2012

1
2
3
( )

, 2012. 320
ISBN

ISBN

4
6

8
11
21
28
32

33
33
52
69
72

73
73
79
84
87

88
88
93
98
101

102
102
112
115
118

119
119
127
130
133

5
 135
135
140
145
149

150
150
159
165
168

170
170
173
177
180

181
181
194
206
209

210
210
222
227
229

6
 231
231
242
354
257

258
258
268
274
277

278
278
285
288
291

292
292
297
313
317

318

319
319
319

7
 -

8
 :
-

2011

9
10
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.

1)
2)
3)

11
 -

(1845 1890)

1)

2) -

3)

(1890 1933)

2) -

12
 (1933 )

2001 , ,

2002 ,

2003

2005 ,
).
2007

2009

-
-
-

13
 -
-
-
:

( )

14
 .

(circular flow model)

15
 -

, , , , , ,
, , ,

principium
:
1)

16
2)

3)
4)
5)

(opportunity cost)

,
. :
-

.
(production possibilities frontier)

:
-

17
 - ,

-
N -

25
24
20
N

15
M
10

10 20 28 34 38 40

18
 (law of increasing opportunity cost),

19
 -

(principle of comparative advantage)

20
 , ,

institutional environment)

21
 1.

2.

1000 80 ,
1000 : 80 ,
12,5 .

5
6

1.

22
 -
-
-
2.

- 12%;
- 20%.

1.
1.

2.
8

3.

2
29

- -

1. 0,12

2. (1,2 + 2

3. (1,2 +14

23
 .
X.
250,

X
( ), ( ).
300
1 12 .
25
400
1 14,815 .
27
250
1 12,5 .
20
320
1 14,545 .
22

25 = 200 .

200 = 100
.
400 8 + 320 8 + 250
.
, 100

24
 x 2 y 40,
4 x 2 y 100.
. 1.3
(25; 0),
(20; 10),

50

20 C

B
10

A
20 25 40

. 1.3.

M2 4M 2T 140 .

1)
2)
3)

4)

5)

25
 M2 4M 2T 140 , M 0 , 2T 140 , T 70 .

M2 4M 2T 140 , T 0 M2 4M 140
M2 4M 140 0 .

M 1, 2 2 4 140 2 12 ,
M1 2 12 14 , M 2 2 12 10 .

M 2 4M 2 40 140 M 2 4M 60 0 .
M 1, 2 2 4 60 2 8 . M1 6, M2 6 .

= 82 4 8 2T 140 T 22 .

70

B
40

C
22

D
6 8 10
1.4.

26
 - 24 : 8 = 3;
- 30 : 6 = 5;
- 24 : 4 = 6.

14

78

B
54

C
24

D
8 14 18

1.5.

27
 1. .
8=

30 : 6 4 =
24 + 20 =
44 =

480 : 24 2 = ,
480 : 30 2 =

40
2.

: 30 4 =
+ 0,8 =
8,8 =

: 6 0,2 =

. .

60

50

1.

2.

28
 3. , ,

4.

5.
,

6.

7.

1.

000

1)
2)
3)

4)

5)

2.

,
3.

28

4. ,

29
 5.

6.

15

20

7.

30

1.

2.

3.

4.

250 180
300 130

30
 5.

;
;
;

6.

500

:
;

7.

80

;
;
;

8.

31
 9.

10.

:
;
;
;

1. :
6- 1.
2.
. 1., . 1.
3. ;

. 1, 4.
4.
1998. . 1.
5.

6. 2-

7.
- . 1, 2.
8.

32
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.

2.1 .
(demand)

(individual demand) (market

demand)
(quantity demanded)

(demand price)

(law of demand).

33
 1. (income effect)

2. (substitution effect)

3. (law of diminishing marginal

utility)
,

(band wagon effect)),

.
P

18

12

4 D
2
Q
4 8 16 28 44

2.1. demand curve)

34
 (demand function)

Qd = f(P) = a bP,
P
Qd
,b
(a > 0, b > 0).

Pd = f(Q)

P(price) Q(quantity) D(demand)

( (determinants of demand)):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. -

6.

:
Qd = f( , N, , W, F, PS, PC, E),
Qd
P
N

35
 W
F
PS - substitute goods,
substitutes);
PC - complementary goods,
complements);
E

(change in quantity
demanded
(change in demand

-
-

D1

D0

D2
Q

. 2.2. D1 D2)

(normal goods) (Giffen

goods)

36
 (elasticity of demand).
(coefficient of price
elasticity of demand)

Q
E pd ,
P
d
p
, %;
.
(coefficient of income
elasticity of demand)

Q
EId ,
I
d
I
, %;
.
(coefficient of cross
elasticity of demand)
Y
d QX
E XY ,
PY
d
XY
X , %;
Y Y, %.

37
 ,

Q2 Q1 P P
E pd ( 100%) /( 2 1 100%) ,
Q P
Q1
Q2
Q

Q2 Q1
Q ,
2
1
2

P2 P1
P .
2

Q2 Q1 P2 P1
E pd ,
P2 P1 Q2 Q1
1
2
Q1
Q2

(coefficient of arc elasticity of demand).

(coefficient of point-price elasticity)),

dQ P0
E pd ,
dP Q0
dQ
dP
0
Q0

38
 . 2.3.
P
D1
D3

D4

D5

D2

Q
. 2.3.

D1 perfectly inelastic demand)

= 0.
D2 perfectly elastic demand -
.
D3 inelastic demand), < 1.
D4 unit (or unitary) elastic
demand), 1.
D5 elastic demand), 1.

Q AP .

1.

2.
.
3.
4.

39
 5.

(TR (total revenue))

P TR
P TR

TR

(TR)

P TR
P TR

2.2
(supply)

individual and
market supply

(quantity supplied)

(supply price)

(law of supply).

1.

40
2.

10 S

2
1
Q
4 20 32 36 39 40
2.4.

(supply function).

Qs =f(P) = P,
P
Qd
c, d (c > 0, d > 0).

1)
2)
3)
4) -
5)

41
 6)

Qs = f(P, N, Pres, Tech, , T/S, E),

Qs
P
N
Pres
Tech
K -
T/S
E

-
-

S2
S0
S1

Q
. 2.4. S1 S2 )

(elasticity of supply).

42
 .
(coefficient of price
elasticity of supply)

Q
E ps ,
P
s
p
, %;
, %.

1. (instant run market period)

s = 0).

P
S0

P1

D1

P0

D0

Q
Q0
2.5.

2. (short run market period)

2.6).

0 < 1).

43
 P
S0

P1
D1

P0

D0

Q
Q0 Q1
. 2.6.

3. (long run market period) .

s> 1
P

D1

D0
S0

P1
P0

Q
Q0 Q1
. 2.7.

1.

44
 2.

3.

4.

(market equilibrium).

(equilibrium price)
(
(equilibrium quantity)
(QE).

E
PE

Q
QE

. 2.8.

45
 E= PS D,
E
PS
D
, Q = QS = QD,
Q ;
QS
QD
(partial market equilibrium),

(general equilibrium)

QD = a bP,
QS = c + dP a, b, c, d Q =a bP = c + dP.

a c ad bc
PE QE .
b d b d

( ) (consumer surplus).
(

( )
(producer surplus) (
(economic profit).

,
,
( ).

(social surplus),

46
 P

PE

D
Q
QE
. 2.9.

).
P
P

S
D S

PS

PD

D
Q
Q QD QS

. . . .

( )

47
 excess demand

(excess supply

Q2 Q1
(P2 1

P P

S S

P2 P2

E
PE E PE

P1 P1

D D

Q Q
Q1 QE Q2 Q1 QE Q2

. 2.11.

(cobweb model)
,

48
 QSt = S(Pt -1) Q St t;
t -1 t 1 t.
P
P
S S

Q Q

. 2.12.

S D

D
S ),

49
2.4.

(indirect tax)

S1

E1
P1 t
S0
E0
P0
P2

D0

Q
Q1 Q0
. 2.13.

, (subsidies).

50
P

S0

E0
P0
S1
E1
P1

Q
Q0 Q1
. 2.14

(price fixation),

.).
(deficit).

P
S1

P1 E1
S0
E0
P0

P*
D0

Q
Q1 Q0 Q2
. 2.15.

, Q2 Q1,

51
 S1.
S0 S1

*
1)
( 0

. Q1 = 40
Q2 = 36 Q3 = 40

1 + Q2 + Q 3 = 116
< 1 + Q2

A
8

B
6
C
5

D
Q
16 26 116

. 2.15.

: 8);
5); D(116, 0).
.
Qd1 = 6 0,2P1 Qs1 = 1 + 0,2P1.

Qd2 = 3 0,1P2, Qs2 = 1 + 0,4P2.

52
 1.

2.

1.

6 0,2P1 = 1 + 0,2P1,
0,4P1 = 5,
P1

3 0,1P2 = 1 + 0,4P2,
0,5P2 = 4,
P2
2.

Qd1 + Qd2 = Qs1 + Qs2,

(6 0,2P) + (3 0,1P) = (1 + 0,2P) + ( 1 + 0,4P),
6 0,2P + 3 0,1P = 1 + 0,2P 1 + 0,4P,
9 0,3 = 0,6 ,
9 = 0,9 ,

2-

Qs2 Qd2 = Qd1 Qs1,

( 1 + 0,4P) (3 0,1P) = (6 0,2P) (1 + 0,2P),
1 + 0,4 P 3 + 0,1P = 6 0,2P 1 0,2P,
4 + 0,5 = 5 0,4 ,
0,9 = 9,

1. P1 P2 . 2.
. QDt = 200 0,5Pt,
S
Q t = 0,7Pt-1 10, t = 0,

53
 1.

2.

1. QDt = QS t
Pt = Pt-1.
P 10 = 200 0,5P P* = 175; Q* = 112,5.

QD1 = 230 0,5P1; QS1 P1 = 460 2 112,5 = 235.

S2
Q = 0,7 235 10 = 154,5; P2 = 460 2 154,5 = 151.
QS3 = 0,7 151 10 = 95,7; P3 = 460 2 95,7 = 268,6.
QS4 = 0,7 268,6 10 = 190,62; P4 = 460 2 190,62 = 78,76.

2.
0,7P 10 = 230 P * = 200; Q * = 130.

1.

. 2.16.
P

. 2.16.

.
N

54
 2.17
P

S1 S2

10

D1

Q
2000 3000
. 2.17.

( P1 P2 ) (Q2 Q1 )
( P1 P2 ) Q1 =
2
(10 8) (3000 2000)
= (10 8) 2000 +
2
8) (3000
:

.
X: QD = 80 4 S =P Y: QD = 8 0,3 S =
0,2P + Z: QD = 95 6 S = 4P + 15.

X, Y, Z.

Q1 = f(P1) = f(P0 + t).

55
T = t Q1
CSl = (P1 P0) Q1 PSl = T CSl.

Esp >>Edp,
CSl >>PSl

Edp >> Esp PSl >> CSl

P
S1

P1 S0
t
P0

D1

Q
Q1 Q0
. 2.18.

DWL = 0,5t (Q0 Q1).

- Tmax > DWL.

Edp 0 Esp -

T < DWL
Edp >>1 s
p >>1

QD = QS0 => 80 4P0 = P0 10 => 5P0 = 90 => P0 = 18 Q0 = 8;

QD = QS1 => 80 4P1 = (P1 5) 10 => 5P1 = 95 => P1 = 19 Q1 = 4,

56
T = 5 4 = 20 => DWL = 0,5 5 (8 4) = 10 < T,
CSl = (19 18) 4 = 4, PSl = 20 4 = 16 > CSl.
Y
QD = QS0 => 8 0,3P0 = 0,2P0 + 3 => P0 = 10 Q0 = 5;
QD = QS1 => 8 0,3P1 = 0,2(P1 5) + 3 => P1 = 12; Q1 = 4,4;
T = 5 4,4 = 22 => DWL = 0,5 5 0,6=1,5 << T;
CSl = (12 10) 4,4= 8,8; PSl =22 8,8 = 13,2 > CSl.
Z: .
QD= QS0 => 95 6P0 = 4P0 + 15 => P0 = 8; Q0 = 47,
QD= QS1 => 95 6P1 = 4(P1 5) + 15 => P1 = 10; Q1 = 35,
T = 5 35 = 175 => DWL = 0,5 5 12 = 30 << T,
CSl = (10 8) 35 = 70, PSl = 175 70 = 105 > CSl.

Y Z
.
Q1 = 2P 6; Q2 = 3P 15; Q3 = 5P

Q = Q1 + Q3 = 7P 6.

dQ P 4,5
E ps =7 1,24 .
dP Q 31,5 6
:
1,24.

.
Q1s = 8 + 2,5 2
s
= 9+ 3
s
= 3 + 0,5P.
d
Q = 40 2

57
 Qd = 40 2

Qs = Q1s + Q2s + Q3s = 20 + 4 .

2 = 20 + 4 = 10; Q = 20.

dQ P 10 Q1 Q0 P1 P0 40 2 P 20 P 10
= = 2 1 E 1.
dP Q 20 Q0 P0 20 10

1
3
2
,
3

P 2
= 2 .
40 2 P 3
P = 8, Qd = 40 2 = 24.

Qs = Q1s + Q3s = 11 + 3 = 13.

Qd Qs = 24 13 = 11.
: .
.

30
90
d = 1, Es= 4/3.
1.

2. 7

3.

1.
Qd = a bP
Qs = x + yP.

58
 b

P P
E pd b , E ps y .
Qd Qs

b
30
1 b b 3.
90

:
a Qd bP 90 3 30 180 .

Qd = 180 3P.

4 30
y y 4,
3 90
x Qs yP 90 4 30 30 .

Qs = 30 + 4P.

Qd = Qs; 180 3P= 30 + 4P; P0 = 30, Q0 = 90.

2.
.:
Qs1 30 4( P 7) 30 4P 28 58 4P .

Qs1 Qd ,
58 4P 180 3P P1 34 .

1
Q1 = 180 3 34 =

7Q1 = 7 78 = 546 .

( 1 0)
Q1 = (34 30) 78 =
312 : 546 = 0,571,

546 312 = .,
: 546 = 0,429,

3.
t .
Qs1 30 4( P t ) 30 4P 4t .

59
 Qs1 Qd ,
4
30 4 P t 180 3P Pt 30 t.
7
t
4 12
Qt: Qt 180 3(30 t) 90 t
7 7

12 12 2
Qt = t (90 t) 90t t .
7 7
t,

2
+ + :
*
b
t .
2a *
* *
= 12/7.
*
b 90
t 26, 25 .
2a* 12
2
7

2-
dT/dt
dT 24 24
90 t ; 90 t 0 ; t = 26,25 .
dt 7 7
1. Qd = 180 3P, Qs = 30 + 4P. 2.

. 3. 2 .
.

150%.

Ed Ed
Ed Ed
Q P
Ed : Q
Q P
P = 0,08

60
 TR = P Q
TR = 1,15 = Q= 1,25.
Q = 0,25Q.
Q P
Ed = :
Q P

0,25Q 0,08P
Ed = : 0,25 : 0,08 = 3,125.
Q P
Ed = 3,125 : 2,5 = 1,25.
Ed = 1,25 <

:2 2=

:
.
QD = 65 0,2Px + 0,03Py + 0,001I
QD
Px ;
Py Y;

x y

1.
2.
.
3.
.
4.
.
5. .

1. = 100 = = Qx
Qx = 65 0,2 + 0,03 + ,
Qx = 65 0,2 100 + 0,03 500 + 0,001 100000 = 160,

61
 Qx = 160.
2.
Q P Q P
E pd : ,
Q P P Q
Q
=
P
= 100; Q = 160.
100
, E pd = 0,2 = 0,125.
160

3.

Q I Q I
Eid : ;
Q I I Q
Q
= ),
I
Qx = 160; = 100000,
100000
Eid = 0,001 0,625.
160

3.
Qx Py Qx Py
E xyd : ,
Qx Py Py Qx
Qx
=
Py
= 500; Qx = 160.
500
E xyd = 0,03 = 0,09375.
160
- Y.
5. X
Px Qx 100 160
. X 0,16
I 100000

1. . 2. 0,125. 3. 0,625. 4. 0, 09375. 5. 16%.

.
QS = 4

1)

62
 2)

3)
Q = 200.
4)

4 80 = 200,

0,5( min) Q ,
min:
4 80 = 0,
min
0,5(70 20)
0,8
0,5( max ) Q
max:
4000 = 0,5( max 70) 200,
max

0 y y0
1 0 y1 y0
Q 200 P 70
,
0 200 110 70
Q 200 = 350 5P,
QD = 550 5P.
5 80
1/2 (110 80) 150
= ,

Q = 150.
150 = 4 80,
= 57,5.
1/2 (57,5 20) 150 + (80 57,5) 150
= 6187,5.
: 5000 ,

0,5(80 70)(200 150) + 0,5(70 57,5)(200 150) = 562,5.

63
 D Q0 Q1
P P0
3. P= : 1 ,
Q0 P0
D 550 5 200 70 5( 70) 70
P= : = 1,75 .
200 70 200 70
D
P >1 .
4.
P

110

S
B
80
E
70

57,5 A
D

20

Q
150 200
. 2.19.

13.

(
. 2.20

95

40

64
 80 140 Q

. 2.20.

Qd1 = a bP, Qd2 = m nP, Q > 80

Qd1+d2 = (a + m) (b + n)P
Qs = l + kP.
Q P = 40,
8/7).
(b + n)P/Q = 8/7 => (b + n) = 8 140 : 7 40 =
:
140 = (a + m) 40 a + m) = 300.
Qd1+d2 = 300 4P.

Qd1+d2 = 300 4P; 80 = 300 4P => P = 55.

Q P Q P a = 190, b
Qd1 = 190 2P.
b + n = 4, b = 2, n a + m = 300, a m = 110.
Qd2 = 110 2P.
Q P Q
P Qs = 4P 20.

P
Qd = 190 2P P
300 4P P 55

Q = 190 2(P + t 190 2(P + t) = 4P

P = 35 1t Q = 120 4t/3.
Q t
2
t (120 4t/3) = 120t 4t /3.
t
y = 120t 4t2 t = 120/( 24/3) = 45.

65
Q = 300 4(P + t 300 4(P + t) = 4P
P = 40 0,5t Q = 140 2t
80 Q t
: t (140 2t) = 140t 2t2
t
t = 140/(
t 2400

: Qd1 = 190 2P, Qd2 = 110 2P, Qs = 4P 20.

.
QS = a + bP, QD = c dP,
.

P
S0

PB

A B
PM + t

PM C D D0

. 2.21.

+t

ABDC, q t, q
), t ).
t qt,
(qt)'

66
 QS = a + bP; QD = c dP), q
q = QD QS,
q c d ( P t ) (a b( P t ))
c dP dt a bP bt.

QS = QD,
a bP c dP ; a c dP bP .
q,
q c dP dt c dP bP bP bt
dP bP bP bt dP dt.
qt dPt bPt bP t bt 2 dP t dt 2 .
qt dP bP bP 2bt dP 2dt.

2bt 2dt bP dP bP dP
2t (b d ) P (b d ) P (b d )
P P
t .
2
:
.
2

.
QD = 15 P (Q ,
QS = 2 (Q

3
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

67
 6.

7.

. 2.22
.
P
D =15 P S =2P

4B

0 Q
6 8 11 12

. 2.22.

= = =
= d;
1) );
2) (3 + 1 = 4 ),

3)
(8 (12 6 =
(11 8=3
4) +b+c+d );
5)
1=
(7 );
6) b+d );
7) .

(3 +b+c+d

68
 (7
, b + c + d (1,5 ).

1. , ,
?
2.

4.

5. ,
,

6.
,

7.

8. ,
,

9.

69
 1.

2.

3.
Y

4. QX = 14 PX + 0,1PY
Y
Y.
5. QD = 8 P
QS = 7 + 2P
6. QD = 14 2P,
QS = 4 + 2P

7. QD = 7 P
QS = 5 + 2P

8. QD = 8 P
QS = 4 + 2P.

1. :

-
-

2.

70
3.

4.

2004 30000
2005 50000

;
;
.
.
?
) );
) );
) );
) ).
5.

6.

7. :

71
8.
QS = 10P7 QS = 7043:

.
9.

10.

1.
1.
2. /
6- 15, 16.
3.
. 2.
4. ;

. 6.
5.
3.
6. 2-
, 3.
7.
; - . 2, 3, 4.
8. -
3.

72
3.1.
3.2.

1)
3)

(cardinal theory)
(consumer behavior)
,
(ordinal theory)

3.1.
( )

(law of diminishing marginal utility)

(Gossen's First Law).

73
 MU (

TU ( ),

U MU

Max

Q
A B

Q
A B

. 3.1.

(utility function)

TU = f(Q).

MU = d(TU)/d(Q).
optimal
consumption bundle)

74
 .
(2- )
(law of equi-marginal utility, Gossen's Second Law)

MU 1 MU 2 MU n
... , MU1, MU2, , MU
P1 P2 Pn
1, 2,...,

3.2

1.

2.
-

3.

.
4.

-
5.

75
 (indifference curve)

Y1

Y2

X
X1 X2
. 3.2.

U3
U2
U1
X
. 3.3.

76
 (marginal rate of substitution MRS)

X Y

y
MRS xy ,
x
y dy
MRS xy lim .
x 0 x dx

MRS =

Y Y
Y MUY
MU
YMUY .

Y MU X
YMUY = ,
X MU Y
y MU X
MRS xy MRSxy = .
x MU Y

(budget line)

Y
X, Y Y
:
X YY,
)
I PX
Y= X,
PY PY

77
 X Y

= 0, Y = Y
Y. Y = 0, X =
(budget
constraint):
Y

1 / PY

- PX / P Y
X
1 / PX

. 3.4.

(consumer equilibrium)

Y* E

U3
U2
U1

X
X*
. 3.5.

PX
MRSxy = .
PY

78
 .
,
,
xc (1 xâ )
TU ,
2
x ,
x ,

x x TU = max.
x >

x =x.
x x
2
xc (1 xc ) xc xc
y .
2 2

x = 0,5.
: .

. U x 2 y
y
10
.

90 10 y
: x . (1)
Px

MU x MU y
(2)
Px Py

79
 1
MUx = 1, MUy = .
y

1 1 Px2
y . (3)
Px 10 y 100

90 Px 900 Px2
x x . (4)
Px 10 10 Px

900 Px2 > Px < 30.

90 Px
x , 30,
Px 10
0, .
90 Px
x Px < = 0.
Px 10

. A

( 2).

32 .
.

(a1; b1) = (24; 36), (a2; b2)

a2 = b2, (a3; b3) = (32; b3). U (a1; b1)
=U (a2; b2) = U (a3; b3) b3.

a = b.
a<b
U (a; b) = da + cb. MRS = 2 = d
U (a; b) b
(a2; b2):
U (a1; b1) = U (a2; b2),
2 1 + cb1 = 2 2 + cb2,

80
 2 24 36 = 3 2,
a2 = b2 = 28.

a>b U (a; b) =
+ 2cb (a3; b3)
3+ 2cb3 2 + 2cb2,
32 + 2cb3 = 3 28,
b3 = 26.
: = 26.
.
108 8
0, 5
x y 0, 5 1

2 + 8 = 108 (1)

MU x MU y
. (2)
Px Py
MUx MUy
x y
x 0, 5 y 0, 5 1

TU x 0, 5 y 0, 5 .
, MUx = TU`x= 0,5 -0,5 0,5
y ; MUy = TU`y= 0,5y -0,5 x0,5.
0,5
0,5 x y 0,5 0,5 x 0,5 y 0,5
,
2 8 (3)
2 x 8 y 108.
= 27, y = 6,75.

TU x y I,
x y Px Py,

I 0,5 108
x = 27 ;
Px 0,5 0,5 2
I 0,5 108
y = 6,75.
Py 0,5 0,5 8
= 27, = 6,75.

81
 .
u( x1 , x2 ) x1 2 x2 ,
u( x1 , x2 ) 2 ln x1 2 x2 ,
u( x1 , x2 ) min x1 , x2 :

u( x1 , x2 ) x1 2 x2 .

u x1
x1 2 x2 u x2 .
2 2
:
x2

U3
U2
U1

x1

. 3.5.
u
MU 1 x1 1
MRS 1, 2
MU 2 u 2
x2

2 1
u( x1 , x2 ) 2 ln x1 2 x2 .
2 ln x1 2 x2 u.
u
2 x2 ln x1 .
2

82
 . 3.6:
x2

U1 U2 U3

x1

. 3.6.
u
MU 1 x1 1
MRS 1, 2 .
MU 2 u x1
x2
u( x1 , x2 ) min x1 , x2 .
:
u x2 x2 x1 ,
min x1 , x2
u x1 x2 x1 .
. 3.7:
x2

U2

U1

x1

. 3.7.

:
u
MU 1 x1 0
MRS 1, 2 0 ÿêùî x 2 x1 ,
MU 2 u 1
x2

83
 u
MU 1 x1 1
MRS 1, 2 ÿêùî x 2 x1 ,
MU 2 u 0
x2
MRS1, 2 , x2 x1 .

1. , ,
,

2.
,

, ,

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

1. = 2X1 X2 I = 70
1 2 X1 X2
3. Y
Y
Y

84
 4.

5. TU = 4X Y2 X Y

2) 4).
6. TU = 8X + 12Y + 16Z.
Y i Z,

7. ,
2 3
TU = X + X .

8. TU = 2X Y

5).

1.

2.

.
3.
-

85
 4.
Y Z

Y Z?
MUY = 20; MUZ = 40;
MUY = 40; MUZ = 20;
MUY = 10; MUZ = 40;
MUY = 10; MUZ = 5.
5.

6. Y
Y

Y
;
Y;
Y
7.
Y = 45 0,6X Y

:
Y = 54 0,72X;
Y = 42 0,6X;
Y = 36 0,48X;
Y = 15 12X.
8. X Y

X= Y
MRSxy =
X Y
X Y
X Y
X Y

86
 9.

2/3;
3/2;
5/6;
6/5.
10. TU = X Y
PX PY

6 + 4Y;
3X + 6Y;
2X + 3,3Y;
6Y + 3X.

1.
1. 384
2. :
6- 2 5.
3.
. 3.
4. ;

5.
5.
. 5 7.
6. :
1998. . 3.
7.

8. 2-
.
9. -
4.

87
4.1.
4.2.

4.1.

( income consumption curve),

(line of life level) . 4.1)
-

Y4
Y3
Y2
Y1

X
X1 X2 X3 X4
. 4.1.

1896).

(Engel graph).

88
(Engel curves)

I
. 4.2.

QD a1 I /( I b1 ) , a1 > 0, b1 > 0.
QD 1.
QD a2 ( I b2 )(² ñ2 ) b2 ,
a2 > 1, 2 >0

QD a3 ( I b3 )( 3 ) b3, b3 > b2,

3> 0.

( price consumption
curve).

4.3).

89
 Y

U1
U2 U3 U4 D

X
X1 X2 X3 X4
PX

PX1

PX2

PX3
PX4
D

X
X1 X2 X3 X4
. 4.3. -

4.2.

(Slutsky method)

90
 (Hicksian
method)

(income-compensated budget line),

E2
E0
U2
E1

U1

. 4.4.

91
 Y

E2

U2

E0
E1

U1
U1
X

. 4.5.

4.6).

. 4.6.

92
 ,
,

(compensated demand curve)

. 1 2.
U x1 , x2 4 x1 x2 x1 1, x2
2.
1.

4), (9, ?), (4, ?), (1, ?).

2. 1
2
1 2
3. 1.

U 4 x1 4 20 . 1=
U 4 9 x2 20 2=
20 12 =
U 4 4 x2 20 x2 = 20 8 =
U 4 1 x2 20 x2 = 20 4 =
U 4 0 x2 20 x2 =
2. PX1 x1 + PX2 x2 = 24,
x1 + 2x2 = 24,
x2 = 12 0,5x1,
0,5
1 Px1 MU 1 4 0,5 x 2
,
2 Px 2 MU 2 1 x1
x1 4 , x1
x2 = 12 0,5 16 = 12
1 2.
3. x1, x2
MU 1 Px1
.
MU 2 Px 2
2
2 Px1 4 Px 2
= . x1 2
.
x1 Px 2 Px1

93
 2.
= 4X + 6Y. X Y,
Y

1)
2)

1.

: MUX /PX = MUY /PY.

X Y
Y
MRS: MRSXY = MUX/MUY = 4/6.
MUX/MUY = PX/PY = 4/6.
= 4 Y = 6, 1
U1, -

0 QX 12 .

> 4),
Y X U1
(MRS PX / PY ) .
Y

< 4

2 = 3), 3
U1,

U2, U3.
b, c, d
<4
QD ( X ) 48 / PX
( b, c, d)

94
 Y

16 U3

10,7 U2
U1
8

B1 B2 B3
Y 12 16 24

16

10,7
a
8

b c d
X
PX 12 16 24

a b
4
c
3
d
2 D

X
12 16 24
. 4.7.

.
Mini

Medium

95
 Maxi

1.

2.

3.

y
1.
1. Mini: 5x y 1000 .
Medium:
100 2 x y 1000,
2x y 900 x 0, 100 ,
100 2 100 1 x 100 y 1000,
x y 800 x 100, 800 .
Maxi:
1000 500 y,
y 500 x 0, 400 ,
1000 500 1 x 400 y,
x y 900 x 400, 900 .
2.
4.8.
Y
1000

900
700 Medium

500

Maxi
Mini

100 200 400 800 900

. 4.8.

96
 4.9):
Y
1000

900
700 Medium

500

Maxi
Mini

100 200 400 800 900

. 4.9.

.
U(A, B) = (Q 4) (Q 6).
PA = 1, PB = 1,5.

B P = 2. ?

I QA 1,5QB .

QB 6 1
.
QA 4 1,5

QA 29,5, QB 23.

U A, B QA 4 QB 6 25,5 17 433,5.

QA 4 433,5 / QB 6.

97
 I 1 Q A 2QB ,
QB 6 1
,
QA 4 2
Q A 28, QB 18.

QA pB 433,5
; 2
2;
QB p A QB 6
QB 20,72; QA 4 433,5 / 14,72 33,45.

QA 33,45 29,5 3,95; QB 20,72 23 2,28;

QA 28 33,45 5,45; QB 18 20,72 2,72.

: 5,45;

1. , -

2.

,
3.

4.

5. ,

6. ,

98
 1. Y

80

2.

Y Y

3. Y
Y
=
= 10.

-
Y.
4. Y

40 60 80 200
5 7,5 10 15 30
Y 2 3 6
Y
.
5. TU = X Y
Y

6. X Y.
0,5 0,5
TU = X Y X
Y
Y. X Y.

1. ,

X Y

99
 2.

3. ,

X Y

4.

5.

6.

)
7.

100
 8.

9.

10.

1.
1.
2. :
6- 6, 8.
3. -
. 3.
4. ;

. 5.
5.
- 4.
6.

101
 5

5.1.

5.2.
5.3.

(production)

(theory of marginal productivity),

5.1.

(production
function)

102
 Q = f (F1, F2,..., Fn),

Q
F1 f1;
F2 f2;
Fn fn.

Q = f (L, K).

Cobb Douglas
production function):

Q AL K ,

> 0);

(0 < < 1,
0 < < 1).

103
 (TP total product)

(AP average product)

(MP

TP MP ,
TP
AP ,
F
dTP
MP .
dF

(law of diminishing
returns (diminishing marginal productivity))

5.1).

104
 TP

TP

MP,
AP

MP AP
F

. 5.1. F

(cost minimization problem),

MP1 MP2 MPn

... ,
P1 P2 Pn

MP1, MP2, , MPn

P1, P2, n

105
 ,

(profit maximization problem)

(marginal productivity in
terms of money)

MRP1 MRP2 MRPn

... 1,
P1 P2 Pn

MRP1, MRP2, MRPn

MRP = MP , MP

P1, P2, n

4.2.

(isoquant)

106
 (isoquant
map) L K).

K
III
II
I

K1

K2
15
K3 10
5
L
L1 L2 L3

. 5.2.

, ,

MRTS (
),

K MPL
MRTS LK ,
L MPK
MRTSLK

(isocost line)

107
 L K
L K

I PL
LL+ PKK, K= L,
PK PK

L K

L = 0, =
= 0, L= L
5.3.).
K

/r

w/r
L
/w

. 5.3.

III
II
I

L
. 5.4.

108
 PL
MRTSLK = .
PK

(
path)
. 5.5)
- -

K4
K3
K2
K1

L
L1 L2 L3 L4

. 5.5.

(increased return to
scale (IRS

(decreased return to scale

(DRS
(constant
return to scale (CRTS)).

109
 ,

K
S

40
30
20

10
L
5.6.

,
Q AL K , + > 1,
+ =1 + <1

110
 (minimum efficient
scale)

. 5.7).

Q1
Q2 Q3 Q4

L
L1 L2 L3 L4
PL

PL1

PL2

PL3
PL4
D

L
L1 L2 L3 L4

5.7.

111
(substitution effect) (output effect)

0 0,6
40 1,0
60 1,3
80 1,4
100 1,45

0 1,0
20 1,1
40 1,4
60 1,65
80 1,65
100 1,65
:
. .
.
3
0,03 . .

112
 0 0,6 36 20 2,6 0 13,4
60) 0,6)
40 1,0 60 20 3,0 20 17,0
60 1,3 78 20 3,3 30 24,7
80 1,4 84 20 3,4 40 20,6
100 1,45 87 20 3,45 50 13,55
.

0 1,0 60 20 3,0 0 37
20 1,1 66 20 3,1 6 36,9
40 1,4 84 20 3,4 12 48,6
60 1,65 99 20 3,65 18 57,35
80 1,65 99 20 3,65 24 51,35
100 1,65 99 20 3,65 30 45,35
.

(24,7+57,35),

102,
. X
L K

113
 MPL

1 11 1 24
2 9 2 21
3 8 3 18
4 7 4 15
5 6 5 9
6 4 6 6
7 1 7 3
1.
X 80

2.

3.

1.
MPL MPK
;
PL PK

2
Q = 80
=4 1+2
Pr = 80
2.
.

: PL = MRPL; P = MRP

3. Q = (11 + 9 + 8 + 7 + 6 + 4 + 1) + (24 + 21 + 18 + 15 + 9 + 6 + 3) =
142 ( );
Q = 142
=7 1+7
Pr = TR = 142
: 1. . 2. L = 7, K = 7. 3.
. Q=K L
4

114
 MPL/PL= MPK/PK,
dQ
MPL= =0,75K 1/4 L -1/4,
dL
dQ
MPK= =0,25K -3/4 L 3/4.
dK
0,75K 1/4 L -1/4/PL= 0,25K -3/4 L 3/4/PK, 3K/PL= L/PK.
3K/12 = L/ K = L.
=K L K = L.
K=L=

1.

2. .

3.

4. , ,

,
5.

6. ,

7.
f( ) = AK L
+
( +

115
 1.

?
2.

7 ,

3. Q = 4L0,5K L

8.
4. Q = 0,5L0,5 .

L = 4, = 8.
5.
100

6. Q = KL0,5

1.
):
;
;
-

2.

116
 3.
):

;
-

4.

5.

6.

7.
f( , L) = 0,57K0,7L0,3

8.

117
 9. Q = 5L0,5K L

10. Q = (KL)0,5 2,

1.
6- 17 19.
2.
1, 7.
3. , 2007.
6.
4. 2-
6.
5. -
5.
6.
1996.
7.

118
 6

6.1.
6.2.

6.3.

- -

119
 (explicit costs)

( ) (total revenue)
(accounting profit).
.
(implicit costs)
2) (normal profit)

(economic profit)

TR

6.1.

120
 (FC fixed cost)

6.2.
C

C0 FC

Q
6.2.

(VC )

121
 Q1

VC

Q
Q1
6.3.

(TC total cost)

Q):
= f(Q). = FC + VC,
.

TC

VC

FC

Q
6.4.

122
 (AFC av )
AFC = FC/Q.

C1

C2 AFC

Q
Q1 Q2
. 6.5.

(AVC )
Q: AVC = VC/Q

Q1 .

AVC

Q
Q1
6.6

123
 (ATC, AC average total cost)

AFC
AVC):
= (FC + VC)/Q.

ATC

AVC

AFC

Q
Q1
. 6.7.

(MC )

dTC d ( FC VC ) dVC
MC .
dQ dQ dQ

MC <
MC >

, .

124
 C

MC
ATC

AVC

6.8.

MP
AP

MP,
AP

AP

MP

MC, MC
AVC
AVC

Q
6.9.

125
5.3.

,
Pr ( )
TR (total revenue) ;
(total cost)

TR,
C
TC
TR(Q)

Max
(Q)

Q
. 6.10.

( )
(MPr)
(MR) (MC).
d Pr d (TR TC)
MR MC 0, MR = MC.
dQ dQ
MR MC
(
maximization problem).

126
10

200

)
)

+ : 50/10 + 10 + 200 = 215

( ).
)
)

: 0,5 12 + (50 + 10) 0,1 =

+ 12 = 227 ( ).

227 = 3 ( ).

127
 TVC
AVC AVC = 200);
Q
w w = 3000);
N
q

q = Q/N.

AVC = TVC/Q .

TVC = w N.

Q = w N/AVC.
Q
q = w N : (AVC N) = w/AVC.

q = 3000 :
:

= 22 + 3Q3 + 2Q2 8Q.

3 4 2 3
TC MC 22Q Q Q 4Q 2 C.
4 3

3 4 2 3
Pr 1000 (22 5 5 5 4 52 55) 383 ( ).
4 3
:

128
 = 162 0,5(30 Q)2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1. Q = 0, TC , Q = 0,
TC = FC. FC = 288.
2.
'
= 0.
= 162 0,5(30 Q)2 = 30Q 0,5Q2 288
'
= 30 Q = 0
Q = 30.
3. 30 = 2700.
= 162 0,5(30 30)2 = 162.
5. Q=
30 (288 + VC), VC = 2250.
TR = TC ,
= 0.
0 = 162 0,5(30 Q)2,
0,5(30 Q)2 = 162,
(30 Q)2 = 324,
|30 Q| = 18,
Q1 = 12,
Q2 = 48.
,
Q1 = 12, TR = TC = 90 12 = 1080.
FC VC12 = 1080 288 = 792. 12 = 792 : 12 = 66.
Q1 = 48, TR = TC = 90 48 = 4320. FC = 288,
VC48 = 4320 288 = 4032. 48 = 4032 : 48 = 84.
:
C, R TC
TR
4320

2700

162
1080
12 30 48 Q
-288
12 30 48 Q

129
 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

7.

8.

9.
10.

1.
= 30 + 6Q + Q2
Q.
2. MC = 5 + 2Q

5.
3.
3000

Q.

4.

130
5.

Q AFC VC ATC MC TC
0
10 20
20
30 11 390
40 420
50 2 14
6.

7.
TC 30 40 60 80 130 220
Q 1 20 40 60 80 100

VC.

1.

2.
AFC;
LAC;
ATC;
LMC.
3. MC > AVC
AVC

131
 4. -

5.

6.

7. -

8.

;
;
;
.
9. AC (10) = 20, MC (10) = 11, AC (9) = ?

10.
.

132
1.

2.
6- 18.
3.
1994.
12.
4.
. 8.
5. 2-
2003. 13.
6.

133
 .

134
7.1.
7.2.

7.1.
(perfect competition)

(price taking behavior). -

MR = P
(perfectly
elastic)

135
 = ,

.
C, P

MC

ATC
K
M P
R AVC
S

Q
0 N
7.1.

TR = P Q
OMKN TC = ATC Q
ORSN
Q ATC Q = (P ATC) Q,
MKSR.

P = MC

P = MC

P = MC
),

VC
FC).

136
4. P = MC

(marginal firm)

FC).
P = MC

(VC).

C, P

MC MC

ATC
ATC

AVC
P
AVC

Q
C, P

MC MC
ATC
ATC

AVC
P
AVC

C, P

MC
ATC

AVC

7.2.

137
 (
curve).
(

P, C

S = MC
AVC

P0 MR=P

S=0

Q
Q0
7.3.

ATC1 2

3 4).
L
1, 2, ATC3, ... , ATCn.

138
 ATC

ATC1
ATC4 ATCL
ATC2 ATC3

Q
7.4.

P, C

MC
ATC

P0 R

Q
Q0

7.5.

L.

139
 1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

P MR TR Q TC MC ATC AVC

S 4,0 2000 7400 2,9 3,2

S 5,9 10000 5,9 4,7 4,2
S 40000 4000 10 10 8,7
S 25,0 100 3500 26 35,0 23,9
S 9,0 500 9,0 15,0 12,0
E L 37,9 500 45,0 45,0

P MR TR Q TC MC ATC AVC

S 4,0 4,0 8000 2000 7400 2,9 3,7 3,2 600

S 5,9 5,9 59000 10000 47000 5,9 4,7 4,2 12000
S 10 10 40000 4000 40000 10 10 8,7 0
S 25 25 2500 100 3500 26 35,0 23,9 -1000
S 9,0 9,0 4500 500 7500 9,0 15 12,0 -3000
E L 37,9 37,9 18950 500 22500 45,0 45,0 -3550

140
 MR > MC

MR = MC
MR = MC

M C > MR AVC < P < ATC

P < AVC
< minATCL

TC = 0,2Q3 8Q2 + YQ
Qd = 1360 10P

Y.

1.

P = MR = LMC = LATCmin,

MR
LMC
LATCmin
TC 0,2Q 3 8Q 2 YQ
2. ATC = 0,2Q 2 8Q Y .
Q Q
dATC
ATC = min 0.
dQ
Q:
dATC
ATC 2 0,2Q 8 ATC 0,4Q 8 .
dQ

(Qi):
0,4Q 8 = 0,
Qi = 8 : 0,4,
Qi = 20.

141
 3.
Qs= Qi N,
N
N=48, Qs = 20 48 = 960.
4. Qd Qs ( ):
Qs = 960,
Qd = 1360 10
Qd = Qs,
1360 10 = 960,
10 = 400,
= 40.
P = MR = MC.
dTC
MC 3 0,2Q 2 2 8Q Y ,
dQ
MC = 0,6Q2 16Q + Y,
P = 40,
P = MC = 40,
0,6Q2 16Q + Y = 40.
Qi = 20, Y
2
0,6Q 16Q + Y = 40,
Y = 40 0,6Q2 + 16Q,
Y = 40 0,6 202 + 16 20,
Y = 120.
120.

Qd = 106 P,

1.

TCL Q3 4Q 2 10Q .
2.
3.

1.
P = minATCL.

:
TC
ATC
Q

142
 TC L
ATC L ,
Q
ATC L
TC L .
TCL Q3 4Q 2 10Q .

TC L Q3 4Q 2 10Q
ATC L Q2 4Q 10.
Q Q

dATC L
0.
dQ

2Q 4 = 0,
2Q = 4,
Q=2 .
Q=2

= ,
dTC L dVC
MC ,
dQ dQ
MC (Q 3 4Q 2 100) 3Q 2 8Q 10,
MC 3Q 2 8Q 10.
Q
MC 3 2 2 8 2 10 6 = =

Qd = 106 P,
P = 6,
Qd = 106 6 =

Qd = 100
N
Qd 100
N 50
Q 2
2.
.

143
 P

E
PE = 6

Q
QE = 100
7.5.

MC ATC

PE = 6 P = MR

Q
Q=2
7.6.

3.
< min ATC L
.

144
 P

E S1
P=6

P=5

D1
Q
Q = 100
7.7.
P

MC ATC

PE = 6 P = MR

PE = 5 P = MR1

Q
Q=2
7.8.

1.

145
 2.

3.

4.
,
5.

6.

7.

1. -
Q = 1000, TR = 6000, FC = 1500, AVC = 5,5, MC =

2.
= 22 + 3Q3 + 2Q2 8Q.

1000 .
3.
= 40 + 2Q
. .
4.
= 16 + Q2

5.
= 0,1Q2 + 15Q + 200.
A.

B.

6.
= Q3 4Q2 + 8Q
Qd = 2000 100

7. -

146
 1. , .

= 2Q2 + 40Q + 1?

2.

3.
=6 MC =

4.
= 40 + 2Q
200

147
 5.

= Q2 2Q +

6.
TC = Q2 + 4Q +

;
;
;

7.
,

8.

108

60 ;

9.
= 0,2Q3 20Q2 +

.
.
.
.

148
 10.

1. / :

2.
. 2002. 9.
3.

7.
4.
32 9.
5. : ,
1998. 8, 9.
6. , 2007.

7. 2-

8. 2-
2003. . 14.

149
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.

( . monos , poleo )

1. (natural monopoly)
-
-

.
2. (administrative monopoly)

150
 3. (pioneer monopoly)

(closed
monopoly).
4. (economic monopoly)
-

5. (artificial monopoly)

cartel)

syndicate)

trust)

concern)

MR < P

151
 (price discrimination)

(first-degree price
discrimination) (perfect price
discrimination),

(second-degree price
discrimination (block pricing))

(third-degree price
discrimination (market segmentation))

MR = MC

PEEBATCB.
P

MC
E ATC
PE

B
ATCB
D
A

MR
Q
QE

8.1.

152
 MR
D
P = a bQ

dTR d ( P Q) d ((a bQ) Q)

MR a 2bQ .
dQ dQ dQ

1
MR P (1 ),
E
MR

( = 1),
(MR = 0).
MR

MR D
Q
TR

TR

. 8.2.

( < AVC).

153
 P, C
MC
ATC

ATCE

AVC

AVCE
PE E

D
MR Q
QE

8.3.

MC
PM

A B
PC
C
D

MR
Q
QM QC

8.4.

154
 QC
Qm
m

>

+
(deadweight loss)

-
.
+ .4,

- (X-inefficiency)
-

ATC

ATC

X-

ATCM

B
X-
ATCC
A

Q
QM QC

8.5. -

155
 -

-
-
-
-
-

( ) (Herfindahl-Hirschman index).

I ÍÍ S12 S 22 S32 ... S n2 ,

I

156
 S1, S2, , Sn

(concentration ratio),

(q1 + q2 + q3 + q4):
q1 q2 q3 q4
K ,
Q

> 0,6,

100% A

B
O 100%
8.6.

(Gini coefficient)

157
 :
S
KD ,
SOAB
D 0 KD 1.
0, D= D= 1.
(entropy coefficient)

n
1
KE Qi ln ,
i 1 Qi

n
Qi -

(IL) (Lerner index):

Pm MC 1
IL ,
Pm E
IL
Pm

m.

IL =

Pm AC ( Pm AC ) Q Pr
IL ,
Pm Pm Q TR
IL
Pm

158
Pr
TR

.
:
2
TR = 1000Q 10Q ,
100Q + 5Q2,
Q

=
dTR
MR 1000 20Q,
dQ
dTC
MC 100 10Q.
dQ

1000 20Q = 100 + 10Q; 30Q = 900; Q =

159
 Q 1000Q 10Q2 = Q
1000 10Q.
= 1000

= 100 + 100Q 1000 10Q.

100 + 10Q = 1000 10Q,

Q = 1000 10 45
: 1. Q = 30; = 700. 2. Q = 45; = 550.
. N

1.

2.

2920 : 730 = 4 +1=

2920 : 365 = 8 +1=

.
:
. Q = 10P-3,
= 2Q

Q =10P-3
( 3).

MR = MC

160
 1
MR = P (1 ).

= 2Q

1
, P (1 )=2 3.
3

Q = 10 3-3
: Q = 0,37; = 3.
. Z

Qd = 75 0,5 MR = 150 4Q,

= 8Q + 6.

1.
Z
2. -
Z
3. Z

4.

Qd = Qs d= Ps.
Ps = MC = 8Q + 6.
d=
150 2Q.
, 8Q + 6 = 150 2Q; 10Q = 144; Q = 14,4 121,2.

150 4Q = 8Q + 6; 12Q = 144; Q = 12 150 2 12 = 126.

, Qd = 0:
=150.

50; 0)) = 0,5 (150 121,2) 14,4 = 207,36.

150; ) = 0,5 (150 126) 12= 144.

144 207,36 = 63,36.
Ps Q = 12:
Ps = 8 12 + 6 = 102.

161
 ; 0; ))
0,5 (126 121,2) (14,4 12) + 0,5 (121,2 102) (14,4 12)
= 5,76 + 23,04 = 28,8.
3. TC.
TR = = 121,2 = 1745,28.
Ps Q = 0: Ps = 6.

6; 0; 0,5 (6 + 121,2) 14,4 = 915,84.

= 1745,28 915,84 = 829,44.
TR = 12 126 = 1512.

(0; 6; : 0,5 (6 + 102) 12 = 648.

= 1512 648 = 864.
: 864 829,44 = 34,56.
. 8.7.
P

150

MC = S
B
126 E0
121,2
102 A
D

6
MR
Q
12 14,4
8.7.

Q P
d : ((Q1 Q0) : Q0) : (( 1
Q P
0) : 0),

75 0,5 14,4 121,2 60,6 0,5 121,2

: = 4,2.
14,4 121,2 14,4 2(60,6 0,5 )
: 1. 63, 36. 2. 28,8. 3. 34,56. 4. 4,2.
. -

162
 . .

. .
. .

y kx b ( P kQ b P, Q).

39 k b
.
38 2k b
k 1, b 40
P 40 Q .
56 2k b
;
54 3k b
k 2, b 60 P 60 2Q .
-

MR MC

dTR
MR .
dQ
MR 40 2Q
40 2Q 12 , Q 14
P 40 14 26
.
3.
MR 60 4Q 36

4. + 12 =
TR TC

163
 TC 200 12Q :
26 14 36 12 (200 12 26) 796 512 284
:

.
,

1.

Q1d = 10 2 1
d
Q2 = 30 3 2 TC = 20 + 2Q.
2.

1. Q1 10 2P1 ,
Q1
P1 5 .
2
Q12 dRT1 dTC
TR1 P1 Q1 5Q1 ; MR1 5 Q1 ; MC 2.
2 dQ1 dQ
3
MR1 MC ; 5 Q1 2 ; Q1 3 ; P1 5 3,5 .
2

2
Q2 Q2
Q2 30 3P2 ; P2 10 ; TR2 P2 Q2 10Q2 ;
3 3
dTR2 2 2
MR2 10 Q2 ; MR2 MC ; 10 Q2 2; Q2 12 ; P2 6.
dQ2 3 3
.

12 .

Q Q1 Q2 3 12 15

P1 Q1 P2 Q2 TC 3000 350 12000 600 (20 2 15000) 8250 (

164
 .).

Q Q1 Q2 ; P1 P2 P.
2
Q
Q 10 2P 30 3P 40 5P ; P 40 Q ; TR P Q 8Q ;
5 5
2 2 40 15
MR 8 Q ; MC 2 ; MR MC ; 8 Q 2 ; Q 15; P 5;
5 5 5
15000 500 (20 2 15000) 7469 .

4.

1.
2. .

3.

4. -

5. -

6.

1.
d
Q = 301 = 120 + Q + Q2

2. -

AR = 10 Q
AC = (6 + Q) : Q

165
 3. ,
,
2
1 = 10Q1, TC2 = 0,25Q2
Q = 200 2

4. = 30 + 10Q.

1 = 40 3Q1, 2 = 90 10Q2

5. = 10 + 2Q.

6.

7. -
d
Q = 100
= 10Q + 0,5Q2

1.

2.

3.
:

166
4.

AVC;

AVC;
.
5.

6.
= 10 + 4Q

)6 ;
)

7. = 5Q +
= 120 0,5Q

8. -

QD = 900 2P

167
 9.
1?
> ;
MR > ;
MR < 0;
< .
10.
= 10Q ,

0,5;
1;
2;
4.

1.
. 2.
2. : /
6- . 23.
3.
. . 10.
4.

. 8.
5.
-
6.
1998.
7.

8. 2-

9.
.
10.
-
11.
1996.
12.

13.

168
9.1.
9.2.

9.3. .

(1930)
(1933)

(monopolistic competition)

169
 (differentiated product),

MR = MC

Pmc > ATC

(Pmc < AVC

9.1

170
 P P
MC

MC ATC
ATC
PMC ATC

PMC
ATC
D

D
MR
MR
Q Q
QMC QMC

. 9.1.

minATC).
P > MC).

(excess capacity)

(P = MC

0
).
Q2

ATC2 < ATC1).

171
 ATC
ATCP
ATC0

ATC1

B
ATC2

Q
QM QC

172
 P

MC
ATC

PMC

MR

Q
QMC

101

MR102
102).

173
 102

102 102 101 = 102 102 101 101 = 102 102 101 101
= 10404
102 102

102 < 102 -

AR = 10 Q
AC = (6 + Q) : Q

dTR d ( AR Q) d ((10 Q) Q)
MR 10 2Q ,
dQ dQ dQ
dTC d ( AC Q) d ((6 Q) / Q Q)
MC 1.
dQ dQ dQ
10 2Q = 1;
Q = 4,5

TR TC ( AR AC ) Q (10 Q) Q (6 Q) 13,25

Q=

174
 P

Pd = a bQ

TRmax
a/2

MR D
Q
a/2b a/b

Pd = a bQ.
Q = .
= 120.
120 bQ.

TR P Q Q P 1
MR P (1 ).
Q Q Ed
MR

P
MR(Q) PQ (a bQ) ( b) Q a 2bQ .
Q
2. TR P Q (120 bQ) Q 120Q bQ 2 ,
dTR
MR 120 2bQ .
dQ
MR

MR Q
EMR .
Q MR
MR = 0 120 2bQ.

Q
0,5 2b ,
120 2bQ
0,5 (120 2bQ) 2bQ ,
60
b ,
3Q

175
 20
b .
Q
Q=
20 20
b 2.
Q 10
MR = 0.
MR = 120 2bQ, b = 2.
MR = 120 2 2Q = 120 4Q.
120 4Q = 0.
Q = 30.
P = 120 bQ Q = b P = 120 2 30 = 60.
TR = 60 30 = 1800.
:

Q = 40 2P
3Q 10.

dTR
TR = P Q = (20 0,5Q Q. MR 20 Q .
dQ

20 Q = 3Q 20,
Q = 10.

3Qmin 10 = 35,
Qmin = 15.

Qmin Q = 15

176
 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

1.
Qd = 300 5
= 200 + 30Q

2.
MR = 20 Q,
3Q 10.

3. -
AC = 3Q 2.
Q = 52 2P.
C = 0,5Q2 + 6Q
Q = 104 2P.

.
4.

AC = Q + 10.
P = 150 3Q.

177
 5.
TC(Q) = 100 + 10Q + Q2.
QD(P) = 4600 100P

6. TC(Q) = 100 + 10Q + Q2

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

178
6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11 = 12 =
-

;
MC > MR;

179
1.

2.
6-
3.

4.

5.
-
6.
1998.
7.

8. 2-

9.

10. -
572 7.
11.
1996.
12. :

13.

180
1

( oligos poleo )

1)

2)

3)

3)

181
 P0

D1 D2

P, P,
MR, MR,
MC MC
D2
MC1
A MR2 A
P0 P0

B B MC2
D2

C MR2 C

D1 D1
MR1 MR1
Q Q
Q0 Q0

(inflexible prices)

(MR = MC)

P = AC = M

P < MC),

182
 (kinked demand curve)

(price leadership)
(
(residual demand))

-
MR MC

- -

(cost-plus pricing
approach)

(game theory)

183
 (pure strategy) -

(mixed strategy)

(cooperative games)
(non-cooperative games)

184
 (dominant strategy)
-
(Nash equilibrium)

-
-

185
 -

1)
2)

3)

1.

2; 0 0; 1
0; 1 1; 0
2.

3. q
1 q. p
1 p.

2 + (1 0 0 + (1 q .
q=
2/3.

1 + (1 0 + (1 .
q

186
(1 p q) = 1/6 + 2/6 = 0,5.

1; 1 1; 2

10; 1 2; 2

187
 ( )

1- 2-

6; 6 1; 10
10; 1 3; 3

( )

3; 3 10; 1
1; 10 6; 6

188
(collusion)

(pure monopoly).

189
 (1838) (Cournot model)

(
(simultaneous quantity setting)).

P a b(q1 q2 ) ,
q1 q2
a b

q2 0

q2

P1 a b(q1 q2 ) P1 (a bq2 ) bq1 .

MR1 :
d (TR1 ) d ((a bq2 ) bq1 )q1
MR1 a bq2 2bq1 ,
dq1 dq1
a bq2 2bq1 c ,
a c q2
q1 .
2b 2
(reaction function)
R1(q2).

a c q1
R2 (q1 ) q2 .
2b 2

190
 Q1

Q11 A

Q21 C
B
D E
Q*1

R1 (Q2)
R2 (Q1)
Q2
Q12 Q22 Q*2
10.2.

(reaction curve)

q11 q2
1

R2 (Q1 ).
R1 (Q2 )

R2 (Q1 ) .

a c a c
q1 = q2 q2 = q1 .
b 2b

(Cournot equilibrium)

a c
q1 q2 .
3b

2(a c) a 2c
q q1 q2 , P .
3b 3

191
 N

a c
qn ,n=1 ;
( N 1)b

a Nc N a c
P ;q .
N 1 N 1 b

(1934) (Stackelberg model)

( (sequential
quantity setting)) (follower)

(Stackelberg equilibrium)

a c a c a 3c
q1 ; q2 ; P .
2b 4b 4
-
-

2(a c)
(Stackelberg warfare) q1 q2
5b

192
 -

(1883) (Bertrand model),

P2
R1
A

R2

C
B
E
P*2 D

P1
P*1
. 10.3.

(
(simultaneous price setting))

P = MC

(Bertrand equilibrium)

a c a c
q1 q2 ;q ; P .
2b b

193
 P1 = 85 q1
P2 = 130 4q2
= 375 + 25q + 0,6q2.
1.

P1 = 85 q1 P2 = 130 4q2.
1 2,

1 85 130 4 2 ,
3q = 45, q = 15.
1 85 15 70 ; 2 130 4 15 70 .

TR TÑ 70 15 375 25 15 0,6 15 2 165.

:
2
TR1 85q q ,
MR1 85 2q 85 2 15 55 MR).

TR2 130q 4q 2 ,
MR2 130 8q 130 8 15 10 MR).
q=

(70

TC 375 25q 0,6q 2 ,

194
MC 25 1,2q 25 1,2 15 43.

P, R, C

P2=130 4
90 q2
80

1=85 q1
60
MR1=85 2q1
50

20 MC=25+1,2q
MR2=130 8q2
q
15 30 35
10.4.

1. q ,

Qd 160 2 P ,
P
Qd

1.
Qd = 160 2P; P = 80 0,5Qd.
Q

Q = Q1 + Q2,
Q1
Q2

195
 2.
,
P = 80 0,5Q,
P = 80 0,5(Q1 + Q2),
TR1 = (80 0,5(Q1 + Q2 Q1,
TR1 = 80Q1 0,5Q12 0,5Q1 2.

P = 80 0,5Q,
P = 80 0,5(Q1 + Q2),
TR2 = (80 0,5(Q1 + Q2 Q2 = 80 0,5Q22 0,5Q1 2,
TR2 = 80Q2 0,5Q22 0,5Q1 2.
3.
dTR dTR1
MR ; MR1 .
dQ dQ1

TR1 = 80Q1 0,5Q12 0,5Q1 2,

MR1 = 80 Q1 0,5Q2.
MR2:
dTR2
MR2 ,
dQ2
TR2 = 80Q2 0,5Q22 0,5Q1 2,
MR2 = 80 Q2 0,5Q1.
4.

MR1 = MC; MR2 = MC,

MC = 2,
80 Q1 0,5Q2 = 2.

Q1 = 78 0,5Q2

80 Q2 0,5Q1 = 2.
Q2 = 78 0,5Q1
5.
Q1 78 0,5Q2 ,
Q2 78 0,5Q1 .

Q1 = 78 0,5(78 0,5Q1) = 78 39 + 0,25Q1,

Q1 0,25Q1 = 39,
0,75Q1 = 39,
Q1 = 39 : 0,75,
Q1

196
 Q2 :
Q2 = 78 0,5Q1 ,
Q2 = 78 0,5(78 0,5Q2),
Q2 = 78 39 + 0,25Q2,
Q2 0,25Q2 = 39,
0,75Q2 = 39,
Q2 = 39 : 0,75,
Q2
6.
P = 80 0,5Q,
Q = Q1 + Q2,
P = 80 0,5(Q1 + Q2),
Q1 = 52,
Q2 = 52,
P = 80

Q1 = 78 0,5Q2.
Q2 Q1
Q1 Q2

Q2 = 78 0,5Q1,
Q1 = 0, Q2 = 78,
Q2 = 0, Q1 = 156.

Q2

156

1-

78
E
52

2-

Q1
52 78 156

197
 a, b c, d

e, f g, h

1.
a e; b d g; f h?

3.

voluntary public goods game

16

198
 (16, 16) (8, 18)

(18, 8) (10, 10)

> 1

N : N = 10

199
10

Ê
10 10 Â .
N
1
10
N
1.

10 10
N
10 10 .
N N

10
N
10 10 10 10 ).
N N N

1
N

- :
10 10 10 10 10 10 .
N N N N

-
q1 q2,

p1 = a bq1 cq2.

p2 = a bq2 cq1,
a > b b > c > 0.

1.
2.

b=c=

200
 q 1 2.

1.

max (a bq1 cq 2 )q1 .

q1

:
a cq 2
a 2bq1 cq 2 0 q1 .
2b

a cq1
q2 .
2b
q2 q1
a ab a 2b
q1 q2 p1 p2 1 2 .
2b c 2b c (2b c) 2
2.

- q1
a cq1
q2 .
2b

a cq1
max (a bq1 c )q1 .
q1 2b

q1
a(2b a)
a c
a(2b c) 4b 2 2c 2 .
q1 , q2
4b 2 2c 2 2b
b = c = 1:
a a
q1 , q2 .
2 4

a cq 2 p1 a cq1 p2
q1 , q2 .
b b

:
a(b c) cp 2 bp1 a(b c) cp1 bp 2
q1 , q2 .
b2 c2 b2 c2

201
 a(b c) cp 2 bp1
max p1 .
p1 b2 c2

p1
ab ac p 2 c
p1 .
2b

ab ac p1c
p2 .
2b

b c ab
p1 p2 a , q1 q2 .
2b c (2b c)(b c)

a ab
q1 q3 ,
2b c (2b c)(b c)
ab b c
p1 p3 a .
2b c 2b c

n n,
-
n n

n -

q = 3200
1600p

202
q = qc + q v qc qv

1.

2.

q vt 1

t q Ct

3. q vt 1

q Ct
4.
qVt 1 .

RCt qVt 1

a bqVt 1 ).
5.

6.

7.
qV
qC

203
 q
p 2 .
1600
qVt 1 qCt
2. qVt 1 400, qCt 1200 p 2 1.
1600
qVt 1 qCt q St 1qCt (qCt ) 2
3. p 2 1 TR p q 2qCt
1600 1600
qVt 1 2qCt
MR 2 .
1600
qVt 1 qCt t
4. p q t
C 0,5q t
C 2q t
C qC 0,5qCt ;
1600
qVt 1 qCt qVt 1
2 0,5 0 qCt 1200 RCt qVt 1 .
qCt 1600 2

qCt 1
RVt qCt 1 1200 .
2

qCt 1 200, qCt 700, qCt 1 750, qCt 2 775, qCt 3 762,5,
qVt 1 1000, qVt 1100, qVt 1 850, qVt 2
875, qVt 3 812,5.
qS qC
7. qC RC qV 1200 ; qS RV qC 1200 .
2 2

qC qV 800 q 1600, p 1.

q Ct

q Ct

204
 t

t q Ct .

qV qC
p qV 0,5qV , p 2 ,
1600
qV qC qC
t
2 0,5 0 qV 1200 .
qV 1600 2

qC
qV 1200 .
2
qC
q qC qV 1200 .
2
qV qC 5 qC
p 2 .
1600 4 3200

5 qC2 5 qC
TR p qC qC MR .
4 3200 4 1600
qC
1200 qC
4. p qC 0,5qC (2 2 )qC 0,5qC ,
1600
3 qC
0 qC 1200; qV 600; q 1800,
qC 4 1600
7
p ; C 450; V 225.
8

205
 1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6. -

7.

1.
= 240 3Q

Q=

2.
= 10 Q = 2.

3.

6; 4 8; 8

0; 20 0; 20

4.
Q 40 P

206
5.

300 5Q.
6. PD(Q) = 100 0,1Q
MCi =

7. PD(Q) = 100 0,1Q.

MCi = 40.

1.

3.

207
 -

8.

9.

208
 10.

1
50 35
500 700
50 500 100
2 100 300
35 700 300

1.
.
2.
6-
3.

4.

5.
-
6.
1998.
7.

8. 2-

9.

10. -
572
11.
1996. 646
12.

13.

209
11.1.
11.2. -
11.3.
11.4.
11.5.

(uncertainty),

(incomplete data),

(risky
activity).
. resecum (risk)
-
( probability

210
 1974).

1)

(objective probability)

(subjective probability)

(expected value)

E ( x) p1 x1 p2 x2 ... pn xn pi xi ,
E (x)
xi
n
pi 1.
i 1

(variance)
n
2
p1 [ x1 E ( x)]2 ,
i 1
2

xi

E (x)

211
 ( ) (standard
deviation)

(CV) (coefficient of variation)

CV ,
E (x)
CV

E (x)

11.2. -

(risk averse)

212
 32
30
27

20

10 20 30 40 )

11.

-
.

Y
X Z Y
p(Y) L(X, p(Y), Z) Y

(risk neutral)

40

30

20

10

10 20 30 40 )

213
 (risk lover)

50

20

9
3
10 20 30 40 )

- (Saint
Petersburg Paradox).

-
-

n- 2n

1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32

214
 ( = ),
( ()= ).
-

1.

2.
-

E(P) = 0,5

215
 E(Pr1)

15

E(Pr2) 60000 = 15

(TR)
1 0,5(100000 75000) 2 0,5(50000 75000 2 ) 25000

2 0,8(90000 75000) 2 0,2(15000 75000 2 ) 30000

( 2 > 1)

(E(TR1) < E(TR2)),

CV.

E(TR2)

25000 1
CV1 1
,
E (TR1 ) 75000 3
30000 1
CV2 2
.
E (TR2 ) 120000 4

11.4.

216
 11.5 , 11.5 , 11.5

E (RP) E (RP) E (RP)

U1
U2
U3
U1
U2 U1
U3 U2
U3

e e e

a) ) )

11.5

b
(0 < b < 1), b
(Pr)
E (Pr) b Rm (1 b) Rg ,
b
Rm

(1 b)

Rg

Rm > Rg

(Pr) = Rg+ b(Rm Rg).

2
m m

Pr )
m :

Pr b m b Pr
.
m

217
 b
Rm Rg
E (Pr) Rg Pr .
m

Rg, Rm m

Rm Rg
m

(Rp)
U1 U2 U3

Rm

Rm Rf
E
Re m

Rf

e m
( e)

Pr
E(Pr

6).

218
1. (diversification)

2. (risk pooling)

3. (risk spreading)

-
4. (information search)

( ) ( )

219
 MC

PE E

MB

QE
11.7.

QE
MB
MC,
(MB > MC)
(MB < MC)

(information asymmetry)

220
 -

(English auction)

(Dutch auction)

-
eBay).
5.

(futures)

(forward contract),

(option)

221
 -

1.
25%);
2.
20%).

(TR)

(TR)
(TR)
= (600 450) 2 0,25 (500 450) 2 0,5 (200 450) 2 0,25 = 32500 =180
= (800 450) 2 0,2 (450 450) 2 0,6 (100 450) 2 0,2 = 49000

.
L K. L
K

L
K

L K
L
K

222
 separating equilibrium

1.
L
K L
K,
Q = 250K + 100L

2. L

K L

3.

223
 L

K -
L
-

V
$V V
- -
V
$V V/

1.

2.

3.

224
 4.

5.

6.

2000

2000 0
P E (V ) 1000
2

1000 1000 = 1 000

2.
:
X
P E( X ) .
2
3. 200)$

2.

200 = =

V V/

:2=

225
 N

300 .

900 900
500

1.

2.

3. 1200

4. 1200

1.
.
900

900
500

pooling equilibrium

226
 = 900
.).
= 100
= 900 , = 100

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

1.

25%);

20%).

2.

- 0,8 (2-
0,7 (3- 0,5 (4-

3. Rm
m
Rf
R ).

227
 1.

2.

3.

228
 9.

1.
6- , 13.
2.
-
13.
3. : ,
1998.
4.
-
5.
10.

229
230
 (derived demand),

marginal revenue product

D = MRP).

231
 marginal resource
cost S = MRC = P).

PL

MRC > MRP

PL

E
PL1 S = MRC

D = MRP

L
L1

(
)

MR < P

(MRP = MP MR)

232
 PL

SL = MRCL
PL

MRPLC = MPL

MRPLM = MPL P
LM LC L

(monopsony)

MRCL
(S = ACL).

MRPL = MRCL (MRP = MRC rule)

PL

AHMPLM.

233
 PL

MRCL SL = AC

A H
C
PLC
DL = MRPL
PLM M

L
LM LC

(bilateral monopoly)

PL

MRCL SL

E3
PLU
PLC E1
DL

E2
PLM

MR
L
LM LU LC

(labor union)

234
235
 wage))

PL (w) MPPL ,
PL(w)
MRPL

( income leisure )

w0.
U1, U2, U3.

U3
U2
U1

E
0

0 24

12.5

24

236
 .
0 24 0),
I0 = w0 (24 0), w0

MRSIH = w0.
w0 w1.
1Y

E0 1.

E2
I2

U2

E3

E1
I1
U1

H3 H2 H1

(substitution effect)

1 3.

(income effect
3 2

237
 E2
I2 E3

E1 U2
I1
U1

H3 H1 H2

PL

SL
PL4

PL3

PL2

PL1

H1 H4 H2-3

12.8.

238
(Lorenz curve)

( (quintile))

12.9).
-

239
 A
100

80

,%
60

40

20

O 20 40 60 80 100

12.9.

(Gini coefficient)

0,25 (2000),
0,35

0,31 (2006 0,3 (2000).

(decile coefficient)

240
 (coefficient of funds)

progressive tax
system

A
100

80
,%

60

40

20

O 20 40 60 80 100

12.10.

241
 -

=
Q= A =
2
B= 30 + 5 + .

2
A = 25 20 B (30 + ).
2
A B = 25 20 (30 + 5

-
A B =

A<
> 0:
25 10 20 10 23.
B 0:
2
10 (30 + 5 10 + 10 ) 18.
-
10

Ld 1800 4W
LS 600 8W W Ld LS

242
 -

Ld LS , 1800 4W 600 8W
W 200 , L 1000

LS 1 0,75LS 0,75( 600 8W ) 450 6W .

Ld LS , 1800 4W 450 6W W1 225 , L1 900 .

900.

Q = 50L 0,25L2 (0 L

LS = 20 + 2W LS = 10 + 0,5W.

1.

2.

3.

L=L +L.

Q
Ð.
Læ
Q = 50(L + L )
2
0,25(L + L ) L
MRPLæ 50 2 0,25 Læ L÷ 2 100 Læ L÷ .

LS = 10 + 0,5W; W = 2L 20.

243
 (W L )
MRC = = 4L 20.
L

MRC = ; 4L 20 = 100 L L ; L = 24 0,2L .

Q
MRPL MPL
L
MRPL (50 2 0, 25( L L )) 2 100 L L
(W L )
LS= 20 + 2W; W = 0,5L + 10; MRC = = L + 10
L
MRC = ; L + 10 = 100 L L ; L = 45 0,5L .

L = 24 0,2L ,
L = 45 0,5L ,
L = 16,6; L = 36,7.

W = 2 16,6 20 = 13,2; W = 0,5 36,7 + 10 = 28,3.

LS
LS = 20 + 2W 20 + 2W
W

LS = 10 + 0,5W < W < 10,

LS = L + L = 10 + 0,5W + ( 20 + 2W) = 10 + 2,5W, W > 10.

0<W 10
W = 2L 20.
< 2L 20 10.
<L

L = 100 L
MRCL = 4L 20.

MRCL = L; 4L 20 = 100 L; L =

10 < L
W>
LS 10 2,5W , W = 0,4L + 4. 0,4L + 4 > L > 15.

244
 d (W L)
MRCL = =
dL
0,8L + 4; MRCL L; 0,8L + 4 = 100 L; L = 53,3 >
W = 25,3.
L = 22,7; L = 30,7.
2.11.
W

DL

MRCL

WL
SL = ARCL

L
15 LL
12.11.

1. L = 16,6; L = 36,7; W = 13,2; W = 28,3. 2. L = 22,7;

L = 30,7; W = 25,3.

- Q = LK
PK = 4; PL = 1.
QD = 60 2P.
1.

2.

1.
PL = MR MPL; PK = MR MPK.

30 Q K 30 LK K
PL = .
2 L 2 L
K PL
,
L PK

PL PL PK
PL = 15 L LD 30 2 PK .
PK 2 PK PL

245
 PL
KD 30 2 PL .
PK
MPL K 1
L 4K .
MPK L 4
TC = 4PLK + PKK = 8K Q = 4K 2 2K K 0,5Q.
TC = 4Q MC = 4.
MR = MC
Q=4 Q = 26, P = 17.
Q
TR TC (30 )Q 4Q 221 .
2

12.12).
1.
2.

3.

100

20

80 100

12.12.

246
 1.
-

2. N Y
M = Y/N.

1 = 0,2Y / 0,8N = 1/4M

= 100).

2 = 0,8Y/0,2N = 4M

3.

(1 0,25) =
1 0,6 = 0,4.

2 = 400 (1 0,25) =

1.

2.

3.

4.

247
 1.

Sô
K .
S OAB

100

S S3

10 S2
S1
40 80 100

12.13.

Sô S OAB S1 S2 S3 .
S1 , S 2 , S 3 S OAB :
40 10
S1 200,
2
10 X
S2 40 200 20 X ,
2
100 X
S3 20 1000 10 X ,
2
100 100
S OAB 5000 .
2
:
5000 (200 200 20 Õ 1000 10 Õ )
X 0,36 ,
5000
3600 1800 30 Õ , Õ 60 .
=
10% = 60%
= 100% 60% =

248
 2.

0,5 0,1

0,6 = 0,24

0,5 0,8 = 0,4

0,1 0,4 0,4 + 0,5 0,2 = 0,1 0,16 0,1 0,36

100

76

S
S3
36
S2

S1

40 80 100

40 36 36 76 100 76
5000 40 20
S OAB ( S1 S 2 S3 ) 2 2 2
K1
S OAB 5000

5000 (720 2240 1760) 5000 4720 280

0,056,
5000 5000 5000

K 1 = 0,056.

249
 3.
1000 .

I
1000 N
N

0,2N

0,4 I
2 1000 2000 .
0,2 N

0,5I
1,25 1000 1250
0,4 N

0,1I
0,25 1000 250
0,4 N

0,24 I
1200
0,2 N

0,4 I
1000
0,4 N
0,36 I
900
0,4 N

y = ax2 + b,
x
y
a b

1.
= 0:
2
y = ax + b;
0 = a 0 + b.
b = 0.

250
 2.

y = ax2 + b,
b = 0,
100 1002.
= 1/100.
1 2
ó õ .
100

(10) = 1/100 102 = 1%.

2
(100) (90) = 1/100 1/100 902 = 19% .
): CF = 19/1 = 19.

U(F,I)= F 10 + 0,1I ,
F
I
1.

2.

1.
U(F,I)= F 10 + 0,1I :
dU 1 dU 0,1
= 0,5 ; = 0,5 .
dF F 10 dI I
d² I
MRSFI = MRS FI = .
dF 0,1( F 10)
I = 8 10 = 80, F = 24
MRSFI w = 10.
MRSFI > w

2.
L.
I
MRSFI = =w
0,1( F 10)

251
 I = wL = 10L; F = 24 L.
10 L
10 .
0,1(14 L)
L = 7.
:

U cr c r

1.
2.

3.

1. U cr
r + l = 80,
l
1
c w l 5l ; l c.
5
1
r c 80 5r c 400 .
5

1 MU
MRS c r .
5 MU r
1 r
.
5 c

c 5r.

252
 5r 5r 400 .
10r 400 ; r 40 ; c 5 40 200.
l
l 80 40 40

0 r 40 ; 40 r 80 .
0 r 40 : c 6r 4r 6r 10r 10 40 400 .
+ 6r = 400.
40 r 80 : c 4r 4r 4r 8r 8 40 320 .
+ 4r = 320.
r=
= 4 r = 4 40 = 160.

1 MU c
MRS c r .
4 MU r
r 1
; c 4r.
c 4
+ 4r = 320):
4r + 4r = 320; 8r = 320; r = 40.

400

200
UC

r
40 80
12.14.

253
 c

400

160
U

r
40 80
12.15.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

254
 1.

Q = 200L 2L2

2.
Q = L0.5K
40 w
1

3.
Q = 12L 2L2

L = 0,1w

4. - LK .
PK = 4; PL = 1.
QD = 60 2P.
.

1.

2.

3.

255
 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

256
 9. Q = 200L 2L2

) 25 ;
)

10.

Q = 210L L2 Q L

1.
3.
2.
6-
3.

4. .
, 12.
5. 2-
, 12.
6. -

257
 capitalis (capital)
-
.
-
(physical capital)
(financial capital)

(human capital),

258
 PK (r ) MRPK ,
PK (r) );
MRPK
:

(investment)

(nominal interest rate) (i )

(R)
(K):
R
i 100% .
K

i r

(real interest rate)

r i .
10 %.

(Fisher equation):

259
 i
r .
1
100 %

(discounting)

n
n
,
r
1
100%
r

).
PV FV
t
FV
PV n .
r
1
100
1
n
r
1
100
n

(NPV net present value)

Pr
(I ) :
Pr1 Pr2 Prn
NPV I ... ,
r r
2
r
n
1 1 1
100 100 100
NPV 0 NPV 0
NPV 0

260
 (PI Profitability index)
(R)
( ):
n Ri
i 1 r i
(1 )
PI 100
.
I
PI 1 PI 1
PI 1

( )

(IRR Internal Rate of Return)

r = IRR,
Pr1 Pr2 Prn
NPV I ... 0.
r r
2
r
n
1 1 1
100 100 100

r IRR r
IRR r
IRR r

261
 (theory of intertemporal choice)

(model of optimal
intertemporal choice)
(C0 ) (C1 )
Ut U (C0 , C1 ) .

C1

I2

1+i2

1
E2
C1(i2)
I1
A
1+i1 Ut2
1
E1
C1(i1)
Ut1
C0
C0(i2) C0(i1) I0

13.1.

( ) (intertemporal marginal rate of substitution):

MRTS C1 / C0 .

(S )

intertemporal
budget constraint (I ) (i ) ,
(intertemporal budget
line):
S0 C1 (1 i) ( I 0 C0 ) .

262
 (1 i) I 0
I1 / I 0 1 i
I0

(1 i)

( C1 / C0 ) ,
(1 i)
MRTS C1 / C0 1 i .

SK

i2 E2

E1
i1

K
K1 K2

13.2.

263
 (upward-sloping supply curve of
saving) 13.2).

(land)

(agricultural land demand

not agricultural land demand):
DE = D + D ,
DE
D
D

P
(
)

D
D
D
Q )

264
 13.3).

rente
reddita
R
S

R1

R0 D1

R2 D0

D2

265
 (ground rent)

- (absolute rent

- (differential rent I)

- (differential rent II

(market price)

PE R
r
R 1 R R
PE PE .
r 1 r r
1 1 1 1
100% r r 100% 100%
1 1
100% 100% r
1
100%

PA :

266
 D
PA ,
r
100%

D r

(entrepreneurial abilities)

1.
2.
3.

4.

-10%.

1. (profit as payment for risk).

,

2. (profit as payment for innovations).

3. (monopoly profit).
-

267
 S 0.
1000
S A0 1000 1909
1 0,1
1000 1000
S 0 500 2235
1 0,1 (1 0,1) 2

1000 1000 1000

S 0A > S 0 , 1000 > 500 ,
1 r 1 r (1 r ) 2
r
r,
r >( 2 r > 42%.

-
FV PV
FV = PV : (1 + 0,1 )5,
PV = FV : (1 + 0,1)5,

268
 FV = 20, PV = 20 : 1,15

25%.

1
1- 2- 3-

200000
160000 .
1 0,25
200000
128000 .
(1 0,25) 2
1200000
614400 .
(1 0,25) 3

160000 + 128000 + 614400 = 902400 ( ).

N
C N
P n
.
n 1 (1 i ) (1 i) n

269
 D = 1563,38 : 7,67 = 203,83
S):
mn
(1+ j/m) ,
j
m
n

D 203,83
S 1200
(1 j / m) mn 1 (1 0.08 / 2) 2 2 1

1.

2.

3.

(1 r ) n 1
S R
r
R
r
n

n
1 (1 r )
A R .
r

270
 S
A

(1 r ) n 1
R
S r (1 r ) n 1 (1 r ) n 1
= (1 r ) n =
A 1 (1 r ) n 1 (1 r ) n 1
R 1
r (1 r ) n
0,18 4 12
(1 ) (1 0,015) 48 1,015 48 ,
12

2.

S A 1 S 1 1
r ( 1) = (1,015 48 1) (2,05 1) 0,022
A n n A 48 48
3.
S 1,5 A
):
S
= (1 r )n = r ) .
A
S
1 r n =1,015 48
1,5 .
A
1,015 48
1,5
12 (1,015 48
1,5

3. 8%.
.

50
1

1.
2.
3.

271
 4.

1)
156 â³êîí (40 õâ 20 õâ) 50 ãðí / ãîä . 7800 ãðí ;
2)
156 â³êîí (90 õâ 30 õâ) 25 ãðí / ãîä . 7800 ãðí ;
3)

156 40 50 / 156 30 25 / 5200 1950 7150 ;

220

R
P R i P,
i
P
R
= 24% : 12 = 2%).

0,24 220000
R 4400
12

1000

272
 1 2

Qs
Qs > 1000.

1500 S

1000

Q
5 15

P R
P = 1200, R = 5 1200 + 10 200 =

1000 = 100

Q 200 X 2X 2 ,
Q
X

1.
2.

273
 dQ
MP 200 4 X .
dX

MRP P MP 80 200 4 X 16000 320 X .

X 30 MRP 16000 320 30 6400

R 6400 100
P 64000
r 10
100%

1.

2.

3.

4.

-
-
-
5.

6.

7.

1.

10%.
2.

274
2500
r

3.
Qd = 180 3r r

4.

5. 10%

1.

3.

4.

275
 5.

6.

7.

9.

276
 10.

1.

2.
6-
3.
, 14.
4. 2-
, 12.
5. -

277
 ).
P P
D S D S

Q Q
a) )
P
P
D S D S

Q Q
) )

278
 ).

(feedback effect

(partial
equilibrium

(general equilibrium).

n-

( ) (Edgeworth box

L K
-
-

(resource constraint of economy).

X Y

L = Lx + Ly, K = Kx + Ky.
(criteria of efficiency),
(Vilfredo Pareto,
Pareto-efficiency

279
 X Y

(curve of efficient factor allocation

LY 0Y
KX

QX2
QX3
QY2

QY3
QX1

QY1
KY
0X LX

MRTS X LK MRTS Y LK .

(production possibilities frontier).

Y

QY

QY1

QY2

QX
QX1 QX2

280
 (marginal rate of transformation)
MRTXY Y
X:
Y
MRTXY .
X

MC x
MRTXY .
MCY

Qx = 800,
Qy = B

14.4
B.
QX 0B
QY

UA2
UA3
UB2

UB3
UA1

UB1
QY
0A QX

,
(contract curve

281
 X Y:
A
MRS XY MRS B XY .

(consumption
possibility frontier), (utility possibility
frontier

UY

UY1

UY2

UX
UX1 UX2

(Pareto optimum

MRS A XY MRS B XY MRTXY .

282
 X
MRS = MRT

(welfare economics (welfare

(the first fundamental theorem of

welfare economics

283
 (the second fundamental theorem
of welfare economics) -

(allocative
(distributional)

(John Rawls' criterion of justice)

(Caldor Hicks criterion)

SS'

284
 (
criterion): -
-

UB

A
C

UA

14.7.

U = X 2Y
2
U=X Y Y

X = 20; Y = 50; Y
= PY =5.

285
2Y1/X1 = Y2/2X2

1+ 2 = 100, Y1 + Y2 = 200.
Y1 1:
Y1 = Y2 1/4X2 = (200 Y1 X1/4(100 X1).

Y1 = 200X1/(400 3X1), Y2 = 200 Y1, 2= 100 1.

1

D E F
X1 0 10 50 80 90 100
X2 100 90 50 20 10 0
Y1 0 5 40 100 138 200
Y2 200 195 160 100 62 0

D E F
U 0 500 100 000 640 000 1 117 800 20 000 000
U 40 000 000 308 002 500 1 280 000 200 000 38 440 0

MUX1 : MUY1 = 2Y : X = 100 : 20 = 5.

MUX2 : MUY2 = Y : 2X = 20 : 100 = 0,2.

MUX1 : MUY1 > MUX2 : MUY2.

286
 MUY1 : MUX1 = 2Y1 : X1 X1 = Y1.
X1 + 5X1 =
15X1 =
X1* Y1* = 30.

Y.

MUX2 : MUY2 = Y2 : 2X2 Y2 = 4X2.

10X2 + 20X2 X2 = 600.

X2 Y2*=80.

Y X.

X = X1 + X2 = 20.
Y Y Y1 Y2 =
+40.

Y X
-
Q1 = 2L10,5 Q2 = 8L20,5 Q1
Q2 L1 L2

1.
0,5 0,5
MP1 = L1 , MP2 = 4L2 .
2.
L1 + L2 L1.
0,5 0,5
L1 = 4(90 L1) L1 L2 = 60.
3. -
0,5 0,5
Q1 + Q 2
-

287
 : 10 800
(LU = LM = 10800).
TU (QZ 30)(QW 10) .
LZ
QUZ
100
LW
QUW 120, LZ LW ,
120
.
LZ LW
QMZ QMW .
90 80
-
.

QW QW (QZ )
, , :
LZ 10800 LW
QUZ LW 10800 100QUZ .
100 100

LW 10800 100QUZ 5
QUW 90 QUZ .
120 120 6
:
LZ 10800 LW
QMZ LW 10800 90QVZ .
90 90

LW 10800 90QUZ 9
QMW 135 QMZ .
80 80 8

:
LW 10800 100QUZ 5
TU (QZ 30)(QW 10) max, QUW 90 QUZ .
120 120 6
QUZ = 45, QUW = 52,5.
:
LW 10800 90QUZ 9
TU (QZ 30)(QW 10) max, QMW 135 QMZ .
80 80 8
Q = 49,4, Q = 79,4.

288
 1.

2.

3.

4. -

5.

6.
?
7.

1. M N X Y = 20
TUm = X0,5Y0,5
TUn = X0,25Y0,75
2. = 50,
L X Y
Q = K0,5L0,5 Y:
0,2 0,8
Qy = K L
3. -
Q1= K0,5 Q2 = 2K0,5

1.

2.

289
 3.

4.

5.

7.

8.

290
 9.

10
Y
Y 2

75;
2;
25.

1.

2.
6- 30.
3.
1998.
4.

5. 2-

6. -

291
( )
, ,
, .

- ,
, qwerty-

-
.
( ). principal

.
.

292
 QWERTY-

( QWERTY

-
qwerty-

90- qwerty-
Path Dependence,

15.1.

( ) (market failur).

(quasi-
optimum).

(externalities),

SC
(social cost PC (private cost
(external cost). (social benefit)
(private benefit
(external benefit).

293
 (negative externalities)

MSC = MPC + MEC

E2
P2
MEC
S = MPC

P1 E1

D = MSB

Q
Q2 Q1

S MPC .

MSC MPC MEC.

D MSB.

P1 P2 ,

t ( (Pigouvian tax)),

t = MEC.

294
 (positive externalities

P
S = MSC

P2 E2
MEB
D2 = MPB + MEB = MSB
P1 E1

D1 = MPB

Q
Q1 Q2

D1 MPB.

D2 MPB MEB MSB.

S MSC. AE1 E2

(Coase theorem
(internalization of externalities

295
 -

296
 -

. (government failure)

(public choice theory).

1.

297
 2.

3.

).

> > > > > >

> , > , >

> >

(lobbyism
(logrolling).

298
J.

299
 -

:
1.
( )

300
2. ( ).
-

x
n

, n x xi ,
i 1
y i-
y = yi, i = 1, ..., n.

(joint supply)

301
 -

(merit goods -

(merit bads

302
 MPC MSC

-
-

303
 -

Qd =160 10P
Qs = 10 + 5P (P
, ; Q

1.

2. ?

P
S1

E
Ts
PE S

Q
50

D
S S1. P

50

304
 S1 QS1 = 10 + 5(P Ts
Ts.

Td

E
PE
D

D1
Q
50

S
D D1. P

50
(Td .
(D1) Qd2 = 160 10(P + Td
Td.

S2

Ts S
Td

E
PE
D

D2
Q
50

D
D2
S S2. P

305
 .

Q(S2) = Q(D2
160 10(P + Td )= 10 + 5(P Ts). (1)

160 10(P + Td)= 50,

10 + 5(P Ts) = 50.

P + Td = 11,
P Ts = 8.
Td + Ts = 11 8 = 3.

2. (Td = 0, Ts =

160 10(P + 0)= 10 + 5(P 3),

160 10P = 10 + 5P 15,
15P = 165,
P
(Td = 3, Ts =

. P = 200 Q
(Q P
P = 80 + Q.

306
 Q.
1.

2.

3.

1. P
Q
Q = 80 + Q P
Q = 60.
2. PMC
PMC = 80 + Q

SMC = PMC + MCp = 80 + Q + Q = 80 + 2Q

PMB = SMB = 200 Q.

Qs
+ 2Q = 200 Q
Ps Qs = 40.

P
SMC

Es = Em
t = 40
PMC = S
160
140 EC

80
SMB = D
MR
Q
40 60 100 120

307
 t(Q
3. MC = MR,
dTR
MR = =200 2Q,
dQ
200 2Q = 80 + Q.
Pm Qm = 40.

: 1. P = 140, Q = 60. 2. Ps = 160, Qs = 40, t .

3. Pm = 160, Qm = 40.

(1000, 500) (1000, 800)

(600, 1000) (600, 800)

1.

?
2.
3. .

308
 4.

5.

1.

(600 1000 = (800

1000 = 200).
2.

3.

4.

+ 200 =
200 = 800
5.

309
 q

w
pw

w1

q1 f (w1 ) 2(w1 )1 / 2 òà q2 f (w2 ) 2(w2 )1 / 2 .

1. w1 w2

2.

w1 w2 w1
w2
3.

4.

w1*

1 10 2w 1/2
1 2w1 .

10w1 1 / 2 2 0.
w1 1 = 50.

Ï 2 10 2w 1/2
2 3w1 2w2 .

10w2 1 / 2 2 0.
w2 2 = 25.

Ï 2 10 2w1/2
1 2w1 10 2w1/2
2 3w1 2w2 .
w 2:
10w2 1/ 2
2 0.
w2 = 25.

310
 w1:
10w2 1/ 2
5 0.
w1 1 2 = 38.

1 + 2 1 + 2 = 50
(
-
(
- 32 = 18.
:

hH hL

1.
SMC social
marginal costs SMB social marginal
benefit

2.

1
T ( hH hL ) .
2

3.

4.

311
 1.

SMB = PMB hH
SMB = PMB hL

Q1 Q2:
Q1 Q2.

P P

PMB PMB
hL
hH
SMB
SMB

B A PMC = SMC B A PMC = SMC

P* P*

Q Q
Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1

2.

Q3 P*

1
T ( hH hL ) ,
2

Q2 Q3

312
 Q2 Q 3)

P P

hL
hH T T

C A B A
P* P*
B C

Q Q
Q2 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q2 Q1

3.

4. H
L

1.
2.

3.
4.

313
 5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

1. Qd = 100 2P
Qs = 20 + 3P
(P Q

B. ?
2.

(1500, 700) (1500, 1200)

(800, 1500) (800, 1100)

314
 ?

D.

E.

3.

US = 2XSG UB = XBG XS XB
G

4.

t = 20 0,0005x,
t

h = 2 + 0,001x.

5. -

A.

Q1 = 40 2 , Q2 = 20 P.
B.

C. .

315
 1.

2.

-
3.

4.

5.

6.

316
 7.

9.

10.

1.

2.
6- 2006. 34.
3.
1998.
4.
6, 17.
5. 2-
14, 15.
6. -
3, 14.
7.
-

317
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
13

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15

318
1.
6-
2. 2-

/ -

3.

1.

384
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
-

8.

1994.
9. 2-

10.

11.

12.

13.
2-
319
 ,

_____

320