Karl Jason Josol LEGAL CLINIC CASE DIGESTS Atty.

Mary Jean Pedro NWU Laoag College of Law

RENATO L. CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, 201 SCRA 210,

G.R. No. 100113, September 03, 1991

#Facts:
During the term of President Corazon C. Aquino, that is April 25, 199,1 she nominated
herein respondent Christian Monsod to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
Subsequently, the Commission on Appointments, on June 5, 1991 confirmed said nomination.
However, petitioner herein Renato L. Cayetano opposed and challenged the nomination and the
subsequent confirmation of the Commission because he alleged that Monsod does not possess
nor does he satisfy the required Constitutional qualification that nominees on the said position
should have at least been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Nonetheless, on
June 18, 1991 Monsod took his oath of office and assumed the role as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
The record reveals that respondent Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law
and having hurdled the bar, worked in his father’s law office. Then he worked as Operations
Officer in the World Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the
Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and subsequently
rendered services to various companies either as legal and economic consultant or Chief
Executive Officer. He also served as former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide
Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

#Issue/s:
1) Whether or not respondent Monsod, who, having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years, as stated in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution satisfies
the required qualification for the position of Chairman of COMELEC

2) Whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of Commission on
Appointments re: Monsod’s confirmation

#Ruling:
1) Yes. Respondent Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position. Atty.
Monsod may not be engaged in practice of law through litigation but he has been
deemed to be practicing law though various responsibilities such as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor. These satisfies the constitutional
requirement of engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The SC reiterated the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava where it
pointed out that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”
 Karl Jason Josol LEGAL CLINIC CASE DIGESTS Atty. Mary Jean Pedro NWU Laoag College of Law

2) No. The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm the nomination of the
COMELEC Chairman by thepresident is mandated by the Constitution under Article IX,
Section 1 (2), Sub Article C where it provides: “The Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” The power of appointment is
essentially within the discretion to whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no
occasion for the Supreme Court to exercise its corrective power since COA did not
commit grave abuse of discretion based on the evidence presented

People vs Villanueva 14 SCRA 109, G.R. No. L-19450,

May 27, 1965

#Facts:
On September 4, 1959, Villanueva was charged by the Chief of Police of Alaminos,
Laguna, with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court at the same
municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by
counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston
Fule of San Pablo City, Laguna, appearing as private-prosecutor with a granted permission from
the Office of the Secretary of Justice with the condition, however, that during trial he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and will thus not receive any payment for his services
Thereafter, the counsel for the accused questioned the appearance of City Attorney Fule
as private prosecutor, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., wherein it was ruled
that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City
Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice."
Moreover, said counsel for the accused contented that entertaining the appearance of City
Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. Nonetheless, on December 17, 1960
the Justice of the Peace Court issued an order sustaining the legality of the latter’s appearance
as a private prosecutor.
Subsequently, on January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now
Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rulesof Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel
claims that City Attorney Fule falls within this limitation. Nevertheless, the JP Court ruled on the
negative and maintained that Fule was not “actually” engaged in private law practice. In
response, said Order was appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna, but the same
was not granted in which the court ruled otherwise in favor of Attorney Fule. Hence, this appeal.
 Karl Jason Josol LEGAL CLINIC CASE DIGESTS Atty. Mary Jean Pedro NWU Laoag College of Law

#Issue:
Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes
practice of law and whether his appearance is in violation of Section 32, Rule 27, of the Revised
Rules of Court

#Ruling:
No. The Court ruled in the negative dismissing said appeal for patently being without
merits. It clarified the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel because of the the confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules) which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." The court believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public,
as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. As the
Solicitor General stated in his observation, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be inthe active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.For one thing, it has never been refuted that
City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it
ishereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.
 Karl Jason Josol LEGAL CLINIC CASE DIGESTS Atty. Mary Jean Pedro NWU Laoag College of Law

PEOPLE v. EUSTACIO DE LUNA et al., 102 Phil 968,

G. R. Nos. L-10236-48, January 31, 1958

#Facts:
On or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, an Information was filed before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against herein defendants, namely, Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P.
Marco, Santos L. Pariña, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla, Oreste Arellano y
Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin I. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo,
Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. for allegedly taking an oath before Mr.
Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public and as such they were accused in contemptuously
disobeying the Supreme Court Resolution after they knowingly or are aware that they have failed
their corresponding Bar examinations which is a pre-requisite in the admission to the Bar to
practice law. In response, defendants herein moved for the dismissal of the said case and the
lower court ruled thus in their favor which granted their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
reasoning out that the contempt was not committed against it but against the Supreme Court.
Said decision by the CFI was anchored on Rule 64 Section 4 of the Rules of Court and Corpus
Juris Secundum. Moreover, the lower court opined that the facts alleged in the amended
information's, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which
said defendants are charged. Hence, this appeal.

#Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is correct in saying that appellees could not be guilty of
contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law

#Ruling:
No. The lower court is not correct. The Supreme Court reasoned out in this wise: The
lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of
court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers
"by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney * * * and acting
as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be
committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "the oath
of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would
"practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and purposes,
"held out to the public" as such attorneys-at- law as cited in U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque which
involved two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out
a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general
practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were
convicted as charged, although upon different grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that
a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, on
account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the aforementioned circular
"amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and
that "consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order
made in a proceeding to which he was a party." As regards Ney, he was found guilty of
"misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court."
Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations,
appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the
authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue
whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the
 Karl Jason Josol LEGAL CLINIC CASE DIGESTS Atty. Mary Jean Pedro NWU Laoag College of Law

administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the
Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in
violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.
"* * * Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront
its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court." * * *. (12 Am. Jur. 395.)

MAURICIO C. ULEP v. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

#Facts:
Petitioner herein, Mauricio C. Ulep, prays that this Court to order the respondent
corporation herein, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.”
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent, however, argues that assuming that the services advertised
are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the
light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

#Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent corporation, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

#Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined: Black defines "practice of law" as:"

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
 Karl Jason Josol LEGAL CLINIC CASE DIGESTS Atty. Mary Jean Pedro NWU Laoag College of Law

pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with thel aw."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description
of the services it has been offering. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and shop there
as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends
to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of
the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. (SEE CANON 2): A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession,
advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell
us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.