This is a pre-print version of

Lucas Lixinski, ‘Cultural Heritage as the New Standard of Civilization? Engagement with UNESCO

from Rejection to Aggressive Embrace and the Perpetuation of Empire’, in Chien-Huei Wu, Frank

Ganessmantel and Francesco Giumelli (eds.), Multilateralism in Peril: The Uneasy Triangle of the US,

China, and the EU (Routledge, 2023) 21-35

Cultural Heritage as the New Standard of Civilization? Engagement with UNESCO from Rejection to

Aggressive Embrace and the Perpetuation of Empire

Lucas Lixinski*

Abstract: This paper discusses the variation in strategies of engagement with UNESCO’s cultural

heritage safeguarding systems (particularly the 1972 World Heritage Convention, but also the 2003

Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention) from the perspective of three key actors: the European

Union, the United States, and China. Whereas the European Union uses the World Heritage system to

promote heritage within Europe and beyond that reminds the world of the breadth of European

powers historically, China has aggressively pursued the addition of its sites on the World Heritage List

as a means of selectively showcasing its own cultural heritage to the world, and the United States’

departure from UNESCO shows its unwillingness to engage with a changing landscape that embraces

contested statehood. As international listing and recognition of cultural heritage becomes akin to a

new standard of civilization, these different strategies have implications far beyond just cultural

heritage, and speak to diplomacy and multiculturalism more generally in important if under-

appreciated ways.

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 1. Introduction

Cultural heritage has long been a means of exerting diplomatic power, particularly soft power.

Heritage can both be a part of diplomatic efforts, or itself be diplomacy, as Tim Winter (2015) has

argued. Meant to be a bridge between civilizations and a tool for perpetual peace, culture is an often-

underestimated means through which power is performed in the international stage. In this respect,

the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a pivotal space where

multilateralism takes place, alongside posturing and diplomatic muscle-flexing by specific states and

other international actors. Through their diplomatic practices, states show the myriad uses of heritage

for both internal and external purposes. Common to these uses is the idea of cultural heritage as a

new means of securing a spot among civilized nations. Civilization, after all, begets culture, and

internationally recognized culture therefore is a sign of an internationally recognized civilization. This

distinction has historically been enshrined in international law, too. Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of

the International Court of Justice, for instance, describes general principles of law “recognized by

civilized nations” as a source of international law. But as international law moves away from officially

endorsing the distinction between civilized and uncivilized nations, some animals still need to be more

equal than others, and a different proxy is needed.

I argue in this chapter that this new standard of civilization is to be found in international cultural

heritage law, regimes, and processes, and that it creates opportunities to shape (rather than just be

shaped) by the competition for hegemonic power among three major powers. Heritage diplomacy

becomes a fertile ground through which different forms of engagement with the international sphere

are performed, and, with them, different ways of seeing the world and wanting to be seen by it.

Examining the practice of the European Union (EU), United States (US) and China, I show how different

modes of engagement result in a dynamic environment that is a proxy for mapping multilateralism

when the stakes of “civilization” are sharply on the surface.

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I will particularly focus on UNESCO’s two leading heritage domains: World Heritage, through the 1972

World Heritage Convention (WHC); i and intangible cultural heritage (ICH), colloquially known as

folklore (a comparison criticized in heritage circles, however, as discussed by Lixinski 2013), through

the lenses of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICHC). ii

Both treaties create international lists, which makes them comparable, even if there are marked

differences in the ways in which listing is used by states. While the former can be seen primarily as a

means of showcasing heritage to the world, the latter seems to be more often used to control the

internal limits of culture that paves the way for international posturing.

In what follows I will first discuss the connection between UNESCO heritage programs and a new

“standard of civilization”; next, I will map out three different models of engagement with

multilateralism through heritage. Next, I will focus on the engagement of EU, US and China with the

WHC and ICHC as a means of highlighting the impacts of the three modes of engagement mapped out

in the previous section, as well as the possibilities of mediating tensions among these three power

(blocs). I will then provide some concluding remarks underscoring the consequences of thinking about

heritage diplomacy as a theater for multilateralism more generally.

2. Heritage Diplomacy and the Standard of Civilization

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and the destruction and looting of cultural sites there, has put

UNESCO firmly on the forefront of the international agenda. But, more than a forum for countries all

over the world to decry the loss of ancient sites, UNESCO has also become the new international site

for the culture wars.

UNESCO now gets together and passes judgment on the civilized and the uncivilized. Every time it

decides whether something should be on an international list, it is in fact assessing culture against

international benchmarks of what it considers to be civilized. These judgments have implications for

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the international reputation of countries; after all, a country with culture accepted by other countries

as the ‘right’ kind of culture is civilized, and deserving of our attention and trade. A civilized country is

also deserving of support to resolve its problems internally, as opposed to needing foreign

intervention.

Many states, particularly among the emerging economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,

and South Africa), have already caught on to those possibilities, and are using UNESCO processes to

try and create better images of themselves (Meskell 2018). Sometimes the culture states put forward

is the culture of minorities, and is presented in a way that ties that minority into a broader national

narrative, regardless of whether the minority has consented to that portrayal. UNESCO rules do not

require a country to consult domestically before proposing things to international lists, and therefore

these rules are subject to abuse. Embracing cultural diversity is a worthwhile goal, but manipulating

these processes to create an appearance of cultural diversity that acts as a smokescreen to hide

domestic rule of law problems such as minority oppression is another.

Historically, the distinction between civilized and uncivilized has played a large role in how the world

operates. It has justified colonialism, wars, and unequal terms of trade. Throughout history, non-

Western countries have quickly caught on to the disadvantages of being deemed “uncivilized”, and

manipulated international processes to present themselves as civilized (Becker Lorca 2014).

Sometimes that meant the training of diplomats in Western countries, and the adoption of Western

dress during diplomatic meetings, instead of their regular formal wear. Now, at UNESCO, it means

staking a claim to cultural heritage and showcasing it as worthy of comparison with Western culture.

Since its creation in 1946, UNESCO has become the main international forum where culture is judged

and deemed worthy of the civilized world or not. In the 70 years since its founding, several different

mechanisms were developed under UNESCO, depending on the type or domain of culture being

looked at. Each of these mechanisms has been and is exploited to redefine the boundaries of

civilization. Perhaps the best-known domain of culture UNESCO deals with is World Heritage, best

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represented by a list of over 1,000 places around the world that includes the Grand Canyon, the

Vatican, and Machu Picchu (UNESCO 2019a).

To get on the World Heritage List, a site needs “outstanding universal value”, which has become a

mark of civilization. But this mark of civilization is self-reinforcing, inasmuch as it stands for a very

specific Western aesthetic of monumentality (Brumann and Berliner 2016). Among the listed sites in

Africa and Asia, for instance, a large number is remnants of colonization by European countries. Which

is to say, the native culture of these countries is still largely deemed “uncivilized” by these standards.

One notable exception is China, which in the past decade or so has quickly risen to the second country

with most sites on the World Heritage List (Italy is the first; Spain, France, and Germany round off the

top five countries) (UNESCO 2019b), increasingly using its presence on the list as a mark of its embrace

of, and presence in, the world community at large. China’s embrace of cultural heritage processes has

also attempted to cleverly use “civilization” to pursue other international agendas. For example, the

presence of Chinese shipwrecks in the South China Seas has been used as an argument for China to

claim historic occupation (and therefore current legal title) to the area (Guilford 2013).

Other processes under UNESCO for different types of culture can also be used to pursue different

domestic and international political agendas, by categorizing culture as civilized or not. The

mechanisms available with respect to ICH can be used to manipulate minorities, as only the state

where the culture exists (and not the minority group themselves) gets to speak at UNESCO about what

the cultural practice means and entails (Lixinski 2013). In doing that, countries can potentially

manipulate a culture to make it seem supportive of a nationalistic political agenda, even if the minority

is in fact seeking independence.

The legal definition of intangible cultural heritage, on the other hand, says that only forms of culture

that comply with universal human rights standards will be accepted (ICH Convention, Article 2.1).

Female circumcision was the example in mind when the definition was created, but it has since been

used to pass judgment on other forms of culture (Lixinski forthcoming 2019). The Kankurang (Manding

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initiatory rite practiced in Senegal and Gambia) has been scrutinized for potential violation children’s

rights, for instance (UNESCO 2019c). This series of rituals and ceremonies involves, among other

things, the circumcision of young males, so they can become men in the eyes of the tribe. This practice

has ultimately been added to the international list, but that was not always a certainty, given heated

debates within UNESCO suggesting that physical harm should not be condoned and protected as

culture.

Bullfighting in Spain is currently being hotly debated around Europe for its potential violations of

animal rights, too (Alamilla 2018). If it gets rejected from the international intangible heritage list, it

will mean saying that the practice is barbaric, uncivilized, in the eyes of the world.

The effect of all these different processes and UNESCO involvement in culture is to reargue the

boundaries of civilized and uncivilized, in a discussion that is done in a quieter, almost technocratic

manner. That these judgements are depoliticized is not necessarily a bad thing; the real problem is

that they happen without people taking notice until it is too late.

If UNESCO is to be the new frontier of the clashes of civilizations, so be it. But we all need to pay more

attention, and engage with UNESCO in a way that allows us to perceive cultural diversity not only as a

tool to pursue diplomatic agendas, but one that can truly elevate us and promote better

understanding of other cultures.

After establishing UNESCO’s role and mandate in the area of heritage, and the possibilities of cultural

heritage to manufacture and reinforce notions about civilization and belonging in international

relations, a question remains as to whether this interpretation resonates with major powers’

interactions with the organization. The next section maps out models of engagement by the three

powers that are the focus of this book (China, EU and US), before analyzing these models and their

implications in more depth.

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 3. Cultural Heritage Multilateralism and Soft Power: Three Models

The three powers that are the object of this chapter each have different modes of engagement with

UNESCO, at least seen from the perspective of cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is an important

component of civilization, and, as such, it speaks to distributions of identity that are important for the

shift or maintenance of hegemony (Allan, Vucetic and Hopf 2018). Therefore, the engagement with

heritage forms part of discursive practices that shape leadership and the possibilities of the emergence

of competing hegemony. (Liberal) Political values go against the rise of China as a hegemon, so other

avenues need to be pursued, and historical civilizational achievement, alongside current cultural

might, gain more importance.

3.1. China: Strategic Platform

China’s use of cultural heritage processes points in the direction of using these multilateral fora as a

platform to position China as a world leader, whether it is through its civilizational standing (WHC), its

presentation of a unified identity to the world (ICHC), or, as has become the case since US departure

from UNESCO (see below), occupying a power vacuum. In fact, China attempted to have one of their

own elected as UNESCO Director-General in 2017 (Lynch and Groll 2017), underscoring the importance

China gives to this specialized body of the UN system.

China’s engagement with UNESCO’s culture programs, particularly heritage, has also served to place

China in relation to its neighbors and economic rivals, such as South Korea and particularly Japan,

particularly in the invocation of WWII events to attack Japan’s attempts (successful or not) to list

heritage related to WWII, whether it is Hiroshima Peace Memorial on the World Heritage List, or

China’s inclusion of the Nanjing Massacre archives by China onto the Memory of the World Program

(Agence France-Presse in Tokyo 2016).

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 3.2. European Union: Alliance

For the EU, the alliance with UNESCO is fairly formalized, as discussed below, and there are programs

between the two international organizations that transcend the usual relationship between UNESCO

and member states. Part of the EU’s special position within UNESCO has to do with the fact that any

relationship between UNESCO and the EU in fact necessitates a special agreement, since the EU itself

cannot be a UNESCO member. But the EU’s engagement with UNESCO goes also beyond EU borders,

indicating a desire to use culture and heritage diplomacy to occupy spaces not necessarily tied to

nationalistic projects. In the case of engagement with African countries discussed below, in particular,

it may be that the EU is attempting to use soft power to combat the increasing presence of China in

the region, which the EU decries usually on the basis of human rights conditionality. The EU requires

conditionality for its economic engagement with other countries, but China does not, and that has led

to many investment-receiving countries being more friendly towards China, displacing EU economic

and political influence in former European colonies. As such, Chinese money has flowed more easily

throughout Africa, and the EU needs to reassert its presence and influence in other ways (Bohoslavsky

2019). Heritage may be just such a way, since it speaks so powerfully to identity. Further, the EU

funding heritage projects in Africa takes attention away from the constant claims for return of African

heritage in European museums and other public spaces (Nayeri 2018).

3.3. United States: Rejection

Finally, US engagement with UNESCO is characterized by a rejection of soft diplomacy, and an inward-

looking focus that is in line with US exceptionalism and its overall engagement with heritage (Kupchan

2018). The US has decided to leave UNESCO as a result of UNESCO’s acceptance of Palestine as a

member state, as is well documented (Sputnik International 2017; Rosenberg and Morello 2017). But

the US in the meantime has also accrued significant debts to UNESCO, since its suspension in 2012 did

not mean a suspension of its financial obligations (Coningham 2017). As these obligations mounted to

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close to half a billion US dollars, the US decided to finally leave UNESCO, an action it has already taken

in the past (Lynch 2017). Notably, US withdrawal leaves a power gap that is set to be occupied by

China, but it will continue to engage with UNESCO as an observer state, and its participation in the

WHC remains unchanged (Greshko 2017).

These three models set the scene for us to think about the different modes of engagement not only

with UNESCO and cultural heritage more broadly, but also with the idea of cultural heritage listing as

markers of “civilization”. The next section analyzes how these models play out in the practice of

multilateral engagement with UNESCO’s heritage listing processes in more detail, particularly seen

from the perspectives of World Heritage and Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO’s two main list-

creating treaties.

4. Engagement with UNESCO’s Heritage Domains and the Promises and Perils of and for

Multilateralism

This section focuses on the ways in which these three powers, in their different modes of engagement,

look at UNESCO heritage-listing efforts, and what these efforts mean for the (re)making of these

actors’ power and influence in the world, measured against the yardstick of cultural civilization. The

framing of the modes of engagement in this section differently from the three models has a double

meaning. First, it illustrates how, in spite of these powers’ wishes, they are still fundamentally

constrained by the language of the different treaties and mechanisms within the international

organization, which funnels energy in specific and often path-dependent ways, thus shaping the three

modes mapped out above. Second, and relatedly, describing the modes of engagement through the

lenses of inward-looking and outward-looking offers a heuristic binary (but not without its constitutive

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consequences, as indicated in the previous point) that allows for deeper analysis of engagement of

these actors.

Therefore, this section proceeds in three parts. First, looking at the outward-looking pathways of

engagement with World Heritage and the World Heritage List, that showcase civilization to the world

at large. Second, focusing on the inward-facing possibilities of intangible heritage as a means to

galvanize and create civilization for domestic purposes. Finally, I will build on these two analytical

prisms to discuss possible lessons for multilateral engagement and the making of the standards of

civilization.

4.1. Outward-Looking World Heritage

As indicated above, the World Heritage List under the WHC is a highly successful mechanisms, with

1,092 sites inscribed across 167 countries at the time of writing. The World Heritage List was originally

created as a means to showcase “outstanding universal value” of sites, understood as “cultural and/or

natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common

importance for present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent protection of

this heritage is of the highest importance to the international community as a whole.”iii Under this

definition, inscribed heritage clearly has an outward-facing component, even if ultimately it still largely

serves nationalistic (or, in the EU’s case, regional) narratives.

With respect to China’s engagement with World Heritage, as mentioned above, China is on its way to

become the country with the largest number of World Heritage Sites. It currently ranks second, after

Italy, but, with 62 sites on the Tentative List (UNESCO 2019d) that indicates intention to add to the

World Heritage List (compared to Italy’s 40, for instance) (UNESCO 2019e), China is well positioned to

take the lead in the near future. On the one hand, it is entirely understandable that this might happen.

After all, China is bigger in territory and population than the entirety of the European Union, let alone

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Italy. Like Italy and other European countries, it also boosts extensive remnants of ancient civilization,

which is favored in World Heritage processes and their focus on monumentality. Lastly, China also has

the financial resources to invest in the expensive nomination processes. The question that remains is

why exactly China would be so keen to engage in World Heritage listing.

One possible explanation, already mentioned above, is to reinforce China’s standing among the

contemporary world’s greatest cultures, and therefore greatest countries. The process behind listing

the Great Wall is emblematic. According to Haiming Yan (2018), the Great Wall contains two narratives

sometimes in tension with one another: the Great Wall as “defensive, exclusive, and conservative”;

and the Great Wall as “expansive, inclusive, and open” (id., 155-157). Since its early days, the Great

Wall may not have functioned as an impenetrable defense system, but it has always played the role

of “a cultural marker between civilization and barbarism” (Yan 2018: 157). While the Great Wall

started playing an increasingly prominent role in unifying the Chinese nation in the early 20 th century,

it was only in the UN era that it came to symbolize global friendship. In this latter iteration, it was

added to the World Heritage List in 1987, after being re-valorized by external actors, who are

responsible even for the term “Great Wall” (Yan 2018: 161). Western engagement with this

monument has always been essential for its narrative of civilizational prowess, and, as such, it forms

an important part of China’s posturing as a major civilization on the world stage. As Yan (2018: 166)

put it, “the more it is appreciated internationally, the more the Great Wall becomes domestically

enshrined.” The Great Wall stops being a barrier separating China from the world, and becomes a

symbolic channel that connects China to the rest of the world.

The listing of Chinese World Heritage sites is seen by Chinese officials at the local and national levels

as an acceptance of Chinese worldviews and civilization by the West. But at the same time, listing

underscores the differences between China and the rest of the world, particularly the West. Therefore,

WHC processes play a dual function of bringing China to the world stage as a great civilization, while

at the same time making it distinctive and unique. So, while outward-looking, World Heritage status

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in China also plays a role in cementing nationalistic sentiment, which is more acutely seen in the

context of intangible heritage and the ICHC, discussed below.

In contrast, the European Union’s engagement with World Heritage focuses not only on sites within

the EU, but also beyond (whether in Europe or elsewhere, particularly Africa). On the basis of a

memorandum of understanding between the EU and UNESCO, iv the former contributes funding and

technical assistance (a major form of international cooperation under the terms of the WHC) for the

safeguarding of World Heritage sites in non-EU countries in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

With respect to sites within EU borders, the EU has concluded a specific agreement that focuses on

the protection of World Heritage cultural sites, valued at EUR 1.6 million (UNESCO 2019f). Protecting

these sites aligns with the EU narrative, discussed by Psychogiopoulou (2018), of privileging heritage

that speaks to a shared European identity (or an “European dimension” of heritage), sometimes at the

expense of heritage sites that challenge this idea of European unity.

In relation to sites elsewhere, the countries that benefit from EU funding for heritage protection are

generally former European colonies, even if the cultural heritage being targeted with the money is not

necessarily European in origin. The EU also funds specific projects with respect to Syrian heritage in

the context of the ongoing conflict (UNESCO 2019g). Through these external activities, the EU places

itself in the role of benefactor, and therefore uses cultural heritage soft power not only to showcase

its own culture, but to ingratiate itself with other countries. There is a risk that, as with any foreign

aid, these programs in fact replicate colonial patterns, and even reinforce EU presence in areas it seeks

to engage with in neo-colonial forms, echoing tensions in the area of international development

(Kapoor 2008). Technical assistance as a key modality of cooperation is emblematic, since it may mean

in the specifics that only EU experts can be hired for safeguarding projects, meaning that effectively

the EU would be using foreign aid to subsidize its own culture sector. Even if that is a risk, though, the

EU is still distinctively outward-facing in its approach to World Heritage.

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The US approach to World Heritage is markedly different from the EU’s, and in many respects similar

to China’s. It is noteworthy that the WHC structure, and particularly the listing mechanism, is modeled

after the US National Parks system (Rössler and Cameron 2013), which can be seen through US natural

sites on the World Heritage List, such as the Grand Canyon (Arizona) and Yellowstone (Wyoming). But

US engagement with the World Heritage List has for the most part been used to promote symbols of

US might to the world. Key among those are US cultural sites on the List, such as the Statue of Liberty

(New York, NY) and Independence Hall (Philadelphia, PA). Both of these sites project an image of the

US as the birthplace of democracy and a land of opportunity, which are key characteristics of the

diplomatic persona of the United States.

Engagement with the WHC and the World Heritage List in particular by the US, China and the EU

therefore shows that this list allows for the projection of an outward-facing image that is central to

international diplomacy. However, this type of projection is not to be found across all of UNESCO’s

heritage domains. The next subsection engages with ICH as an example of how heritage does not

always serve an outward-facing purpose, even if certain advantages can still be derived from

engagement with that convention.

4.2. Inward-Looking Intangible Cultural Heritage

In opposition to the outward-facing effects of World Heritage List as UNESCO’s flagship heritage

program, other heritage domains under UNESCO allow for the engagement by states and entities like

the EU in more inward-facing ways. That is specifically the case with ICH under the 2003 ICHC, which,

with 178 states parties at the time of writing, is also a very successful treaty, and thus a good

counterpoint to the WHC. Initially modelled after the WHC, the ICHC also responds to some of the

criticisms of the World Heritage system, particularly its western-centric orientation and emphasis on

monumentality. Therefore, the main list under the ICHC focuses on “representativeness”, rather than

“outstanding universal value”, as a key criterion (Lixinski 2013). The representative qualification of

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ICH, as well as its natural predisposition to being closer to identity (inasmuch as ICH is living heritage,

and thus cannot be dissociated from people in the same way as monuments and sites under the WHC

can), make this heritage domain suited to engaging with the internal control possibilities of heritage,

which can have impacts on heritage diplomacy.

With respect to China, as indicated above, ICH and the ICHC represent an optimal avenue for the

nationalistic and minority control project associated with heritage. In contexts like Tibet, heritage has

often been used to control the Tibetan minority, and authorize specific meanings to their heritage that

do not engage with separatism or Tibetan identity politics more generally. At times, too, heritage

listing itself has been used as a tool of minority oppression, such as the listing of Lhasa on the World

Heritage List, which was used as a pretext to relocate Tibetan shop owners from the market square,

and make way for Han souvenir shop owners (Shepherd 2006). With respect specifically to ICH, a key

example is the listing of Tibetan Opera, which, as I discussed elsewhere, allowed for the Chinese

central government to control the meanings of this cultural expression, and strip it of any possible

political connotations (Lixinski 2013). Importantly for our purposes, though, before the rest of the

world the listing of Tibetan heritage is read as the Chinese government embracing cultural diversity,

while in effect it is authorizing a very specific version of that heritage, that can in fact be characterized

as further oppression (Lixinski 2015).

In the EU context, ICH is used, much like other cultural heritage, for the promotion of European-ness,

or a shared European identity. The benefit for EU foreign policy is less apparent, except inasmuch as

the market rationality imposed on the treatment of heritage (in other words, that EU action is only

triggered if an impact on economic freedoms can be perceived) means the EU can use ICH to engage

in the cultural exception to trade (Lixinski 2013; Voon 2007).

With respect to the US, it must be said at the outset that the US is not a party to the ICHC. However,

it does have a fairly rich ICH program internally, particularly through the Smithsonian Institution’s

Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage (2019). This Center, as well as other ICH initiatives throughout

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the US, are used largely to cement a sense of the US as a melting pot, thus serving the purpose of

unifying US communities amongst themselves, and has no clear outward-facing purpose (Stefano

2016).

This subsection shows that not all engagements with heritage serve only (or even primarily) diplomacy

purposes. Rather, in many instances diplomatic effects are incidental, if there are any at all. But, for

the domains of heritage where there is a clear outward-looking dimension, they factor heavily in how

soft power is exercised in multilateral fora. Nevertheless, the diplomatic effects exist, and it is

important to account for them in making sense of trilateral engagement among the EU, US, and China.

The next subsection engages with some of those possibilities, reconnecting to the role of heritage

listing as the standard of civilization, and making recommendations for UNESCO’s role inasmuch as it

is affected by the gravitational pull of this diplomatic triangle.

4.3. Beyond Inward and Outward: Looking Forward

The modalities of engagement with UNESCO of the EU (alliance), US (rejection), and China (platform)

are inevitably shaped by the possibilities of the international regimes through which they are

channeled. With respect to cultural heritage specifically, one also must consider the appeal of heritage

listing as a new standard of civilization, which influences and is influenced by these attitudes. But so

far our mapping largely assumes that UNESCO heritage processes are funnels with relatively little

agency. This section aims at adding another layer of complexity by not only querying what we can say

about these three powers through their engagement with UNESCO and heritage processes, but also

what these types of engagement say about heritage and multilateral specialized fora more broadly. In

this discussion, it is not my aim to point at means of constricting or “taming” certain powers, but rather

to contribute to a framework of productive engagement in service not of these powers’ foreign policy

agendas, but of the global public goods that international leadership makes them more responsible

for than other countries.

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With respect to heritage, the standard of civilization is, unsurprisingly, a key factor to consider. The

engagement of these three actors seems to be reshaping the standard of civilization in largely

productive ways, by expanding what heritage is worthy of international attention. However, it bears

noting that this expansion is a double-edged sword, and that in the context of ICH, for instance, the

standard can facilitate domestic assimilationist policies that are not really conducive to fostering

cultural diversity. The capture of the standard of civilization in these two diametrically opposed ways

therefore shows a passivity of UNESCO heritage processes. As UNESCO finds itself in a particularly

vulnerable financial and political position in light of US departure, China’s occupation of the power

vacuum has been all the more powerful. However, UNESCO would do well to remember that China

stands to benefit enormously from using UNESCO processes, so the organization need not passively

endure the manipulation of its mandate. The EU’s alliance with the organization can be an important

counterpoint in this respect, except the EU, too, is more concerned with promoting European-ness at

the expense of subaltern accounts. UNESCO needs to use its leverage in heritage processes towards

these actors more effectively, and in this way promote engagement with the standard of civilization

and cultural diversity in ways that do not serve only international posturing and internal politics, but

rather can generate tangible multilateral (or at least tripartite) international leadership.

The lessons for international organizations follow from the UNESCO heritage context. Mapping out

the modes of engagement of these different powers is useful in helping identify their key interests,

and what is at stake in this engagement. But the mapping does not render international organizations

passive. There is, after all, more to international organizations than just pursuing the interests of its

individual members, if one subscribes (like me) to a theory of public goods (Stiglitz 1995; Russett and

Sullivan 1971), as opposed to functionalism, a descriptive and normative account that is grounded on

colonial management techniques (Klabbers 2014).

International organizations therefore are presented with opportunities to leverage the mapping of

“great powers” dynamics to pursue their own agendas. The lesson to be drawn from the UNESCO

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example and the modes of engagement of the three powers (China, EU, and the US) is that power

vacuums present opportunities not only for states to occupy a space and shape it in their own

semblance, but also for international organizations to hold their ground and use the space to shape

the power’s actions to advance a global public goods agenda.

5. Concluding Remarks

Heritage diplomacy is a fruitful means of thinking about multilateralism, particularly inasmuch as

multilateralism is at least in some respects a competition for hegemony, and hegemony requires

civilizational leadership. As cultural heritage becomes the new standard of civilization, the

engagement of these three powers shows how heritage is shaped by different hegemonic agendas.

But there is an underlying promise in multilateral institutions, particularly those dedicated to global

public goods, in also shaping the rules of engagement in the race for hegemony, and an opportunity

to be seized by organizations like UNESCO to shape a multi-power landscape that pursues objectives

well beyond domestic or regional domination agendas.

A multi-power landscape within UNESCO requires it being less dependent on the funding from a

handful of nations. Voluntary contributions are one way to address this dependency, but UNESCO

needs to reimagine what it can offer in exchange for additional resources. The veil of neutrality that

UNESCO has worn for so many years is all but gone, so a purported interest in a global public good

that is beyond politics will not be an appealing proposition unless UNRSCO can regain credibility.

Accepting Palestine as a member, though it triggered US departure from the organization, can be read

as an attempt for the organization to position itself above great powers’ political interests and in

service of humanity at large. At the same time, it had unintended consequences that made the

organization more of a prey to those political interests, at least in the short term. The European Union,

because of its internally diffused power and resources, can act as an important counterpoint, but it

needs to resist the urge of perpetuating the imposition of its own civilizational agenda onto UNESCO,

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however indirectly. Further, recovering UNESCO’s civilizational mandate and putting it in the open

may trigger competition and further politicize the organization in the short term, but making these

politics that already happen in the shadows visible can only benefit multilateralism. Multilateralism

will be enriched and ultimately strengthened by opening more possibilities to less active states to

diffuse power in the institution and make the standard more representative of the diversity of

civilizations in the world.

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*
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, UNSW Sydney. PhD in International Law, European University Institute.
i
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 (adopted 23
November 1972, entered into force 15 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151 (WHC).

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ii
Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003 (adopted 17 October 2003, entered into
force 20 April 2006) 2368 UNTS 3 (ICHC).
iii
Operational Guidelines for the World Heritage Convention, UNESCO Doc. WHC.16/01 (26 October 2016),
para. 49.
iv
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Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and its subsidiary bodies and the European Union (8 October
2012), at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/BSP/pdf/UNESCO-
EU_MoU_8_October_2012.pdf

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