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Cyberspace Implications for National Security

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Cyberspace Implications for National Security

Executive Summary
Cybercrime and security have become a global concern affecting various governments
worldwide. Developed countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. strive to develop strategies to
curb cyber security challenges that threaten national and international security. The
department of defence plays the overall role of managing cross-border security for the U.S.
government. The policy recommendation document will focus on the implications of the
dual-hatted U.S. cyber command and National security agency (NSA) operations. The paper
shall examine what necessitated the same leadership for the dual-hatted security agencies in
the U.S. government, yet their missions are distinct. In addition, the pros and cons of
maintaining the dual-hatted agency's leadership to the same person will be explored.
Moreover, there will be a discussion about various U.S. government stakeholders that
the secretary of defence should consult or consider. The paper shall categorically examine
stakeholders that should be peers, advisors, influencers to the president, and personal advisors
to the secretary of defence. Generally, the U.S. government security sector comprises several
entities that serve various roles, including cyber security, national intelligence, and foreign
security. Lastly, three policy recommendations the secretary of defence should give the
president will be outlined. The policy recommendations will be based on the information
discussed in all the preceding sections.
Why the Leadership of U.S Cyber Command and NSA is the Same Dual-Hatted
Individual
The need to accelerate the U.S. cyber command necessitate its unification with the
National security agency (NSA). The idea of having a dual-hatted individual at the helm of
the U.S cyber command and NSA stems from the need to have a unified purpose (Di Pane,
2019). There were assumptions in the early days that the cyber command and NSA would
separate one day. Generally, the two institutions were intertwined for the manifestation of
great power incubated in cyber command. Another assumption was that the cyber command
would eventually break away on its own once it had established enough personnel, accesses,
and operational capabilities (DOD, 2018). Remarkably, there are some specific reasons for
the dual-hatted leadership of the U.S. cyber command and NSA.
First, the need for better integration of the general functions of the U.S cyber
command and NSA may have resulted in dual-hatted under the same individual. There was
an observation that operating the two entities under the same dual-hatted leadership would
reduce competition among those with immense power (Di Pane, 2019). As a result,
maintaining the same dual-hatted leadership remained a noble idea. Secondly, the same dual-
hatted leadership was necessary for a robust operational infrastructure where the personnel
and facilities deployed are enough to meet the unique missions of the two agencies.
Operating under the same leadership as the dual-hatted entity was appropriate to ensure
unified command of all cyber security infrastructure and systems (Dévai, 2019). Generally,
having the same dual-hatted leadership would strengthen the operational planning of the U.S
cyber command and NSA.
Thirdly, there was concern that USCYBERCOM may not be mature to handle
separate operations from the NSA. The idea of merging the leadership of the two entities
under the same individual was to enable information sharing and capacity building across the
two entities (Warner, 2020). Sharing leadership of the dual-hatted structure was necessary to
uplift the capabilities of either the U.S cyber command or the NSA. In addition, the idea of
dual-hatted leadership under the same individual was to reduce operational costs for the two
entities working separately. Observers believed that working under the same leadership
would mean using the same person across the entities, resulting in the cost-effective
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management of the cyber security command (Pohle et al., 2017). Therefore, an affordable
structure necessitated the same leadership for the dual-hatted organization.
Moreover, another reason for the same leadership for the dual-hatted system of the
U.S. cyber command and the NSA was that intertwining their structure automatically created
the need for the same leadership. The same leadership of the dual-hatted U.S. cyber
command draws from the experience with the British government commission headquarters
(GCHQ) equated to the NSA (DOD, 2018). Therefore, incorporating NSA with the U.S.
cyber command was viewed as a way to bring the NSA into close relation with the
Department of Defence (DoD). As a result, the U.S. cyber command and NSA would receive
adequate support from the DoD in running their operations (Healey, 2019). Generally, a
cyber security strategic plan requires a formidable force that would expedite the success of
several goals set by the president in fighting cyber security
Pros and Cons of Maintaining the Dual-hat
Former U.S president Barack Obama made a maiden speech about national security
while narrating every event chronologically. Since the World War and the Cold War, the U.S.
government has experienced several security threats (“Summary”, 2018). The formation of
the national security agency marked a significant milestone in scaling the fight against
external attacks on U.S borders. Consequently, the formation of the U.S cyber command
enhanced the NSA operations (Trump, 2018). As a result, many observers, including Obama,
felt it was necessary to maintain the dual-hatted organizations under the same leadership.
However, some individuals and entities raised concerns over the dual-hatted operations of the
U.S cyber command and NSA (Pohle et al., 2017). Generally, Obama saw more pros of
maintaining the two organizations under the same leadership than splitting them.
Pros of maintaining Dual-hatted U.S. Cyber Command and NSA
a) There is Speed in Decision-making
Having the same leadership for the dual-hatted entities implies that there will be unity
of command. The president's effort to address cyber security challenges would be easy since
the dual-hatted entities will operate from a single control. Maintaining the U.S. cyber
command and NSA together will mean that every decision needed will be faster and focused
on a single purpose (Dévai, 2019). Unity of control will ensure that decisions are tailored
towards achieving the goals set by the DNI as far as cyber security is concerned. When the
two organizations work together, they will quickly understand the most offensive and
defensive tools for cyber security (Di Pane, 2019). As a result, consultation time will be
shortened, leading to speedy decision-making. Therefore, maintaining the U.S cyber
command and NSA as dual-hatted entities shortens the time for decision-making.
b) Enhances Interdependence
Maintaining a dual-hatted relationship between the U.S. cyber command and NSA
would mean that each entity will depend on another on crucial issues affecting their
operations. For example, there will be sharing of cyber security infrastructure across the
board for the two agencies. An expert working for the U.S. cyber command would find it
noble to share their knowledge with NSA personnel (Di Pane, 2019). In addition, the two
entities will agree on a budgeting structure that would favor the operations of the DNI and the
national cyber security and strategy agency. There will be fewer disputes between the two
entities when under the same leadership since the leader will give direction on how each
entity should operate (Dévai, 2019). Therefore, the same administration for the dual-hatted
entities will enhance interdependence and eliminate inter-organizational battles.
c) No Organization with Automatic Advantage
When the two entities operate under the same leadership, none of them will gain an
advantage over the other. The U.S cyber command and NSA serve as cyber intelligence and
military unit, respectively (Trump, 2018). Operating the dual-hatted organizations under the
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same leadership will ensure that neither the cyber intelligence nor military unit gains an
undue advantage over the other. The dual-hatted leadership model will ensure the two entities
fragment their operations for the benefit of the entire DoD and the president's office as far as
national security is concerned (Pohle et al., 2017). In addition, the coupling of the two
organizations will ensure that their operations are more risk-acceptant. Each organization's
resources will be directed towards the ultimate cyber security and military operations goals
(Di Pane, 2019). Conclusively, the dual-hatted system of the U.S. cyber command and NSA
will equalize the outcomes of their strategies and expectations.
Cons of Maintaining the dual-hatted Organizations
a) Broad Span of Control
Some officials from DoD believed that leaving the two organizations' leadership to an
individual was not practical. The DoD officials cited that the U.S cyber command and NSA
are two vast organizations that will be too big for an individual (Di Pane, 2019). As a result,
they proposed the halting of the dual-hatted model used for the two organizations. The
difference in objectives of the two organizations prompts the need to separate them to allow
each of them to have its command system (Warner, 2020). Generally, operating entities with
a broad span of control may result in inefficiency in the long run.
b) Risk of Cyber Security Tools Exposure
The dual-hatted U.S. CYBERCOM and NSA operations necessitate information and
tool sharing among them. The continuous need for tool sharing between the two agencies
exposes the DoD to the potential exposure of the NSA tools and operations (Pohle et al.,
2017). Notably, when adversarial networks get wind of the exposure of the tools, they might
do their best to access NSA information. As a result, it will be easier for them to gain an
advantage over the DoD operations and plan massive attacks. Maintaining the dual-hatted
operations of the U.S. cyber command and NSA breed the risk of exposure of crucial NSA
tools and operations to the enemies.
c) The tension between Military and Intelligence Operations
The U.S cyber command and NSA's objectives might not always be achievable as
assumed. The two agencies strive to achieve two distinct missions. The U.S. cyber command
strives to fulfill cyber intelligence missions while the NSA seeks to achieve military
operations missions (“Summary”, 2018). As a result, it may be challenging to have a mutual
approach to the operations of the two entities. There will likely be tension between the two
agencies when there is no mutual agreement between them (Dévai, 2019). Therefore,
maintaining dual-hatted U.S. cyber command and NSA may not be sustainable in the long
run.
Stakeholders in the USG that the Secretary of Defence should Consult
The secretary of defence is responsible for creating allies and peers around him whom
he will consult from time to time. The secretary needs people with vast experience in defence
operations in the U.S. government and beyond borders (Trump, 2018). As a result, there are
few people that the secretary should consult or consider working with in performing his
duties. First, the secretary should consult General Milley, the chairman of the Joint chief of
staff. General Milley has vast experience in the U.S defence forces, which makes him
valuable as the secretary's peer (DOD, 2018). Secondly, the secretary should consult the
secretary of state, Mr. Antony J. Blinken. The secretary of state works closely with the
president's office since he presides over internal and external U.S affairs. Therefore, he is a
good peer to the secretary of defense.
The secretary of state also is experienced in matters of foreign policy. Therefore, he
can be the best advisor to the secretary of defence on foreign policies suitable to propel the
DoD operations (Di Pane, 2019). In addition, the secretary of defense can consult General
Nakasone, the commander of the U.S. cyber command and also serving as the director of the
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NSA. The secretary of defence needs advice from general Nakasone on cyber command and
national intelligence service (Healey, 2019). Conclusively, general Nakasone forms the key
part of the advisory team to the secretary of defense since he serves as a director to the U.S
CYBERCOM and NSA, respectively.
The director of national intelligence (DNI), Avril Haines, will influence the president
in various ways. First, the DNI will gather intelligence information within and outside the
U.S. borders. As a result, she is responsible for influencing the president on national cyber
security policy decisions (Warner, 2020). The DNI also cooperates with foreign countries'
national intelligence directors and defence ministers, such as General Zaluzhnyi of Ukraine.
The DNI will use information shared by foreign countries’s defense minister to influence the
president about the decisions the U.S. government should make against Russia. Therefore, the
DNI significantly affects the president's national and foreign security policy decisions.
Finally, the secretary of defense should meet the DNI personally more often. The DNI
harbors all the national intelligence information that the secretary requires to decide about
military and intelligence operations (DOD, 2018). The secretary should receive daily,
weekly, and monthly briefings from the DNI about the state of national and foreign
intelligence. Generally, the DNI is the custodian of all the national intelligence that the U.S.
government needs for its critical national security decisions.
Policy Recommendations by the Secretary of Defence to the President
The secretary of defence is essential in influencing the president to decide on national
cyber security and strategic policies. The secretary collaborates with various stakeholders in
the U.S government security sector to have unified policies that will ensure the U.S security
and safety of American citizens. Therefore, the secretary of defence will make the following
recommendations to the president;
 Establish Separate Commands for U.S. Cyber Command and NSA. The two
organizations aim to achieve distinct missions which make their dual-hatted model
complicated to be managed by the same person (Di Pane, 2019). Therefore, allowing
each entity to operate its affairs under different commands will be necessary to benefit
national security. In addition, separating their command will enhance their focus on
serving their distinct functions.
 The president should give an individual all the national security advisory roles instead
of receiving advice from different quarters. There will be a need to establish a
separate entity that focuses specifically on advising the president on national security
matters (Warner, 2019). As a result, different security departments, including NSA,
U.S. cyber command, DNI, and the U.S army, should often table their reports to the
special national security advisory unit formed by the president.
 The national security policy should separate internal security affairs from foreign
affairs to enhance its focus on different entities. Different commands responsible for
national and foreign security should be appointed (Pohle et al., 2017). Generally,
security intelligence, cybercrime, and defence should be managed distinctively at
national and international levels.
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References
"Summary. Department of Defense. Cyber Strategy" (2018). DoD Cyber Strategy, 1-7.
Dévai, D, (2019). Theory of national security. Military national security service, 5. 1-105
Di Pane, J. (2019). Should Cyber Command and the NSA Have Separate Leadership? How to
Decide. Heritage Foundation, 1-7
DOD, (2018). DoD cyber strategy and cyber posture review. Sharpening our competitive
edge in cyberspace.
Healey, J. (2019). The implications of persistent (and permanent) engagement in cyberspace.
Journal of Cybersecurity, 5(1), 1-15.
Pohle, Julia; Van Audenhove, Leo (2017). Post-Snowden internet policy: between public
outrage, resistance and policy change, Media and Communication, ISSN 21832439,
Cogitatio, Lisbon, 5(1), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.932
Trump D, (2018). National cyber strategy of the United States of America.
Warner, M. (2020). US Cyber Command’s First Decade. A Hoover Institution Essay. Aegis
Series Paper, 1-28.