Page 20
David Kennedy teaches at Northern l\/lichigan
The Community of Inquiry
and Educational Structure
By David Kennedy
n a recent issue of Thinking, AT.
I Lardner takes up an issue which has
had a quiet life for several years now,
but has never, to my knowledge, been
brought squarely before the community
of practitioners of philosophy for
children. I am speaking of smdent resis-
tance to the program, expressed i n bore-
dom, impatience, and sometimes even re-
jection.^ As Lardner's brief, clear article
implies, there is undoubtedly a whole
tissue of explanation possible, f r o m
psychological resistance on the part of in-
dividuals, to poor or shaky discussion
leadership skills, to the wrong time of
day, to larger social effects, for example,
a culmre that teaches individualism, in-
strumentalism, and competition, and
samrates us with the message that being
reflective can be socially and even
economically dangerous.
My theory is that, in addition to a lot
of reasons like the ones just cited, the
problem has to do with the way schools
and classrooms are strucmred, which in
mrn is the result of an overall educa-
tional model. Lardner does take this up
briefly, i n referring to several aspects of
"normal" educational evironments which
he thinks leads to the rejection of
philosophy for children. H e speaks of
"goal and/or product based experience,"
and the split that develops between i n
and out of school experience, whereby
smdents learn to "survive within the
fi:£imework of school by doing only what's
necessar)^'^ I want to look, not so much
at the educational model which results
in this kind of school experience—I
think that we're all aware of the profound
failures of what Lipman has referred to
as "tribal" or "information-acquisition"
David Kennedy, The Community of Inquiry and Educational
education. In fact, he has said right out:
"The doing of philosophy requires con-
versation, dialogue, and community
which are not compatible with the re-
quirements of the traditional classroom."^
Rather, I want to argue that there is a
"new" educational model—in fact it is
already about 200 years old—and that it
has the strucmral characteristics which
provide place for what Lipman refers to
as "participatory collaborative communi-
tyf'^ This paper is about that model, and
about how it provides a place for con-
versation, dialogue and community.
First, I need to point out a few of my
primary assumptions. One of them is
that there is a correlation between the
strucmres of educational environments
and forms of educational discourse If
the larger, strucmral configurations of an
educational environment are not
reasonable—i£., are based on domina-
tion, hierarchy, and selfperpemating
goals and processes which are rigid and
unreflective—then neither much of the
behavior nor the language events in that
environment will be reasonable either
A second, related assumption, is that,
although in certain heroic and ex-
emplary cases, discourse transforms
strucmre, in the vast number of cases,
strucmre determines discourse^ This is
an important assumption, because it
challenges what I understand to be one
of the i m p l i c i t assumptions o f
philosophy for children, which is tiiat the
discourse of the program is capable of
evenmally changing the model to a col-
laborative and participatory one Most of
us, I think, carry the hope, if not the faith,
that the setting up of communities of in-
quiry within the traditional classroom
Structure
University, l\/larquette. This paper was
delivered at the Fourth Annual Conference of
the International Council of Philosophical In-
quiry with Children, Mexico City, April 10-12,
1991.
will evenmally transform that classroom
in their own image But my assumption
su^ests that this is improbable if not im-
possible, because the strucmral model
logically and psychologically precedes the
discourse that the model generates. The
present form of schooling with its rigid
hierarchies, its one-way environments, its
lockstep curricula, its insensitivity to
developmental differences and differenc-
es i n learning style, and so on, does not
make a place for the form of discourse
called the community of of inquiry The
latter always lives on borrowed time in
the traditional model.
The implication of this is that, in order
to be successflil, philosophy for children
must be i n the business, not only of
generating a form of discourse, but of
generating the larger educational struc-
tures for that form of discourse In fact,
Lipman himself has called for what, in
contrast to the "tribal" he calls the "reflec-
tive" model of education, which, instead
of providing for " the assimilation of the
child by the culmre;" provides for "the ap-
propriation of the culture by the child."
But he seems to assume that this is a
form of discourse which can happen
anywhere, that it is simply a question of
the kinds of texts one uses, curricular se-
quencing and interweaving teacher
behaviors like "encouraging original
thinking and at the same time encourag-
ing smdents to find the errors in their
thinking"^ etc Those are all necessary to
a new model, it is true, but are surface,
rather than deep strucmral elements.
The deep strucmral elements of any
educational model have to do with fiin-
damantal guiding beliefs about the
namre of human beings, of childhood,
Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 9, Number 4.
and of human development, and about
the goals and processes of any human
community, including the community
called school.
What I would like to offer now are
some indications of the deep strucmre
of a model which would provide a home,
a place, for the community of inquiry
and its form of discourse Historically the
model I am describing is connected with
early childhood education. Froebel, in-
spired by Rousseau and Pestalozzi, was its
first great exponent, and it has been
enriched by theorists and practitioners
alike since he founded the Kindergarten
in the 1830's. It formed the foundation
for the progressive education movement
of the first three decades of this cenmry
during which period it was both adopted
and profoundly influenced by Dewey
who was a close reader of Froebel, and
whose laboratory school at Chicago, i f it
would still seem alien to public educators
today, would not lift an eyebrow in early
childhood circles. Although the model
failed then, and in another attempt in
the late 1960's and early 1970's, to estab-
lish itself in public educational circles, it
has never been seriously challenged in
the field of early childhood education
and has a rich, constantly evolving
theoretical and practical life there I will
describe the model in terms of five
broad, deep strucmral characteristics,
which, in my understanding distinguish
it in a radical way from the traditional
model. M y claim is that those character-
istics are the very ones which also pro-
vide the strucmral home for the com-
munity of inquiry
The New Model
First, it is developmental. Whereas, the
old model assumes that education im-
plies forcible, violent change, something
done to children against their will, the
new one assumes that the human drive
for self organization, greater articulation,
greater both differentiation and integra-
tion of function, is inherent For the de-
velopmental model, the child is not a
deficit, a notchild which must be made
into a child; rather, as Froebel said,
"... adult man has not become an adult
man by reaching a certain age, but only
by faithfully satisfying the requirements
of his childhood, boyhood, and youth."'
If this is the case, then those require-
ments must become the determinative
conditions for our school environments
and our curricula. This means, for one
thing a new epistemological and peda-
gogical pluralism, since we can assume
that those different "requirements" im-
ply different kinds of knowing and
therefore a variety of different learning
and teaching styles, formats, and material
bases. For another, it means a new
dependence on allowing and following
children's own initiatives, whereby the
child becomes a main actor in her own
education, and the teacher is a col-
laborative partner in the child's project
Second, the new model is environmen-
tal. The old model makes of the class-
room a machine—a specialized, custom-
ized, productoriented system, where
transmission of information and practice
of isolated skills by isolated individuals
is the rule Because these are its purposes,
it is stripped down, it is a deprivation en-
vironment, it aspires to be a completely
neutral space, so as not to get in the way
of the information being delivered. The
blanker, the more rigid, the less inviting
the less interactive the better, since the
information coming from the adult at
the front of the room, or from the book,
is what is important
The new model conceives the class-
room as a human and material land-
scape, an enriched world, a place for
relatively free movement, choice, and in-
itiative Although it is an open setting it
is also what Montessori called a "prepar-
ed environment:" safe and protective, it
is scaled with children in mind, it is
aesthetically pleasing it has a definite
order, and calls out to the child to ex-
plore and interact with i t Therefore,
materials—all kinds of materials, not just
books—are organized and displayed
within plain view and easy reach of the
children. This is a setting which children
can change through their activity i£., on
which they can have an effect, and for
which they must take responsibility as a
community. This is Dewey's microcosm,
the little world which, rather than being
isolated fi^om the world, provides a world
of action analogous to the big one; a
responsive environment, which reacts to
the child's act, either to accommodate or
resist, or encourage transformation.
Third, whereas the old model assumes
invariant, relatively discontinuous cogni-
Page 21
tive, affective; and social stages which are
consistent across all domains, as well as
a unitary f o r m o f intelligence,
measurable by standardized tests, the new
model is individualized, since it assumes
what Piaget called "horizontal decalage,"
i£., different levels of development in d i f
ferent domains within the same indivi-
dual. The assumptions of the old model
lead logically to age-graded classrooms,
and a standardized work model, based
on models of industrial production. The
new model assumes individual d i f
ferences in rate, and even sequence, of
development among children of the
same age, as well as differences in learn-
ing style, and even kinds of intelligence
This entails multi-age grouping and the
development of curricula for individuals
and small as well as large groups. It also
entails the prepared environment, in
order that activities and projects are not
all dispensed and initiated by teachers,
but a multiplicity of potential activities
are available to children, in the form of
concrete materials, e.g., blocks, woodwork-
ing materials, art and music materials,
props and facilities for drama, com-
puters, a variety of educational games,
etc The child or children interact witii
the materials, with the teacher as a third
pole of the relation.
Fourth, the new model is interactive. It
assumes that only through a varied
multiplicity of transactions—between in-
dividual and environment, between in-
dividuals, and between individuals and
groups—will individual and collective
growth occur It assumes, widi Piaget, that
learning takes place through a dialectical
process of assimilating experience to the
rules and principles one has already in-
ternalized, and accommodating one's
rules and principles to new experience
When the equilibrium between assimila-
tion and accommodation becomes
unstable enough, the strucmre changes,
in the direction of more inclusive, ar-
ticulated rules and principles. The new
model builds curricula on the basis of
the play of this process—^which is a pro-
cess evident in critical thinking as well,
in which exceptions to rules force us to
revise the rules to cover as many concrete
instants as possible The process calls for
botii interactive materials and interactive
teaching: an environment rich with
choices, and pedagogical strategies such
Page 22
as provision of ample time for free
choice of projects and materials, small
groups for diagnostic teaching of skills
as well as interest groups, individualiza-
don of tasks, mtoring (cross-age and
otherwise), frequent group discussion in
order to build a sense of community, and
collaborative decision making in group
matters.
Finally, die new model is dialogical. In-
asmuch as the old model decides what
needs to be done to the child in order
to m m her into an adult, and then does
it, it proceeds by first identifying where
the adult wants the child to be, then
working backwards to where the child is;
it has already decided about what the
child will be; and applies its "educational
technology" and "learning delivery
systems," to the task. The new model,
because it assumes that "the young
human b e i n g . . . would seek, although
still unconsciously, as a product of namre;
yet decidedly and surely, that which is in
itself best,"* receives its direction from the
child himself Dialogical education both
speaks and listens. It assumes diat the
child has interests which have educa-
tional implications, and therefore seeks
to discover what children are already do-
ing then design structures, activities, texts
and materials which meet those forms of
thought and action, both to satisfy them
and to challenge them to transformation.
Thus, dialogical curriculum is built on
observation of and conversation with
children's forms of life In this model the
teacher, rather than transmitter of knowl-
edge, is observer, diagnostician, facilitator,
nurmrer, model (not ot neglect gadfly
and midwife), and the form of instruc-
tion is indirect, project-oriented, indivi-
dualized, multi-sensory active, mimetic
The New Model and the
Community of Inquiry
Now I would like to offer some reasons
for claiming that the educational model
whose characteristics I have just sketch-
ed is more conducive to the formation
of the community of inquiry than the
traditional model. First, when we com-
pare the basic dynamics of such a class-
room strucmre with those operating i n
the community of inquiry we find, if not
direct equivalents, certainly f r u i t f u l
analogues. The community of inquiry is
developmental i n the tradational
David Kennedy, The Community of Inquiry and Educational Structure
Wernerian sense of the orthogenetic
principle, i£., that development proceeds
from a state of "relative globality and lack
of differentiation" to a state of "increas-
ing differentiation, articulation, and hier-
archic integration."^ The developmental
metaphor also describes the dialectical,
self correcting namre of the community
of inquiry which, if it is healthy, is in a
process of continual clarification. Like
developing persons, and like the littie
community of the classroom i n the new
model, the community of inquiry cor-
rects itself through an equilibration pro-
cess whereby it is continually losing its
balance and regaining it on a higher
level. The community of inquiry is also
developmental i n that it is epigenetic—
i£., a new state is emerging from the
earlier one which cannot emerge except
the earlier one is there, but which is ir-
reducible to the earlier one
The community of inquiry is environ-
mental because it represents an environ-
ment of discourse for each member, a
whole context of thought and language
which is internalized by the individual.
As an environment of discourse, it
represents a multiplicity of perspectives
which for the individual has the
character of unity Like the classroom en-
vironment, the "materials" of the com-
munity of inquiry—both what lipman
calls the "ageless concepts" (questions,
really), and the technical moves diorugh
which the ocmmunity of inquiry pro-
ceeds—are there for each individual to
choose from and interact with. They
form an environment upon which,
through his self initiated action, he can
have an effect.
The community of inquiry is individu-
alized because the internalization of
dialogue by each individual happens at
her particular response-level, and is
mediated by the drive for meaning and
the dialectical skill of each individual. A
community of inquiry which does not
provide a cognitive challenge for each in-
dividual roughly at her level is to that ex-
tent malflmctioning When flmctioning
well, the community of inquiry has some-
thing for everyone A n d each individual
listens and speaks f r o m within her own
"promixal zone of development."^^
The community of inquiry is dialogical
because it only proceeds through hear-
ing and responding within the con-
straints of the speaker's formulation,
which is altered i n the response, and
becomes a formulation which draws
another response, and so on. In dialogue;
each actor must commit himself to the
emergence of truth firom beyond himself^
i£., from the community of which he is
only a part. H e recognizes that he is a
m o m e n t i n a larger pattern o f
emergence, a horizon of meaning which,
as Corrington says, "is more that the
mere 'sum' of all horizons."" The com-
munity of inquiry is not just cognitively
but also socially dialogical, i n that each
individual knows himself through his
transformative interaction with the com-
munity I am not just "me" i n the com-
munity of inquiry, but me in the context
of the horizon of meaning and this
means a great deal to the character of my
self knowledge
The community of inquiry is interactive
in that its very modus operandi is the in-
teraction of persons—individual with in-
dividual and individual with group—and
of concepts i n the governing interest of
the dialectical emergence of new wholes,
new forms of understanding. It simply
cannot be thought apart from interaction,
for no statement has significance in the
community of inquiry until it has called
forth (activated) a response
Is the Community of Inquiry Possible
in the Traditional Classroom?
Given these analogical relationships
between die community of inquiry and
the new model of schooling does that
constimte an argument for the new^
model as the best setting for the forma-
tion of the community of inquiry? I
think that it does. Can the community
of inquiry function within the old
model? N o and yes. No, because i f a
developmental, environmental, in-
dividualized, interactive, dialogical
perspective is not present on other levels
of school experience—in the physical en-
vironment, in the routine, i n curriculum
content and planning i n pedagogy in
group decision-making processes—then
to try to introduce this perspective only
in philosophy class is inconsistent, and
it will be difficult for children to inter-
nalize the disposition of dialogue, much
less the skills. The community of inquiry
is, i n other words, only one dimension
of a larger process of community build-
Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 9, Number 4.
ing. For the community of inquiry to
form, there must be community forming
in all domains of school life
Yes, because wherever the community
of inquiry acmally forms, it will through
its very operation work to transform its
setting from a "transmission" to a
"dialogical" model. But this is a weak yes,
because if things are not moving in that
direction in other domains of school life,
either the classroom rejects the com-
munity of inquiry, or the community of
inquiry bogs down. For if the communi-
ty of inquiry assumes as its regulative
principle the inherent drive for meaning
meaning can only be pursued and ap-
prehended to the extent that the environ-
ment recognizes and encourages that
drive The traditional model in fact dis-
courages that drive The notion of think-
ing for oneself assumes the individual
identification and assumption of mean-
ings, rather than their passive acceptance
The individual identification of mean-
ings assumes a relatively pluralistic, de-
centralized environment, where freedom
of choice, self direction and dialogical, in-
teractive pedagogy are normative None
of those things are characteristic of the
traditonal model.
The Role of Philosophy for
Children in the New Model
Where the new educational model ex-
ists or is emerging the operation of the
community of inquiry in the philosophy
for children program has the clear po-
tential to become the central, paradig-
matic discourse model underlying all
levels of school life, both child and adult.
It can shape pedagogy planning evalua-
tion, conflict resolution, and manage-
ment and organization in general. It can
shape the approach to the disciplines: by
approaching each content area from the
point of view of the "philosophy of^' a
more synergistic, integrated curriculum
will emerge It is in philosophy class that
the community of inquiry operates at its
most unalloyed, but its patterns of dis-
course come to inform all the other fimc-
Page 23
tions of the new classroom, which oper-
ate in analogous ways. What it amounts
to is a fiilfillment of the recent educa-
tional mandate that critical thinking be
built into all curricular areas.
It is only when philosophy for child-
ren has become a paradigm for, rather
than a survivor in, its school environ-
ment, that we will no longer experience
dissonance between the strucmre of the
traditional classroom and the fimction of
the community o f inquiry. T h i s
dissonance often makes for a deep and
subtle unease among both philosophy
for children teachers and the children
they are attempting to lead into a new
form of discourse, and can lead to
resistance to and rejection of the pro-
gram. This is not to say that once this
dissonance is removed other dissonances
would not remain. The success of the for-
mation of the community of inquiry is
not guaranteed in or by any setting. Nor
is it to say that the philosophy for child-
ren program does not need to continue
to change and evolve in order to avoid
smdent boredom and resistance It is on-
ly to say that, if its form of discourse is
not matched by a corresponding form of
schooling its chances of meeting its ob-
jectives are significantly reduced.
NOTES
1. AT. Lardner, "Smdent Resistance in
Philosophy for Children," Thinking 9 (2):
13-15.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. Matthew lipman, Philosophy Goes to School
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1988), pp 19, 41.
4. Ibid.,ip. 42.
5. This, of course, is because it is a form of
discourse itself, reified in spatial, temporal,
organizational, and goal stmctures. As
such, it is hegomonic
6. Lipman, Philosophy Goes to School, pp. 20,
25
7. Friedrich Froebel, The Education of Man
(Clifton, NJ: Augusms Kelley, 1974). p 8
8 Ibid., p 29
9. Heinz Wemer, "The Concept of Develop-
ment from a Comparative and Organismic
Point of View" in Dale B. Harris, ed., The
Concept of Development (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p.
126.
10. L.S. Vygotsky, Mind in Society (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1978).
11 . Robert S. Corrington, The Community of
Interpreters (Macon, OA: Mercer Universi-
ty Press, 1987), p 103