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    Hay 2006

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    Winston Poki Smith

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    lad, hy rte, Redbnm ry feat), of | fet Hevalheole d VAS Tobit, QU, roe | - inceptior and met! isms (see CHAPTER 4 Myair construc | poses. T of const CONSTRUCTIVIST rre-exis change, INSTITUTIONALISM aa tionalisr eee existing | 1 consid construr COLIN HAY 1] The proliferation of new institutionalist scholarship has, perhaps unremarkably, led to a corresponding proliferation in the adjectives used to characterize its ‘Causi variants, In 1984 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen spoke quite comfortably of grapple the new institutionalism in the singular. By 1996 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor the oor eventually settled on thtee Tiew institutionalisms (having toyed in earlier iterations In this of the same now classic article, with four). And by 1998 B. Guy Peters identified no Sate [ks than seven new institutionalisms, Yet none of these authors made any reference Thee to constructivism, far less to a distinctive constructivist variant of institutionalism in its own right. Indeed, until very recently, there has been very litle if any reference to what is now variously described as an ideational, discursive, or as te here, constructivist institutionalism. This is for three very good reasons—const;uct- eta ivist institutionalism is-by far the most recent. addition to. the family of (0996) 1 institutionatisms, it arises out of an engagement with the limitations of the others, ost and, as a consequence and in contrast the others, it is still very much in its elie tions of * 1am greatly indebted to Mark Bly and to the editors for encouraging and perceptive comments ox Aionais aan earlier Version of this chapter, Alas, | must bear sole responsibility for the errors of substance and bread "The fit pled efocs ht candice oa dscursive andor detonators by thos are in John L. Campi and Ove K: Pedersen’ (2008 edited collection on The Rise of Nelberalisn “Taylors ‘and Institutional Analy sociloy arkably, vrize its tably of y Taylor zations ified no ference onalism > if any 2, oF as astruct- nily of others, in its ance and onaism bra CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALIS! inception, It is, nonetheless, already highly distinctive (ontologically, analytically, and methodologically), and it poses a series of challenges to extant institutional- isms (see also Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2006; Schmidt 2006). My aim in this brief chapter is quite simple—to summarize the distinctiveness of constructivist institutionalism and to identify the nature of the challenge that it poses. The chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first, | consider the origins of constructivist institutionalism in an attempt to grapple with the limits of pre-existing institutionalist scholarship to deal with post-formative institutional ‘change, particularly that associated with disequilibrium dynamics. In the second, T consider the ontological and analytical distinctiveness of constructivist institu~ tionalism’s turn to ideas and the associated nature of the challenge its poses to ‘existing neoinstitutionalist perspectives. In the third and concluding section, I consider the contribution to the analysis of complex institutional change that constructivist institutionatism has thus far made, 1 From Historica TO CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM Constructivist institutionalism, as T will label it, has its origins in attempts to grapple with questions of complex institutional change—initially from within the confines of existing neoinstitutionalist scholarship (see also Schmidt 2006). In this respect, rational choice and normative/sociological institutionalism proved most obviously limiting (see Table 42). The reason was simple. Constructivist instittionalists were motivated by the desire to capture, describe, and interrogate + ideational or discursive instiutionalism 2 1 prefer the tem constructivist nstcutionalism co since the forme implies a dstint ontology such 25 might credibly inforin a distinetive approach to instituuonal analysis. This would seem consistent with Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor's [aoge) reference to rational choice institaticnalism, sociological institutionalism, and bistorical institationalsm, cach of which might lay claim toa distinetive ontology (or in the case of historical institutional, perhaps, a combination of ontologies) This is @ point to which we return. On the ontological diferences berween these four new institutionalisms, see Figure 43. One of the implica: ons of labeling intitttonalisms in terms of their ontological assumptions is that network institu tionaliom (eee Chapter 5) is not further discussed jp this chapter, since i is not characterized by ts Uistinet ontology so much as by its empirical concerns. At this point, ti perhaps also important 10 hte thatthe term sociological institationaism is by mo means always enthusiastically embraced by thoae to whom its intended to refer tn what follows I will, theo, depart slighty fom Hall and Tuvlor’s terminology by referring to notmativfsociological insttutonalism where they refer to sociological institutionalis. suumanns od snBanens wien ue stop a6uews jeuonmnsuy 26ue4 40 Su2wow 429 0, ‘shee aut szysues 0} feuopmasutjeuones wo sm904 Z séueup reuogmpsy sauey 2x00 ‘sou suopmnsu, “svonuanu ein, 40 wodoouan “POU “ypenudde eopfieuy ‘uoguanueo pue suiou sMoqop siowse-ipeaidde: {snioie9, suoidursse eonpioou, --ypeoudde jeon.2s034, Lisyeuonnyasu siarongsuoy wsjeuonnygsu, © soup jevoney is}yeuornysut sjalqanuzsuod JO ssauaAnaUNsip |eDIBO{O,U0 aut Lb 918) anes aipey ‘souapuadap yea bueip jevomasut quanbasgns yuuie _G@uaudoyarap quanbosqns uo you 30 Sivaulow spuewy seq uouwion sisap reuorransu: euones Uo S120 2 suioyiad SssaUjEM sausayn hay 60 COLIN Hay institutional disequilibrium. As such, rational choice and normative/sociological institutionalism, which rely albeit for rather different reasons on the assumption of equilibrium, were theoretical non-starters.t Unremarkably, then, and by a process of elimination, most routes to constructivist insttutionalism can trace their origins to historical institutionalism (see, for instance, Berman 1998; Blyth 2002; Campbell 2001, 2004; Hay 2001, 2002; McNamara 1998; Schmidt 2002), Yet if historical institutionalism has typically served as an initial source of inspiration for constructivist institutionalists, it has increasingly become a source of frustration and a point of departure. For, whilst ostensibly concerned with "process tracing” and hence with questions of institutional change over time, historical institutionalism has tended to be characterized by an emphasis upon institutional genesis at the expense of an adequate account of post-formative institutional change.> Moreover, in so far as post-formative institutional dynamics have been considered (for instance Hall 1993; Mall and Soskice 2001; Pierson 1994), they tend either to be seen as a consequence of path dependent lock-in effects on, where more ruptural in nature, as the product of exogenous shocks such as wars on revolutions (Hay and Wincott 1998). Historical institutionalist, it seems, is incap- able of offering its own (ie. endogenous} account of the determinants of the “punctuated equilibria” (Krasner 1984) to which it invariably points, This, at least, is the charge of many constructivist institutionalists (see, for instance, Blyth 2002, 19-23; Hay 2001, 194-5). fone follows Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996) in seeing historical insticutionalism as animated by actors displaying a combination of “calculus” and » Though hardly constructviny, the work of Robert H, Bates eal. (1998) is particularly interesting in thie regard, Operating from an evowedly rational choice institutionaist perspective, yet concerned With questions of social and political change under conditions of disequilibrium which they fesy concede that rational choice insitutionaism is poorly equipped to deal with (1998, 23), they fectively import insights from constructivist esearch in developing « more dynamic bet sell «sentially rational choite theoretical macel, Whi the resulting synthesis can certainly be challenged ia terms of its internal consistency—ontologicaly an! epistemologially—it docx lend farther «credence to the notion that constructivist insights have mich to offer an analyse of institutional ‘change under disequilibrium conditions (for a eitical commentary sc alsa Hay 2004a, 47-9) « Stitly speaking, normativelsociologicalinstitutionalism does not so much assume as predict ‘quilibrium. For the “logis of appropriateness” that constitute its principal analytical focus and that i discerns and associates with succesful instutionalzanion are themselves sen as equlibeting, ‘The hey point, however, is tha, like rational choice insttutionalism, it docs not effer (nor, send claim to offer) much analytical purchase on the question of institutional dynamisan in comtents of Aisequiibrium, * lnerstingly, this is something it seems to have inherited fom the attempt to “bring the state ‘bck into” (North American} political science in the 1g8os out of which it evolve (se, for insane Evans et al. 1985) Fr, inthe formers emphasis, in particular, apon the institutional and organi tional capacity to wage war effectively upon the process of state formation, it came to identify the Lighly consequential and path-dependent nature of institutional genesis for post-formative institu Honal evolution (sce Mann 1988; Tilly 1973) In Charles Tilly’ characterstically ince aphorism, “wars make states and states make wa” “cultural” logics instrumental log an initial condit are themselves vutility maximiz tutionalism) or sociological ins unlikely to offer institutional ch insticational ch infrequent, bo respect, histori normative/soci cerns, histories of rational che equilibrium dy identification « This is all ve ivist path fron accuracy of H. a an amalganr conceptions © been suggeste “ontologically ‘Taylor 1998). 1 the term itse) of historical i socialized tree ‘Thelen anc institutionalis © This is, of € escribe/predict, game). Yet they 9 The distinc [New institution: “This pernaps re porary political to limit, indee political dynam the stick too st the pati-deper intended and w ‘the new institu change logical otion of Process otigins mpbell arce of source with + time, s upon mative aamics 1994), vets or, vars or incap- of the his, at Blyth torical sand resting sceened freely D, they at stil lenges further stional oredict ve thet rating, cee, oxts of fy the CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM 61 “cultural” logics, then itis perhaps not difficult to see why. For, as already noted, instrumental logics of calculation (calculus logics) presume equilibrium (at least as an initial condition)® and norm-criven logics of appropriateness (cultural logics) are themselves equilibrating. Accounts which see actors as driven either by utility maximization in an institutionalized game scenario (rational choice in: tutionalism) or by institutionalized norms and cultural conventions (normative! sociological institutionalism) or, indeed, both (historical institutionalism), are unlikely to offer mach analytical purchase on questions of complex post-formative institutional change. They are far better placed to account for the path-dependent institutional change they tend to assume than they ate to explain the periodic, infrequent, bouts of path-shaping institutional change they concede.’ In this respect, historical institutionalism is no different than its rational choice and normative/sociological counterparts. Indeed, despite its ostensible analytical con- cerns, historical institutionalism merely compounds and reinforces the incapacity of rational choice and normative/sociological institutionalism to deal with dis- equilibrium dynamics. Given that one of its core contributions is scen to be its identification of such dynamics, this isa significant failing. ‘This is all very well, and provides a powerful justification for a more construct: ivist path from historical institutionalism. It does, however, rest on the assumed accuracy of Hall and Taylor's depiction of historical institutionalism—essentially a8 an amalgamation of rational choice and normative/sociological institutionalist conceptions of the subject. This is by no means uncontested. It has, for instance, been suggested that historical institutionalism is in fact rather more distinctive ontologically than this implies (compare Hay and Wincott 1998 with Hall and ‘Taylor 1998). For if one returns to the introduction to the volume which launched the term itself, and to other seminal and self-consciously defining statements of historical institutionalism, one finds not a vacillation between rationalized and socialized treatments of the human subject, but something altogether different. Thelen and Steinmo, for instance, are quite explicit in distancing historical institutionalism from the view of the rational actor on which the calculus approach © This is, of course, not to deny that standard rational choice/ncoclesicl economie models can Aescrbeipredicr disequilibrium outcomes (think, for instance, of a multiplayer prisoners dilemma {game}. Yet they do, assaming inital equilibrium conditions, 7 Thedistinction beeween path-dependent and path-shaping logics and dynamic ie a crucial one, ‘New institutional in general have tended to place far greater emphasis on the forme than the later, ‘This perhaps reflects the latent structuralism of the attempt to bring intittions back into cantern- pporaty political analysis (see Hay 2002, 105-7). For institutions, as structures ar invariably seen to limit, indeed delimit, the parameters of political choice. As such, they are consteains on political dynamism, This is certainly an important insight yt there isa certain danger in titing the sick too strongly in the direction of structure. For, under certain conditions, institutions, and the path-dependemt logics they otherwise Impose, are recast and redesigned through the intended and unintended consequences of political agency. Given the importance of such moments ‘the new instivationalis has had remarkably litle to say om these bouts of path-shaping institutional change. 62 COLIN HAY : is premised. Actors cannot simply be assumed to have a fixed (and immutable) institutionalism preference set, to be blessed with extensive (often perfect) information and fore- (2004)) seem in sight, or to be self-interested and self-serving utility maximizers. Rational choice : they discern at ¢ and historical institutionalism are, as Thelen and Steinmo note, “premised on : bridge which thy different assumptions that in fact reflect quite different approaches to the study of institutionalism, politics” (1992, 7). foundations inte Yet, if this would seem to imply a greater affinity with normative/sociological is a trajectory t institutionalism, then further inspection reveals this not to be the case either. For, cultural and cale to the extent that the latter assumes conventional and norm-driven behavior also closes off t thereby downplaying the significance of agency, it is equally at odds with the institutionalism defining statements of historical institutionalism. As Thelen and Steinmo again I suggest snatttional analysis. allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as Sbiects and az agents of history. The institutions that ate atthe centee of historical Shatttionalistapalss_--can shope and constrain political statics in important ways but they are emselves als the outcome (conscious or snntended) of deliberate politcal 2 TH states of political colt and of choice. (Thelen and Steinmo 192, 1; emphasis added) Distr Set in this context, the social ontology of historical institutionalism is highly distinctive, and indeed quite compatible with the constructivist institutionalism Which it now more consistently seems to inform. This brings us to a most important point. Whether constructivist institutionalism is seen as a variant, further develop- : In the context, ‘ment or rejection of historical institutionalism depends crucially on what historical arship, the anal institutionalism is taken to imply ontologically. Ifthe latter is seen, as in Hall and are highly disti ‘Taylor's influential account, as a flexible combination of cultural and calculus { and normative approaches to the institutionally-embedded subject, then it is considerably at E inform an end ‘odds with constructivist institutionalism. Seen in this way, it is, moreover, incom- : and innovation patible with the attempt to develop an endogenous institutionalist account of the ‘Actors are 5 mechanisms and determinants of complex institutional change. Yet, if iis seen, as stantly changit the above passages from Thelen and Steinmo might suggest, as an approach E over others an predicated upon the dynamic interplay of structure and agent (institutional context incomplete an and institutional architect) and, indeed, material and ideational factors (see Hay event, Moreow 2002, chs. 2, 4, and 6), then the difference between historical and constructivist : for actors are institutionalisms is at anost one of emphasis i preferences, at Whilst the possibility stil exists of a common historical and constructivist material or eve institutionalist research agenda, it might seem unnecessarily divisive to refer to . a normative (i constructivist institutionalism as a new addition to the family of institutionalisms Yet this can, I think, be justified. Indeed, sad though this may well be, the prospect, ‘of such a common research agenda is perhaps not as great as the above comments : © This is an in might suggest. That this is so is the product of a recent “hollowing-out” of gmpiallysinc historical institutionalism, Animated, it seems, by the (laudable) desire to as ea build bridges, many of the most prominent contemporary advocates of historical dangers of ontale amutable) and fore- ral choice mised on 2 study of siotogical ther. For, behavior with the no again historical ant ways, € politieat is added) s highly ionalism portant develop: tstorieal Hall and calculus rably at incom- of the seen, as proach context see Hay uctivi uuctivist refer to ralisms, rospect naments out” of sire to storical CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTION ALISA. institutionalism (notably Peter Hall (with David Soskice, 2001) and Paul Pier (2004)) seem increasingly to have resolved the calculus-cultural balance whi they discern at the heart of historical institutionalism in favor of the former. The bridge which they would seem to be anxious to build, then, runs from historical y way of an acknowledgment of the need to incorporate micro~ foundations into institutionalist analysis, 1o rational choice institutionalism. This is a trajectory that not only places a sizable and ever-growing wedge between cultural and calculus approaches to institutional analysis, but one which essentially also closes off the alternative path to a more dynamic historical constructivist institutionalism, 2 THE ANALYTICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTIVENESS OF CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM In the context, then, of contemporary developments in new institutionalist schol arship, the analytical and ontological assumptions of constructivist institutionalism are highly distinctive. They represent a considerable advance on their rationalist and normative/sociological predecessors, at least in terms of their capacity to inform an endogenous account of complex institutional evolution, adaptation, and innovation Actors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent, and con- stantly changing goals. They do so in a context which favors certain strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that contest which are at best incomplete and which may very often prove to have been inaccurate after the event, Morcover, ideas in the form of perceptions “matter” in a second sense—~ for actors are oriented normatively towards their environment, Their desires, Preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact-—a reflection of ‘material or even social circumstance—but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting @ normative (indeed moral, ethical, and political) orientation towards the context This x am important caveat, Ontologies are not contending theories that can be adjudicated empircally—since what counts as evidence in the first place is not an entalogiclly-neutral issue ‘Thus, while certain ontological assumptions can preclude a consideration, say, of disequilibrium dynamics (hy estentilly denying their existence), this dacs aot in itell invalidate them. On the dangers of ontological evangelism, sce Hay (20). 64 COLIN Hay in which they will have to be realized, As this suggests, for constructivists, politics is rather less about the blind pursuit of transparent material interest and rather more about both the fashioning, identification, and rendering actionable of such conceptions, and the balancing of (presumed) instrumentality and rather more affective motivations (see also Wendt 1999, 13~35).° Consequently, actors are not analytically substitutable (as in rational choice or normative/sociological institu- tionalism), just as their preference sets or logics of conduct cannot be derived from the (institutional) setting in which they are located. Interests are social constructions and cannot serve as proxies for material factors; as @ consequence they are far more difficult to operationalize empirically than is conventionally assumed (at least, in a non-tautological way: see also Abdetal, Blyth, and Parsons 2005; Blyth 2003) In common with rationalist variants of institutionalism, the context is viewed in, largely institutional terms. Yet institutions are understood less. as functional means. nnctionality or dysfunction ality is an open—empirical and historical—question. Indeed, constructivist insti tutionalists place considerable emphasis on the potentially ineffective ancl inefficient nature of social institutions; on institutions as the subject and focus of political struggle; and on the contingent nature of such struggles whose outcomes can in no sense be derived from the extant institutional context itself (see, especially, Blyth 2002). ‘These are the basic analytical ingredients of constructivist institutionalism's approach to institutional innovation, evolution, and transformation, Within this of reducing uncertainty, so much as structures whose fi perspective, change is seen to reside in the relationship between actors and the context in which they find themselves, between institutional “architects,” institu- tionalized subjects, and institutional environments. More specifically, institutional change is understood in terms of the interaction between strategic conduct and the strategic context within which it is conceived, and in the later unfolding of its consequences, both intended and unintended. As in historical institutionalism, such a formulation is path dependent: the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point itself constrains the trajectory after that point; and the strategic choices made at a particular moment “+ The affintice between constructivism in international relations theory and constructivist inst tatonalism are, perhaps on this point especially, considerable. And, on the face of it there is nothing terribly remarkable about that. Yet however terapring it might be to arribute the latter's view of preferenceinterest formation tothe former, thie would be mistaken. For while the still ecent labeling ‘of constructivist insttutionlism as a distinctive position in its own right has clay been influenced by the prominence of constructivism within international relations theory (Abdsal etal. 2005), the ‘ausal and constitutive role accorded to ideas by such insttutionalits predates the rise of construct- ivism in international relations (seo, for instance, Blyth 1997; Hall 1993: Hay 3996). As such, cow srutivista in international relations and constructivist instivutionalsin are perhaps best scen as parallel ifinitially distinct developments eliminate whole condition of exis ence does not pr change, in whi Moreover, and « ppath-shaping in response to exo} Further diffe institutionalists ideational path very ideas on development, #1 on ideational fe their subsequen Constructivi: the extent to embedding —* which actors cx concerned wit! and_ paradigm: paradigmatic s Such a forr between instit comprise ther sizes institutio for a considers doing it offer ‘emphasis upo) recognizes the structured (na constantly che militating aga knowledge of affects the abil in which they Finally, itis formulation. ideas about 5 possible, and which they fir is through s ultimately ass ists, politics and rather ible of such ather more ‘ors are not ical institu. be derived + are social onsequence \ventionally ind Parsons s viewed in onal means ysfunction- tivist insti- ective and ad focus of ules whose intext itself tionalism's Nithin this rs and the s institu- sstitutional act and the ing of its ationalism, fects how strains the moment res nothing ters view of ‘ent abeling ‘Feonstrct: + such, con ALISM 65 climinate whole ranges of possibilities from later choices while serving as the very condition of existence of others (see also Tilly 1994). Yet, pointing to path depend- ence does not preclude the identification of moments of path-shaping institutional change, in which the institutional architecture is significantly reconfigured. Moreover, and at odds with most existing new institutionalist scholarship, such path-shaping institutional change is not merely seen as a more-or-less functional response to exogenous shocks. Further differentiating it from new institutionalist orthodoxy, constructivist institutionalists emphasize not only institutional path dependence, but also ideational path dependence. In other words, it is not just institutions, but the very ideas on which they are predicated and which inform their design and development, that exert constraints on political autonomy. Institutions are built ‘on ideational foundations which exert an independent path dependent effect on their subsequent development. Constructivist institationalism thus seeks to identify, detail, and interrogate the extent to which—through processes of normalization and institutional- embedding—established ideas become codified, serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret environmental signals. Yet, crucially, they are also concerned with the conditions under which such established cognitive filters and paradigms are contested, challenged, and replaced. Moreover, they see paradigmatic shifts as heralding significant institutional change. Such a formulation implies a dynamic understanding of the relationship between institutions on the one hand, and the individuals and groups who comprise them (and on whose experience they impinge) on the other. It empha- sizes institutional innovation, dynamism, and transformation, as well as the need for a consideration of processes of change over a significant period of time. In so doing it offers the potential to overturn new institutionalism’s characteristic ‘emphasis upon institutional inertia, At the same time, however, such a schema recognizes that institutional change does indeed occur in a context which is structured (not least by institutions and ideas about institutions) in complex and ‘constantly changing ways which facilitate cettain forms of intervention whilst militating against others. Moreover, access to strategic resources, and indeed to knowledge of the institutional environment, is unevenly distributed. This in turn affects the ability of actors to transform the contexts (institutional and otherwise) in which they find themselves. Finally, itis important to emphasize the crucial space granted to ideas within this formulation, Actors appropriate strategically a world replete with institutions and ideas about institutions, Their perceptions about what is feasible, legitimate, possible, and desirable are shaped both by the institutional environment in which they find themselves and by existing policy paradigms and world-views. It is through such cognitive filters that strategic conduct is conceptualized and ultimately assessed. 66 coun 3. CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM AppLisep: CRISES, PARADIGM SHIFTS, AND UNCERTAINTY Whilst there may well be something of 2 tension between the contemporary trajec- tory of historical institutionalism and the developing constructivist institetionalist research agenda, this should not hide the considerable indebtedness of the later to eatlier versions of the former. The work of Peter A. Hall, in particular that on policy paradigms, social learning, and institutional change (3993), has proved a crucial source of inspiration for many contemporary currents in constructivist institution- alism. Indeed, the latter’s indebtedness to historical institutionalism is arguably rather greater than its indebtedness to constructivism in international relations theory. For despite the ostensible similarities between constructivist insitutionalism and constructivism in international relations theory, the former has been driven toa far greater extent than the latter by the attempt to resolve particular empirical puzzles. Those puzzles, principally concerned with understanding the conditions of existence of significant path-shaping institutional change, have led institutional- ists to consider the role of ideas in influencing the developmental trajectory of institutions under conditions of uncertainly and/or crisis. They were explored first by historical institutionalists, most notably Peter A. Hall Halls work represents by far the most sustained, consistent, and systematic attempt within the historical institutionalist perspective to accord a key role for ideas in the determination of institutional outcomes. Like most of the con- structivist institutionalist scholarship which it would come to inform, Hall’ approach to ideas comes not from a prior ontological commitment (as in constructivist international relations theory), but from the observation of an ‘empirical regularity—ideational change invariably precedes institutional change. Drawing inspiration from Kuhn, Hall argues that policy is made within the context of “policy paradigms.” Such interpretative schema are internalized by politicians, state managers, policy experts, and the like, They come to define @ range of legitimate policy techniques, mechanisms, and instruments, thereby delimiting the very targets and goals of policy itself. In short, they come to circumscribe the realm of the politically feasible, practical, and desirable. As Hall elaborates: policy makers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing... [T]his framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policy makers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of itis taken for granted and ‘unamenable to scrutiny as a whole, (1993, 279) ‘The identification of such distinctive policy paradigms allows Hall to differentiate between: (a) periods of “normal” policy-making (and change) in which the paradigm rem policy-making of “exceptional the very pararr and replaced, desirable is con Hall conce theoretically-i in a variety policy-making periodization such insttutic litle to say ab This provid self-conscious ‘This still nase date, accume Attention has invoked but r Biyth’s me the addition interested nv ‘emergence ¢ through moi and constite capitalist ecc departure fo ‘The analy policy para as moment problematiz more “notn ‘transparent uncertainty ‘which ager pathologies to the resol theories, at ® Wis per position very instance, that at a logieal The fol (2004b 207 articularly ninstalled, vin, butthis ept as self, ceptions of dical inde- rendering in Blyth's ould seem, Iraccess to atives—to is requires, 8 an idea. »opulation ‘And in a apable of eas come ley have a leas? If, as is to sign- ‘portunity outcomes >erceived) € tise of prevent nents of About the on of the ST INSTITUTIONALISM 71

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