Republic of the Philippines Court of Appeals CEBU CITY SPECIAL TWENTIETH (20') DIVISION kaR A CECILIA V. COROMINAS, CA-G.R. SP NO. 14125 Petitioner, Members: ‘FAJARDO, JR., J.G. Acting Chairperson, “10,M - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION BATHAN, E.L., J.: iew,' petitioner seeks the reversal of the dered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), ‘ase No. M-CEB-1700386-CR-R00-00 that ion’ of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Criminal Case No. M-CEB-17-00386-CR, Via this petition for revi February 10, 2020 Judgment? ren Branch 5, Cebu City in Criminal C affirmed the April 22, 2019 Decis (MTCC), Branch 5, Cebu City in 19, 2022 designating Mr. Justice Jacinto G. Fajardo, Jr. as Acting tis Court. gular Chairperson of this 20" Division is on Wellness Leave. $, Macabaya, Rollo, pp. 51-52 drino, Rollo, pp. 41-44Be eee CA-GR. SPO. 14125 Decision Page 2 of 10 and the RTC Order dated Februa i Ty 16, 2021+ th: iti y 7 for Reconsideration.’ st denied petitioner's eaten THE FACTS AND THE CASE The following are the facts as found by the lower courts: Paul M. Corominas and Cecilia V Corominas (petitioner herein) are ‘ousins, who were earlier embroiled in another criminal case wherein, in thee ea former was indicted for perjury upon the instance of ‘ Perjury case, petitioner made use of a falsified document to support her Reply-A ffidavit filed with the Cebu City Prosecutor’s office on July 28, 2016. The falsified document consisted of a Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation (MCAC) Board Resolution dated September 5, 1995, which was allegedly notarized by Atty. Bacaltos and entered as Doc. No. 400, Page No. 81, Book No. 13, Series of 1995. On the witness stand, Atty. Bacaltos confirmed having issued a certification dated August 22, 2016 to the effect that he categorically disavowed any participation in and knowledge of such Board Resolution and denied owning the signature appearing thereon or having notarized the same. Witness Atty. Joaquino, then incumbent Clerk of Court of the RTC, attested that he had also issued a certification dated August 15, 2016 stating that Atty. Bacaltos “submitted on February 14, 1994 his Notarial Book No. XIII, the last entry of which was an Affidavit of Loss dated November 11, 1992,” and that “if the last document entered in that Book No. XIII is 1992, it will never happen that there could be entered in that book a document under Series of 1995 because the last entry is 1992.” Petitioner’s defense is that, she obtained a copy of the Board resolution dated September 5, 1995 as this was furnished to her by her sisters, Joan Corominas and Atty. Constancia Lim, who have been providing her with documents pertaining to the meetings of the Board of Directors of MCAC; that she did not have any knowledge that the said Board Resolution was falsified, if indeed it was, since she was “not privy to its preparation, execution and notarization”; that the resolution did not appear irregular to her as it was signed and approved by Paul and her own siblings, and even notarized by a lawyer; that in fact, neither her siblings not Paul himself, who signed ion twice on the same page, questioned the authenticity ir Sij at she believed that the filing of the perjury case it to harass her and for Paul to gain an improper at they had been trading charges in court — wasrie GR. SPNO. 14125 cision Page 3 of 10 ye After due proceedings, the trial court tendered a verdict, viz: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the cour Cecilia V. Corominas GUILTY beyond reasonable Tones of Use of Falsified Document under the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. As the prescribed penalty for the use of falsified document under the last paragraph of Art. 172 of the RPC is one degree lower than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00). SO ORDERED.” Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the RTC. The appealed decision was affirmed by the RTC, and ratiocinated that: “ex x, With regard to the first element of the crime, the arguments of the accused-appellant, that she had no knowledge of the falsity of the Board Resolution, are untenable. The fact that the Board Resolution is a falsified document and that it was used by the accused-appellant to in her Reply-Affidavit to the Prosecutor's Office, is not in dispute. It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger. Consequently, it is presumed that the accused-appellant has knowledge of the forgery of the document, The burden of evidence has now shifted on the accused to show otherwise. The court agrees with the ruling of the court a quo and finds that the accused-appellant has failed to rebut the aforementioned presumption. The testimony of the accused-appellant as sole witness is uncorroborated with testimonies from other witnesses and documents, and is ultimate self-serving. The evidence of the accused appellant is insufficient to prove that she had no knowledge that the subject document was falsified. t, the court finds no reason to deviate from uo. The falsified Board resolution was used to support her case for Perjury against Paul prejudice of the latter.”* (citations omitted). 10. Rollo, pp. 45-50, at pp. 49-50.ae ea-GR. SPO. 14125 Decision Page 4 of 10 Hence, the petition. Petitioner contends that the JSirst a ‘ ind fourth element: paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code is ae tie People argues that all the elements were established by the : ni beyond reasonable doubt. ae Issue: whether the petition is impressed with merit. OUR RULING ‘ We find it in the affirmative. We need to set aside the lower courts’ ruling, The last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes two acts: first, the introduction of a falsified document as evidence in any judicial proceeding; and second, the use of a falsified document in any other transaction. The second punishable act presupposes that the person who used the falsified document is not the one who falsified such document. Thus, the elements of the crime of use of falsified document in any transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceeding) are: (1) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (2) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. | and 2 of Article 172; (3) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and (4) the use of the false falsified document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage.’ In the crime of use of falsified document, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the falsity of the document and the defendant's knowledge of its falsity.* Jayme v. Jayme and People, G.R. No. 248827, August 27, 2020, made to clarify that in the crime of use of falsified document, the person who used the forged document is different from the one who falsified it such that if the one who used the falsified document is the same person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and the use of the same is not a separate crime.’ Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same person who falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification.” age, according to Dean Gregorio, is required is used in another proceeding, which is not ly 17, 2019 citing The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Luisr ‘ag. SPO. 14125 pation Page 5 of 10 judicial (Fundamentals of Criminal Law Revi iB, p. 283). of Criminal Law Review by Antonio L, Gregorio, 1985 he word “intent” accordin; ritanni means “the ig to The Britannica Dictionary i ; nary means “; thing that you plan to do or achieve; an aim or purpose” and the word “damage” means “physical he is a i body” pry rm that is done to something or to someone's The crime of which petitioner was convicted by the tri affirmed by the RTC is Use of Falsified Document as defined i ae under last paragraph of Art. 172, of the Revised Penal Code. The lower courts found that the prosecution clearly established the fact that: (1) the petitioner knew that a document was falsified by another person; (2) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (3) petitioner used such document in the prosecutor’s level, therefore, not in judicial proceedings; and (4) petitioner used the false falsified document to cause damage to respondent or with intent to cause damage to respondent. The crime of Use of Falsified Document under under last paragraph of ‘Art. 172, of the Revised Penal Code is an intentional felony for which liability attaches only when itis shown that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice.” If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him." Was criminal intent then demonstrated to justify petitioner's conviction? We find it not. Good faith is a valid defense in cases defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Per her testimony, petitioner showed good faith in attaching the Board Resolution with the belief that said Board Resolution was duly notarized. It could have been different had she testified that she had knowledge as regards notarization issue of said Board Resolution, but there was none. Per her testimony, she did attach the same to her Reply-Affidavit with the belief that, per its face, the document was legally and duly notarized. Sans such lack of knowledge regarding the document’s notarization issue as said document was furnished to her by her sisters Joan Corominas and Atty. ia Lim, petitioner can never be adjudged to have been negligent or age. (1955) ‘No, 130872, March 25, 1999.yr CA-GR. SPNO. 14125 Decision Page 6 of 10 imprudent when she utilized and attached said Board Resolution to her Reply- Affidavit. . In one of relatively old case, the High Court had the occasion to explain that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence.* The respondent’s contention that petitioner’s intention of attaching that Board Resolution to the petitioner's Reply-Affidavit was to cause damage against him but to Our mind, petitioner’s intention when she attached that Board Resolution to the petitioner’s Reply-Affidavit was to enhance and to support the very foundation of petitioner’s case for perjury against the respondent. There is really an intent to cause damage, so to speak, but such intent to cause damage is directed to destroy respondent's theory of want of probable cause in the perjury case. It is a common experience of man that every party litigant —be it in the prosecutor's level or in the trial court level, civil or criminal- will exhaust and solicit all possible pieces of evidence of legitimate source or sources just to win his or her case; and not to resort in utilizing pieces of evidence which he or she knows it will back fire or boomerang on him or her. The presumption that the person who is benefited by the falsified document is presumed to be the author, is not applicable in this case." The circumstance that the use is so closely connected in time with the forgery, or the user may be proved to have the capacity to undertake the forgery, or such close connection with the forgers to create a reasonable link" is not applicable in this case, because the Board Resolution, per its face was notarized on September 5, 1995." The time when the Board Resolution was attached was not so closely connected in time with the forgery issue. than our Constitution provides the presumption that the il proven otherwise by proof beyond a reasonable jires moral certainty, or that degree of proof which 124) cited in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, supra. 1026, June 15, 2006. $70 (2014).cA-GR. SPNO. 14125 Decision Page 7 of 10 produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.» It is the prosecution, who has the burden to overcome the presumption of innocence, and in the discharge of its burden, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence, and not on the weakness of the defense. Following this well-entrenched doctrine, it is worth noting that per petitioner’s testimony, one of petitioner’s sister is a lawyer by the name Atty. Constancia Lim; and it was her two (2) sisters Joan Corominas and Atty. Constancia Lim who furnished her with the copy of the Board Resolution. The presumption that he who is the possessor of a falsified document is presumed the author thereof does not apply to petitioner. Again, it is because, according to petitioner's testimony, it was her sisters Joan Corominas and Atty. Constancia Lim who furnished her with the copy of the Board Resolution. Since one of the providers of the Board Resolution to petitioner is her sister who is a lawyer (Atty. Constancia Lim), the presumption arises that such document appeared to be legally notarized is really a legally notarized one. Petitioner’s testimony to the effect that it was her sisters Joan Corominas and Atty. Constancia Lim who furnished her with the copy of the Board Resolution was not rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, We are not convinced regarding the circumstances relied upon by the lower courts as it do not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove that it was not petitioner’s two sisters who indeed provided that document In this case, We find that the guilt of petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence of the prosecution does not pass the test of moral certainty sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. From the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral certainty. We find respondent’s testimony rather weak. While there may be inherent weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on petitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined to old that the evidence is conclusive that she is not guilty, neither is it inced that she is so, based on the circumstances of this case. So long as and the circumstances can be explained upon any esis inconsistent with his guilt, she must be an of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable s that the prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient 1 (1995), 126, June 15, 2006,AG. SPNO, 12S Page 8 of 10 ain the guilt of the petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty - certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it? Itis such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be doubted,» for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.* And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction,* and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be considered.** Verily, We cannot simply accept the theory of the prosecution at face value, and ignore the basic rule that criminal conviction must rest upon the strength of the prosecution's evidence, and not on the weakness of the defense.” Indeed, the - evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the Court must acquit." Lastly, Our findings in this case should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize the prosecution evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, of even a testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.” In the words of People vs, Pascua: 198 SCRA 357 (1991). phil. 732 (2000) , 81 (1986), il, 78 (1948). |, 999 (2000). il. 806 (2014), R, No. 207175, November 26, 2014, 21,1989 cited in Abdulla v. People, G.R, No, 150129, April 6,200: . April 6, 2005CMG.R.SPNO, HDS Decision Page 9 of 10 “Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it has often happened that at the commencement of a trial, people's minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed sentence against the accused, An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Proof must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed to convict. Here, that quantum of proof has not WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) Cebu City in Criminal Case No. M-CEB-1700386-CR-R00-00 dated February 10, 2020 affirming the April 22, 2019 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City (Branch 5) in Criminal Case No. M-CEB-17-00386-CR; and the RTC February 16, 2021 Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cecilia V. Corominas of the crime of Use of Falsified Document as defined and penalized under last paragraph of Art. 172, of the Revised Penal Code, on reasonable doubt. Thus, ACQUITTED. No costs. SO ORDERED. ORIGINAL SIGNEL ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN Associate Justice