Counterinsurgency  in  the  Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan  Borderlands  
A  Discourse  Analysis  of  the  American  Assessment  of  the  Border  Region  to  
Pakistan  in  the  Afghanistan  Counterinsurgency  Mission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Julia  Karlsson    
Bachelor  Thesis  
Department  of  Government  
Supervisor:  Jorge  Ojeda  
January  2017  
 
Word  Count:  10794,  Page  Count:  40  
Abstract  
The   main   theatre   of   the   war   in   Afghanistan   is   in   its   borderlands   to   Pakistan.  
There   the   Taliban   strongholds   never   ceased   and   its   local   population   seem   to  
affiliate  with  the  enemy.  December  1  2009  President  Barack  Obama  presented  a  
new  “comprehensive”  strategy  concerning  the  mission  in  Afghanistan.  This  was  a  
strategy   highly   dominated   by   counterinsurgency   –   or   in   other   words   to   change  
the  main  focus  from  the  enemy  to  the  population.  The  study’s  aim  was  to  analyse  
the   assessment   of   the   borderlands   in   the   new   Afghanistan   counterinsurgency  
mission.   This   was   done   with   the   tools   of   critical   discourse   analysis   and   also   in  
identifying   ideal   types   in   the   counterinsurgency   theory.   The   goal   was   to  
understand   how   the   borderlands   were   assessed   in   the   mission   and   if   the  
concepts   of   regional   aspects,   external   support,   winning   hearts   and   minds   and  
securing  the  population  were  addressed.    The  results  show  that  the  borderlands  
were   assessed   well   in   accordance   to   counterinsurgency   theory,   but   the   specific  
cultural   aspects   of   Afghanistan   were   given   little   attention.   The   situation   in   the  
borderlands  is  still  to  this  day  very  unstable.    
 
 
   

  2  
Table  of  Contents  
Abstract  ................................................................................................................................  2  

1.  Introduction  ...................................................................................................................  4  
1.1  Aim  and  Scope  .......................................................................................................................  5  
1.2  Research  Questions  .............................................................................................................  5  
1.3  Outline  .....................................................................................................................................  5  

2.  Background  ....................................................................................................................  7  
2.1  The  Ambiguity  of  the  Border  and  Its  Porosity  ...........................................................  7  
The  Durand  Line  ........................................................................................................................................  7  
2.2  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  and  the  International  Security  Assistance  
Force  ...............................................................................................................................................  8  

3.  Theoretical  Framework  ...........................................................................................  10  

3.1  Counterinsurgency  Theory  ...........................................................................................  10  
Border-­‐Crossings,  Sanctuaries  and  External  Support  .............................................................  11  
Winning  Heart  and  Minds  ..................................................................................................................  12  
The  Necessity  to  Secure  the  Population  ........................................................................................  14  
3.2  Theoretical  Expectations  ...............................................................................................  15  

4.  Method  ...........................................................................................................................  18  

4.1  Critical  Discourse  Analysis  ............................................................................................  18  
Faircloughian  Textual  Analysis  ........................................................................................................  19  
Categorizing  the  Analysis  ...................................................................................................................  20  
4.2  Material  ................................................................................................................................  21  
4.3  Implementation  of  Method  ............................................................................................  22  

5.  Analysis  and  Results  ..................................................................................................  23  

5.1  White  Paper  of  the  Interagency  Policy  Group's  Report  on  U.S.  Policy  toward  
Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  .....................................................................................................  23  
5.2  COMISAF’S  Initial  Assessment  ......................................................................................  26  
5.3  The  US  Army  and  Marine  Corps  Counterinsurgency  Field  Manual  3-­‐24........  31  

6.  Discussion  .....................................................................................................................  35  

7.  Conclusive  Summary  .................................................................................................  38  

Bibliography  .....................................................................................................................  39  

 

  3  
1.  Introduction  
“The  War  on  Terror”  has  shown  proof  of  how  the  regional  aspects  of  the  Middle  
East   and   South   East   Asia   are   a   matter   as   complex   to   understand   as   the  
characteristics   of   the   Taliban   and   al   Qaeda.   Directly   after   9/11,   the   American  
military  mission  Operation  Enduring  Freedom  was  launched  in  Afghanistan,  with  
the   preliminary   goal   to   oust   the   Taliban   from   power   and   to   destroy   the   al   Qaeda  
network.   The   mission   was   thought   to   be   a   success   and   a   new   government   was  
elected.   Yet,   15   years   later   the   situation   in   Afghanistan   is   far   from   stable   and   the  
Taliban  has  still  influence  over  parts  of  the  country.  It  is  said  that  the  terrorists  
never   really   left,   but   instead   they   sought   a   safe   haven   in   Pakistan   and   in   the  
mountainous   border   region.   It   took   advantage   of   the   tribal   affiliation   of   the  
borderland   villagers   and   of   the   porous   border;   like   that   the   Taliban   could  
continue  its  terror  and  to  subsidise  instability  in  the  region  from  sanctuaries  in  
the  mountains.  Eventually  it  could  re-­‐cease  one  Afghan  village  after  another  and  
the  new  government  was  unceasingly  weakened  and  undermined.1  
  It   is   clear   that   the   regional   aspects   of   a   war   theatre   play   a   vital   part   and  
should   be   addressed   accordingly.   The   porosity   of   the   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  
border   has   through   history   continuously   been   taken   advantage   of   to   smuggle  
drugs,   weapons   and   humans   between   the   countries:   it   is   not   respected   by   the  
people  who  live  in  the  region  as  it  divides  families  and  villages  with  kinship  and  
the  border  is  routinely  crossed  without  any  formalities.2    
  On   1   December   2009   President   Barack   Obama   announced   a   new  
“comprehensive”   strategy   concerning   Afghanistan.   This   was   a   strategy  
dominated  by  counterinsurgency,  meaning  that  the  new  goal  was  to  focus  on  the  
population   rather   than   the   enemy   and   also   to   deepen   the   trilateral   U.S.-­‐
Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   relation.3  The   puzzle   of   the   borderlands   seemed   to   finally  
be   addressed   and   it   is   of   interest   to   examine   how   it   was   assessed   in   the   new  
strategy.   By   conducting   a   discourse   analysis   of   relevant   reports   and   doctrines  

                                                                                                               
1  Olsson  2011,  pp.  17-­‐18  
2  Gregory,  p.  240  
3  Remarks  by  the  President  In  Address  to  the  Nation  on  the  

Way  Forward  in  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan.  December  1,  2009.  

  4  
this   thesis   seeks   to   shed   light   on   the   American   conception   of   the   Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan  border  and  the  region  surrounding  it.    

1.1  Aim  and  Scope    

The   aim   of   this   thesis   is   to   analyse   the   assessment   of   the   borderlands   in   the  
American   mission   in   Afghanistan.   The   scope   has   been   set   to   post-­‐2009   with   a  
focus   on   the   comprehensive   strategy   and   counterinsurgency   in   Operation  
Enduring   Freedom   and   the   International   Assistance   Force.   Due   to   the   word   limit  
the  research  cannot  be  considered  completely  comprehensive,  but  it  only  serves  
as   an   indication   of   how   the   borderlands   were   assessed   by   the   American  
administration.  The  choice  of  material  will  be  explained  further  in  section  4.2.  

 
1.2  Research  Questions  
Below   the   research   question   is   stated,   followed   by   two   sub-­‐questions   that   the  
project  wishes  to  address  and  attempt  to  answer.  
 
• How   was   the   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   borderlands   addressed   in   the  
Afghanistan  counterinsurgency  mission  post-­‐  2009?  
1. How  were  the  regional  aspects,  external  support  and  the  security  of  
the   population   assessed   in   the   “comprehensive”   strategy   of   the  
Obama  administration?  
2. How  were  regional  aspects,  external  support  and  the  security  of  the  
population  assessed  in  counterinsurgency  doctrine?    
 

1.3  Outline  
The   thesis   is   divided   into   seven   parts.   The   second   part   is   devoted   to   background  
and  it  focuses  on  both  the  ambiguity  of  the  border  and  the  people  of  the  border  
region  and  the  characteristics  of  the  American  mission.    
  The  third  section  is  called  “theoretical  framework”  and  it  presents  previous  
research   and   relevant   theories   concerning   counterinsurgency   and   the   regional  
aspects  of  the  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  borderlands.  

  5  
   The  following  section  involves  a  presentation  of  the  method  and  material,  or  
in  other  words  information  concerning  how  the  analysis  was  made.  In  this  thesis  
the   analysis   consists   of   a   critical   discourse   analysis   of   the   white   paper   for   the  
new  comprehensive  strategy,  the  commander  of  the  mission’s  initial  assessment  
of  Afghanistan  in  2009  and  the  field  manual  for  the  U.S.  Army  and  Marine  Corps  
concerning   counterinsurgency   warfare.   A   discussion   concerning   the   choice   of  
material  is  conducted  in  section  4.2.    
  Section   five   is   dedicated   to   the   results   of   the   analysis   and   subsequently   a  
discussion  concerning  these  in  relation  to  theory  is  made.  Lastly,  a  conclusion  is  
drawn  and  hopefully  more  knowledge  is  gathered  on  how  the  Americans,  given  
the   material,   indeed   addressed   the   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   borderlands   and   its  
regional  aspects.    

   

  6  
2.  Background    

2.1  The  Ambiguity  of  the  Border  and  Its  Porosity  

To  understand  the  border,  it  is  relevant  to  start  with  the  simple  question  “what  is  
the   border?”   By   first   glance   it   is   nothing   more   than   a   way   of   dividing   territory  
between  states,  but  borders  are  also  geographical  boundaries  of  political  entities  
and   legal   jurisdictions.   They   offer   opportunities   and   risks,   they   are   sites   where  
transversal   struggles   are   waged   and   they   increase   processes   of   othering.  
However  conceptualised,  international  borders  seem  to  be  implicated  by  issues  
of  power.4  
  One   of   the   key   ambiguities   characterising   borders   is   that   they  
simultaneously  create  difference,  as  they  can  be  considered  to  be  merely  socially  
produced   institutions.   On   one   side,   boundaries   are   socio-­‐spatial   markers   of  
dissimilarity  as  they  define  the  territorial  extent  of  legal  sovereignty,  or  in  other  
words,   boundaries   actively   order   space.   On   the   other   side,   such   spatial   entities  
are  not  static  as  different  forms  of  social  action  constantly  challenge  them.5  The  
vast   majority   of   international   borders   are   an   unceasing   source   of   conflict   and  
their  exact  placement  and  characteristics  are  therefore  rather  flexible.6    
  Still,   some   borders   have   been   more   commonly   disputed,   more   violated   and  
more   arbitrary   than   others.   In   many   cases   this   is   the   result   of   imperial  
boundaries   imposed   upon   colonized   regions.   The   urge   to   modernize   together  
with   imperial   rivalries   often   leads   to   the   creation   of   boundaries   as   a   mean   of  
keeping   domains   separate   of   two   different   imperials.   In   most   cases,   little   or   no  
respect  is  paid  to  regional  specificities  and  the  occupied  states.7      
 

The  Durand  Line  

The  Durand  Line  is  the  present  international  boundary  between  Afghanistan  and  
Pakistan.  The  name  derives  from  Sir  Mortimer  Durand,  the  foreign  secretary  of  
British   India,   who   initiated   the   creation   of   the   border   in   1893.   It   is   said   that  

                                                                                                               
4  Novak,  p.  741  
5  Ibid,  p.  743  
6  Mishra,  p.  106  
7  Ibid  

  7  
Afghanistan   was   a   strategic   buffer   state   between   British   India   and   Russia  
through   the   entire   nineteenth   century   and   nearly   all   of   its   boundaries   are   a  
result   of   British   and   Russian   negotiations.   Afghan   leaders   never   had   much   say   in  
the  discussions.8  
  The   last   border   to   be   negotiated   was   the   Durand   Line   and   it   is   also   the   most  
contentious  one.9  The  2,450  kilometres  long  border  bisects  the  cultural  region  of  
Pashtunistan,  which  means  that  it  divides  villages  and  families  with  kinship  and  
strong   cultural   connections.   Expectedly,   the   borderlands   are   highly   porous   and  
many  of  the  inhabitants  still  routinely  cross  it  without  any  border  formalities.10  
The   wild   and   largely   unregulated   border-­‐region   play   an   extremely   important  
role  in  the  Taliban  insurgency.  Pashtunistan  provides  a  steady  source  of  recruits,  
a  safe  haven  for  senior  leadership  and  a  base  of  operations  and  training  for  the  
Taliban   and   Al-­‐Qaeda   associates.11  This   will   be   discussed   further   in   the   theory  
section.  

 
2.2   Operation   Enduring   Freedom   and   the   International   Security  
Assistance  Force  
It   is   often   said   that   the   war   in   Afghanistan   began   by   the   American   invasion   in  
2001.   Yet,   for   the   Afghans   the   war   began   much   earlier.   In   1979   they   were  
invaded  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  a  guerrilla  war  has  been  fought  in  the  country  
ever   since.   The   Soviets   tried   to   beat   the   Afghans   with   a   strong   conventional  
force,   but   since   that   resulted   in   a   great   loss   the   Americans   decided   to   do   the  
opposite.   The   strategy   was   to   have   as   few   “boots   on   the   ground”   as   possible;   the  
goal  was  to  beat  the  Taliban  in  order  to  defeat  Al-­‐Qaeda  and  then  leave  quickly.  
They   said   they   wanted   to   leave   a   light   footprint   and   the   mission   got   the   name  
“Operation  Enduring  Freedom”  (OEF).  It  was  in  the  same  spirit  that  the  NATO  led  
“International  Security  Assistance  Force”  (ISAF)  was  created,  but  its  purpose  was  

                                                                                                               
8  Mishra,  p.  107  
9  Ibid  
10  Gregory,  p.  240  
11  Johnson  &  Mason,  p.  82  

  8  
instead   to   support   the   new   Afghan   government   in   its   effort   to   remain   stability  
and  safety  in  the  vicinity  of  Kabul.12    
  Something   went   wrong.   The   Taliban   was   successfully   ousted   from   power  
and  a  new  regime  was  implemented.  Nonetheless,  soon  after  it  became  clear  that  
the  Taliban  was  not  defeated  at  all,  but  it  was  hiding  in  safe  havens  in  Pakistan,  
on  the  other  side  of  the  Durand  Line.  From  there  the  insurgent  could  continue  its  
jihad   mission   and   continuously   cause   instability   in   the   region.13  According   to  
Seth  G.  Jones,  a  researcher  at  the  RAND  Corporation,  the  freedom  to  use  foreign  
territory   as   a   sanctuary   is   often   correlated   to   the   presence   of   a   weak  
government.14  In  Afghanistan  the  state-­‐building  process  at  the  time  never  led  to  
a  regime  that  could  offer  stability  and  safety  for  its  population.  Yet,  Afghanistan  
was   in   an   American   perspective   considered   to   be   under   control   and   in   2003  
most  of  the  attention  and  resources  were  instead  directed  to  Iraq.  In  Afghanistan  
the  return  of  the  Taliban  was  inevitable.15    
  In  Pentagon  the  matter  was  not  opened  for  discussion  until  Barack  Obama  
was  elected  president.  In  late  2008  a  60-­‐day  inter-­‐agency  “strategy  review”  was  
done  and  on  March  27,  2009,  Obama  announced  a  “comprehensive”  strategy  that  
announced   deployment   of   an   additional   21,000   U.S.   forces.16  In   June   the   same  
year   General   Stanley   McChrystal   was   announced   new   commander   for   the  
mission:   a   general   who   was   famous   for   his   preference   for   counterinsurgency  
theory.   After   his   first   assessment   of   the   situation   in   Afghanistan   he  
unsurprisingly  emphasised  the  importance  and  relevance  of  the  guidelines  given  
by  counterinsurgency.  17    
 

   

                                                                                                               
12  Olsson  2011,  p.  16  
13  Ibid,  p.  17  
14  Jones,  p.  22  
15  Olsson  2011,  pp.  17-­‐18  
16  Katzman,  p.  24  
17  Ibid,  p.  25  

  9  
3.  Theoretical  Framework  
Much  of  International  Relations  literature  is  focused  on  the  interaction  between  
states   and   also   how   different   parts   act   during   war.   In   counterinsurgency  
literature,   the   recognition   of   regional   aspects   and   the   importance   of  
understanding   the   culture   of   the   local   population   is   a   popular   theme.   The  
Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  borderlands  is  a  good  example  of  a  region  which  has  been  
highly   contested   and   caused   a   lot   of   tension   historically   –   both   in   war   and   in  
peace.    

 
3.1  Counterinsurgency  Theory  
For   starters,   in   relation   to   the   aim   of   this   thesis,   some   general   contemplations  
concerning   counterinsurgency   theory   must   be   made.   It   normally   considers   a  
two-­‐part   war:   an   insurgent   and   a   counterinsurgent.   Although   contemporary  
counterinsurgency   is   often   conducted   by   a   third   party,   as   the   OEF   and   ISAF   in  
Afghanistan,   this   thesis   will   not   make   any   distinction   between   the   host   state   and  
the  third  party.  This  is  to  make  the  argumentation  as  stringent  as  possible.    
  There   are   two   ways   of   approaching   counterinsurgency   theory:   the  
population-­‐centric  version  and  the  enemy-­‐centric  version.  First  the  population-­‐
centric  version  will  be  presented,  which  is  by  far  the  most  influential  one.18  What  
the   population-­‐centric   version   contains   is   that   there   is   a   core   difference   of  
counterinsurgency   and   of   conventional   warfare.   David   Galula,   a   French   general  
of   the   wars   in   colonial   Algeria   and   a   counterinsurgency   scholar   that   today   has  
close  to  a  cult  status,  expressed  that  conventional  warfare  strives  to  conquest  the  
territory  of  the  enemy  and  to  destroy  his  forces.  However  in  counterinsurgency  
the  opposing  part  has  no  territory  and  that  is  also  not  what  he  is  fighting  for.  “He  
is   everywhere   and   nowhere”.  19  In   his   book   Counterinsurgency  Warfare:  Theory  
and   Practice   Galula   describes   the   parameters   of   insurgency   war.   According   to  
him   the   major   characteristic   of   these   wars   is   the   role   of   the   population.   Its  
support   is   necessary   in   order   to   seek   legitimacy;   the   one   who   wins   its   “hearts  

                                                                                                               
18  Moyar,  p.  135  
19  Galula,  p.  53  

  10  
and  minds”  will  also  win  the  war.20  From  the  insurgents  perspective,  as  the  more  
contemporary  scholar  David  Kilcullen  expressed  it,  “[it]  needs  the  people  to  act  
in   certain   ways.   [It]   needs   their   sympathy,   acquiescence,   and   silence,   or   simply  
their   reaction   to   provocation,   in   order   to   survive   and   further   [its]   strategy.”21  
Insurgents  need  the  population  in  order  to  seek  shelter,  receive  supplies  and  to  
gain   new   recruits.   Counterinsurgents   need   the   trust   and   support   of   the  
population  in  order  to  stop  the  insurgent  from  growing  and  surviving.  In  short,  
the   population-­‐oriented   version   of   counterinsurgency   theory   says   that  
insurgency  wars  will  be  won  if  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  population  are  won.  
  Concerning   the   other   approach,   the   enemy-­‐centric   version,  
counterinsurgency   is   much   more   seen   as   a   conventional   war.   It   is   seen   as   a  
military   struggle   between   two   enemies   of   which   the   goal   is   to   eliminate   the  
other.22  Today   this   logic   is   rare   at   the   strategic   level,   but   it   is   still   relatively  
common   at   a   tactical   and   operational   level.   In   the   most   recent   Iraq   war   for  
example,   operations   have   been   conducted   with   the   aim   of   seizing   physical  
terrain  and  by  that  disrupt  insurgent  operations.23      
 

Border-­‐Crossings,  Sanctuaries  and  External  Support    

The   aim   of   this   thesis   concerns   the   border   region   and   therefore   issues   regarding  
that   part   of   counterinsurgency   theory   will   be   given   additional   space.   David  
Galula   meant   that   the   border   areas   are   a   constant   source   of   weakness   to   the  
counterinsurgent,   especially   if   the   neighbouring   country   supports   the  
insurgency.   It   is   not   rare   that   the   insurgent   exploits   this   advantage.   He   means  
that  “by  moving  from  one  side  of  the  border  to  the  other,  the  insurgent  is  often  
able  to  escape  pressure  or,  at  least,  to  complicate  operations  for  his  opponent.”24  
Naturally  border  crossings  must  therefore  be  restricted  and  also  as  an  effort  to  
prevent   terrorist   insurgents   a   sanctuary   on   the   other   side   of   the   border.  25    
According  to  a  study  by  Austin  Long  at  the  RAND  Corporation,  insurgents  have  
                                                                                                               
20  Galula,  p.  6  
21  Kilcullen,  p.  146  
22  Larsdotter,  p.  138  
23  Ibid,  p.  139  
24  Galula,  pp.  25-­‐26  
25  Sepp,  p.  11  

  11  
won  almost  half  of  the  conflicts  in  which  they  have  had  access  to  a  sanctuary  (23  
out   of   52   studied   cases).   By   contrast,   out   of   the   conflicts   in   which   they   did   not  
enjoy   a   safe   haven   they   won   only   three   out   of   the   23   wars.26  It   is   close   to  
impossible  for  an  insurgent  to  win  the  war  without  a  sanctuary  and  support  from  
an  external  source.    Yet,  very  little  is  written  on  how  the  counterinsurgent  should  
address   the   issue.   Long   concludes   that   in   the   absence   of   a   border   security  
system,   that   at   least   hinders   or   deters   the   insurgent   from   crossing   from   one   side  
to  another,  no  model  solution  leads  to  conflict  termination.27  
  The   enemy-­‐centric   logic   would   presumably   argue   for   a   military   border  
blockade.   However,   it   can   in   many   cases   lead   to   situations   of   which   the  
population   living   in   the   region   is   forced   to   move   in   order   to   give   space   to   the  
border   security   measurements.28  Assumingly   though,   this   would   lead   to   a   loss   of  
faith  from  the  population  and  the  insurgent    
 

Winning  Heart  and  Minds  

In   order   to   break   the   Taliban   stronghold,   the   counterinsurgent   could   instead  
seek   the   trust   of   the   population   in   the   border   region,   the   population   in   the  
neighbouring   state   and   also   the   government   of   the   neighbouring   state.   If   the  
counterinsurgent   successfully   attains   regional   support   it   is   less   likely   for   the  
insurgent   to   achieve   civil   assistance   to   cross   the   border,   smuggle   weapons   and  
resources,  and  to  find  a  sanctuary.29    
  In   the   case   of   Afghanistan   the   key   would   then   be   the   Pashtun   population.  
However   its   association   to   the   Taliban   has   traditionally   been   strong,   which  
according  to  some  theorists  can  partly  be  explained  by  it  being  an  ethnic  group  
that   puts   a   lot   of   importance   to   tribal   affiliation.   This   makes   the   loyalty   within  
each   clan   very   strong   and   in   some   cases   it   is   even   stronger   than   that   to   the   state  
or   other   actors.   This   is   a   structural   factor   that   plays   a   part   in   why   some   tribes  
have  a  strong  allegiance  to  the  Taliban  rather  than  to  the  Afghan  state.30  In  fact,  

                                                                                                               
26  Connable  &  Libicki,  p.  50  
27  Long,  p.  51  
28  Larsdotter,  p.  142  
29  Ibid  p.  143  
30  Olsson  2009,  p.  18  

  12  
most   of   the   Taliban   senior   leaders   were   born   in   the   same   Pashtun   tribe.31  The  
importance  of  the  Pashtuns  to  the  Taliban  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  The  shaded  
section  of  the  map  shows  areas  on  both  sides  of  the  border  in  which  the  Taliban  
has  its  main  influence  and  stronghold.    
 
 

 
Figure  1:  Map  over  the  borderlands  and  the  Taliban  influence32  
 
 
To   state   that   kinship   is   the   only   reason   for   the   people   of   the   borderlands   to  
affiliate   with   the   Taliban   is   still   to   oversimplify   the   situation.   The   Taliban   is   a  
master   at   psychological   warfare   and   it   is   common   that   it   has   gained   support   as   a  
result   of   verbal   threats   or   intimidation.   It   normally   focuses   on   the   fact   that   the  
Americans  can  and  will  not  stay  forever,  and  when  they  leave  the  Taliban  will  kill  

                                                                                                               
31  Johnson  &  Mason,  p.  78    
32  Attained  from  BBC  News:  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐south-­‐asia-­‐

15149996    

  13  
every   family   and   person   who   has   ever   collaborated   with   the   Americans   or   the  
Karzai  government.33  Evidently  such  messages  have  an  overwhelming  effect.    
 

The  Necessity  to  Secure  the  Population  

The  motive  for  an  individual  to  support  the  insurgency  is  not  obvious.  It  can  be  
because   of   kinship,   or   it   can   be   because   he   prefers   its   political   agenda,   but   a  
citizen  can  also  support  the  insurgents  because  of  mere  fear.  Like  that  he  will  not  
choose  the  side  that  is  the  most  in  accord  with  his  liking,  but  the  one  that  creates  
the   highest   incitement   for   personal   security.   It   is   then   not   enough   for   the  
counterinsurgent   to   create   affinity,   but   only   by   guaranteeing   the   safety   of   the  
population   can   the   bound   to   the   insurgent   be   broken.34  Bringing   security   and  
stability   to   the   Pashtun   tribal   areas   will   reduce   the   implications   of   using   the  
region  as  a  sanctuary.  This  together  with  a  guarantee  of  better  governance  is  key  
to   a   successful   counterinsurgency   in   Afghanistan.35  Like   that   it   would   create   a  
credible  motivation  for  the  Pashtun  population  to  seek  trust  in  the  new  Afghan  
government.    
  However,   certain   scholars   argue   for   the   fact   that   the   counterinsurgency  
approach   might   be   too   costly   in   Afghanistan.   They   promote   a   solution   close   to  
the  enemy-­‐oriented  version  of  counterinsurgency,  in  which  the  aim  is  to  disrupt  
Al-­‐Qaeda  by  persistent  special  operations  and  drone  attacks.  The  main  argument  
is  that  stabilising  Afghanistan  will  not  make  any  difference  if  Pakistan  does  not  
prosecute   a   similar   pacification   campaign:   otherwise   the   insurgents   will   still  
benefit   from   safe   havens   across   the   Durand   Line.36  Yet,   unjust   killings   in   the  
Pashtun   belt   might   work   as   a   catalyst   for   creating   more   Islamic   militants.   It  
creates  a  never-­‐ending  cycle  of  radicalisation  and  killing  in  the  tribal  areas.37    
  A   long-­‐term   solution   would   instead   include   both   Afghanistan   and   Pakistan,  
in  order  to  win  over  the  Pashtuns  on  both  sides  of  the  border.  With  the  support  
of   the   local   population   targeted   killing   of   insurgents   will   be   possible,   as   the  

                                                                                                               
33  Johnson  &  Mason,  p.  87  
34  Olsson  2011,  p.  29  
35  Cassidy,  p.  41  
36  Ibid,  p.  42  
37  Ibid,  p.  43  

  14  
provided  intelligence  will  be  more  precise.  The  end  result  should  be  a  disrupted  
Al-­‐Qaeda  and  fewer  civilian  casualties.38    
 

3.2  Theoretical  Expectations  

As  mentioned  in  the  above  section,  according  to  theory  counterinsurgency  wars  
are  won  by  gaining  the  trust  of  the  people.  However,  something  that  is  important  
to   note   is   that   counterinsurgency   theory   derives   from   the   1950’s   and   60’s   and  
the  colonial  wars.  Back  then  most  sociological  theorists  believed  that  legitimacy  
and   stability   were   implemented   as   a   result   of   security,   good   governance   and  
economical  wealth.  The  heritage  of  the  theory  can  be  translated  into  a  belief  in  
the  same  model  for  success  for  the  Afghanistan  mission.39    
  It   is   not   hard   to   see   how   the   model   is   true   for   security;   law   and   order   need  
to   be   implemented   in   order   to   achieve   long-­‐term   stability.   Few   can   argue   with  
the  fact  that  in  a  situation  where  there  is  no  one  to  sustain  security,  each  and  one  
would   need   to   do   it   him   or   her   self,   resulting   in   a   situation   of   anarchy.   If   there  
instead   is   a   clear   authority,   whether   it   is   a   cruel   warlord   or   a   working   police  
force,  the  people  will  stay  calm.  However,  the  second  part  of  the  believed  trinity  
is  less  obvious.  A  well  functioning  state  might  make  life  easier  for  its  citizens,  but  
it   does   not   necessarily   make   it   legitimate.   Sociologist   Max   Weber   wrote   about  
different  factors  for  legitimacy  and  it  is  true  that  efficiency  is  one  of  them,  but  not  
the   only   one.   According   to   Weber   there   are   three   different   types   of   legitimate  
authorities,   namely   legal   authority,   traditional   authority   and   charismatic  
authority.     It   basically   means   that   people   spontaneously   tend   to   follow   leaders  
who   are   either   very   charismatic,   because   they   have   traditionally   been   the   leader  
or  because  of  a  rational  legal  system  and  bureaucracy.  40  
  In  Western  societies  the  legal-­‐rational  model  is  clearly  the  dominant  one,  in  
combination  with  a  belief  in  democracy.  We  accept  authority  if  it  is  applied  by  a  
democratic  elected  leader  who  implement  an  impartial  bureaucracy.  This  is  also  
the   foundation   for   the   counterinsurgency   theory   that   was   used   in   Afghanistan  
post-­‐2009:   that   by   building   schools,   creating   roads   and   infrastructure   and   the  
                                                                                                               
38  Cassidy,  p.  43  
39  Olsson  2011,  p.  31  
40  Ibid,  p.  32  

  15  
implementation   of   rule   of   law,   legitimacy   would   be   created   for   the   new  
government  in  Afghanistan.  Nonetheless,  as  just  shown,  it  is  a  simplified  version  
of   how   to   reach   legitimacy   and   the  heart  and  minds  of  the  people   by   just   ensuring  
good  governance  and  state  building.  41    
  What   is   important   to   remember   is   that   Afghanistan   is   an   underdeveloped  
country   and   access   to   education   and   health   care   is   not   necessarily   the   highest  
priority   for   the   population.   For   them   it   has   never   been   an   essential   part   of   life  
and   therefore   not   within   their   expectations   of   good   governance.42  Especially   in  
the   case   of   Afghanistan   in   which   religion   and   tribal   affiliation   play   an   essential  
role   in   what   the   population   perceives   as   a   legitimate   source   of   power,   the  
western  way  becomes  problematic.  This  means  that  even  in  theory  mullahs  and  
heads   of   families   and   tribes   receive   more   legitimacy   and   affiliation   of   the   Afghan  
people   than   the   Karzai   government   will   ever   be   able   to   do.   Also   as   mentioned  
earlier,  the  Taliban  is  a  master  at  psychological  warfare  and  many  of  its  leaders  
are   considered   very   charismatic;   they   use   a   combination   of   charismatic  
attraction,   traditional   tribe   association   and   intimidation   in   order   to   win   the  
affiliation  of  the  Afghan  people.    
  The  third  part  of  what  is  believed  necessary  in  order  to  receive  legitimacy  
according  to  the  model  is  to  guarantee  economical  wealth.  This  is  not  completely  
uncontroversial   either;   it   is   assumed   that   economical   development,   an   increased  
amount   of   jobs   and   business   opportunities   will   lead   to   a   lower   risk   for   armed  
conflict.   Yet,   there   is   no   proven   connection   between   poverty   and   the   use   of  
violence.   Though   in   Afghanistan   many   recruits   to   the   Taliban   occurred   due   to  
unemployment   among   young   men,   it   does   not   mean   that   there   is   a   direct  
connection  to  a  feeling  of  injustice.  This  is  rather  an  effect  of  the  strategy  of  the  
Taliban  in  combination  with  a  lack  of  other  job  opportunities;  it  does  not  mean  
that  the  insurgent  is  considered  more  legitimate.43    
  As  shown  the  theoretical  expectations  on  the  strategy  used  in  Afghanistan  
are   relatively   low.   The   problem   with   counterinsurgency   theory   and   other  
theories   like   it   is   that   they   have   a   tendency   to   be  too   general   and   vague.   There   is  

                                                                                                               
41  Olsson  2011,  p.  33  
42  Ibid,  p.  34  
43  Ibid  

  16  
a   very   large   step   between   the   dependent   and   independent   variable,   between  
cause  and  effect.44  Another  factor  that  is  mentioned  many  times  in  the  literature  
is   that   counterinsurgency   is   not   a   “quick-­‐fix”.   To   win   the   hearts   and   minds   of   the  
population   is   a   long   process   that   can   take   many   years:   the   most   common  
estimation  is  10  years,  but  some  researchers  claim  that  it  can  take  up  to  40  years  
to  see  any  real  effects  of  society.45    
  It  might  sound  like  there  is  little  interest  in  conducting  research  concerning  
counterinsurgency  in  the  borderlands  of  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  due  to  the  low  
theoretical  expectations.  However,  the  area  is  considered  key  to  the  conflict  and  
it   is   still   of   relevance   to   analyse   its   complexity.   Due   to   an   increase   in  
psychological   operations   of   the   Taliban   in   the   borderlands,   this   thesis   aims   at  
understanding  if  and  how  they  were  encountered  by  the  Obama  administration.  
Consequently  there  might  be  a  connection  between  the  American  perception  of  
counterinsurgency,  the  border,  regional  aspects  and  the  fact  that  Afghanistan  is  
still  today  far  from  stable.      
   
 

   

                                                                                                               
44  Olsson  2011,  p.  35  
45  Ibid,  p.  42  

  17  
4.  Method  
In   order   to   identify   the   strategy   regarding   the   borderlands   in   the   American  
mission   a   qualitative   discourse   analysis   of   relevant   documents   and   manuals   was  
conducted.   The   research   strategy   was   qualitative   as   it   aims   at   a   deeper  
understanding  by  interpretation  of  discourse  and  also  because  it  is  inductive  in  
its   approach   to   the   relation   between   theory   and   research.46     The   aim   was   to  
examine   a   piece   of   reality   in   order   to   see   what   it   can   provide   to   our  
understanding  of  the  general  picture.      
 

4.1  Critical  Discourse  Analysis    

The   concept   of   discourse   and   discourse   analysis   is   rarely   properly   defined   and   it  
can   therefore   give   a   vague   impression.   Yet,   in   many   cases   underlying   the   term  
“discourse”   is   the   general   idea   that   language   is   structured   in   different   patterns  
depending  on  both  domain  and  social  structure.  Discourse  analysis  is  the  study  
of   these   patterns.   It   is   thought   that   our   ways   of   talking,   writing   and  
communicating  in  general  do  not  neutrally  reflect  reality,  but  rather  contribute  
to   creating   and   changing   it. 47  Discourse   can   therefore   be   understood   as   “a  
particular  way  of  talking  about  and  understanding  the  world  (or  an  aspect  of  the  
world)”48.   The   term   critical  discourse  analysis   (often   abbreviated   CDA)   refers   to  
theories  and  methods  for  the  empirical  study  of  relations  between  discourse  and  
social  and  cultural  developments  in  different  social  domains.49    
   The   theorist   Norman   Fairclough   constructed   a   useful   framework   for   the  
analysis   of   discourse   as   social   practice.   To   Fairclough   discourse   is   not   only  
constitutive   but   also   constituted,   meaning   that   he   appoints   a   function   to   the  
discourse.   It   is   an   important   form   of   social   practice   that   both   reproduces   and  
changes   knowledge,   identities   and   social   relations. 50  To   investigate   how   the  
Durand   Line   was   presented   and   addressed   in   different   official   discourses,   will  
become   of   higher   relevance   when   viewing   the   discourse   in   the   Faircloughian  

                                                                                                               
46  Bryman,  p.  40  
47  Winther-­‐Jørgensen  &  Phillips,  p.  1  
48  Ibid  
49  Ibid,  p.  60  
50  Ibid,  p.  65  

  18  
manner.  He  has  a  very  text-­‐oriented  approach  to  CDA  that  tries  to  comprehend  
how   discursive   processes   operate   linguistically   in   certain   texts.   Yet   for  
Fairclough  a  linguistic  text  analysis  is  not  enough  in  itself,  as  it  does  not  put  the  
discourse   into   context   nor   shed   light   on   its   social   structures.   He   argues   for   an  
interdisciplinary   perspective   where   the   researcher   combines   textual   and   social  
analysis.51  In   order   to   do   so   he   suggests   his   so-­‐called   three-­‐dimensional   model,  
which  suggests  that  discourse  should  be  seen  as  a  text,  a  discursive  practice  and  a  
social   practice.  However,  Fairclough  also  mentions  that  not  all  three  dimensions  
always   need   to   be   included   in   discourse   analysis,   as   they   can   be   seen   as   three  
different  research  projects.52  For  the  sake  of  this  project  only  a  textual  analysis  
will  be  made,  but  in  order  to  fully  address  the  research  questions  more  aspects  
than   linguistics   need   to   be   addressed.   Therefore   the   analysis   will   be  
complemented  by  the  identification  of  certain  ideal  types.  
 

Faircloughian  Textual  Analysis  

By  analysing  the  linguistic  characteristics  of  a  text  in  detail,  it  is  possible  to  cast  
light  on  how  discourses  are  activated  on  a  textual  level  and  how  they  arrive  at  a  
certain   interpretation.   Fairclough   proposes   a   number   of   different   tools   for   text  
analysis,   for   example   interactional   control,   ethos,   metaphors,   wording   and  
grammar.   The   textual   factors   that   will   be   of   focus   for   this   project   are   the  
grammatical  elements  transitivity  and  modality.      
  To   investigate   transitivity   means   that   the   focus   is   on   how   events   and  
processes   are   connected   (or   not   connected)   with   subjects   and   objects.   The  
interest   lies   in   the   ideological   consequences   of   different   forms   in   the   grammar.  
For  example  in  the  sentence  “50  civilians  were  killed  yesterday”  a  passive  voice  
is  used  and  the  agent  is  omitted.  It  presents  the  event  as  a  natural  phenomenon  
with  no  one  who  is  seemingly  responsible.53    
  An   analysis   of   modality   does   instead   emphasis   the   speaker’s   degree   of  
affinity   to   his   or   her   statement.   The   statements   “it’s   bad”,   “I   think   it’s   bad”   and  
“perhaps   it’s   a   little   bit   bad”   are   different   ways   of   expressing   an   opinion:   they  
                                                                                                               
51  Winther-­‐Jørgensen  &  Phillips,  p.  66  
52  Ibid,  p.  76  
53  Ibid,  p.  83  

  19  
represent   different   modalities,   meaning   that   the   speaker   commits   to   the  
statement  of  a  varying  degree.54  
 

Categorizing  the  Analysis  

There  are  certain  concepts  derived  from  the  theory  that  will  be  of  main  focus  for  
the   discourse   analysis.   Therefore   it   is   of   relevance   to   define   them   in   an  
unambiguous   manner   in   order   to   simplify   their   operationalization   and   also   to  
make   sure   that   they   are   understood   in   the   same   manner   for   every   discourse.  
Worth  noting  is  that  the  definitions  given  here  should  not  be  considered  as  direct  
reflections  of  reality,  but  they  only  serve  the  purpose  of  making  analysis  easier  
and  more  stringent.55    
 
Regional   aspects:   The   regional   specificities   of   the   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  
borderlands.   These   consist   of   for   example   the   presence   of   the   Pashtun  
population,   the   porosity   of   the   Durand   Line   and   the   increased   presence   of  
insurgency.  
External   support:   External   support   should   be   understood   as   support   given   to  
the   insurgent   from   an   external   source,   mainly   it   would   involve   a   neighbouring  
country   or   in   this   case   Pakistan.   External   support   can   also   be   given   at   a   local  
perspective,  when  the  population  helps  the  insurgent.      
Winning  hearts  and  minds:   This   concept   should   be   understood   as   the   effort   of  
the   counterinsurgent   to   gain   the   affiliation   of   the   population.    
Securing   the   population:   In   the   theory   the   need   to   secure   the   population   in  
order   to   win   its   “hearts   and   minds”   was   emphasised.   However   “securing   the  
population”  should  be  understood  differently  than  “winning  hearts  and  minds”,  
since  to  secure  rather  reflect  the  physical  security  than  the  mental  affiliation.    
 
“Regional   aspects”   and   “external   support”   should   be   understood   as   the   main  
concerns   of   the   counterinsurgent,   while   “winning   hearts   and   minds”   and  

                                                                                                               
54  Winther-­‐Jørgensen  &  Phillips,  pp.  83-­‐84  
55  Teorell  &  Svensson,  p.  42  

  20  
“securing  the  population”  are  the  main  solutions  according  to  counterinsurgency  
theory.  
 

4.2  Material  
The   process   of   finding   appropriate   material   to   answer   the   research   questions  
has   proved   to   be   complicated.   There   is   a   need   for   official   sources   in   order   to  
properly   study   how   the   borderlands   were   addressed   in   the   mission   by   the  
Obama   administration   and   also   by   doctrine.   A   lot   of   material   is   classified   or  
partly   classified   and   a   lot   of   main   Afghanistan   reports   focus   on   issues   with   no  
connection   to   the   borderlands.   Hence   a   selection   has   been   made,   mainly   based  
on   both   accessibility   and   relevance.   The   scope   of   the   thesis   is   also   relatively  
small   due   to   the   word   limit,   making   the   study   not   completely   comprehensive.  
Instead   this   thesis   shows   a   fragment   of   the   American   understanding   of   the  
Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   borderlands   and   only   three   source   documents   will   be  
analysed.    
  In   order   to   answer   the   first   research   question   (how   were   the   regional  
aspects,   external   support   and   the   security   of   the   population   assessed   in   the  
“comprehensive”   strategy   of   the   Obama   administration?)   the   white   paper   that  
was   sent   from   the   White   House   to   members   of   Congress   on   Mars   27   2009,  
“White   Paper   of   the   Interagency   Policy   Group’s   Report   on   U.S.   Policy   toward  
Afghanistan   and   Pakistan”   and   the   report   by   General   Stanley   McChrystal,  
“COMISAF’s  Initial  Assessment”,  will  be  used.    The  reason  for  the  choice  is  because  
the  comprehensive  strategy  is  presented  in  the  white  paper  and  then  the  ideas  
are  developed  further  by  McChrystal  in  his  assessment  of  the  actual  situation  in  
Afghanistan.   Though   some   parts   of   the   report   are   classified,   its   public   sections  
are   still   of   relevance   in   the   understanding   of   the   American   conception   of   the  
Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  borderlands.  
  To   answer   the   second   research   question   (how   were   regional   aspects,  
external   support   and   the   security   of   the   population   assessed   in  
counterinsurgency   doctrine?)   the   actual   counterinsurgency   field   manual   was  
analysed.  “The   U.S.   Army   and   Marine   Corps   Counterinsurgency   Field   Manual   3-­‐24”  
(FM   3-­‐24)   create   a   thorough   picture   of   how   commanders,   staffs   and   forces   were  

  21  
guided   in   the   counterinsurgency   mission.   The   first   version   of   FM   3-­‐24   was  
published  in  2006  and  it  was  later  severely  revised  in  2014.  However,  due  to  the  
ISAF  coming  to  an  end  in  2014  and  OEF  in  2015,  the  older  version  is  in  respect  to  
this  thesis  of  higher  relevance.    
  A   contemplation   that   must   be   done   is   that   it   is   not   sure   that   the   doctrine  
was   completely   followed   on   the   field   and   also   there   might   be   classified  
documents   that   state   other   aspects.   However,   these   are   factors   that   cannot   be  
taken   into   account   in   this   analysis.   Instead   the   results   and   conclusions   will   be  
based  only  on  the  information  given  from  the  material.  
 

4.3  Implementation  of  Method  

The  critical  discourse  analysis  was  conducted  at  a  macro  and  a  micro  level.  First  
a   brief   read-­‐through   of   each   document   was   made   in   order   to   achieve   an  
overview  of  the  content.  After,  a  second  more  thorough  reading  was  conducted  
in  which  the  four  ideal  types  –  regional  aspects,  external  support,  winning  hearts  
and   minds   and   securing   the   population   –   were   identified.   The   identification  
focused  on  finding  parts  of  the  discourse  that  addressed  the  different  concepts  in  
one  way  or  another.  
  The   parts   that   were   identified   as   relevant   were   after   analysed   on   a   micro  
level.   The   tone   of   voice   was   taken   into   account,   the   transitivity   and   the   modality.  
This  was  done  in  order  to  deepen  the  understanding  of  the  actual  assessment  of  
a  certain  concept  or  issue.    

   

  22  
5.  Analysis  and  Results  
The  analysis  is  divided  up  in  a  manner  that  first  presents  the  results  from  each  
discourse  individually.  After  a  general  discussion  will  be  made  in  order  to  put  the  
results  into  context  and  in  relation  to  other  social  patterns.    

5.1   White   Paper   of   the   Interagency   Policy   Group's   Report   on   U.S.  

Policy  toward  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  
The  initial  release  of  the  new  American  strategy  for  Afghanistan  began  with  the  
“White   Paper   of   the   Interagency   Policy   Group’s   Report   on   U.S.   Policy   toward  
Afghanistan   and   Pakistan”   on   Mars   27   2009.   It   is   a   document   of   6   pages   sent  
from   the   White   House   to   members   of   Congress   in   order   to   explain,   in   some  
detail,   the   President’s   new   strategy   and   its   goals   concerning   Afghanistan   and  
Pakistan.    
 
Regional  Aspects  
Due  to  the  inclusion  of  Pakistan  in  the  title  of  the  policy  paper,  it  seems  already  
from  the  beginning  to  recognise  the  specific  aspects  of  the  borderlands  and  the  
relation  between  the  two  countries.  In  the  introduction  the  following  is  stated:  
 
The   ability   of   extremists   in   Pakistan   to   undermine   Afghanistan   is   proven,  
while  insurgency  in  Afghanistan  feeds  instability  in  Pakistan.  The  threat  that  
al   Qaeda   poses   to   the   United   States   and   our   allies   in   Pakistan   -­‐   including   the  
possibility   of   extremists   obtaining   fissile   material   -­‐   is   all   too   real.   Without  
more   effective   action   against   these   groups   in   Pakistan,   Afghanistan   will   face  
continuing  instability.56  
 
Although   the   aspects   of   the   borderlands   are   hinted   on   many   places   in   the  
relatively   short   paper,   it   is   never   explicitly   mentioned   and   the   only   detail  
concerning   the   regional   aspects   that   is   mentioned   is   that   Afghanistan   is   70%  
rural.57  

                                                                                                               
56  White  Paper,  p.  1  
57  Ibid,  p.  2  

  23  
External  Support    
The  trilateral  relation  of  U.S-­‐Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  is  mentioned  as  essential  and  
also   that   the   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   bilateral   cooperation   should   be   bolstered.  
However   the   American   relation   to   Pakistan   seems   to   be   thought   of   in   different  
terms  than  that  to  Afghanistan.  In  many  places  the  phrase  “our  allies  in  Pakistan”  
is   used,   while   the   same   formulation   is   not   applied   to   describe   the   U.S-­‐
Afghanistan   relation.   It   is   also   said   that   the   objective   of   disrupting   terrorist  
networks  is  especially  important  in  Pakistan.58    
  Through   the   paper   there   are   several   suggestions   to   Pakistan   playing   an  
essential   part   in   the   disruption   of   Al   Qaeda   (the   insurgent).   It   is   said   that   the  
engagement  of  the  Pakistani  government  is  required  to  successfully  shut  its  safe  
havens  and  that  Pakistan  needs  to  work  in   both  the  civilian  and  military  sphere.  
There   is   a   clear   goal   of   engaging   the   neighbouring   state   in   the   fight   against  
extremists   and   American   assistance   is   offered   in   order   to   strengthen   its  
capability.59  

Strengthening  the  civilian,  democratic  government  must  be  a  centrepiece  of  

our   overall   effort.   Key   efforts   should   include   fostering   the   reform   of  
provincial  and  local  governance  in  the  Federally  Administered  Tribal  Areas  
and  the  North  West  Frontier  Province.  We  need  to  help  Islamabad  enhance  
the  services  and  support  in  areas  cleared  of  insurgents  so  that  they  have  a  
real  chance  in  preventing  insurgents  from  returning  to  those  areas.60      

Furthermore  the  international  community  is  suggested  to  be  of  assistance,  as  the  
extremist   threat   is   considered   to   be   international.   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  
cooperation  is  recommended  to  be  bolstered  and  it  is  said  that  “in  approaching  
allies  we  should  emphasize  that  our  new  approach  is  integrated  between  civilian  
and  military  elements  and  in  looking  at  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  as  one  theatre  
for  diplomacy”.61  

                                                                                                               
58  White  Paper,  p.  1  
59  Ibid,  p.  5  
60  Ibid,  pp.  5-­‐6  
61  Ibid,  p.  6  

  24  
Winning  Hearts  and  Minds    
It  is  stated  that  the  U.S  must  overcome  the  “trust  deficit”  it  is  facing  in  the  region,  
as  many  do  not  believe  it  to  be  a  reliable  long-­‐term  partner.  It  is  stating  that  the  
aim  is  to  engage  the  Afghan  people  in  “ways  that  demonstrate  our  commitment  
to   promoting   a   legitimate   and   capable   Afghan   government   with   economic  
progress”.62      
  It   is   also   written   that   in   order   to   reach   the   objectives   of   the   “new   way  
forward”   an   enhanced   engagement   with   the   population   in   the   region   and   at  
home   is   necessary.   The   strategy   proposes   a   significant   increase   of   civilian  
resources   and   a   better   civil-­‐military   coordination.     The   following   statement  
serves  as  an  example  of  this:  

In  a  country  that  is  70  percent  rural,  and  where  the  Taliban  recruiting  base  
is   primarily   among   under-­‐employed   youths,   a   complete   overhaul   of   our  
civilian   assistance   strategy   is   necessary;   agricultural   sector   job   creation   is  
an  essential  first  step  to  undercutting  the  appeal  of  al  Qaeda  and  its  allies.63  

Another   recommendation   concerning   the   prevention   of   new   recruits   to  

extremist   organisations   is   to   develop   a   communication   strategy   to   counter   the  
terror   information   campaign,   or   in   other   words   to   find   a   way   of   countering  
propaganda.  It  is  a  top  priority  and  the  goal  is  to  improve  the  image  of  the  U.S.  in  
order  to  also  increase  its  likability.64      
  Another   purpose   for   the   strategy   of   increasing   civilian   capacity   is   to  
strengthen   the   relationship   between   the   Afghan   people   and   their   new  
government.  A  particular  focus  is  given  to  the  provincial  and  local  levels  and  to  
create   basic   infrastructure   and   economic   alternatives   to   the   insurgency.65  It   is  
stated   many   times   that   it   is   important   that   the   integration   is   Afghan-­‐led   and   that  
the  state  eventually  will  not  be  dependant  on  the  U.S.  anymore.  

Securing  the  Population    

The   most   prominent   dilemma   is   that   it   is   evident   that   the   purpose   of   the   new  
                                                                                                               
62  White  paper,  p.  2  
63  Ibid  
64  Ibid,  p.  3  
65  Ibid  

  25  
strategy  is  not  to  secure  the  local  population,  but  to  secure  the  nation  at  home.  
Already   the   first   sentence   states   that   the   “U.S.   has   a   vital   national   security  
interest  in  addressing  current  and  potential  security  threats  posed  by  extremists  
in  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan”.  Furthermore  it  states  that  the  core  goal  of  the  U.S.  
is   to   disrupt,   dismantle   and   defeat   al   Qaeda. 66  For   this   purpose   increased  
assistance  will  be  given  to  Pakistan,  but  it  will  be  limited  if  they  do  not  show  a  
greater   ability   to   cooperate   in   the   elimination   of   insurgency   sanctuaries. 67    
  However   there   are   also   suggestions   concerning   the   security   of   the   local  
population.   One   way   is   to   build   effective   local   governance   and   economic  
development  and  to  expand  the  Afghan  National  Security  Forces.68    

Transitivity  and  Modality    

The   chosen   modality   concerning   the   recommendations   is   very   strong   as   each  
claim   is   expressed   as   “we   must”   or   described   as   “urgent”,   meaning   that   the  
degree  of  affiliation  to  each  statement  is  very  high.  Concerning  transitivity,  it  is  
evident   that   the   U.S.   takes   the   role   as   the   responsible   agent   for   the  
implementation   of   the   suggestions   and   therefore   for   the   outcome   in   Afghanistan  
and   Pakistan.   Each   claim   is   presented   as   “our   responsibility”   or   “we   must  
ensure”.    

5.2  COMISAF’S  Initial  Assessment  

In  2009  General  Stanley  McChrystal  was  appointed  commander  of  the  U.S.  forces  
in   Afghanistan.   On   June   26   2009   the   U.S   Secretary   of   Defence   directed   him   to  
provide  a  multidisciplinary  assessment  of  the  situation  in  Afghanistan.  He  went  
to  Afghanistan  and  his  report  was  later  published  on  August  30  under  the  name  
“COMISAF’s   Initial   Assessment“.   It   presents   his   findings   and   recommendations  
concerning   the   overall   situation,   review   plans   and   on-­‐going   efforts   and   it   also  
tries   to   identify   revisions   to   operational,   tactical   and   strategic   guidance.  69  The  
unclassified   sections   of   the   report   were   released   by   the   Washington   Post   in  
September  the  same  year.  

                                                                                                               
66  White  paper,  p.  1  
67  Ibid,  p.  2  
68  Ibid,  p.  3  
69  McChrystal,  p.  i  

  26  
        
 
Regional  Aspects  
General   McChrystal’s   assessment   of   Afghanistan   focuses   primarily   on   the   need  
for   a   population-­‐centric   strategy.     In   so   doing   he   also   recognises   the   difficult  
geography   of   Afghanistan   and   also   the   specificities   of   the   tribal   group   in   the  
borderlands.    
 
All   isolating   geography   and   a   natural   aversion   to   foreign   intervention  
further   works   against   ISAF.   Historical   grievances   reinforce   connections   to  
tribal   or   ethnic   identity   and   diminish   the   appeal   of   a   centralized   state.   All  
ethnicities,   particularly   the   Pashtuns,   have   traditionally   sought   a   degree   of  
independence   from   the   central   government,   particularly   when   it   is   not   seen  
as   acting   in   the   best   interest   of   the   population.   These   and   other   factors  
result  in  elements  of  the  population  tolerating  the  insurgency  and  calling  to  
push  out  foreigners.70  
 
He   continues   by   marking   out   the   complex   social   landscape   of   the   country   and  
how   it   might   even   be   more   difficult   to   understand   than   the   characteristics   of   the  
insurgent.   According   to   McChrystal   there   is   a   need   to   learn   more   about  
Afghanistan’s   people   and   its   needs,   identities   and   grievances.   He   urges   ISAF  
leaders   to   take   regional   aspects   into   consideration   in   order   to   better   understand  
the  population  and  also  to  more  efficiently  fight  the  enemy.71    
  Concerning  the  insurgent  fighters  they  are  described  as  being  mainly  Afghan,  
but  that  they  are  connected  to  a  small  number  of  senior  leaders  that  are  based  in  
Pakistan.72  The   insurgent’s   key   geographical   objectives   are   described   as   being  
the   provinces   of   the   border   region   and   a   lot   of   its   resources   are   drawn   from  
Pakistan.73  The  porosity  of  the  Durand  Line  is  not  explicitly  mentioned,  but  it  is  
clear   that   the   General   is   aware   of   it   and   that   it   is   taken   advantage   of   by   the  
insurgent.    

                                                                                                               
70  McChrystal,  p.  2-­‐4  
71  Ibid,  pp.  2-­‐4  –  2-­‐5    
72  Ibid,  p.  2-­‐5  
73  Ibid,  p.  2-­‐6  

  27  
  
External  Support  
As   stated   in   the   section   for   “regional   aspects”   many   of   the   insurgent’s   senior  
leaders   are   based   in   Pakistan.   Reportedly   they   are   aided   by   some   elements   of  
Pakistan’s   ISI   (Inter-­‐services   Intelligence). 74  It   is   clear   that   Afghanistan’s  
insurgency   is   supported   from   Pakistan,   but   the   report   also   mentions   external  
support  from  India,  Iran  and  Russia/Central  Asia.75    
 
Winning  Hearts  and  Minds  
Already   on   page   1   McChrystal   states   the   need   for   “an   integrated   civilian-­‐military  
counterinsurgency   campaign   that   earns   the   support   of   the   Afghan   people   and  
provides  them  with  a  secure  environment”  76.    
 
The   people   of   Afghanistan   represent   many   things   in   this   conflict   –   an  
audience,   an   actor,   and   a   source   of   leverage   –   but   above   all,   they   are   the  
objective.   The   population   can   also   be   a   source   of   strength   and   intelligence  
and   provide   resistance   to   the   insurgency.   Alternatively,   they   can   often  
change   sides   and   provide   tacit   or   real   support   to   the   insurgents.  
Communities  make  deliberate  choices  to  resist,  support,  or  allow  insurgent  
influence.  The  reasons  for  these  choices  must  be  better  understood.77  
 
McChrystal   continues   by   describing   how   ISAF   and   the   new   Afghan   government  
have  failed  to  focus  on  this  objective.  The  weakness  of  the  state  and  corruption  
has   left   few   incitements   for   the   population   to   feel   trust:   these   problems   have  
instead  alienated  large  segments  of  the  Afghan  citizens  and  it  has  created  fertile  
ground  for  the  insurgent.78    

                                                                                                               
74  McChrystal,  p.  2-­‐10  
75  Ibid,  p.  2-­‐11  
76  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐1  
77  Ibid,  p.  2-­‐4  
78  Ibid  

  28  
   Furthermore   military   and   civilian   personnel   of   ISAF   are   recommended   to  
acquire   a   far   better   understanding   of   the   Afghan   people.   The   coalition   must   be  
seen  as  guests  rather  than  an  occupying  army.79    
 
To  gain  accurate  information  and  intelligence  about  the  local  environment,  
ISAF   must   spend   as   much   time   as   possible   with   the   people   and   as   little   time  
as   possible   in   armored   vehicles   or   behind   the   walls   of   forward   operating  
bases.80    
 
It   is   clear   that   McChrystal   recognises   counterinsurgency   and   the   “winning   of  
hearts   and   minds”   of   the   people   as   the   key   to   mission   success.   The   concept   is  
repeated  many  times  through  the  report  and  is  strongly  emphasised.    
 
Securing  the  Population  
McChrystal   focuses   on   “the   dual   threat   of   a   resilient   insurgency   and   a   crisis   of  
confidence   in   the   government   and   the   international   coalition”81.   He   means   that  
there   is   a   need   to   primarily   protect   the   population   from   both   of   these   threats.   In  
doing   so   the   importance   of   improving   and   resourcing   the   Afghan   National  
Security   Forces   (ANSF)   is   raised   and   he   also   claims   that   there   is   a   need   to  
prioritize  resources  to  the  areas  of  the  country  in  which  the  civilian  population  is  
threatened. 82  Additionally,   McChrystal   does   not   only   identify   security   as  
something   that   necessarily   has   to   be   provided   by   an   actual   force:   instead   he  
believes  in  a  softer  version  of  protecting  the  people.    
 
Conventional  wisdom  is  not  sacred;  security  may  not  come  from  the  barrel  
of   a   gun.   Better   force   protection   may   be   counterintuitive;   it   might   come  
from  less  armor  and  less  distance  from  the  population.83  
 

                                                                                                               
79  McChrystal,  p  2-­‐12  
80  Ibid,  p.  2-­‐12  
81  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐2  
82  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐1  
83  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐3  

  29  
He  believes  in  adaptation  and  to  create  a  secure  environment  for  the  people  in  
being   reliable,   respectful   and   create   stability   in   the   country.   According   to   the  
assessment  it  is  necessary  that  the  ANSF  learn  to  protect  their  own  people,  but  
there   is   still   a   need   of   assistance   from   ISAF   as   the   Afghan   forces   still   lack  
capabilities.    
  The   other   part   of   McChrystal’s   assessment   regarding   the   security  
situation   is   the   lack   of   governance   that   the   Afghan   people   also   find   to   be  
acceptable  and  state  weakness.    
 
The   second   threat,   of   a   very   different   kind,   is   the   crisis   of   popular  
confidence   that   springs   from   the   weakness   of   GIRoA   institutions,   the  
unpunished   abuse   of   power   by   corrupt   officials   and   power-­‐brokers,   a  
widespread  sense  of  political  disenfranchisement,  and  a  longstanding  lack  of  
economic   opportunity.   ISAF   errors   have   further   compounded   the   problem.  
These   factors   generate   recruits   for   the   insurgent   groups,   elevate   local  
conflicts  and  power-­‐broker  disputes  to  a  national  level,  degrade  the  people’s  
security  and  quality-­‐of-­‐life,  and  undermine  international  will.84  
   
By   strengthening   the   state   and   improving   governance,   the   affiliation   of   the  
people   will   be   stronger   and   they   will   also   achieve   a   more   adequate   feeling   of  
security.    
 
Transitivity  and  Modality  
The  transitivity  of  the  report  is  rather  neutral  as  most  sentences  are  constructed  
without  a  responsible  agent.  However  when  a  subject  is  used  it  is  mainly  abstract  
statements  as  “we  must”  or  “our  responsibility”.  In  general  the  tone  of  the  report  
gives   an   impression   of   a   high   degree   of   accountability   as   the   U.S.   is   pictured   of  
being  in  charge  of  the  outcome  and  future  of  Afghanistan.  
  Unsurprisingly  the  modality  is  equally  as  strong  the  one  in  the  white  paper.  
The   assessment   does   not   express   recommendations   or   findings   as   something  
that   could   be   up   for   discussion,   rather   the   use   of   language   nearly   recalls   for  
orders  or  commands.    

                                                                                                               
84  McChrystal,  p.  2-­‐5  

  30  
  

5.3  The  US  Army  and  Marine  Corps  Counterinsurgency  Field  Manual  
3-­‐24    
The   Counterinsurgency   Field   Manual   3-­‐24   (FM   3-­‐24)   from   2006   was   issued   by  
Lieutenant   General   David   Petraues,   who   in   2010   was   appointed   commander   of  
the   Afghanistan   mission.   The   manual   was   designed   to   fill   a   doctrinal   gap,   as   it  
had   been   20   years   since   the   Army   had   published   a   field   manual   devoted  
exclusively   to   counterinsurgency.   Unsurprisingly   the   281-­‐paged   manual  
achieved   a   lot   of   attention   when   it   was   published   both   from   military   and   civil  
academics.    
 
Regional  Aspects  
Due   to   the   generality   of   the   FM   3-­‐24,   there   are   no   specific   regional   aspects  
mentioned.   Yet,   it   is   recognised   that   “environment   and   geography,   including  
cultural   and   demographic   factors,   affect   all   participants   in   a   conflict”85.   The   level  
of   adaptation   is   explained   as   a   factor   that   creates   advantages   and   the   effect   is  
immediately  visible.86  
  The  complexity  of  porous  borders  is  addressed  and  also  how  the  insurgent  
relies  heavily  on  it:  it  needs  to  be  able  to  move  across  borders.  
 
1-­‐99.   Insurgent   movements   do   not   control   the   geographic   borders   of   a  
country.   In   fact,   insurgencies   often   rely   heavily   on   freedom   of   movement  
across   porous   borders.   Insurgencies   usually   cannot   sustain   themselves  
without   substantial   external   support.   An   important   feature   of   many  
transnational   terrorist   groups   is   the   international   nature   of   their   basing.  
Terrorists   may   train   in   one   country   and   fight   or   conduct   other   types   of  
operations  in  another  country.  The  movement  of  fighters  and  their  support  
is  vulnerable  to  intervention  or  attack.87  
 

                                                                                                               
85  Field  manual,  p.  1-­‐16  
86  Ibid  
87  Ibid  p.  1-­‐18  

  31  
The   general   tone   concerning   regional   aspects   is   that   the   counterinsurgent’s  
understanding   of   the   environment   is   key   to   success.   It   is   stated   that   soldiers   and  
marines  must  understand  organization  of  key  groups  in  the  society,  relationships  
and  tensions  among  groups,  ideologies  and  narratives  that  resonate  with  groups,  
values   of   groups   (including   tribes),   interests,   and   motivations,   means   by   which  
groups  (including  tribes)  communicate  and  the  society’s  leadership  system.88  
  It  is  also  stated  that  the  insurgent  has  a  clear  advantage  in  its  level  of  local  
knowledge  and  is  therefore  more  likely  to  understand  the  population’s  interest.  
This  means  that  great  efforts  in  educating  the  counterinsurgent  is  needed.89  
 
External  Support  
The  FM  3-­‐24  expresses  the  necessity  for  the  insurgent  to  gain  external  support  
because   it   has   difficulties   to   attain   itself   without   it.   Border   areas   do   therefore  
become   of   high   interest   and   they   should   be   seen   as   vulnerability   for   the  
counterinsurgent,  especially  if  the  neighbouring  state  supports  the  insurgency.90  
 
1-­‐85.   Access   to   external   resources   and   sanctuaries   has   always   influenced  
the   effectiveness   of   insurgencies.   External   support   can   provide   political,  
psychological,   and   material   resources   that   might   otherwise   be   limited   or  
unavailable.   Such   assistance   does   not   need   to   come   just   from   neighboring  
states;   countries   from   outside   the   region   seeking   political   or   economic  
influence   can   also   support   insurgencies.   Insurgencies   may   turn   to  
transnational   criminal   elements   for   funding   or   use   the   Internet   to   create   a  
support   network   among   NGOs.   Ethnic   or   religious   communities   in   other  
states   may   also   provide   a   form   of   external   support   and   sanctuary,  
particularly  for  transnational  insurgencies.91  
 
External   support   and   sanctuaries   in   neighbouring   countries   have   historically  
provided   insurgents   with   a   place   to   rebuild   and   reorganize   in   peace.   However,  
the  manual  emphasises  the  fact  that  modern  target  acquisition  and  intelligence  

                                                                                                               
88  Field  manual,  p.  1-­‐22  –  1-­‐23    
89  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐23  
90  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐16  
91  Ibid  

  32  
gathering   technology   make   it   more   difficult   for   the   insurgent.   It   would   thus   be  
more  strategic  to  hide  among  the  population.92  
 
Winning  Hearts  and  Minds  
The   quest   for   the   counterinsurgent   to   “win   the   hearts   and   minds”   of   the  
population  is  a  constant  theme  of  the  entire  manual.  In  order  to  create  legitimacy  
and  to  stop  the  population  from  taking  the  side  of  the  insurgent,  it  is  important  
to  show  them  a  better  alternative.  It  is  mainly  suggested  that  focus  should  be  in  
fostering   effective   governance   and   the   legitimacy   of   the   new   government   in  
order   to   gain   support   from   the   population,   six   factors   are   listed   as   possible  
indicators  of  this:  
 
• The   ability   to   provide   security   for   the   populace   (including   protection  
from  internal  and  external  threats).  
• Selection  of  leaders  at  a  frequency  and  in  a  manner  considered  just  and  
fair  by  a  substantial  majority  of  the  populace.  
• A  high  level  of  popular  participation  in  or  support  for  political  processes.  
• A  culturally  acceptable  level  of  corruption.  
• A   culturally   acceptable   level   and   rate   of   political,   economic,   and   social  
development.  
• A  high  level  of  regime  acceptance  by  major  social  institutions.93  
 
It   is   also   mentioned   that   if   the   counterinsurgent   fails   and   the   insurgent   attains  
popular   support   it   will   to   a   greater   degree   receive   safe   havens   and   freedom   of  
movement.94  
 
Securing  the  Population  
The  manual  states  that  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  counterinsurgency  is  to  secure  
the   population.   The   FM   3-­‐24   focuses   mainly   on   delegating   the   mandate   of  
security  and  border  control  to  the  host  nation.95  It  is  suggested  that  transferring  

                                                                                                               
92  Field  manual,  p.  1-­‐16  
93  Ibid,  p.  1-­‐21  
94  Ibid,  3-­‐77,  3-­‐84-­‐3-­‐88  
95  Ibid,  6-­‐3  

  33  
the   power   back   to   the   Afghans   is   a   way   of   helping   them   to   recreate   their  
sovereignty  and  to  be  able  to  protect  their  own  borders.96    
  An   entire   chapter   is   spent   discussing   the   process   and   recommendations  
concerning  development  of  a  host-­‐nation  security  force.  
 
6-­‐6.   U.S.   and   multinational   forces   may   need   to   help   the   host   nation   in  
improve   security;   however,   insurgents   can   use   the   presence   of   foreign  
forces   as   a   reason   to   question   the   HN   government’s   legitimacy.   A  
government   reliant   on   foreign   forces   for   internal   security   risks   not   being  
recognized  as  legitimate.  While  combat  operations  with  significant  U.S.  and  
multinational   participation   may   be   necessary,   U.S.   combat   operations   are  
secondary   to   enabling   the   host   nation’s   ability   to   provide   for   its   own  
security.97        
 
As  stated  in  the  quote  above,  the  U.S.  troops  should  not  be  the  primarily  source  
of   security   as   it   can   undermine   the   legitimacy   of   the   government.   Instead  
resources   are   recommended   to   be   generously   spent   on   the   establishment   of   a  
national  security  force.  This  is  thought  to  increase  the  sense  of  local  security  and  
also  to  attain  popular  support  even  for  other  matters.  
 
Transitivity  and  Modality  
The   manual   is   written   in   a   passive   voice,   as   it   directs   instructions   concerning  
how  a  counterinsurgency  mission  should  be  conducted.  There  is  no  responsible  
agent,  but  instead  descriptions  are  given  in  a  manner  that  make  them  sound  as  
uncontested   and   obvious.   The   modality   is   very   neutral   as   well,   but   regarding  
certain  key  issues  enforcing  words  as  “vital”  or  “governments  must”.    
 

   
                                                                                                               
96  Field  manual,  2-­‐36  
97  Ibid,  p.  6-­‐2  

  34  
6.  Discussion  
In   this   section   follows   a   discussion   of   the   results   from   the   analysis:   they   are  
sought  to  be  better  understood,  put  into  context  and  measured  to  the  situation  of  
Afghanistan   today.   A   discussion   of   the   results   in   connection   to   the   theoretical  
expectations  of  counterinsurgency  will  also  be  made.    
  The   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   borderlands’   regional   aspects   were   addressed   by  
all  three  source-­‐documents,  but  to  different  degree  and  in  different  manners.    It  
was   mainly   the   COMISAF’s   Initial   Assessment   that   went   into   detail   in   the  
specificities   of   the   borderlands,   the   Pashtun   population   and   the   relation   to   the  
Taliban.   In   FM   3-­‐24   the   importance   of   recognising   regional   aspects   was   also  
brought   up   and   several   examples   of   how   to   do   so   were   presented.     The   white  
paper   focused   mainly   on   the   bilateral   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   relation   and   the  
trilateral  U.S.-­‐Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan  relation.  This  can  be  understood  as  a  way  of  
recognising  the  aspect  of  Pashtunistan  and  its  importance  to  the  Taliban,  but  also  
as  an  idea  to  undermine  the  external  support  from  Pakistan.    
  What   stood   out   as   the   main   issue   concerning   the   borderlands   was   the  
difficulty  of  “winning  hearts  and  minds”.  This  is  a  complex  concept  that  needs  a  
close   to   impossible   level   of   adaptation   and   there   are   many   vital   factors   in   its  
success.   Commander   McChrystal   emphasised   the   need   of   a   strong   Afghan   state  
that   can   guarantee   the   safety   of   the   population.   However,   as   mentioned   in   the  
theory   section,   this   is   a   simplified   version   of   what   is   needed   to   achieve  
legitimacy.  Afghanistan  is  a  tribal  society  and  affiliation  to  its  traditional  leaders  
will   be   hard   for   the   Americans   to   trump.   Also   the   Taliban   is   a   master   at  
psychological  warfare;  it  deters  the  local  population  by  threatening  to  kill  them  if  
they   collaborate   with   the   Americans   or   the   new   government:   it   focuses   on   the  
fact  that  the  Americans  can  and  will  not  stay  forever  and  the  protection  from  the  
Afghan  government  is  still  weak.98    
  The   main   focus   of   the   entire   American   mission   seems   to   have   been   the  
necessity   to   provide   security   to   the   population.   Allocating   more   resources   to   the  
Afghan  National  Security  Forces  and  to  assist  in  training  have  been  pictured  as  
essential   and   also   to   help   the   Afghan   government   concerning   the  

                                                                                                               
98  Johnson  &  Mason,  p.  78  

  35  
implementation  of  governance  and  rule  of  law.  However,  little  focus  has  been  put  
on   the   psychological   factors   of   the   war   and   the   specific   cultural   aspects   of   the  
Afghan  people  and  their  way  of  perceiving  a  legitimate  authority.    
  According   to   the   theories   presented   in   this   thesis   and   the   results   from   the  
attempted   discourse   analysis,   it   seems   like   the   Americans   have   assessed   the  
borderlands   almost   completely   in   accordance   with   counterinsurgency   theory.  
However,   today   probably   very   few   would   call   the   Afghanistan   mission   a   success.  
Despite  the  millions  of  dollars  spent  by  the  international  community  to  stabilize  
the   country   and   increase   human   security,   Afghanistan   has   seen   little  
improvement.   The   Afghan   population   is   today   at   greater   risk   than   it   has   been  
since  the  Taliban  rule,  with  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  number  of  people  fleeing  
the  country.99    
  It   is   also   thought   that   the   Taliban   still   achieves   external   support   from  
Pakistan  and  that  the  U.S.  efforts  so  far  have  been  ineffective.  Pakistan  managed  
the   art   of   pretending   to   help   the   U.S.   while   in   reality   being   on   the   side   of   the  
enemy:   a   good   example   being   how   it   made   the   Americans   believe   they   were  
negotiating   with   Mohammad   Omar,   the   then   leader   of   the   Taliban,   while   the  
truth  was  that  he  had  been  killed  long  ago.100  The  Pakistani  army  has  by  several  
scholars  even  been  described  as  “the  godfather”  of  the  Taliban,  due  to  its  heavy  
support.  The  Pakistani  action  against  the  U.S.  is  a  good  example  of  psychological  
and   information   warfare,   which   is   part   of   counterinsurgency   but   still   a   relatively  
fresh  area  of  research.  
  The  results  of  the  analysis  of  this  thesis  do  in  many  ways  correspond  to  the  
expectations   on   the   counterinsurgency   theory   that   were   presented   earlier   on.  
The   problem   with   the   American   strategy   is   that   it   in   many   ways   tries   to  
implement   a   western   way   of   achieving   legitimacy   in   a   country   with   very  
different  traditions  and  priorities.  This  in  combination  with  advocacy  of  opinion  
and   psychological   operations   being   of   a   lower   priority   within   ISAF,   functioning  
as  a  complement  to  the  conventional  forces  rather  than  a  necessity,  could  explain  

                                                                                                               
99  Doctors  without  borders:  http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/support-­‐

us/events/stability-­‐and-­‐human-­‐security-­‐afghanistan-­‐2016-­‐brookings-­‐
institution-­‐event    
100  Zakaria  

  36  
the  difficulties  the  Americans  met.101  Also  the  issue  of  time  was  never  properly  
addressed.   Counterinsurgency   is   not   a   quick-­‐fix,   but   it   requires   many   years   of  
implementation  as  it  takes  a  long  time  to  change  the  behaviour  of  the  population  
and   its   deep-­‐rooted   feelings   of   affiliation.   However,   this   is   also   a   very   costly  
process.  
  The   main   research   question   asked   does   not   have   a   simple   answer,   but  
according  to  the  analysis  of  the  discourse  chosen  for  this  thesis  the  Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan   borderlands   were   addressed   in   a   what   seems   to   be   oversimplified  
manner.  The  way  of  trying  to  implement  a  western  doctrine  on  eastern  countries  
is   something   that   the   US   has   been   accused   for   in   the   past.   In   the   case   of  
Afghanistan   however   there   seem   to   have   existed   a   willingness   to   take   regional  
aspects   into   consideration,   but   the   complexity   of   the   task   and   the   fact   that  
resources  are  limited  have  made  the  mission  very  difficult  to  properly  conduct.    
 
 
   

                                                                                                               
101  Olsson  2009,  p.  51  

  37  
7.  Conclusive  Summary  
The   aim   of   the   thesis   was   to   analyse   the   assessment   of   the   borderlands   in   the  
American  mission  in  Afghanistan.  This  was  done  via  a  critical  discourse  analysis  
of   the   “White   Paper   of   the   Interagency   Policy   Group's   Report   on   U.S.   Policy  
toward  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan”,  “COMISAF’S  Initial  Assessment”  and    “The  US  
Army   and   Marine   Corps   Counterinsurgency   Field   Manual   3-­‐24”.   The   results   of  
the   analysis   showed   how   the   Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan   borderlands   were   assessed  
very  much  in  accordance  to  the  recommendations  of  counterinsurgency  theory.  
However   it   also   shows   that   the   theoretical   expectations   discussed   came   out  
painfully  true.    
  The  situation  in  Afghanistan  is  far  from  stable  and  the  U.S.  troops  together  
with   the   Afghanistan   National   Security   Forces   have   still   failed   to   make   the  
population  feel  safe  and  to  guarantee  legitimacy  of  the  new  Karzai  government.  
Even  if  a  lot  of  resources  have  been  directed  to  Pakistan,  in  an  effort  to  stabilise  
the   country   and   deepen   the   bilateral   relation   between   Afghanistan   and   Pakistan,  
support   to   the   Taliban   is   still   given   from   the   Pakistani   army,   government   and  
intelligence  service.    
  The  results  of  this  thesis  raise  the  question  of  whether  counterinsurgency  
is  an  oversimplified  theory.  It  seems  like  the  difference  between  cause  and  effect  
is   too   large   and   issues   concerning   cultural   differences   in   relation   to   legitimacy  
are  left  out.  As  also  mentioned  in  the  discussion,  there  is  an  issue  of  the  mission  
being   too   short.   It   is   believed   that   counterinsurgency   takes   at   least   10   years   in  
order  to  be  effective,  but  this  also  requires  immense  resources  that  do  not  exist.  
In   the   end   the   research   question   can   be   answered   as   the   aspects   of   the  
borderlands   were   assessed   in   an   oversimplified   way   and   that   not   enough  
consideration   was   taken   on   cultural   differences.   The   Western   way   of   creating  
legitimacy   and   stability   might   seem   obvious   for   Europeans   and   Americans,   but  
the  Afghan  people  view  the  problem  in  a  different  manner.  This  is  something  that  
ISAF  failed  to  address.    
 
 

  38  
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