EVANGELINE LADONGA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 141066, 17 February 2005

On March 27, 1991, three Information for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the
RTC
It was alleged that sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, the accused conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, 

They [ Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga] draw and issue UCPB Check
postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS
AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, without
informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to
cover up the amount of the check

They gave and delivered the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of
rediscounting. Upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the United
Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed
The cases were jointly tried.

In court, Alfredo Oculam (complainant) testified that the SPS. accused were his
regular customers where they have obtained 9,075.55 from, which was guaranteed by a
UCPB Check.

[Criminal Case complaint against sps.]

RTC- sps as guilty beyond Reasonable doubt

CA- (Evangeline argued that the principle of Conspiracy is not applicable in
special laws such as BP Blng. 22. and that she is not a signatory of the checks)

It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its
provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary.
The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability
in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did
not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator
takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The
Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be
held to be the act of the other.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS
CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.
RULING:
[Q1] B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the
general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.
[Q2] The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness,
complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband,
Adronico, signed the check subject
Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not
specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a
direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in
the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only
did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

YU v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 134172, 29 September 2004

Petitioner was charged with 19 counts of violation of BP 22 before the QC RTC.

The RTC rendered her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the 19 charges and imposed
on her monetary penalties for each. The CA also affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Enter petitioner’s present appeal. She contends that Sec. 1 of BP 22 provides
only the imprisonment OR fine, OR both. She should not suffer subsidiary imprisonment
in case of non-payment of fines imposed by the RTC.
It bears stressing that on February 14, 2001, Administrative Circular No. 13-
2001 was issued clarifying the imposition of imprisonment for violations of BP 22 and
subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is unable to pay the one he
is sentenced to pay. In clarifying the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the Circular
states that if the accused is unable to pay the one imposed by the trial court, "there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.”

ISSUE/S & RATIO/S

1. W/N the accused found guilty of violations of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22
(bouncing checks law) be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in the case
s/he fails to pay the fines imposed by the trial court.

RULING:
The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Art. 38
and 39 of the RPC. The absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in
BP 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its violations.
RULING WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

QUESTION:
 Explain the basis of SC in applying Art. 39 of the RPC to a Special Law.

Under Section 1, BP No. 22- Where the check is drawn by a corporation,

company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of
such drawer shall be liable under this Act."Provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can
be applied suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same
Code, which provides:

"ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary."

ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet
the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight
pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and

fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the
preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not
exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it
continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be
counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary

imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional

no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in

a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during
the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to
suffer the same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty
consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improve." (Underscoring ours)

We hold that the above provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied

suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code, which
provides:
 "ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V SAMSON

G.R. No. 214883, 2 September 2015

Cristina Samson was charged with the crime of Parricide for stabbing her
husband, Gerry Delmar, which resulted to his death.
She invoked self defense as a justifying circumstance. According to Cristina, she
and her two children were watching television in their home when the victim arrived
drunk when the Victim asked for his dinner but the wife was not able to cook food which
led to a fight. After they were pacified, Gerry left.
Upon his return, he pointed a knife at Cristina's neck. Despite her plea not to hurt
her, he still continued pointing the knife (told Cristina to stop talking or otherwise, he will
put a hole in her neck.)
Then, Gerry slapped Cristina's face twice. While Gerry was still holding the knife,
Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the knife which Gerry was
holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest
pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife
went in contact with his chest. When she saw her husband bloodied, she shouted for
help and her father and brother came and brought Gerry to the hospital. Her relatives
told her that Gerry died in the hospital. 
Christine, their youngest daughter who witnessed the fight, narrated that as the
fight escalated, her mother was able to get hold of a knife, which was inserted in the
roof, and used it in stabbing her father. The victim fell on the ground and crawled until
he reached the door. When the victim was being brought to the hospital, Cristina
left. And that was the last time they saw their mother.

RTC- Christina is guilty of Parricide and the rendered “self-defense” as was

reasoned out by Christina was held untenable
(There was no longer any threat to her life before she stabbed her husband
Gerry. Though there was an initial danger as there was an altercation before the
stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when Gerry already put down
the knife. It was Cristina who provoked him when she suddenly pushed him to the
ground. She then took the knife and told him not to come near her. When he grabbed
her, she stabbed him. After she took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would necessitate the need to kill Gerry.)
CA- affirmed the decision of RTC
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense
in favor of Cristina. 

RULING:
Yes. Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry's aggression had already
ceased when he was disarmed, it is the Court's view that the aggression still continued.
Her perceived peril to her life continued and persisted until she put an end to it. 
The requisites to constitute the validity of the use of self-defense were present, viz;
1. There must be unlawful aggression
- an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person. 
(there was a continuous peril in Christina’s life when her husband posed a
threat of killing her, that even though Gerry was already unarmed, he
continued to go around Christina despite the plea that he should not come
near his wife, it can be presumed also that the husband could just easily
overpower Christina and kill her…Gerry did not walk away from his wife)
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
- met if the person invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner
equivalent to the means of attack used by the aggressor (Perfect equality
between the weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the
aggressor is not required.)
(use of knife by Christina as was also used by Gerry beforehand; the single
stab caused to Gerry manifest that it was inflicted to suppress the
materialization of Gerry’s threat toward his wife)
3. Lack of Sufficient Provocation
- Christina merely took the opportunity to save her life from the threat posed by
her husband
QUESTION:
May there still be unlawful aggression even if the attacker was disarmed?
Yes. Even if the victim was no longer armed, unlawful aggression may still persist
such that the victim still posed a threat to the life of the accused. 
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V RODOLFO OLARBE
G.R. No. 227421, 23 July 2018
On May 2006, Olarbe and his [common-law] wife were sleeping in their house in
Luisiana,Laguna, when at midnight, they were awakened by the seemingly drunk Arca,
carrying a rifle and a bolo, shouting insults and threatening to kill them from outside their
home. Arca forcibly entered their home and held the two at gunpoint, but Olarbe
grabbed the gun and shot Arca.
However, Arca still managed to get his bolo from his waist and attack them, until
the fight had moved to the outer portion of the house, where accused and Arca fought
again for the possession of the bolo. Olarbe managed to acquire, and hack Arca, and
after the killing incident, Rodolfo surrendered himself to the authorities.
(
RTC- ruled in favor of Arca and charged and convicted Olarbe with murder
CA- affirmed the decision of RTC
ISSUE:
Whether or not Olarbe may be acquitted on grounds of self-defense.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that Olarbe had established the justifying circumstances
invoked, as Olarbe’s act was a culmination of Arca’s consistent aggression towards
them, to protect himself and his spouse, and repel the unlawful aggression towards
them, as the danger to their lives was imminent.
Thus, pursuant to Article 11, paragpraph 3, Olarbe was acquitted on grounds of
self-defense and defense of stranger.

QUESTION:
Was Rodolfo able to establish that he acted in self-defense? Explain
-Yes, Olarbe's account of what did happen on that fateful night was highly
plausible. At the minimum, the details and sequence of the events therein described
conformed to human experience and the natural course of things. Armed with both the
gun and the bolo, Acra not only disturbed Olarbe's peace but physically invaded the
sanctity of latter's home at midnight. Given that the aggression by Arca was unprovoked
on the part of Olarbe, and with no other person disputing the latter's account, we should
easily see and understand why Olarbe would feel that his and his common law spouse's
lives had been put in extreme peril.
In addition, Olarbe's conduct following the killing of Arca - of voluntarily surrendering
himself to the police authorities immediately after the killing (i.e., at around 12:30 o'clock
in the early morning of May 8, 2006), and reporting his participation in the killing of Arca
to the police authorities - bolstered his pleas of having acted in legitimate self-defense
and legitimate defense of his common-law spouse. Such conduct manifested
innocence.
How did SC rule on Rodolfo’s invocation that he acted in defense of a stranger
-Invoking Article 11, par 3. The person defending "be not induced." Paragraph 3
of Art. 11 uses the phrase "be not induced." Hence, even if a person has a standing
grudge against the assailant, if he enters upon the defense of a stranger out of
generous motive to save the stranger from serious bodily harm or possible death, the
third requisite of defense of stranger still exists. The third requisite would be lacking if
such person was prompted by his grudge against the assailant, because the alleged
defense of the stranger would be only a pretext.
SPO2 LOLITO NACNAC v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191913, 21 March 2012

At the evening of February 20, 2003, accused-appellant, the victim

(Dodie Espejo) and a number of other police officers were on duty. Their
shift started at 8:00 in the morning of the same day, to end at 8:00 the
next morning. Accused-appellant, being the highest ranking officer during
the shift, was designated the officer-of-the-day. Shortly before 10:00 in the
evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Eduardo Basilio, took the
patrol tricycle from the station grounds. When accused-appellant saw this,
he stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. The victim
told accused-appellant that he (the victim) needed it to go to Laoag City to
settle a previous disagreement with a security of a local bar.

Accused-appellant refused and told the victim that he is needed at

the station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was
drunk. Nacnac’s statement was not received well by Espejo so he told
accused-appellant in Ilocano: Iyot ni inam kapi (Coitus of your mother,
cousin!).

The victim got off from the tricycle. SPO1 Eduardo Basilio did the
same, went inside the office, and left the accused-appellant and the victim
alone. The victim took a few steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was
tucked in a holster on the right side of his chest. Accused-appellant then
 fired his M-16 armalite upward as a warning shot. Undaunted, the victim
still drew his gun. Accused-appellant then shot the victim on the head,
which caused the latters instantaneous death. Accused-appellant later
surrendered to the stations Chief of Police.

RTC- held Nacnac huilty of the crime charged

CA- affirmed RTC’s decision and held that the sufficient elements
of self-defense were lacking
ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstances of the petitioner’s acts
constitute as valid self- defense.

RULING:
Yes.

Elements of Self-Defense:
The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.––The following do not incur any criminal liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We explained,
"Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements
are present."10 It would "presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person––not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude––but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor. x x x There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when
the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.

1. The drunken state of the victim;

2. The victim was also a police officer who was professionally trained at shooting;
3. The warning shot fired by petitioner was ignored by the victim;
4. A lawful order by petitioner was ignored by the victim; and
5. The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior.

the victim was inebriated and had uttered invectives in response to petitioner’s
lawful order.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
[in re: case at bench- the lone gunshot wound suffered by the victim.1âwphi1 The
nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused. The lone gunshot was a
reasonable means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of
the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to
stand down despite a warning shot.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
- As gleaned from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the victim a lawful order
and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. Absent from the
shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim prior to
the shooting. Petitioner was only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow police
officer.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. V EDGARDO GONZALES

G.R. No. 195534, 13 June 2012

The victim [Eligio Donato] went to the house of the appellant at the
invitation of Edmundo. When the victim arrived, he was met by the appellant who
was armed with a .22 caliber firearm. The appellant and Edmundo immediately
fired at the victim six (6) times, hitting him three (3) times - in the arm, in his left
thigh and in his left chest. The victim expired before he could receive medical
treatment.

(Version of the accused) The appellant denied the charge and claimed
that he had acted in self-defense. He narrated that he was at his house watching
television when the victim suddenly arrived, armed with a short firearm. The
victim shouted invectives at the appellant and threatened to kill him. When efforts
by the appellant to pacify the victim proved to be futile, the appellant retrieved his
own firearm inside his house. A struggle for the possession of the appellant’s
firearm then ensued between the appellant and the victim which caused the
appellant’s gun to discharge three times; thus, hitting the victim.

RTC- held that the appellant was guilty of murder qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation, given the manner and the means employed in
attacking the unsuspecting victim, leaving him no time or opportunity to resist

The appellant contends that he acted in self-defense

CA- The CA agreed with the RTC that the killing was qualified by
treachery since the attack was executed in a manner that rendered the
victim defenseless and unable to retaliate

ISSUE:
WoN the act of the appellant forms part of a valid claim of self-defense

RULING:
No. the elements of self-defense were lacking.  first, the appellant who
was armed met the victim; second, while at a distance, the appellant fired twice
at the victim’s direction; and third, the appellant fired at the victim when the latter
tried to take away his firearm.
There was no unlawful aggression caused by the victim-no actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not merely threatening and
intimidating action.
Means employed by the appellant was unreasonable (treachery) the use
of a firearm, the number of times he fired at the victim and the number of gunshot
wounds sustained by the victim - were not reasonably necessary and that the
number of gunshot wounds reveals a clear intent to kill, not merely to repel the
attack of the unarmed victim.
There was sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant
sufficient provocation by the appellant in placing the victim’s life in actual
danger. Thus, any aggression made by the victim cannot be considered unlawful
as it was made as an act of self-preservation to defend his life.

Sufficient provocation by the appellant in placing the victim’s life in actual danger.
Thus, any aggression made by the victim cannot be considered unlawful as it was
made as an act of self-preservation to defend his life.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS v BINGKY CAMPOS

G.R. No. 176061, 4 July 2011
(Version of the prosecution) At around [8:00] oclock in the evening of
August 19, 2001, prosecution eyewitness Lester Huck Baldivino (Lester) was
tending his sari-sari store near his house located at Arellano St., Brgy. Calango,
Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental when [the victim] Romeo Abad (Romeo), his
maternal uncle, came to buy cigarettes and candies. Lester was already
preparing to close his store, but Romeo lit up a cigarette and started to converse
with him.
 
Lester, who was facing the highway, suddenly heard footsteps and
immediately saw Danny Boy Acabo (Acabo) running towards his uncle’s
direction, closely followed by Bingky Campos (Campos). Before Lester can utter
a word of warning, Danny swiftly stabbed Romeo at the lower right side of the
latter’s abdomen with a  plamingko while Bingky stood nearby. Immediately
after stabbing Romeo, Danny and Bingky fled.
 
Lester was shocked but darted out of his store to apply pressure on
Romeos wound when he heard the latter cry out for help. Lester told Romeo to
 hang on and ran inside his house to call his mother and Romeos son and told
them to prepare the car.
Romeo was brought to the Holy Child Hospital where he died. The
weapon hit him at the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, penetrating and
causing injury to the liver, with through and through laceration of the gall bladder
and the duodenum, and transecting the whole length of the pancreas. Dr. Yee
further testified that the injury to the pancreas caused the massive blood loss
which [made] Romeo to suffer hypovolemic shock [resulting to] cardio-
pulmonary arrest [and, eventually, his] death.

(Version of the defense)

On August 19, 2001 while on their way to the house of their uncle, Danny
and Bingky met four men who mauled Bingky. When Bingky was able to run
away, they approached Danny and kicked his buttocks. Danny pulled out a knife
and thrust it towards one of the men. Danny then ran away to escape.

RTC- ruled against Danny and Bingky, guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced with reclusion perpetua
CA- affirmed RTC’s decision in toto

ISSUE:
Whether the claim of self-defense is tenable

RULING:
No, the condition sine qua non for self-defense was not present (there was no
unlawful aggression caused by the victim, no actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, it is not
certain that the victim was one of the four persons who attacked Danny and mauled
Bingky.

The justifying circumstance of self-defense may not survive in the face of

appellants flight from the scene of the crime coupled with his failure to promptly inform
the authorities about the incident

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MELANIO NUGAS

G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011

On March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the evening, Glen Remigio (Glen), his wife,
Nila Remigio (Nila), and their two children, Raymond and Genevieve, then 11- and 6-
years old, respectively, were traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX,
along Marcos Highway in COGEO, Antipolo, Rizal. 
 Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his extreme right because their children sat
between them. While they were passing along Carolina Village, two men waved at them
signalling their request to hitch a ride. Glen accommodated the two men, one of whom
was carrying a maroon plastic bag, allowing them to board the vehicle at the rear. When
the vehicle neared Masinag Market, the two men suddenly brandished knives that each
pointed at Glens and Nilas necks, warning them not to make any wrong move if they did
not want to be harmed.
Considering that the two men demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia Mall, Glen
continued driving the vehicle. Upon the vehicle reaching Kingsville Village, the man
behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men fled. Glen
pulled the knife from his neck and handed it to Nila. He drove to the nearest hospital,
but he collapsed on the way and lost control of the vehicle, causing it to run over two
pedestrians, one of whom died and the other suffered a broken arm. Once the vehicle
hit the railings of a gas station, Nila cried for help. Concerned citizens immediately
rushed Glen to the nearest hospital, which was about 50 to 60 meters away. Nila stayed
behind to look after their children. When she checked the vehicle, she found the knife,
its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag left by the assailants at the rear of the vehicle.
She gathered the articles and later turned them over to the police officer in charge of the
investigation. The maroon plastic bag was found to contain the following items: a
National Bureau of Investigation clearance, a police clearance, Social Security System
papers, and official receipts,] all issued in the name of Araneta, a stainless fork knuckle,
and a bunch of keys.

During trial, Nugas contends that he did so in self-defense which stemmed from
having Glen overcharging the fare while his tamaraw was alleged to be a passenger
taxi, that when Nugas was about to get off the car, Glen punched him. Thinking that
Glen would grab a gun from his clutch bag, that is time he stabbed Glen from preventing
alleged future harm to be caused against him. [“inunahan ko na siya”]

While asked why he had knife that time, he reasoned out that it is because he
lives in the squatter’s area.

RTC- convicted Nugas for murder

CA- affirmed RTC’s decision

ISSUE:
 WoN the accused is entitled to self-defense

RULING:
No. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed,
the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence, because the existence of self-
defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-
defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense
itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an
actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense [(a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.] [two kinds:
(a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression]; (b)
there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression [(a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that such
means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the accused without danger to his person.] ; and (c) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate
cause of the victims aggression.

Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached for
his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there.

MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v SERGIO PATOTOY

G.R. No. 102058, 26 August 1996

On February 7, 1990, at about 4:30 p.m., the residents of Barangay Sawang,

Uson, Masbate were celebrating the wedding of a certain Ergie Garganta to a
Chinese.  Dancing and merrymaking attended the wedding celebration which was held
at the barangay plaza 
 
While the dancing was in progress, victim Manuel Verano succeeded in getting
Sergio Patotoy's wife as dancing partner.  This apparently irked co-accused for after the
dance, he approached said victim and elbowed the latter on the stomach.  The victim
asked why he was elbowed.  Instead of answering, co-accused boxed him.  Thereafter,
a fistfight ensued.  The people pacified them and advised them to go home.  While the
victim went home, co-accused went to his house five meters away to get a bolo then
returned to the plaza.
Bonifacio Patotoy (son of Sergio) knew about the incident as was made known to
him by Bugoy Munares. He then headed to the plaza and asked his father about it, his
father adviced him to kill the victim (Manuel Verano), so, Bonifacio went to the house of
the victim while he was followed by his father.
While Patotoy reahed the victim’s house, uttered “what did you do to my father?”
and immediately stabbed the victim with an upward thrust on the left breast.
The victim’s wife and child tried to stop Patotoy but as the co-accused came, the
latter stabbed anew the dying victim instead.
They fled the scene and Sergio said “this is what I want for my son, he knows
how to kill”
At around 5:30 p.m., appellant surrendered to the Barangay Captain of Marcella,
Uson, Masbate

The medical report of Dr. Artemio Capellan, the municipal health officer who
conducted an autopsy, revealed that Manuel Verano had sustained the following
injuries:

"1.              Stab wound affecting the left lateral portion of the chest just above the
mammary gland, hit by a sharped (sic) pointed instrument.  Major organs
and blood vessels were affected.

"2.              Stab wound affecting the left lumbar area of the back, hit by a sharped
(sic) pointed instrument.  Major organs and blood vessels were affected

Appellant admitted having killed Manuel; he denied, however, that his father was
with him at the time.  He instead gave the following account
 But, according to Velasco, appellant did not surrender to the barangay captain of
Sawang, the latter being a relative of the victim

ISSUE:
WoN the accused is entitled to self-defense

RULING:
No, Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack,
or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.  There must exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person
claiming self-defense. This element, in the case before us, is sorely wanting.  No
veritable physical force on the part of Manuel has been shown that could have really
endangered appellant's life.  Manuel's alleged act of drawing "something" from his waist
certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike
at the victim with such lightning-speed as appellant has delivered.  In fact, no weapon,
supposedly in the person of Manuel, is shown to have been found.  Without unlawful
aggression, self-defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MAMERTO NORVAEZ

G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, 20 April 1983

Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David

Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia
during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into
his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying
his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,
gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also
shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was
involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over
certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for
annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At
time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case
pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received
letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property.
On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of
property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v RONALD CREDO

G.R. No. 197360, 3 July 2013

On 22 June 2005, at around 10:30 in the evening, the victim, Joseph Nicolas
(Joseph), was at a "bingohan" in Zone 3 of Brgy. San Nicolas, Pili, Camarines Sur,
together with his wife Maria and friends Manuel Chica (Manuel) and Ramon Tirao.  
 Randy Credo (Randy) arrived at the "bingohan," approached Joseph and
suddenly punched the latter on the chest, causing him to fall down.
This caused the people at the "bingohan" to scamper away. Joseph’s friend
Manuel proceeded towards Zone 3. There, he met Randy, who was already
accompanied by his co-appellants: his brother Ronald Credo (Ronald) and their father
Rolando Credo (Rolando). The three were each armed with a bolo.
Joseph’s children, Russel, Ramon, Roldan and Rea heard that their father was in
trouble, so they decided to look for him in Zone 3. On their way, they met appellants,
who suddenly started throwing stones at them, causing them to run away. Russel got
separated from his siblings but he continued to look for his father. He came across
appellants again in Zone 2 where he saw them hacking somebody with their bolos. That
person later turned out to be their father. Russel saw that when all three appellants
were done hacking their victim, Randy and Rolando went back to where the victim was
lying and gave him another blow, saying in the Bicolano dialect, "pang-dulce" (for
dessert).
Francis Credo’s testimony- heard Roger Credo, the brother of Randy and
Ronald, shout: "Tama na Manoy, gadan na!" (Enough brother, he is already dead!)
Upon hearing these words, Francis went out of the bedroom, proceeded to their sala
and peeped through the jalousies of the sala window. He saw appellants, all armed with
a bolo, repeatedly hacking Joseph to death. He saw the hacking incident very clearly
because the place was lighted by a lamppost and the moon was shining brightly.
Moreover, the distance between the crime scene and the window from where he was
watching is only about 3 to 4 meters. Francis was able to note that Joseph was
unarmed and was, in fact, holding a lemon in his right hand and an egg in his left hand.
Joseph died on the same day of the incident. He obtained six (6) hack wounds:
one on the right ear, two on the left scapular area, one on the lumbar area, one on the
right forearm and another one on the left lateral neck area which, according to the
doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of Joseph, was the most fatal wound.
Rolando and Randy denied any participation in the hacking incident, claiming
that it was Ronald alone who killed Joseph. They also claimed that the killing was done
in defense of Ronald and Randy’s mother whom Joseph was, at the time of the incident,
about to hack. They argue that Joseph was brandishing the bolo and was about to
attack their mother so she shouted a warning to their mother. Ronald came to her
rescue and attacked Joseph, resulting in the latter’s death.

RTC- the accused as guilty of murder through conspiracy

CA- Affirmed the judgment of RTC
ISSUE:
WoN the act done by the accused takes part of a “self-defense”
RULING:

No, even if the claim of defense of a relative is taken into consideration, the same
would still not be valid.

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides, in part, as follows:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,

ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second
requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the
further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked,
that the one making defense had no part therein.

Based on the afore-quoted provision, both self-defense and defense of relatives

require that unlawful aggression be present in order to be held valid. "For the accused
to be entitled to exoneration based on self-defense or defense of relatives, complete or
incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for
if there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel. For
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.

As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of
Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg.
According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively belied the
allegation of Ronald that he was prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first
hacked and hit him on his neck. The trial court further pointed out that if Joseph indeed
hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising that the latter did not suffer any injury when
according to them.
 *There was nothing to retaliate upon since the victim did nothing against the
appellants and to their mother whom they were claiming as the one about to be harmed
by Joseph; unarmed but was only holding a lemon and an egg*

No valid self-defense > no valid defense of a relative

NICOLAS VELASQUEZ and VICTOR VELASQUEZ v PEOPLE

G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017

On May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo
(Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut, which was about 100
meters away.
Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo
(Nora) in the midst of having sex. Horrified with what he perceived as a defilement of his
property,Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both
scampered away. Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora, Jesus went to the
house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there. He began
making his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow
accused.
Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a
stone. Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. Accused Felix did the
same, hitting Jesus above his left ear. Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo,
hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus on his left
cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, blooded. Jesus crawled and
hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got up
and staggered his way back to their house.
 After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained
a crack in his skull. Dr. Jose D. De Guzman issued a medico-legal certificate
indicating injuries obtained by the victim. Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries
required medical attention for four (4) to six (6) weeks. Jesus was also advised to
undergo surgery. He was, however, unable to avail of the required medical
procedure due to shortage of funds.

Nicolas argues that their act toward Jesus was prompted when he saw
Jesus hacking the door of Victor, and while the victim was being pacifies, he
instead tried to hit Nicolas and so while Nicolas in retaliation- caused the injuries
sustained by Jesus.

RTC- found that the petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty of attempted murder
while Boy Velasquez as guilty of less serious physical injuries, while Ampong remained
at large

ISSUE:
WoN the petitioners acted in self-defense of themselves and in defense of
their relatives

RULING:
No, the said accused could have had easily held the private complainant,
who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of
hitting him. Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the
beating dealt to him by petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of
what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary
means to repel his supposed aggression.
Non-existence of the second requisite of self-defense

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ARTURO PUNZALAN

G.R. No. 199892, 10 December 2012