Introduction to Game Theory

Quiz 2

Time Allowed: 40 mins

1. Consider the following game played between two players:

1/2 x y
a 9,2 1,10
b 10,0 0,12
c 8,4 3,4

Let q is the probability with which player 2 plays x:

a. What should player 1’s Best response be, if :

i. q>3/5
ii. q<3/5
iii. q=3/5

b. Now suppose that player 2 believes that player 1 will play each one of his strategies with equal
probability. What should player 2 do as a best response to this belief.

[10 marks]

2. Solve for all pure and mixed strategy Nash in the following game:

1/2 a b
A 10,10 2,6
B 8,3 5,5

[10
marks]

3. John, Mark, and Sam are flat mates. They have two choices each- either to go shopping (S) or
clean the flat (C). For each of them, the cost of cleaning the flat is 3. Assume that there is no cost
or benefit of shopping. If only one of them does the cleaning, the benefit of cleaning is 2 for
each player. If two of them do the cleaning, the benefit is worth 6 to each of them. If all three
help out in cleaning, the benefit is worth 8 to each. If no one cleans, the payoff to each is zero.
All these costs and benefits are measured in dollars, and note that the costs are to be subtracted
from benefits to arrive at the payoffs for each player.
Their choices are simultaneous and independent.
(a) Write the game in strategic form
(b) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.