HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC, GR No.

179987, 2009-04-29
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre
Malabanan... claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco,
testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did... not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified... to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the... manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the... classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and... disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could
not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
Issues:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG
notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the
State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of... prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against
public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable
and disposable.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the... property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no... longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is... duly authorized by law.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his... predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they presented
in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot... avail themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national... evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.  Thus, it is... insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 155076               January 13, 2009

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 27, 2006, this Court’s First Division rendered judgment in this case as follows:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court and the Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to issue an order granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended Information.

SO ORDERED.1

By way of brief background, petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-2425, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150. The Amended Information charged the accused with theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use the
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is
a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air
wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the
call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount
of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)," on the ground that the factual
allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the Motion
to Quash the Amended Information, as well petitioner’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review with this Court.

In the above-quoted Decision, this Court held that the Amended Information does not contain material
allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal property since international long distance calls and the
business of providing telecommunication or telephone services are not personal properties under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code.

Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc. It maintains that the Amended Information charging
petitioner with theft is valid and sufficient; that it states the names of all the accused who were specifically
charged with the crime of theft of PLDT’s international calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service on or about September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by conducting ISR or International
Simple Resale; that it identifies the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service of PLDT as the personal properties which were unlawfully taken by the accused; and that it
satisfies the test of sufficiency as it enabled a person of common understanding to know the charge against
him and the court to render judgment properly.

PLDT further insists that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code’s
definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is
exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code used the words "personal property" without qualification, it follows that all "personal properties"
as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.

PLDT also argues that "taking" in relation to theft under the Revised Penal Code does not require
"asportation," the sole requisite being that the object should be capable of "appropriation." The element of
"taking" referred to in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code means the act of depriving another of the
possession and dominion of a movable coupled with the intention, at the time of the "taking," of withholding it
with the character of permanency. There must be intent to appropriate, which means to deprive the lawful
owner of the thing. Thus, the term "personal properties" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code is not
limited to only personal properties which are "susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and
of being transported from place to place."

PLDT likewise alleges that as early as the 1930s, international telephone calls were in existence; hence,
there is no basis for this Court’s finding that the Legislature could not have contemplated the theft of
international telephone calls and the unlawful transmission and routing of electronic voice signals or impulses
emanating from such calls by unlawfully tampering with the telephone device as within the coverage of the
Revised Penal Code.

According to respondent, the "international phone calls" which are "electric currents or sets of electric
impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a receiver," are
personal properties which may be subject of theft. Article 416(3) of the Civil Code deems "forces of nature"
(which includes electricity) which are brought under the control by science, are personal property.

In his Comment to PLDT’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a
conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to
electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of
appropriation. Petitioner claims that the analogy between generated electricity and telephone calls is
misplaced. PLDT does not produce or generate telephone calls. It only provides the facilities or services for
the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that "business" is not personal property. It is not
the "business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a business." This right is what is considered as
property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be subject of
theft.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with respondent PLDT that "international phone calls and
the business or service of providing international phone calls" are subsumed in the enumeration and
definition of personal property under the Civil Code hence, may be proper subjects of theft. It noted that the
cases of United States v. Genato,3 United States v. Carlos4 and United States v. Tambunting,5 which
recognized intangible properties like gas and electricity as personal properties, are deemed incorporated in
our penal laws. Moreover, the theft provision in the Revised Penal Code was deliberately couched in broad
terms precisely to be all-encompassing and embracing even such scenario that could not have been easily
anticipated.

According to the OSG, prosecution under Republic Act (RA) No. 8484 or the Access Device Regulations Act
of 1998 and RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 does not preclude prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code for the crime of theft. The latter embraces unauthorized appropriation or use of PLDT’s
international calls, service and business, for personal profit or gain, to the prejudice of PLDT as owner
thereof. On the other hand, the special laws punish the surreptitious and advanced technical means
employed to illegally obtain the subject service and business. Even assuming that the correct indictment
should have been under RA 8484, the quashal of the information would still not be proper. The charge of theft
as alleged in the Information should be taken in relation to RA 8484 because it is the elements, and not the
designation of the crime, that control.

Considering the gravity and complexity of the novel questions of law involved in this case, the Special First
Division resolved to refer the same to the Banc.

We resolve to grant the Motion for Reconsideration but remand the case to the trial court for proper
clarification of the Amended Information.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent.

The elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the definition of the term "personal
property" in the penal code provision on theft had been established in Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in
United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that
any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft.

Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property"
has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal
property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not
real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the
context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that where words
have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and
have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they
are used, the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have
been previously used.6 In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal property" in interpreting
the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.

Cognizant of the definition given by jurisprudence and the Civil Code of Spain to the term "personal property"
at the time the old Penal Code was being revised, still the legislature did not limit or qualify the definition of
"personal property" in the Revised Penal Code. Neither did it provide a restrictive definition or an exclusive
enumeration of "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code, thereby showing its intent to retain for the
term an extensive and unqualified interpretation.  Consequently, any property which is not included in the
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enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft
under the Revised Penal Code.

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be
capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying
away."7 Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require
asportation or carrying away.8

To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. 9 The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code
includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed
through the use of the offenders’ own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or
card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive the
owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 10 use of
a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert
electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v.
Menagas.11

As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science
such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring
such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device
to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with engaging in
International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local
or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.

As early as 1910, the Court declared in Genato that ownership over electricity (which an international long
distance call consists of), as well as telephone service, is protected by the provisions on theft of the Penal
Code. The pertinent provision of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila, which was involved in the said
case, reads as follows:

Injury to electric apparatus; Tapping current; Evidence. – No person shall destroy, mutilate, deface, or
otherwise injure or tamper with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating,
containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service, nor tap or otherwise
wrongfully deflect or take any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus.

No person shall, for any purpose whatsoever, use or enjoy the benefits of any device by means of which he
may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service; and the existence in
any building premises of any such device shall, in the absence of satisfactory explanation, be deemed
sufficient evidence of such use by the persons benefiting thereby.

It was further ruled that even without the above ordinance the acts of subtraction punished therein are
covered by the provisions on theft of the Penal Code then in force, thus:

Even without them (ordinance), the right of the ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and
518 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting,
and in some respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the
supreme court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing the provisions of
articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these
islands.

The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for
generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or
otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and
(c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of
electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.

In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or
apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-
route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of
subtraction mentioned above.

The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be
the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section
2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft:

Section 2. Any sale, transfer, mortgage, or assignment of a stock of goods, wares, merchandise, provisions,
or materials otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and the regular prosecution of the business of the
vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, or any sale, transfer, mortgage, or assignment of all, or
substantially all, of the business or trade theretofore conducted by the vendor, mortgagor, transferor or
assignor, or all, or substantially all, of the fixtures and equipment used in and about the business of the
vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, shall be deemed to be a sale and transfer in bulk, in
contemplation of the Act. x x x.

In Strochecker v. Ramirez,12 this Court stated:

With regard to the nature of the property thus mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business above
described, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration
of real properties in article 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.

Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the
time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since it
is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil
Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real
property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil
Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Following the ruling in Strochecker v.
Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive
enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property. 13

As can be clearly gleaned from the above disquisitions, petitioner’s acts constitute theft of respondent PLDT’s
business and service, committed by means of the unlawful use of the latter’s facilities. In this regard, the
Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense by making it appear that what petitioner took were
the international long distance telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDT’s business.

A perusal of the records of this case readily reveals that petitioner and respondent PLDT extensively
discussed the issue of ownership of telephone calls. The prosecution has taken the position that said
telephone calls belong to respondent PLDT. This is evident from its Comment where it defined the issue of
this case as whether or not "the unauthorized use or appropriation of PLDT international telephone calls,
service and facilities, for the purpose of generating personal profit or gain that should have otherwise
belonged to PLDT, constitutes theft."14

In discussing the issue of ownership, petitioner and respondent PLDT gave their respective explanations on
how a telephone call is generated. 15 For its part, respondent PLDT explains the process of generating a
telephone call as follows:

38. The role of telecommunication companies is not limited to merely providing the medium (i.e. the electric
current) through which the human voice/voice signal of the caller is transmitted. Before the human
voice/voice signal can be so transmitted, a telecommunication company, using its facilities, must first break
down or decode the human voice/voice signal into electronic impulses and subject the same to further
augmentation and enhancements. Only after such process of conversion will the resulting electronic impulses
be transmitted by a telecommunication company, again, through the use of its facilities. Upon reaching the
destination of the call, the telecommunication company will again break down or decode the electronic
impulses back to human voice/voice signal before the called party receives the same. In other words, a
telecommunication company both converts/reconverts the human voice/voice signal and provides the
medium for transmitting the same.

39. Moreover, in the case of an international telephone call, once the electronic impulses originating from a
foreign telecommunication company country (i.e. Japan) reaches the Philippines through a local
telecommunication company (i.e. private respondent PLDT), it is the latter which decodes, augments and
enhances the electronic impulses back to the human voice/voice signal and provides the medium (i.e. electric
current) to enable the called party to receive the call. Thus, it is not true that the foreign telecommunication
company provides (1) the electric current which transmits the human voice/voice signal of the caller and (2)
the electric current for the called party to receive said human voice/voice signal.

40. Thus, contrary to petitioner Laurel’s assertion, once the electronic impulses or electric current originating
from a foreign telecommunication company (i.e. Japan) reaches private respondent PLDT’s network, it is
private respondent PLDT which decodes, augments and enhances the electronic impulses back to the
human voice/voice signal and provides the medium (i.e. electric current) to enable the called party to receive
the call. Without private respondent PLDT’s network, the human voice/voice signal of the calling party will
never reach the called party.16

In the assailed Decision, it was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is
converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party called. A telephone
call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as
electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal
property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under
control by science."17

Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the
instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls
were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such
calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could
not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these
communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction"
penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international
long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the
gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state
that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this
amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the
dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the
amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of
the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 27,
2006 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68841
affirming the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150,
which denied the Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment) in Criminal Case No. 99-2425 for theft,
is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby
DIRECTED to amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services
and business of the private offended party.

SO ORDERED.

https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/university-of-st-la-salle/corporate-law/luis-marcos-laurel-
vs-abrogar-gr-no-155076/27088910
G.R. NO. 155076 LUIS MARCOS LAUREL, PETITIONER VS. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC.
MAKATI CITY, AND PP AND PLDT, RESPONDENTS
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that,
only movable properties which have
physical or material existence
and susceptible of occupation by another
are proper objects of theft. Only those
movable properties
which can be taken and carried from the
place they are found are proper subjects
of theft.
G.R. No. 155076 February 27,
2006
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, Petitioner,
vs. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR,
Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES& PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, Respondents.
Facts: Baynet Co., Ltd. Is being sued for
network fraud. Laurel is the board
member and corporate
secretary of Baynet. 2 other filipinos and
two japanese composed the board.
(Baynet) sells "Bay Super
Orient Card" which uses an alternative
calling patterns called International
Simple Resale (ISR).
ISR is a method of routing and
completing international long distance
calls using International Private
Leased Lines (IPL), cables, antenna or air
wave or frequency, which connect
directly to the local or
domestic exchange facilities of the
terminating country (the country where
the call is destined). The
operator of an ISR is able to evade
payment of access, termination or bypass
charges and accounting
rates, as well as compliance with the
regulatory requirements of the NTC.
Thus, the ISR operator offers
international telecommunication services
at a lower rate, to the damage and
prejudice of legitimate
operators like PLDT.
Search warrants were issued against
baynet through PLDT's complaint. The
seach was followed by an
inquest investigation. The prosecutor
found probable cause for THEFT and
filed Information. After
preliminary investigation the information
was amended to include Laurel and the
other members of the
board for THEFT using ISR
DOCTRINE: THE GENRAL RULE IS THAT ONLY MOVABLE PROPERTIES WHICH HAVE PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL
EXISTENCE AND SUSCEPTIBLE OF OCCUPATION BY ANOTHER ARE PROPER OBJECTS OF THEFT. ONLY THOSE
MOVABLE PROPERTIES WHICH CAN BE TAKEN AND CARRIED FROM THE PLACE THEY ARE FOUND ARE PROPER
SUBJECTS OF THEFT.

FACTS:

Baynet Co., Ltd is being sued for network fraud. Laurel is the board member and corporate secretary of Baynet.
Two other filipinos and two Japanese composed the board. (Baynet) sells Bay Super Orient Card” which uses an
alternative calling patterns called ISR. ISR is a method of routing and completing internation long distance call
using International private leased lines (IPL), cables antenna or air wave or frequency which connect directly to
the local or domestic exchange facilities of the terminating court. The operator of an International Simple Resale
ISR is able to evade payment of access, termination or bypass charges and accounting rates as well as compliance
with the regulatory requirements of the NTC. Thus, the ISR operator offers ITS at a lower rate to the damage and
prejudice of legitimate operator like PLDT.

Search Warrants were issued against Baynet through PLDT complaint. The search was followed by an Inquest
investigation. The prosecutor found probable cause for theft and filed information. After PI the information was
amended to include Laurel and the other member of board for theft using ISR.

Accused Laurel filed a MTQ on the grounds that RPC does not punish used of ISR, the telephone calls belong to
the person call not to PLDT and that NO PERSONAL PROPERTY WAS STOLEN FROM PLDT. THERE IS NO CRIME
WHEN THERE IS NO LAW PUNISHING THE CRIME.

ISSUE:

WON international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the telecommunication services
provided by PLDT for such calls or in short PLDT’s business of providing said telecommunication services are
proper subject of theft under Article 308 of the RPC.

HELD:

RTC denied MQ MR denied. Petition for Certiorari with CA, dismissed. SC, granted.The petition is
meritorious. An information or complaint must state explicitly and directly every act or omission
constituting an offense and must allege facts establishing the conduct. the Amended Information does not
contain material allegations charging the petitioner of theft of personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication
services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.
For one to be guilty of theft the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi)
personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession
of personal property which intent is apart from and concurrently with the general criminal
intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus)
An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property;
(b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the taking be done with intent to gain; and
(d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation of person/s or force upon
things.
"Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the
word "take" in the law. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that,
clearly, not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only
movable properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation
by another are proper objects of theft. only those movable properties which can be taken
and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft.
Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same cannot be
"taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated. movable properties under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate. A
naked right existing merely in contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to the person
who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny. Such rights or interests are
intangible and cannot be "taken" by another.
There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires
possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and
control of the thief. The taker, at some particular amount, must have obtained complete and absolute
possession and control of the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the lawful possessor
thereof.t is not necessary that the property be actually carried away out of the physical
possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape with it. Neither
asportation nor actual manual possession of property is required. Constructive possession of the thief of
the property is enough. The essence of the element is the taking of a thing out of the
possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without animus revertendi.

gas and electricity are susceptible of taking since they can be appropritated.
Business and services cannot be taken thus, not a subject of theft. They both have different definitions.
RPC could not have included human voice or ISR in theft since such was not existing at that time.
Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the telephone
callers or of the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice and the
electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession,
occupation or appropriation by the respondent PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT
merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities and equipment.
Congress did not amend the definition of theft rather they passed RA 8484 and 8792.
Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, on February
11, 1998. Under the law, an access device means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic
serial number, personal identification number and other telecommunication services, equipment or
instrumentalities-identifier or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods,
services or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds other than a transfer originated
solely by paper instrument. Among the prohibited acts enumerated in Section 9 of the law are the acts
of obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an access device, with intent to defraud or
intent to gain and fleeing thereafter; and of effecting transactions with one or more access devices
issued to another person or persons to receive payment or any other thing of value. Under Section 11
of the law, conspiracy to commit access devices fraud is a crime. However, the petitioner is not charged
of Violation of R.A. 8484.

Significantly, a prosecution under the law shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provisions of the Revised Penal Code inclusive of theft under Rule 308 of the
Revised Penal Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if an individual
steals a credit card and uses the same to obtain services, he is liable of the following: theft of the credit
card under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; violation of Republic Act No. 8484; and estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code with the service provider as the private complainant.
The petitioner is not charged of estafa before the RTC in the Amended Information.
Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides:
Sec. 33. Penalties.— The following Acts shall be penalized by fine and/or imprisonment, as follows:
a) Hacking or cracking which refers to unauthorized access into or interference in a computer
system/server or information and communication system; or any access in order to corrupt, alter, steal,
or destroy using a computer or other similar information and communication devices, without the
knowledge and consent of the owner of the computer or information and communications system,
including the introduction of computer viruses and the like, resulting on the corruption, destruction,
alteration, theft or loss of electronic data messages or electronic documents shall be punished by a
minimum fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and a maximum commensurate to the
damage incurred and a mandatory imprisonment of six (6) months to three (3) years.

“When Machines Become Real Property”

GR 17898; Oct. 31, 1962
PARTIES:
Pastor D. Ago, petitioner vs. Hon. CA, Hon. Ortiza Judge of CFI Agusan, Provincial Sheriff of Surigao,
and Grace Park Engineering

Facts
 In 1957, Pastor Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipments from (R) Grace Park
Engineering and executed a chattel mortgage over said machineries to secure the balance of
P32,000.
 The machineries were taken to Lianga, Surigao and installed in the building of Golden Pacific.
 (P) Pastor Ago agreed to pay on installment basis but later on defaulted twice.
 Grace park filed for execution of the machineries. Court granted. Writ of execution followed.
 Sheriff of Surigao levied the sawmill machineries in question in public auction but his levy did
not have notice of sale.
 Ago filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prelim. inj. with respondent CA, alleging that
respondent Surigao sheriff acted illegally by acting on a void writ of execution.
 CA issued writ of prelim inj. but (R) sheriff already sold the machineries at public auction. Grace
Park was the only bidder at P15,000. CA instructed to suspend the issuance of cert. of sale until
final decision.
 CA ruled in favor of lower court. No grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of
judgment.
 Hence, the instant case.
When sheriff sold the sawmill machineries and equipments at public auction without notice of sale,
was it valid? No.
Real property requires notice of sale of property on execution (Sec 16 Rule 39 ROC) Are the machines
real property? Yes
 When ago purchased the machineries, he assigned them to Golden Pacific as payment for his
stock subscription.
 They were installed in a building and permanently attached to the ground. Basis: Article 415(5) of
Civil Code
Decision
The writ of execution in this case against the sawmill machinery and equipment purchased by petitioner
Pastor D. Ago from the Grace Park Engineering, Inc., as well as the sale of the same by the Sheriff of
Surigao, are null and void.

ERG’S PRODUCTS v. PCI LEASING, GR No. 137705, 2000-08-22

Facts:
"On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. ("PCI Leasing" for short) filed with
the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money (Annex 'E'), with an application for a writ of replevin
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33500.
"On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of
replevin (Annex 'B') directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI
Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
"On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory,
seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other machineries.
"On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order (Annex 'C'), invoking the
power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying
for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of... replevin.
"This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex 'F'), on the ground that the properties [were] still
personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.
"In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties' agreement to the contrary notwithstanding.
They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to... innocent third parties.
They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal
because the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and
farcical.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject machines were
personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled that
the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of... the contracting
parties." Observing that Petitioner Goquiolay was an experienced businessman who was "not
unfamiliar with the ways of the trade," it ruled that he "should have realized the import of the
document he signed." The CA further held:
"Furthermore, to accord merit to this petition would be to preempt the trial court in ruling upon the
case below, since the merits of the whole matter are laid down before us via a petition whose sole
purpose is to inquire upon the existence of a grave abuse of discretion on... the part of the [RTC] in
issuing the assailed Order and Resolution. The issues raised herein are proper subjects of a full-
blown trial, necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties. The contract is being enforced by
one, and [its] validity is attacked by the other a... matter x x x which respondent court is in the best
position to determine."
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues:
whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property which may be a proper subject of
a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue: Nature of the Subject Machinery
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as follows:
"ART. 415. The following are immovable property:...
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
I... n the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was... movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry."[16] In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing
that the said machines are real, not... personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
[17]
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not
proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered
as personal.[18] After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise
NOTE that the reason why the machine was deemed as a personal property was because of the
lease agreement which binded both parties. HERE petitioner was ESTOPPED from declaring that
the machines subject in the writ was agreed to be a personal property in the lease contract.

In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be
considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:[21]
"12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that
the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or
attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any... building thereon, or
attached in any manner to what is permanent."
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as
personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be deemed personal
property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned.[22] Hence, while the parties are bound by the
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the
subject machinery as personal.[23] In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party
would be adversely affected.
The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis mota of the civil action pending before the
RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is effectively a resolution of the merits of the case.
Hence, they should be threshed out in... the trial, not in the proceedings involving the issuance of the
Writ of Seizure.
It should be pointed out that the Court in this case may rely on the Lease Agreement, for nothing on
record shows that it has been nullified or annulled. In fact, petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC
proceedings, which had ironically been instituted by respondent.
Accordingly, it must be presumed valid and binding as the law between the parties.
Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab
initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article
1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. There... is nothing on record to show that
the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same.

Principles:
After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal
or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a
proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other... contracting party.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to... a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth
of any material fact found therein.

by another are proper objects of theft. only those movable properties which can be taken
and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft.
Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same cannot be
"taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated. movable properties under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate. A
naked right existing merely in contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to the person
who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny. Such rights or interests are
intangible and cannot be "taken" by another.
There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires
possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and
control of the thief. The taker, at some particular amount, must have obtained complete and absolute
possession and control of the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the lawful possessor
thereof.t is not necessary that the property be actually carried away out of the physical
possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape with it. Neither
asportation nor actual manual possession of property is required. Constructive possession of the thief of
the property is enough. The essence of the element is the taking of a thing out of the
possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without animus revertendi.
gas and electricity are susceptible of taking since they can be appropritated.
Business and services cannot be taken thus, not a subject of theft. They both have different definitions.
RPC could not have included human voice or ISR in theft since such was not existing at that time.
Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the telephone
callers or of the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice and the
electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession,
occupation or appropriation by the respondent PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT
merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities and equipment.
Congress did not amend the definition of theft rather they passed RA 8484 and 8792.
Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, on February
11, 1998. Under the law, an access device means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic
serial number, personal identification number and other telecommunication services, equipment or
instrumentalities-identifier or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods,
services or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds other than a transfer originated
solely by paper instrument. Among the prohibited acts enumerated in Section 9 of the law are the acts
of obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an access device, with intent to defraud or
intent to gain and fleeing thereafter; and of effecting transactions with one or more access devices
issued to another person or persons to receive payment or any other thing of value. Under Section 11
of the law, conspiracy to commit access devices fraud is a crime. However, the petitioner is not charged
of violation of R.A. 8484.
Significantly, a prosecution under the law shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provisions of the Revised Penal Code inclusive of theft under Rule 308 of the
Revised Penal Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if an individual
steals a credit card and uses the same to obtain services, he is liable of the following: theft of the credit
card under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; violation of Republic Act No. 8484; and estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code with the service provider as the private complainant.
The petitioner is not charged of estafa before the RTC in the Amended Information.
Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides:
Sec. 33. Penalties.— The following Acts shall be penalized by fine and/or imprisonment, as follows:
a) Hacking or cracking which refers to unauthorized access into or interference in a computer
system/server or information and communication system; or any access in order to corrupt, alter, steal,
or destroy using a computer or other similar information and communication devices, without the
knowledge and consent of the owner of the computer or information and communications system,
including the introduction of computer viruses and the like, resulting on the corruption, destruction,
alteration, theft or loss of electronic data messages or electronic documents shall be punished by a
minimum fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and a maximum commensurate to the
damage incurred and a mandatory imprisonment of six (6) months to three (3) years
Held: RTC denied MQ MR denied. Petition for Certiorari with CA, dismissed. SC, granted.The petition is
meritorious.
An information or complaint must state explicitly and directly every act or omission constituting an
offense and must allege facts establishing the conduct. the Amended Information does not contain
material allegations charging the petitioner of theft of personal property under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are
not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor
MARCELO R. SORIANO v. SPS. RICARDO AND ROSALINA GALIT, GR No. 156295, 2003-09-23
Facts:
Petitioner was issued a writ of possession in Civil Case No. 6643[1] for Sum of Money by the
Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1. The writ of possession was, however, nullified by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65891[2] because it included a parcel of land which was not
among those explicitly enumerated in the Certificate of Sale issued by the Deputy Sheriff, but on
which stand the immovables covered by the said Certificate. Petitioner contends that the sale of...
these immovables necessarily encompasses the land on which they stand.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Respondent Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from petitioner Marcelo Soriano, in the total sum of
P480,000.00, evidenced by four promissory notes in the amount of P120,000.00 each dated August
2, 1996;[3] August 15, 1996;[4] September 4,... 1996[5] and September 14, 1996.[6] This loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
569.[7]  After he failed to pay his obligation, Soriano... filed a complaint for sum of money against
him with the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City,... Respondents, the Spouses Ricardo and Rosalina
Galit, failed to file their answer.
Hence, upon motion of Marcelo Soriano, the trial court declared the spouses in default
On July 7, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 1 rendered judgment[9] in favor of
petitioner Soriano, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the latter to pay:... the plaintiff the amount of P350,000.00 plus 12% interest to be
computed from the dates of maturity of the promissory notes until the same are fully paid;... the
plaintiff P20,000.00, as attorney's fees; and... the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The judgment became final and executory.
Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of execution in due course, by virtue of which, Deputy
Sheriff Renato E. Robles levied on the following real properties of the Galit spouses:
A parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. T-569 (Homestead Patent No. 14692)
situated in the Bo. of Tapulac, Orani, Bataan.
STORE/HOUSE - CONSTRUCTED on Lot No. 1103
BODEGA - constructed on Lot 1103,... At the sale of the above-enumerated properties at public
auction held on December 23, 1998, petitioner was the highest and only bidder with a bid price of
P483,000.00.
On February 23, 2001, ten months from the time the Certificate of Sale on Execution was registered
with the Registry of Deeds, petitioner moved[14] for the issuance of a writ of possession. He
averred that the one-year period of redemption had elapsed... without the respondents having
redeemed the properties sold at public auction... thus, the sale of said properties had already become
final.  He also argued that after the lapse of the redemption period, the titles to the properties should
be considered, for all legal intents... and purposes, in his name and favor.[15]
On June 4, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 1 granted the motion for issuance
of writ of possession.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 65891, assailing the inclusion of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-40785 among the list of real properties in the writ of... possession.[18] Respondents argued
that said property was not among those sold on execution by Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles as
reflected in the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Property.
In opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition because respondent spouses failed
to move for the reconsideration of the assailed order prior to the filing of the petition.   Moreover,
the proper remedy against the assailed order of the trial court is an... appeal, or a motion to quash
the writ of possession.
On May 13, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.  Accordingly, the writ of possession issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 1, on 18 July 2001 is declared NULL and VOID.
In the event that the questioned writ of possession has already been implemented, the Deputy
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 1, and private respondent Marcelo Soriano
are hereby ordered to cause the redelivery of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-40785 to the petitioners.
SO ORDERED
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes to this Court
Issues:
1.)
THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT THE PLAIN, SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY OF THE RESPONDENTS IN ASSAILING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION ISSUED
BY THE LOWER COURT BUT THERE WERE STILL OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM AND
WHICH WERE NOT
RESORTED TO LIKE THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR MOTION TO
QUASH OR EVEN APPEAL.
2.)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARAING THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE ON EXECUTION OF REAL PROPERTY AS NULL AND VOID AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE
WRIT OF POSSESSION BECAUSE THE SAME IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT WHICH ENJOYS THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND IT
CANNOT BE OVERCOME BY A MERE STRANGE FEELING THAT SOMETHING IS AMISS ON ITS
SURFACE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE TYPEWRITTEN WORDS ON THE FRONT PAGE AND AT THE
DORSAL PORTION THEREOF IS DIFFERENT OR THAT IT IS UNLIKELY FOR THE SHERIFF TO USE
THE DORSAL PORTION OF THE FIRST PAGE BECAUSE
THE SECOND PAGE IS MERELY HALF FILLED AND THE NOTATION ON THE DORSAL PORTION
COULD STILL BE MADE AT THE SECOND PAGE.
Ruling:
On the first ground, petitioner contends that respondents were not without remedy before the trial
court. He points out that respondents could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated June 4, 1999, but they did not do so. Respondents could also have filed an... appeal but they,
likewise, did not do so. When the writ of possession was issued, respondents could have filed a
motion to quash the writ.  Again they did not.  Respondents cannot now avail of the special civil
action for certiorari as a substitute for these... remedies.  They should suffer the consequences for
sleeping on their rights.
We disagree.
Concededly, those who seek to avail of the procedural remedies provided by the rules must adhere
to the requirements thereof, failing which the right to do so is lost. It is, however, equally settled that
the Rules of Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on technical rules and... to make litigation as
inexpensive as practicable and as convenient as can be done.[20] This is in accordance with the
primary purpose of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as provided in Rule 1, Section 6, which reads:
Section 6. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[21]
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense and are used only to help
secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would
be defeated.[22] They should be liberally... construed so that litigants can have ample opportunity to
prove their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to technicalities.[
Indeed, well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not
appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.
In short, since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their
strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided.[30] Technicality should not be allowed to stand
in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
Eschewing, therefore, the procedural objections raised by petitioner, it behooves us to address the
issue of whether or not the questioned writ of possession is in fact a nullity considering that it
includes real property not expressly mentioned in the Certificate of Sale of
Real Property.
Petitioner, in sum, dwells on the general proposition that since the certificate of sale is a public
document, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and all entries therein are presumed to be done in
the performance of regular functions.
The argument is not persuasive.
There are actually two (2) copies of the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Properties issued on
February 4, 1999 involved, namely: (a) copy which is on file with the deputy sheriff; and (b) copy
registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The object of scrutiny... is... the copy thereof subsequently registered by petitioner with the Registry
of Deeds on April 23,... 1999,[33] which included an entry on the dorsal portion of the first page
thereof describing a parcel of land covered by OCT No. T-40785 not found in the Certificate of Sale
of Real Properties on file with the sheriff.
True, public documents by themselves may be adequate to establish the presumption of their
validity. However, their probative weight must be evaluated not in isolation but in conjunction with
other evidence adduced by the parties in the controversy, much more so in this case... where the
contents of a copy thereof subsequently registered for documentation purposes is being contested.
o reason has been offered how and why the questioned entry was subsequently intercalated in the
copy of the certificate of sale subsequently registered with the
Registry of Deeds. Absent any satisfactory explanation as to why said entry was belatedly inserted,
the surreptitiousness of its inclusion coupled with the furtive manner of its intercalation casts
serious doubt on the authenticity of petitioner's copy of the Certificate of
Sale. Thus, it has been held that while a public document like a notarized deed of sale is vested with
the presumption of regularity, this is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.
It must be pointed out in this regard that the issuance of a Certificate of Sale is an end result of
judicial foreclosure where statutory requirements are strictly adhered to; where even the slightest
deviations therefrom will invalidate the proceeding[35]... and the sale.
The certificate of sale is an accurate record of what properties were actually sold to satisfy the debt.
The strictness in the observance of accuracy and correctness in the description of the properties
renders the enumeration in the certificate exclusive. Thus, subsequently... including properties which
have not been explicitly mentioned therein for registration purposes under suspicious circumstances
smacks of fraud.
The appellate court correctly observed that there was a marked difference in the appearance of the
typewritten words appearing on the first page of the copy of the Certificate of Sale registered with
the Registry of Deeds[38] and those appearing at the... dorsal portion thereof. Underscoring the
irregularity of the intercalation is the clearly devious attempt to let such an insertion pass unnoticed
by typing the same at the back of the first page instead of on the second page which was merely
half-filled and could accommodate the... entry with room to spare.
The argument that the land on which the buildings levied upon in execution is necessarily included is,
likewise, tenuous. Article 415 of the Civil Code provides
The foregoing provision of the Civil Code enumerates land and buildings separately. This can only
mean that a building is, by itself, considered immovable.[39] Thus, it has been held that... while it is
true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements
thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has
been built. Such mortgage would be... still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be
considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.[40] (emphasis
and italics supplied)
In this case, considering that what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial
court was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-40785, which by themselves are real properties... of respondents spouses,
the same should be regarded as separate and distinct from the conveyance of the lot on which they
stand.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.   The
Decision dated May 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65891, which declared the
writ of possession issued by the Regional Trial Court of Balanga
City, Branch 1, on July 18, 2001, null and void, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V REPUBLIC G.R 179987

FACTS:
On February 20, 1998, Malabanan filed an application for land registration of a parcel of land a cadastral
lot. He claimed that he purchased the said parcel of land from Eduardo Velasco. Likewise, claimed that
they were in OCEAN over the said property for more than 30 years.
Aside from the documents presented, he testified that the said parcel of land was originally or it came
from a 22 hectares owned by his great grandfather. However, on the part of the Republic of the
Philippines did not present any evidence to controvert the application. The evidence presented by
Malabanan during the trial are Certification issued by the CENRO-DENR, stating that the property was
verified to be within the alienable or disposable land.
Hence, The RP filed an appeal to the CA, alleging that Malabanan failed to prove that the property
belonged to an alienable and disposable land of the public domain and that the RTC erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of times required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
The CA held that under Section 14(1) of the property Registration Decree any period of possession prior
to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was irrelevant and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR verified
that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the great grandfather
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
ISSUES:
WON MALABANAN is entitled to the registration of the subject land under Section 14(1) of the
property registration decree. (Section 14.(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.) or Section 14.(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.
HELD: No. The Malabanan is not entitled to the registration of the subject land under section
14(1) of the PRD. The provision of section 14(1) states that Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.) In this case, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure (by the law itself) converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that
the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1â
TEOFILO C. VILLARICO v. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, GR No. 136438, 2004-11-11
Facts:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 7,
1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883, affirming in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 259, dated November 14, 1996, in Civil Case No. 95-044.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are:
Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, Metro Manila with an area
of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the
Registry of Deeds, same city.
Petitioner's lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the
government.  As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining
areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)... constructed stairways at several portions
of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo,
respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land.  In November that
same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andok's Litson Corporation... and Marites' Carinderia, also
impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion
of the same area owned by the government.  The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in
the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque City, a complaint for accion publiciana against
respondents. He alleged inter alia that respondents' structures on the government land closed his "right of
way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioner's allegations, claiming that they have been
issued licenses and permits by Parañaque City to construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner
has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the... government.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision
Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession over the subject land
The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in
question.  On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in actual possession of the area. 
According to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of... his "right of way" as he could use the Kapitan
Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial court's Decision. In this
petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals
Issues:
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A CONCLUSION WITHOUT
CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE SAME WAS BASED.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF
THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS BETWEEN HIS PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA IS NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT CARRY POSSESSION OVER THE SAME.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS THE BETTER
RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LAND BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.
Ruling:
In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that petitioner's
action for accion publiciana is not the proper remedy in asserting his "right of way" on a lot owned by the
government.
Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings on the lot in question, have
deprived him of his "right of way" and his right of possession over a considerable portion of the same lot,
which portion is covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430 he acquired by... means of exchange of real property.
It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner's alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the state or
property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
"ART.  420.  The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth."
Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public."
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it:  (1) cannot be alienated or leased
or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3)
is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4)... cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it cannot
be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner.  In fact, its use by the
public is by mere tolerance of the government through... the DPWH.  Petitioner cannot appropriate it for
himself.  Verily, he cannot claim any right of possession over it.
his is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession."
Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents have better right
of possession over the subject lot.
However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants' buildings were constructed on the
portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioner's name.  Being its owner, he is
entitled to its possession.
Principles:
Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
"ART.  420.  The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth."
wphi1

NIMFA USERO v. CA AND SPS. HERMINIGILDO AND CECILIA POLINAR, GR NO. 152115, 2005-
01-26
Facts:
Private respondent spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land at no. 18 Anahaw
St., Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, behind the lots of petitioners Samela and Usero.
Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of water
filled with floating water lilies; abutting    and perpendicular to the lot of petitioner Samela, the lot of
the Polinars and the low-level strip of land is the... perimeter wall of Pilar Village Subdivision.
Apparently, every time a storm or heavy rains occur, the water in said strip of land rises and the
strong current passing through it causes considerable damage to the house of respondent Polinars.
Frustrated by their predicament, private respondent spouses, on July 30, 1998,... erected  a concrete
wall on the bank of the low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and rip-rapped
the soil on that portion of the strip of land.
Claiming ownership of the subject strip of land, petitioners Samela and Usero demanded that the
spouses Apolinar stop their construction but the spouses paid no heed, believing the strip to be part
of a creek. Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, the Polinars offered to pay for... the land being
claimed by petitioners Samela and Usero. However, the parties failed to settle their differences.
Issues:
The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not the disputed strip of land, allegedly encroached
upon by the spouses Polinar, is the private property of petitioners or part of the creek and therefore
part of the public domain.
Ruling:
A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the assailed decisions are founded on sufficient
evidence. That the subject strip of land is a creek is evidenced by: (1) a barangay certification that a
creek exists in the disputed strip of land; (2) a certification from the
Second Manila Engineering District, NCR-DPWH, that the western portion of Pilar Village where the
subject strip of land is located is bounded by a tributary of Talon Creek and (3) photographs showing
the abundance of water lilies in the subject strip of land. The Court of
Appeals was correct: the fact that water lilies thrive in that strip of land can only mean that there is a
permanent  stream of water or creek there.
Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.[8] Concomitantly, Article 420 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 420.  The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar  character;
The phrase "others of similar character" includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river.  It is
property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership.[9] Being
public water, a creek cannot be registered under... the Torrens System in the name of any
individual[10].
Accordingly, the Polinar spouses may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the
erosion of their property.

AUGUST 27, 2022 CASES

1. Articles 427 - 439, CCP
2. CASES

Cases:
A. Gerardo Mendoza vs. Soledad Salinas, 152827, Feb. 6, 2007;
B. Sps. Canezo vs. Sps. Bautista, 170189, Sept. 1, 2010;
C. Datu Kiram Sampaco vs. Hadji Serad, 152827, Feb. 6, 2007
D. MWSS vs. Act Theater, 147076, June 17, 2004
E. Del Fierro vs. Seguiran, 152141, Aug. 8, 2011
F. Rogelio Jakosalem vs. Roberto Barangan, 175025, Feb. 15, 2012
G. Rodil Enterprises vs. CA, 129609, Nov. 29, 2001

3. Add-on: 440-444, CCP

G.R. No. 152827             February 6, 2007

GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA and IYLENE all surnamed MENDOZA, Petitioners,

vs.
SOLEDAD SALINAS, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Order dated April 2, 2002 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72, acting as Land Registration Court, in LRC Case No.
N-04-0-97, granting respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. 1

The assailed Order was issued by the RTC after it rendered a favorable judgment on respondent's application
for registration in its Decision dated November 3, 1998, and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-10053
was issued in her name covering a parcel of land described as follows:

A parcel of land (Plan Psu-224228, LR Case No. N-04-0-97, LRA Record No. N-68955), situated in the Barrio
of Barretto, Municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, Island of Luzon, Bounded on the NW., points 1-
3 by Road (6.00 m. wide) (unimproved); on the NE., points 3-4 by Public Land claimed by C. Panaligan; on
the E., SE., and SW., points 4-19 by Makinaya River (10.00 m. wide); on the SW., points 19-29 by Public
Land; and on the NW., points 29-1 by Road (6.00 m. wide) unimproved. Beginning at a point marked "1" on
plan, being S.84 deg. 47'E., 2644.65 m. from B.L.B.M. 2, Barrio of Matain, Subic, Zambales, thence

xxxx

beginning; containing an area of TWENTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE (20, 149) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. x x x2

Petitioners opposed respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession claiming that they were
not oppositors/parties to the registration case and they have been in actual physical possession of the
property since 1964. The RTC, however, rejected their arguments and granted respondent's application for
the issuance of a writ of possession per herein assailed Order.

Hence, the present petition. 1avvphi1.net

Petitioners set forth the lone assignment of error that the RTC erred in issuing the writ of possession and
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction. 3 Petitioners reiterate their
argument that they cannot be ousted of their possession of the property, having been in actual possession of
the property since 1964, as evidenced by petitioner Gerardo C. Mendoza's Sales Application made in
January 1986 over the following property:

A parcel of land situated at Burgos St., Bo. Barretto, O.C. Bounded on the North., by Benjamin Salinas;
South., by Gloria Montemayor; East., by Benjamin Salinas & Conrado Pilapil and West., Burgos St. situated
in Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City, Zambales, and containing an area of 932 square meters x x x. 4

and a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and 1985, 5 among others.

Respondent counters that the present petition should be dismissed, arguing that the petition should have
been initially with the Court of Appeals, based on the principle of hierarchy of courts, and that the general
order of default on October 8, 1998 issued by the RTC binds them and personal notice was not necessary.
The petition must be granted.

On the procedural issue, it should be pointed out that what petitioners filed with the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of Court, and not a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65. The principle of hierarchy of courts does not find any application in this case.
Under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that in all cases where only questions of law
are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45, Section 1 of which provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.6

The substantive issue posed for resolution in the present case pertains to the propriety of the issuance of the
writ of possession by the RTC. This, obviously, is a question of law; consequently, direct resort to this Court is
proper.

There is no question that the writ of possession granted in this case was made by the RTC acting as a land
registration court, after finality of its Decision dated November 3, 1998 and the corresponding OCT No. P-
10053 was issued in the name of respondent. As the soundness of the order granting the writ of possession
is a matter of judgment, the remedy is ordinary appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari. An error of
judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of
discretion." Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable
by certiorari.7

Petitioners, therefore, filed the proper petition before the Court.

On the substantive issue of the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession, the Court finds that the
RTC committed a reversible error in granting the issuance of the writ of possession.

A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings under
Sec. 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a
real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.

In land registration cases, principles regarding the issuance of a writ of possession are well-settled. A
judgment confirming the title of the applicant in a registration case and ordering its registration in his name
necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of
ownership.8 This is sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle
upon which the administration of justice rests.9

Also, a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration
case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the
land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree, 10 and it is the duty of the registration court
to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant. 11

Based on these tenets, the issuance of a writ of possession, therefore, is clearly a ministerial duty of the land
registration court. Such ministerial duty, however, ceases to be so with particular regard to petitioners who
are actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership. Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. This conclusion is supported by Article 433 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.

Under said provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the
appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be
properly heard and adjudicated. 12

It is noted that there already exists a final and executory decision disregarding respondent's claim for
possession over the property. In a Decision dated January 21, 2002, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 4643, an action for unlawful detainer filed by
respondent and her spouse against petitioners and several other occupants of the property, the case against
petitioners was dismissed by the MTCC for lack of cause of action. 13 While the MTCC Decision was appealed
by the other defendants, respondent and her spouse manifested that they will not appeal the decision and,
instead, will file for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97.

Note should also be made that petitioners registered their opposition to respondent's application for the
issuance of a writ of possession and apprised the RTC of their actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted
possession since 1964,14 including therein documents supporting their claim, consisting of Gerardo C.
Mendoza's Sales Application made on January 1986 and a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976
and 1985, among others.15 The RTC, nevertheless, disregarded their opposition and, instead, relied on the
ruling in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals [195 SCRA 482],16 that a writ of possession may be issued in a land
registration proceeding.

A reading of the Serra Serra case, however, supports the Court's conclusion that a writ of possession should
not have been issued in this case. It was ruled by the Court that while a writ of possession may be issued
only pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land registration proceedings, it cannot issue against
possessors under claim of ownership, as actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership, and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property,
not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. 17

Thus, it was erroneous for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession against petitioners. This conclusion,
of course, is without prejudice to any case that respondent may file for the recovery of the property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated April 2, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 72, acting as Land Registration Court, in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97,
is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of possession is DENIED,
without prejudice to any case that she may file for recovery of the property.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES ELEGIO CAÑEZO AND DOLIA CAÑEZO v. SPOUSES APOLINARIO AND CONSORCIA L.
BAUTISTA

FACTS: Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (appellees) are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 186 square meters, covered by TCT No. 32911. Whereas, Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia
Bautista (appellants) are the registered owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of 181 square
meters, covered by TCT No. 31727. Both parcels of land are located at Coronado Heights, Barangka
Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants’
lot is adjacent to that of appellees.

Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During the
construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by
appellants without appellees’ knowledge and consent.

Three surveys were conducted which confirmed the fact of encroachment. However, despite oral and
written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the structures encroaching appellees’ lot.

Spouses Cañezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition with damages on 13 April
2000. In an Order dated 15 August 2000, the trial court declared the spouses Bautista in default for
failure to answer within the reglementary period. The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of
the spouses Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built structures encroaching on the
land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The spouses Bautista also refused to remove the structures and
respect the boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to the Barangay Lupon failed
to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in
bad faith, such that spouses Cañezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.

On appeal, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the Trial Court’s Decision. The
appellate court ruled that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year
before the filing of the complaint, the spouses Cañezo should have filed a suit for recovery of
possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of demolition can be granted only as
an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses Cañezo’s complaint should be dismissed. The
spouses Cañezo failed to specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of their property.
Because of this failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the
appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for recovery of
possession and that the encroachment was built in good faith, the market value of the encroached
portion should be proved to determine the appropriate indemnity.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition?

HELD: The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of Demolition with
Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434
of the Civil Code. Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby
plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.

The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached property. Aside from
testimonial evidence, the spouses Cañezo were also able to present documentary and object evidence
which consisted of photographs, transfer certificates of title, and a relocation survey plan.
DATU KIRAM SAMPACO v. HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD, GR No. 163551, 2011-07-18
Facts:
Respondent Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court, filed an action to quiet title
with damages... against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in the lower court,
who has been substituted by his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-Macabando.
Respondent  alleged in his Complaint [3] that he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential
lot located at Marinaut, Marawi City, with an area of 897 square meters covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-658.
Datu Kiram Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several armed men,
forcibly and unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the nursery buildings, cabbage seedlings
and other improvements therein worth P10,000.00.
Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen prepared and issued a decision [4] in
writing stating that petitioner Datu  Kiram Sampaco is the owner of the subject parcel of land.
Respondent stated that the acts of petitioner... and the said decision of the Barangay Captain may
cast a cloud over or otherwise prejudice his title.
Respondent stated that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public and exclusive
possession of the subject property.  He prayed that the acts of... petitioner and the decision of
Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared invalid, and that petitioner be
ordered to pay respondent damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees.
Datu Kiram Sampaco, petitioner herein, denied the material allegations of the Complaint. Petitioner
asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public,
continuous, and exclusive... possession of the property in dispute.
Petitioner alleged that OCT No. P-658 was secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception
and misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot  and the title
issued is a free... patent.
On the contrary, petitioner has all the evidence of actual possession and ownership of permanent
improvements and other plants on the land... in dispute.
the trial court rendered a Decision on March 31, 1999 in favor of petitioner,... Dismissing plaintiff's
complaint for lack of merit;
Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-658 (Exh. A) null and void and of no legal effect;
Declaring the defendant the absolute or true owner and possessor of the land in dispute; and
Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees plus P500.00
per appearance. [16]
The trial court held that the issuance of respondent's title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with fraud
and irregularities and the title is, therefore, spurious; hence, it is null and void, and without any
probative value... title were verified and had no record in the said office... while free patents are
normally issued for agricultural lands, respondent's title is a free patent title issued over a  residential
land... the trial court stated that respondent failed to establish with competent and credible evidence
that he was in prior possession of the subject property
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the trial court
The Court of Appeals held that there is no controversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens title;
hence, he is the owner of the subject property. The appellate court stressed that Section 47 [19] of
the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) provides that... the certificate of title covering registered
land shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all
matters stated therein.
The allegation of fraud in securing OCT No. P-658 on the ground that the property in dispute is a
residential lot and not subject of a free patent was not given weight by the appellate court as it was
supported only by testimonial evidence that did not show how (by metes and... bounds) and why the
property in dispute could not have been the subject of a free patent.
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioner claimed that the subject property is only part of his
larger property. Although petitioner introduced proof of payment of the real estate taxes of the said
property, as well as a previous mortgage of the property, petitioner did... not show that the disputed
property is part of his larger property. Hence, the appellate court stated that under such
circumstances, it cannot rule that petitioner owned the land under litigation, since petitioner failed
to show that it is part of his larger property.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS
TITLE INVOLVED HEREIN WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT WHICH COULD NOT BE
VALIDLY ISSUED OVER A PRIVATE LAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED TO BY THE
BUREAU OF LANDS ITSELF NO SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ISSUED BY
IT; HENCE, SAID FREE PATENT IS SPURIOUS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE SUBJECT LOT HAD LONG BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED BY THE
DEFENDANT (PETITIONER HEREIN) OR HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR
CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENT'S TITLE IS BARRED.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT CASE
IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF'S TITLE.
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-658 and
confirming respondent as owner of the property in dispute.
Ruling:
The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein,
and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings.
the Court holds that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that fraud was committed in the
issuance of respondent's Torrens title. Hence, respondent's Torrens title is a valid evidence of his
ownership of the land in dispute.
action for reconveyance,
Principles:
Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a... certificate of title which is an
incontrovertible proof of ownership.
An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is
as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings.
[28]  However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by
fraud and misrepresentation.
t... he allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made only by respondent, but the
true classification of the disputed land as residential was not shown to have been made by the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as The Public Land Act.
It has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been
made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born Filipino citizen.
Art. 434.  In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code,  to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity
of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.
[35]... n regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof. [36]
In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property.  However,
petitioner failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds
thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description... contained in the title of
respondent, which would have shown whether the disputed property really formed part of
petitioner's larger property.
did not conclusively show the metes and bounds of petitioner's larger property in relation to the
metes and bounds of the disputed property; thus, there is no sufficient evidence on record to
support petitioner's claim that the disputed property is part of his... larger property.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS v. ACT THEATER, GR No. 147076, 2004-06-17
Facts:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo
Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of the
Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as...
amended by B.P. Blg. 876. The respondent's employees were subsequently criminally charged
(Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On account of the incident, the respondent's
water service connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for... injunction
with damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondent's water service
connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and... sanitation, not only of the
respondent's patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected. The
respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages.
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision to the CA.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME CODE
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law,
or recognized as a result of long usage,[6] constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person
against the other.
the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right... should not be confused with the
manner by which such right is to be exercised.
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one's rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable.[9] In this case, the petitioner
failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is... due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water service connection.
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo and
the appellate court that the petitioner's act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent,
justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
the petition is DENIED.

DEL FIERRO VS. SEGUIRAN 152141 AUG 8,2011

FACTS:

The Complaint20 alleged that plaintiffs (petitioners) were the owners and possessors of a parcel of land
identified as Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, formerly part of Lot No. 1197, situated at Barangay Locloc, Palauig,
Zambales. On July 26, 1964, Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial unlawfully entered the land occupied by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs sued them for forcible entry 21 before the Municipal Court of Palauig. The municipal court ruled in favor
of plaintiffs, which decision was affirmed on appeal by the CFI of Iba, Zambales, Branch II on August 1, 1973.
Consequently, Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial were ejected from the premises. Meanwhile, on June 29, 1964,
Marcial had mortgaged the lots to the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc., which foreclosed the real estate
mortgage on December 26, 1972, and consolidated ownership over the lots on April 22, 1982. On October 28,
1981, defendant Rene S. Seguiran purchased from Lodelfo Marcial (deceased) the subject lots. On November
9, 1981, defendant purchased the subject lots again from the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc.
Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that Lodelfo Marcial, predecessor-in-interest of defendant, had no legal right to
convey the said lots to plantiffs, since he was merely a deforciant in the said lots. Further, defendant, with
evident bad faith, fraudulently applied with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the said lots, alleging that
he was the actual possessor thereof, which constitutes a false statement, since the plaintiffs were the ones in
actual possession. Despite knowing that the said lots were the subject of legal controversy before the CFI of
Iba, Zambales, Branch II, defendant fraudulently secured a certification from the Court of Olongapo to prove that
the said parcels of land were not subject of any court action. As a consequence of the foregoing illegal and
fraudulent acts, defendant was able to secure OCT Nos. P-7013 and P-7014 for Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626,
respectively.

On May 20, 1988, defendant filed his Answer,30 claiming that when he bought the land in dispute on
October, 28, 1981, Lodelfo Marcial was no longer its owner, but the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc., since
Marcial failed to redeem the land within the one-year period of redemption. His only purpose for buying the land
from the mortgagor, Lodelfo Marcial in November 1981 was for the peaceful turn-over of the property to him by
Marcial. Defendant denied any fraud, illegality or bad faith in securing OCT Nos. P-7013 and P-7014. He
asserted that when he secured a certification from the RTC on June 6, 1983, there was in truth no pending case
involving the subject properties in any court in Zambales; hence, no bad faith could be attributed to him.
Defendant prayed that judgment be rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiffs to
pay him actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and the expenses of litigation.

The trial court held that plaintiffs (petitioners) failed to prove the identity of the property sought to be recovered.
The numerous documents they presented to prove ownership of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 showed that the
properties covered by sale or pacto de retro are located at Liozon,39 Palauig, Zambales, while Lot Nos. 1625 and
1626 are located at Locloc, Palauig, Zambales; and there is no clear showing that parts of Liozon became
Locloc. Moreover, although the Del Fierros were declared as the possessors of the property in the ejectment
case (forcible entry)40 filed by Generosa del Fierro against Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial, the property concerned
in the said case is Lot No. 1197. There was no evidence as to the original size of Lot No. 1197 and no proof that
Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 formed part of Lot No. 1197. Based on the foregoing, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’
complaint.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to reconveyance of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, and whether the certificates
of title of respondent to the said lots should be cancelled.

HELD: NO

The requisites of reconveyance are provided for in Article 434 of the Civil Code, thus: Art. 434. In an
action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and
not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land
claimed; and second, his title thereto.45

In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to
the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
thereof.46 Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party
can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed. 47

In this case, petitioners failed to prove the identity of the parcels of land sought to be recovered and their title
thereto. Petitioners contend that they are the owners of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 by virtue of the decision of the
Municipal Court of Palauig, Zambales in the ejectment case (forcible entry) 48 against Lodelfo and Narciso
Marcial, declaring them (petitioners) as the ones in possession of the property, which decision was affirmed on
appeal. However, as stated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the property involved in the ejectment
case was Lot No. 1197, and it was never mentioned in the respective decisions 49 of the Municipal Court of
Palauig, Zambales and the CFI of Zambales, Branch II-Iba that the portion intruded upon was Lot Nos. 1625
and 1626. Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce in evidence the technical description of Lot No. 1197 and failed
to prove that Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 were part of or used to be part of Lot No. 1197.

Further, the documents presented by petitioners to prove their title over Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 showed that the
properties covered therein were located in Barrio Liozon, Palauig, Zambales, while Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 are
located in Barrio Locloc, Palauig, Zambales. In addition, petitioners failed to establish which of the deeds of sale,
donation or documents evidencing transfer of properties to their father, Miguel del Fierro, which were adduced in
evidence, covered Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626.

A perusal of the documents ( DEED OF SALE IN SPANISH )would readily show that the lots indicated in the
Spanish deeds of conveyence were located in Barrio Lioson and not in Locloc, Palauig, Zambales, the actual
location of the Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626. As to the tax declarations, the real properties declared therein, although
situated in Locloc, Palauig, Zambales were not designated as Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 until the year 1985, the
same year the said lots were titled in the name of defendant-appellee. And even without such designation of Lot
Nos. 1625 and 1626, plaintiffs-appellants failed to show that the separate lots which their predecessor-in-
interest, Don Miguel del Fierro, had acquired in the 1920’s, were the very same land (or included therein) which
have been designated as Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, or which was covered by the land supposedly donated by
their grandfather to Don Miguel del Fierro. In other words, the identity of the land being claimed by plaintiffs-
appellants could not be clearly established on the basis of either the Spanish deeds of purchase and donation or
the old tax declarations presented by plaintiffs-appellants. 50
Based on the foregoing, petitioners failed to prove the identity of the properties sought to be recovered and their
title thereto.

As regards the second issue raised, petitioners contend that the Partial Pre-Trial Order stated that during
the pre-trial conference the following facts were stipulated on:
1) By the plaintiffs and intervenor – that Lot 1625 is actually occupied by the Del Fierros, while Lot 1626, Cad. Lot
364-D of the Palauig is occupied by the heirs of Francisco Santos, who is already deceased. The defendant did
not admit this fact.
2) The plaintiffs and defendants—that there exists a decision rendered by the then Court of First Instance
of Zambales thru Honorable Judge Pedro Cenzon in favor of the plaintiffs in this case, affirming the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of Palauig, Zambales where it was stated that the plaintiffs are the ones in possession
of Lots 1625 and 1626, which is docketed as Civil Case No. 706-I entitled "Generosa Jimenez Vda. de Del Fierro,
et al. versus Leodolfo Marcial, et al." The intervenor did not admit this fact. 52

Petitioners contend that the said judicial admission is binding and conclusive on the respondent and it cannot
just be ignored by the trial court without doing violence to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Evidence.

Petitioners also contend that the decision of the appellate court in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 706-I), filed
by petitioners against Lodelfo Marcial, respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, is conclusive as to petitioners’
possession of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626. Since petitioners are in possession, respondent fraudulently applied for
and procured free patents, as the consideration in qualifying as a patentee is that the applicant is in actual
possession of the land applied for. Moreover, the undisputed possession of petitioners and their predecessors of
the land as early as 1920s had long converted the parcels of land to private land and no longer part of the public
domain.
Petitioners’ contention does not persuade.

As stated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the ejectment case entitled Generosa
Jimenez Vda. de Del Fierro, et al. v. Leodolfo Marcial, et al. involved Lot No. 1197, and there
was no mention of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 therein. The land involved in the ejectment case was
described by the plaintiffs (petitioners) in their Complaint 54 as follows:

Consisting of 21.3196 hectares, more or less, and bounded on the North by Leoncia Apostol,
Heirs of P. Lesaca, Justa Ponce and P. Artiquera; East by Hrs. of Potenciano Lesaca, M.
Abdon, P. Artiquera, David Abdon and D.
Abdon; South by P. Garcia, Barrio Road and Maximo Abdon and West by River and Beach. It is
designated
as Lot No. 1197 of the Palauig Cadastre and declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
Heirs of Miguel del Fierro under Tax Declaration No. 18324 and assessed at P5,330.00. 55

Moreover, in this case, petitioners failed to prove that Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 were part of Lot
No. 1197. The Survey Map56 of Lot 1626 showed that Lot Nos. 1197, 1625, and 1626 are
distinct lots. The cadastral survey of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 was conducted sometime in
1962.57 The ejectment case was filed in 1964, after the cadastral survey of Lot Nos. 1625 and
1626, yet petitioners did not mention in their complaint that the ejectment case involved Lot
Nos. 1625 and 1626.

In view of the foregoing, the Partial Pre-trial Order58 mistakenly stated that petitioners were
declared as the ones in possession of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 in the ejectment case. Even
the trial court stated during the pre-trial conference held on October 28, 1988 that there was
no mention of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 in the decision 59 of the CFI of Zambales, Branch II-Iba
in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 706-I). 60 Moreover, contrary to the contention of
petitioners, respondent did not admit that petitioners and the intervenors were in possession of
Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, respectively, which fact was clearly stated in the Partial Pre-trial
Order.
Jakosalem and Dulfo v. Barangan  G.R. No. 175025, 15 February 2012.First
DivisionDEL CASTILLO,
 
FACTS:
In 1966, Barangan purchased a 300 sq. m. land and a new title, TCT No. N-10772,
was issued in his name. Since then, he has been dutifully paying real property
taxes for the said property. He was not, however, able to physically occupy the
subject property because as a member of the Philippine Air Force, he was often
assigned to various stations in the Philippines. In 1993, when he was about
to retire, Barangan went to visit his property where he was planning to build a
retirement home. It was only then that he discovered that it was being occupied
by Dulfo and his family. In February 1994, Barangan sent a letter to Dulfo
demanding that he and his family vacate the subject property within 30 days. In
reply, Atty. Jakosalem, the son-in-law of Dulfo, sent a letter claiming ownership
over the subject property. In May 1994, Barangan commissioned a geodetic
engineer to conduct a relocation survey of thesubject property which revealed
that the property occupied by Dulfo and his family is the same property
covcovered by Barangan’s title.

In November 1994, Barangan filed acomplaint for recovery of possession against

Dulfo and Jakosalem with the RTC.

ISSUES:
(1) Is Barangan entitled to recover the subject property?
(2) If so, is he entitled to actual and moral damages, as well as attorney’s fees?
(3) Are laches and prescription applicable in the case?

RULING:
(1) YES, Barangan is entitled to recover the subject property. Article 434 of the 
CivilCode provides that in an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of the defendants claim.
In other words, in order to recover possession, a person must prove (1)
theidentity of the land claimed, and (2) his title. In the case, Barangan was
able to provethe identity of the property and his title.

(2) YES, since he was deprived of possession. For the mental anguish, sleeplessn
ights and serious anxiety suffered by Barangan, he is entitled to moral
damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. Although not alleged in the
complaint, he is entitled to attorney’s fees because it is sanctioned by law,
specifically, paragraphs 2 and 11 of  Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated

August 3, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 79283 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. 
The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00 while the award of
temperate damages is DELETED.  The reasonable monthly rental of P3,000.00
shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 17, 1994,
and at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until the obligation is fully satisfied.
 [G.R. No. 129609. November 29, 2001]

RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN BONDOC, TERESITA BONDOC-
ESTO, DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR and CHUA HUAY SOON, respondents.

ARTICLE 428 OWNERSHIP -PROPERTY

FACTS:

 ORRACA Bldg. is owned by the Republic of the Phil. Which was leased to Rodil Ent.
 Rodil Ent. Entered into a subleased contract with the private respondents who are members of
ORRACA Tenants Assoc. Inc. (Association).
 Rodil offered to buy the building, while pending for appraisal of market value of the
property, ASSOCIATION
offered to lease the same building.
 Pending action for Rodil’s offer to buy the bldg., Rodil request for another renewal of the lease
for 5 years.
 The Management suspend the request of Rodil for renewal of lease for 5 years because
Association’s offer to lease was more beneficial to the Republic.
 The management issued a temporary occupancy permit to ASSOCIATION.
 A new custodian was designated to manage the ORRACA Bldg.
 Renewal of lease was entered into by Rodil and the new management for the bldg for 10 years.
 Rodil filed an action of unlawful detainer against the members of ASSOCIATION.
 MTC ruled in favor of Rodil and was affirmed by RTC
 CA on appeal reversed the decision of the RTC
 Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.

HELD: YES.

We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no
exception.

The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to
enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor,
the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual
elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.

Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the
REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of
acquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a
"temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the
occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of
the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose.
Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL
by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 36381, 37243 and 39919 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 39, in Civil Cases
Nos. 94-70776, 94-71122 and 94-71123 as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 23, in Civil Case No. 94-72209 affirming in toto the Decisions of the MeTC —
Br. 28 in Civil Case No. 143301, MeTC — Br. 15 in Civil Case No. 143216, MeTC —
Br. 7 in Civil Case No. 142258, and MeTC — Br. 24 in Civil Case No. 142282-CV, as
herein quoted, and the Orders dated 14 August 1992 and 6 November 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 87-42323, recognizing the validity and
legality of the Renewal of the Lease Contract dated 18 May 1992 and the Supplemental
Contract dated 25 May 1992, are REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. Costs
against private respondents in both cases.