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Political Impact Of Climate Change In Sub-Saharan Africa:

Projections For Some Vulnerable Markets
17 Aug 2022 Sub Saharan (Region) Political Risk

This article is one of a two-part series focusing on the non-physical impact of climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this
article, we will focus on the long-term political ramifications, notably on policymaking, and social and political stability.

Key View

• At Fitch Solutions, we expect that the physical impact of climate change - notably floods, rising sea levels, droughts
and storms - will cause further mass internal displacements and cross-border migrations in Sub-Saharan Africa,
exacerbating ethnic tensions and encouraging more restrictive immigration policies.
• We believe that as more frequent and extreme weather events limit the availability and accessibility of natural
resources, land and water conflicts will intensify, increasing militarisation.
• We also expect that there will be an increase in poverty and income inequality, creating fertile ground for more
social unrest and recruitment of insurgents.

At Fitch Solutions, we expect that the physical impact of climate change, namely floods, rising sea levels,
droughts and storms, will cause more mass environmental internal displacements and cross-border migrations
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), exacerbating ethnic tensions and encouraging more restrictive immigration
policies. According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), rising global temperatures
have caused more frequent and extreme weather events in SSA, and it projects that there will continue to be an
increase in pluvial and fluvial flooding, droughts and tropical storms in the continent as temperatures rise. The IPCC
predicts that by “by 2030, about 250mn people may experience high water stress in Africa, with up to 700mn people
displaced as a result.”

SSA To Continue Facing Various Extreme Weather Events

SSA - Natural Hazards Affecting The Largest Number Of People, 2008-19
 Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, World Bank, Fitch Solutions

Within our ten-year forecast period of 2022-2031, we expect that the number of climate-induced internal displacements
in the continent will increase as temperatures continue to rise (see chart below). This will cause demographic changes in
the ethnic composition of settlements ranging from villages to cities, and we expect that ethnic intolerance and mistrust
in the continent will intensify as more groups compete for limited amenities and resources. Ethnic tensions exacerbated
by climate change will, we expect, be used by those promoting nationalist politics or outright secessionism, while
increased resource competition through cross-border migration could also encourage more restrictive immigration
policies in the long term.

Higher Temperatures To Cause More Climate Displacements

Global - Mean Temperatures & SSA - Climate Displacements
 Source: NASA, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Fitch Solutions

For example, communities in the southern states of Nigeria frequently clash with Fulani herdsmen from northern
Nigeria in their areas. This has perpetuated separatist calls from the Indigenous People of Biafra (a predominantly Igbo
movement) and from Oodua Peoples Congress (a predominantly Yoruba movement), which have blamed Fulani herders
for communal clashes in their respective regions. We expect that an increasing number of Hausa-Fulani people of
northern Nigeria, who face the most climate risk out of any ethnic group in Nigeria (see chart below), will increasingly
migrate southwards to more Igbo- and Yoruba-dominated states, further fuelling southern separatist movements over
the coming years.

Displacement Of Northern Nigerians To Intensify Southern Separatist Movements

Nigeria - Water Scarcity Risk (LHS); Urban Flood Risk (RHS)

Source: Think Hazard, Fitch Solutions

Meanwhile, in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, cross-border migration as a result of extreme weather has already
been taking place. Indeed, according to Ethiopia’s Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs and the UN Refugee Agency,
the influx of migrants from Somalia to Ethiopia (which is also experiencing La Niña-induced drought) is being driven by
frequent and prolonged drought, as well as conflict (which has increased vulnerability to natural disasters). Relations
between the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia have historically been poor - the two countries had border conflicts
in every decade between the 1960s and 1990s - and there is a clear risk that rising competition for increasingly scant
resources could prompt the Ethiopian government to implement tighter immigration policies. Likewise, drought in
Angola since 2021 has forced thousands of Angolans to migrate to neighbouring Namibia for food. Again, this could
potentially lead the Namibian authorities to restrict immigration levels so as to contain pressure on limited domestic
natural resources.

We believe that as more frequent and extreme weather events limit the availability and accessibility of natural
resources, land and water conflicts in SSA will intensify. The Sahel will be particularly vulnerable to exacerbated
resource conflict as a result of higher temperatures causing drier conditions in the semi-arid region. Indeed, in northern
Mali, there has been a series of violent land and water disputes between herding and farming communities. As the
Fulani herding communities of Mali are nomadic and therefore move their herds from one area to another in search for
grass and water, they have clashed with the Dogon farming communities over resources. We expect that these clashes
will remain heightened and could spread more across the Sahel as communities flee violence and attempt to settle in
other areas, increasing intercommunal clashes and regional insecurity. This will likely prompt Sahelian governments to
increasingly cooperate in effort to suppress rising eco-violence in the region, particularly as countries such as Mali,
Niger and Chad have weak institutions.

Effects Of Climate Change To Keep Military Spending Elevated In The Sahel

Sahel - Average Military Expenditure, % Of Government Spending

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Fitch Solutions

Meanwhile, in the Nile region, there is potential for warmer temperatures to ignite transboundary water conflict,
although this is not our core scenario. Ethiopia has been constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
project on the Blue Nile since 2011, which has raised tensions with Egypt and Sudan over fears the dam would disrupt
the water supply to the two downstream countries. Egypt and Sudan are seeking a binding agreement on the filling and
operation of the GERD. However, Ethiopia prefers communications on an ad hoc basis, and tripartite negotiations have
stalled since April 2021. In August 2022, Ethiopia completed the third-stage filling of the dam, despite the disapproval of
Egyptian and Sudanese officials. Warming temperatures and increasingly scarce water supply could further strain
relations between Sudan and Egypt, on one side, and Ethiopia on the other, if the countries fail to reach an agreement
over the operation of the GERD, although our core view is that there will eventually be a mediated solution to
disagreements.

Climate Change Could Potentially Escalate GERD Dispute In The Nile Region
Map Of Nile River Basin
 Source: Atlantic Council, Fitch Solutions

We also expect that there will be an increase in poverty and economic inequality as a result of climate change,
creating fertile ground for social unrest. The latest available data from World Bank shows that 53.0% of total
employment in SSA was within the agricultural sector in 2019. Given budgetary constraints, limited access to
international capital markets, security issues and inadequate access to irrigation systems, the continent’s agricultural
sector lacks resilience to extreme weather events.

Fiscal Constraints To Limit Capacity To Provide Food Subsidies

Selected SSA Markets - Budget Balance, % Of GDP
 f = Fitch Solutions forecast. Source: National sources, Fitch Solutions

Thus, harsher climate conditions will likely lead to increased unemployment and income loss in the rural population, and
raise food insecurity in both rural and urban areas as crops are destroyed, causing an uptick in food prices. We believe
that this will stoke more social unrest in the form of protests, as many governments will lack the financial capacity to
provide food subsidies to the majority of their populations. While more climate disasters could increase the amount of
humanitarian food aid coming in to SSA, this could also trigger more clashes between security forces and armed groups,
particularly in West and East Africa, where there have been multiple instances of insurgents and armed bandits stealing
food supplies to sustain themselves.

Income Inequality In Southern Africa To Be Exacerbated By Climate Disasters

Top 10 Most Unequal Countries - GINI Index

Note: 0 = perfect equality; 100 = maximal inequality. Source: World Bank, Fitch Solutions

Meanwhile, in Southern Africa, we expect that economic inequality - already the highest in the continent (and world - see
chart above) - will widen further as more severe flooding and drought undermine the livelihoods of both the rural and
urban poor. This will trigger more recurrent large-scale protests in markets such as South Africa and Namibia, where
income redistribution tools to tackle inequality are limited. We also expect that an increase in inequality will create more
fertile ground for insurgent groups to recruit new members. This will particularly be the case in Mozambique, where
Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab (no connection to the Somali group of the same name) has recruited locals in the
country’s Cabo Delgado province, taking advantage of grievances among the ethnic Mwani people of the province’s
coast. This is a Muslim-majority ethnic group who have felt that they have been economically and politically marginalised
by the largely Christian Makonde ethnic group, which form the majority in the province. We therefore expect that while
counterinsurgency progress in Cabo Delgado is being made, risks of insurgencies will persist in the long term as climate
change exacerbates minority grievances.

Characteristics Of Society Weighs On Long-Term Political Risk Score

SSA - Long-Term Political Risk Index & Components

Note: Scores out of 100; lower scores imply higher risk. Source: Fitch Solutions

We give Sub-Saharan Africa a score 50.5 out of 100 (lower scores imply higher risks) in our proprietary Long-
Term Political Risk Index (LTPRI). This score is largely weighed down by the score of 39.0 in the ‘characteristics of
society’ component of our LTPRI. We expect that climate change will contribute to increased social grievances, leading to
more intercommunal tension, conflicts and anti-government protests in SSA, and thus add downside pressures to our
scores.

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