of the
Budget that his presence would create pressure on him to make an immediate
decision at the end of the meeting.101) Whitney told the NSC that the U.S.
of the Army (Draper/Voorhees) Germany 000.1, “Berlin Crises, Book 1,” NARA; and William H.
Draper, Memorandum for Record, 19 July 1948, in RG 335, Under Secretary of the Army (Draper/
Voorhees), SAOUS 000.1 Germany, NARA.
99. Truman diary, 19 July 1948, in Ferrell, ed., Off the Record, p. 145.
100. Secretary of State Marshall to Douglas, 20 July 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 971.
101. Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945–1947,” The Journal of
202
Air Force was shipping about 1,000 tons per day and the British about 750.
The maximum lift they could get by adding 180 C-54s and 105 C-47s, every-
thing they had, would be only 3,000 tons per day, which with the British con-
tribution of 1,000 tons would still fall short of the 5,300 tons Whitney esti-
mated to be Berlin’s requirements. To accomplish even this, they would have
to ªnd new airports and ship one or two repair depots. The runway at
Tempelhof was breaking up under the current load, and maintenance of the
planes in operation was rapidly deteriorating because of lack of proper facili-
ties. The maximum lift would involve the entire transport reserve operated by
a large number of troops. The United States would then have concentrated its
military aviation resources in Germany, and many planes would be caught on
the ground and destroyed if hostilities broke out. Whitney concluded that the
Air Staff was ªrmly convinced that the “air operation is doomed to failure.”
Lovett agreed that the best information available indicated that the “air
lift was an unsatisfactory expedient.” Soviet ofªcials knew that ºying weather
would be too bad for this operation to continue past October. The NSC de-
cided to reserve any recommendation to the president on whether to increase
the airlift.102 In a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs on 17 July, Army Chief of
Staff Bradley reported that the airlift was failing to meet Berlin’s needs by one-
third, which meant that stockpiles would be depleted in three months. The
addition of 85 C-54 aircraft would not quite meet reported minimum daily
requirements for the summer months and, with the onset of cold and inclem-
ent weather, would increasingly fall short of Berlin’s needs. General Bradley
concluded that “continued air supply for Berlin as a long-term operation is
not feasible.”103
Clay provided a more optimistic prognosis for the airlift when he visited
Washington to brief the president and the NSC. At an NSC meeting on
22 July presided over by Truman, the ªrst full-dress session since the Berlin
blockade began, Clay reported that the airlift was averaging about 2,500 tons
per day, which was enough to handle food requirements but not Berlin’s fu-
ture needs for coal. Clay assured Truman that with another 75 C-54s, the
United States and Britain could airlift 4,500 tons per day, enough to meet
Berlin’s requirements without hardship throughout the winter. Clay admitted
American History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (September 1972), pp. 369–388; and Nelson, “President Truman
and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” pp. 365–366, 377.
102. Memorandum for the President, 16 July 1948, in PSF, Subject File, 1940–1953, National Secu-
rity Council Meetings File, “Memorandum for the President, Meeting Discussions 1948,” HSTL. No
ªrm estimates of West Berlin’s tonnage requirements were available at the beginning of the crisis, and
the numbers varied with the speaker.
103. Memorandum from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Military
Courses of Action with Respect to Berlin, 17 July 1948, in RG 218, Records of the JCS 381 (8-20-
43), Sec. 17, NARA.
203
Larson
that the use of armed convoys “obviously could create an act which might lead
to war,” so they should not be tried until “all other ways have been tried and
failed.”104 Clay’s caution on this matter was justiªed, according to the former
Soviet military ofªcer Victor Gobarev, who claims that former Soviet military
ofªcials have indicated that they regarded the demarcation between Eastern
and Western occupation zones as an international border, and that their tanks
might well have opened ªre on a column of U.S. troops attempting to cross
the zonal boundary.105
Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg pointed out that add-
ing planes to the airlift would seriously disrupt the Military Air Transport Ser-
vice. A full Air Force effort would require at least one more airport in Berlin
and a repair depot in England with a subdepot in Germany and buildup of
maintenance personnel. In answer to a question from Marshall, General
Vandenberg said that the maximum airlift would involve using planes in-
tended for emergency use, many of which might be destroyed in the event of
hostilities, adversely affecting U.S. capabilities for waging strategic warfare.
Clay countered that “if we move out of Berlin we have lost everything we are
ªghting for,” and Truman said this was his opinion also.106 After Truman left
the meeting, the NSC recommended that the United States “stay in Berlin in
any event,” build an additional airport in Berlin, and provide Clay with the
75 additional C-54s that he had requested.107
The Joint Chiefs still had serious reservations about the commitment to
West Berlin. In a memorandum dated 22 July that was not completed in time
for the NSC meeting, the JCS acknowledged that Berlin’s minimum require-
ments could be met by air transport at the cost of reducing the U.S. capability
to implement emergency war plans. But the airlift was preferable to armed
convoys. “Soviet passive interference, such as road and bridge obstruction or
destruction” could abort an attempt to send an armed convoy, and Soviet mil-
itary action would escalate the problem from “local friction to that of major
war involvement.” Because neither the airlift nor armed convoys offered a
permanent solution, the Joint Chiefs requested that some justiªcation “be
found for withdrawal of our occupation forces from Berlin without undue
104. Memorandum for the President, 23 July 1948, in PSF, National Security Files, Meetings, Memo-
randa for the President, Meeting Discussions (1948), HSTL.
105. Victor Gobarev, “Soviet Military Plans and Actions during the First Berlin Crisis, 1948–1949,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), p. 16.
106. Memorandum for the President, 23 July 1948, in PSF, National Security Files, Meetings, Memo-
randa for the President, Meeting Discussions (1948), HSTL.
107. Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the National Security Council, 22 July 1948, in PSF, National
Security Council Files, Meetings, Meeting 16: July 22, 1948, HSTL.
204
loss of prestige.”108 On 26 July, Forrestal forwarded the memorandum to the

NSC, where it was noted at the 5 August meeting.109 The head of the State
Department Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, commented to Lovett
that the JCS did not “realize that the important issues in the Berlin situation
do not lie so much in our immediate interests in Berlin itself as in the sym-
bolic signiªcance of this contest for east-west relationships throughout Eu-
rope and all the world.”110
In light of the 22 July NSC decision, General Vandenberg decided to ap-
point Major General William H. Tunner to a special airlift taskforce. Tunner
had commanded the most successful airlift in history, the shipment of sup-
plies from India over the Himalayas (ºying the “Hump”) to U.S. troops and
Chinese forces in China during World War II. Initially, Vandenberg had re-
sisted Lieutenant-General Albert Wedemeyer’s urgings that Tunner be placed
in command, but Wedemeyer, as the ªeld commander in China during the
“Hump” airlift, had witnessed how Tunner’s efªcient organization and man-
agement had greatly increased the amount of supplies carried by air, and he
continued speaking strongly in Tunner’s behalf.111
Arriving in Germany on 28 July, Tunner realized that the number of
planes that could participate in the airlift was limited by the 20-mile width of
the three air corridors. To maximize the number of ºights per day, Tunner es-
timated, the planes should be spaced three-minutes apart, which would re-
quire instituting standardized procedures for all phases of the airlift, including
cargo loading, scheduling, ºight routes, ºying speeds, and aircraft mainte-
nance. New air trafªc control systems would also have to be devised to pre-
vent collisions between planes ºying from at least three bases in West Ger-
many. The British ºew to Berlin along the northern corridor, the U.S. planes
used the southern corridor, and both groups returned to West Germany by
means of the central corridor, with planes separated by altitude as well as dis-
tance, an extraordinarily complicated undertaking.112
In accordance with the NSC decision, construction of a new airªeld was
108. Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin,”
Memorandum for the National Security Council, 22 July 1948, in RG 218, Records of the JCS 381
(8-20-43), Sec. 17, NARA.
109. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 144.
110. Kennan to Lovett, 2 August 1948, in Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Germany 1947–48,
RG 59, NARA.
111. Miller, To Save a City, p. 90; William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (New York: Duell, Sloan, and
Pearce, 1964), pp. 159–161; and Lt. Col. Lemley, “Movement of Aircraft to Europe,” Memo for Re-
cord, 29 June 1948, in RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, Decimal File, 381 TS 1946–48, Sec.
V-A (Part II), NARA.
112. Tunner, Over the Hump, pp. 168, 174; and Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, pp. 181–182, 247–248.
205
Larson
started in the French zone, Tegel, using crushed bricks and rubble to build the
runways, with labor provided by unemployed Germans. Because the Soviet
Union had previously removed all heavy equipment, heavy construction ma-
chinery had to be dismantled by torch and ºown into Berlin for reassembly.113
With the airlift now established as a continuing operation, staffed by person-
nel with expertise in air transport, the tonnage could be substantially in-
creased, leaving only the obstacle of winter weather to be surmounted.
Diplomatic Stalemate
Bevin had strong reservations about informally approaching Stalin, concerns

that subsequently proved to be warranted.114 Stalin entangled the Western
powers in detailed negotiations, then pulled back at the point of agreement as
a delaying tactic. When the Western ambassadors met with the Soviet leader
on 2 August, he was “extraordinarily amiable and cooperative.” Stalin dis-
claimed any intent to oust the Western allies from Berlin. He offered to lift
the trafªc restrictions, provided that the Western countries withdrew their
currency from Berlin and temporarily suspended the London decisions until a
four-power meeting on Germany could be held. Stalin said that the “only real
issue” was the formation of a West German government. When the U.S. and
British ambassadors declined this offer, Stalin said that he would no longer
ask as a condition that the London decisions be postponed, although he
wished this to be recorded as the “insistent wish of the Soviet Government.”
The Soviet leader offered to lift the trafªc barriers so long as the west mark
was replaced by the Soviet east mark in Berlin, and he also again requested a
four-power conference on Germany.115
What initially seemed to be a reasonable compromise proved to be im-
possible to implement in subsequent negotiations with Molotov. The Soviet
foreign minister insisted that the London decisions must be suspended in ac-
cordance with Stalin’s “insistent wish.” Molotov also declined to grant the
three Western powers any control over use of the east mark in Berlin, without
which they would have no inºuence over Berlin’s government.116 After
another appeal to Stalin and more meetings, an agreement was reached on
30 August that the Soviet mark would be the sole currency in Berlin, that re-
113. Tunner, Over the Hump, pp. 211–212; and Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, p. 257.
114. Marshall to Douglas, 21 July 1948, in FRUS: 1948, Vol. II, p. 975; and Bullock, Ernest Bevin,
pp. 584, 588.
115. Forrestal diary, 3 August 1948, in Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, p. 469; and Smith to Marshall,
3 August 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 999–1006.
116. Smith to Marshall, 6 August 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1018–1019.
206
strictions on transportation would be lifted, and that a four-power conference

would be held to discuss Germany and Berlin. Use of the Soviet-backed cur-
rency would be under the supervision of a four-power ªnancial commission
to preserve the economic independence of the Western sectors. Detailed pro-
cedures for implementation of the Moscow directive would be worked out by
the military governors in Berlin by 7 September.117
Clay was concerned that the agreement did not guarantee four-power
control of Berlin, worries that were borne out by subsequent negotiations.
Sokolovskii refused to lift all trafªc restrictions that had been imposed by the
Soviet government, and he proposed new regulations on civil air transport af-
fecting the airlift. Based on a dubious interpretation of the Moscow agree-
ment, Sokolovskii argued that the ªnancial commission would not be allowed
to interfere with use of the east mark.118
On 7 September, with the Berlin negotiations on the verge of collapsing,
Truman presided over an emergency NSC meeting. Secretary Marshall re-
ported that the situation regarding the Berlin negotiations was “discouraging
and serious.” Lovett observed that experienced Foreign Service ofªcers had
never seen such “complete Soviet duplicity.” The Soviet Union had a “cynical”
attitude toward the negotiations, he said, and the United States “could not
continue to do business this way.” Truman expressed agreement.
Marshall commented that although the airlift had been more successful
than they had expected, they had been losing time, and “in many respects
time was on the side of the Soviets.”119 He wanted to clarify areas of disagree-
ment, even if doing so meant a break with the Soviet Union, and then submit
a complaint to the United Nations (UN). Bevin, supported by the French,
preferred to blur the issues and thus prolong four-power negotiations under
what Marshall regarded as humiliating conditions. Giving priority to allied
unity, Marshall agreed to make another diplomatic approach to Stalin and
Molotov. This time Molotov rejected the Western note as “one-sided,” and
Stalin did not meet with them at all, supposedly because he was under treat-
ment.120 Subsequent negotiations under UN auspices also proved to be un-
117. Smith to Marshall, 27 August 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1085–1087.
118. “Teleconference,” 24 August 1948, in Smith, ed., Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, pp. 781–784;
Murphy to Marshall, 1 September 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1101–1103; “Memorandum by
Bohlen,” 2 September 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1108–1109; and Clay to Draper, 4 Septem-
ber 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1109–1112.
119. Memorandum for the President, 9 September 1948, Truman Papers, in PSF, Subject File, 1940–
1953, National Security Council Meetings File, “Memoranda for the President: Meeting Discussions:
1948,” HSTL.
120. Marshall to Murphy, 11 September 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1147–49; and Smith to
Marshall, 14 September 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, p. 1157.
207
Larson
productive.121 The Soviet Union had decided to drag out the negotiations in
the expectation that the airlift would fail because of the winter weather.122
Decision to Augment the Airlift through the Winter
Given the limited capacity of the air corridors and Berlin’s airports, the most
direct way to increase the tonnage ºown into West Berlin was to replace the
older C-47s with larger C-54s. The British, who had been providing about
one-third of the tonnage, did not have any more of the larger carriers. On
10 September, Clay requested an additional 116 C-54s, about half of the U.S.
transport reserve, which would upset emergency war plans. The Air Force
would agree to provide only 50. In private, Marshall told Bevin that the major
limiting factor in increasing the airlift was the risk of concentrating too great a
proportion of the air transport ºeet in Germany and that the U.S. govern-
ment had decided not to hazard more than 30 percent of its total resources for
the Berlin airlift. Clay’s request and the failure of four-power negotiations
stimulated another reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Berlin by the NSC.123
In a memorandum on 13 October, the JCS responded that in view of the
president’s 22 July decision to “remain in Berlin in any event,” General Clay
should be given the 66 additional aircraft. But the Joint Chiefs were not pre-
pared to let matters rest. They requested clariªcation as to whether the words
“in any event” meant that the United States would stay in Berlin even if this
resulted in war. If so, then “full-out preparations for the early eventuality of
war” should be inaugurated immediately. If not, then actions should be taken
“leading to our withdrawal from Berlin.”124 The JCS had reason to be con-
cerned about the U.S. military’s lack of preparedness. The U.S. Army in Ger-
many and Austria consisted of only 90,821 troops, of which combat units
121. Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 366–367.
122. Murphy et al., Battleground Berlin, p. 67; and Narinskii, “The Soviet Union and the Berlin Cri-
sis,” pp. 71–72.
123. Clay to Bradley and LeMay, 10 September 1948, in Smith, ed., Papers of General Lucius D. Clay,
Vol. 2, p. 852; Clay to Bradley, 23 September 1948, in Smith, ed., Papers of General Lucius D.
Clay, Vol. 2, pp. 878–879; Clay to Bradley, 4 October 1948, in Smith, ed., Papers of General
Lucius D. Clay, Vol. 2, p. 890; and “Conversation between Bevin and Marshall,” 22 September 1948,
in Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, eds., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Ofªce Conªdential Print. Part IV, From 1946 through 1950, Series F, Europe 1948, Vol.
13 (Germany and Austria: 1948) (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), pp. 181–
182.
124. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 151–153. According to Condit, the Joint Chiefs’
original 13 October memoranda were recalled and destroyed. Condit makes inferences about their
content from the earlier JCS 1907/9 and JCS 1907/11, which are available.
208
consisted mainly of one division of 12,180 soldiers. Soviet forces in Germany

and Austria, by contrast, numbered 23 divisions, or 348,000 soldiers. Com-
bat troops of the Western allies in Berlin were equivalent to ªve U.S. battal-
ions, with no heavy weapons and limited combat effectiveness, facing four So-
viet divisions (45,000 troops).125
The Joint Chiefs did not persuade Truman to clarify whether the United
States would ªght, if necessary, to stay in West Berlin. At a special NSC meet-
ing on 14 October, not attended by Truman, Lovett stated that the United
States had faced the risk of war over the Berlin issue back in July, when the
NSC had agreed that they were determined to remain in Berlin. “We are,”
Lovett said, “in Berlin with a full knowledge of the risks involved. It is our
policy that we do not propose to be forced out of Berlin.” The NSC recom-
mended that the airlift be continued and augmented as required.126
A week later, Clay reported to an NSC meeting that the airlift had proved
that it could be sustained even in adverse weather. Uniªcation of the British
and U.S. lifts under a single command (the Combined Air Lift Task Force),
he said, had resulted in greater efªciency. (The United States with its larger
carriers could ºy the shorter distance from British air bases in Germany, deliv-
ering one-third more cargo.)127 The following day, Truman, who had not been
present at the NSC meeting, approved the Joint Chiefs’ request that Clay be
given 66 additional C-54s.128
Belying Clay’s conªdent assessment, U.S. occupation authorities were
worried that the airlift would not be able to supply adequate food and coal
through the winter. In November 1948, Berlin’s usual cold, damp fog set in,
grounding ºights for at least ªfteen days, and the situation in December was
not much better. In November, the Combined Airlift Task Force was able to
ship an average of only 3,786.3 tons per day, and in December only 4,562.5
tons, which still fell short of Clay’s target of 5,200 tons. The airlift continued
despite the fog, with U.S. pilots ºying by instrument rules while air trafªc
controllers guided the planes to a landing using new technology, the ground-
controlled-approach radar system, recently installed at all airlift bases.129 In
125. “Summary of the Military Situation in Germany,” JCS 1907/1, 19 July 1948, with Attachments,
in RG 218, 381 (8-20-43), Sec. 17, NARA.
126. Memorandum for the President, 15 October 1948, in PSF, Subject File, National Security Coun-
cil-Meetings File, Memoranda for the President: Meeting Discussions: 1948, HSTL.
127. Memorandum for the President, 22 October 1948, in PSF, Subject File, National Security Coun-
cil-Meetings File, Memoranda for the President: Meeting Discussions: 1948, HSTL.
128. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 155.
129. Frank Howley, Berlin Command (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1950), pp. 230–231; Tunner,
Over the Hump, p. 172, 209; and Miller, To Save a City, pp. 120–121, 168, 170.
209
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January the weather turned unseasonably mild with no frost (in January two
years earlier, by contrast, Berlin had seen 281 hours of very severe frost and a
further 97 hours of severe frost). Also contributing to success, the additional
C-54s had begun to arrive in mid-November. By 1 December the airlift was
being carried out by 206 C-54s, and a month later the number of C-54s had
risen to 225. An average of 5,546 tons was shipped per day in January. Even
after fog returned in February, the tonnage did not drop substantially.130
Given the airlift’s apparent triumph in overcoming winter weather, it was
probably not a coincidence that on 31 January 1949, in response to written
questions submitted by a journalist, Stalin signaled his willingness to end the
blockade. He suggested that the trafªc restrictions would be lifted if the
Western powers postponed the establishment of a West German govern-
ment until another four-power conference on Germany could be held and if
they reopened trade between East and West Germany. Stalin failed to men-
tion the currency issue that was supposedly responsible for the trafªc restric-
tions.131 Some have suggested that Stalin gave in because the Western counter-
blockade was severely damaging the economy of the Soviet occupation zone.
They point to his mention of the lifting of Western trade restrictions as a con-
dition for lifting the blockade. But the extensive illegal trade that went on be-
tween East and West German ªrms, implicitly condoned by Soviet authori-
ties, helped to maintain production in the eastern zone as well as in West
Berlin.132
After informal inquiries were made about whether Stalin’s omission of
the currency issue was intentional, secret talks were initiated between the
U.S. ambassador to the UN, Phillip Jessup, and his Soviet counterpart,
Yakov Malik, on terms for ending the blockade. An agreement was reached
on 4 May to lift the blockade on 12 May, followed by a CFM meeting on
23 May to consider both Germany and Berlin.133 By this time, the Western
allies had agreed on their residual powers in an occupation statute, and
the West Germans had enacted the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), making agree-
ment with the Soviet Union on a uniªed German government highly un-
likely.134
130. Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, pp. 306–307; and Miller, To Save a City, 169, 172.
131. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929–1969 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 283.
132. Paul Steege, Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946–1949 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), pp. 247, 249–250, 253.
133. Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 284; and Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade,
pp. 380–382, 387.
134. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 669, 692.
210
Conclusion
Truman’s decision to stay in West Berlin while relying on the airlift to feed the
city was seemingly vindicated by the outcome of the crisis. Stalin retreated
without gaining a quid pro quo on Germany, and U.S., British, and West
German ofªcials began to perceive themselves as partners rather than ene-
mies. In addition, the United States and Britain gained increased prestige
through demonstration of their air power.135
Despite these beneªts, the U.S. commitment to West Berlin was highly
contingent. If Truman had engaged in more extensive discussion and deliber-
ation with his advisers, his decision might have been different. Army studies
held that West Berlin could not be supplied by air and that the U.S. position
would become untenable. These studies also pointed out that even if the So-
viet Union lifted the blockade, the Soviet Union could reintroduce various re-
strictions that would jeopardize the city’s economy. Nevertheless, Truman re-
fused even to consider withdrawal, apart from his statement that if the United
States lost Berlin it would lose everything it was ªghting for. He also did not
take into consideration the increased coercive leverage that the U.S. position
in West Berlin would offer the Soviet Union. The Berlin case therefore high-
lights the importance of individuals in formulating U.S. Cold War policy. De-
fense and State Department ofªcials were deeply divided over the proper
course of action. Marshall was reluctant to place at risk valuable U.S. trans-
port planes by allocating them to the airlift, even though West Berlin’s needs
could not have been supplied through the winter without the additional
planes.
The complexity of the issues related to Berlin—the city’s symbolic value,
its relationship to West Germany, French security concerns, the risk of future
blockades—and uncertainty about the outcome of either withdrawal or the
airlift favored the use of judgment by Truman. The ultimate success of the air-
lift largely resulted from the skill, ingenuity, organization, and motivation of
airlift personnel, as well as a break in the winter weather, factors that were
difªcult to anticipate. Truman received a bit of good luck with the unusually
mild January weather.136 The U.S. commandant in Berlin, Colonel Frank
Howley, recalled that “by the end of the year our coal reserves had slumped to
a dangerous low of sixty-ªve thousand tons,” but “when conditions seemed
blackest, the weather miraculously improved, and thenceforth air deliveries
increased rapidly.”137
135. Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, pp. 374, 377.

136. Ibid., pp. 307, 377.
137. Howley, Berlin Command, p. 237.
211
Larson
The Joint Chiefs and the military were correct, however, in their assess-
ment that the U.S. position in West Berlin would be a continuing source of
vulnerability. The United States tried to deter the Soviet Union from taking
over West Berlin by threatening to use nuclear weapons, a threat that lost
credibility as Soviet nuclear capabilities increased.138 In November 1958, Ei-
senhower reºected that “we perhaps should not have committed ourselves as
deeply as we had to Berlin,” where “the situation was basically untenable.”139
On the plane returning from the Vienna summit in June 1961, President
John F. Kennedy reºected, “God knows I’m not an isolationist, but it seems
particularly stupid to risk killing a million Americans over an argument about
access rights on an Autobahn.”140 A more systematic, deliberate consideration
of the weakness of the U.S. position and Soviet interests in Berlin might have
reached a conclusion different from the one Truman reached relying on his
own judgment. In the end, however, Truman’s resolve prevailed and set the
guidelines for U.S. policy on West Berlin thereafter.
138. Ernest R. May, “America’s Berlin: Heart of the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4 (July/
August 1998), p. 157.
139. “Memorandum of Conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles,”
18 November 1958, in FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Vol. VIII, p. 85.
140. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960–1963 (New York:
HarperCollins, 1991), p. 225.
212

13.1.larson Origins of Containment Truman and West Berlin

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Access Provided by Biblioteca Max von Buch de la Universidad de San Andres at 06/13/11 3:17PM GMT

The Origins of Commitment

✣ Deborah Welch Larson

Journal of Cold War Studies

To explain the commitment, this article traces the Truman administra-

Realism and the U.S. Commitment to West Berlin

The Use of Judgment in Foreign Policy

A growing body of psychological theory and evidence indicates that

The Origins of the Berlin Crisis

Marshall adjourned the meeting on 15 December without scheduling further

In January, the U.S. Army’s Planning and Operations (P&O) Division

The “Baby Blockade” and the “Little Lift”

trains to proceed without shooting. Truman agreed with Under Secretary of

sending a joint U.S.-British-French note to the Soviet government afªrming

The Decision to Stay in Berlin

occupation zone. In a 14 June 1945 cable to Stalin, Truman offered to with-

84. Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 292.

Formulating a Diplomatic Strategy

Decision to Increase the Airlift

As it became clear that negotiations would be prolonged, opposition to the

loss of prestige.”108 On 26 July, Forrestal forwarded the memorandum to the

Bevin had strong reservations about informally approaching Stalin, concerns

strictions on transportation would be lifted, and that a four-power conference

Decision to Augment the Airlift through the Winter

consisted mainly of one division of 12,180 soldiers. Soviet forces in Germany

135. Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Airlift, pp. 374, 377.

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