While investigating another issueaboard a CH146 Griffon, Sergeant Anderson noted that the method of lock-wiring canon plugs"{Ilayhave

contributed to faulty cockpit gaugeindications: During the investigation of the transmissionpressuretransducerand gaugewiring, he found that the shelf for the oil pressuregaugetransducerwas loose. Sergeant Anderson then inspectedthe remaining aircraft and determined that three other aircraft sharedthe problem. A local supplementaryinvestigation was raisedto correct the incorrect lock-wiring procedure that causedthe problem. Sergeant Anderson then developeda TechnicianAwareness Program to guide technicians in theatre on the proper procedure. Sergeant Anderson demonstratedextremeprofessionalism in thesecircumstances.Not only did his diligence uncovera subtle glitch, he quickly found the causeof the problem, determined its extent within our fleet, and instituted a program to ensurethat those past errors would not be repeated. As Bosnia-Herzegovina an inherently hazardousarea is due to extensivemining; it is a dangeroussituation when an aircraft must land outside of approved landing zones. By detectingand remedyingthis snag,Sergeant Anderson has potentially savedaircrew from having to perform this action. His actions clearly dem'qnstrate profeshis sionalism and commitm~nt. .

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Flight Comment, no 3, 2001

Onl0 May 2000,the crew of Freedom6 departedthe KRWAU in Griffon helicopter #146470to pick up four British soldiers of the Royal RegimentFusiliers at a landing zone located within the city limits of Pristina. The helicopter subsequentlydeparted the pick-up point and commenceda reconnaissance mission overheadthe city. The aircraft was flying at approximately 40 knots and 300' AGL, overheadPristina, when #1 engine flamed out. Upon hearing the sound of an engine winding down, the flying pilor-{Major Charpentier) immediately loweredthe collective a~9increased airspeed in order to regain single engine parameters.The other crewmemberslater noted that the AC's (aircraft captain) reaction was so quick that the single engine parameterswere achievedbefore the #1 engine-out light had a chanceto illuminate. Within two to three seconds of hearing the engine wind down, the AC informed the I other crewmembersthat an engine had beenlost. The crew had performed the usual preflight briefing and, thus, no further direction was required to deal with the emergency. The AC I reacquiredsingle engine i parametersand regained I altitude. While the AC was turning the aircraft toward Pristina airport, 14kilometers from the incident location, the other crewmembersperformed their respective duties in order to deal quickly with the emergency situation. All theseactions occurred within the first two minutes of the engine flameout. While enroute to the Pristina airport, it was rapidly concluded that not knowing why the #1 engine had failed, the secondengine could possiblyfail, at any moment; thus a closer landing zone had to be considered.With 20,000 known piecesof unexploded ordinance in the Canadianarea of responsibility, there are only certain

landing zonesthat are deemedsafeto land in, even within the city limits of Pristina. At approximately six kilometers from the incident area, the aircraft was approachinga well-known securelanding wne known as"Tree Tops."It is a grassyarea measuring 150 x 80 meters with 200-foot high industrial power lines on its easternside.The Griffon checklistrecommendsthat for a single engine landing, a shallowerthan normal approach to a wide and flat areashould be made. Although lessthan ideal for a single engine approach,the crew agreedthat a landing at "Tree Tops" was the best option giventhe circumstances.Recallingthat there were light westerlywinds, the AC decided that the best approach would be into wind, ~espitethe industrial wires on the selectedapproachpath. .The AC flew the approach in two stages. During stage one, he brought the helicopter to a point where it was at 60 knots and 15 feet over a post supporting these industrial wires eastof the landing zone. Once the tail had clearedthe obstacle,the AC maintained 60 knots and descendedrapidly in order to maximize what was left of the 150 meter landing zone. At the appropriate altitude, the AC slowedthe descentrate and safelylanded the aircraft with only a very small run-on, which resulted in no injury and no damageto the aircraft. He did so while remaining well within the single engine parameters. In summary, this crew displayed excellentcrew cooperation, exceptionalalertnessand, aboveall, outstanding technique when faced with a very difficult and unusual situation. Their timely and professional reaction prevented a possiblecatastrophic accidentthat could have cost the lives of a number of civilians, crewmembersand fellow KFOR members..

Flight Comment. no 3. 2001

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Le 10mai 2000, l'equipage de Freedom 6 a quitte KRWAU a bord de l'helicoptere Griffon nO 146470pour faire monter quatre soldats britanniques du Royal Regiment Fusiliers a une aire d'atterrissage situee a l'interieur des limites de la ville de Pristina. Parla suite, l'helicoptere a decolle de cet endroit et a entrepris une mission de reconnaissance audessusde la ville. L'appareil volait a quelque 40 nreuds et 300 pieds AGL au-dessusde Pristina lorsque Ie moteur no1 s'esteteint. En entendant Ie bruit d'un moteur en deceleration,Ie pilote aux command~(le lpajor Charpentier) a immediatement abaisse Ie collectif tGu{en augmentant la vitesse afin de rentrer dans les parametr~~de vol sur un seulmoteur. Les autres membres d'equipage ont remarque que la reaction du commandant de bord (CB) avait ete si rapide que les parametresde vol sur un seul moteur ont pu ~tre atteints avant que Ie voyant d'extinction du moteur no1 n'ait eu Ie temps de s'a11umer. Le bruit de deceleration du moteur n' avait pas dure plus de deux ou trois secondes que deja Ie CB avait averti les autres membres d'equipage qu'un moteur etait tombe en panne. Cette situation ayant ete discute lors de l'expose prevol routinier, aucune instruction supplementairen'a donc ete necessaire pour composeravecla situation d'urgence.Le CB a atteint les parametresde vol sur un seul moteur et a repris de l'altitude. Pendantque Ie CB effectuait un virage en direction de l'aeroport de Pristina, situe a 14 kilometres de l'endroit de l'incident, les autres membres d'equipage ont rapidement effectue leurs tachesrespectivesafin de s'occuperde la situation d'urgence.

PendantIe trajet veTsl'aeroport de Pristina, il est apparu rapidement que,la causede l'extinction du moteur no1 n'etant pas connue.n se pouvait tres bien que l'autre moteur tombe lui aussien vanDea tout moment et que,par consequent,il fallait envisagerdevoir se poser avant l'aeroport. Comme 20 000 munitions connuesn'ayantpas explosese trouvent encoredans la zone sousresponsabilite canadienne, seulesquelqueszones sont jugees surfS pour un atterrissage, m~me a l'interieur des limites de la ville de Pristina. A quelque six kilometres du lieu de l'incident, l~appareil estarrive a proximite d'un endroit d'atterrissagesUr et bien conDO l'equipage baptise TreeTqps . D'apres la liste de de verifications du Griffon, applicable au vol sur un seul moteur, il estrecornrnande faire one approchemoins prononceequ'a de l'habitude veTS zone Tree one -, large et plane. Bien que bien Tops ffit loin d' ~tre un, endroit , ideal pour faire one approche sur un seul moteur,l'equipagea neanmoins estime que, dans leg circonstances, s'agissaitde la il meilleure solution envisageable. l' equipagea effectue one approche en deux etapesevitant, en approche finale, des fils electriquespour enfin poser l'appareil en toute securite sur one distancetres courte. Cette delicatemanreuvre a vermis d'eviter toute blessureaux occupants et des dommagesa l'appareil, tout en demeurant a l'interieur desparametresde vol sur un seulmoteur. En resume,l'equipage a fait preuve d'une excellentecooperation, d'une vigilance exceptionnelle et, par dessustout, d'une habilete technique hoTsdu common quand il a ete confronte a one situation tres difficile et inhabituelle. Gracea sa reaction rapideet professionnelle,il a reussia eviterun accidenteventuellement catastrophiquequi aurait pu couter la vie a des civils, a l'equipage de conduite eta sescolleguesde la KFOR. .

Propos de vol, no 3. 2001

29

Pendantline inspection a bord d'un CH-146 Griffon, Ie sergentAndersona observeque Ie freinagepar fil desfiches Cannon pouvait avoir .f.ausse indications de certains leg instruments de bordo A16rsqu'il examinait Ie cablagede l'indicateur et du transducteur,depressiond'huile transmission, il a constateque Ie support du transducteur etait lache. Il a alors inspecte leg autres appareils et releve Ie m~me probleme dans trois d'entre eux. Une enqu~telocale complementaire a ete faite pour corriger Ie freinage par fil qui etait a l' origine du probleme. Le sgt Anderson a ensuite mis au point un programme de sensibilisationpour initier leg techniciens de theatre a la procedure a suivre. Le sgt Anderson a fait preuve d'un grand professionnalisme. Gracea sa diligence,il a decouvert un probleme difficile a deceler,il en a rapidement trouve la cause,il en a determine l'importance dans la flotte et il a institue un programme pour Ie corriger line fois pour toutes. La Bosnie-Herzegovine ayantete beaucoup minee, il est dangereuxd'y Caireatterrirun aeronef a l'exterieur des zonesd'atterrissageapprouvees.En detectant eten corrigeant cette anomalie,Ie sgt Anderson a peut-~tre sauver desvies en evitant a desequipagesde se trouver dans cette situation. Sesgestessont un temoignage eloquent de son professionnalismeet de son engagement. .

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Propos de vol, no 3, 2001