SSRN Id2849727

THE DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT,
1958: CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF

THE 1958 ACT
This research paper critically analyses and appreciates the 1958 legislation (the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958) on diverse fronts. The topics of prime focus in this research paper are the
following: Historical background of the 1958 Act; Definition of landlord, tenant and
premises; Constitutionality of the 1958 Act; Difference between lease and licence;
Tenancy not created by payment of rent, waiver or estoppel; Tenancy by holding over
and tenancy at sufferance; Eviction of tenant on various grounds enumerated in Section
14 of the 1958 Act; Sub-Letting; Eviction: Rights of Deserted Wife/ Divorced Wife;
Summary trial in eviction cases under Section 14(1) (e) and Section 14-A to Section 14-D
of the 1958 Act; Limited Period Tenancy; Bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court; and
Deposit of rent. All landmark case-laws albeit the 1958 Act are discussed with erudite
precision.
Authored by: Shivam Goel, B.Com (H), LL.B. (Delhi University), LL.M. (NUJS);
Author of: Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide: Scope for a New
Legislation in India, Penguin-Partridge, Bloomington, 2015; and Concept of Rights in
Islam, Lambert Publication, Germany, 2014.
Associate, S.G. & Co. (New Delhi); advocate.shivamgoel@gmail.com
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THE DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958 (59 of 1958)
General Points:
a. Lease is a contract between lessor and lessee for use of premises, as against a
consideration, called rent.
b. If the amount of rent albeit a property is less than Rs. 3,500/- then the provisions of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 will apply; however, if the amount of rent albeit a
property is more than Rs. 3,500/- then, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 will apply. If the amount of rent charged is Rs. 3,500/- exact, then the provisions
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 will apply. The ceiling limit of rent, that is,
Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was introduced by virtue of Act 37
of 1988 (Section 2; operational with effect from: 01-12-1988).
c. The proceedings under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 take place
before the Rent Controller (parties to the proceedings are called: the petitioner and the
respondent); the proceedings under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 take place
before a civil court, that is, before a civil judge (parties to the proceedings are called:
the plaintiff and the defendant).
d. Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court, but however states as follows by virtue of sub-section (4):
“Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a civil court
from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question
of title to any premises to which this Act applies or any question as to the
person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such premises.”
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1. Historical Background and Mischief: Rent control legislations are prime example
of social legislation. They try to strike a just balance between the rights of the
landlords and the requirements of the tenants. Such legislations prevent the landlords
from taking the extreme steps of evicting the tenants merely upon technicalities or
skilful grounds. These legislations are enacted to prevent the vulnerable class called
the ‘tenants’ from the clutches of the landlords, who often to thrive on the
predicament of the tenants arising due to the scarcity of the premises. Due to the
scarcity, the landlords often exploit the tenants for their unjust gains/enrichment and
also subject the tenants to un-called for litigation; in answer to the emergent situations
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prevailing, the legislators intervene to protect the tenants from the harassment and
exploitation of the landlords, thereby enacting the necessary rent control legislations.
2. No doubt, the rent control legislations are intended to preserve the social environment
and are purposed to promote social justice, but at the same time, some safeguards
should also be given to the landlords as well. In the case of E. Palanisamy v.
Palanisamy (D) by LRs and Ors, 2003 (1) SCC 123, it was held that the provisions of
the rent control legislations are not to be interpreted with a hyper-technical approach,
which indirectly causes frustration of the mischief. Though the rent control
legislations normally intend to benefit the tenant, but still, the tenant also has a duty to
strictly comply with the statutory provisions of the concerned rent control legislations;
if a tenant does not comply with the statutory provisions strictly, then, the tenant
should not be allowed to avail/reap the benefit available to him albeit the concerned
rent control legislation; hence, equitable considerations have no place in such matters.
3. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745, a seven judge bench
of the Supreme Court of India, held that, giving a notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not necessary as far as eviction against the tenants
under any state rent control legislation is concerned. In order to get a decree for
eviction against the tenant, the notice is not necessary. The tenant continues to be a
tenant even thereafter, that post the serving of the eviction notice. The landlord is
under a duty to make out a case from the grounds mentioned under the concerned rent
control legislation, and it shall be sufficient to have the eviction thereafter. The real
purpose of the notice of eviction is to terminate the contract as so subsisting between
the landlord and the tenant; eviction however, is not permissible under the relevant
state rent control legislation until and unless, specific ground for eviction of the tenant
as so provided under the concerned state rent control legislation is not made out.
4. Section 2(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 defines the term ‘landlord’; this
definition is fairly comprehensive and is stated in the widest possible amplitude. It not
only includes the owner but also the person who collects the rent on behalf of the
owner, and moreover this definition includes the legal representatives of the owner of
the premises, as has been held in the case of Pukhraj Jain v. Padma Kashyap, AIR
1990 SC 1133.
In the case of Imtiaz Ali v. Nasim Ahmed, AIR 1987 Delhi 36, it was held that even a
person holding a general power of attorney, and thus, empowered to collect the rent
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on behalf of the owner of the premises, will come within the ambit of the expression
‘landlord’.
In the case of Emperor v. Dattatraya Sitaram, AIR 1948 Bom 239, it was held that,
even a clerk empowered to collect rent comes within the periphery of the expression
‘landlord’.
5. It is quite essential to ascertain whether the person to whom the rent is deposited is
actually the landlord or not. This is because, the very basis of the jurisdiction of the
rent controller lies on the premise that there should be a landlord-tenant relationship
existing between the parties to the dispute. If no such relationship exists then, it might
oust the court of its jurisdiction under the concerned rent control legislation. In the
case of Gomti Devi v. Om Prakash & Anr, 15 (1979) DLT 291, it was held that the
landlord-tenant relationship can be proved by oral evidence and documentary
evidence is not necessary.
6. Thus, so far as the conceptual framework of the term ‘landlord’ is concerned, there
can be plurality of persons that can come within the definitional scope of the term
‘landlord’, that is not only the actual owner of the premises, but so also, the one
receiving the rent on behalf of the actual owner of the premises.
7. In the case of Balquis Jeha Begum v. Sibghatulla & Anr, 1971 RCR 95, it was held
that, mere physical act of receiving rent, without anything more would not make the
person who receives it the landlord of the premises. There must be a right to receive
it.
8. The literal interpretation to the word ‘landlord’ is applicable to the entire Act, that is,
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, but under the concept of bona-fide requirement
under Section 14(1) (e) the word ‘owner’ has been used and thus, in such a case, that
is in the case of eviction on the ground of bona-fide requirement under Section 14(1)
(e), the landlord would mean the owner of the premises. In other words, the legal
fiction albeit the comprehensive meaning rendered to the term ‘landlord’ under the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 would apply throughout the 1958 Act but except for in
the case of eviction on the ground of bona-fide requirement under Section 14(1) (e).
9. Section 2(l) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 lays down the definition of the term
‘tenant’. According to Section 2(l) of the 1958 Act, a person paying or on whose
behalf the rent is paid is considered as a ‘tenant’. This definition is also an inclusive
definition, as for example, it includes within its periphery a ‘sub-tenant’ also; even a
person continuing in possession after the termination of tenancy along with his legal

representatives is deemed to be a tenant, despite the fact that the contract or the
relationship as was so subsisting has been terminated; these individuals who continue
to occupy the premises despite the severance of the landlord-tenant relationship as
was previously subsisting are called as the ‘statutory tenants’. There are two legal
concepts that emerge from this, that is, the concept of “tenant by holding over” and
the concept of “tenant at sufferance”.
10. In the case of R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140,
the Supreme Court of India held that, a tenant at sufferance is the one who comes into
the possession of the land under a lawful title, but who continues to hold the
possession wrongfully even after the termination of the term or the expiry of the lease
by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, the one who wrongfully
continues in the possession of the premises even after the extinction of the lawful title.
There is in fact little difference between tenant at sufferance and a trespasser.
In Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act, 7th Edition, at p.633, the position of tenancy at
sufferance has been stated thus: “A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid
continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least
and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by
contract and arises only by implication of law when the person who has been in
possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been
determined, without the consent of the person entitled (that is, the landlord). A
tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant.”
At page 769, it is stated, regarding the right of a tenant by holding over thus: “The act
of holding over, after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy
of any kind. If the lessee remains in possession after the determination of the term, the
common law rule is that he is a tenant at sufferance. The expression “holding over”
is used in the sense of retaining the possession. A distinction should be drawn
between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease without
the consent of the landlord, and a tenant doing so with the landlord’s consent. The
former is called tenancy by sufferance in the language of the English Law and the
latter class is called tenancy by holding over or tenancy at will. The lessee holding
over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than the one occupying the
premises without such a consent; the tenancy at sufferance is converted into a tenancy
at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of landlord and tenant is not
established until the rent is paid and accepted, the assent of the landlord to the

continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy creates a new
tenancy.”
11. Tenancy is not created by payment of rent or by estoppel or by waiver: That in a
tenancy, the payment of rent is an important factor, but mere payment of rent does not
create a tenancy. In the case of Satjit Singh v. Skipper Towers (P) Ltd., 79 (1999)
DLT 521, it was held that estoppel or waiver does not create a relationship, since
tenancy is a contract there has to be consensus ad idem (meeting of the minds) and
unless it is shown that there was meeting of the minds, it cannot be deduced that there
was a landlord-tenant relationship. In the above case it was categorically held that,
by a unilateral action of the tenant of surrendering his right of tenancy in favour
of a third-party by delivering the possession of the tenanted premises to the said
third party, no new tenancy is created which may legally bind the landlord. By
mere acceptance of rent for the tenanted premises from the said third party, no
new tenancy is created which may legally bind the landlord. Similarly, by mere
acceptance of rent for the tenanted premises tendered by the tenant in the name
of a third party, a new tenancy in favour of the third party cannot be taken to
have been created.
Section 116 (Effect of Holding Over) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, holds that
there has to be an offer and a definite consent or in other words a bilateral contract;
this question of binding bilateral contract between the parties, in fact, has to be
decided according to the facts and circumstances of each case.
12. In the case of Inmacs Ltd. v. Prema Sinha & Ors, RFA No. 341/2007, High Court of
Delhi (Decided on: 26.09.2008), it was held as follows:
a. Expiry of lease by efflux of time results in the determination of the relationship
between the lessor and the lessee and since the lease expires under the contract by
the efflux of time thus, no notice of determination of the lease is required.
b. A person who enters upon the property of another without authority of law is a
trespasser. It could be argued that the very next moment after the period of lease
stands expired the act of entering upon property by the tenant is an act of trespass.
But the law says-“no”. A lessee who continues in possession after expiry of the
lease, without the consent of the lessor or without any agreement between the
parties or in disagreement with the lessor, is treated in law as a tenant by
sufferance. But where the lessor consents to the continued possession of lessee on

the same terms and conditions as per the original lease a tenancy by holding over
comes into operation.
c. The words “accepts rent or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession” in
Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contemplates that from the side
of the lessee there should be an offer to take a new lease and on the side of the
lessor there must be a definite consent to the continuation of possession. In other
words there must be a bilateral contract.
d. Such bilateral contract could be express or implied. Thus, mere continuance of
possession after the expiry or determination of the lease is not enough to entitle
the tenant to establish tenancy by holding over.
e. There is no statutorily prescribed proforma of a notice envisaged by Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As long as the notice can be reasonably
understood by a person of ordinary prudence that his tenancy has been determined
and he is required to vacate the tenanted premises at the end of the tenancy month,
the notice is fine.
f. When a contract of tenancy gets determined by efflux of time, generally, the new
relationship that ensues between the parties is that of a tenancy on a month to
month basis.
13. In the case of, Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury, AIR 1988 SC 852, it was held
that if the landlord accepts the rent from the sub-tenant, it does not create a sub-
tenancy.
14. In the case of, Kailash Kumar v. Dr. R.K. Kapoor, 1994 (2) RCR 36, it was held that,
if the son of the tenant pays the rent and consequently, the rent receipt is issued in the
name of the tenant and his son, this by itself will not make the son of the tenant a co-
tenant.
15. Eviction under Section 14(1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: All
members of joint family liable to ejectment: In the case of Hemraj v. Jagdish
Singh, 1967 PLR (Delhi Section) 142, it was held that, a tenant may obtain lease of
certain premises for the benefit of his joint family, that is keeping in view the benefit
the lease will obtain on the large number of the family members of the tenant; but the
provisions of the 1958 Act do not take this factor into account when they provide for
the eviction of the tenant on an allotment of a residence to him. All members of the
family of the tenant must be evicted along with the tenant when another
accommodation is allotted to the tenant.

16. Premises- Section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 2(i) of the
1958 Act provides for a concept known as “premises”. It is basically a building or a
part of a building given to a tenant for a specific user, that is, either residential or
commercial. Apart from these purposes, letting-out can be for any other purpose also.
The word “other purpose” appearing in Section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958, can be construed to include “manufacturing purpose”. As such the word “other
purpose” has been interpreted/defined in other rent control legislations prevalent in
the country, to signify “manufacturing purpose”, thus, the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 been pari materia with other rent control legislations prevalent in the country, it
shall be safe to conclude that the word “other purpose” as appearing in Section 2(i) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 means “manufacturing purpose”.
17. A combined reading of the definitions of the terms landlord, tenant and premises
shows that the term “premises” implies the subject matter of tenancy in respect of
which there is jural relationship of landlord and tenant and in respect of which the
quantum of rent is agreed to between them.
18. The term “premises”, covers within its import: gardens, grounds and outhouses-
appertaining to (that is, attached to) a building which has been let out. The important
factor that needs to be kept in mind is that, an open area needs to be attached to a
building or a part thereof to be brought within the periphery of the term “premises”.
19. Kamla Devi v. Laxmi Devi, (2000) 5 SCC 646: When, in any case, the question arises
whether an open plot of land or a plot of land with structures thereon, was let out, the
Court has to determine the same on the facts of that case. In deciding this question, it
will be useful to bear in mind that if a plot with a structure was let out it will fall
within the meaning of the term “premises”, but if an open plot without any structure
was let out then it does not fall within the meaning of the term “premises”. It is
immaterial whether the tenant raised structures before the creation of the tenancy or
after he was let in as a tenant. In either case, the tenant alone will have proprietary
rights in the structure and not the landlord.
Note: Order XIV, Rule 3: Materials from which issues may be framed: The Court
may frame the issues from all or any of the following materials:
a. Allegations made on oath by the parties, or by any persons present on their behalf,
or made by the pleaders of such parties;
b. Allegations made in the pleadings or in answers to interrogatories delivered in the
suit;

c. The contents of documents produced by either party.
20. In the case of, Gobind Sahai v. Narain Dass & Ors, ILR 1972 (1) Delhi 55, it was
held as follows:
I. Whether or not a property is a building is primarily a question of fact
depending upon the circumstances of each case and upon the form and
substance of each transaction of letting;
II. Premises are a building or part of a building which is separately let out for use.
A building consists of a piece of land with superstructures which are habitable
and are let out for a useful purpose like residence, commercial use or other
normal and reasonable purposes;
III. A vacant piece of land, if appertaining to and forming part of a building, is
included within the definition of 'premises' while an open and vacant land not
so appertaining cannot constitute a building and is outside the connotation;
IV. The land bounded by walls and covered by a roof and capable of being used
for a useful purpose is normally a building;
V. The existence of boundary walls is not decisive of the matter as they may be
erected to demarcate the boundaries of the land or to support a shed or a roof
or for any other purpose;
VI. A roofless structure would ordinarily not constitute a building unless it is
established as a fact that the same was capable of being and was intended to be
used as such without a roof, for example, an open air restaurant, a swimming
pool etc;
VII. The erection of superstructures by a tenant after the letting is irrelevant for
determination of the question as to whether what had been let out by the
landlord constitutes premises.
21. The word ‘rent’ has not been defined under the 1958 Act. The word ‘rent’ in simple
terms would be the consideration for the contract to be paid by the tenant to the
landlord for the use of the premises. In its wider sense, it means any payment made by
the tenant to the landlord.
In the case of, Karnani Properties Ltd v. Augustin, 1957 SCR 20, it was held that,
though the term ‘rent’ has not been defined in the concerned rent control legislation,
but the ordinary dictionary meaning can be taken into consideration for the purpose of
defining the term ‘rent’. Further, it was held that, the word ‘rent’ is so comprehensive
that it would include within its import, all the payments made for the use of the

premises and so also payments made for the use of furnishings, electronic
installations, and sometimes the even the furniture supplied to the tenant by the
landlord.
Another interesting question arose, that is, whether or not, “maintenance charges”
come within the periphery of the word “rent”? In the case of, Standard
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Gyan Chand Jain & Anr, 97 (2002) DLT 290, it was held
that, maintenance charges fall within the ambit of the word ‘rent’ and accordingly, if
after the addition of the maintenance charges, the rent amount exceeds beyond Rs.
3,500/-, then it would oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller.
22. Rent and its Constitutionality:
Though the word rent has not been defined under the 1958 Act but a concept called as
the “standard rent”, has been provided for under Section 6 of the 1958 Act. This
Section 6 provides for a procedure or a method for calculation of standard rent,
having its starting point from the year 1944; however, after a passage of considerable
time this provision, that is, Section 6, has become otiose.
There are certain premises whose monthly rent is still Rs. 25/- or Rs. 100/- per month.
But, now, with the passage of time the vulnerable class, as so was existing, at the time
of independence has now gained a decent standard of living of their own; the
landlords are, on the other hand, today languishing on the roads, and accordingly this
concept of standard rent was challenged before the High Court of Delhi in the case of,
Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran (HUF) v. Union of India, 95 (2002) DLT 508,
and in this case it was held that, the concept of standard rent vide Sections 4, 6 and 9
of the 1958 Act, does not withstand the constitutional scrutiny under Articles 14,
19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The Court after delineating the
entire history of rent legislation and examining the various provisions of the 1958 Act
took the view that Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which deal
with the determination and fixation of standard rent, do not take into consideration,
the huge difference between the cost of living in the past and the present times and
thus, these provisions do not pass the test of reasonableness. The said provisions were
thus, adjudged as "archaic" in nature, as they provide no mechanism to compensate
the landlords and to offset the inflation. But, the decision rendered by the Hon’ble
Delhi High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court of India and the matter is
still sub judice (that is, pending consideration).
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23. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of, Shalimar Paints Ltd. v.
Bani Jagtiani Trust and Ors., 107 (2003) DLT 58, while holding that the landlord
was competent to increase the rent legally as per the provisions of Section 6A and
Section 8 of the 1958 Act, has laid down that there is no legal bar in the landlord
availing the remedy of filing a suit once the rent stood increased to more than
Rs.3,500/- per month. Paragraph 22 of the said judgment, which is apposite, is
being reproduced hereunder:-
"22. In view of the aforesaid position of law, we do not find any merit in
the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent
cannot avail two remedies for a single cause of action. Even according to
Ambalal's case (supra) there is no legal bar even in availing of two
remedies but it will not be right for the landlord to continue two
proceedings. In the instant case the 1st proceeding was initiated when the
rent was less than Rs.3500/- and the second proceedings were initiated
when the rent was more than Rs.3500/- and the tenancy fell outside the
purview of the Rent Control Act. The respondent was wholly justified in
initiating two proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of this case."
24. In the case of, Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. P.S. Jain Co. Ltd., 1995 (2) RCR 34,
a question was posed, that is: whether, when tenancy of a building which is further
sub-let and the sub-tenant is paying a rent in excess of Rs. 3,500/-, then the Civil Court
would have jurisdiction or the Rent Controller?
The Court held that, there is no distinction between the rent payable by the tenant or
the sub-tenant and in such a case, the rent control legislation would not be applicable,
and the Civil Court would have the jurisdiction.
25. In the case of Sh. S.R. Batra v. Smt. Taruna Batra, AIR 2007 SC 1118, it was held
that, the definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting,
which can lead to chaos in the society. Such interpretation should be given to Section
2(s) of the 2005 Act that protects the society from chaos. In Para 22 of the judgment,
the Court opined as follows:
“As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a
right to residence in a shared household, and a ‘shared household’ would only mean
the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to
the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the
11

present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a
joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member, it is exclusive
property of appellant no. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared
household’.”
Section 17(1) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 states as follows: “Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a
domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether
or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.”
Ratio Decidendi: Wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared
household, and a ‘shared household’ would only mean house belonging to or
taken on rent by husband, or house which belongs to joint family of which
husband is a member.
26. Eviction: Rights of a deserted wife: In the case of, B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi
Redy, (2005) 3 SCC 313, a three-judges bench of the Supreme Court of India, held
that, a deserted wife who has been or is entitled to be in occupation of the matrimonial
home is entitled to contest the suit for eviction filed against her husband in his
capacity as tenant subject to satisfying the following two conditions:
a. That the tenant-husband has given up the contest or is not interested in contesting
the suit and such giving up by the tenant-husband shall prejudice the deserted wife
who is residing in the premises;
b. The scope and ambit of the contest or defence by the wife would not be on a
footing higher or larger than that of the tenant-husband. In other words, such a
wife would be entitled to raise all such pleas and claim trial thereon, as would
have been available to the tenant-husband and no more.
So long as by availing the benefit of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
and the rent control legislation, the tenant-husband would have been entitled to stay in
the tenancy premises, the wife too can continue to stay exercising her right to
residence as a part of right to maintenance subject to compliance with all such
obligations including the payment of rent to which the tenant-husband is subject to.
The right comes to an end with the wife losing her status as wife consequent upon
decree of divorce and the right to occupy the house as part of right to maintenance
coming to an end.
12

Thus, having been deserted by the tenant-husband, the wife cannot be deprived of the
roof over her head where the tenant-husband has conveniently left her to face the peril
of eviction attributable to the default or neglect of the tenant-husband. Hence, a
deserted wife continuing in occupation of the premises obtained on lease by her
husband, and which was their matrimonial home, occupies a position akin to that of
an heir of the tenant-husband if the right to residence of such wife has not come to an
end. The tenant-husband having lost interest in protecting his tenancy rights as
available to him under the law, the same right would devolve upon and inhere in the
wife so long as she continues in occupation of the premises. Her rights and
obligations shall not be higher or larger than those of the tenant-husband.
27. Eviction: Rights of a Divorced-Wife: Divorce is termination of matrimonial

relationship and brings an end to the status of the female spouse to be called ‘wife’ as
such. Whether or not she has the right of residence in the matrimonial home, would
depend on the terms and conditions in which the decree of divorce has been granted
and provision for maintenance (including residence) has been made. In the event of
the provision for residence of a divorced wife having been made by the husband in the
matrimonial home situated in the tenanted premises, such divorced wife too would be
entitled to defend, in the eviction proceedings, the tenancy rights and rights of
occupation there-under in the same manner in which the tenant-husband could have
done and certainly not higher or larger than that. She would be liable to be evicted in
the same manner in which her husband as tenant would have been liable to be evicted.
28. Lease and Licence: In the case of Associated Hotels of India v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR
1959 SC 1262, it was held that-
i. To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of
the document must be preferred to the form;
ii. The real test is the intention of the parties whether they intend to create a lease
or a licence;
iii. If the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease, but, if it only
permits another to make use of the property of which legal possession
continues with the owner, it is a licence; and
iv. If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima
facie, he is considered to be a tenant, but circumstances may be established
which negative the intention to create a lease.
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29. In the case of, M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, AIR 1965 SC 610, it was held
that, the mere fact that the premises were in the exclusive possession of a person
would not make him a lessee and that exclusive possession coupled with interest in
the property could only make him a lessee.
30. The definition of lease is contained in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act,
under which a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy the
property.
A licence is defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act as a right to do or
continue to do, in or upon immovable property of the grantor something which would
in the absence of such right be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an
easement of an interest in the property.
31. In the case of, C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao, (2004) 3 SCC 595, it was held
that few principles are well settled. User of the terms like ‘lease’ or ‘licence’, ‘lessor’
or ‘licensor’, ‘rent’ or ‘licence fee’ is not by itself decisive of the nature of the right
created by the document. An effort should be made to find out whether the deed
confers a right to possess exclusively coupled with transfer of a right to enjoy the
property, or, what has been parted with is merely a right to use the property while the
possession is retained by the owner. The conduct of the parties before and after the
creation of relationship is of relevance for finding out their intention.
32. Service of Notice: Various modes of service of notice have been laid down under
Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; generally, Order V is applicable when
a case is filed in a court of law, but apart from that, there would be instances where
without filing a suit still a notice is sent to the concerned party or the person against
whom an allegation of infringement of a right is attributed or to a person who has
denied the right to the other; in such cases the notice would be sent by a Registered
AD Post, here AD would mean ‘Acknowledgement Due’. There can be instances
where though a letter is sent but it is refused by the person concerned; now, the
question arises, whether in such cases there would be deemed to be a service of
notice?
In the case of, Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604, it was held that,
when a notice is sent by the landlord vide a registered post, and the same is returned
back with an endorsement of “refused”, then it will be presumed that the notice has
been served.
33. Section 80 (Notice), the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
14

i. From a bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 80, it is plain that subject to
what is provided in sub-section (2) thereof, no suit can be filed against the
Government or a public officer unless requisite notice under the said provision has
been served on such Government or public officer, as the case may be.
ii. Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, imposes a statutory and
unqualified obligation upon the Court and in the absence of compliance with
Section 80, the suit is not maintainable.
iii. The service of notice under Section 80 is a condition precedent for the institution
of a suit against the Government or a public officer.
iv. The legislative intent of Section 80 is to give the Government sufficient notice of
the suit, which is proposed to be filed against it so that it may reconsider the
decision and decide for itself whether the claim made could be accepted or not.
v. The object of Section 80 is the advancement of justice and securing of public good
by avoidance of unnecessary litigation.
See: State of A.P. & Ors v. Pioneer Builders, (2006) 12 SCC 119
34. Another situation can arise where neither the envelope nor the AD card has been
received back, either as served or as un-served, in such a case we can proceed as per
Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Under Section 27 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, there is a presumption with regard to service by post. According to this,
unless a different intention appears, if a post is properly addressed and is properly
stamped, and further, is duly posted, but has neither been received back as served or
as un-served and generally, a period of one-month has lapsed, then, the Court may
presume that service has been effected validly.
In the case of, Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain, 2010 (9)
SCC 157, the Supreme Court of India relied on Section 27 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897 and presumed that a valid service has been effected. Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been
effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post; unless and until the
contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected
at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of
business.
35. Section 14(1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 lays down about the ground of
eviction, called as, arrears of rent, the essential ingredients of Section 14(1) (a) are as
follows:
15

a. Relationship of landlord and tenant;
b. Existence of arrears of rent;
c. Service of notice of demand;
d. Failure on the part of the tenant to pay the rent.
The cause of action would only arise after the failure of the tenant that too after two
months have lapsed from the date of service of the notice. The law does not provide
for with any particular form of notice; it is just that it must come from a proper
quarter, that is, either the landlord or his advocate. As far as service of notice is
concerned it has to be read along with Rule 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules which
provides for service in person or through Registered AD.
In the case of, Raghunath Ravji Dandekar v. Anant Narayan Apte, 1966 Civil
Appeal No. 387 of 1964, Decided on: April 5, 1966 (SC), it was held that, merely
because of the fact that the amount of rent demanded was more than that which was
actually due, in the notice to quit under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, by the
landlord to the tenant, it is no ground for holding that the suit is not maintainable.
In the case of, Damadi Lal & Ors v. Parashram & Ors, AIR 1976 SC 2229, it was
held that, if a cheque is sent to the landlord, it is a valid tender. In the case of, Priya
Bala Ghosh v. B.L. Singhania, AIR 1992 SC 639, it was held that rent can be
tendered by money order, and in case if the money order is sent within time but it
reaches late to the landlord, then, it would be deemed as a valid tender.
In the case of, Kamala Bakshi v. Khairati Lal, 2000 (1) RCR (Rent) 400 (SC), it was
held that, if the claim of the landlord for recovery of arrears of rent is not enforceable
in a court of law for having become barred by limitation, the amount ceases to be
“legally recoverable”. For recovery of arrears of rent, Article 52 of the Limitation Act,
1963 prescribes a period of three years from the date the arrears become due. This
being the position, landlord will be entitled to recover rent for a period of three years
immediately preceding demand notice. Arrears of rent for the rest of the period will
not be legally recoverable.
36. Section 14(1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 cannot be read in isolation, it
has to be read along with Section 14(2) and Section 15 of the 1958 Act. Section 14(2)
and Section 15 of the 1958 Act give another opportunity to the tenant to deposit the
16

rent and in case he deposits the rent then, no eviction order is to be passed against the
tenant. Proviso to Section 14(2) provides that the benefit contemplated in Section
14(2) read with Section 15 can only be enjoyed once by the tenant.
In the case of Jagan Nath v. Ram Kishan Das, AIR 1985 SC 265, it was held that, it
is only if an order for possession is not passed against the tenant by reason of the
provision contained in Section 14(2) that it can be said that the tenant has obtained the
benefit under this Section. If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it
cannot be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of Section 14(2).
Note:
I. Section 14(2) provides that no order for recovery of possession of tenanted
premises can be made on the ground that the tenant has committed default in
the payment of rent, if he pays or deposits the rent in accordance with the
provisions of Section 15 of the 1958 Act.
II. The benefit which the tenant obtains under Section 14(2) is the avoidance of
the decree of possession of the tenanted premises, though the tenant had
committed default in the payment of rent. Thus, the right under Section 14(2)
accrues to the tenant by reason of the fact that he has complied with the order
passed by the Controller under Section 15 of the 1958 Act.
III. The passing of an order under Section 15 of the 1958 Act is not really in the
nature of a benefit which accrues to the tenant under Section 14(2), for it is
obligatory on the Controller to pass an order under Section 15(1) in every
proceeding for the recovery of possession on the ground specified under
Section 14(1) (a), there by ordering the tenant to pay the rent to the landlord or
deposit with the Controller, the arrears of rent and so also the future rent.
IV. It is through the medium of Section 15 that the tenant obtains the benefit under
Section 14(2) of the 1958 Act; and this benefit consists of the acquisition of
immunity against the passing of an order of eviction or recovery of possession
of the tenanted premises, on the ground of default in the payment of rent by
the tenant.
V. It must follow that it is only if an order for possession is not passed against the
tenant by reason of the provision contained in Section 14(2), then it can be
said that, the tenant has obtained a benefit under Section 14(2). Proviso to
Section 14(2) can be attracted only if it can be shown that the tenant had
17

already obtained once, the benefit of the provision contained in Section 14(2)
read with Section 15 of the 1958 Act and not otherwise.
37. In the case of, Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1977 SC
1986, it was held that, by the first part of sub-section (2) of Section 14, the legislature
has made clause (a) subject to sub-section (2) by providing that no order for recovery
of possession shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) if the tenant makes
the payment or deposit as required under Section 15. This is an additional protection
conferred on the tenant. In case the tenant does not avails of this additional protection,
and fails to make the payment or deposit as required by Section 15 of the 1958 Act,
and the conditions mentioned in clause (a) are fully satisfied, then, the Controller is
bound to pass an order for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord, as against
the tenant. The benefit under sub-section (2) is not available to the tenant if
having enjoyed it once, the tenant again makes a default in payment of rent for
any three consecutive months.
If the defence of the tenant is struck off under Section 15(7) of the 1958 Act, for the
non-compliance of an order passed under Section 15(1) of the 1958 Act, then the
Controller cannot straight away proceed to pass an order for eviction. If a case under
Section 14(1) (a) is made out, then surely, the tenant has the right to participate in the
eviction proceedings and cross-examine the landlord.
38. In the case of, Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, AIR 1980 SC 1664, it was held that,
the provisions contained in Section 15(7) of the 1958 Act are directory and not
mandatory.
In this case, the tenant was a working woman who had to get to the office and be there
between 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. She, therefore, had difficulty in appearing in Court. She had
engaged a lawyer and in pursuance of the order under Section 15(2) of the 1958 Act,
all arrears of rent had been paid by her by cheque or in cash to her advocate. The
advocate, however, neither paid those amounts to the landlord nor deposited them in
Court. When the tenant found it out, she made a complaint to the Bar Council of Delhi
as a result of which an inquiry was initiated against the advocate. Under these
circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that it was not a fit case for striking
out of the defence.
39. In the case of, Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas, (1980) 2 SCC 151, it was held
that, sub-section (7) of Section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 gives
discretion to the Rent Controller and does not contain a mandatory provision for
18

striking out the defence of the tenant against eviction. The Rent Controller may or
may not pass an order striking out the defence. The exercise of this discretion will
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If the Rent Controller is of
the view that in the facts of a particular case the time to make payment or
deposit pursuant to an order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 15 should be
extended, he may do so by passing a suitable order. Similarly, if he is not satisfied
about the case made out by the tenant, he may order the defence against eviction to be
struck out. But, the power to strike out the defence against eviction is discretionary
and must not be mechanically exercised without any application of mind to the facts
of the case.
40. Section 14(1) (b)- Sub-Letting:
Generally speaking, sub-letting is allowed, if the tenanted premises are sub-let with
the prior permission of the landlord, and such permission has been obtained in
writing. Sub-tenant is a tenant under a tenant.
The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 needs to be read in conjunction with the
Registration Act, 1908. The most important sections of the Registration Act, 1908,
which require, specific mention are: Section 17, 18 and 49. Section 17 deals with the
documents of which registration is compulsory; Section 18 deals with the documents
of which registration is optional; and Section 49 deals with the effect of non-
registration of documents required to be registered.
If lease is of 12 months or from “year to year” then registration is compulsory. For
registration of a document like a lease deed of more than 12 months, “stamp duty” is
paid. The amount of stamp duty payable on a lease deed of more than 12 months, for
example, in Delhi is 2 percent of the annual rent. To save the amount payable as
stamp duty, people generally resort to go for a lease of 11 months, instead of 12
months.
41. According to the purport of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, if a document is
required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 but is not
registered, then it is just a piece of paper, having no value, and it cannot be read into
as evidence except for collateral purpose. Collateral purpose means for establishing
“landlord-tenant” relationship.
42. Situation: A lease-deed is for 5 years, consisting of a clause that the tenant has an
absolute and unqualified right to sub-let the premises, even without the permission of
the landlord. The tenant sub-lets the premises. Landlord on the contrary files an
19

eviction petition under Section 14(1) (b). Tenant relying on the relevant clause of the
lease-deed, states that he has been conferred with the right to sub-let. Landlord takes
the stand that, the lease deed is not registered and hence, it cannot be read into
evidence. Tenant replicates that, although there is no registration of the lease deed but
still it can be used for collateral purposes. Decide?
Estoppels are of two kinds: “Estoppel of Fact” and “Estoppel of Law”; Section 49 of
the Registration Act, 1908 is in the nature of a legal estoppel (that is, once a thing is
illegal, it will always be illegal). There can be no estoppel against law. The case will
go in favour of the landlord, as against the tenant, as the lease-deed cannot be read
into evidence. So, far as the argument of collateral purpose is concerned, lease deed
can merely be relied upon for establishing the landlord-tenant relationship.
43. Section 14(1) (b) of the 1958 Act, lays down that, a tenant can be thrown out of the
tenanted premises if he sub-lets, assigns or parts with the possession of the tenanted
premises. Generally speaking, a decree of eviction on the ground of sub-letting is not
applicable on the sub-tenant, unless and until, the sub-tenant is made a party to the
eviction proceedings and an order is obtained directing the sub-tenant also to get
evicted. To have an eviction order under Section 14(1) (b), what is required to be
proved is that, there is presence of a third-person in the tenanted premises; there is
transfer of possession of the tenanted premises to the third person; and that there is
sub-letting of the tenanted premises without the prior written permission obtained
from the landlord. Section 14(1) (b) is to be read in conjunction with Section 14(3)
and Section 14(4).
44. In the case of, Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, (1968) 1
S.C.W.R. 914, it was held that, the initial burden of proof of sub-letting is on the
landlord, but once it is discharged then the onus gets shifted on the tenant to rebut the
same.
45. In the case of, Krishnawati v. Hans Raj, (1974) 1 SCC 289, a three-judges bench of
the Supreme Court of India has laid down that, if the wife allows her husband to
continue business from the tenanted premises, then it does not amounts to sub-letting.
46. In the case of, Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. Behari Lal Kholi, 1989 (2) RCR 320 (SC), it was
held that if a document is inadmissible in evidence for the want of registration, that is,
due to the non-registration of the said document, then all the contents of that
document are inadmissible in evidence including the covenants dealing with the
permission to sub-let.
20

47. In the case of, G.K. Bhatnagar v. Abdul Alim, (2002) 9 SCC 516: On 28.05.1979,
proceedings for eviction were initiated by the landlord against the tenant, by filing a
petition before the Rent Controller on the ground of “sub-letting” as provided for
under Section 14(1) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, alleging that the tenant
had, without the permission of the landlord, sub-let the premises and parted with the
possession of the whole of the premises in favour of one, Sh. Jagdish Chander.
According to the tenant-respondent, there was no sub-letting of the tenanted premises
as one, Sh. Jagdish Chander was taken into partnership by the tenant-respondent in his
pre-existing business run in the tenanted premises (that is, the shop) under a “Deed of
Partnership”, dated 13.10.1978. After 09.06.1952, sub-letting, assigning or
otherwise parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the tenanted
premises, without obtaining the prior consent in writing of the landlord, is not
permitted and if so done, then, there appears a ground for eviction of the tenant
by the landlord. However, inducting a partner in the business or profession by the
tenant is permitted so long as such partnership may ostensibly (that is, apparently) be
to carry on the business or profession of the partnership, but if the real purpose of sub-
letting of the tenanted premises to such other person, who is inducted ostensibly as a
partner, is not in the furtherance of the partnership business but otherwise, then the
same shall be deemed to be an act of sub-letting attracting the applicability of Section
14(1) (b) of the 1958 Act. If there is no material available on record to hold the
partnership business to be a sham then, eviction under Section 14(1) (b) cannot be
upheld.
48. In the case of, Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam, 2004 (4) SCC 794, a three-judges
bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held as follows:
“If the tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the use
and control over the tenancy premises with him, may be along with the partners, the
tenant may not be said to have parted with possession. However, if the user and
control of the tenancy premises has been parted with and deed of partnership has
been drawn up as an indirect method of collecting the consideration for creation of
sub-tenancy or for providing a cloak or cover to conceal a transaction not permitted
by law, the Court is not estopped from tearing the veil of partnership and finding out
the real nature of transaction entered into between the tenant and the alleged sub-
tenant.”
21

49. Section 14(1) (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: The concept of injury to
the premises is the foundation of this clause. The change of user contemplates
prejudice to the interest of the landlord. However, this provision has to be
interpreted in the light of the present day social milieu, but keeping also in mind
that the provision is obviously one to protect interests of the landlord. Section
14(1) (c) is to be read in conjunction with Section 14(5).
50. Test for Section 14(1) (c): “What is the primary purpose for which the tenant is using
tenanted premises?”
For example: Even though a house is taken for residential purpose, it does not
prevent the person from carrying on his profession in the said premises during the
spare time. Thus, where the tenant and his family members were residing in the
premises and were incidentally carrying on tailoring work in the house, it was held
that it did not amount to conversion of residential premises into a non-residential one.
In Rattan Lal v. Asha Rani, JT 1988 (4) SC 83, the initial purpose for which
premises were let on rent was to run a grocery shop. The tenant instead of using it for
grocery shop started running a bookshop therein. The Supreme Court held that, this
cannot afford a valid ground for ordering eviction.
51. Eviction under Section 14(1) (c): Conditions to be satisfied:
1. There has to be change of user or misuse of the tenanted premises;
2. Where the letting is governed by sub-clause (i) of clause (c), according to which
the consent of the landlord has to be in writing, the mere conduct of the landlord
by way of acquiescence would not be sufficient to constitute consent of the
landlord necessary for a valid change of user under sub-clause (i) of clause (c).
3. As per the mandate of Section 14(5), an application for the recovery of possession
of any premises shall not lie under Section 14(1) (c) unless the landlord has given
to the tenant a notice in the prescribed manner requiring him to stop the misuse of
the premises and the tenant has refused or failed to comply with such requirement
within one month of the date of service of the notice.
4. As per the mandate of Section 14(5), no order for eviction against the tenant shall
be made unless the Controller is satisfied that the misuse of the premises is of
such a nature that it is a public nuisance or that it causes damage to the premises
or is otherwise detrimental to the interests of the landlord.
22

5. The words “detrimental to the interests of the landlord” connote that either the
property interest or the reputation of the landlord owning the house in the locality
is jeopardised. (See: Pushpa Devi v. Om Prakash Khera, SAO No. 219 of 1973,
decided by S.B. Wad, J. on May 04, 1979)
52. Section 14(1) (d): “that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the
tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six
months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of
possession thereof;”
In the case of, Baldev Sahai Bangia v. R.C. Bhasin, 1982 (2) RCJ 98 (SC): In this
case the tenant had shifted permanently to Canada, he left behind his parents and two
sisters and a brother to continue to occupy the suit premises. The Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 under which the case had arisen contains a provision under clause (d) of
Section 14(1) to the effect that if a premises let for residence is not occupied by the
tenant or any member of his family for a period of six months immediately preceding
the date of filing of the eviction application, the landlord is entitled to a decree of
eviction. The question arose whether in these facts it could be stated that neither the
tenant nor any member of his family was residing in the tenanted premises for past six
months. It was held that the word ‘family’ has to be given not a restricted but a wider
meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all members or
descendants from the common ancestor who are actually living together in the same
house.
53. Section 14(1) (e) read with Section 14(6), Section 14(7) and Section 19 of the Delhi
Rent Control, 1958: Section 14(1) (e) of the 1958 Act lays down the concept of bona-
fide requirement. This concept of bona-fide requirement generally means that the
premises is now required by the landlord himself or for the benefit or enjoyment of
any member of his family. This section has undergone drastic changes after the dicta
in the case of, Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India; Appeal (Civil)
1897 of 2003, decided on 16.04.2008. Before this judgment (Supra), this section [that
is, Section 14(1) (e)] was solely applicable to residential premises but now it is
applicable to all premises.
The most important ingredient under this section is the word “bona-fide”. This word
“bona-fide” is to be construed to mean in “good-faith”; it means genuine, natural, real,
pure, sincere and honest. The word “requirement” is to be construed differently as per
the requirements of different individuals according to their standard of living.
23

In the case of, Siddalingam v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561, it was held that
the words “bona-fide requirement” are to be construed neither too liberally nor too
conservatively.
In the case of, Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, 1996 (5) SCC 353, in this case relating
to Section 14(1) (e), it was held that a bona-fide desire of a landlord to live into his
own house cannot be defeated merely on the ground that his own landlord has not
asked him to vacate. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He
has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the
landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential
standard of their own.
Note: If a plea of bona-fide requirement made by landlord is once rejected by the
Controller on any ground averred by the landlord in the eviction petition, this will not
preclude/debar the landlord from filing a second eviction petition on a different
ground, praying for the eviction of the tenant.
Note: Generally speaking, Rent Controller is not vested with the power to decide or
adjudicate upon the title of the premises. In a case governed by concerned rent control
legislation, all that a landlord has to prove is that, he (that is, the landlord) has a better
title than the tenant(s).
54. It is important to note that, under Section 14(1) (e), landlord means the “owner” of the
premises let on rent. In the case of, T.C. Rekhi v. Usha Gujral, (1971) RCJ 322, it
was held that, the tenant cannot decline to vacate premises required bona-fide by the
landlord for his residence merely because it is possible for him (that is, the landlord)
to live in some other town where he may have residential accommodation available.
55. In the case of, D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish, (1987) 4 SCC 424, it was held that,
Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 puts an embargo on a tenant of an immoveable
property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title to the landlord at the
beginning of his tenancy. So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later
cannot deny landlord’s title. However, defective the title of such landlord may be, the
tenant cannot deny the title to such landlord. But subsequent to his induction as tenant
if the landlord loses his title under any law or agreement and there is threat of tenant’s
eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title-holder, then any denial of title by
the tenant to the landlord who inducted him into the tenancy will not be covered by
this principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
24

(Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is based on the salutary principle of law and
justice that a tenant, who could not have got the possession but for his contract of
tenancy, there by admitting the right of the landlord, cannot be later on allowed to
dispute the title after taking undue advantage of the possession that he got from the
landlord. Of course, the tenant can deny the landlord’s title after giving up the
possession, thus restoring the status quo ante.)
56. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, envisages that a tenant is estopped to
deny the landlord’s title. This doctrine is based on equitable principle in as much as
once, one enters into the premises as a tenant and continues to possess in that
capacity, he, then cannot be heard to deny the lessor’s (landlord’s) title. If he does so,
then Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, comes into play. As
provided therein, the lessee’s right to the lease-hold property is forfeited by happening
of certain events, one of such events being disclaimer or denial of the lessor’s title.
“Disclaim” as the word imports, necessarily means renouncement by the party of his
character as a tenant either by setting up a title in another person or by claiming a title
to himself. The principle embodied in Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, is based on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. So a tenant
having lawfully entered into lease-hold premises, if denies landlord's title, then his
position in relation to the lease-hold land is as that of a trespasser. In such situation,
one of the co-owners can maintain a suit for eviction against him, that is, against the
tenant.
57. Sections 14(6), 14(7) and 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: The legislative intention
underlying Section 14(6) is that a landlord who himself is unable to evict a tenant for
some reason, should be deprived of the temptation of transferring the premises to
another person who would otherwise not be prevented from evicting the tenant. No
doubt, it is possible that this provision may in some cases work hardship, because if a
transfer is made by a landlord who could have otherwise proved his case under
Section 14(1) (e), the transferee would be precluded from making a claim for the
eviction of the tenant within 5 (five) years even though he, in his turn, would also
have proved his case under Section 14(1) (e). Section 14(6) is not made applicable to
a person who lets out the premises after he had already acquired them by transfer.
Section 14(6) applies only when a person becomes a landlord of the premises in
question by virtue of the transfer itself.
25

Section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Under Section 14(7), an order
for eviction passed under Section 14(1) (e) will not be executed within 6 (six) months
from the date of the said order. This provision has been incorporated for the benefit of
the tenant who has suffered an order of eviction. As the provision is for the benefit
and protection of the tenant, the tenant can waive the benefit and protection accruing
on him. Thus, with the consent and approval of the tenant, the period of 6 (six)
months so granted can be waived altogether or curtailed.
Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 19 provides for recovery of
possession for occupation and re-entry. This section requires that the landlord, who
recovers possession of the tenanted premises from a tenant on the ground of bona-fide
personal necessity under Section 14(1) (e) of the 1958 Act, not to re-let the premises
within the period on 3 (three) years from the date of obtaining the possession of such
premises from the tenant, except with the permission of the Controller obtained in the
prescribed manner.
Section 19(2) provides that where a landlord recovers possession of any premises
from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under Section 14(1) (e) of the 1958
Act, and the premises are not occupied by the landlord (or by the person for whose
benefit the eviction was effected) within 2 (two) months of obtaining such possession;
or the premises having so occupied are at any time within 3 (three) years from the
date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without
obtaining the permission of the Controller under Section 19(1) of the 1958 Act;
or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person for reasons which
do not appear to the Controller as bona-fide, the Controller is empowered, on an
application made to him in this behalf by the evicted tenant within the prescribed
time, to direct the landlord to put the tenant back into the possession of the premises
or pay him (the tenant) such compensation as the Controller thinks fit. (Emphasis
Supplied)
58. Section 14(1) (f) & Section 14(1) (g) read with Section 20 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958:
Section 14(1) (f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: In order to succeed under
clause (f) of Section 14(1), the landlord must prove:
i. That the premises have become unsafe/unfit for human habitation;
ii. That the landlord in good-faith requires the possession of the premises for
carrying out the repairs; and,
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iii. That the repairs cannot be carried out without the actual vacation of the
premises.
iv. The main consideration is the safety and health of the occupants and
incidentally improvement of the premises
The requirements numerated under clause (f) of Section 14(1) of the 1958 Act are not
mainly of the landlord but are rather of the tenant or else is in the public interest.
Section 14(1) (g) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: An order of eviction in this
clause (g) is sought so that the landlord may be permitted or be allowed to develop his
property and make it more profitable. Increase in the accommodation or modernising
the plan of the building may give more profit directly to the landlord. The interest of
the tenant of the premises is hardly a relevant consideration in clause (g). The interest
of the tenant is really to be considered under clause (f) but hardly under clause (g).
As per clause (g) two requirements must be satisfied: firstly, the premises must be
required bona-fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or
additions or alterations; secondly, the court must be satisfied that the specified work
cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated.
To safeguard the interest of the tenant, Section 14(8) of the 1958 Act provides that no
order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be allowed to be made
under clause (g) unless the Controller is satisfied that the proposed reconstruction will
not radically alter the purpose for which the premises were let or if there is racial
alteration albeit the premises, the same is in public interest. The Controller is to take
note of the fact that planned estimates of the reconstruction are properly prepared and
further, necessary funds for the purpose of reconstruction are available with the
landlord.
In the case of, Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 6 SCC 475, the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, held that, for recording a finding
that requirement for demolition was bona-fide, the Rent Controller has to take into
account the following:
i. Bona-fide intention of the landlord, far from the sole object to get rid of the
tenants;
ii. The age and condition of the building;
27

iii. The financial position of the landlord, that is, his financial viability to
demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of
the Act.
In the case of, Harrington High School v. S.M. Ispahani, (2002) 5 SCC 229, it was
held that, the fact that demolition and reconstruction would result in modernisation,
making additional space available and/or would augment the earnings of the landlord
are relevant factors for determining the bona-fide requirement for demolition and
reconstruction. It was also held that, the reconstruction plan sanctioned/approved by
the concerned local authority may not be filed along with the eviction petition, but the
same can be and in fact, should be filed at the time of execution of the decree of
eviction.
Section 20 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Recovery of possession for
repairs and rebuilding and re-entry: Section 20(1) provides that in making any
order on the grounds specified in clause (f) or clause (g) of Section 14(1), the
Controller shall-
i. Ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed back into the
possession/occupation of the premises or part thereof from which he has been
ordered to be evicted;
ii. Record the fact of election in the eviction order;
iii. Specify in the order of eviction the date on or before which the tenant shall
deliver possession to the landlord to enable him to commence work of repairs.
A duty is cast upon the Controller to fulfil the above conditions. If the tenant
does not elect to be placed back into the premises post the repairs, then, this fact
should also be recorded in the order of eviction. After the repairs of the
premises, the re-entry of the tenant into those premises is the function of the
court.
Sections 19(2) and 19(3) come into play only where the tenant elects to be placed in
occupation of the premises. It is important to note that, after the tenant delivers the
possession of the premises to the landlord in pursuance of the order made under
Section 14(1) (f)/ 14(1) (g) of the 1958 Act, specifying such date of delivery of
possession by the tenant to the landlord, but the landlord fails to commence with the
building/re-building/repair works within 1 (one) month of the date of delivery of the
28

possession by tenant to the landlord as specified in the respective order; or, fails to
complete the work within reasonable time; or, having completed the work fails to
place back the tenant in occupation of the premises in accordance with Section 19(2);
then, the Controller may on an application made to him, in this behalf by the tenant,
order the landlord to place back the tenant into the premises, or, pay the tenant such
compensation as the Controller deems fit.
59. Section 14(1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Clause (h) of Section 14(1)
of the 1958 Act, applies to those premises which are let for residential purposes only.
It has no application to premises let for non-residential purposes or for a composite
purpose (that is, for residential and non-residential purposes). For a petition under
this clause it is not necessary that the petitioner should be the owner. The
petition can be filed by the landlord.
In the case of, B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi, AIR 1987 SC 2220, it was held that where
the spouse of the tenant has built, or has acquired, or has been allotted a residence and
if the tenant has legal right to go and stay there, only then can clause (h) of Section
14(1) would be available to the landlord to cause eviction; otherwise, ordinarily, a
husband cannot be made to lose his tenancy on his wife’s acquiring the possession of
a flat, or allotment of accommodation because of her official duties, as on such
premises the husband has no right or domain of occupation of his own; but, if the
other spouse too has the legal right to stay in that accommodation, only then, can
clause (h) of Section 14(1) shall stand attracted.
60. Section 14(1) (j) read with Section 14(10) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: In
the case of, Suraj Prakash Chopra v. B.N. Dhawan, 2003 (2) RCR (Rent) 83, it was
held that in a case under Section 14(1) (j) of the 1958 Act, the following propositions
need to be kept in mind:
1. The onus of proving that the tenant has caused substantial damage to the demised
premises is upon the landlord;
2. Landlord must prove that addition and alteration in the tenancy premises is carried
out by the tenant;
3. Tenant has made the construction without the consent of the landlord;
4. The said construction has materially affected the tenancy premises and further that
the construction which had been carried out by the tenant had materially altered
the premises;
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5. Court must determine the nature, character of the construction and the extent to
which they make changes in the structure of the premises having regard to the
purpose for which the premises have been let out;
6. Landlord has to prove it by cogent evidence and wherever necessary expert
witness should be examined (See: Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872);
7. An eviction order under section 14(1) (j) could be passed if the tenant has carried
out such additions or alterations and structural changes in the tenancy premises
which had brought about material impairment in the value and utility of premises;
8. Every construction or alteration does not impair the value and utility of the
building and that construction must be of material nature which should
substantially diminish the value of the building either from commercial and
monetary point of view or from utilization aspect of the building;
9. A temporary alteration or addition which can be easily repaired without causing
damage to the structure is not “substantial damage” to the tenancy premises;
10. Every change, addition or alteration in the tenancy premises will not invite
eviction of the tenant under Section 14(1) (j), and that each case would depend
upon its own facts;
11. The alteration should be of structural nature and not merely of a decorative nature;
12. The impairment of the value and utility of the building is to be seen from the point
of view of the landlord and not the tenant.
Note: Section 14(10) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, provides that, the
Controller shall not pass an order of eviction under Section 14(1) (j) of the 1958 Act,
as against the tenant, if within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the
Controller, the tenant carries out the repairs to undo the damage caused to the
tenanted premises, to the satisfaction of the Controller or pays to the landlord such
amount, by way of compensation, as the Controller may direct.
61. Section 14(1) (k) read with Section 14(11) of the 1958 Act:
The requirements of section 14(1) (k) of the 1958 Act can be listed out as follows:
a. The user of the premises by the tenant should be contrary to a condition imposed
on the landlord by the Government;
b. Such user must continue even after a notice to discontinue the same is given by
the landlord;
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c. The condition which is contravened by the user of the tenant should be one which
is imposed on the landlord by the Government while giving the landlord the lease
of the land on which premises are situate.
The purport of Section 14(11) of the 1958 Act is that, no order for recovery of
possession of any premises should be made on the grounds specified in Section 14(1)
(k) of the 1958 Act, if the tenant, within such time as may be specified by the
Controller in this behalf, complies with the condition imposed on the landlord by any
of the authorities referred to in Section 14(1) (k), or, pays to that concerned authority
such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct.
In the case of, Faquir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (1973) 1 SCC 572, it was held
that Clause (k) is not meant for the benefit of the landlord (the lessee), rather it is
meant for the benefit of the lessor, that is, the public authority (DDA, MCD, L&DO
etc). It was further held that, the landlord cannot waive the duty imposed on him
originally by virtue of the lease given to him by the public authority. The landlord can
waive his right, if he had one, but not the right of the public authority, which is
statutory in nature, and there is no estoppel in law as against a statute. The landlord
owes a duty to the “superior lessor”, that is, the public authority, and eviction cannot
be set-side under Clause (k), merely on the ground that, the landlord himself was a
party to the breach of conditions under which the land was leased to him (that is, the
landlord).
In the case of, S.P. Arora v. Ajit Singh, 1970 RCR 628, it was held that, where the
facts of a case are such that they are covered under both clauses, that is Clause (c) and
Clause (k), the provision in Clause (k) alone would apply, because, it being a specific
provision, would exclude the general provision in Clause (c). For example, there may
be a case whereby, the land is let out by the concerned authority (MCD, DDA or
L&DO) on a condition that, it has to be used only for residential purposes, and the
lessee of the concerned authority also lets out the premises built thereon to a tenant
for residential purposes, but the tenant uses it for non-residential purposes. In this
case, it may be said that the landlord (that is, the lessee of the concerned authority)
may seek eviction of the tenant from the premises, either under Clause (c), as the
tenant had used the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was let out to
him, within the meaning of Clause (c); or, under Clause (k) as the tenant had used the
31

premises in a manner contrary to the condition imposed on the landlord by the
concerned authority, within the meaning of Clause (k); but, in such a case, the
provision contained in Clause (k) being a specific provision having its own
requirements and procedure, prevails over and above the general provision in Clause
(c). It is a settled law that, both, Clauses (c) and (k) are independent of each other,
though, in a given case, both the provisions may be attracted, and in such a case, the
landlord would be at liberty to utilize both the provisions, that is, Clause (c) and
Clause (k); however, pleading of eviction under the purport of Clause (k) will have
precedence over, pleading of eviction under the purport of Clause (c).
In the case of, Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati, (1996) 6 SCC 707, it was held that,
where the premises are used in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the
landlord by the Government or Delhi Development Authority or Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, the landlord will be entitled to recovery of the possession under
Section 14(1) (k) of the 1958 Act and that Section 14(11) of the 1958 Act enables the
Controller to give another opportunity to the tenant to avoid an order of eviction. The
first opportunity to the tenant is given when notice is served on the tenant by the
landlord, and, the second opportunity is given when a conditional order under Section
14(11) of the 1958 Act is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of
compensation for regularization of user up to the date of stopping of the misuse and
further directing the stoppage of unauthorised use. The continued unauthorised use
would give the paramount lessor (that is, the public authority) the right to re-enter
after cancellation of the lease deed.
In the case of, Veera Rai v. S.P. Rao, 2000 (1) RCR (Rent) 621, it was held that,
where the concerned authority insists that misuse must cease, the Rent Controller will
have no authority to permit the continued misuse of the premises on payment of
misuse charges.
In the case of, Kamla Marwah v. Kapur Fabrics, 1993 (1) RCR (Rent) 97, it was
held that, if premises were let by the landlord to the tenant for a purpose which was in
contravention of the terms of the principal lease deed subsisting between the
paramount lessor (that is, the concerned public authority) and the landlord (that is, the
lessee) under the provisions of the concerned statute (The Delhi Development Act,
1957), then the tenant using the tenanted premises contrary to the terms of the
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principal lease deed subsisting between the paramount lessor and the landlord cannot
claim estoppel based on the tenancy agreement subsisting between the tenant and the
landlord, as there can be no estoppel in law against the provisions of a statute, thus,
eviction of tenant can be sought relying upon terms of the principal lease deed,
notwithstanding the terms contained in the tenancy agreement.
In the case of, M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Lakshmi Devi & Ors, (2002) 5 SCC 629, an
order of eviction was passed under Section 14(1) (k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. Also, an order under Section 14(11) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was
passed regarding the misuse charges. The tenant did not challenge the order of
eviction, but took the plea that, it could not be compelled to pay the misuse charges in
the proceedings initiated under the 1958 Act. It was held by the Supreme Court that,
the tenant could not be compelled to pay the misuse charges in the proceedings
initiated under the 1958 Act, but this would not mean that the owner of the property
or the landlord was precluded from realising compensation or damages for misuse or
unauthorised use of the suit property, through the filing of a civil suit in a civil court.
Thus, proceedings under the 1958 Act cannot be initiated for realisation of damages
and/or mesne profits by the landlord from the tenant. It was emphasised that, when the
tenant was ready to vacate the suit premises, then, payment of misuse charges were
only to amount to temporary regularisation of the earlier misuse and continuance in
possession of the suit premises.
62. Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14-A to
Section 14-D, are somewhat exceptions to Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. Under Section 14, there has to be a trial, and that too in a strict sense of the
term, and the landlord has to prove thereby that specific ground has been made out to
procure the eviction of the tenant. However, Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the 1958
Act, postulate a right in favour of the landlord, which stands accrued and fortified in
his favour due to the fact that the landlord is falling within the periphery of the words
“certain persons” as regards Section 14-A; “members of armed forces” as regards
Section 14-B; “Central Government and Delhi Administration employees” as regards
Section 14-C; and “widow” as regards Section 14-D of the 1958 Act. As regards
Section 14-A to Section 14-D, “certain persons”; “members of armed forces”;
“Central Government and Delhi Administration employees”; and “widow”, connote
special types of landlords. Thus, by virtue of Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the
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1958 Act, a special class of landlords have been created, who have been conferred
with the rights in the nature of availing immediate possession, only by proving that
they belong to the aforesaid specified special class of landlords postulated under
Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the 1958 Act, and they have a bona-fide requirement.
In the case of, Rabi Dutt v. Ratan Lal, 1984 (2) SCR 614, the constitutional validity
of Section 14-A of the 1958 Act was upheld.
In the case of, B.M. Channa v. Union of India (Delhi) (DB), 1990 (40) DLT 113, the
constitutional validity of Section 14-C of the 1958 Act was upheld.
In the case of, Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271, it was held as
follows:
i. Section 14-B does not require that the premises should have been let out for
residential purposes only; the purpose of letting out is irrelevant so far as
Section 14-B is concerned;
ii. Section 14-B (a), relates to a released/retired person from any armed forces.
However, Section 14-B (b), refers to a dependent of a member of any armed
forces who had been killed in action. In case of Section 14-B (a), the petition
must be moved before the Controller within 1 (one) year from the date of
release/retirement or within a period of 1 (one) year from the date of
commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever
is later.
With regard to a dependent of a member of any armed forces who has been
killed in action, such dependent must apply to the Controller for recovery of
possession within 1 (one) year from the date of death of such member or
within a period of 1 (one) year from the date of commencement of the Delhi
Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later.
iii. Section 14-B (3) imposes a restriction on the landlord, who is having more
than one property; such a landlord cannot ask for possession of more than one
property, but can choose any one of the property from and among two or more
of the properties, which have been let-out.
Note: Under Section 14(1) (e), landlord can ask for eviction on the grounds of
bona-fide requirement. Interestingly, Section 14(1) (e) does not preclude the
34

landlord from seeking eviction of the tenants from more than one of the
several properties that the landlord owns, provided the landlord establishes the
need/ bona-fide requirement.
63. Limited Period Tenancy: Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
i. Section 14 of the 1958 Act gives protection to the tenants against eviction and
specifies grounds on which alone, the landlord can obtain an order of eviction.
It was realised that some premises may be available for being let-out only for a
limited period of time, where the landlord did not require the same during that
period of time alone, provided the landlord was assured of restoration of
possession on expiry of that limited period of time. Section 21 of the 1958 Act
achieves that goal and at the same time ensures that the provision is not
misused by capricious landlords to circumvent the rigours of Section 14 of the
1958 Act by requiring the Controller’s permission to be granted in certain
specified circumstances only, post the fulfilment of the following conditions,
namely: (a) the landlord would not require the premises for a particular period;
(b) the Controller must be satisfied about that position; and, (c) the tenant
agrees to vacate at the end of the end of the period.
ii. In the case of, S.B. Noronha v. Prem K. Khanna, 1980 (1) SCC 52, the
Supreme Court has laid down that the Controller must be satisfied that it is not
a case of the landlord not requiring the property indefinitely as distinguished
from a specific or particular limited period of time. As per this judgment, if a
man has a house and he so lets it, even if he specifies as pretence a period of
time in the lease, Section 21 of the 1958 Act cannot be attracted but, on the
other hand, if he gives a special reason as to why he can let out only for a
limited period and requires the building at the end of that period, such as that
he expects to retire by then or that he is going on a short assignment or on
deputation and needs the house when he returns home, it is good compliance.
The second condition to be satisfied is that the letting must be for a
residential purpose only. The Controller must require and satisfy himself
about the requests of the landlord’s non-requirement “for a particular period”
and the letting itself being “as a residence”. Lastly, there should be an
agreement between the landlord and the tenant, in writing, to take the
specified premises on a lease for a particular period.
35

iii. In the case of, Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, 1992 (1) RCJ
339, the Supreme Court of India observed that, the only condition for
applicability of Section 21 of the 1958 Act is non-requirement of premises by
the landlord for short period and that the other conditions, namely, passing of
order, letting it for residential purpose, and entering of agreement with the
tenant in writing are incidental only.
It was further held that-
a. Permission granted under Section 21 of the 1958 Act can be
assailed by the tenant only if it can be established that it was
vitiated by fraud or collusion or jurisdictional error;
b. A permission does not suffer from any of the errors merely because
no reason was disclosed in the application at the time of creation of
short term/limited period tenancy;
c. It was held that any objection as to the validity of the sanction
should be raised prior to the expiry of the lease period;
d. The objections should be raised by the tenant, immediately on
becoming aware of the fraud or collusion;
e. The burden to prove fraud is upon the person alleging it, that is, the
tenant.
64. Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Special procedure for the
disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona-fide requirement:
Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 lays down the procedure that is to
be followed in case there is a petition on grounds specified in Section 14(1) (e) of the
1958 Act, or, Section 14-A to Section 14-D of the 1958 Act. The procedure that
Section 25-B of the 1958 Act provides for is a summary procedure; or a procedure
which is akin to that, which is followed by Court of Small Causes.
As the name suggests, this procedure under Section 25-B of the 1958 Act is to a larger
extent similar to the summary procedure enumerated under Order 37 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Primarily in case of summary procedure, the right to defend or
to file a statement of defence is not a right per se. Permission needs to be sought from
the Court before the person is allowed to take a defence, and this availing of
permission and there by filing of defence is time bound- the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 provides for a period of 10 days, whereas the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958,
provides for a period of 15 days.
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This reply (“leave to defend”) has to be in form of an affidavit laying down the
grounds which would disentitle the landlord from getting the eviction order in his
favour, as against the tenant; in case the landlord does not appear or his leave to
defend is rejected, then, the judgment is to follow. But in case, the leave to defend of
the tenant is allowed then, broadly speaking, the procedure akin to the one followed in
a normal civil suit is adopted.
Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, there are no provisions supplying for
“appeal” or “second appeal”, however, revision or review may lie, challenging the
order of eviction decreed by the Controller.
In the case of, Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) through LRs, (2010) 2 SCC
15, it was held that, there can be no condonation of delay, not even of 1 (one) day,
beyond the prescribed statutory period of 15 days in filing of the leave to defend
application, and if the leave to defend application is not filed within the statutory
period of 15 days, then the bona-fide necessity of the landlord as averred vide the
eviction petition has to be decreed in view of the provision contained in Section 25-B
(4) of the 1958 Act, which necessarily speak of “deemed admissions”. Once the leave
to defend application is not filed within the statutory period of 15 days then- the said
leave to defend application cannot be considered, since, there can be no condonation
of delay in filing of the leave to defend application.
65. Deposit of Rent:
In the case of, Atma Ram v. Shakuntala Rani, 2005 (7) SCC 211, it was held that, if
the landlord is refusing to accept the rent from the tenant, then the tenant should pay
the rent as per the law provided under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Sections 27,
28 and 29 speak of deposit of rent by the tenant in court. Section 27 of the 1958 Act
prescribes what must be done by a tenant if the landlord does not accept the rent
tendered by him within the specified period. He is required to deposit the rent in Court
of the Rent Controller giving the necessary particulars as required by sub-section (2)
of Section 27. In view of this specific provision it would not be open to a tenant to
resort to any other provision. If the rent is not deposited in the Court of the Rent
Controller as required by Section 27 of the 1958 Act, and is deposited somewhere
else, it shall not be treated as a valid payment/tender of the arrears of rent within the
meaning of the 1958 Act and consequently the tenant must be held to be in default. It
is, however open to the tenant to remit the rent to his landlord by postal money order.
37

Important Insights:
1. Problem: That a landlord had filed a case for eviction before the Rent Controller
on the ground of bona-fide requirement. The tenant contended that the rent is
Rs.3650/- and hence, the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction. On this admission on
the part of the tenant, the Rent Controller refused to entertain the petition, as
Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, lays down a bar on the point of
jurisdiction. Subsequently, the landlord filed a petition before the Civil Court, now
in the Written Statement, the tenant is claiming the rent to be below Rs.3500/- and
hence, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. Decide.
Decision: In the present problem at hand, the basic issue is this: Whether the
jurisdiction lies in a Civil Court or not, based on the of admissions of the tenant;
and also, whether the tenant can be allowed to retract from his earlier admissions,
and whether or not there is an estoppel on the tenant qua his admissions?
When a person admits in the court of law a certain fact, then there is,
principle of estoppel operational on him and he cannot be allowed to retract
from his admissions.
In the present case, there is a clear and unequivocal admission on the part of the
tenant qua the amount of rent which ousts the jurisdiction of the Controller and
vests the Civil Court with the jurisdiction, and it is a basic tenet of the law of
evidence that admitted facts need not be proved. Therefore, in this case the tenant
cannot be allowed to retract from his admissions, and the jurisdiction is to vest
with the Civil Court, regard may be had to the following case-law: Mukesh Gupta
v. Sushma Vasishtha, 126 (2006) DLT 217.
2. Problem: Premises were let out for an amount of Rs. 3500/- per month,
subsequently, another room which formed the servant quarter was also given on
rent along with the previous tenancy. The new tenancy was for a total rent amount
of Rs. 4000/- per month; but when the tenant became aware of the ceiling rent
limit of Rs. 3500/- per month under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; the tenant
on his own motion started paying the rent in two-splits of Rs.3500/- per month
and Rs. 500/- per month, respectively, as if two tenancies, one of the erstwhile
premises and second of the servant quarter possessed later on, were running
concurrently but separately. An eviction petition was preferred by the landlord
before the Civil Court on the ground that the tenancy is for Rs. 4000/- per month;
will the Civil Court have jurisdiction? Decide.
38

Decision: In the case of, Constellate Consultants Pvt. Ltd. & Anr v. Shammi
Jain, 77 (1999) DLT 65, it was held that, if the tenant has agreed to pay a
consolidated rent of Rs. 4000/- per month for the entire premises then, the same
cannot be allowed to be split into two tenancies, merely on the ground that the
original/erstwhile premises were let-out for Rs. 3500/- per month and the servant
quarter was added later on for an additional rent amount of Rs. 500/- per month.
Thus, it is the Civil Court that would have jurisdiction over the matter and not the
Rent Controller.
3. Problem: Where there is tenancy exclusively for premises and not the land, and if
the same is destroyed by natural calamity, what would be the status of the
tenancy?
Decision: In the case of, Vannattankandy Ibrayi v. Kunhabdulla Hajee, (2001) 1
SCC 564, it was held that, where tenancy is for premises only and not for the land,
it would stand extinguished if the subject matter of the contract is destroyed by
natural calamity. Generally, where rented premises are governed by the relevant
State Rent Control Legislation, there the tenant cannot claim any benefit under the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The State Rent Control Legislation governs the
landlord-tenant relationship, and is self-contained and comprehensive, it
enumerates in detail the rights and liabilities of the landlord and the tenant; no
benefit under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 can be conferred.
4. Problem: If there is an eviction petition pending in a court of law and during the
pendency of that eviction petition, one of the owners (that is, the co-owner) of the
property transfers his share to the tenant concerned, then, what would happen to
the tenancy, whether it will ipso facto determine?
Decision: In the case of, Pramod Kumar Jaiswal & Ors v. Bibi Husn Bano &
Ors, AIR 2005 SC 2857, it was held that, the tenancy would not be ipso facto
determined and the tenant would continue to be the tenant of the other co-owner,
and thus, the other co-owner can claim eviction from his part of the concerned
tenant. (Note: Same was the ratio, in the case of, India Umbrella Manufacturing
Co. & Ors v. B. Agarwalla, AIR 2004 SC 1321)
5. Problem: Whether statutory tenancy is heritable and if so, whether it is applicable
on both commercial and residential tenancies?
Decision: Conjoint reading of the following two case-laws: Damadilal & Ors v.
Parashram & Ors, 1976 (4) SCC 855 and Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar &
39

Ors, 1985 (2) SCC 683, settles the position of law on this score, stating that,
statutory tenancies under both- commercial and residential tenancies can be
inherited.
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THE DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT,

1958: CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF

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27. Eviction: Rights of a Divorced-Wife: Divorce is termination of matrimonial

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