Security Programme

Operator Security Programme
Chapter 00
Administration and Control Page: 1-0
Chapter 01
Administration and Control
First Edition Rev: 00 Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd Date: 23rd May 2022
Chapter 00
00.1 Administration and Control of this Operator Security Programme (OSP)
00.2 Editorial Conventions

When used in this OSP, the following terms shall have the meaning as defined below:
a) Auxiliary verb “shall” indicate that the application of a rule, procedure or provision is mandatory.
b) “Should” indicates that the application of a rule, procedure or provision is recommended.
c) “May” means that the application of a rule, procedure or provision is optional.
d) “(The) Company” means Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd.
e) “Approved” means that the Appropriate Authority for Aviation Security (hereinafter
referred to as the Appropriate Authority) in Sri Lanka (Director General of Civil Aviation), has
reviewed the concerned method, procedure and policy and has issued a formal written approval.
00.3 Certificate of Compliance:
a) It is certified that this OSP complies with the appropriate requirements of Sri Lanka’s National
Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) and the relevant provisions of the law.
b) It contains mandatory instructions for strict compliance by all persons associated with Lakwin
aircraft operations. Though any person may bring forth suggestions for the revision of the
content herein, compliance with the existing instructions is mandatory, until any revision is
incorporated and approved.
00.4 Number of Chapters
This OSP consists of Thirteen (13) chapters as follows:
Chapter 00 Administration and Control
Chapter 01 General
Chapter 02 Security Policy and Organization
Chapter 03 Objectives of the OSP
Chapter 04 Legal Authority
Chapter 05 Definitions (and Abbreviations/Acronyms)
Chapter 06 National Obligations
Chapter 07 Roles and Duties
Chapter 08 Preventive Security Measures
Chapter 00
Chapter 09 Quality Control
Chapter 10 AVSEC Training
Chapter 11 Bomb-Warnings on Ground
Chapter 12 Incident Reporting
00.5 System of Amendment and Revision:
a) Revision option is available for all controlled programmes (Manuals) developed by Lakwin. Post
Holder for AVSEC is responsible to issue amendments and revisions to this OSP.
b) Only approved amendments and revisions hereto, shall be included.
c) Amendments are promulgated through revisions issued to effect corrections or to add or update
information.
d) They are issued in the form of loose replaceable pages, accompanying filing instructions, and the
List of Effective Pages, needs updated.
e) The revised pages bear the Revision Number and Date of Issue. When an amendment is
incorporated, its insertion is recorded in the Record of Revision sheet.
f) Hand-written amendments and revisions are not permitted except in situations requiring
immediate amendment or revision in the interest of urgent security requirements.
g) Each holder of a copy of the OSP is responsible for the protection of same and for the insertion of
amendments / revisions. It is also the responsibility of the holder to maintain the copy in good
order.
00.6 Distribution of Copies of this OSP:
a) There are two originals and one thereof is held by the Appropriate Authority and the other
shall be in the personal custody of Post Holder for AVSEC in his capacity as the document
owner.
b) Controlled copies shall be issued to the other authorized parties.
c) Distribution of the controlled copies shall be as follows:
Control Number Custodian
01 Appropriate Authority SL (original)
02 Post Holder for AVSEC (original)
03 Chief Executive Officer
Chapter 00
04 Accountable Manager
05 Head of Flight Operations
06 Head of Ground Operations
07 Head of Engineering and Maintenance
08 Head of Quality Assurance
09 Head of SMS
10 Head of Flight Control
11 Head of Security Services BIA
12 do Rajapaksa Intl Airport
13 do Colombo Intl Airport
14 do Batticaloa Airport
15 do Anuradhapura Airport
16 do Ampara Airport
17 do Minneriya Airport
18 do Jaffna Airport
19 do Katukurunda Airport
20 do Koggala Airport
21 do Sigiriya Airport
22 do Trincomalee Airport
23 do Vavuniya Airport
24 do Wirawila Airport
25 do Iranamadu Airport
00.7 Description of the Annotation of Page
Header of each page contains:
- Name of the OSP (Manual): Operator Security Programme
Chapter 00
- Chapter Number
- Chapter Title
- Page Number (within the chapter)
- Company Logo
Footer of each page contains the company name.
- Company Name
- Edition Number
- Revision Number of the current page and the effective date
00.8 Corporate Commitment by the Operator
a) Lakwin’s senior management, through its Accountable Manager, is holding the overall
responsibility to provide financial and other resources to ensure the implementation of the
requirements of this OSP, and any security directives issued by the Appropriate Authority.
b) Above responsibility extends, but not limited to the following:
- Compliance with all requirements and regulations communicated by the Appropriate

Authority.
- Organizing, managing and supervising of all AVSEC operations within the organization
- Application of strict quality control standards to all AVSEC operations.
- Training of personnel adequately, to enable them to accomplish the assigned AVSEC tasks.
- Having Contingency Plans and an incident reporting system in place.
- Maintaining of the legality of AVSEC operations.
- Taking of appropriate disciplinary action against personnel involved in misconduct relating to

AVSEC responsibilities.
Chapter 00
00.9 Executive Statement of Company Commitment to Aviation Security
a) It is acknowledged that Lakwin’s senior management has committed to implementation of AVSEC

requirements, as a priority, throughout the company.
b) Company is also committed to comply with regulations as and when they are issued, and to
adopt industry best practices, and to the development of a security culture and continuous
improvement of Security Management System (SeMS) within.
c) AVSEC responsibility is shared by all company employees, agents and contractors.
Signed _________________ Date _____________
Lakshitha Weerasinghe
Accountable Manager
Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd.
285/3, Piliyandala Road, Godigamuwa,
Maharagama,
Sri Lanka.
Tel: 0112160668 / Fax: 0112160667
Email info@lakwinair.com
Chapter 00
00.10 Approval of the Appropriate Authority
a) This edition of Lakwin Operator Security Programme (OSP), developed meeting the Aviation
Security requirements relevant to domestic commercial air transport operations, has been
reviewed and assessed and found to be in compliance with Sri Lanka’s National Civil Aviation
Security Programme (NCASP), and relevant industry practices, and as such, is hereby approved.
b) Lakwin shall amend this programme in response to any directions given by the undersigned in
respect of any changes related to national (or international) Aviation Security.
c) No changes shall be made to any provision of this programme, unless prior approval has been
obtained from the undersigned.
Signed __________________ Date ______________
Capt. Themiya Abeywickrama

Director General of Civil Aviation,
Appropriate Authority for Aviation Security in Sri Lanka.
Civil Authority of Sri Lanka,

152/1, Minuwangoda Road,
Katunayake,
Sri Lanka.
Chapter 00
RECORD OF REVISIONS
This OSP is effective May 2022. Revisions to this edition, approved by the Appropriate Authority, should
be recorded below.
Rev.
No. Effected Pages Date Issued Date Filed Filed by
Chapter 00
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Page Number Revision Date

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Chapter 00
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Chapter 01
General Page: 1 - 1
Chapter 01
General
Chapter 01
General Page: 2 - 1
1.1 General
a) Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd is an approved Flight Training School, base at the Colombo
International Airport (RML), Ratmalana, operating under an AFTO license issued by the Civil
Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL).
b) It owns the following fleet:
Aircraft Type Engines Seats Number of Aircraft Reg. No(s)

Cessna 152 01 02 03 4R-LWR
4R-LWC
4R-LWB
Gipps Aero GA 8-1 01 02 + 06 01 4R-SRD

Piper PA34-200T
Seneca 11 02 02 + 04 01 4R-SJA
c) urrently, the above fleet is utilized for Flight Training purposes.
d) Lakwin intends to engage the two larger aircraft (Gipps Aero GA 8-1 and Piper PA34-200T Seneca
11) for domestic commercial passenger aircraft operations (probably on charter-basis), and the
carrier is required to obtain its Air Operator Certificate (AOC) in this connection.
e) Fulfillment of certain AVSEC requirements, is a prerequisite in the process.
f) Completion of appropriate AVSEC Training for Lakwin personnel and having an approved
Operator Security Programme (OSP), are the two said requirements.
g) This OSP, Inter-alia, would include the AVSEC requirements that Lakwin shall or should or may
implement in its capacity as a domestic commercial passenger aircraft operator.
h) Lakwin is authorized engage the services of Authorized Security Personnel for screening
operations, and may engage its own trained security personnel for other security functions,
relevant to its domestic passenger aircraft operations. These may include the protection of
screened Hold-Baggage and Aircraft Security.
i) From their base at Colombo International Airport (RML), Lakwin intends to conduct aircraft
operations to the following airports:
Airport IATA Code ICAO Code

Bandaranaike International Airport
(BIA), Katunayake CMB VCBI
Rajapaksa International Airport
(MRI), Mattala HRI VCRI
Anuradhapura ACJ VCCA
Chapter 01
General Page: 3 - 1
Ampara ADP VCCG
Batticaloa BTC VCCB
Iranamadu ----- VCCI
Jaffna JAF VCCJ
Katukurunda KTY VCCN
Koggala KCT VCCK
Minneriya HIM VCCH
Sigiriya GIU VCCS
Trincomalee TRR VCCT
Vauniya ----- VCCV
Wirawila ------ VCCW
j) This OSP which has been authenticated by Lakwin’s Chief Executive Officer and approved by the
Appropriate Authority in Sri Lanka i.e., the DGCA, needs, as a minimum, reviewed and
updated annually.
Chapter 01
General Page: 4 - 1
Chapter 02
Security Policy and Organization Page: 1 - 2
Chapter 02
Security Policy and Organization
Chapter 02
2.1 Security Policy and Organization
a) AVSEC is an element of Lakwin’s corporate management responsibility and should be considered

as an integral part of its core business management.
b) Security policy entails the following:
- Security awareness across the company;
- Verifying compliance through quality assurance; and
- Training and audit functions to ensure the compliance with the national and international
Aviation Security requirements.
c) Lakwin’s senior management should be committed to provide financial, human and other
resources necessary for the effective management of AVSEC to meet its objectives.
d) An appropriate senior company official shall be appointed to be accountable to the Appropriate

Authority in respect of the financial commitment relating to the management of AVSEC and the
provision of human and material resources thereto. This senior official shall be referred to as the
Accountable Manager, and he/she shall be accountable to the Appropriate Authority for the
effective management of AVSEC within.
e) Lakwin may not have its Head of AVSEC per se, but need to identify an appropriate senior official
as the Post Holder for AVSEC who shall be responsible for the administration and maintaining
AVSEC.
f) Lakwin recognizes that there should be minimum interference with, or delay to aviation activities
at the concerned airport, provided the effectiveness of the Security Controls outlined in this
programme is not compromised.
g) Company understands the obligation to provide its employees, agents and other contractors with
clear directions of AVSEC requirements.
h) This programme is based mainly on the requirements of Sri Lanka’s National Civil Aviation
Security Programme (NCASP) which is considered a restricted document, and therefore, the
content herein considered sensitive, hence should be disseminated on the need-to-know
principle.
2.2 AVSEC Organization:
Lakwin’s AVSEC Organization comprises the following:
- Operator Security Programme (OSP)

- Accountable Manager
- Post Holder for AVSEC
- Head of Flight Operations
- Head of Ground Operations
- Head of Training
Chapter 02
- Head of Quality
- Heads of Security Services of Civil Airports of Operation
- Commanding Officers of the Military Airports of Operation
- Military Units positioned at Civil Airports (EOD & Rescue Team)
2.3 Post Holders:
Area Name Phone / Email

0777709979 / 0717709979
Accountable Manager Lakshitha Weerasinghe lakshitha_1976@yahoo.com
0777773011
Aviation Security (AVSEC) Capt. B C H Perera hiranthaperera79@gmail.com
Flight Operations do do
Training do do
Ground Operations do do
0716260190
Engineering & Maintenance W A P S Fernando managereng@lakwinair.com
0777181897
Quality S L Wijesena qam@lakwinair.com
2.3.1 Responsibilities of the Post Holders
a) All Post Holders, other than Quality, under the authority of the Post Holder for AVSEC, are
collectively held responsible to implement respective areas of this OSP.
b) AVSEC Internal Quality Control (IQC) may come under the purview of the Post Holder for Quality,
c) Some personnel in appropriate areas, may be responsible for certain AVSEC functions as
secondary tasks.
d) Post Holders shall ensure that appropriate Initial and Annual Refresher AVSEC Training (including
Awareness Training for those accessing Security Restricted Areas), is provided for their
personnel.
e) It is the duty of all Post Holders to develop a security-culture across the company.
Chapter 02
Chapter 03
Primary Objective Page: 1 - 3
Chapter 03
Primary Objective
Chapter 03
3.1 Primary Objective:
3.2 Primary objective of this Operator Security Programme (OSP) is to have a system in place, to
ensure the safety of passengers, crew and ground personnel and, where relevant, the general
public and company assets, including aircraft, against Acts of Unlawful Interference that may
be perpetrated against Lakwin aircraft operations. To that end, it:
a) meets the requirements of Sri Lanka’s National Civil Aviation Security Programme
(NCASP) and the State’s legal and regulatory requirements. It also meets or may exceed the
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) stipulated in Annex 17 - Security-
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, in its application to domestic aircraft
operations.
b) provides standardized security procedures and clear security directives for security personnel,
crew, other employees, handling agents and contractors;
c) provides for additional security measures that need implemented in times of increased security
threat;
d) sets performance standards, achievable through initial and recurrent training for security
personnel, crew and all employees, meeting the requirements of Sri Lanka’s National Civil
Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP); and.
e) provides to have in place an independent Internal Quality Control (IQC) system and an
Incident Reporting System, to verify compliance level of the aviation security (AVSEC)
requirements.
3.3 If any area has not been addressed herein, the sound judgement of the Post Holder for
Aviation Security, preferably endorsed by the Appropriate Authority, would prevail. Such
areas shall immediately be included in this AOSP, and approved.
Chapter 03
Chapter 04
Legal Authority Page: 1 - 4
Chapter 04
Legal Authority
Chapter 04
4.1 Legal Authority
a) Following criteria explains the legal authority relevant to this OSP.
b) It works in two ways:
i. Sri Lanka’s role in her obligations to international air law; and
ii. her national law.
4.2 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention):
a) This (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) is an international legal instrument, which is the
foundation of international civil aviation industry. State Parties thereto are known as
Contracting States.
b) Sri Lanka have ratified the Convention and therefore, is a Contracting State.
4.3 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
a) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), created by the Convention, is the world’s
regulator of international civil aviation and, since 1947 is the United Nations specialized agency
for civil aviation matters.
b) Contracting States are also ICAO Member States which currently count at 194. Every ICAO
Member State has a corresponding statutory agency responsible to the ICAO. In Sri Lanka, this
agency is the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL), which has been created under
the provisions of Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka Act, No.34 of 2002.
4.4 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs):
a) The Convention, under its Article 37, has introduced an international specification system, known
as Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), to maintain uniformity among the
Member States in respect certain technical areas, in order to enhance the efficiency of
international air navigation.
b) ICAO has been authorized to issue and amend, from time to time, these SARPs as Annexes to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and are sent to Contracting States (ICAO
Member States) for the implementation within. These are generally referred to in the industry, as
Annexes
c) It is mandatory for Contracting States (ICAO Member States) to implement Standards within
their territory, unless they have filed objection (in terms of the Convention), at the initial stage.
d) Recommended Practices are desirable for implementation, but not mandatory.
e) In Annexes, Standards are printed in light-face Roman text and Recommendations in light-face
Italic text being indicated with the prefix Recommendation in bold Roman Text.
Chapter 04
f) Currently, there are 19 Annexes and they, being Annexes to the Convention, are treated as part
of international air law.
4.5 Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation:
a) Full title is “Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation -Security-

Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference”
(hereinafter referred to as Annex 17).
b) This (Annex 17) is the main Annex that bears the SARPs relating to Aviation Security (AVSEC).
c) Annex 17 (2020 11th Edition) Standard 2.2.2 stipulates that AVSEC Measures shall apply to
domestic civil aircraft operations, if a threat is present.
d) Apart from Annex 17, there are many other Annexes which bear AVSEC SARPs. They are included
in Annex 17 as an Attachment.
e) After the disastrous events of 9/11, many amendments have been brought into Annex 17, and
new AVSEC SARPs have been introduced into other Annexes as well, in order to minimize the
chances of repeating a similar attack.
4.6 AVSEC Organization:
a) Chapter 3 of Annex 17 contains the SARPs applicable to the creation of an AVSEC Organization in
a Contracting State.
b) In terms of the said Chapter 3, each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written
National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) to safeguard civil aviation operations,
against Acts of Unlawful Interference. NCASP is the main component of the said
organization.
c) Chapter 3 also stipulates that commercial air transport operators providing services from a
State shall establish, maintain and implement a written Aircraft Operator Security
Programme (AOSP) meeting the requirements of the NCASP of that State.
d) Both the NCASP and AOSP are requirements of Annex 17 SARPs.
e) Therefore, they are legal documents recognized by international air law
f) Sri Lanka’s NCASP stipulates that aircraft operators engaged in commercial air transport
operations within, shall develop and implement AOSPs meeting the former’s requirements.
4.7 Sri Lanka’s Civil Aviation Act, No. 14 of 2010:
a) According to its preamble, Civil Aviation Act, No.14 of 2010 (herein after referred to as the
Act), has been enacted to give effect to the Chicago Convention in Sri Lanka.
b) Its Section 2, read with Section 124 (1), expressly states that the Convention and its Annexes
relating to security (and safety, regularity and efficiency) of civil aviation, shall govern all civil
Chapter 04
aviation activities within the territory of Sri Lanka, thus giving national legal recognition to AVSEC
SARPs.
c) Section 17 (1) states that the CAASL [4.2 (b)] shall formulate a NCASP in accordance with the
relevant SARPs.
d) Section 87 (3) (a) stipulates that an air operator shall have an approved AOSP to obtain its Airline
License.
e) Local procedure has made it mandatory for an air operator, to have an approved AOSP as a
prerequisite to obtain the Air Operator Certificate (AOC).
4.8 Sri Lanka’s Civil Aviation (Interim) Regulations No. 01 of2002:
a) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, above also recognizes Annex 17 SARPs as having the
force of law in Sri Lanka.
b) NCASP has been developed as stipulated in Annex 17, thus amounts to be a legal document in
this context as well.
4.9 Legal authority to develop this OSP:
a) Legal authority, in terms of international and national law, pertinent to the development of this
OSP has been explained in the above provisions.
Chapter 04
Operator Security Programme Chapter 05
Definitions and Abbreviations/Acronyms Page: 1 - 5
Chapter 05
Definitions and Abbreviations/Acronyms
5.1 Definitions:
a) These definitions have been extracted from:
− Annex 17 and other Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation;
− other recognized industry technical documents;
− international legal instruments related to AVSEC; and
− national legislations.
b) These definitions are not self-explanatory and they may not have the accepted dictionary
meaning. A definition may not have an independent status but is an essential part of the
procedure or the criteria in which the term is used.
Access Control:
This is an important Security Control by which the security-integrity of a protected location, is
maintained. The process has 3 steps:
- Identifying the person seeking entry,

- Verification of the legitimacy of the business within, and
- Screening of the person, carry-ons and the conveyance, to ensure the absence of Prohibited
Items.
Accompanied Hold Baggage:

Baggage which is accepted for carriage in the hold of an aircraft and which is checked in by the
passenger who is on board.
Acts of Unlawful Interference:

These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation including but not
limited to:
− unlawful seizure of aircraft
− destruction of aircraft in-service
− hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes
− forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility
− introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material

intended for criminal purposes
− use of aircraft in-service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious
damage to property or the environment (using civil aircraft as WMD)
− communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in-flight or on

the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the
premises of a civil aviation facility.
Aerodrome:
A defined area in land or water associated with buildings, installations and equipment which is either
wholly or partly used for take-off, landing and surface movement of aircraft.
Agent:
Any person, company or organization engaged either directly or through contractual agreement to carry
out the duties of a principle. E.g. an aircraft or airport operator.
Aircraft:
Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the
reactions of the air against earth’s surface.
Aircraft in-flight:
An aircraft is considered to be in-flight from the moment all its external doors are closed following
embarkation, until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation.
In the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities
take over the responsibility for the aircraft, and for persons and property on board.
Aircraft Commander:
See “Pilot-in-Command”
Aircraft-Hijacking:
See Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
Aircraft-in-Service:
An aircraft is considered to be in-service from the beginning of the preflight preparation of the aircraft by
ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours after any landing; the period
of service shall, in any event, extend for the entire period during the aircraft is in-flight.
Aircraft Operator:
Commercial operator of any one or more aircraft, holding an Air Operator Certificate or a Foreign Air
Operator Certificate.
Aircraft Operator Documents:

Air Waybill, Stores Consignment Note, Cargo Manifest, Passenger Ticket Advice, Boarding Pass, Excess
Baggage Ticket, Miscellaneous Charges Order, Damage and Irregularity Report, Baggage and Cargo
Label, Timetable, Weight and Balance Document etc.
Aircraft Security Check

An inspection of the interior and the holds of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access, for
the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons or other dangerous devices, articles and
substances.
Aircraft Security Search:

A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of an aircraft for the purpose of discovering suspicious
objects, weapons or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
Airport:
Any area in a Contracting State which is open for commercial air transport operations.
Airport Operator:
The person or the organization responsible for the operation of an airport.
Airside:
The movement of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is
controlled.
Annex 17
Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation – SECURITY- Safeguarding Civil
Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference. A document published by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) pursuant to Article 37 of the said Convention, in which Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) relevant to Aviation Security are included.
Appropriate Authority (for Aviation Security):

The authority designated by a State within its administration to be responsible for the development,
implementation and maintenance of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP). In Sri
Lanka, Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) is the Appropriate Authority (for Aviation Security).
Apron:
A defined area on a land aerodrome intended to accommodate aircraft for the purposes of loading or
unloading of passengers, cargo or mail, refueling, parking or maintenance.
Authorized Security Personnel

Members of the Security Service maintained by a Service Provider to whom a licence is issued by the
DGCA for the provision and maintenance of an Aviation Security Service and includes any member of the
Armed Service or Police, who is performing or is called upon to perform duties within an airport.
Note:
In Sri Lanka, members of the Security Department of AASL fall within this category, in addition to the
Armed Services and Police personnel who are required to provide security services within an airport.
Aviation Security (AVSEC):

See “Security”
Background Check:
A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including, where legally permissible, any criminal
history as a part of the assessment of an individual’s suitability to implement security controls and/or for
unescorted access to a security restricted area.
Baggage:
Personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the operator.
Bomb-Warning (Threat):
A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise which suggests or infers whether true or false, that the
safety of an aircraft in-flight or on ground or any airport or civil aviation facility or any person (in such
aircraft, airport or civil aviation facility) may be in danger from an explosive or any such device or item.
Certification:
A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate authority for aviation security
that a person possesses the necessary competencies to perform assigned functions to an acceptable level
as defined by the appropriate authority.
Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka:

An authority established under the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka Act, No. 34 which, as stipulated in
its Section 7, shall exercise powers and discharge duties, in accordance with Sri Lanka’s international
obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Commercial Air Transport Operation:

An aircraft operation involving the transportation of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire.
Company Aviation Security Personnel:

Security personnel duly employed by Lakwin, engaged in AVSEC operations
Contracting States:
Signatory countries to the Chicago Convention / Member States of the ICAO.
Controlled Area:
The airside area or other areas of an airport or areas used in support of an airport not forming part of a
designated security restricted area to which access is controlled in accordance with criteria detailed by
the Civil Aviation Authority (of Sri Lanka).
Courier Service:
An operation whereby shipments tendered by one or more shippers are transported as the baggage of a
courier passenger on board a scheduled airline service under normal checked baggage documentation
(and shall not include express parcels carried as cargo under an Air Waybill).
Crew Member:
A person assigned by an operator for duties on an aircraft during flight duty period.
Crew Member Certificate / Crew Identity (ID) Card:

A photo identity card issued by the authorized officials to operating crew of aircraft owned/leased by FITS
Aviation (Pvt.) Ltd.
Dangerous Goods:
Articles or substances which are capable of posing significant risk to health, safety, property or the
environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions for the
Safe Transport Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Doc 9284) or classified according to those instructions (OR
those classified so in the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations).
Disruptive Passenger:
A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft or to follow the
instructions of airport staff or crew and thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on
board the aircraft.
Explosive Device:
Any device that can be triggered to explode.
Facilitation:
The efficient management of a necessary controlled process with the objective to expedite clearance of
persons or goods and prevent unnecessary operational delays.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED):

An explosive device that could be triggered manually or electronically not made to specifications which
could be of any shape, dimensions, weight or colour.
Incendiary Device:
Any device containing inflammatory substances to cause fire.
In-flight:
See “Aircraft In-Flight”
International Airport
Any airport designated by a Contracting State in whose territory it is situated as an airport of entry and
departure for international air traffic where the formalities incident to Customs, Immigration/Emigration,
Public Health, Animal and Plant Quarantine and similar procedures are carried out.
Landside:
Those parts of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof that are not airside, as
identified by States and relevant entities in their security programmes.
Mishandled Baggage (Expedite Baggage):

Baggage involuntarily or inadvertently separated from passengers or crew.
Non-Restricted Area:
Areas of an airport to which the public has access or to which access is otherwise unrestricted.
National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP)

A document developed by a Contracting State pursuant to Chapter 2 of Annex 17, outlining the national
policy and procedures in respect of Aviation Security.
Operator:
A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation.
Operator Security Programme (OSP):

A written statement detailing the measures and procedures required to be implemented by an operator
or his agents to achieve compliance with the requirements of the National Civil Aviation Security
Programme (NCASP).
Passenger-Baggage Reconciliation:
This is a procedure that uses a verifiable tracking system to bring attention to hold-baggage that has
been loaded or is about to be loaded onto a specific flight, despite the failure by a passenger or a crew
member to board the aircraft concerned.
Permits:
Cards or other documentation issued to individual persons employed at airports or who otherwise have
need for authorized access to airports or any restricted parts thereof for the purpose of facilitating access
and identifying the individual and includes vehicle documentation issued for similar purposes. Permits are
sometimes referred to as airport identity cards, airport access control permits or airport passes.
Pilot-in-Command:
The pilot designated by the operator, or in the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in command
and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.
Prohibited Items:
A term used to jointly refer to weapons, explosives and other dangerous devices, articles or substances
that may be used to commit an Act of Unlawful Interference.
Screening:
The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons,
explosives or other dangerous devices which may be used to commit an Act of Unlawful Interference.
Security (Aviation Security):

Safeguarding civil aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference. This objective is achieved by a
combination of measures and human and material resources.
Security Control:
A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or
substances which may be used to commit an Act of Unlawful Interference, can be prevented.
Security Equipment:
Devices of a specialized nature using individually or as a part of a system in the prevention or detection
of Acts of Unlawful Interference with civil aviation and its facilities.
Security Restricted Area (SRA):

Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority risk areas where, in addition to
access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas normally include, inter-alia, all commercial
aviation passenger departure areas between the screening check point and the aircraft, the ramp,
baggage make-up areas, including those where aircraft are being brought into service and screened
baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft cleaning
premises.
State of Registry:
The State in whose register the concerned aircraft is entered.
Stores (Supplies):
− For consumption. Goods whether or not sold, intended for consumption by the passengers and
crew on board an aircraft, and goods necessary for the operation and maintenance of the
aircraft, including fuel and lubricants.
− To be taken away. Goods for sale to passengers and crew of an aircraft with a view to being
landed.
Stores (Supplies to be taken away):

Goods for sale to the passengers and crew of an aircraft
Supernumeraries:
A person, in addition to the flight crew, that is not an operating cabin crew member or a passenger, but
is on board either a cargo or passenger aircraft in a capacity as follows:
− Is assigned to the flight by the operator as necessary for the safety of operations; or
− Has a relationship with the operator (E.g. employee, employee family member); or
− Is a State or operator authorized representative (E.g., CAA Flight Operations Inspector), auditor
(E.g., IOSA Auditor) or observer (E.g., IOSA Observer) in the performance of his or her duties; or
− Is on board of a cargo aircraft and is assigned a function associated with the on-board cargo
(Loadmaster, Cargo Attendant, Animal Handler); or
− Is assigned to a passenger flight by the operator to conduct certain customer service activities
(E.g., Beverage Service, Customer Relations, Ticket Sales) in the passenger cabin.
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft:

A person on board an aircraft-in-flight, unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of
intimidation, seizing or exercising control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act. (As per the
Hague Convention)
Unidentified Baggage:
Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage-tag, which is not picked up by or identified with a
passenger.
Unpredictability:
The implementation of security measures in order to increase their deterrent effect and their efficiency,
by applying them at irregular frequencies, different locations and/or with varying means, in accordance
with a defined framework.
5.2 Abbreviations / Acronyms
5.2.1 Following abbreviations and acronyms have been used in this OSP:
AASL - Airport & Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd

AOG - Aircraft on Ground
ASP - Airport Security Programme
AVSEC - Aviation Security
BIA - Bandaranaike International Airport
CAASL - Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka

DGCA - Director General of Civil Aviation
DGR - Dangerous Goods Regulations
IATA - International Air Transport Association
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
IOSA - IATA Operations Safety Audit
IED - Improvised Explosive Device
NCASP - National Civil Aviation Security Programme
NCASTP - National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
NCASQCP - National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme
OSP - Operator Security Programme
PIC - Pilot-in-Command
PTI - Positive Target Identification
SARPs - Standards and Recommended Pr
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction (aircraft used as WMD)
Chapter 06
National Obligations Page: 1 - 6
Chapter 06
National Obligations
Chapter 06
6.1 National Obligations
a) Lakwin is obliged to be abided by Sri Lanka’s national laws and regulations relevant to AVSEC,
and the provisions of her National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP).
b) It recognizes Sri Lanka’s Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) as the State’s
Appropriate Authority for AVSEC.
c) It also recognizes its responsibility to the travelling public and its employees to conduct secure
operations.
d) This responsibility includes, in terms of the NCASP requirements and other regulations, the
protection of its aircraft, aircraft maintenance areas and other restricted areas, and also extends
to take appropriate Preventive Security Measures (see Chapter 8) in respect of:
i. Passengers/Crew and Cabin Baggage;

ii. Special categories of passengers;
iii. Hold-Baggage supplemented with Passenger/Hold Baggage Reconciliation; and
iv. Company Stores and other goods;
e) It is also a national obligation on the part of Lakwin in its capacity as an operator engaged in
commercial air transport operations, to develop, implement and maintain this approved
Operator Security Programme (OSP) meeting the provisions of national law and the
requirements of Sri Lanka’s NCASP.
f) Lakwin acknowledges that SARPs in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil

Aviation, are applicable to the extent practicable to its aircraft operations.
g) Lakwin recognizes that this OSP is the main component of its AVSEC Organization explained in
Annex 17, which Sri Lanka have recognized as a legal instrument by the operation of
international and national law.
h) As required by the NCASP, Lakwin ought to appoint a senior company official, having direct
access to its senior management, to be responsible to manage AVSEC within.
i) The official referred to at (h) is responsible to develop, implement and maintain this OSP, which
should:
i. meet national legislation and NCASP requirements;
ii. take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of Lakwin aircraft operations;
iii. be modified, from time to time, to correct its deficiencies and to satisfy Lakwin’s security
needs;
iv. be reviewed and updated regularly at least annually; and
v. be updated and/or amended and approved by the Appropriate Authority.
Chapter 06
6.2 Aviation Security Legislations

Lakwin recognizes the appropriate provisions of the following national air law legislations and
shall be abided by them where relevant, as explained below:
1) Offences Against Aircraft Act, No. 24 of 1982:
a) This Act has ratified the following Aviation Security Conventions (International Air Law
Instruments):
i. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Convention);
ii. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention); and
iii. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Convention).
b) In relation to the above legislation, Lakwin duly recognizes, inter-alia, that:
i. the State of Registry (State of Registration) in respect of its current fleet, is Sri Lanka;
ii. the Competent Authority referred to is the Director General of Civil Aviation;
iii. in terms of Part 1 of the Act, a Lakwin aircraft is considered to be in-flight in the period
of time commencing at the moment, when power is applied for the purpose of take-off
and ending at the moment when the landing run ends;
iv. if an act or omission committed by any person on board a Lakwin aircraft in-flight or
(whatever the reason may be) any other area outside the territory of any State or in
international air space, that act is considered an offence, if such act or omission
constitutes an offence under the laws of Sri Lanka, and triable, based on the gravity of
the offence, either by the Magistrate’s Court or the High Court of Colombo;
v. the Pilot-in-Command enjoys the powers of a Police Officer in Sri Lanka, when dealing
with above (b) iv, which extend to the restraining of the offender;
vi. any person on board resists or obstructs the Pilot-in-Command is committing an offence;
vii. any crew member who fails to carry out the instructions given by the Pilot-in-Command
to restrain a person is committing an offence;
viii. Lakwin crew or passengers may restrain an offender on their own;
ix. restraining of a person shall not be continued after the landing of the aircraft, except as
provided in this Act.
x. Pilot-in-Command commits an offence if he fails to report to the authorities of the

landing State regarding the person he intends to deliver and the reasons therefor.
Chapter 06
2) Suppression of Unlawful Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation Act,

No. 31 of 1996:
Lakwin recognizes the criminal offence contemplated in this Act.
3) Civil Aviation Act, No 14 of 2010:

Lakwin has recognized and obliged to be abided by the following:
a) Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) is the designated Government Agent for national
civil aviation security in Sri Lanka.
b) Service Provider of the Aviation Security Service and the Authorized Security Personnel
contemplated in the Act.
c) That the said Service Provider is the Security Department of the only airport operator in Sri
Lanka i.e., Airport and Aviation Services (SL) Ltd (referred to herein as the AASL Security).
d) Authorized Security Personnel are those attached to AASL Security, and members of the Sri
Lanka Armed Services and Police, who are performing or called upon to perform security
duties at civil airports located within Sri Lanka.
e) It is inferred that, notwithstanding the method applied, screening conducted by the

Authorized Security Personnel in respect of persons and their belongings and/or any
conveyance used within the premises of an airport, is carried out with the express or implied
consent of the person concerned.
f) If a person objects to such screening, the above Act provides authority for them to carry out
the screening process against the consent of such person.
g) Act also provides authority for the Authorized Security Personnel to detain persons under
certain circumstances.
h) Lakwin Security personnel, if any, should notwithstanding the method applied, screen
persons and their belongings and/or any conveyance, within the premises of an airport, only
with the express or implied consent of the person concerned.
i) If a person objects to such screening, Lakwin Security personnel have no legal authority to
proceed with the screening process and shall immediately report to the closest Authorized
Security Personnel on duty.
j) Such incidents shall be reported to the Post Holder for AVSEC immediately, and all details
shall be recorded.
Chapter 06
Roles and Duties Page: 1 - 7
Chapter 07
Roles and Duties
First Edition Rev: 00 Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd Date: March 2022
7.1 Post Holder for AVSEC
a) Lakwin shall appoint a suitable person to be responsible for the management of its AVSEC
activities, and approved. He/she may be an official already holding other responsibilities, or a
person recruited from outside for this role.
b) Notwithstanding the manner of being appointed, the person concerned shall be a member of the
company’s employment carder, and shall not be outsourced.
c) It is preferable for him/her to possess experience in airline/airport activities, and shall be

adequately trained on the subject of AVSEC, to the satisfaction of the Appropriate Authority.
d) Irrespective of the routine reporting hierarchy, Post Holder for AVSEC, should have direct access
to Lakwin’s Accountable Manager, in AVSEC related issues.
7.2 Post-Holder for AVSEC, shall:
a) define the overall security policy for the acceptance of Lakwin senior management;
b) develop and implement system-wide security standards and practices;
c) ensure the appointment of approved Security Service Providers system-wide;
d) conduct an initial survey of facilities, relating to Lakwin aircraft operations system-wide, in order
to determine the security needs corresponding to the likely vulnerabilities;
e) modify this programme to correct deficiencies as necessary, to conformity with national AVSEC
requirements;
f) ensure this programme is current. and amendments in any, have been endorsed by the Chief
Executive Officer, and submitted to the Appropriate Authority for approval;
g) ensure that all Lakwin employees, including those outsourced, are trained on AVSEC, meeting
national standards;
h) ensure the continuing effectiveness of this programme through regular evaluations and
inspections, and by encouraging internal quality control functions;
i) maintain close relationship with the senior management and other departments so as to facilitate
the implementation of effective AVSEC measures across the company;
j) advise management on all aspects of AVSEC;
k) promote security culture and vigilance;
l) ensure effective response appropriate to any threats or security incidents;
m) initiate special security measures during periods of increased risk and/or for critical flights and
routes;
n) maintain familiarity with applicable legislation and regulations relating to AVSEC in Sri Lanka;
o) maintain relevant security records, and report all findings of unauthorized weapons or suspect-
explosive devices onboard Lakwin aircraft, or on their premises;
p) report all actual or suspected Acts of Unlawful Interference occurring against Lakwin aircraft
operations, to the Appropriate Authority.
q) notwithstanding who the service provider is, ensure to have adequate manpower, equipment and
other resources for the provision of AVSEC systemwide.
7.3 Other Parties who may be Involved in Lakwin’s AVSEC Responsibilities
a) Flight Crew who bears AVSEC responsibilities as a secondary function
b) Passenger Handling Personnel systemwide, including those outsourced (as a secondary function).
c) AASL Security and SLAF Personnel manning airports which Lakwin is operating to and from.
d) Members of Sri Lanka Police, at relevant airports.
7.4 Classification of Materials

Following documents in the custody of Lakwin, which may contain sensitive security information,
are considered to be in the category of ‘need-to-know’.
a) Relevant parts of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) delivered by the
Appropriate Authority,
b) National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP)
c) National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NCASQCP)
d) This Operator Security Programme (OSP)
7.4.1 Documents referred to above a, b, and c should be in secure custody and accessed only by
senior company personnel on official business. Unauthorized copies of these documents shall not
be made.
Provisions of this OSP or the Standard Operating Procedures based on it, should be made
available only to personnel of the ‘need-to-know’ category.
7.5 Operator Security Programme Distribution
a) This OSP is a need-to-know category document and should be protected against unauthorized
access;
b) Original should be in the personal custody of Head of Aviation Security.
c) List of authorized controlled-copy holders is included in Chapter 00.
7.6 Communications
a) Communications between the Appropriate Authority and Lakwin are made through accepted
channels including meetings of which the proceedings would be recorded where relevant.
b) Lakwin:
i. may exchange Aviation Security information with other air operators and industry
stakeholders. In significant cases, such information needs to be communicated to the
Appropriate Authority;
ii. shall not make any media statements on sensitive security issues unless approved by the
Appropriate Authority.
7.7 Other Entities
7.7.1 In terms of international guidelines and Sri Lanka’s NCASP, there are varying agencies in Sri
Lanka who contribute to the management of AVSEC system within. These agencies may perform
certain roles and duties relevant to security of Lakwin aircraft operations.
7.7.2 As stipulated in this OSP, AVSEC entails Preventive Security Measures and the following agencies
may be involved in performing roles and duties related thereto:
- Airport Operators
- Armed Services
- Police
- State Intelligence Services
- Security Service Providers
7.7.3 Roles and duties of each agency are explained below:
a) Airport Operators:
Operator of the airport where Lakwin aircraft operations are conducted, may be engaged in
providing the following security services, which include but not limited to:
i. Passenger and Cabin Baggage Security;
ii. Hold-Baggage Security;
iii. Aircraft Security;
iv. provision of secure Ground Handling services;
v. facilitating official access to Lakwin employees to restricted areas of the airport;
vi. accommodating Lakwin in the Airport Security Committee;
vii. responding to security related emergencies and incidents involving Lakwin operations
b) Armed Forces:
Their roles and duties entail:
i. the inspection and disposal of suspect explosive devices that maybe found on board
Lakwin aircraft or its premises; and
ii. armed intervention, if a Lakwin aircraft or its premises is involved in a hostage situation.
c) Police:
In relation to Lakwin operations, Police would be required to investigate offences stipulated in
national air law instruments,
d) State Intelligence Agencies:

These agencies are required to gather intelligence with regard to security threats against Lakwin
operations, and to advise the Appropriate Authority accordingly.
e) Security Service Providers:
i. As appropriate, Lakwin is required to get security services from approved agencies

providing such services.
ii. Security Service Providers, when providing services, shall meet the provisions of this
OSP.
Preventive Security Measures Page: 1 - 8
Chapter 08
Preventive Security Measures
8.1 Objective of Preventive Security Measures:

These measures should be able to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices,
articles or substances which may be used to commit an Act of Unlawful Interference, the
carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means
whatsoever, on board an aircraft operated by Lakwin (Pvt) Ltd.
Note:
In Sri Lanka, the law stipulates that the Statutory Service Provider [Airport and Aviation
Services (SL) Private Ltd. (AASL)] is required to maintain an Aviation Security (AVSEC)
Service for the provision of security within airport environment, implying that it (AASL) is the
sole legal AVSEC Service Provider in the State.
Law also recognizes the members of the Aviation Security Service, as Authorized Security
Personnel. Members of the armed forces and police, are also recognized as such, if they are
engaged or called upon to provide services within an airport.
It is also noted that the law expressly or impliedly does not prohibit aircraft operator personnel
implementing Security Controls to protect their aircraft. This is covered in International
AVSEC SARPs which bear the force of international and national law.
Therefore, subject to the approval of the Appropriate Authority, it would be lawful for Lakwin
to implement, at relevant locations, some or all the Preventive Security Measures discussed
below, through its personnel, as applicable, under the authority of the Pilot-in-Command (PIC)
8.2 Prohibited Items:
a) The ICAO is referring to the said weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices, articles or
substances, technically and collectively as Prohibited Items, and it has published a List of
Prohibited Items. This list is found at Annexure 1 to this chapter.
b) It is noted that notwithstanding how unauthorized Prohibited Items could come on board,
Preventive Security Measures should be capable to intercept them. This is also applicable to
the carriage of unregulated Dangerous Goods (DG) by passengers and crew.
c) In order to achieve the above objective, Lakwin shall implement appropriate Security Controls.
8.3 Dangerous Goods (DG):
a) Definition:
Dangerous Goods are articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety,
property or the environment, and shown in the List of Dangerous Goods in the Technical
Instructions (ICAO Doc 9284) published by the ICAO, or classified according to those
Instructions.
b) DG ordinarily carried by passengers (and crew) include, but not limited to:
- Alcoholic Beverages
- Devices powered by Lithium Batteries
- Camping Stoves containing flammable liquid fuel
- Disabling Devices
- Dry Ice
- e-cigarettes
- Electro Shock Devices
- Gas Cartridges
- Heat Producing Articles
- Hair Culers
- Matches
- Mobility Aids
- Security Type Attaché Cases
- Thermometers
c) Lakwin shall adhere to the published (ICAO/IATA) Regulations when transporting passengers
(crew) carrying the above items.
d) Preventive Security Measures must be able to intercept unregulated DG, irrespective whether
or not they are Prohibited Items.
8.4 Implementation of Preventive Security Measures:

Lakwin shall ensure the implementation of the following Preventive Security Measures, by
the application of the relevant Security Controls.
8.4.1 Access Control:

Lakwin aircraft may be parked and/or operated from the designated Security Restricted Area
(SRA) of airports, or from airports where such area is not demarcated.
Controlling access to the airside / SRAs, is the responsibility of the Airport Operator. Lakwin
shall coordinate with them to ensure that the following requirements are met in case their aircraft
are long-term parked, outside their own hangar.
a) Thorough inspection of the Restricted Area Access Permit held by a person reaching the
aircraft,
b) Verifying of the legitimate business the entrant has within, and
c) Screening of the person to ensure the absence of unauthorized Prohibited Items on his/her
person, and carry-ons and the vehicle that he/she may use.
Lakwin should coordinate with the authorities to ensure the above (a) to (c) are fulfilled.
8.4.2 Helipads Established Outside Designated Civil Airports:

If Lakwin uses Helipads located outside designated civil airports for their helicopter operations, if
any, sufficient Access Control methods shall be implemented.
8.4.3 Background Checks:

Lakwin should establish a mechanism to conduct Background Checks of personnel needing
access to the airside / SRAs of the airports of operation.
8.4.4 AVSEC Awareness Training:

Lakwin shall ensure that personnel entitled to access the Airside/SRAs, shall undergo AVSEC
Awareness Training.
8.4.5 Airport Restricted Area Access Permits:
a) Normally, issued by the Airport Operator.
b) Lakwin should ensure that only those having essential airside operations are recommended, and
the holder is educated on the following:
- Shall use to enter the airport only on official business
- Prominently displayed at the chest-level
- Loss of a permit shall be immediately reported
- Surrender to Lakwin management in case of resigning or being terminated
8.4.6 Security of Aircraft:

a) Parking at the Base:
i. Sufficient surveillance shall be exercised to prevent unauthorized access into aircraft when
parked within the hangar at the base.
ii. If parked outside the hangar, implementation of the following shall be ensured:
- Parked at a reasonable distance away from the perimeter-fence
- Parked during nights in well illuminates areas
- Aircraft is kept under security surveillance
b) Parking Off-Base:
i. Aircraft shall not be left unattended.
ii. Guarding arrangements shall be made throughout.
iii. Access Control shall be supplemented by locking the aircraft (if feasible).
iv. Disabling the aircraft and using of tamper-evident security seals, are optional.
c) AOG Situations:
i. Arrangements similar to above (b) shall be made.
d) Aircraft Security Check / Aircraft Security Search:
i. Shall be carried out prior to each departure
ii. Whether the requirement is a Check or Search, is based on the current threat level declared
by the Appropriate Authority.
iii. Since the structural pattern of Lakwin aircraft is less complicated, routine conducting of the
Aircraft Security Search, is recommended.
e) AVSEC Records:
i. In the case of Aircraft Security Check/Search, Checklists (Annexure 2 to this chapter) shall
be used and records kept.
ii. Records relevant to a particular flight, may be destroyed after two weeks.
f) Transit Cabin Check (if applicable)
i. Passenger-Cabin shall be inspected to ensure that disembarking passengers have not left
behind any items.
g) Aircraft Operator Documents:
i. Adequate measures shall be exercised to protect them against going to unauthorized

persons.
8.4.7 Security of Passengers/Crew and their Cabin Baggage/Carry-ons:
a) Responsibility:
i. In Sri Lanka, Statutory Service Provider (AASL) is responsible for the screening of
departing airline passengers (joining and transfer) together with their Cabin Baggage and
other carry-on items (except those exempted from screening) as stated at e (ii) prior to
allowing them into the final holding area (Sterile Area), or the Security Restricted Area or
the aircraft for which they have been accepted.
ii. Above (i) is relevant to both originating and transfer passengers. Lakwin may carry
passengers transferring from international carriers and vice-versa.
iii. Alternatively, Lakwin may be responsible (as approved by the Appropriate Authority) for
the carrying out of the above task (i) where the Statutory Service Provider is not required to
do so.
iv. If applicable, the Airport Operator or Lakwin, as the case may be, is responsible to ensure
that transit passengers and their Cabin Baggage and carry-on items, are protected against
unauthorized interference.
b) Screening of Passengers:
i. All departing passengers (joining and transfer) shall be screened either by Hand-Search (pat-
down exercise) or using Walk-Through Metal Detectors (WTMD) or Hand-Held Metal
Detectors (HHMD) or a combination of all 3.
ii. In the event WTMD and HHMD are used, they have to be calibrated meeting either the
specifications of the manufacturer or those published by the Appropriate Authority, as the
case may be.
iii. In cases where the WTMD emits the alarm, such passengers shall be further screened to
identify the cause for same. And HHMD and/or Hand-Search may be used for this purpose.
Passenger concerned shall again be screened through the WTMD.
iv. Unless the cause for the alarm is fully resolved, no passenger shall be permitted beyond the
screening point.
v. Whether or not the WTMD emits the alarm, passengers shall be Hand-Searched at random to
detect non-metallic items they may possess.
vi. If WTMD equipment is found unserviceable, Hand-Search supported by HHMD equipment,

shall be implemented.
vii. When Hand-Search is carried out or HHMD is used, both parties shall be of the same gender.
c) Screening of Cabin Baggage:
i. Cabin Baggage of departing passengers (joining and transfer), along with other carry-on
items, shall be screened using one the following screening methods:
a. Conventional X-ray equipment

b. Hand-Search
ii. Whilst X-raying, if the screener has concerns about the content of any Cabin Baggage, it shall
be subjected to a full Hand-Search. Passenger shall not be allowed to interfere with the
Hand-Search process.
iii. Where Hand-Search is employed, Screener should be vigilant for suspicious signs such as
inconsistent weight and signs of tampering.
iv. A minimum of 10% of the baggage subjected to X-ray screening, shall be Hand-Searched.
v. If any Restricted / Prohibited Items (Annexure 1 to this chapter) are recovered either on the
person or from Cabin Baggage, one of the following actions should be taken based on the
merit of each case:
vi. Sending the item to the destination as Checked-Baggage or as a Security Restricted Article;
or
vii. Confiscation of the item; or
viii. Deny boarding and refer the case to the Police, having evaluated all the circumstances (if the
item is a firearm or a replica thereof or an item taking the shape of a grenade or any forms
of explosives or incapacitating devices).
d) Private Screening:
This is not routinely provided.
i. Passengers carrying:
- high-value material
- human organs
- items with religious significance
- medical items
- lifesaving material
- evidentiary items
- scientific material
- urns. and
- passengers with pacemakers and reduced mobility, may be screened in an area out of
the public view.
ii. However, these passengers and their Cabin Baggage shall be screened by Hand-Search, may
be supplemented by HHMD.
iii. Wheelchairs and other aids also shall be screened visually/manually.
e) Screening of Diplomats and Diplomatic Pouches:
i. Subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomats and
other privileged persons and their Cabin Baggage, except the ‘Diplomatic Pouch” shall be
liable for screening.
ii. Following citizens of Sri Lanka and members of Diplomatic Corps and their baggage (Cabin
and Hold-Baggage) are exempted from screening:
- H E the President and his/her family

- Hon. Prime Minister and his/her family
- Citizens of Sri Lanka identified by the Secretary to the President and Defence Secretary
- Heads of Missions and their families
iii. Bona fides of the “Diplomatic Pouch” shall be verified.
iv. Diplomatic Couriers and their Cabin Baggage are not exempted from screening.
v. Diplomatic Pouches shall be examined externally for the State indicia and seals, and the
Courier should be requested to produce appropriate identification and authorization.
f) Classified Material:
Classified Material belonging to State agencies shall be inspected to the extent necessary to
ensure the absence of unauthorized Prohibited Items. If, however, any safety issues remain
unresolved, such Classified Material shall not be carried.
h) Carriage of Inadmissible Passengers, Deportees and Persons in Lawful Custody or

under Administrative Control:
Lakwin may get involved either as the originating or the transfer carrier.
i. These passengers are considered potentially disruptive
ii. If Lakwin is the originating carrier, in the cases of Deportees and Persons in Lawful Custody,
the relevant authority is required to notify them (Lakwin), of the intended travel, a minimum
of 24 hours before the Scheduled Time of Departure, in order for the latter to make
necessary security arrangements.
iii. Lakwin and/or the Pilot-in-Command have the right to refuse the carriage at the last
moment, based on valid security reasons.
iv. Carriage of such passengers shall be limited to one per flight.
v. In relation to (iii) above, it may be necessary for Lakwin to carry out a security risk
assessment. Following criteria would be relevant to that process:
- The gender and identification viz NIC, Passport/Emergency Certificate Number etc.
- Reason for deportation;
- History of the passenger, duration in custody, any records of violence and previous; removal attempt
- Any pending court proceedings (criminal or otherwise)
- Whether the person falls within “wanted” category in any State, or whether any State
(destination/transit/transfer) has any political interest of the person
- Person’s willingness to travel
- Medical clearance on suitability for air travel, including evidence of drug-addiction
vi. Details of escorts, if any (names, designations and titles, NIC, Passport Numbers, firearms and
restraining devices carried)
vii. If escorts carry firearms, provisions below (h) shall apply
viii. Authorized Carriage of Armed Individuals:
i. Following categories of passengers may carry firearms and ammunition on board Lakwin
aircraft.
a. Law Enforcement Officials and Armed Services Personnel, in the discharge of their duties;
b. Private individuals participating in sporting events;
c. Private persons carrying firearms for legitimate reasons, and
d. Personnel of private security companies.
ii. Above (a) category is authorized to carry firearms on surface-transport by virtue of their
office whilst (b) (c) and (d) are required to hold a license issued by the relevant authority to
possess a firearm.
iii. Firearms and ammunition fall within the meaning of implements of war and shall not be
carried in a civil aircraft within the territory of Sri Lanka (or on board an aircraft registered in
Sri Lanka anywhere in the world) except on the authority of a permit issued by the Director
General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) [Section 78 (3) of Civil Aviation Act, No. 14 of 2010].
iv. If a passenger expresses his/her wish to carry firearms at the time of making the reservation,
he/she must be informed to make necessary arrangements with the office of the DGCA. In
the cases of transferring to international flights, the passenger must be informed to take
necessary approval of the destination/transit/transfer States as well.
v. At the departure airport, the firearm/s shall be inspected by a trained and a competent
official to ensure it/they are duly separated from ammunition.
vi. At the departure. airport, written permit issued by the DGCA and those issued by the
destination/transit/transfer States shall be thoroughly examined to ensure all the details
therein are accurate.
vii. Firearm and ammunition shall be stored separately in the special onboard locked strong-box,
or in a location inaccessible to passengers.
viii. Keys of the strong box shall only be made available at the originating and destination
stations and no keys shall be made available on board.
ix. Pilot-in-Command shall be informed of the presence of the firearms/s and ammunition and
their location.
x. The number of passengers carrying firearms per flight should be limited to one unless the
circumstances dictate otherwise.
xi. With regard to ammunition, provisions of Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) shall apply.
xii. Care shall be taken at the destination, to deliver the firearm/s and ammunition to the
properly identified passenger securely and acknowledgement obtained.
xiii. In the case of passengers transferring to Lakwin from international flights, written permission
issued by the DGCA, is mandatory.
j) Refusal to Undergo Screening:
i. It is the accepted practice to deny boarding for a passenger who refuses to screen self
and/or his/her Cabin and/or Hold-Baggage. This need be communicated to passengers by
including same in Conditions for Carriage.
ii. It is essential that the passenger is questioned for the reasons related to such refusal. From
a security perspective, this situation could be vulnerable and adequate precautions should be
taken.
iii. If a reasonable suspicious exists to the effect that an explosive or a similar device or
substance is concealed in the baggage or on the person, emergency steps relevant to a
similar situation, shall be taken.
iv. Norm is that airline passengers are screened with their express or implied consent.
v. If screening is refused, law provides for the Authorized Security Personnel (see
Paragraph 8.1), subject to limitations, the authority to search that individual and the items
carried, without consent.
k) Mixing of Screened Passengers with those not screened and other unauthorized
persons:
i. Most commercial airport departure areas have been designed taking this security requirement
into account.
ii. Lakwin shall ensure that the airport operator makes physical and/or procedural arrangements
barring the mixing of screened departing passengers with arrival passengers and those not
screened, and other unauthorized persons.
iii. If mixing of a passenger is suspected, rescreening should be conducted.
iv. At locations where no formal procedure is in place, it is the responsibility of the Pilot-in-
Command (PIC) to enforce this requirement.
l) Carriage of LAGs (Liquids, Aerosols and Gels) by Passengers and Crew:
i. Only permitted quantities can be carried on the person and in Cabin Baggage.
ii. Each item shall be packed in a transparent sealable container with capacity of or less than
100 ml;
iii. Containers shall be placed in a re-sealable transparent plastic bag with capacity of or less
than 1000 ml (1 liter);
iv. Plastic bag shall be presented at the security checkpoint and only one such bag per
passenger is normally permitted;
v. Exemptions, regarding the maximum permitted volume, may be made in respect of

medications, baby-milk and dietary requirements, subject to verification.
vi. Other Guidance re LAGs:
- Passengers / Crew may be sensitive to their medical conditions and therefore privacy
should be respected;
- In relation to the volume of LAGs carried (in excess of 100 ml), the total time away from
home to the destination (not just the destination airport) should be taken to account;
- More than one such 1000 ml plastic bags may be necessary to pack all the containers;
- Passengers / Crew may be asked to produce prescriptions or other authentication in

respect of medications and dietary requirements;
- Based on the ‘time away from home’, option to carry LAGs in checked-baggage should be
examined.
m) Security of Crew and Cabin Baggage:
i. Whilst on operational duty, crew shall attire in full uniform and carry their Crew Member
Certificates (CMC).
ii. Crew, Stand-by Crew and supernumeraries shall:
- undergo all Security Controls applicable to departing passengers; and
- exercise adequate care to protect their Cabin Baggage against tampering and/or
substitution and/or theft.
iii. Crew, Stand-by Crew and supernumeraries may access parked aircraft for legitimate business
such as maintenance, engine run-up, Load Control requirements etc. In these situations,
they should always carry valid credentials and take proper authorization from the Airport
Operator or the duly designated agency, to access the Security Restricted Areas.
n) Unruly/Disruptive Passengers:
.
i. Policy to deal with these passengers shall entail:
- raising awareness among passengers of Lakwin’s response to such behavior;
- communication of the likelihood and the type of consequences that such passengers may
have to undergo; and
- implementation of zero-tolerance policy.
ii. Dealing with these passengers at the Departure Terminal is the responsibility of the airport
operator.
iii. Lakwin may decline carry passengers likely to disturb the good order on board.
iv. How to react to an unruly/disruptive passenger situation in-flight, has been explained in
Chapter12 Paragraph 12.1.
v. Legal aspects and the Powers of the PIC, are explained in Chapter 6 Paragraph 6 (2) (1) (b).
8.4.8 Security of Hold-Baggage (Checked Baggage):
a) Responsibility:
i. In Sri Lanka, the Statutory Service Provider (AASL) is responsible for the screening of Hold-
Baggage belonging to joining airline passengers. When it comes to Transfer Passengers,
Ground Handling Agent seems to be doing that.
ii. Alternatively, Lakwin, under the purview of the PIC, may be responsible for the carrying out
of this task where the Statutory Service Provider is not required to do so.
iii. Arrangements shall be in place to ensure that passengers have no access to screened Hold-
Baggage, until collected at the destination.
b) Acceptance of Hold-Baggage:
i. Lakwin or a duly appointed agent shall take over the Hold-Baggage at the Check-in Counter,
after verifying that each piece has been screened.
ii. During the Check-in process, a valid relationship between the passenger and his/her baggage
shall be established, by positively identifying the former against ticketing documentation and
an acceptable identity/travel document. Check-in Agent shall ensure the baggage is marked
externally to identify same against the passenger.
iii. Each item of Hold-Baggage shall be tagged for identification, and a Boarding Pass is issued to
the passenger.
iv. Hold-Baggage Manifest should be prepared.
c) Screening of Hold-Baggage:
i. All joining and transfer Hold-Baggage shall be screened using the following methods or a
combination thereof:
ii. Conventional X-ray equipment with a minimum of 10% either:
- Hand-Searched; or
- Viewed from two different angles using the same equipment.
iii. Locations where X-ray equipment is not available, baggage shall be fully screened by Hand-
Search.
d) Mishandled-Baggage:
i. Details of Mishandled Baggage shall be recorded and kept in the custody of the designated
agency, and shall be subjected to additional Security Controls including screening, prior to
uplift.
ii. If conventional X-ray equipment is used, the item should be viewed from two different
angles.
iii. Current threat situation may interfere with the uplift of Mishandled-Baggage.
e) Hold-Baggage Exempted from Screening:
i. Baggage owned by passengers referred to at (e) (ii)
ii. Diplomatic Pouch referred to in Vienna Convention.
iii. Cabin Baggage already screened and protected.
f) Protection of Hold-Baggage:
i. Lakwin shall ensure that Hold-Baggage is accepted from bona fide passengers by its duly
recruited employees or by an authorized agent.
ii. All items of Hold-Baggage shall be protected against unauthorized interference since
screening until it is delivered to the owner at the destination or transferred to another carrier.
iii. If the security integrity of any item of Hold-Baggage is reasonably suspected to have been
jeopardized before being placed on board the aircraft, it shall be re-screened and protected
prior to loading.
iv. Lakwin shall ensure the taking of the following steps:
- Secure conveyance to the aircraft since screening.
- Hold-Baggage shall not be left unattended prior to loading and the hold shall be guarded
until the departure of the aircraft.
v. In deserving cases, passengers may be permitted to access screened Hold-Baggage, subject

to close security scrutiny to ensure that no item is:
- introduced into the baggage; or
- removed from baggage taken into the aircraft or the Security Restricted Area.
g) Crew Hold-Baggage:
Crew-Hold Baggage shall be subjected to same Security Controls similar to those applied to
Passenger Hold-Baggage.
First Edition Rev: 00 Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd Date: March 2022
h) Passenger-Baggage Reconciliation:
i. This is a mandatory Security Control.
ii. Principle is that any piece of Hold-Baggage shall be carried, only if the owner-passenger
travels on board the same aircraft.
iii. Basic form of reconciliation is for the passengers, whilst boarding, to personally and
physically identify all his/her Hold-Baggage.
iv. Identified baggage should be loaded onto aircraft and those not identified shall not be
loaded.
v. If a passenger has not boarded for whatever the reason, his/her Hold-Baggage shall be
offloaded.
i) Security of Stores and Supplies:

All items, including crew-refreshments, lubricants and spare parts, taken on board shall be
screened and protected until departure.
8.4.9 Security of Aircraft Cleaning Operations:
i. Sri Lanka’s law has identified Aircraft Cleaning as an Aeronautical Service.
ii. Cleaning of originating flights shall be conducted before carrying out the Aircraft Security
Check or Search, as the case may be.
iii. Turn-around aircraft may be cleaned upon arrival after the disembarkation of passengers,
and unloading of baggage, but before the Aircraft Security Check / Search is carried out. This
is applicable to terminator flights as well.
iv. Cleaning should be conducted by Lakwin personnel or an outsourced approved agency.
v. Personnel entering the aircraft for cleaning shall be subjected to Access Control.
vi. Cleaning shall take place only under the supervision of a senior official.
vii. Upon completion of cleaning operations, if the aircraft is deemed not-in-service, all external
doors shall be closed and ground equipment removed.
8.4.9 Security of Aircraft Maintenance Areas:
i. Lakwin’s routine aircraft maintenance work takes place at its base station i.e., Colombo
International Airport (RML), Ratmalana.
ii. Above area is located within the Security Restricted Area of the RML.
iii. Following routine maintenance, Aircraft Security Check/Search should be carried out.
Annexure 1
LIST OF PROHIBITED ITEMS
Annex A to the NCASP has identified the following as Prohibited Items within its context and are
applicable to this OSP:
1. Firearms: - any weapon from which a shot may be fired by the force of an explosion or
compressed air or gas, including starter and flair pistols
2. Knives and Cutting Tools: - including sabers, swords, cardboard cutters, hunting knives,
martial arts devices, professional tools and such other knives with blades of 6 cm or longer and /
or knives considered illegal by law
3. Bludgeons: - blackjacks, billy-clubs, baseball bats and similar items
4. Explosives / Ammunitions / Flammable Liquids / Corrosives: - any explosive or

incendiary components, which by themselves or in conjunction with other items can result in an
explosion or fire. These include explosive materials, blasting caps, fireworks, gasoline, other
flammable liquids, ammunition etc or any combination of these items, any corrosive or toxic
substances including gases whether or not under pressure
5. Disabling or Incapacitating Items: - all tear gas, mace and similar chemicals and gases
whether in pistol, canister or other container, and other disabling devices such as electronic
stunning/shocking devices
6. Other Articles: - such items as icepicks, alpenstocks, straight razors and elongated scissors
which, even though not commonly thought of as a deadly or dangerous weapon, could be used
as a weapon, including toy or ‘dummy’ weapons or grenades
7. Articles: - any kind giving rise to reasonable suspicion that an item may be used to simulate a
deadly weapon and such articles shall include but not limited to objects resembling explosive
devices or other items that may give the appearance of a weapon or dangerous item
8. Chemical / Biological Attack Items and Substances: - the possibilities for chemical/
biological attacks include the use of chemical or biological agents to commit unlawful acts. Such
restricted chemical / biological substances shall include but not limited to Sulphur Mustard, VX,
Chlorine, Sarin, Hydrogen Cyanide, Anthrax, Botulism, Smallpox, Tularemia and Viral
Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF)
Note: Items indicating the nature of chemical / biological substance of suspicion of such nature shall
immediately be notified to the airport operator, police and other relevant authorities and isolated from
public terminal areas.
Annexure 2
AIRCRAFT SECURITY CHECK / SEARCH - CHECKLIST
May be used for all aircraft types to conduct Aircraft Security Check/Search*. Some components /
locations may not be found in a particular type.
Aircraft Type …………………………. Registration ………………………..
AIRCRAFT INTERIOR
O Seats (passenger & flight crew) including pouches, cushions and underside of seats
O Log book and flight manual stowage
O Entire floor including area forward of rudder pedals and beneath all flight crew seats
O Ceiling, side and rear walls (upholstered)
O Life-jacket stowage
O Area around rudder/brake pedals
O Connection of stair to fuselage, as well as shelf at this point
O Fire extinguisher stowage
O Floor - do not remove carpet unless presence of foreign object is suspected
O Light recesses
O Passenger Doors
O Life vest pouches
O First-aid kit (only if unsealed)
AIRCRAFT EXTERIOR
Fuselage (the areas behind the following doors and openings should be checked).
O Oil Cooler Intake
O Propeller Spinner
O Engine Compartment
O Engine Exhaust and Duct
O Nose Leg Cowling
O Cargo Pod Area
O Left / Right Wheel Brake Limit Area
O Wings & Horizontal Stabilizer Access Panels
Landing Gear Wheel Wells and Gears
O Nose wheel well – area behind access and zip-fastener panels
O Entire main wheel wells and zone of wing roots LH + RH
O Gears, wheels – tires, rims, brakes and parts such as struts, drag-braces, beams, arms,
actuators, frames and truss
Wings
O Trailing edge flap sections
O Inspection snap-covers
O Fuel vent openings
Name and designation of the person in charge of the inspection: …………………………………………………………
Remarks, if any: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Airport …………………………………………………………….
Date: …………………… …………………………….

Signature of the Person in Charge
*Note:
Aircraft Security Check:

− An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access and an
inspection of the holds for the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or
other dangerous devices, articles or substances.
Aircraft Security Search:

− A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of an aircraft for the purpose of discovering
suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances.
− In both instances, if the inspecting party needs to access behind panels etc, assistance from
qualified engineering personnel must be sought.
Quality Control Page: 1 - 9
Chapter 09
Quality Control
9.1 Quality Control
a) A fundamental component of an Aviation Security System is the effective implementation of

Quality Control (QC) measures.
b) These measures could be defined as surveillance techniques and activities used to assess an
operator’s security system, and to resolve identified deficiencies.
c) In order to implement QC measures, Lakwin should develop, implement and maintain an Internal
Quality Control (IQC) Programme, of which the aim should be to:
i. monitor the standard of implementation of the Preventive Security Measures included this
AOSP, and the compliance level to other relevant areas therein;
ii. examine the compatibility of this programme with the NCASP requirements and national laws
/ regulations and the relevant international SARPs, and take corrective actions where
necessary; and
iii. identify all aspects of this programme. that may need updating.
9.2 Organization, Responsibilities and Resources
a) To ensure the independence of QC activities, an appropriately designed one-man QC Unit

(preferably under the auspices of a non-operational manager) with the responsibility of the
implementation of the IQC Programme. This manager should be adequately trained.
b) QC Unit should:
i. develop, implement and maintain QC activities to verify the compliance standards with those
referred to at 9.1 (c) I to iii.
ii. establish a reporting system to report deficiencies direct to the Accountable Manager;
iii. establish and implement corrective action plans for identified deficiencies;
iv. have a time frame for corrective action unless such action is immediately necessary; and
v. develop an annual report on QC activities and submit same to the Appropriate Authority.
9.3 Internal Quality Control (IQC) Inspection Report Form
Format in Annexure 1 to this chapter may be used for the QC monitoring process.
Annexure 1
Area under inspection Location File Ref.
Date
Observations and identified deficiencies
Recommendations
IQC Manager’s Signature Name Date
Comments / Action Taken
Implementing Official’s Signature Name Date
Comments
Post Holder’s (AVSEC) Signature Name Date

Inspection follow-up
IQC Manager’s Signature Name Date
AVSEC Training Page: 1 - 10
Chapter 10
AVSEC Training
10.1 Objective of AVSEC Training:
a) Appropriate and comprehensive AVSEC Training is essential for all personnel involved or
responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP.
b) National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP) provides necessary

curriculum and guidance in respect of training, including OJT (on-the-job-training) and recurrent
training, required for each category of personnel, with the objective of effective application of
standardized level of Preventive Security Measures, by airport and aircraft operators and
other entities, on a continual basis and to a consistent standard, in order to safeguard civil
aviation against Acts of Unlawful interference.
10.2 Responsibility:
a) This OSP meets the appropriate areas of Sri Lanka’s NCASP, and Lakwin should ensure that their
own personnel and those outsourced, are adequately trained to be knowledgeable of the subject
of AVSEC, and to apply the provisions herein, where relevant.
b) The NCASTP identify two employee categories namely, security and non-security.
c) In the non-security category, there are employees who are required to perform certain AVSEC
tasks as a secondary function. Flight Crew and Check-in Agents are two such employee-groups.
10.3 Types of Training:
a) Initial and Annual Refresher AVSEC Training for security, and the said non-security
categories [10.2 (c)], and
b) Initial and Annual Refresher AVSEC Awareness Training for other non-security personnel,
needing access to the Security Restricted Areas (SRAs) of a civil airport, or similar areas of
an airport controlled by the military, where Lakwin aircraft operations are conducted.
10.4 It is a regulatory requirement for commercial operators to establish, implement and maintain an
Aviation Security Training Programme, which meets the requirements of the NCASTP.
Bomb-Warnings on Ground Page: 1 - 11
Chapter 11
Bomb-Warnings on Ground
11.1 Bomb Warnings (see the definition in Chapter 5):
11.2 First and foremost, there are a few salient points to remember:
a) Triggering of concealed bombs, is one of the main methods used by terrorists to commit mass-
murder, destruction and economic damage, when the responsible party is miles away, or even
may be out of the country.
b) Concealing of a bomb, especially in a sensitive high-security area, is no small task.
c) Having taken all the trouble to plant a bomb, it does not make sense for a terrorist group to
prewarn the authorities and the public of its presence.
d) If such warning is communicated, its conceivable motive would be to minimize the consequences
of an explosion, with priority to save lives.
e) Reasons behind such a genuine warning are found at Paragraph 11.10. Common sense dictates
that the tendency in such cases, would be to communicate more details about the concealed
device, to minimize the danger.
f) As for international civil aviation, the commercial passenger aircraft had been the target of
terrorists.
g) During the last about 6 decades, there had been nearly a couple of hundreds of such attacks,
murdering more than 200,000 innocent passengers and crew, and destroying aircraft worth
billions of dollars.
h) Very significantly, there had been no pre-warnings received about the presence of bombs on
board such aircraft, except in one instance in the US in 1972, where bombs had been concealed
on board a couple of commercial passenger aircraft operated by Trans World Airlines (TWA), by
criminals with the motive of extortion.
i) In the past, thousands of Bomb-Warnings had been received at airports and by airlines world
over, mainly over the telephone. Sri Lanka are also in the equation. All, without any exceptions,
had been hoaxes. Motive, in almost all cases, had been to disrupt airport operations. Mian
culprits were pranksters.
j) Though the facts are as stated above, AVSEC experts do not want aircraft and airport operators
just to ignore Bomb-Warnings, since human life may be at risk even in the remotest way.
Hence, the following procedure has been brought into mainstream AVSEC.
11.3 Bomb Warnings could be directed against:
a) Lakwin aircraft:
- on the ground; and

- in the air.
b) Lakwin facilities.
11.4 Bomb-Warnings are usually anonymous and communicated by telephone. Written warnings are
rare. They are normally intended to cause nuisance, yet may presage an act of terrorism with
criminal intent. Each warning must be assessed to determine its significance and the risk it
represents, so that appropriate security measures could be implemented.
11.5 Bomb Warning Assessment:
a) Lakwin is responsible for the assessment of Bomb-Warnings received against its aircraft or
other assets, but the concerned Airport Operator shall be informed immediately and shall
welcome if the latter wishes to join the process.
b) Lakwin shall have a trained assessment team, with the mandatory presence of its Post Holder for
AVSEC.
11.6 The assessment process consists of the following:
a) Reaction by the person receiving a Bomb-Warning
b) An assessment, by the designated team, employing Positive Target Identification (PTI)

methodology
c) Coordination of action appropriate to the risk as assessed
d) Provision of assistance to the authorities for the detection of persons responsible for the Bomb -
Warning, and
e) Follow-up action.
11.7 Receipt of Bomb-Warnings:
a) Bomb-Warnings over the phone may be received directly from people issuing such warnings or
from intermediaries (E.g., media).
b) In all cases, the recipient of the warning should endeavor to obtain as much information as
possible in order to facilitate its assessment and to identify the person issuing same.
c) Such information received, is the only basis that the assessors could proceed from.
11.8 Action by the Recipient:

Recipient of a Bomb-Warning, over the telephone should:
a) listen carefully and make a note of the precise time and actual words used by the caller;
b) take action to trace the call (if facilities available).
c) record the call (if facilities available).
d) prolong the call to obtain as much information as possible; and
e) ask the caller the following questions:
i. WHERE is the bomb?

(asked first so that an evacuation can be planned).
ii. WHEN will it go off?

(so that a time factor is known for the evacuation).
iii. WHAT does it look like?

(to help in recognition of the device during the search).
iv. WHY are you doing this?

(to build up a better picture of the incident and keep the caller on the line to assist in tracing the
call).
v. WHO are you?

(to see if the caller is from a credible group).
Note 1: The questions should be posed as open questions rather than leading ones. For
example, ask “Where exactly is the bomb?” rather than, “Is the bomb in the hold of the
aircraft?’
Note 2: The order in which the questions are asked, is important as the caller may hang up
before all them are asked.
f) if possible, test the credibility of the caller by making up a non-existent flight number, flight time
or a location and asking the caller whether that is the one which he or she is referring to; and
g) report to the management forthwith.
11.8.1 When receiving information from intermediaries, the recipient should:
a) ask for and make written note of the precise time at which the warning was received, and the
exact words used by the caller; and
b) ask whether the intermediary obtained answers to any of the questions detailed above, and
about the origin of the call and the caller’s identity in terms of the Bomb Warning Report
(Annexure 1 to this chapter), and
c) report to the management forthwith.
11.8.2 Recipient of a written Bomb-Warning should preserve same and deliver it to the management
with precise information about its discovery. (In the event a similar communique is discovered in
an airborne aircraft, it should be treated as a warning received in the air.)
11.8.3 Management should interview the recipient of any call, or message in order to complete Bomb
Warning Report and relay it to the Assessment Team.
11.9 Bomb Warning Assessment (Aircraft on Ground and Other Cases)
a) A threat must be viewed for what it is, a statement expressing an intention to commit an act of
violence against a target.
b) Generally, a Bomb-Warning is designed to disrupt operations and alarm members of the

workforce. An assessment process should be in place for the assessment team to declare the
threat as ‘specific’, ‘non-specific’ or ‘hoax’. Process is explained in Paragraph 11.12.
c) Obtain as much details (referred to in Bomb Warning Report) about the warning as possible,
including the precise wordings from the person who received it.
11.10 Likely perpetrators are:
a) irate passengers / customers / environmentalist groups and competitors;
b) pranksters;
c) persons of unsound mind;
d) a person who has information regarding the planting of a bomb by a third party;
e) a group / person who has planted a bomb, but wishes to reverse the danger;
f) a group / person who has planted a bomb who wish/es to save human life but not property;
g) a group / person who wishes authorities to know that the security system has been penetrated,
but no destruction is intended;
Note: Chances are that the warning is genuine, if the originator is one of the last four (d - g).
11.11 Lakwin is responsible for the assessment of the risk posed by a Bomb-Warning issued against
them. Airport operator shall be informed of the warning and all known information
immediately. Both should agree on the assessment.
11.11.1 Post Holder for AVSEC should always take the lead in the assessment process.
11.11.2 The assessors should obtain full details of the warning message, ideally in the form of a Bomb
Warning Report from the person who completed it and by the fastest possible means.
11.11.3 If reachable, Post Holder for AVSEC should personally speak to the recipient of the threat call, or
the message, as the case may be, to obtain firsthand information.
11.12 Assessment TEam should assess the warning by working methodically through the Bomb
Warning Assessment Form (Annexure 2 to this chapter).
a) The form is designed to lead the team to a logical assessment of the warning as RED, AMBER or
GREEN. Although this procedure is largely dependent upon the provision of “yes” or “no” answers
to a series of questions, assessors must also take account of other factors that may contribute to
the credibility of the warning, particularly the “Background Details” area in the Bomb Warning
Assessment Form which includes the characteristics of the call as described in the Bomb
Warning Report.
b) Work through the Bomb Warning Assessment Form methodically from box 1A or 1B
onwards.
c) A tick in box 1A or I B and one or more ticks in box 2 (Positive Target Identification) would
normally lead to a RED or AMBER assessment. No ticks in box 2 would normally lead to an
AMBER or GREEN assessment.
d) Entries in box 3 [background data, e.g., a succession of previous similar warnings all of which
have been proved spurious or something in the nature of the (phone) call that indicates strongly
it is a hoax] may influence the assessment. If they do, the reasons for the re-assessment (if
done) must be recorded fully.
e) In judging the efficacy of the security measures in force whilst working through the routes to the
final assessment, it may become necessary to consult the airport security management.
f) It should be noted that a warning, with a valid reason such as to avoid casualties, is most likely
to be genuine. Likely scenario is that the caller seeks to get through with time and as much as
details, to react.
g) Following information may be of use if relevant:
i. Industrial unrest prevailing within Lakwin or at the airport;
ii. Political unrest in the country/city;
iii. Community disputes involving the airport;
iv. Similar (hoax) warnings received by Lakwin or another carrier at the airport recently;
v. Operation of a high-profile flight (preferably at the departure airport);
vi. Similar incidents having been recently reported in the media.
11.13 Definitions of the categories, to which the assessment would lead, are as follows:
Category RED
- A specific warning is judged as credible, when the threat is of a nature leading to the
identification of a specific target, or where the caller has positively identified himself or the
organization involved.
- Existing security measures are likely to have been compromised and may endanger people,
property or commercial activities and therefore merits countermeasures.
Category AMBER
- A non-specific warning that could be related to one or more targets, but doubt exists
about its credibility or about the effectiveness of the existing security measures.
- This may involve danger and may require countermeasures.
Category GREEN
- A warning that may not identify a target or a specific group of targets, or otherwise lacks
credibility.
- This does not justify countermeasures.
Annexure 1
BOMB-WARNING REPORT
This form should be completed by a senior official and forwarded to the Assessment Team. If the
warning is received by other means (other than over the phone), this form should be completed as
appropriate.
If any information is not applicable or not available, please indicate same by writing N/A.
Warning was received by (name and position) ……………………………………………………………………………..
on (date) ………………………………. at (time) ……………………….
Receiving Phone No: ………………………….. Location ………………………………………….
Originating Phone, No, ………………………… Language spoken: ………………………………..
Command of Language: Excellent Good Fair Poor (mark as appropriate)
Contact details of the recipient of the Warning: …………………………………………………………………….
Person to whom enquiries should be directed and contact details ……………………………………………………….
WARNING in exact words used:
WHERE is the bomb? (mark as appropriate)
Terminal Fuel Farm Cargo Area
Lakwin Premises Aircraft Other:
Details:
Did the caller sound familiar with the aircraft or building by the description of the bomb location?
YES / NO
WHEN will it explode? (mark as appropriate)
Time Date In-flight If moved
Other:
WHAT does it look like? (mark as appropriate)
Briefcase Carrier Bag Suitcase Box Parcel Mobile Phone
Other:
WHY are you doing this? (Why the call is given)
WHO are you?
Organization ………………………………………… Name …………………………………………. …..
Where are you now? ……………………………………………………………………………………..
Background details (Circle appropriate answers)
Origin of the call: Pay Phone Land Phone Mobile Phone Internal Local Overseas
Caller Characteristics:
Sex: ………… Approximate Age: ……… Language Fluency ……………………………..
VOICE CHARACTERISTICS SPEECH BACKGROUND NOISE

Loud Soft Fast Slow Quiet
High pitched Deep Distinct Distorted Mixed
Rasping Pleasant Stutter Nasal Trains
Intoxicated Other Slurred Music
Voices
ACCENT MANNER Kitchen
Local Calm Angry Aircraft
Foreign Rational Irrational Animals
Coherent Incoherent Office Machines
Emotional Deliberate Factory do
Righteous Laughing Street Traffic
Obscene Proper Party
Name of the person completed this form ……………………………………………………………..
Designation ………………………………………………………………………………………….
Contact details ………………………………………………………………………………………………
Date ……………………… Time ……………........

Signature: ……………………………….
Annexure 2
BOMB-WARNING ASSESSMENT FORM
WARNING DETAILS
From Flight No. Route
Time (24-hour clock): Location: Received by: Staff No.
Who advised the Assessment Team: Name: Position: Tel.
Receiving Telephone Number: Location of Receiving Phone:
Exact wording of the warning Assessors Signature
Taped? Yes / No Tracing Action? Yes / No
(1A) (1B)
Specific aircraft ID? /X Ground facility ID? /X

Flight No. / Carrier? Airport named?
Departure time? Terminal building ID?
Destination / Route? Airline facility ID?
Location of aircraft?
Aircraft type?
 
→ → → → (2)   
Positive Target Identification (P T I)  / X Comments
Specific aircraft ID?
Exact location of the device?
Technical description of device?
Device concealment location?
Specific passenger / crew member ID?
Terrorist or other organization named?
Terrorist Code Word used
Extortion / Political demands made?
Industry-type terms used?
Unique knowledge indicated?
 
→ (3) 
Background Data /X Influencing Factors
Recent warnings / incidents?
Influence of current events?
High-profile passenger (aircraft/airport)?
Late passengers for flight?
Additional airport security?
Spurious nature of the call?
Police opinion of warning (if relevant)
Rank/Name: local responsible official
 
    (4) → → → →
 
Positive Target Identification (PTI) Negative Target Identification
(specific target identified) (no specific target identified)
aircraft / facility Identified
 
Doubts over Yet doubts over  Confidence in PSM

PSM PSM
  
RED AMBER GREEN
PSM = Preventive Security Measures
In-flight Emergencies Page: 1 - 12
Chapter 12
In-flight Emergencies
12.1 Violence on Board
a) Two types
- Routine unruly passenger behaviour
- Such behaviour leading to a hijack situation
b) Recommended crew reaction to minimize above threats, vary from the simple verbal-warning to
the use of deadly-force.
c) In the event, a similar event occurs in board Lakwin aircraft, it is lawful for the Flight Crew to
take the above action, followed with immediate landing at the closest airport.
d) It is lawful for the Pilot-in-Command to restrain an unruly passenger. He may delegate this task
to a passenger.
e) Flight Crew or the passenger, is protected against prosecution, for taking such action in good
faith.
12.2 In-flight Bomb-Warnings
a) Contrary to those received on ground, In-flight Bomb Warnings are the ones received when
the aircraft is airborne. Methods of receiving such warnings on board Lakwin aircraft would be:
- an utterance made by a person on-board, and
- finding of a written note or graffiti on-board (very unlikely)
b) A warning communicated to the Flight Crew by ground-authorities, is not an Inflight Bomb

Warning
c) An utterance made by a person on board, based on the actual words, may constitute a Specific
Bomb Warning.
d) Immediate landing shall be carried out.
12.3 ATC Assistance:
a) If equipped, Transponder Code 7500 shall be activated.
b) ATC shall give priority to an aircraft under security-threat.
c) In case of any other emergency, the Code is 7700.
d) If a passenger has committed a serious penal offence on board, ATC should be requested, prior
to landing, to make arrangements for law enforcement officials to meet the aircraft.
12.4 Post-Landing Procedures
a) If the landing caused by a Bomb-Warning, the aircraft is guided to a remote location.
b) Immediate disembarkation of passengers and crew shall take place.
c) Pilot-in-Command has the legal right to deliver the concerned passenger to the law enforcement
officials. He/she shall assist them in the investigation process.
Incident Reporting Page: 1 - 13
Chapter 13
Incident Reporting
13.1 Incident Reporting:

Lakwin employees/agents operating at airports, by virtue of the fact that they are issued with an
airport restricted area access permit, are expected uphold airport security by:
a) complying with access control regulations and maintaining security measures in their work-area;
b) strictly abiding by the escort rules of the Airport Operator; and
c) reporting:
- any breach of access control procedures;
- the presence of firearms, other weapons or explosive devices anywhere within the airport;
- the presence of unattended baggage/parcels in the terminal buildings or public areas; and
- any situation or incident that could represent a security risk, which may be leading to the
compromising of the safety and/or security of the airport.
13.2 Further Clarifications:
a) An aviation security related incident could be defined as an actual, attempted, threatened or

suspected act, which may result in an Act of Unlawful Interference or a breach or malfunction of
the particular aviation security system.
b) It is incumbent upon Lakwin employees and/or agents to report (Attachment 1 to this chapter) to
the management the observations made with regard to the deficiencies in the company AVSEC
system or those applicable to the airport of operation if, in the opinion of such employee /agent,
they are likely to jeopardize the safety of the company aircraft operations or those of the airport
concerned.
c) This is a non-punitive process (unless grave negligence or willful misconduct is observed) and
employees and agents, if they wish to, have the option to remain anonymous when reporting.
d) It shall be the responsibility of the Post Holder for AVSEC, to ensure an effective system is in
place to ensure the above is implemented and to communicate to staff of this requirement.
e) Upon receipt of such report, Post Holder for AVSEC shall evaluate the report, make further
observations and take action to correct the deficiency if same is about the company security
system. If the deficiency is in respect of the airport of operation, same should be reported to the
Airport Operator.
f) Depending on the gravity of the deficiency, either within or at the airport, same should be
reported to the Appropriate Authority.
13.3 Categories of Reportable Incidents.

Events in each case may not be limited to those explained below.
a) Aircraft
- Tampering, Sabotage or Damage
- Unauthorized / suspicious persons found inside or in the vicinity
- Finding of unaccounted articles inside or in the visinity
b) Airport Access
- Perimeter breach
- Perimeter damage
- Presence of suspicious persons within the Controlled Area/SRA
- Unsecured / unmanned entry points to airside
- Tampering / breaking of gate locks
- Intrusion
c) Criminal
- Assault
- Disorderly conduct
- Drunken behavior
- Abuse / intimidation to airline / airport personnel
d) Screening events
- Unauthorized Prohibited Items / (undeclared) Dangerous Goods detected at screening
- Unauthorized Prohibited Items / (undeclared) Dangerous Goods found on board aircraft
- Un-serviceability of screening equipment
e) Suspicious events
- Suspicious items found in the terminal
- Suspicious vehicles parked in the close proximity to the terminal
f) Threats
- Bomb-Warning against aircraft
- Bomb-Warning airport facilities
Annexure 1
Incident Report Form
To: Post Holder for AVSEC
[What the reporting person witnessed or what eyewitnesses {with names (optional)} reported to
him/her]
Date/Time the Incident was Observed: ………………………………….. Location ………………………………
Incident:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Description of Injury to Persons and/or Damage to Property
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Date of Report: ……………………..
Details of the Reporting Person (Optional)
Name / Staff No / Position: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Phone No: (Official)……………………. (Private) …………………… E-mail ………………………………..
Signature ……………………

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Operator Security Programme

Administration and Control

00.1 Administration and Control of this Operator Security Programme (OSP)

00.2 Editorial Conventions

b) “Should” indicates that the application of a rule, procedure or provision is recommended.

c) “May” means that the application of a rule, procedure or provision is optional.

d) “(The) Company” means Lakwin Aviation (Pvt) Ltd.

00.3 Certificate of Compliance:

00.4 Number of Chapters

This OSP consists of Thirteen (13) chapters as follows:

Chapter 00 Administration and Control

Chapter 02 Security Policy and Organization

Chapter 03 Objectives of the OSP

Chapter 04 Legal Authority

Chapter 05 Definitions (and Abbreviations/Acronyms)

Chapter 06 National Obligations

Chapter 07 Roles and Duties

Chapter 08 Preventive Security Measures

Chapter 09 Quality Control

Chapter 10 AVSEC Training

Chapter 11 Bomb-Warnings on Ground

Chapter 12 Incident Reporting

00.5 System of Amendment and Revision:

b) Only approved amendments and revisions hereto, shall be included.

00.6 Distribution of Copies of this OSP:

b) Controlled copies shall be issued to the other authorized parties.

c) Distribution of the controlled copies shall be as follows:

Control Number Custodian

01 Appropriate Authority SL (original)

02 Post Holder for AVSEC (original)

03 Chief Executive Officer

05 Head of Flight Operations

06 Head of Ground Operations

07 Head of Engineering and Maintenance

08 Head of Quality Assurance

10 Head of Flight Control

11 Head of Security Services BIA

12 do Rajapaksa Intl Airport

13 do Colombo Intl Airport

00.7 Description of the Annotation of Page

Header of each page contains:

- Name of the OSP (Manual): Operator Security Programme

Footer of each page contains the company name.

00.8 Corporate Commitment by the Operator

b) Above responsibility extends, but not limited to the following:

- Compliance with all requirements and regulations communicated by the Appropriate

- Application of strict quality control standards to all AVSEC operations.

- Having Contingency Plans and an incident reporting system in place.

- Maintaining of the legality of AVSEC operations.

- Taking of appropriate disciplinary action against personnel involved in misconduct relating to

00.9 Executive Statement of Company Commitment to Aviation Security

a) It is acknowledged that Lakwin’s senior management has committed to implementation of AVSEC

c) AVSEC responsibility is shared by all company employees, agents and contractors.

Signed _________________ Date _____________

00.10 Approval of the Appropriate Authority

Signed __________________ Date ______________

Capt. Themiya Abeywickrama

Civil Authority of Sri Lanka,

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Page Number Revision Date

Page Number Revision Date

Page Number Revision Date

Intentionally left blank

b) It owns the following fleet:

Signed _____ Date _

Signed ____ Date