Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Volume 12
Editors
Elspeth Guild
Kingsley Napley Solicitors, London,
Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen
Jan Niessen
Migration Policy Group, Brussels
The series is a venue for books on European immigration and asylum law and
policies where academics, policy makers, law practitioners and others look to
find detailed analysis of this dynamic field. Works in the series will start from
a European perspective. The incresed co-operation within the European Union
and the Council of Europe on matters related to immigration and asylum
requires the publication of theoretical and empirical research. The series will
contribute to well-informed policy debates by analysing and interpreting the
evolving European legislation and its effects on national law and policies. The
series brings together the various stakeholders in these policy debates: the legal
profession, researchers, employers, trade unions, human rights and other civil
society organisations.
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
EU Immigration and Asylum Law:
Text and Commentary
Edited by
ISBN 90 04 15374 8
© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
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subject to change.
Annexes 943
Annex I Proposed and Adopted Title IV Measures (as of 1 Jan.
2006) 945
Annex 2 EC Treaty Provisions on Immigration and Asylum 983
Annex 3 December 1998, Vienna European Council 989
Annex 4 Excerpt from Conclusions, Tampere European Council 993
Annex 5 Excerpts from Conclusions, Laeken, Seville and
Thessaloniki European Councils 997
Annex 6 Excerpts: The Hague Programme 1009
Annex 7 EU Constitutional Treaty (excerpt) 1023
vi
Table of Contents
viii
Table of Contents
ix
Table of Contents
x
Table of Contents
xi
Table of Contents
xii
Table of Contents
xiii
Table of Contents
xiv
Table of Contents
xv
Table of Contents
Annexes 943
Annex I Proposed and Adopted Title IV Measures (as of 1 Jan.
2006) 945
Annex 2 EC Treaty Provisions on Immigration and Asylum 983
Annex 3 December 1998, Vienna European Council 989
Annex 4 Excerpt from Conclusions, Tampere European Council 993
Annex 5 Excerpts from Conclusions, Laeken, Seville and
Thessaloniki European Councils 997
Annex 6 Excerpts: The Hague Programme 1009
Annex 7 EU Constitutional Treaty (excerpt) 1023
xvi
Preface
The idea for this book came when the Commission began publishing its pro-
posals for immigration and asylum measures under Title IV of the Treaty. At
that time there was a good deal of optimism that the measures would be con-
cluded with relative speed and be adopted in due course. A conference was held
in London on Asylum and Immigration under Title IV at the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law in 2002. All the guest contributors to this
book presented papers at the conference on topics of general application in the
asylum and immigration field. As general editors we intended to provide com-
mentary on the texts of the specific measures adopted under Title IV.
Years passed, some measures were rejected altogether by the Council and
others were the subject of protracted negotiation. Publishing commentary on
texts that were very likely to be changed before adoption seemed unattractive
from our perspective not least because the book would date so quickly. How-
ever we could not have anticipated that it would take until late 2005 for the
final major asylum directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive to be agreed and
adopted.
We apologise particularly to the contributors who have waited years for
their papers to be published, although these papers have been fully updated for
publication. However we hope that the book will now stand the test of time
and be useful to academics, students and practitioners alike whose work might
engage study or use of the many regulations, directives and other measures con-
cluded under Title IV of the Treaty.
Section I, entitled “Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law”, con-
stitutes a number of papers including an examination of the historical develop-
ment of the institutional framework and the workings of the EC institutions
from the asylum and immigration law perspective in two papers by Steve Peers.
In a paper by Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers “Out of the Ghetto: The Personal
Scope of EC Law” the extension of the personal scope of EU law to third coun-
try nationals is examined. Steve Peers’ paper on Human Rights and EC Immi-
gration and Asylum Law presents an analysis of the part that human rights law
Nicola Rogers and Steve Peers
has to play in the interpretation and application of immigration and asylum law
measures. Finally in this section Judith Toth’s paper looks at EC Immigration
and Asylum law from the perspective of Enlargement. This paper remains very
relevant following the enlargement of 2004, as the issues around that enlarge-
ment and future enlargement remain thorny where immigration and asylum law
are concerned.
Sections II – V cover visas and border controls, asylum, legal migration and
integration and irregular migration in turn. Sections III-V contain the second-
ary legislation of primary importance for asylum, legal migration, and irregular
migration. All that legislation is separately commented upon each chapter. A
chapter on a particular piece of legislation includes a summary of the main
features of that legislation, the legislative background to the measure, analysis
of the main legal issues arising from that legislation and commentary on the leg-
islation. The text of the legislation is then included for ease of reference. For the
most part the legislation examined has been adopted by the EC. However, due
to its importance, the book also examines one measure which was not adopted
(the proposed Directive on employment and self-employment).
The chapters on specific texts of legislation are all written by the editors
and the contributors bear no responsibility for them. Most of the sections con-
clude with a paper or papers by contributors examining topical issues relevant to
that section. These contributions do not analyse specific measures concluded or
proposed at EU level since these are separately analysed in the preceding chap-
ters. The contributions are intended to provide a wide framework for analysis of
specific measures or the agenda of the EU in the relevant fields.
Section II on visas and border controls is relatively short with the three
main issues in this area commented upon.
In Section III on asylum in addition to the text and commentary on the six
major asylum measures, three papers are presented by contributors. The first
paper by Geza Tessenyi on Massive Refugee Flows and Europe’s Temporary
Protection examines the background to mass influxes to Europe and elsewhere
and questions whether a measure on temporary protection was in fact even
needed when the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees arguably provides
the appropriate framework for protection in mass influx situations. What is
notable is the fact that although the Directive on Temporary Protection was
amongst the first of the Title IV measures to be adopted, the instances of mass
influx into Europe have been extremely rare if they have occurred at all. Frances
Nicholson’s paper on the Challenges to Forging a Common European Asylum
System examines the process of harmonisation in the asylum field. The paper
looks at the road to harmonisation, the interaction with human rights law and
practice, the impact on individual Member States’ laws and the effect that an
EU Common Asylum System might have internationally. The final paper in Sec-
tion III is by Nathalia Berkowitz, and is on Gender and EU Asylum Law. As is
argued in the paper gender can have an impact on the whole asylum determi-
xviii
Preface
nation process as well as how people arrive in the EU and their experiences in
their countries of origin. The paper looks at the various aspects of the asylum
determination process that require gender neutrality and questions the extent to
which Member States are providing an approach that is truly gender neutral.
Section IV on Legal Migration and Integration includes the text and com-
mentary of the five major measures in this area. The section concludes with a
paper on The Socio-Economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
by Jan Niessen. This paper charts the gradual insertion of immigration on the
European Union’s socio-economic agenda. It looks at mobility into and within
the European Union and issues of integration which is sorely lacking from the
EU agenda.
Section V on Irregular Migration includes the text of and commentary
upon seven measures in this area. The section ends with a contribution by Rys-
zard Cholewinski on Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy: A
Human Rights Deficit. In this paper the human aspects of illegal migration are
examined. The paper argues that although absent from the EU agenda, issues
around the human rights of illegal migrants need addressing at EU level. This is
examined against the international legal framework and the measures that could
be employed by the EU to alleviate the human rights deficit in this area are sug-
gested and analysed.
We are very grateful for all the help that we have received with this book. It
has take n years to complete and had undoubtedly impacted on our professional
colleagues as well as our private and family lives. We are particularly grateful to
Elspeth Guild who as always has been both encouraging and enthusiastic about
this book. We are grateful to Lindy Melman at Brill Publishers who has not
bemoaned once the delays in presenting the final text of the book. The text and
commentary is correct as of 1 January 2006. All the errors in the text and com-
mentary chapters are our own.
xix
Section I Framework of EC Immigration and
Asylum Law
Chapter 1 Overview
1 Introduction
Since entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999, the EU has
considered, and in many cases adopted, many proposals for legislation or mea-
sures implementing legislation in the area of immigration and asylum law. These
measures run the gamut from highly technical operational matters to broad
measures covering basic aspects of immigration and asylum law. Between them,
the proposed or adopted measures cover virtually every possible issue in relation
to immigration or asylum.
This book contains the text of and commentary upon a large number of
these measures proposed or adopted up until 1 January 2006, including all of
the most important ones. It also includes the text of the key measures concern-
ing asylum, legal migration and irregular migration. A full list of the measures
with references to their legislative history is provided in Annex 1. The purpose
of this chapter is to give an integrated overview of all of the various proposals,
including their relationship with measures agreed or proposed before the Treaty
of Amsterdam and with the overall political context.
2 Legal Context
This book takes as a starting point the entry into force of the Treaty of Amster-
dam because only at that point was it possible for the European Community
to adopt measures dealing with most or all aspects of immigration and asylum
law. Before that point, the Community’s power was limited to measures con-
cerning aspects of visa policy (from 1993 to 1999) and matters largely relating
to Community nationals and their family members (from the inception of the
Community). But the exact scope of these limits of the Community’s “classical”
powers were (and still are) a subject of dispute, as analysed further in Chapter
4. They remain a subject of dispute because the institutional rules relating to
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 3-17.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
“regular” Community law, including the rules for possible “opt-outs” from EC
law, are, despite the Treaty of Amsterdam, still different in several respects from
the rules governing EU immigration and asylum law, found in “Title IV” of Part
Three of the EC Treaty (Articles 61-69 of that Treaty). The text of Title IV is
found in Annex 2; Chapter 3 analyses the functioning of the Community institu-
tions in this distinct legal and institutional context; and Chapter 2 examines the
historical development of the EU’s legal and institutional framework for adopt-
ing immigration and asylum law, including the potential effect of the proposed
Constitutional Treaty.
Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, there were two distinct phases in the
development of EU immigration and asylum law. In the first phase, before the
entry into force of the Treaty on European Union in November 1993, there was
no formal Treaty context for the adoption of rules on immigration and asylum
at all within the European Communities, except for the highly disputed possibil-
ity that the regular rules of the “Community method” could be used. During
this “informal intergovernmental” period, the Dublin Convention setting out
rules on responsibility for asylum requests was agreed, although it did not come
into force until 1997.1 A number of non-binding Resolutions and Recommenda-
tions were also agreed.2
In the second phase, the “Maastricht era” from 1993 to 1999, the Com-
munity gained its limited initial powers over visas, but the main powers were
granted to the “European Union”, which was a “formal intergovernmental”
system.3 But given Member States’ reluctance to agree any binding measures
during this period, the output of this era consists largely of non-binding mea-
sures such as Resolutions and Recommendations.4
There are three other important aspects to the legal context. First of all,
the Treaty of Amsterdam terminated a parallel development, begun with the
1985 Schengen Agreement and continuing with the 1990 Schengen Convention
and a huge number of implementing measures. The Schengen process was a
system agreed among most (but not all) Member States to provide for aboli-
tion of internal border controls between Member States, an integrated system
of external border controls and common rules on short-stay visas, along with
nearly identical rules on responsibility for processing asylum applications. There
were also flanking rules on criminal justice and police cooperation, including the
creation of a database (the Schengen Information System, or SIS) which inter
alia contained a list of persons to be denied entry to the entire Schengen area.
These rules were integrated into the scope of the European Community and
4
Chapter 1 Overview
European Union legal system by the Treaty of Amsterdam.5 Since the Schengen
system began operating in March 1995 and resulted in agreement on far more
immigration measures than proved possible within the EU before the Treaty of
Amsterdam, a number of chapters in this book examine what has happened to
the previous Schengen rules (the “Schengen acquis”) after the Schengen acquis
was integrated into the EU legal framework.6
Secondly, the developments within this field obviously have an important
impact on protection of human rights, within the scope of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Geneva Convention on the status of
refugees and other treaties. This aspect is considered throughout the book, with
a particular focus in Chapter 5.
Thirdly, the enlargement of the European Union loomed larger and larger
over developments in this field since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amster-
dam. By the end of 2002, it was agreed that enlargement would in principle take
place, with ten new Member States joining on 1 May 2004 – the same day on
which the transitional period established by the Treaty of Amsterdam for adop-
tion of EU immigration and asylum law ended. The impact of EU immigration
and asylum rules on the new Member States is considered further in Chapter 6.
3 Political Context
The European Union has consistently attempted to agree on the broad lines of
immigration and asylum policy at the summit meetings of heads of state and
government (“European Councils”). It is often forgotten that back in December
1991, the Maastricht European Council agreed an initial detailed immigration
and asylum policy to be implemented once the new Treaty on European Union
entered into force.7 But in practice, almost no concrete measure to implement
this policy was ever actually adopted.
This time around, the EU first of all agreed a detailed Action Plan on imple-
mentation of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy in December 1998, which
was ultimately endorsed by the Vienna European Council later that month.8
But further attention to the issue was deemed necessary, and so a special Euro-
pean Council to that end was held in Tampere, Finland in October 1999. This
summit meeting set out broad principles in relation to JHA matters and appar-
5
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
ently endorsed a relatively liberal and balanced migration and asylum policy for
the European Union.9
Nevertheless, by the time to review the Tampere conclusions at the end of
2001, little had in fact been agreed. However, the Laeken European Council in
December that year did nothing to help matters, simply “passing the buck” back
to the Commission to come up with revised proposals in several areas where the
Council had failed to reach agreement and weighting the balance of EU policy
further towards control of external borders and illegal immigration10. Shortly
afterwards, highly detailed “Action Plans” were agreed on those specific sub-
jects. In the meantime, by the spring of 2002, events took another turn, with a
perceived increase in the political sensitivity of immigration and asylum matters
following French and Dutch elections.
As a result, immigration and asylum policy became the centrepiece of the
Seville European Council in June 2002, with a four-part plan adopted.11 Firstly,
there were deadlines to adopt all of the outstanding asylum proposals and two
of the outstanding migration proposals. Secondly, the agreed detailed plan for
control of EU external borders was endorsed and certain aspects of that plan
were highlighted for early agreement. Thirdly, objectives for control of illegal
immigration were set, building on the agreed action plan in that area. Finally,
detailed principles were agreed on the relationship between EU external rela-
tions and migration law, involving an ill-defined “carrots and sticks” approach
to inducing non-EU countries to help the EU achieve its migration control
objectives.12
By the start of 2003, a number of key immigration and asylum measures
had been formally adopted or at least informally agreed, although a number of
key measures remained outstanding. With the continued political importance of
the asylum issue, some Member States urged a shift toward external processing
of asylum seekers. This potential shift in policy was examined by the Thessalon-
iki European Council in June 2003, which also took account of developments in
implementing the Seville Action Plan.13 At the same time, the EU Convention
on the future of the EU completed its work, recommending major changes in
the institutional framework applicable to EU immigration and asylum law.
A batch of further key immigration and asylum measures were agreed or
adopted between June 2003 and the end of the transitional period on 1 May
2004. The future of immigration and asylum law in the EU will now develop in
9 For the immigration and asylum provisions of the European Council conclusions,
see Annex 4.
10 See excerpts from the Laeken European Council conclusions in Annex 5.
11 See excerpts from the Seville European Council conclusions in Annex 5.
12 For more detailed comment on the summit conclusions, see Peers, “EU Immigra-
tion and Asylum Law after Seville”, 16 IANL Journal (2002) 176.
13 See excerpts from the Thessaloniki European Council conclusions in Annex 5.
6
Chapter 1 Overview
4 Specific Policies
4.1 Visas and Borders
Since the “Schengen acquis” already contained a number of measures on visas
and border controls, the Tampere conclusions did not focus much on devel-
opment of legislation on these issues, despite the detailed Community powers
granted by Article 62 EC. As regards visas, an early priority was the completion
of a fully common list of countries whose nationals did or did not require visas
to enter the Union.16 Other visa measures included amendments to the common
visa format, creation of new common formats for certain types of visas, adop-
tion of special ad hoc visa arrangements (for the Olympics and Kaliningrad),
development of a planned Visa Information System and agreement on rules for
the amendment of the Common Consular Instructions and associated manuals.
The latter measures were in turn used to amend the EU visa rules to set up a
common form for visa applications, to charge a fee for visa applications (rather
than for the issue of visas), to harmonise these fees and to adopt common rules
on considering collective applications submitted by travel agents.17 Further
development of the Schengen rules on freedom to travel for three months was
hindered by complex arguments over whether the EU could or should agree rules
permitting an extended stay for non-visa nationals, and if so, how to arrange for
such extensions.18 As for border controls, from mid-2001 the development of
policy, and eventually legislation, concerning borders assumed growing impor-
tance.19
4.2 Asylum
The EC Treaty sets out a number of specific powers for the Community over
asylum and other forms of international protection in Article 63(1) and 63(2).
However, in most cases the EU legislation is expressly limited by the EC Treaty
14 OJ 2005 C 53. See excerpts from the Hague Programme in Annex 6. A plan to imple-
ment the Hague Programme in more detail was subsequently adopted in June 2005
(OJ 2005 C 198).
15 OJ 2004 C 310. See excerpts from the EU Constitutional Treaty in Annex 7.
16 See Ch. 8.
17 See Ch. 9.
18 The freedom to travel proposals are not considered in detail in this book.
19 See Ch. 7.
7
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
20 On the development of this system, see Ch. 17. On the specific gender issues in EU
asylum policy, see Ch. 18. The Commission has offered an overview of the system
in an initial communication (COM (2000) 755, 22 Nov. 2000) and follow-up reports
(COM (2001) 710, 28 Nov. 2001 and COM (2003) 152, 26 Mar. 2003).
21 Directive 2001/55 (OJ 2001 L 212/12), which Member States had to implement by
the end of 2002. On this Directive, see further Ch. 15. On the broader issues sur-
rounding temporary protection, see Ch. 16.
22 See discussion of Directive 2003/9 (OJ 2003 L 31/18) in Ch. 12.
23 Reg. 343/2003 (OJ 2003 L 50/1). See Ch. 10.
24 Directive 2004/83 (OJ 2004 L 304/12). See Ch. 13.
25 Directive 2005/85 (OJ 2005 L 326/13). See Ch. 14. Furthermore, Austria tabled an
initiative for a Reg. on “safe third countries” late in 2002 (OJ 2003 C 17/6), but it
lapsed on 1 May 2004 when Member States lost the power of initiative over EC
immigration and asylum law.
26 See Communication (COM (2001) 743, 5 Dec. 2001).
27 OJ 2000 L 281/1.
28 Decision 2000/596/EC (OJ 2000 L 252/12); the Fund was later extended (OJ 2004 L
381/52). The Fund is not considered in detail in this book; on the 2000 Decision, see
Peers, “Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union [2000]”
3 EJML (2001) 231 at 233-235.
8
Chapter 1 Overview
29 Reg. 2725/2000 (OJ 2000 L 316/1); Communication on start of operations (OJ 2003
C 5/2). See Ch. 11.
30 Decision 2001/258 (OJ 2001 L 93/38). The treaty entered into force on 1 April 2001
(OJ 2001 L 112/16). It is not discussed in detail in this book; for analysis see Peers,
n. 28 above, 241-243.
31 COM (2004) 593, Sep. 2004 and COM (2004) 594, Sep. 2004.
32 See the Commission Communication on asylum systems (COM (2003) 315, 3 June
2003), the conclusions of the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council (Annex 5),
the Communication on managed entry of asylum-seekers and external protection
(COM (2004) 410, 4 June 2004), and the Communication on regional protection
(COM (2005) 388, 1 Sep. 2005).
33 For an overview of the issues, see the Commission Communications on immigra-
tion policy (COM (2000) 757, 22 Nov. 2000) and on immigration, integration and
employment (COM (2003) 336, 3 June 2003). For more on integration policy, see the
2005 Commission communication (COM (2005) 389, 1 Sep. 2005).
34 The only measure adopted earlier was Reg. 1030/2002 on a common residence
permit (OJ 2002 L 157/1), in force 15 June 2002; a proposed amendment to this
Regulation (COM (2003) 558, 24 Sep. 2003) was agreed in principle in November
2003. This Regulation is not considered in detail in this book. For comments, see
Peers, “Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union [2001]”
9
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
try nationals who moved within the Community and of Directives on family
reunion and long-term resident third-country nationals.35 Furthermore, at the
end of 2004, the Council adopted a Directive to regulate the status of students,
pupils, trainees and volunteers moving to the EU.36 However, as of autumn
2005, the Council had never really begun serious negotiations on a four-year
old proposal on migration for employment and self-employment, and so the
Commission withdrew its proposal.37 However, the Council was able to agree on
a Directive on admission of researchers from non-EU countries.38 Moreover, an
ambitious Commission initiative to set up a system of “open coordination” for
migration policy was not taken up by the Member States either.39 The Commis-
sion subsequently attempted to re-open debate on this issue with a Green Paper
released at the start of 2005,40 followed by a “policy plan” on legal migration
released at the end of the year.41
10
Chapter 1 Overview
45 See respectively Directive 2001/40 (OJ 2001 L 149/34); Directive 2001/51 (OJ 2001 L
187/45); Directive 2002/90 on facilitation (OJ 2002 L 328/17); and Framework Deci-
sion on facilitation (OJ 2002 L 328/1). For analysis, see Chs. 25, 26 and 28.
46 OJ 2002 L 203/1; see Ch. 27.
47 For the proposal, see Council doc. 14165/1/00, 2 Mar. 2001; for the revised working
methods, see Council docs. 8049/01, 19 Apr. 2001 and 10100/01, 19 June 2001 and
earlier Council Conclusions (Press Release of JHA Council, 30 Nov./1Dec. 2000).
This proposal is not considered in detail in this book.
48 Council doc. 6283/00, 18 Feb. 2000.
49 For the text, see the JHA Council press release, 12 Oct. 2005. This issue is not con-
sidered in detail in this book.
50 See generally Ch. 31.
51 COM (2001) 672, 15 Nov. 2001.
52 Published at OJ 2002 C 142/23.
53 See respectively COM (2002) 175, 10 Apr. 2002; COM (2002) 564, 14 Oct. 2002;
Council doc. 14673/02, 25 Nov. 2002; and Council doc. 15215/02, 4 Dec. 2002.
11
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
Between them, these two Action Plans contain a formidable agenda for
future legislation.54 By 1 January 2006, further legislative measures had been
adopted: a Directive on the residence status of “victims” of trafficking and facil-
itation of illegal migration, with the goal of increasing convictions of traffick-
ers and smugglers;55 a Decision on financing explusions;56 a Directive on transit
for expulsions by air;57 new functions for the SIS;58 amendment of the related
SIRENE manual;59 the creation of an immigration liaison officers’ network;60
obligations for passenger carriers to transmit data on travellers to immigration
authorities;61 a Decision on joint expulsion flights;62 and a Decision on develop-
ment of the network for Member States’ migration management services.63 In
May 2003 the Council adopted a third pillar Decision on “screening” asylum-
seekers to see whether they should be handed over to the International Criminal
Court.64 As for proposals, the Commission has proposed measures establish-
ing a European Return Fund (April 2005), the second version of the Schengen
Information System (May 2005)65 and common standards on expulsions (Sept.
2005).66
12
Chapter 1 Overview
the Member States and the Commission concerning matters within the scope
of Title IV. Here the Council has also been busy, agreeing at the end of 2001 a
Regulation (with a parallel third pillar Decision) funding the development of the
next version of the SIS from the Community budget.67 Subsequently the Council
agreed a funding programme for assisting the adoption and implementation of
EC migration, asylum and borders legislation (the “ARGO” programme).68
67 Reg. 2424/2001 (OJ 2001 L 328/4) and Decision 2001/886/JHA (OJ 2001 L 328/1).
These measures are not considered in detail in this book; see Peers, “Key Legislative
Developments [2001-2002]”, n. 30 above at 364; Commission Communication on
the development of SIS II (COM 2001 720, 18 Dec. 2001); Commission working
paper on the development of SIS II (SEC (2003) 206, 18 Feb. 2003); and the discus-
sion of certain institutional issues concerning the SIS in Ch. 3.
68 Decision 2002/463 (OJ 2002 L 161/11). An amendment to this Decision was adopted
in 2004 (OJ 2004 L 371/48).
69 OJ 2004 L 83/12.
70 See Decision on signature (OJ 2001 L 30/44).
71 COM (2002) 703, 3 Dec. 2002.
72 Reg. 491/2004 (OJ 2004 L 80/1).
73 See respectively Council doc. 8927/03, 5 May 2003; COM (2003) 355, 11 June 2003;
and Annex 7. For an initial report, see SEC (2003) 815, 9 July 2003 (Council doc.
11450/03, 15 July 2003). These issues are not considered in detail in this book. For
analysis, see Peers, “Illegal Immigration and EU External Relations” in Bogusz,
13
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
Yet despite the reference to national conditions and modalities, the Court of
Justice found that there was a directly effective right to equal treatment in work-
ing conditions.77
Even where a Directive refers to ‘national law’ to determine its scope, the
Court of Justice may give that scope a common definition. In the judgment in
Cholewinski, Cygan, and Szyszczak, eds., Irregular Migration and Human Rights
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
74 See respectively COM (2005) 391, 1 Sept. 2005 and COM (2005) 352, 28 July 2005.
75 Case C-162/00 [2002] ECR I-1049.
76 OJ 1994 L 348/1; emphasis added.
77 See also the later judgment in Case C-438/00 Kolpak [2003] ECR I-4135.
14
Chapter 1 Overview
Jaeger,78 Article 2(1) of Directive 93/104 (the working time Directive) specified
that “working time shall mean any period during which the worker is working,
at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance
with national laws and/or practice”.79 The Court of Justice nevertheless held,
despite the relevant German labour law, that:80
... the concepts of working time and rest period within the meaning of Direc-
tive 93/104 may not be interpreted in accordance with the requirements of the
various legislations of the Member States but constitute concepts of Community
law which must be defined in accordance with objective characteristics by refer-
ence to the scheme and purpose of that directive ... Only such an autonomous
interpretation is capable of securing for that directive full efficacy and uniform
application of those concepts in all the Member States.
Accordingly, the fact that the definition of the concept of working time refers
to national law and/or practice does not mean that the Member States may uni-
laterally determine the scope of that concept. Thus, those States may not make
subject to any condition the right of employees to have working periods and cor-
responding rest periods duly taken into account since that right stems directly
from the provisions of that directive. Any other interpretation would frustrate
the objective of Directive 93/104 of harmonising the protection of the safety
and health of workers by means of minimum requirements ...
The same approach can be seen when the issue is not the scope of a Directive,
but the interpretation of a reference to national law in order to determine the
conditions for the exercise of a right, an issue also highly relevant for much EC
immigration and asylum legislation. In BECTU,81 the issue was the interpreta-
tion of Article 7 of the working time Directive, which provides as regards annual
leave:
1. Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker
is entitled to paid annual leave of at least four weeks in accordance with the
conditions for entitlement to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national
legislation and/or practice.82
15
Section I – Framework of EC Immigration and Asylum Law
Furthermore, rules of the kind at issue in the main proceedings are liable to give
rise to abuse because employers might be tempted to evade the obligation to
grant the paid annual leave to which every worker is entitled by more frequent
resort to short-term employment relationships ...
The expression “in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting
of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice” must therefore be
construed as referring only to the arrangements for paid annual leave adopted in
the various Member States. As the Advocate General observed in point 34 of
his Opinion, although they are free to lay down, in their domestic legislation,
conditions for the exercise and implementation of the right to paid annual leave,
by prescribing the specific circumstances in which workers may exercise that
right, which is theirs in respect of all the periods of work completed, Member
States are not entitled to make the existence of that right, which derives directly
from Directive 93/104, subject to any preconditions whatsoever.
As to that, it must be borne in mind that Directive 93/104 merely lays down
minimum requirements for harmonisation of the organisation of working
time at Community level and leaves Member States to adopt the requisite
arrangements for implementation and application of those requirements.
Those measures may therefore display certain divergences as regards the condi-
tions for exercising the right to paid annual leave but, as the Court has held in
paragraphs 52 and 53 of this judgment, that directive does not allow Member
States to exclude the very existence of a right expressly granted to all workers.
16
Chapter 1 Overview
84 For example, see Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer (n. 75 above) and the detailed analysis of the
relevant case law in Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2006),
ch 4.
17
Chapter 2 From Black Market to Constitution:
The Development of the Institutional
Framework for EC Immigration and
Asylum Law
Steve Peers
1 Introduction
Cooperation among EU Member States on issues of asylum and immigration
began back in 1986, in the form of informal intergovernmental negotiations
aimed at agreeing on Conventions and soft law resolutions and recommen-
dations of ministers. This process began shortly after signature of the initial
Schengen Convention, which aimed at more intensive integration among a core
group of Member States. By the start of 2006, the Schengen rules had long since
been elaborated in detail, extended to most Member States, and integrated into
the EU’s legal order; and asylum and immigration cooperation among all EU
Member States had been, via a series of incremental steps, subjected almost
completely to the “Community method” of qualified majority voting (QMV)
in the EU’s Council of Ministers, co-decision in the European Parliament (EP),
the sole initiative of the European Commission, the jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice, and directly effective Community legislation. In the space of twenty
years, cooperation on asylum and immigration issues has gone from the “black
market” of European integration, developed by secret meetings of interior
ministry officials evading any effective parliamentary or judicial scrutiny, to an
increasingly important subject of EC law, largely dealt with like any other area.
Moreover, the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, would, if ratified, fully complete the
application of the “Community method” to asylum and immigration law, and
further expand EU competence over these issues. Although ratification of the
Treaty seemed a distant prospect at the end of 2005, the decision-making rules
applying to EC asylum and immigration law had already largely been trans-
formed.
The purpose of this Chapter is to trace the development of EU and EC
competence and decision-making rules, along with jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice, concerning asylum and immigration law. The background to the role of
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 19-45.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Steve Peers
1 The existing rules, along with their practical application since the Treaty of Amster-
dam entered into force, are examined in detail in Ch. 3.
2 Non-paper of 12 April 1991, published in Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht (Long-
man, 1995), 267.
3 Article G of the text; this is comparable to the final Art. K.6 of the TEU.
20
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
21
Steve Peers
3 Treaty of Amsterdam
As a compromise between Member States with different levels of enthusiasm
for European integration, the more communautaire Member States accepted
less than they had hoped for in the TEU in return for a commitment to a fur-
ther Inter-Governmental Conference to renegotiate the Treaties in 1996, which
would inter alia review the pillar system. This IGC was preceded by a “Reflec-
10 Art. 100c EC, inserted into the EC Treaty by the TEU, and rescinded by the Treaty
of Amsterdam.
11 Voting on the uniform visa format was subject to a qualified majority from the
outset.
12 Decisions on this subject required a unanimous vote in Council and consultation of
the EP.
13 The transfer powers (set out in Article K.9 of the EU Treaty) were never used.
14 See Case C-170/96 Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-2763 and the overview of
these disputes in Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 1st edition (Longman,
2000), Ch. 4.
22
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
23
Steve Peers
nationals on Member States’ territory. The phrase “freedom to travel” would not
have been used either.
As for asylum and immigration, Article C of this initial proposal is clearly
comparable to the current Article 63 EC. The “Dublin” power would have been
the same as the current power in Article 63(1)(a), but the other asylum powers
would have been worded differently than the current powers, comprising powers
over “the basic rules on the right of asylum”, “the procedure for granting ref-
ugee status”, “the conditions under which asylum-seekers are received”, “the
rights of nationals of third countries who cannot be sent back to their country
of origin” (in place of any reference to temporary or subsidiary protection) and
“measures directed towards an even balance of effort, between Member States,
to receive asylum seekers”. The immigration powers (which, like the other
powers, would also have been subject to deadlines to adopt legislation) would
have comprised:19
– the harmonization of conditions of entry and residence, and of procedures
for the issue by Member States and residence permits, including those for
the purpose of family reunion;20
– measures to combat illegal immigration and illegal residence on the territory
of the Member States, by nationals of third countries, including the expulsion
of illegal immigrants and their readmission to the third country of origin or
transit;21
– the rights of nationals of third countries who are legally resident, including
their rights in other Member States.22
However, this text left the role of the institutions (including the Court of Jus-
tice), and the deadlines to adopt legislation, for later discussion.
The consolidated text of Treaty amendments suggested by the Irish Council
Presidency at the end of its term in December 1996 still left the Title IV insti-
tutional issues open, although the Council Presidency did suggest deadlines by
which the Council would have to take decisions: one year for measures on visas
and borders, and two years for asylum and immigration matters, except for the
rights of legally resident third-country nationals and their movement between
19 Provisions which would have constituted additions to the current Articles 63(3) and
(4) are in italics. Deletions are noted in the footnotes.
20 Compared to the current Article 63(3)(a) EC, there would have been an objective of
harmonisation and no reference to long-stay visas.
21 The final phrase was replaced by “repatriation of illegal residents” in the final text
of Article 63(3)(b).
22 Compare with the current Article 63(4), concerning “measures defining the rights
and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident in
a Member State may reside in other Member States.”
24
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
Member States (three years).23 The Irish also made reference to a potential
restriction on the role of the Court of Justice for “workload” reasons, without
suggesting any detail.
However, this Presidency text did amend the provisions concerning pro-
posed EC competence in detail, with these provisions more closely resembling
their final versions. In particular, the visa powers were now limited (as in the
current Treaty) to visas for “intended stays of no more than three months”,
and the power over conditions and procedures for issuing visas had reached its
final form, although there was no power over a “uniform visa” added yet. The
“freedom to travel” power had evolved so that it only applied for a period of “no
more than three months”, and was restricted to non-residents; the words “free
movement” were now used, but not yet “freedom to travel”. As for asylum, the
refugee powers had been revised to include powers over “standards” on recep-
tion conditions for asylum-seekers, “common rules” on “qualification” of refu-
gees, and “standards” on procedures; and from this point on, the powers over
qualification and responsibility were restricted in scope to third-country nation-
als only. A separate paragraph now dealt with temporary and subsidiary pro-
tection and burden-sharing, although the former issue was still expressed more
generally as “the rights of displaced persons from third countries who cannot be
sent back to their country of origin”. The immigration admission powers now
included powers over long-stay visas, the power over irregular migration now
referred to “return” rather than expulsion or readmission, and the powers over
residents now referred to “their right of establishment and their right to seek
employment in other Member States”. A power over administrative cooperation
was added.
The Conference soon began to discuss institutional issues. An early text
submitted by the Dutch Council Presidency left the provisions on competence
alone (except for the addition of the “emergency” power found in the current
Article 64(1) EC), took out the deadlines for action for later discussion, and
suggested that the general decision-making rule should be qualified majority
voting (with the role of the European Parliament to be determined), following
an undetermined transitional period during which proposals would be adopted
by a unanimous vote, with a shared right of initiative between the Commission
and Member States and the EP’s role still left open.24 The transitional decision-
making rules would not apply to the two visa issues already subject to the “Com-
munity method” following Maastricht, or to customs cooperation (which was
later moved out of the draft Title IV altogether). As for the Court of Justice, in
view of the “large number” of expected cases, the Council Presidency listed four
options. First, the number of preliminary rulings could be limited, by making
them optional or restricting them to final courts only. Secondly, the Court of
25
Steve Peers
Justice could be allowed to filter requests coming from national courts. Thirdly,
there could be provisions ensuring quick proceedings, by means of sending all
cases to chambers of the Court or providing for accelerated proceedings. Finally,
there could be power for the Court to rule where national rulings conflict.
By late March 1997, following intensive negotiations, the IGC texts resem-
bled the final Treaty very closely.25 The negotiators had settled on the five-year
deadline to take Title IV decisions, with the three exceptions from that dead-
line,26 that was confirmed in the final version. But at this stage, this deadline
was not matched by a five-year transitional period for the institutions. In fact,
from this point until the very end of the negotiations, the drafts contemplated a
three-year transition period with unanimous voting, a shared right of initiative
and consultation of the EP. In this draft, the only immediate exceptions related
to the two visa matters previously covered by Article 100c EC (the visa list and
visa format) and to rules on a uniform visa, which would be subject to qualified
majority voting, EP consultation and a Commission monopoly on initiative right
away. Following the end of the three-year period, the normal EC method would
apply to all matters (although the EP’s role had yet to be determined) except for
measures relating to burden-sharing of refugees and residence of third-country
nationals in other Member States (the final Article 63(2)(b) and 63(4)). Also, the
Council Presidency had not yet tabled a text relating to the Court of Justice.
At this stage, the provisions on competence closely resembled the final text.
A power concerning rules on a uniform visa was added; the “freedom to travel”
power gained its proper name and was extended in scope to all third-country
nationals, not just non-residents; the powers on reception conditions and asylum
procedures were now confined to “minimum standards” (although the “quali-
fications” provision would still have conferred the power to adopt “common
rules”); the explicit reference to temporary protection and implicit reference to
subsidiary protection (“persons who otherwise need international protection”)
had been added; the legal admissions power no longer concerned “harmonisa-
tion”, although the powers over both legal and irregular migration were termed
“approximation” powers; the power over irregular migration was truncated so
that it concerned only “combating illegal immigration and illegal residence”;
and the power over long-term residents now only referred to their residence and
access to employment in other Member States.
In a draft from 15 May 1997,27 the Council Presidency maintained essen-
tially the same proposals on the institutions, although by this point it had given
25 SN 2017/1/97 REV 1, date unknown. See also an unnumbered and undated docu-
ment, published in European Report, 26 Mar. 1997, which contains identical provi-
sions.
26 Art. 63(2)(b), 63(3)(a) and 63(4), concerning asylum burden-sharing and legal
migration.
27 SN 2555/97.
26
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
27
Steve Peers
were negotiated,29 and a final limitation on the EC’s immigration powers was
added.30
It should be stressed that none of the drafts discussed during the Treaty of
Amsterdam negotiations suggested amending the substantive aspects of Articles
42, 49, 137 or 310 EC, which to some extent govern the status of third-country
nationals as regards social security, provision of services, conditions of employ-
ment and association agreements,31 although the clause on conditions of employ-
ment was inserted into the general social policy provisions of the Treaty with the
abolition of the separate Protocol on Social Policy. In practice, this meant only
that the UK would be covered by these powers. Also, the drafts of the Treaty
suggesting an extension of the EC’s commercial policy powers to cover more
aspects of services and intellectual property expressly excluded the entry and
stay of third-country nationals from that power, provided that such measures
“are not applied in a manner which frustrates international obligations entered
into by the Community”.32 Ultimately, the negotiators agreed on a new Article
133(5) EC, which made any extension of the Community’s commercial policy to
include additional aspects of services and intellectual property dependent upon
a unanimous vote of the Council. This power was never exercised.
29 A draft Protocol on the Schengen acquis had been under discussion since the Italian
Presidency report of June 1996.
30 The final provisions of Article 63, providing that “[m]easures adopted by the Coun-
cil pursuant to points 3 and 4 [of Article 63] shall not prevent any Member State
from maintaining or introducing in the areas concerned national provisions which
are compatible with this Treaty and with international agreements.”
31 See further Ch. 4.
32 SN 600/97, n. 28 above.
33 On the initial IGC agenda, see “Efficient Institutions After Enlargement: Options
for the Intergovernmental Conference” (Council doc. 13636/99, 7 Dec. 1999).
28
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
Also, this time around, given the disputes that had arisen in practice follow-
ing the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam concerning the boundary
between Title IV and other provisions, the discussions focussed not only on the
institutional rules within Title IV, but on the relationship between Title IV and
Articles 42 (social security) and 137 (conditions of employment) in particular.
But in contrast, the possibility that the EC’s power over the common commer-
cial policy would cover service provision by third-country nationals was not con-
troversial as such, and the final version of Article 133 as revised by the Treaty of
Nice clearly appears to cover this issue.
The Commission’s detailed submissions at the outset of the IGC that nego-
tiated the Treaty of Nice suggested a complete move to a qualified majority vote
and co-decision for all aspects of Title IV at the end of the five-year period.34
Later Commission communications raised the question of whether the limita-
tions placed upon the Court by Article 68 EC should be dropped,35 and sug-
gested that Article 42 EC should not only be subject to QMV but also extended
to apply to all persons, with the capacity of the Council (acting by QMV with
co-decision for the EP) to extend the social security rules partly or wholly to
legally-resident third-country nationals.36
In the meantime, the Portuguese Council Presidency had submitted the first
discussion papers on the issue of qualified-majority voting. Its first paper on
social policy recommended QMV for conditions of employment for third-coun-
try nationals, on the grounds that this issue should be treated in parallel with the
free movement of Community national workers.37 The Council Presidency also
suggested a move to QMV for Article 42, without raising the issue of personal
scope. A separate paper on JHA matters raised the possibility of an early move
to QMV and co-decision throughout some or all of Title IV once the new Treaty
entered into force, or deciding in advance which parts of Title IV would be sub-
ject to QMV and co-decision after the expiry of the transitional period.38
Six weeks later, the Council Presidency reported that early discussions had
shown a willingness to continue discussing the extension of QMV to Title IV
at technical level.39 A provisional list of Treaty Articles which could be subject
to QMV was duly drawn up,40 including visa matters and all of Articles 63, 65
and 66.41 An initial redraft of Article 42 suggested extending it to self-employed
29
Steve Peers
persons, but was silent on the nationality of persons covered, while the pros-
pect of applying QMV for conditions of employment for third-country nation-
als (Article 137) had already been dropped at this early stage. A separate paper
suggested extensions of the EP’s co-decision powers to the existing Article 49
(concerning service provision by third-country nationals) as well as to all the
Title IV Articles which could become subject to QMV.42 Also, an experts’ group
on the Court of Justice had considered the possible abolition of the limits placed
by Article 68, and reported that this idea had received broad support, although
with several reservations.43 The Portuguese Council Presidency concluded by
bringing together all these suggestions for institutional reform, with the addi-
tion of the suggestion that the “legal base” for adopting rules on the conditions
of employment for third-country nationals should be reworded and moved to
Title IV, to become a new Article 63(3)(c) EC.44
It fell to the incoming French Council Presidency to continue discussions.
It suggested that the IGC also consider extending QMV to the rest of Article 62
EC, and suggested that Article 42 should be extended to cover all workers “and
persons treated as such”.45 A note clarified that this ambiguous wording was
intended to extend Article 42 to all persons currently governed by EC legislation
adopted pursuant to Article 308 EC. A subsequent proposal from Austria sug-
gested simply that Article 42 extend to workers and self-employed persons, with
power for the Council (also pursuant to QMV and the co-decision procedure) to
extend the relevant rules to all persons who migrate within the Community.46
The Council Presidency soon submitted to a ministerial meeting a discus-
sion paper and texts concerning all of the possible extensions of QMV still under
discussion.47 The discussion paper asked the ministers if they wanted to move
forward the EC method as regards visa powers, and also whether they wanted to
move the EC method forward as regards other Title IV issues, possibly subject
to a further transition period or continued control of the Council. The accom-
panying texts suggested a complete abolition of the transitional period for Title
IV as regards decision-making, although the nature of the EP’s powers was left
open. However, the abolition of Article 68 was no longer in prospect; instead,
the Council Presidency suggested QMV for adapting the jurisdiction of the
Court in future, although the exercise of this power would no longer be subject
to a deadline. As for Article 42, the Council Presidency suggested that it extend
30
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
31
Steve Peers
dam. However, in this draft, the Council would be compelled to make changes
to the decision-making concerning the sectors “excluded” from the “normal”
EC decision-making process before 1 June 2004. The suggested redraft of Article
42 distinguished between EU national workers, self-employed persons and stu-
dents, along with third-country nationals covered by treaties, refugees and state-
less persons on the one hand, who would be covered by QMV and co-decision,
and everyone else on the other hand, where measures would be subject to unani-
mous voting and consultation of the EP. This was the first of several attempts
to draw a distinction between the existing social security rules, which would be
subject to QMV, and any extension of those rules, which would not.
Within a week, the options narrowed again. Although asylum measures
(apart from burden-sharing) were restored to the group of “non-sensitive” mea-
sures which would immediately be governed by the normal EC method, the
Council Presidency suggested for the first time that further amendments to be
made to Article 67 in future by the Council (now before 1 May 2004) should
be spelled out in the form of a Declaration – an approach that was to prove
appealing to the negotiators.53 Indeed, the Council Presidency noted that such
a Declaration could be agreed in place of any amendment to Article 67. Simul-
taneously, as regards Article 42, the Council Presidency suggested that while
stateless persons and refugees should remain within the “core” group of persons
whose social security rights could be adopted by QMV, social security for all
other third-country nationals should be moved expressly to Article 63(4).54 A
week later,55 the Council Presidency’s note to ministers now suggested three pos-
sible approaches to reform of Article 67: an immediate move to the normal EC
method, as set out in the texts previously under discussion (which the Presidency
cautioned would not likely prove satisfactory); an automatic move to the full EC
method from 1 May 2004; or a Declaration regarding the Council Decision to be
taken by 1 May 2004. Alternatively, a combination of the three options could be
agreed. This note suggested that QMV should only apply to the persons covered
by Article 42 when the Treaty of Nice entered into force; any extension would
require a unanimous vote and consultation. The idea of amending Article 63(4)
was dropped.
Another week passed, and options were narrowing further still. The Coun-
cil Presidency now spelled out two options regarding Article 67. The first option
maintained the prior approach of an automatic early move to the normal EC
32
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
5 Developments in 2004
The Title IV transitional period ended on 1 May 2004, with no decision to
change the Title IV decision-making rules or to adapt the provisions relating to
the Court of Justice. However, the end of the transitional period did have the
immediate impact of imposing a Commission monopoly on making propos-
als, QMV and co-decision of the EP on visa rules, and QMV with consultation
of the EP on administrative cooperation issues. The former change meant that
any initiatives by Member States outstanding as of 1 May 2004 would lapse on
33
Steve Peers
that date, so there was a rush to adopt several such initiatives by the deadline.59
Several others lapsed.60 Furthermore, in view of the deadline, Member States
stopped making Title IV proposals after July 2003.61
The question of changing the decision-making and jurisdictional rules
pursuant to Article 67(2) EC was soon raised as part of discussions on the
new multi-annual JHA programme. This was adopted in November 2004, and
became known as the Hague Programme.62 It called for the Council to apply
Article 67(2), in order to adopt a Decision changing the decision-making rules
to QMV and co-decision for the adoption of all asylum and immigration mea-
sures not already subject to QMV, with the exception of legal migration matters.
A Decision to this end was duly adopted in December 2004, and took effect
from 1 January 2005.63 At this point, measures concerning internal border aboli-
tion, external border control, freedom to travel, burden-sharing and irregular
migration became subject to QMV and co-decision. The adoption of imple-
menting measures concerning the Common Consular Instructions and the Bor-
ders Manual also became subject to QMV, rather than unanimity.64
This leaves decisions concerning legal migration subject to unanimity in
Council and consultation of the EP. The adoption of the asylum procedures
directive was also still subject to the same procedure; but following the adoption
of that Directive on 1 December 2005, Article 67(5) EC now entails the adop-
59 The following measures, based on Member States’ initiatives, were adopted between
1 Jan. 2004 and 30 April 2004: Reg. 377/2004 on immigration liaison officers’ net-
work (OJ 2004 L 64/1); Reg. 378/2004 on amending the Sirene manual (OJ 2004 L
64/5); Reg. 871/2004 on future functionalities for the SIS (OJ 2004 L 162/29); Direc-
tive 2004/82 on transmitting passenger information by carriers (OJ 2004 L 261/24);
a Decision on joint expulsion flights (OJ 2004 L 261/28); and a Decision on signs
at border crossing points (OJ 2004 L 261/119). Indeed, the last three measures were
adopted on the last possible date (29 April 2004).
60 The lapsed initiatives were: an Austrian initiative for a Regulation on safe third
countries (OJ 2003 C 17/6); a Finnish initiative for Regulation on airport transit
visas (Council doc. 10867/99, 9 Sep. 1999); a Portuguese initiative for a Regulation
on freedom to travel for non-visa nationals after three months (OJ 2000 C 164/6);
a Finnish initiative for Regulation on readmission of third-country nationals as
between Member States (“internal readmission”) (OJ 1999 C 353/6); and a German
initiative for Decision on illegal immigration networks (Council doc. 13165/1/00).
61 The final initiatives by a Member State were two Italian proposals (OJ 2003 L 223/3
and /5).
62 OJ 2005 C 53.
63 OJ 2004 L 396/45.
64 For more on the implementation of the Decision, see Ch. 3. For an overview of
the background and impact of this Decision, see Peers, “Transforming Decision-
Making on EC Immigration and Asylum Law”, 33 ELRev. (2005) 283.
34
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
tion of all future asylum measures by QMV and co-decision.65 Also, the Coun-
cil did not adopt a Decision amending the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice,
although the Treaty legally obliges it to do so.66 This issue will be addressed by a
Commission proposal due in 2006, according to the Hague Programme and its
implementation plan.67
6 Constitutional Treaty
The EU’s draft Constitutional Treaty was initially negotiated within the frame-
work of a Constitutional Convention, made up of delegates from national gov-
ernments and parliaments and EU institutions, held from February 2002 to July
2003. Immigration and asylum issues fell within the scope of one of the eleven
working groups specialising in particular issues on the agenda. This Working
Group (Working Group X) took evidence from various national and EU offi-
cials, and ultimately suggested sweeping amendments to various aspects of the
EU rules concerning justice and home affairs cooperation.
An initial working paper framed a number of questions concerning the
development of EU immigration and asylum law.68 There were three basic ques-
tions: should Article 63 EC be redrafted to give effect to the Tampere objective
of a developing common European policy on asylum, rather than minimum
standards only? Should co-decision and QMV in the Council extend beyond the
agreements reached during the Treaty of Nice negotiations? Should the principle
of “solidarity” extend to all areas of immigration, asylum and border control?
As regards migration, the working paper asked if it was appropriate to limit the
scope of the policy with a view to facilitating agreement on extension of QMV
and co-decision.
A separate section on external borders raised several questions: should there
be a simplified provision on EU powers over visas? Should this provision cover
other forms of cooperation (training, cooperation, exchange of information,
financial solidarity)? It appeared from discussions within the working group that
the idea of creating a European border guard was “for the long term”. In the
meantime, the questions were whether it was appropriate for the EU to comple-
ment Member States’ needs, and whether there was a need for joint teams of
different Member States’ officials. The working paper was very critical of the
limits on the Court of Justice jurisdiction in this area, raising the question as to
whether the working group would consider whether the general rules on jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Justice should become applicable.
35
Steve Peers
A subsequent paper from the JHA Commissioner set out the Commission’s
view at length,69 arguing for a wider scope of asylum powers (specifically on
external matters), after observing that “[i]nevitably the degree of ambition
expressed in the initial Commission proposals has been reduced in the process of
negotiation”. On the issue of immigration, the Commission interpreted the cur-
rent Treaty powers broadly, but noting that Member States alone should retain
competence over certain issues, including the acquisition of national citizenship.
Again it was noted that “once discussion begins in the Council”, there was “a
lowering of the degree of ambition by comparison with the Commission’s pro-
posal”. The Commissioner made specific mention of the importance of continu-
ing “the objective of ensuring fair treatment of third-country nationals” who
were legally resident, and so argued for “supplementing the existing provision
to allow the adoption of measures covering a wider range of rights for third-
country nationals”. There should be a “[p]articular priority” for “the right to
fully participate in political life at local level”. On the subject of integration of
third-country nationals, the best level to address the issue was local, regional or
national, but “there is a strong case for a specific Treaty base allowing Union
level action where this can genuinely add value”, such as exchange of informa-
tion on best practice. In conclusion, the Commission argued that even though
the current powers are broad, the current Treaty “does not fully acknowlege the
notion of a common European immigration policy as an autonomous objective
that justifies the taking of measures towards its construction”. So the Constitu-
tion should provide “a general provision allowing the adoption of all measures
needed to put in place a common immigration policy, including measures on
illegal immigration and illegal residence”; the Commission took the view that
“it remains particularly important that criminal law measures remain part of the
tool-kit for fighting illegal immigration” and trafficking in persons.
As for visas and border controls, the Commission interpreted the current
powers to mean that the Treaty “provides the potential for full harmonisation
of both substantive and procedural law at Union level in all of the areas set out
in Article 62 EC”. Nonetheless, there should be an express Treaty provision on
the creation of a system of integrated border management. Also, “the politi-
cal objective of a common visa policy should be clearly written into the new
Treaty”, replacing the reference to four separate visa powers as at present with a
power to adopt “all measures needed for the common visa policy”.
The Commission made a case for a general move to qualified majority
voting and co-decision in the area of immigration and asylum, stating that una-
nimity in the Council “is one of the factors which has led to the greatest difficul-
ties in the adoption of measures”, and arguing that “[e]ven where the will to act
has been made clear at the highest levels, individual Member States have used
their power to postpone and block the adoption of measures, forcing last minute
36
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
37
Steve Peers
38
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
without essential changes. These measures would be subject to the normal leg-
islative procedure (QMV in Council and co-decision of the EP). The changes
to the freedom to travel power had not been discussed in the working group,
and were presumably suggested in order to settle certain practical difficulties
agreeing legislation on the basis of the current powers, given that some non-EU
countries want to retain the possibility for their citizens to stay for up to three
months in each Schengen State (so for more than three months in the entire
Schengen area).78
Next, asylum and immigration would be subject to separate clauses. The
asylum clause would provide first of all that:79
2. For this purpose, the European Parliament and the Council, in accor-
dance with the legislative procedure, shall adopt laws or framework laws
to establish a common European asylum system comprising:
– a uniform status of asylum for nationals of third countries, valid
throughout the Union;
– a uniform status of subsidiary protection for nationals of third
countries who, without obtaining European asylum, are in need of
international protection;
– a uniform status of temporary protection for displaced persons in
the event of a massive inflow;
– a common procedure for the granting and withdrawing of asylum
status or subsidiary or temporary protection status;
– criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is
responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary
protection;
– standards concerning the reception of applicants for asylum or sub-
sidiary or temporary protection.
78 On the details of this issue, see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd edition
(forthcoming, OUP, 2006), Ch. 3.
79 Art. 11 of the proposal.
39
Steve Peers
The proposed new clause differed from the current Article 64(2) in three respects:
the apparent restriction to asylum-related situations; the absence of a temporal
limitation of the emergency measures to a six-month maximum; and the require-
ment to consult the European Parliament.
As for immigration, the proposed new Article would first of all set out the
Union’s objectives:
40
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
3. The Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the read-
mission of third-country nationals residing without authorization to
their countries of origin or provenance.
4. The European Parliament and the Council, in accordance with the legis-
lative procedure, may adopt laws or framework laws providing incentives
and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting
the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territo-
ries
Also, the proposed text would abolish all of the provisions limiting the immigra-
tion and asylum jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.80
Subsequently, a number of members of the Convention submitted pro-
posed amendments to the relevant Articles, with some aiming to widen EU
competence, for instance as regards the creation of a European border guard,
and others aiming to restrict it, for instance as regards access to employment.81
Equally, some wished to restrict the extension of QMV in the Council, but some
wished to retain it. The plenary Convention debate on the proposed Articles also
revealed a wide spread of opinion on these issues.82
Ultimately the Convention Presidium proposed a redrafted text of the rel-
evant provisions (as part of a full draft of the main text of the entire Consti-
tutional Treaty).83 The substantive changes made to the text were (as regards
visas and borders) competence to adopt a “common policy on visas and other
short-stay residence permits” in place of a list of the various visa powers, and
the addition of a new paragraph specifiying that this Article “shall not affect the
competence of the Member States concerning the geographical demarcation of
their borders, in accordance with international law.”84 As regards asylum,85 the
revised text referred to a “common system” of temporary protection in place of
a “uniform status”, and also dropped references to temporary protection issues
forming part of the powers over reception conditions and procedures. A specific
new power over the external aspects of asylum was also added, concerning:
41
Steve Peers
(g) partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of man-
aging inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary
protection.
This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes
of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their
territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed.
This last set of amendments to the immigration and asylum provisions was an
important part of the final compromise in the Convention,89 allowing it to reach
agreement on Part III of the Constitutional Treaty.90
The Convention also dealt with the social policy issues addressed by
the social policy working group. Taking account to some extent of the view
of this working group, the Convention’s Presidium initially suggested that the
EC powers over social security for migrant workers (Article 42 EC) and over
conditions of employment for third-country nationals (Article 137 EC) should
become subject to QMV in Council and co-decision with the EP.91 At the same
time, the Presidium also suggested that the current Article 49 EC, governing
the provision of services by self-employed third-country nationals resident in
the EC, should become subject to QMV and co-decision (it is currently subject
to QMV and no role for the EP).92 Subsequently, the Presidium proposed that
42
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
the social security powers should be expanded to cover the self-employed, and
dropped its suggestion for changes to the decision-making rules applicable to
any of the social policy powers.93
Subsequently, an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was convened in
October 2003 to discuss the Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty formally.
The IGC collapsed in December 2003, then reconvened in spring 2004 and was
able to agree the text of the Constitutional Treaty in June 2004, following which
the proposed Treaty was signed in October 2004.94 Strikingly, compared to the
previous three rounds of Treaty negotiations, immigration and asylum (includ-
ing the provisions concerning the Court of Justice) were not an issue in the
negotiations. A few Member States expressed misgivings about the Convention’s
draft text on these issues,95 but they did not pursue the issue at the IGC. The
only amendments to the Treaty’s immigration and asylum provisions resulting
from the IGC took the form of technical legal amendments agreed by a work-
ing group of legal experts, who agreed on two revisions worth noting.96 First,
the asylum clause was redrafted to state that the EU’s objectives included a
common policy on subsidiary protection as well as a common policy on asylum
and temporary protection. Second, the provision on irregular migration so that
it defined more precisely who it applied to: “third-country nationals who do not
or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the ter-
ritory of one of the Member States”.
In related areas, in its final stages, the IGC decided to amend the deci-
sion-making procedure relating to social security for migrant workers and self-
employed persons to allow Member States to invoke an “emergency brake” in
order to invoke a veto under certain circumstances.97 A declaration to the Con-
stitutional Treaty stated that in the same circumstances, the interests of Member
States would be duly taken into account following a draft immigration law pro-
posal.98 This declaration appears to assume that the issue of social security for
third-country nationals is within the scope of the immigration law provisions,
not the social security provisions, although it does not state so expressly. The
IGC left alone the Convention’s text concerning the provision of services by
93 The former amendment first appeared in Conv. 836/03 (n. 87 above), as part of the
compromises agreed during the final discussions on Part III of the Constitutional
Treaty; the latter amendment is dated from the second full draft of the Constitu-
tional Treaty (Conv. 802/03, 12 June 2003).
94 The signed text is published at OJ 2004 C 310. For the full text of the immigration
and asylum provisions, see Annex 7.
95 IGC 38/03, 24 Oct. 2003.
96 IGC 50/03, 25 Nov. 2003.
97 See the final Article III-136 of the Constitutional Treaty.
98 Declaration 14 to the Final Act of the Constitutional Treaty.
43
Steve Peers
7 Conclusions
It can be seen that, until the Constitutional Treaty negotiations, the Treaty
amendments relating to Title IV have consistently been narrowed in scope during
negotiations. The five-year institutional transition period was extended from the
initial proposed period of three years at the very end of the Amsterdam nego-
tiations, and the attempt to (in effect) return to the initial proposal for a three-
year period failed at Nice, except as regards part of civil law and (conditionally)
asylum law. It appears that the most sensitive issues were consistently second-
ary migration of third-country nationals and burden-sharing, later joined by
abolition of internal border controls, which was not considered sensitive during
the Amsterdam negotiations, and followed closely by initial migration of third-
country nationals. Conversely, the least sensitive matters were consistently been
visa matters, followed by asylum law (apart from burden-sharing), irregular
migration, border controls and short-term free movement, and now joined by
civil law (apart from family law), which had been a more sensitive issue during
the Amsterdam negotiations (perhaps because family law had not yet been sepa-
rated from the rest of civil law). By 2004, the only remaining sensitive issues were
legal migration and family law; but the Constitutional Treaty would even take
legal migration out of the “sensitive” category by protecting Member States’
powers to limit entry to work-seekers from outside the EU.
Similarly, it appears that views on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
during negotiations have oscillated between support for the normal EC rules
and even greater movement away from them. The Constitutional Treaty, agreed
by all Member States in June 2004, would require a change to the normal EC
rules, but Member States could not bring themselves a few months later to apply
the normal rules (or even to begin a move toward them).
99 A legal service report had argued that there was an overlap between the EU’s immi-
gration powers and the social policy clause, and suggested either dropping the social
policy clause or indicating that it was lex specialis as compared to the immigration
policy clause (IGC 4/1/03 rev 1, 4 Oct. 2003).
100 For further details, see Peers, n. 14 above, ch. 4.
44
Chapter 2 The EC Institutions and Immigration and Asylum Law
45
Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
Steve Peers
1 Introduction
It will be seen throughout the substantive chapters of this book that the EU
was still, by the start of 2006, some distance short of the objective of creating
an effective and balanced immigration and asylum policy. To what extent is this
failure a consequence of the institutional framework established by the Treaties?
Certainly it is clear that the “Maastricht era” of formal intergovermentalism from
1993 to 1999 failed to achieve the objectives that Interior Minsters set themselves
in 1991. Indeed almost no binding acts were agreed in the area, in contrast with
the modest results in the areas of civil law, criminal law and policing. In moving
immigration and asylum law from the “third pillar” to the “first pillar” pursuant
to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Member States were implicitly acknowledging
the failure of the fully intergovernmental approach to these issues. But although
immigration and asylum became matters of Community law, they were subject
to a transitional period of five years in which the “Community method” of a
strong role for the Commission, EP and Court of Justice and qualified majority
voting in the Council was set aside. During this period, it could be said that the
intergovernmental system of decision-making had been abolished de jure for
immigration and asylum law, but de facto intergovernmentalism (the “modified
Community method”) still applied. The position is different as from 1 January
2005 as regards decision-making, but not concerning the first asylum procedures
Directive, the issue of legal migration, or the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice,
all cases where de facto intergovernmentalism still reigns.
This chapter argues that in practice, Member States used the modified Com-
munity method to retain almost unlimited discretion over the development of
EU immigration and asylum law, explaining the delay and difficulties in agreeing
many measures and the relatively low minimum standards in many measures
which have been agreed. Some Member States also used the apparently ambigu-
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 47-79.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Steve Peers
ous wording of the powers granted to the Community by Title IV to insist that
some matters are outside the scope of Community law altogether, with the result
that they must be addressed either in the remaining third pillar, where decision-
making is even more intergovernmental, or left entirely to national law. In most
cases, these legal arguments are weak, but since the critics were able to exercise a
veto because the requirement of unanimous voting in the Council allowed them
to prevent the Community from acting in certain important areas.
The inevitable consequence of retaining de facto intergovernmentalism was
that a Community policy going much beyond the lowest common denomina-
tor – which was very low indeed in some areas – could not really develop. This
meant that the Tampere objective of developing an effective and balanced immi-
gration and asylum policy could not be realised.
To demonstrate this, the following chapter examines in turn the Treaty
framework, the existence and extent of the current powers of the EC and the
exercise of those powers in practice since the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. The focus is on developments before the changes to the decision-
making rules in most areas that took place in 2004 and 2005, because it is too
early to tell whether those changes will lead to a significant difference in the
content of EC legislation.
48
Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
As we shall see below, the first three of these six features changed as from 1
May 2004, and the first two features have changed again since, but the other
three have remained intact. Compared to the rest of the EC Treaty, the first two
features were merely unusual, as there were (and are) still other cases in which
the EP is merely consulted on legislation or on which the Council votes unani-
3 However, the power to adopt emergency measures, now in Art. 64 EC, is now
broader (see further Ch. 8), and the Commission had more power from the outset
of the Treaty of Amsterdam because the Council had to act on a proposal from the
Commission, so it would need a unanimous vote to alter the Commission’s text (see
ibid.).
49
Steve Peers
mously.4 But the other two institutional features were unique, as there was (and
is) no other part of the EC Treaty where the Commission shared its monopoly
on proposing legislation (leaving aside rules on the functioning of EC institu-
tions or other EC bodies) or where the Court’s power to receive references from
all courts or tribunals was limited.5 Similarly, as regards the two limitations on
the territorial scope of Title IV, there are no “opt-outs” elsewhere in the EC
Treaty identical to those for the UK, Ireland and Denmark as regards Title IV
of the Treaty, although there are “opt-outs” for the UK and Denmark relating
to monetary union.
However, the institutional features of the system applied in principle only
for a transition period lasting five years, expiring on May 1, 2004. After that
point, the first unique institutional feature terminated: only the Commission is
able to propose Title IV measures. The two unusual institutional features were
moderated, as there was an automatic shift to qualified majority voting and the
co-decision procedure as regards the conditions for obtaining a visa and the
rules for a uniform visa. However, any further change in those two features, and
any change in the jurisdiction of the Court, was subject to a decision which the
Council “shall” take, acting unanimously, after the five-year transition period,
according to Article 67(2) EC.
It follows that during the transition period, Title IV was entirely different
from other parts of the EC Treaty as regards its territorial scope, judicial control
and the role of the Commission, and largely different from the rest of the Treaty
as regards the role of the Council and EP.
The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, brought
three further changes. First of all, a new Article 67(5) EC moved civil law (except
for “aspects relating to family law”) and asylum measures (except for burden-
sharing) to the procedure of Article 251 EC, which entails a qualified majority
vote (QMV) in the Council, co-decision of the EP and a monopoly over making
proposals for the Commission. However, for asylum measures, this was subject
to prior agreement on “Community legislation defining the common rules and
basic principles governing these issues”. Leaving aside the distinction between
family law and other civil law measures, this change is legally ambiguous, and is
considered in more detail below.6 Secondly, a new Protocol attached to the EC
Treaty subjected Article 66 EC (concerning cooperation between Member States’
authorities and those authorities and the Commission) to qualified majority
voting in the Council and consultation of the EP from 1 May 2004.
4 For example, the EP is still only consulted on agricultural and fisheries measures
(Art. 37 EC) and the Council still votes unanimously on indirect tax measures (Art.
93 EC).
5 The other two rules applied to the Court by Article 68 EC are also unique in the EC
Treaty.
6 See s. 3.3.
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
Thirdly, Declaration 5 attached to the Final Act of the Treaty of Nice set
out a political commitment: the decision which the Council must take pursuant
to Article 67(2) EC would from 1 May 2004 apply the co-decision procedure
and qualified majority voting to short-term freedom to travel for third-country
nationals and irregular migration, and will apply the same procedure to mea-
sures on external border controls dependent upon prior agreement between
the UK and Spain regarding Gibraltar. The Declaration also stated that the
Council “will…endeavour” to apply the co-decision procedure “applicable from
1 May 2004 to the other areas covered by Title IV or parts of them”. Also, in the
absence of any amendment to Article 67(2), the Council was (and is) still obliged
by that provision to adapt the role of the Court after 1 May 2004.
During the autumn of 2004, the negotiations on the “Hague Programme”
for the future of JHA law adopted by the European Council on 5 November
2004 called upon the Council to change the decision-making rules as regards all
immigration and asylum issues not yet subject to QMV, by 1 April 2005 at the
latest, to QMV and co-decision, with the exception of measures on legal immi-
gration and most asylum measures, which remained subject to Article 67(5).7
On the other hand, the Dutch Presidency of the Council has rejected any move
to change the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, on the grounds that “at the
moment the Court’s workload would not allow for treatment of asylum cases
within acceptable delays”.8 The Hague Programme does state that “in the per-
spective of the future Constitutional Treaty, thought should be given to setting
up a more formal solution to handle requests for preliminary rulings concerning
the area of freedom, security and justice, in particular by amending the Statute
of the Court . The Commission is invited to come forward – after consultation
of the Court of Justice – with a proposal to that effect”. It is not clear whether
this would take place before or after the Constitutional Treaty comes into force
– a prospect which of course now seems highly unlikely. In the meantime, the
Action Plan to implement the Hague Programme, approved by the Council
in June 2005, calls upon the Commission to make a proposal on this issue in
2006.9
The Council decision requested by the Hague Programme amending the
decision-making rules concerning most immigration and asylum measures, was
adopted in December 2004 and took effect from 1 January 2005.10
Following the transition period and the institutional changes taking effect
from the start of 2005, Title IV is still totally different from the rest of the EC
Treaty as regards territorial scope, although the differences as regards the Com-
7 OJ 2005 C 53/1.
8 Summary of remarks of Dutch Justice Minister, Council doc. 13502/04, 18 Oct.
2004.
9 Point 1.3 of the Action plan (OJ 2005 C 198/1).
10 OJ 2004 L 396/45.
51
Steve Peers
mission have definitely been repealed,11 and the differences as regards the Coun-
cil and EP and possibly the Court (in future) have been reduced or removed
to some extent – but not removed entirely. It is therefore essential, even after
1 January 2005, to distinguish between Title IV and the rest of the Treaty; this
subject is addressed in detail in Chapter 4 of this book.
The net result of the changes taking effect in 2003, 2004 and 2005 was that
from 1 January 2005, the role of the EU political institutions as regards Title IV
measures was far more heterogeneous than it was during the transitional period.
The following table sets out the decision-making procedures that apply to each
EC Title IV power from that date:
52
Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
rules relating to different aspects of those powers have led to litigation concern-
ing the dividing lines within a single “legal base”.13
Also, it should be noted that only the Commission can negotiate and then
propose the signature and conclusion of any treaty within the scope of Title IV,
as far as EC competence is concerned, because Title IV makes no derogation
(even during the transitional period) from the procedure for agreeing external
treaties set out in Article 300 EC.14 There is, however, an implicit exception from
these rules in the Schengen Protocol, as regards the Schengen association trea-
ties with Norway and Iceland.
In future, there could be a series of further changes in the Treaty framework
for agreeing immigration and asylum law. This would follow the entry into force
of the EU Constitution, signed on 29 October 2004 and now subject to ratifica-
tion by all of the Member States, if the Constitution obtains sufficient support
to enter into force. These potential changes are discussed further in Chapter 2.
13 See Cases C-36/98 Spain v Council [2001] ECR I-779 (Art. 175 EC) and C-168/98
Luxembourg v Council and EP [2000] ECR I-9131 (Art. 47 EC).
14 On the treaty-making powers as regards readmission treaties, see Ch. 30.
15 See Ch. 4.
16 This section does not consider the possible effect of the EU’s proposed Constitu-
tional Treaty; see Ch. 2 on that issue.
53
Steve Peers
17 See Ch. 8.
18 Case C-170/96 Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-2763.
19 See Commission working paper on visas (SEC (1999) 1213, 16 July 1999).
20 For elaboration of this argument, see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law
(Longman, 2000) at 78-79.
21 Indeed, this was the “legal base” for a Finnish proposal on this issue (Council doc.
10867/99, 9 Sep. 1999).
22 See Ch. 8.
54
Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
3.3 Asylum
Perhaps the most important question here is the scope of the Community’s
powers over subsidiary protection. First, does the Community have such powers
at all? It appears obvious from the wording of Article 63(2)(a) that the Commu-
nity has power over the issue of temporary protection and over other forms of
protection – in particular, subsidiary protection. In the absence of any express
or implied limitation on these powers, they are not limited to specific issues. Sec-
ondly, how far can such measures extend? Again, it appears that these powers
can cover all of the issues addressed as regards Geneva Convention refugee
status by Article 63(1), but that the Community cannot regulate such issues
(responsibility for applicants, reception conditions, definitions and procedures)
unless Article 63(2)(a) is used as a “legal base” to do this.
As to the extent of powers over the access to employment of any category
of persons obtaining or seeking protection status, this issue, for all third-country
nationals, falls within the scope of the “conditions of employment” of third-
country nationals in Article 137 EC. In the alternative, this issue falls within the
scope of Articles 63(3)(a) for recognised refugees, 63(2)(b) for asylum-seekers
and 62(2)(a) for persons applying for or receving temporary or subsidiary pro-
tection, on the grounds that the issue is “ancillary” to the main EC powers in
this field.24
What about the relationship between asylum and migration law? More
technically, what is the distinction between Article 63(1) and (2) on the one
hand, and Article 63(3) and (4) on the other? Since there is nothing to limit the
scope of Article 63(3)(a) to persons without protection needs,25 or to suggest
that the Treaty drafters wanted to preclude the Community from addressing
the migration status of persons with protection needs, it logically follows that
Article 63(3)(a) and 63(4) can be used to govern the legal status of refugees and
23 See Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2nd ed., OUP, 2006), Ch. 3.
24 See Ch. 4 and s. 3.4 below.
25 It could be argued that Art. 63(1) and (2) are lex specialis as regards EC powers to
regulate persons seeking or needing protection and therefore exhaustively set out
EC powers on this issue. But the better view, in the absence of any indication of any
limit on the personal scope of Art. 63(3) and (4), is that the former provisions are
lex specialis only as regards the powers to regulate specific issues, not an exhaustive
list of EC powers to regulate the status of persons seeking or needing protection.
55
Steve Peers
displaced persons in areas falling outside the scope of Article 63(1) and (2).
Similarly Article 63(3)(b) can be used as regards illegal residence and entry of
such persons, although of course its use is almost entirely precluded in practice
by international refugee and human rights law.26 In practice, this means that
Article 63(3)(a) must be used as regards family reunion for recognised refugees
and the legal status of recognised refugees in a Member State (including issues
such as residence permits and access to benefits) since Article 63(1) does not
provide for such powers;27 and Article 63(4) must be used for movement to other
Member States of any persons with protection needs. The impact of this is pos-
sible increased difficulty adopting comprehensive texts on issues like refugee and
subsidiary protection status due to the differences between the decision-making
procedures on these issues.
Next, does the EC’s power over reception conditions for asylum-seekers
apply to the area of education, or is that precluded by the limits on EC power
over education set by Article 149 EC? As argued elsewhere, there is no ground
for such a restrictive reading of the Treaty.28
The final asylum-related question is the scope of Article 67(5) EC, altering
the EC’s decision-making rules on most asylum matters subject to the condi-
tion that “common rules and basic principles” have previously been adopted in
the form of “Community legislation”. This “Community legislation” criterion
clearly ruled out the prospect that the “Dublin II” Regulation had to be adopted
by QMV in Council and the “co-decision” procedure, since the prior Dublin
Convention was manifestly not Community legislation.
But there are still four remaining questions relating to Article 67(5). First,
on what date does (or did) it take effect? Second, does the Council have to take
a decision in order to give effect to it? Third, can it apply in stages to different
aspects of asylum law? Fourth, what are “common rules and basic principles”?
On the first issue, surprisingly, Commissioner Vitorino initially appeared
to take the view that Article 67(5) did not apply until 1 May 2004, although the
Commission altered its position later.29 For their part, the Council and EP also
56
Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
took the more communautaire view.30 It is surely clear beyond any doubt that
the institutions’ interpretation was correct: the new paragraph applied from the
entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, not from 1 May 2004. This conclusion
results from the clear wording of the new provision. As an express derogation
from Article 67(1) EC, which sets out the rules governing the transitional period,
Article 67(5) could begin to apply during that transitional period. Article 67(5)
can obviously be compared to Article 67(3) (which provides for express deroga-
tions from Article 67(1) and (2), governing the transitional period and the period
after 1 May 2004) and to Article 67(4) (which provides for an express derogation
from Article 67(2), governing the period after 1 May 2004). So if the criteria for
the application of Article 67(5) are met, it applied from 1 February 2003 (or, for
asylum law, a later date in advance of the end of the transitional period, when
the criteria for its application are met).
However, at first sight, Article 67(5) cannot apply after 1 May 2004, with
the result that if the criteria for its application were not met before 1 May 2004
(a question discussed below), the ordinary rules governing the post-transition
period in Article 67(2) would now apply in full and any changes to decision-
making on asylum matters would remain subject to a unanimous decision of
the Council, which would not need to show that the “common rules and basic
principles” have been adopted before taking this decision. This strictly literal
interpretation should be rejected, for it would ignore the context of the inser-
tion of Article 67(5) into the Treaty. First of all, the new paragraph was obvi-
ously meant to have effect beyond 1 May 2004; it cannot seriously be argued
that civil law decision making reverted to unanimity with consultation on that
date. It would be consistent to accept that the paragraph can first be “triggered”
after 1 May 2004. Secondly, the Treaty required the relevant asylum measures
to be adopted by 1 May 2004; a different wording of Article 67(5) would have
been inconsistent with that obligation. Finally, the underlying purpose of Arti-
cle 67(5) was to facilitate the transition to QMV and co-decision. Considering
that the original decision-making provisions of Title IV were expressly intended
to be transitional in any event, an interpretation that frustrated the intent of
Article 67(5) merely because the relevant asylum measures were adopted after
2003) and the proposal for a European payment order (COM (2004) 173, 19 Mar.
2004). After 1 May 2004, see the proposed Directive on mediation (COM (2004)
718, 22 Oct. 2004), the proposed Regulation establishing a European small claims
procedure (COM (2005) 82, 15 Mar. 2005), the proposed Decision establishing a
European ‘Civil Justice’ programme (COM (2005) 122, 6 April 2005), the proposed
Regulation amending the Regulation on service of documents (COM (2005) 305, 7
July 2005) and the proposed ‘Rome I’ Regulation (COM (2005) 650, 15 Dec. 2005).
30 The European enforcement order was in fact adopted prior to 1 May 2004 and pur-
suant to the co-decision procedure: see recital 26 of the preamble to Reg. 805/2004
of the EP and Council creating the enforcement order (OJ 2004 L 143/15).
57
Steve Peers
1 May 2004 would clearly be inconsistent with the context and purpose of that
provision.
On the second issue, it appears that there is no need for a Council decision
to put the new decision-making rules into effect. This follows from the wording
of the provision, which does not refer to the Council decision to be taken pursu-
ant to Article 67(2) EC or to any need for a Council decision before Article 67(5)
applies. Also, in practice no Council decision was taken to put Article 67(5) into
effect as regards civil law measures.
As for the third issue, it is not expressly clear from the English text of para-
graph 5 whether it applies to individual asylum issues or whether the criteria
must be met in respect of all the relevant aspects of asylum policy before the
change in decision-making procedure takes effect. Since the special decision-
making rules applying to Title IV are in principle only transitional, any restric-
tions upon the movement to the co-decision procedure and qualified majority
voting should logically be interpreted restrictively in case of ambiguity. It fol-
lows that that Article 67(5) applies to individual aspects of asylum policy. With
the adoption of the asylum procedures Directive in December 2005, the point
is now moot since the EC has adopted measures in all areas of asylum policy,
assuming that those measures in fact satisfy the criteria set out in Article 67(5)
of being “common rules” on asylum.
This brings us to the final point: when are the criteria for the application of
Article 67(5) met? On one interpretation, they cannot ever be met within the cur-
rent Treaty framework except as regards criteria and mechanisms for deciding
asylum responsibility, for in all other cases the Community is presently limited to
adopting only “minimum standards”, which would usually preclude the adop-
tion of “common rules”. But it must be assumed that the Treaty is not internally
contradictory. The two concepts must therefore be read together, with the result
that the co-decision procedure applies whenever the Community has adopted
minimum standards that establish binding rules applicable to the Member States
(therefore constituting “common rules”) in a particular area.
What does Article 67(5) mean in practice? On any view of the final issue, it
means that, if the conclusions on the first three points are correct, future mea-
sures concerning Eurodac must be adopted using the co-decision procedure and
QMV (with Commission monopoly over proposals) from the entry into force
of the Treaty of Nice. So, on the same reasoning, must any measures on the
criteria for asylum responsibility, from the date of the formal adoption of the
“Dublin II” Regulation. On the broader view of the final issue, the procedure
for adopting measures on an EC temporary protection regime and on reception
conditions for asylum-seekers changed from the entry into force of the Treaty
of Nice, as Directives on both subjects were adopted before 1 February 2003.
But the rules on adoption of measures on the definition of refugee and sub-
sidiary protection did not change until April 2004, when the relevant Directive
was adopted, and the rules on adoption of asylum procedures measures did not
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59
Steve Peers
limit among the various clauses limiting EC power over matters such as educa-
tion and health or in the limitation clauses in the final Part of the Treaty. Given
the inevitable effect of access to employment by third-country nationals on the
EC’s internal market and social policies, as recognised by the Court as far back
as 1987,35 it would obviously take express wording to preclude EC powers to
regulate this issue.
The next question is the distinction between the two parts of Article 63(3),
dealing with legal and irregular migration, which became subject to different
decision-making rules from January 2005.36 Already the Council has adopted
five measures with “Article 63(3)” as a legal base (on mutual recognition of
expulsion measures, a uniform residence permit, long term residents, financing
expulsion and victims of human trafficking or facilitation of illegal entry or
stay). Are these really measures on both legal and irregular migration, or should
the Council have chosen one legal base found within Article 63(3) or the other?
The answer obviously has implications for the “legal base” of measures adopted
after 1 January 2005.
As a starting point, basic principles about the distinction between the two
heads of power should be established. It could be argued that any rule concern-
ing the termination of legal residence concerns both “illegal residence” and the
“conditions” of legal stay, and so both powers apply. However, the better view
is that such rules are essentially conditions about whether stay is legal or not,
and so, along with associated “procedures”, go to the heart of the Community’s
power to regulate legal migration. As such they fall within the scope of Article
63(3)(a) only (or Article 63(4), where third-country nationals move between
Member States), although some of the Commission’s proposals on legal migra-
tion fail to recognise this.37 In contrast, rules which solely concern persons who
indisputably were never legally resident or are no longer legally resident are
within the scope of Article 63(3)(b). It follows that any measure setting out rules
on when legal residence could or must be terminated would have to be based at
least partly on Article 63(3)(a).38
35 Joined Cases 281, 283-285 and 287/85 Germany and others v Commission [1987]
ECR 3203.
36 In fact there is already a legal distinction between these two heads of power: Art.
63(3)(b) is subject to a five-year deadline to adopt measures, but Art. 63(3)(a) is not.
But this distinction became moot as of 1 May 2004.
37 The family reunion proposal was based on “Article 63”, while the long-term res-
idents’ proposal included “Article 63(3)” as well as Article 63(4) as a legal base.
However, the Council adopted the former Directive using the legal base of Article
63(3)(a). See further Chs. 19-22.
38 The proposed Directive on expulsion standards follows this distinction (COM
(2005) 391, 1 Sep. 2005).
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
How do these principles apply to measures which have already been adopted
or proposed? The Directive on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions is
based on the premise that a second Member State will take its own decision to
implement an expulsion decision taken by a first Member State, and explicitly
states that it could be applicable to a person who has already received a residence
permit from the second Member State. As such it touches on the termination of
legal residence and indeed had to be adopted using Article 63(3)(a) as well as
Article 63(3)(b).39
Next, the Regulation establishing the uniform residence permit should have
been based on Article 63(3)(a) alone, since such a permit is only issued to persons
who have been authorised to stay by a Member State.40 Here it is necessary to
distinguish between the purpose and the content of the measure; although both
are relevant in determining the correct “legal base” of a proposal, it appears
from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice that the content is crucial. In this
case, although the measure has the objective of preventing irregular residence,
the content of the Regulation only concerns persons with authorised status.
Article 63(3)(b) would only apply to rules on documents issued to persons with
no legal residence status, perhaps as part of a Community measure on the status
of persons in “limbo” (who are subject to expulsion decisions, but who cannot
be expelled for legal or practical reasons).41
Similarly, the Directive on the residence status of victims of trafficking
and smuggling has the obvious objective of preventing and combatting irregu-
lar entry and residence.42 But the means it uses to achieve this objective solely
involve measures related to legal migration: the issue of residence permits to
certain persons. The Commission argued in its explanatory memorandum that
since the proposal involves a change in migration status from an unauthorised to
an authorised status, it must entail use of the Community’s powers over irregu-
lar migration. However, applying the general principles about the distinction
between the two legal powers set out above, a rule about the acquisition of legal
status falls solely within the scope of Article 63(3)(a), just like a rule about the
loss of such status. Only if the measure also contained measures about the treat-
ment of persons denied legal residence status (which it does not) could it also
use Article 63(3)(b) as a legal base. The same reasoning would apply equally to
any Community act concerning regularisation of irregular migrants. Likewise,
the Council was correct to adopt the family reunion Directive on the basis of
Article 63(3)(a) alone, as this Directive only regulates the acquisition and loss of
39 Directive 2001/40 (OJ 2001 L 149/34). The same reasoning applies to the Decision
on financing such expulsions (OJ 2004 L 60/55).
40 See Art. 1(2) of Reg. 1030/2002 (OJ 2002 L 157/1).
41 The proposed Directive on expulsion standards (n. 38 above) does not contain any
such rules.
42 Directive 2004/81 (OJ 2004 L 261/19).
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Steve Peers
legal status; following the same reasoning, the Council should have adopted the
Directive on long-term residence using only Article 63(3)(a) and 63(4).
The next issue is the scope of Article 63(3)(b) as regards irregular employ-
ment, as distinct from irregular entry and residence. At first sight, the Commu-
nity clearly has no powers over irregular employment as such, either in Title IV
or as part of the EC’s social policy powers provided by Article 137 EC. However,
the Commission has argued that the Community does have such powers because
irregular employment violates the conditions of legal stay and so automatically
leads to an irregular residence situation. But the Commission does not try to
prove that this is the situation in each Member State; it is possible that in some
Member States irregular employment will not necessarily result in termination of
legal residence. For instance, it would surely violate the Geneva Convention on
the status of refugees and additionally or alternatively the ECHR if a Member
State were to expel a recognised refugee or a person with a subsidiary protection
need purely for taking up unauthorised employment. Applying the principles set
out above as regards the scope of Article 63(3), it follows that where the EC uses
Article 63(3)(a) to set out conditions for legal residence, it can also set out the
circumstances in which unauthorised employment will terminate that status.43
The EC can also, using its powers in Article 63(3)(b), regulate the position of
persons who have definitively lost their legal status because of irregular employ-
ment or who engaged in irregular employment despite never having such legal
status. But the Community lacks the power to adopt measures concerning irreg-
ular employment in and of itself; it can only act on the issue where it is ancillary
to one of the powers which clearly has been conferred upon the Community.
To what extent does Article 63(3)(b) cover criminal law aspects of irregular
migration and residence? The underlying issue here is the distnction between
Title IV of the EC and Title VI of the EU Treaty, the remaining “third pillar”. If
both these Treaties are read together, the EC Treaty gives powers to define irreg-
ular entry and residence but the EU Treaty concerns powers to adopt criminal
law measures concerning this issue.44 This would mean that the EU acts concern-
43 For example, the Directive on the entry of students and other persons expressly
regulates this issue (see Ch. 22). However the Directives or proposals on family
reunion, migration for employment or self-employment, and various protection
issues do not expressly regulate the issue, and nor does Directive 2001/55 on tem-
porary protection (see further Chs. 19-21 and 12-15). Nor does Directive 2001/40
on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, Directive 2002/90 on facilitation of
illegal entry or residence or Article 96 of the Schengen Convention refer to breach
of national law on the employment of third-country nationals (see Chs. 25 and 28).
44 For this argument in full, see Peers, “Caveat Emptor? Integrating the Schengen
Acquis into the European Union Legal Order”, in Ward and Dashwood, eds., Cam-
bridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Volume 2 (Hart, 2000) 87 at 111-116.
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
ing facilitation of irregular entry were rightly split into two different measures (a
Directive and a Framework Decision).45
However, the approach of the Court of Justice in a judgment of September
2005, in which it annulled a Framework Decision on environmental crime, is
that since the third pillar cannot affect EC law,46 in the event of any dispute as
to whether an act should be adopted on a first pillar or third pillar legal base,
the extent of the first-pillar power should be examined first to see if the aim and
content of the measure in question fall within the scope of that power.47 Follow-
ing this approach, if it is equally applicable outside the field of environmental
law, it is arguable that a Directive should have been used to harmonise criminal
law as regards irregular migration, perhaps including not only smuggling but
also trafficking in persons, at least as regards the basic obligation to criminalise
the activity and to impose penalties of some form on legal persons.48 It seems
clear that the EC’s powers over “illegal immigration and illegal residence” could
just as easily encompass criminal law measures as the EC’s environmental law
powers do; in fact the former powers seem rather more apt to cover criminal law
issues, given their express application to “illegal” acts without any qualification.
However, the Court’s judgment did not address the question of whether a first
pillar or third pillar legal base should apply to detailed harmonisation of pen-
alty levels, as found in the Framework Decisions on smuggling and trafficking
in persons,49 because the Framework Decision on environmental crime which it
annulled did not harmonise penalty levels. Also, the judgment did not address
whether a third pillar or first pillar legal base should apply to the issue of crimi-
nal jurisdiction, because the Commission did not challenge the Framework Deci-
sion on environmental crime on this point. But the Court of Justice nevertheless
annulled the Framework Decision on environmental crime, since the provisions
on extradition and jurisdiction were indivisible from the rest of the measure. It
follows from this analysis that the Framework Decision on irregular migration
is invalid in its entirety, and that a national court must refer the question of its
validity to the Court of Justice to confirm this if the issue is raised before it.50
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Steve Peers
It follows; that the “victims” Directive was rightly based solely on the EC
Treaty since, despite its objective of facilitating the conduct of criminal trials,
its content only concerns migration status; and the EU Decision on counterfeit
documents should have been split so that a first pillar act accompanied the third
pillar act.51
Finally, does Article 63(4) cover the issue of social security for some or all
third-country nationals moving to another Member State? This question con-
cerns the choice between Title IV and other parts of the Treaty, and so is consid-
ered further elsewhere.52
Art. 35 EU) should be able to send such a question to the Court. But it is arguable
that since the argument concerns the correct scope of Title IV of the EC Treaty, that
the Title IV rules in Art. 68 EC should apply instead. The latter interpretation would
entail greater scope to refer the point from the national courts of eleven Member
States (the UK, Ireland and all “new” Member States except the Czech Republic),
but a more limited possibility to refer from the national courts of another twelve
Member States (all the other “old” Member States except Spain and Denmark).
Alternatively, a “most favourable jurisdiction” rule should apply to resolve the con-
flict. See Peers, “Who’s Judging the Watchmen: The Judicial System of the Area of
Freedom, Security, and Justice” 18 YEL (1998) 337 at 397-399.
51 For the Commission’s view on the facilitation measures, see n. 48 above.
52 On the general issue of the distinction between Title IV and the rest of the Treaty,
see Ch. 4; on the specific issue of powers over social security for third-country
nationals, see Ch. 23.
53 For elaboration of this argument, see Peers (n. 23 above), ch. 3.
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
powers pursuant to Article 66 EC, but less intergovernmental than those provi-
sions still subject to unanimous voting or the third pillar.
As argued elsewhere,54 Title IV is the correct legal basis for Article 96 of
the Schengen Convention and any rules concerning the operation and function-
ing of the SIS in relation to Article 96 data. The Council has now apparently
recognised this, despite its failure to allocate the SIS provisions of the Schengen
acquis initially, in adopting two separate first and third pillar measures regarding
amendments to the SIRENE Manual, the funding of future SIS development
and amendments to the rules governing the operation of the SIS.55 This is the
correct approach to the division between the pillars, but what about the division
within the first pillar? Here the Spanish originally proposed joint use of Articles
62, 63 and 66 EC for their SIS proposal of 2002, but this was narrowed to use
of Article 66 EC, apparently following the advice of the Council legal service.56
Is this correct? The same issue arises with respect to the proposed Regulation
establishing SIS II, where the Commission has proposed Articles 62(2)(a) and
66 as legal bases.57 The best interpretation of the distinction between Article
66 on the one hand and Articles 62 and 63 on the other is that any measures
which concern or which are directly connected to the substantive rules concern-
ing checks on individuals at the border, consideration of visa applications, the
conditions for freedom to travel, the entry and residence of legal migrants, or
the detection, registration or expulsion of irregular migrants, including the col-
lection of or processing of personal data to those ends, clearly fall within the
scope of Articles 62 or 63, as such measures fall within the scope of their core
subject-matter.58 Therefore, Article 66 must govern cooperation between admin-
istrations where the subject-matter does not relate to regulating the movement
of persons in concrete situations, governing instead issues such as exchanges of
personnel. So, for example, any measure amending Article 96 of the Schengen
Convention to alter the criteria for including data, or to expand the situations in
which data is used, would also have to be based on Articles 62(2)(a), 62(2)(b)(ii),
62(3), and 63(3)(a) in the former case (because of the impact upon authorisa-
tion to cross the border, conditions for issue of a visa freedom to travel, and the
54 See ibid.
55 See respectively Reg. 378/2004 and Decision on amending Sirene manual (OJ 2004
L 64/5 and 45); Council Reg. 2424/2001 (OJ 2001 L 328/4) and Decision 2001/886/
JHA (OJ 2001 L 328/1); Reg. 871/2004 (OJ 2004 L 162/29) and Decision 2005/211/
JHA (OJ 2005 L 68/44). See also EP and Council Reg. 1160/2005 on the use of the
SIS by vehicle registration authorities (OJ 2005 L 191/18), adopted using the EC’s
transport law powers.
56 See Reg. 871/2004, ibid. The legal service opinion (Council doc. 13713/02, 5 Nov.
2002) is unknown.
57 COM (2005) 236, 31 May 2005.
58 This argument is based on Peers (n. 23 above), Ch. 3, s. 2.3.
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Steve Peers
issue and renewal of residence permits) or the legal base(s) most relevant to the
additional use of the data in the latter case. Similarly, the legislation governing
the Visa Information System will need the legal base of Article 62(2)(b)(ii); the
legality of the June 2004 Decision establishing the VIS, with the legal base of
Article 66,59 is therefore highly questionable.60 On the other hand, the Council
adopted the Spanish initiative concerning the SIS before 1 May 2004, at a time
when Article 66 was in any event subject to the same decision-making process
as the relevant provisions of Articles 62 and 63. The idea that the application of
Article 96 of the Schengen Convention could be extended without adequate par-
liamentary control at either the European or the national level (because of the
use of QMV in the Council, preventing national parliaments from controlling
their governments) is deeply disturbing, but fortunately there is a sound legal
argument against the use of Article 66 EC alone for such a development, which
the Commission at least has rightly accepted.
3.6 Conclusions
It can be seen that the arguments over the distinction between the Community’s
many separate immigration and asylum powers, and the extent of those powers,
are manifold. As long as the decision-making rules are relatively uniform, the
first set of arguments did not matter; but as we have seen, that has recently
changed. The second set of arguments, when coupled with unanimous voting,
led to inhibited use of Community powers; the dispute over the correctness
of the critics’ view has become more relevant now that decision-making has
recently moved largely to qualified majority voting, as the critics might be out-
voted and the Court may then be asked to annul the EC’s measures. Certainly
one might wish for a standard approach to decision-making coupled with unam-
biguous provisions on the extent of each of the Community’s powers, so that
the Community can focus on the substance of the measures. In the absence of
this, Member States’ political arguments will take legal form and with the sharp
reduction in unanimous voting, these disputes could move from the political
arena to the EU courts.
59 OJ 2004 L 213/5.
60 The Commission has proposed the legal bases of Arts. 62(2)(b)(ii) and 66 EC for the
Reg. establishing the VIS in detail (COM (2004) 835, 28 Dec. 2004), entailing the
co-decision procedure. This is correct, in light of the analysis above.
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
61 The sole exception was the Austrian initiative for a Reg. on “safe third countries” (OJ
2003 C 17/6), which lapsed on 1 May 2004 at the end of the transitional period.
62 See Chs. 27 and 28.
63 See the explanatory memorandum (COM (2000) 854, 21 Dec. 2000).
64 See COM (2001) 388, 10 July 2001.
65 See Ch. 8.
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Steve Peers
on “safe third countries” competed with the Commission’s more general pro-
posed Directive on asylum procedures.66
A connected issue of great practical importance to the European Parlia-
ment is the extent to which proposals are amended following the issue of the
EP’s opinion. The Commission’s practice of amending its proposals in light of
the EP’s opinions considerably enhances the EP’s position under the consulta-
tion procedure, because of the additional status such amendments then have
as a consequence of forming part of the Commission’s official proposal. In
fact, the EP/Commission framework agreement specifies that in principle the
Commission should take the “utmost account” of the EP’s opinions during the
legislative procedure.67 But a close examination of all binding EC immigration
and asylum measures adopted by the Council following a Commission proposal
after May 1999 shows that the Commission amended fewer than one-fifth of its
immigration and asylum proposals following the EP’s opinion: in only five out
of twenty-eight cases.68 The five amendments concerned the Eurodac regula-
tion, the first European Refugee Fund, the visa list,69 family reunion and asylum
procedures (although the latter amendment was also due to a request from the
European Council). The twenty-three failures to amend proposals concerned
“Dublin II”, the definition of refugee, reception conditions, the second Refugee
Fund, temporary protection, long-term residents, migration for employment or
self-employment, admission of students et al, admission of researchers, freedom
to travel, social security, the three proposals from 2001 on the formats of visas
and residence permits, the proposals on Kaliningrad and Olympic visas (from
2003), the “ARGO” programme (twice), the proposals on the border agency,
stamping of documents and EU passports, and the “Iconet” proposal on a net-
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
70 This list leaves aside the proposals for Decisions on funding expulsion decisions and
on the VIS, both of which the EP voted to reject. For technical details of the legisla-
tive history of each measure, see Annex 1.
71 The proposals on the second Refugee Fund, ARGO (in 2004), the admission of
students and researchers, the border agency, stamping of documents, EU passports,
and “Iconet” were all adopted by the Council after the expiry of the transitional
period.
72 See the amended proposals on jurisdiction over and enforcement of matrimonial
and custody judgments (COM (2000) 151, 17 Mar. 2000; OJ 2000 C 274 E/13), ser-
vice of documents (COM (2000) 75, 29 Mar. 2000; OJ 2000 C 311 E/112), jurisdic-
tion over and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments (COM (2000) 689, 26
Oct. 2000; OJ 2001 C 62 E/243), the European Judicial Network (COM (2001) 234,
27 Apr. 2001; OJ 2001 C 240 E/101), the general framework for EC civil law activity
(COM (2001) 705, 22 Nov. 2001; OJ 2002 C 51 E/390) and the European enforce-
ment order (n. 29 above). The exceptions are the legislation on legal aid (proposal in
COM (2002) 13, 21 Jan. 2002), on a one-year extension of the Grotius programme
(proposal in COM (2000) 516, 6 Sep. 2000) and on a further parental responsibil-
ity Regulation (proposal in COM (2002) 222, 3 May 2002). Again, this leaves aside
measures not yet adopted by the Council.
73 It voted to reject Directives 2001/40, 2001/51 and 2002/90, Regs. 789/2001 and
790/2001 and the proposed Regulations on readmission between Member States and
extension of freedom to travel, and “safe third countries” and the proposed Direc-
tive on transit for expulsion. However, it supported Regs. 1091/2001, 2424/2001,
415/2003, 377/2004, 378/2004 and 871/2004. It also declined to vote on Directive
2004/82 on passenger data information transfer and the Decision on joint expulsion
flights, due to its opposition to these measures. See Annex 1 for more details. This
leaves aside implementing measures proposed by Member States, as the EP has no
role in such cases.
74 See Annex I, point 7(iii) of the 2000 EP/Commission framework agreement; point
33(iii) of the 2005 revised agreement (n. 69 above).
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Steve Peers
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
and December 2004.81 But this was corrected when adopting a measure based on
Article 66 EC in March 2005.82
As for the co-decision procedure, since its application to EC immigration
and asylum law until 1 January 2006, the EP and Council fully concluded the
process for two measures, in both cases reaching agreement on the text at its
first reading.83 Ten other co-decision proceedings were underway.84 In one case,
a proposal to amend the Regulation on the EU borders agency, the consultation
procedure has been wrongly applied instead of the co-decision procedure.85
81 The Decision amending the ARGO decision: see summary of Council acts for Dec.
2004 (Council doc. 16383/1/04, 23 Feb. 2005, p. 4).
82 See the summary of Council acts for March 2005 (Council doc. 8559/05, 29 April
2005, p. 3), regarding the adoption of the “Iconet” decision by QMV.
83 These concern a recommendation on the issue of visas to researchers and a Regula-
tion on Olympic visas; see Annex I for technical details.
84 These concerned three funding measures, a Directive on expulsion standards, the
VIS, SIS II, and proposals on a border code, transit visas (two proposals) and
border traffic rules. The EP and Council reached an agreement in June 2005 on the
border code, and had apparently reached agreement in Dec. 2005 on the border traf-
fic Regulation. None of the other measures had yet been the subject of agreement
in the Council, or reached a first-reading vote in the EP plenary. See Annex I for
technical details.
85 COM (2005) 190, 13 May 2005.
86 Decision 87/393 (OJ 1987 L 197/33); Decision 1999/468 (OJ 1999 L 184/33).
87 From a large literature, see Andenas and Turk, eds., Delegated Legislation and the
Role of Committees in the EU (Kluwer, 2000); Joerges and Vos, eds., EU Commit-
tees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart, 1999); and Lenaerts and Verhoeven,
“Towards a Legal Framework for Executive Rule-Making in the EU? The Contribu-
tion of the new Comitology Decision” 37 CMLRev. (2000) 645.
88 See particularly Case 25/70 Koster [1970] ECR 1161; Case C-93/00 EP v Council
[2001] ECR I-10119.
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Steve Peers
The practice of the Council regarding immigration and asylum law was
initially to confer implementing power on itself in three key cases, as regards
amendments to most of two key manuals (the Common Consular Instructions
on Visas and the Common Manual on external borders, along with several con-
nected visa manuals) and to the Eurodac Regulation.89 Otherwise, the Council
has widened the power the Commission already enjoyed to adopt rules imple-
menting the EU visa format; given the Commission equivalent powers over
another visa format and Kaliningrad document formats, the issue of visas at the
border, EU passports, and standard forms for expulsion proceedings; conferred
powers on the Commission to implement the “ARGO” programme; transferred
powers from the Council to the Commmission to adopt implementing rules
concerning the common EU residence permit; and conferred powers on the
Commission to amend most of the “Sirene” manual and to manage a migra-
tion management network.90 It has also conferred power on the Commission
as regards the project management of SIS II and the Visa Information System,
tasked the Commission (without any “comitology” control) to draw up standard
forms for reports by Member States’ liaison officers (and to summarise these
reports regularly), and transferred the power to implement asylum responsibil-
ity rules from the old “Article 18 Committee” set up by the Dublin Convention
to the Commission.91 However, the choice of the type of committee to supervise
the Commission’s implementation of the SIS rules proved controversial.92 Of
these cases, the Commission sued the Council as regards the powers over the
CCI and the Common Manual and threatened to sue it in regard to the SIS II
89 See respectively Chs. 8 and 11. Certain powers to implement the Eurodac Regula-
tion have been conferred on the Commission, but they have not been used in prac-
tice.
90 On the first two measures, see Ch. 8. On the others, see respectively Art. 4 of
Reg. 694/2003 concerning Kaliningrad documents (OJ 2003 L 99/15); Art. 3 of
Reg. 415/2003 on the issue of visas at the border (OJ 2003 L 64/1); Art. 5 of Reg.
2252/2004 on EU passports (OJ 2004 L 385/1); Art. 9 of Directive 2003/110 on
expulsion for transit (OJ 2003 L 321/26); Decision 2002/463 (OJ 2002 L 161/11);
Reg. 1030/2002 (n. 40 above); Reg. 378/2004 (OJ 2004 L 64/5); and Art. 6 of the
Iconet decision (OJ 2005 L 83/48). The Council has also conferred implementing
powers over civil law measures to the Commission in all but one case: for details, see
Peers (n. 23 above), Ch. 2.
91 See Reg. 2424/2001 (n. 55 above); Art. 5 of the VIS Decision (n. 59 above); Art. 6(2)
and (3) of Reg. 377/2004 on ILOs (OJ 2004 L 64/1); and Art. 27 of Reg. 343/3003
(OJ 2003 L 50/1). On the latter, see further Ch. 10.
92 On the issue of the choice of committee under the 1999 “comitology” rules, see the
judgment in Case C-378/00 Commission v EP and Council [2003] ECR I-937 and the
opinion of 15 Sep. 2005 in Case C-122/04 Commission v EP and Council, pending.
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and Eurodac Regulations, but ultimately backed off.93 But the Court of Justice
upheld the Council’s decision to confer implementing power upon itself regard-
ing visas and border control rules, inter alia because in 2001 the issues had until
recently been dealt with pursuant to the “third pillar”, the transitional period
was still in force and the Council had committed itself to review the delegation
to itself by 2004.94 Subsequently the Council has agreed in principle to confer
implementing powers regarding borders on the Commission,95 although it has
not yet carried out a review regarding visas.
93 On the Eurodac dispute, see further Ch. 11. On the SIS dispute, see Statement 159/01
in the Monthly Summary of Council acts for Dec. 2001 (n. 78 above). See also
Statement 158/01 on the limits to the Commission’s implementing powers (idem.).
94 Judgment of 18 Jan. 2005 in Case C-257/01 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-
345; see Ch. 9 for a criticism of this judgment.
95 See the agreement on the proposed Borders Code Regulation, referred to in in Ch.
7.
96 Case C-241/05 Bot, pending, concerning the Schengen freedom to travel rules. By
the same date, the Court had received ten references on Title IV civil law matters,
of which two had been found inadmissible as they had been referred from lower
courts, and one had been withdrawn. One of the remaining seven cases had reached
the stage of a judgment of the Court of Justice, and a further four had reached the
stage of an Advocate-General’s Opinion. For further details, see Peers, n. 23 above,
Ch. 2.
97 Order in Case C-51/03 Georgescu, concerning the 2001 visa list Regulation, which
was inadmissible as it was not referred by a final court ([2004] ECR I-3203), and
Case C-45/03 Dem’Yanenko (order of the Court of Justice, 18 March 2004, unre-
ported), both inadmissible because they had not been referred by a final court.
98 Member States had to comply with the first Title IV Directives in December 2002
(Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of explusion decisions and 2001/55 on
temporary protection), while Directive 2001/51 on carrier sanctions had to be
applied by February 2003 and Directive 2002/90 on facilitation of illegal entry and
residence had to be applied by December 2004. Directive 2003/86 on family reunion
was subject to a deadline of 3 October 2005 and Directive 2003/110 on expulsion
transit had to be applied by December 2005. See further respectively Chs. 25, 15, 26,
28, 19 and 30. However, various visa and borders Regulations and implementing
measures have entered into force since 2001.
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Steve Peers
system has been established.99 But the limited number of cases is more surprising
as regards the Schengen acquis, where a considerable body of law already exists,
the Court had jurisdiction to receive references as from May 1999 and there were
already references concerning the criminal law aspects of the Schengen acquis.100
However, the Court had received a reference from a Belgian court incidentally
concerning the 1995 version of the visa list Regulation.101
For that matter, the Court had not received any “requests for interpretation”
pursuant to Article 68 EC. However, one annulment action had been decided,102
and three further annulment actions were pending.103 As noted above, the Com-
mission did not bring a challenge to the Eurodac Regulation or the 2001 SIS
II Regulation; it also backed off a challenge to the Council Decision on charg-
ing fees for visa applications, which the Commission argued had breached of
the basic rules in the Schengen Convention.104 The challenge against the family
reunion Directive indicates that the prospect of annulment actions has increased
following amendment of Article 230 EC by the Treaty of Nice to permit the EP
to bring challenges on any ground, not just in defence of its legislative preroga-
tives. Moreover, now that more aspects of Title IV decision-making have shifted
to QMV and co-decision, it is more likely that some outvoted Member States
will bring an annulment action against a Community act they disagree with.
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
Similarly, the Commission’s use of its implementing powers may attract chal-
lenges from Member States or the EP over time.
As for infringement actions, in late 2004 the Commission brought thirteen
cases to the Court concerning various Member States’ failure to implement the
first three Title IV Directives.105 By 1 January 2006, this had resulted in five judg-
ments,106 six withdrawn cases (presumably because the relevant Member States
had finally implemented the Directives),107 and two cases still pending.108 Two
infringement proceedings on EC free movement law have incidentally concerned
Title IV issues.109
It is surely clear that from practice to date that the Court will not receive sig-
nificant numbers of references from national courts on immigration and asylum
law until all national courts and tribunals can send references to it. Any thought
that the jurisdiction over “requests for interpretation” would make up for the
lack of preliminary rulings has obviously also been disappointed to date. As a
result, there is no prospect that the Court can play a significant role in ensur-
ing the uniform interpretation of EC law until its jurisdiction is reformed. It is
therefore regrettable that the opportunity to reform the Court’s Title IV juris-
diction was wasted during the Nice negotiations, given the other considerable
reforms to the Court’s functioning agreed in that Treaty.110 These reforms further
weaken the already weak argument that any increase in the Court’s jurisdiction
105 The cases concerned Directives 2001/40 on mutual recognition of explusion deci-
sions, 2001/55 on temporary protection and 2001/51 on carrier sanctions. On the
deadlines to implement Directives in this field of EC law, see further n. 98 above.
106 Cases C-448/04 Commission v Luxembourg (Directive 2001/40), judgment of 8
Sept. 2005, unreported; C-449/04 Commission v Luxembourg (Directive 2001/51),
judgment of 21 July 2005, unreported; C-454/04 Commission v Luxembourg (Direc-
tive 2001/55), judgment of 2 June 2005, unreported; C-462/04 Commission v Italy
(Directive 2001/40), judgment of 8 Sept. 2005, unreported; and C-476/04 Commis-
sion v Greece (Directive 2001/55), judgment of 17 Nov. 2005, unreported.
107 Cases: C-450/04 Commission v France (Directive 2001/40); C-460/04 Commission
v Netherlands (Directive 2001/51); C-461/04 Commission v Netherlands (Directive
2001/55); C-474/04 Commission v Greece (Directive 2001/40); C-515/04 Commis-
sion v Belgium (Directive 2001/55); and C-516/04 Commission v Belgium (Directive
2001/51).
108 Cases C-451/04 Commission v France and C-455/04 Commission v UK (both con-
cerning Directive 2001/55).
109 See Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911 and Opinion of 10
March 2005 in Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain, pending, judgment due 31 Jan.
2006.
110 For a detailed analysis, see Dashwood and Johnston, eds., The Future of the Judicial
System of the European Union (Hart, 2001); Kapteyn, “Reflections on the Future of
the Judicial System of the European Union after Nice” 20 YEL (2001) 173.
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Steve Peers
over Title IV matters would “deluge” the Court.111 Moreover, the Court’s dire
predictions from 1999 about the unmanageable flood of cases expected under
its current jurisdiction have proven to be wholly inaccurate, as the Court’s case
load has stabilised since 1999, most of the predicted “growth areas” for litigation
have yielded few or no cases since that date, and the volume of trademark cases
lodged before the Court of First Instance has been far less than estimated.112
On the “supply side”, the EU courts’ functioning has been improved pursu-
ant to the Treaty of Nice amendments, which have been implemented in part to
create a new staff tribunal and to redistribute cases between the Court of Justice
and Court of First Instance. Furthermore, several changes have been made to
the Courts’ Rules of Procedure and their practical operation to improve their
efficiency. Finally, both Courts benefited from a 67% increase in judicial man-
power from spring 2004, following enlargement of the EU; it will be a long time,
if ever, before enlargement by itself results in a 67% increase in either Court’s
workload.113
So the Court’s fears of general “judicial overload” proved unfounded, and
the Treaty of Nice provides powers for further reforms if they are necessary
(the creation of further third-level judicial panels, the appointment of additional
judges for the Court of First Instance, the transfer of more direct actions or
some preliminary rulings to the Court of First Instance). Given the Council’s
obligation to change the rules concerning the Court’s jurisdiction after the end of
the transitional period and the indefensible limits on its jurisdiction at present, it
is highly objectionable that the Council could not find the political will in 2004
to extend the usual EC Treaty judicial rules to the Court.114
Once the Council decides (or is forced by litigation) to implement its obliga-
tion to alter the Court’s jurisdiction, the question will arise whether amendments
to the judicial system will be needed, to deal with any significant increase in the
Court’s workload that may result and/or to ensure that judgments in asylum
and immigration cases are delivered more quickly than the norm. It would be
desirable, at first, to try ad hoc system of special procedures for these cases in
the Court of Justice, coupled with general reforms to the judicial architecture to
111 See Guild and Peers, “Deference or Defiance? The Court of Justice’s Jurisdiction
over Immigration and Asylum” in Guild and Harlow, eds., Implementing Amster-
dam (Hart, 2000), 267.
112 For detailed analysis of developments in the Court’s workload and “supply side”
improvements in the Court’s functioning, see Peers, “The EU judicial system and
EC immigration and asylum law”, forthcoming.
113 It should be recalled that although the number of Member States (and therefore
judges on each Court) increased by 67%, the population of the enlarged Union
increased by far less.
114 For a detailed analysis of the current rules governing the Court’s jurisdiciton in this
area, see Peers, “The EU judicial system” (n. 112 above).
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
reduce the Court of Justice’s overall workload. The next-best option would be
to transfer some of these cases to the Court of First Instance, on condition of
appointment of additional specialist judges in that Court. If necessary, a more
radical reform of the EU judicial system should start with general changes to the
system, by curtailing or abolishing Advocate-Generals and infringement proce-
dures in their present form. Finally, if absolutely necessary, a final radical reform
could permit the creation of a specialist court at EU level that could answer
questions for a preliminary ruling, particularly in asylum and immigration cases,
on condition that the Court of Justice could review its decisions.115
4.4 Instruments
To date, there has been a clear distinction between the use of Regulations and
the use of Directives by the EC institutions as regards immigration and asylum
measures. In keeping with the EC’s usual approach to areas fully harmonised by
a “common policy”, such as transport, agriculture and the common commer-
cial policy, the proposed and adopted measures concerning visas and borders
have all been in the form of Regulations, with one exception. This was the pro-
posed Directive on freedom to travel, but in fact this proposal has in any event
been withdrawn.116 In comparison, asylum and migration measures have almost
entirely been adopted or proposed in the form of Directives, except where the
acts in question are to be applied uniformly (conflict rules for asylum-seekers
or readmission, the uniform residence permit, social security coordination) or
are administered by the Community institutions (the Refugee Fund).117 In these
cases, Regulations or Decisions are used because Directives would be inappro-
priate, for (respectively) the planned uniformity would be affected by divergent
national implementation and the application of the measure is principally the
responsibility of the Community, not the Member States’ administrations. Deci-
sions are also used to conclude treaties with third states. The approach followed
within the scope of Title IV is consistent with the approach in other areas of
Community law.118 As a result, the mix of Regulations and Directives largely
constrains the Member States in the field of visas and border controls, where
Regulations apply; but Member States will have more flexibility as regards most
aspects of immigration and asylum law.
115 For the background to these conclusions, including an assessment of the options for
the future EC judicial system in this area, see Peers, “The future of the EU judicial
system and EC immigration and asylum law” (forthcoming, EJML).
116 See Annex I.
117 Both factors apply to Eurodac.
118 On Title IV civil law measures, see Peers (n. 23 above), Ch. 7.
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Steve Peers
5 Conclusions
During the transitional period, it seems that the Title IV drafters were largely
successful at achieving their goal of ensuring maximum control of the Commu-
nity’s immigration and asylum policy by the Member States. The unanimity rule
meant that no Member State had to change its immigration or asylum policy
(except as regards visa lists) without its consent. Moreover, this veto, to a large
extent, even applied even to implementing measures because of the Council
decision to allocate some key powers to itself and to take decisions unanimously
in such cases. Although there was a gradual shift toward awarding implement-
ing powers to the Commission, this was limited in the case of “Dublin II” by
insisting that some of the provisions from the implementing rules were inserted
into the basic act.
Normally, the Commission’s power of initiative is a less powerful weapon
where the Council votes unanimously, because the rule that Member States must
vote unanimously to change a Commission proposal (Article 250 EC) means
little when they must vote unanimously to adopt that proposal in any case. But
even in those cases the monopoly on initiative means that at least the Commis-
sion controls the agenda, since it can prevent particular proposals being made in
the first place and withdraw its own proposals if it dislikes the approach which
the Council is taking to them. However, within Title IV, Member States’ vigor-
ous use of their right of initiative as regards irregular migration, borders and
visas diminished the authority of the Commission during the transitional period
and prevented it from controlling the agenda. In particular, the four French pro-
posals on irregular migration of summer 2000, issued before any Commission
legislative proposals on asylum or legal migration (apart from the proposals on
temporary protection, the Refugee Fund and family reunion) clearly established
the Council’s emphasis on irregular migration matters from an early date.
Certainly the Member States did not lose power to the EP or Court of
Justice either during the transitional period. The consultation power of the EP
proved far weaker in the Title IV area than in other areas, given the lack of rules
governing Member States’ exercise of their initiative during the transition period
and the Commission’s unwillingness to redraft its immigration and asylum pro-
posals following EP votes. As for the Court, it has been all but removed as an
actor so far as a result of the limits on its preliminary rulings jurisdiction.
This successful preservation of de facto intergovernmentalism had a cost. It
meant delays before agreement on core legislation relating to asylum and legal
migration (with the proposal on migration for employment dropped altogether),
with most adopted or agreed measures setting standards at or near the lowest
common denominator which existed in Member States’ national law previously.
The measures which were adopted or agreed during the transitional period as
a result fall far short of the Tampere goal of a harmonised policy – never mind
the goal of a balanced policy with fair treatment of third-country nationals and
equal treatment of long-term residents. But unanimous voting can co-exist with
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Chapter 3 The EU Institutions and Title IV
119 This leaves aside the question of whether the EU’s criminal law and policing policies
have been balanced.
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of
EU Law
1 Introduction
Our understanding of the modern world has been fundamentally changed by
the discussion about globalisation and its consequences. Susan Strange’s retreat-
ing state in the modern world is one in which the exercise of authority in society
and over economic transactions is not longer the monopoly of the state but
rather legitimately exercised by agents other than states.1 Beck’s modern world is
one “through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined
by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities
and networks.”2 The development of the European Union is often analysed and
presented as an example of the fate of the post modern state, its powers ceded
on the one hand to a supra national structure which in turn, or more correctly
in tandem with developments at the national level, cedes power to non-state
private actors.
As control over many of the nation-state’s fields of sovereignty is dimin-
ished, attention has become increasingly focussed on those areas remaining or
apparently remaining within the control of the state. Torpey’s examination of
the appropriation by the nation state of a monopoly over the legitimate means
of movement of persons across international borders3 and the bureaucratic
requirements of documenting who are nationals of one state and who of another
in order to achieve this appropriation fall clearly within this debate. Interest and
1 Strange, Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cam-
bridge University Press: Cambridge (1996), pp. 12-15.
2 Beck, What is Globalisation? (Polity Press, 2000), p. 11.
3 Torpey, The Invention of The Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, (OUP,
2000), p. 6.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 81-114.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
attention are focussed on the remnants of state sovereignty, most specifically the
right to define individuals.
The tension between the project of the European Union – the ever closer
union of the peoples of Europe – and state sovereignty has, over the past 20
years found expression in particular in this space of the definition of individuals
and borders. The highly disputed relationship between individuals, citizenship
and the crossing of borders at EU level has contributed to the creation of a
whole new treaty governing cooperation between the Member States (the Treaty
on European Union was necessitated, inter alia, by the unwillingness of some
Member States to countenance the inclusion of third country nationals within
the competence of the EC Treaty)4 and a further international treaty competing
with the EC Treaty agreed by some of the Member States.5
The changing nature and place of EU borders has been characterised by
their de-linking from territory. Increasingly they apply to persons not on the
basis of their physical position but on the basis of their nationality and indi-
vidual characteristics. The law of borders is no longer homogeneous. Instead
it has become increasingly like the legal order of the French Ancien Régime,
dependent on the personal characteristics of the individual.6 Furthermore, bor-
ders are controlled by a variety of different agents – Member States on behalf of
one another, private actors on behalf of Member States individually and third
countries on behalf of Member States. As borders become increasingly complex
and difficult to identify so the more powerful of the private sector seek to be
exempted from their application at all.7
This emphasis on defining individuals (citizens or foreigners) as the mea-
sure of state sovereignty and thus the bulwark against globalisation on the one
hand and European integration on the other, has resulted in the development
of an orthodoxy regarding Community law, which holds that citizens of third
countries and stateless persons (“third-country nationals”) are excluded from
the personal scope of the EC Treaty except where specifically included.
This attempt to create an orthodoxy limiting the personal scope of the
EC Treaty, along with the EU Treaty, is based on the premise that the trea-
ties are designed solely to confer rights and impose obligations upon citizens
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
of the European Union. In this view, third-country nationals are only affected
by Community law as family members or employees of EC companies, and this
is only in the context of free movement law. Following the Treaty of Amster-
dam, the EC Treaty now allows adoption of measures concerning third country
nationals, but this is only in the limited context of Title IV of Part Three of the
EC Treaty (“Title IV”). In turn, Title IV forms an institutional “ghetto” within
the EC Treaty, subject to opt-outs from three Member States, distinct decision-
making rules for an initial transitional period (since expired) and limited judicial
control by the Court of Justice, at least initially.8
However, there are strong reasons to challenge this view. In fact, as we dem-
onstrate in this chapter, the exclusion of third-country nationals from the scope
of EC law is the exception, not the rule. If third-country nationals were consid-
ered excluded from all EC law apart from Title IV measures, the result would
not simply be a reduction in the rights and benefits that third-country nationals
can claim. Even if it were considered acceptable, even laudable, in the inter-
ests of boosting EU citizenship, to (for example) leave third-country national
children unprotected by EU rules on child pornography and prostitution or to
subject all third-country nationals to unsafe products, food and water, polluted
air and unscrupulous traders, most EU policies could not work effectively with-
out applying to third-country nationals. For the other side of excluding third-
country nationals from the scope of EU law would be to preclude them from
prosecutions pursuant to criminal law harmonised by third pillar measures, to
exempt them from criminal or administrative liability for breaching prohibitions
imposed by EC law and to exclude them from the common agricultural and
fisheries policies.
In this analysis we will examine the EC Treaty and subsidiary legislation,
with passing reference also to the TEU from the perspective of the personal
scope of its provisions. In our view, the orthodoxy cannot be sustained by any
reasonable interpretation of the Treaty. Indeed the jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice consistently counters the “ghetto” approach to third-country nation-
als. The exceptions are indeed that – exceptions to the general rule that third
country nationals are fully within the European construction.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
refers to free movement of “persons”, rather than citizens, and Article 3(1)(d)
refers to “the entry and movement of persons” as regards Title IV. In the rest
of Part One, the only reference to citizenship was in the prior version of Article
11(1)(c), but this reference was dropped with the entry into force of the Treaty
of Nice.9 The other significant provisions in Part One are Article 5, which sets
out principles limiting the existence and exercise of Community powers; Article
10, which requires Member States to take appropriate measures to implement
the Treaty; Article 12, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality
“[w]ithin the scope of application of this Treaty and without prejudice to any
special provisions contained therein”; Article 13, which provides a legal base to
adopt measures banning discrimination on six grounds besides nationality; and
Article 14(2), which defines the internal market as an area in which “the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty”. The wording of Article 14 clearly suggests that its
personal scope is dependent upon the personal scope of the relevant Treaty pro-
visions, which are considered separately in detail,10 although it should be noted
at the outset that Articles 61(a) and 62(1) EC expressly state that third-country
nationals are among the “persons” covered by Article 14. Articles 12 and 13 are
also considered in detail elsewhere.11
2.3 Citizenship
Article 17(1) creates the citizenship of the Union and Article 17(2) states that
Union citizens “shall enjoy the rights conferred by the Treaty and shall be sub-
ject to the duties imposed hereby”. Does Article 17(2) mean that only Union citi-
zens enjoy the rights set out in the EC Treaty and are subject to duties thereby?
This could be dubbed the “wholly excluded’ approach to the issue of personal
scope, and on the face of it, it is a plausible interpretation. However, on closer
examination, this interpretation contradicts the text of the EC Treaty. Article
61(b) EC expressly gives the Community power to adopt measures pursuant to
Article 63 “safeguarding the rights of nationals of third countries”, and Article
63(4) EC in particular confers powers to adopt measures concerning “rights”
of third country nationals who move between Member States. Also, unless one
distinguishes between “rights” and “freedoms”, the EC has the power to adopt
legislation concerning the “freedom to travel” for nationals of third countries,
according to Article 62(3). So Article 17(2) EC cannot logically be interpreted
to mean that EC secondary legislation can never confer rights on third country
nationals.
9 The provision had expressly prohibited the adoption of flexibility measures that
“concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between nationals of Member
States”.
10 See Sections 2.4 (goods), 2.5 (capital), 3.1 (workers) and 3.2 (services).
11 See Sections 3.4 (Art. 12) and 2.9.2 (social policy).
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
One might still be tempted to argue that Article 17(2) means at least that
the rights and duties conferred directly by the Treaty are limited to EC nationals.
But again the Treaty does not support such an interpretation: Articles 194, 195
and 255 EC each expressly refer to a “right” which can be exercised by citizens
or residents of the Union.12 Article 17(2) EC therefore cannot mean that third-
country nationals are “wholly excluded” from primary or secondary EC law.
Does Article 17(2) support instead a “presumed exclusion” or “obliged
exclusion” approach? On one reading, a case could be made in light of Article
17(2) that only the specific Treaty provisions conferring express power to act
in regard to third-country nationals allow the Community to adopt measures
concerning those persons, or that secondary legislation only applies to such per-
sons where it makes express reference to them. But a “presumed inclusion” or
“obliged inclusion” interpretation of the Treaty could also be reconciled with
Article 17(2), since that provision remains silent on the question of whether non-
nationals of the Community also enjoy rights and duties. Therefore, in our view,
only a detailed examination of other Treaty provisions and case law can deter-
mine the correct approach to personal scope.
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
dent or even visiting the Community inevitably purchase goods and a number
of such persons sell goods within the Community as well. Moreover, for cultural
and linguistic reasons, certain goods, such as particular foodstuffs, books, news-
papers, magazines, videotapes and clothes, are disproportionately purchased and
sold by third-country nationals. This is even more true of such goods when they
come from third countries and enter free circulation in the Community. There
is no indication in the text of Articles 28-30 that sales to and by third-country
nationals fall outside the scope of the Treaty, and it is hard to see how a Member
State could invoke Article 30 EC to defend restrictions on movement of goods
based on the nationality of buyers and sellers. The same would hold true of any
secondary legislation concerning the free movement of goods which purported
to distinguish between EC and non-EC nationals.15 Moreover, restrictions on the
sale or purchase of goods on grounds of non-EC nationality of the participants
to the transaction would also undermine several tasks and other objectives of
the Community, and would in most or all cases directly breach the EC’s obliga-
tions under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and bilateral agreements with
third states. Although Article 31(1) EC refers to non-discrimination against EC
nationals, the text and context of the goods provisions suggests that this provi-
sion is lex specialis, and indeed its existence supports an a contrario interpreta-
tion of the other provisions on goods.
This interpretation is supported by secondary legislation on customs union,
which regulates the entry of goods accompanying persons (including third-
country nationals) on entry into the Community in considerable detail. Such
legislation includes rules on moving the personal effects of “natural persons
transferring their normal place of residence from a third country to the customs
territory of the Community”, with specific rules on the entry of personal effects
after marriage, when furnishing a secondary residence, taking up self-employ-
ment or studying in the Community.16
Title I applies equally to the agricultural and fisheries rules in Title II (Arti-
cles 32-38), except where special agricultural provisions specify otherwise.17 But
there are no agricultural provisions based on citizenship: EC agricultural law
is concerned with using “labour”; at ensuring “a fair standard of living for the
agricultural community”, particularly “by increasing the earnings of persons
engaged in agriculture”; and with ensuring “that supplies reach consumers at
15 On invalidity of EC legislation for breach of Article 28 EC, see, for example, Case
C-51/93 Meyhui [1994] ECR I-3879.
16 Art. 2 and Arts. 11-15, 20-28 and 38 of Reg. 918/83 (OJ 1983 L 105/1), setting out
common rules on exemption from customs duties.
17 See Art. 32(2); this assumes that the “common market” referred to in that para-
graph is a reference to Title I.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
18 See respectively Arts. 33(1)(a), 33(1)(b), and 33(1)(d) (emphases added), and see also
Art. 37(3)(a), referring to “the producers concerned” by a common market organisa-
tion.
19 This is true even of persons who only consume foods produced in third countries,
since CAP rules regulate the entry of such food if it falls within the scope of the
CAP.
20 See particularly the reference to “taxpayers” in other countries in Art. 58(1)(a). This
provision is not expressly limited to taxpayers in other Member States (some of
whom will be third-country nationals in any event), and logically is intended to refer
to taxpayers in third countries as well in light of the scope of Art. 56, to which Art.
58(1) expressly refers.
21 Arts. 67(1) and 70(2) EEC.
22 Art. 1 of Dir. 88/361 (OJ 1988 L 178/5).
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
still retain the personal scope of the former provisions. This interpretation is
confirmed by the first judgment on the scope of the revised Treaty provisions
on capital and payments, which in part concerned a Turkish national wishing
to move banknotes from Spain to Turkey.23 Here, the application of the capital
rules to third-country nationals was uncontested.
Can Member States invoke an exception on grounds of third-country
nationality? There is a possible derogation in this field which does not apply
in the context of free movement of goods. Article 57(1) of the Treaty permits
Member States to apply pre-1994 restrictions on free movement of certain types
of capital to and from third countries, so any such “grandfathered” rules will
still be valid, even if they discriminate against third-country nationals on the
basis of nationality, unless Article 12 EC applies to third-country nationals or
such a rule infringes an international agreement concluded by the Community.
Nevertheless, this clause only permits pre-existing restrictions as regards some
types of capital movement; it does not permit pre-existing restrictions against
movement of other types of capital, or as regards free movement of payments,
and would not protect any pre-existing restrictions on third-country nationals
resident within the Community on grounds of nationality. Nor does it apply to
the movement of capital to and from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, due to
the European Economic Area treaty, which applies the EC Treaty capital rules
fully to those States.24 Any such restrictions would relate to “internal” move-
ment between Member States and so could instead only be defended pursuant
to Article 58(1) EC, which sets out general exceptions to the free movement of
capital and payments. Given the Court’s restrictive interpretation of these excep-
tions, it is hard to imagine that a Member State could justify a restriction based
solely on the third-country nationality of a person sending or receiving capital
or payments.25
It could also be argued that Article 58(2) EC, which states that the capital
and payments rules are “without prejudice to” the “restrictions” on the freedom
of establishment compatible with the Treaty, limits the application of the capital
and payments rules to Community nationals. But logically, Article 58(2), which
23 Joined Cases C-163, 165 and 250/94 Sanz de Lera [1995] ECR I-4821. See also Case
C-452/01 Ospelt [2003] ECR I-9743, on the application of the free movement rules
to nationals of Liechtenstein, Norway or Iceland. Further cases on the movement
of capital to or from non-EU countries are pending: Cases C-513/03 Van Hilten-van
der Heijden, Opinion of 30 June 2005; C-452/04 Fidium Finanz; C-492/04 Lasertec;
C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation; C-101/05 A; C-102/05 A
and B; and C-157/05 Holbock.
24 On the restriction to certain types of capital movement, see Sanz de Lera (ibid.); on
the non-application to the EEA, see Ospelt (ibid.).
25 On these exceptions, see Peers, “Free Movement of Capital: Learning Lessons or
Slipping on Spilt Milk?”, in Scott and Barnard (n .7 above), 333.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
has not yet been interpreted by the Court, could only apply where a person is
simultaneously enjoying establishment rights and capital rights. It follows that
Article 58(2) cannot apply to third-country nationals, since they have no free-
dom of establishment pursuant to the EC Treaty in the first place.
26 Respectively Arts. 62(2)(b)(i), 62(3), 63(1)(a), 63(1)(c), 63(2)(a), 63(4) and 64(2).
27 Respectively Arts. 62(2)(b)(ii) to (iv) and 63(3).
28 Art. 62(1), which also expressly defines the scope of Art. 14.
29 Respectively Arts. 62(2)(a), 63(1)(b), 63(1)(d), 63(2)(a) and (b), 65 and 66.
30 Regs. 1346/2000 (OJ 2000 L 160/1); 1347/2000 (OJ 2000 L 160/19); 1348/2000 (OJ
2000 L 160/37), particularly recital 8; 44/2001 (OJ 2001 L 12/1); 1206/2001 (OJ 2001
L 174/1); and 805/2004 (OJ 2004 L 143/15). Directive 2003/9 on legal aid (OJ 2003
L 26/41) expressly specifies a rule of non-discrimination between EU citizens and
“third-country nationals residing lawfully in a Member State” (Art. 4). The “Brus-
sels II” Regulation has now been replaced by Reg. 2201/2003 (OJ 2003 L 338/1), but
there is nothing in the later Regulation to indicate that it has a narrower personal
scope.
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plaintiff.31 In Groupe Josi, the Court ruled that the Canadian domicile of a plain-
tiff was usually irrelevant for the purpose of applying the Brussels Convention;
the important question was in most cases where the defendant was domiciled
in a Member State.32 Moreover, the Court expressly ruled that “it must be con-
cluded that the system of rules of conferment of jurisdiction established by the
Convention is not ... based on the criterion of the nationality of the parties.”33
2.7 Transport
Title V, concerning transport (Articles 70-80), makes no reference to nationality.
This is not surprising as transport within the Community sometimes inevita-
bly involves journeys to and from third countries as well as journeys within the
Community,34 either of which could involve the provision of services by third-
country nationals or their employment by a Community service provider. The
former aspect of the transport rules is reflected by secondary legislation, which
expressly refers to movement to and from third countries in some cases,35 while
the latter aspect is also reflected in adopted or proposed secondary legislation.36
In practice, the Court has taken a “presumed inclusion” approach to transport
legislation, finding in Awoyemi that in the absence of express wording excluding
third-country nationals from the scope of the Directive on mutual recognition
of drivers’ licences, a Nigerian national usually resident in the UK could rely
on it.37 This was despite the preambular reference in the Directive to the free
31 See the consolidated texts of the Brussels and Rome Conventions (OJ 1998 C 27).
See also the Opinion in the Ingmar case, n. 108 below, drawing a link between the
personal scope of the commercial agents’ directive and the personal scope of the
Rome Convention.
32 Case C-412/98 [2000] ECR I-5925. Subsequently the Court has ruled that the
Convention applies even where a dispute involves only one Contracting State and
non-Member State(s): judgment of 1 March 2005 in Case C-281/02 Owusu, not yet
reported.
33 Paras. 53 and 54 of judgment, ibid.
34 See the Court’s interpretation of the present Article 71(1)(a) EC in Case 22/70 Com-
mission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263.
35 See Regulation 3820/95 (OJ 1985 L 370/1) on driving time, particularly Art. 2(2),
and Case C-313/92 Van Sweiten [1994] ECR I-2177 and C-439/01 Cipra and Kvas-
nicka [2003] ECR I-745; on maritime issues, see for instance Case C-435/00 Naftil-
iaki [2002] ECR I-10615; and on aviation, see Regs. 868/2004 (OJ 2004 L 162/1) and
847/2004 (OJ 2004 L 157/7) and Directive 2004/36 (OJ 2004 L 143/76).
36 See particularly the proposed Regulation on maritime cabotage and Directive on
manning conditions between Member States (COM (1998) 251, 29 Apr. 1998; the
latter proposal was amended by COM (2000) 437, 13 July 2000), and Reg. 484/2002
on driver attestation (OJ 2002 L 76/1).
37 Case C-230/97 [1998] ECR I-6781.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
movement of persons.38 It might seem odd that transport services have a wider
personal scope than other services, but the Treaty clearly recognises the distinc-
tiveness of the transport sector, by stating expressly that transport services are
governed by Title V, rather than Chapter 3 of Title III.39
38 See also the link between the Schengen acquis and secondary transport legislation
drawn in the Opinion in Case C-70/99 Commission v Portugal [2001] ECR I-4845.
39 Art. 51(1) EC.
40 Case 6/72 Continental Can [1973] ECR 215; Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85,
116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, Ahlstrom and others [1988] ECR 5193; Case
T-102/96 Gencor [1999] ECR II-753.
41 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; Case C-264/98 Balog, Opinion of 29
March 2001, unreported (case withdrawn).
42 Transfers from third countries were not at issue in the case.
43 Joined Cases C-72 and 73/91 [1993] ECR I-887.
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44 See particularly Directive 83/183 (OJ 1983 L 105/64) on excise tax exemptions,
which contains rules on personal effects coming from third countries; compare with
the longer customs rules on the same issue (n. 16 above).
45 S. 2.4 above. For example, see EC intellectual property legislation, which usually
makes no reference to nationality but on occasion draws a distinction between EC
and non-EC nationals and/or non-EC residents (see Art. 3 of Dir. 87/54 on pro-
tection of semiconductors (OJ 1987 L 24/36), although a subsequent amendment
has revoked discrimination against nationals or residents of other WTO members
(Decision 94/284, OJ 1994 L 349/201); Art. 7 of Dir. 93/98 on the term of protection
for copyright (OJ 1993 L 290/9); Art. 11 of Dir. 96/9 on the protection of databases
(OJ 1996 L 77/20); and Art. 7 of Dir. 2001/84 on resale rights for artists (OJ 2001 L
272/32).
46 On the objectives of measures adopted pursuant to Article 95, see Case C-376/98
Germany v EP and Council (tobacco advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419 and C-491/01
BAT [2002] ECR I-11453.
47 See the discussion of the provisions on free movement of goods, capital, persons
and services (ss. 2.4, 2.5, 3.1 and 3.2).
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
cohesion and research. Third, there are several provisions which necessarily con-
cern relations with third countries: Title IX on the common commercial policy;
Title X on customs cooperation; Title XX on development cooperation; and
(following the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice) Title XXI on cooperation
with other third states. Finally, there are two related Titles where the position of
third-country nationals is highly relevant but also potentially ambiguous. These
are Title VIII, concerning employment policy, which makes no direct reference
to nationality, and Title XI, concerning social policy, youth, education and voca-
tional training. Several Titles are worth more detailed consideration.
2.9.1 EMU
First, it is hardly surprising that the Treaty provisions on EMU do not distin-
guish between nationals of Member States and non-Member States, for EMU
simply would not work unless it applied to all persons in the territory of partici-
pating states. It would be technically possible to require resident and/or visiting
third-country nationals to use a different currency, but the cost to business and
government would be substantial, and no useful objective of such a requirement
is apparent. As for the economic aspects of EMU, it would simply be impossible
to develop an economic policy that applied only to EC nationals as distinct from
third-country nationals.
48 This was Art. 137(3), fourth indent, before the entry into force of the Treaty of
Nice.
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
49 Joined Cases 281, 283-285 and 287/85 [1987] ECR 3203. See now the Opinion in
Case C-171/01 Birklite ([2003] ECR I-4301), in which Advocate-General Jacobs
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
argued that excluding Turkish nationals from trade union rights would violate the
social policy principles set out in Art. 136 EC.
50 Case C-13/95 [1997] ECR I-1259.
51 Dir. 77/187 (OJ 1977 L 61/27), later amended (Dir. 98/50, OJ 1998 L 201/88) and
then consolidated (Dir. 2001/23, OJ 2001 L 82/16).
52 Para 3, n. 43 above.
53 See Art. 3(2) of Dirs. 2000/43 and 2000/78 (OJ 2000, L 180/22 and L 303/6), which
state that third-country nationals are within the scope of the relevant directives,
excepting measures related to their immigration status (see also recitals 13 and 12
respectively).
54 Since these two Directives are not social policy measures, we rely on them only to
show that Article 13 is subject to the same underlying reasoning as social policy
measures as regards personal scope. We do not suggest that the personal scope of
the Directives necessarily means that Article 13 has the same personal scope as the
social policy chapter. Conversely, it cannot be argued a contrario from Art. 3(2) of
each of the Article 13 Directives that in the absence of an explicit provision bringing
third-country nationals within the personal scope of a social policy measure, such
measures are limited in scope to EU citizens. Rather we suggest that the personal
scope of Article 13 and of the social policy Chapter must be determined indepen-
dently. There is no reference to nationality in the proposed or agreed text of the
Article 13 Directive concerning sex equality (COM (2003) 657, 5 Nov. 2003; agreed
text in Council doc. 13137/04, 6 Oct. 2004).
55 See Article 137(5) EC, which sets out exclusions from those powers.
56 For example, stress at work, which has not yet been the subject of a health and
safety directive.
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
57 Article 137(1)(g) does not require the relevant measures to ensure equality between
third-country nationals and EC nationals, although a measure which did not do
so might be legally suspect on grounds that it breached human rights and the EC’s
agreements with third countries, many of which require equal treatment for nation-
als of the signatory state.
58 See s. 3.1 below.
59 Recommendation 2001/613 (OJ 2001 L 215/30); compare with initial and amended
proposals (COM (1999) 708, 21 Jan. 2000 and COM (2000) 723, 9 Nov. 2000) and
see 27th and 29th reports of the House of Commons Select Committee on Euro-
pean Scrutiny (1999-2000).
60 See the Annex, recital 20 and point I(1)(h) of the Recommendation (ibid).
61 See now the “Erasmus Mundus” programme designed solely for third-country
national students coming from outside the European Union (OJ 2003 L 345/1).
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
62 For an analysis of these treaties, including the relevant case law, see Hedemann-
Robinson, “An Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level
in Relation to Third-Country Nationals Resident within the European Union,
with Particular Reference to the Case Law of the European Court of Justice,” 38
CMLRev. (2001) 525.
63 OJ 2002 L 114. This differs from the Commission’s proposal for separate approval
of each treaty using separate legal bases (see COM (1999) 229, 4 May 1999). See the
13th and 14th reports of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee
(1999-2000).
64 Preamble to treaties (OJ 2004 L 84/13 OJ 2005 L 26/3).
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
of such agreements fall within the scope of Community powers,65 the insertion of
Title IV into the EC Treaty could only change that situation by expressly altering
the scope and effect of Article 310 EC or by altering the scope of Article 310 by
implication. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam inserted only one express provi-
sion into the EC Treaty to alter the scope of Article 310: the Protocol on border
control for the UK and Ireland, which refers to all provisions of the EC Treaty
and any secondary measure or international treaty adopted pursuant to it. But
this Protocol could only affect the provisions of the agreement with Switzerland
which relate to crossing borders.
Alternatively, has the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the scope of Arti-
cle 310 EC by implication? The answer is clearly no, because the Court’s initial
reason for concluding that immigration provisions fell within the scope of the
Community’s powers over association agreements were that such agreements
gave the EC the power to extend the Community’s internal rules to associated
states.66 So free movement of Swiss nationals into the EC is linked to Title III of
Part Three of the EC Treaty, on the free movement of persons, not to Title IV,
on immigration and asylum. Therefore only those provisions of an association
agreement which govern immigration from none of the Contracting Parties to
that agreement (for example, provisions governing readmission of nationals of
non-contracting States) are linked to Title IV EC within the EC legal order.
In the alternative, even if the UK and Ireland are entitled to opt out of the
so-called “Title IV” provisions of the agreement with Switzerland, any decision
to opt in must entail opting into a Community act, not opting in intergovernmen-
tally. The Protocol on the application of Title IV in the UK and Ireland does
not provide for any possibility for those Member States to accept any Title IV
legislation merely as “an obligation under international law”, by contrast with
the Protocol on Denmark.67
As for the treaties with FYROM and Croatia, it can again be argued that
the limitation as regards Title IV matters only applies to rules which affect
asylum and immigration from non-contracting parties.68 In the alternative, if
it is considered that the opt-in provisions apply even to nationals of Croatia
and FYROM, the validity of those provisions can again be doubted in light of
the scope of Article 310 EC. In any event, even if the relevant provisions are
valid and apply to nationals of Croatia and FYROM, the “opt-out” does not
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
2.10 EU Treaty
As for the EU Treaty, the decisions of the Union must be taken as closely as
possible to the “citizen”, according to Article 1 EU. The creation of Union citi-
zenship is one of the objectives of the Union, according to Article 2 EU; the
other four objectives mentioned are not limited to EU citizens. Article 7(3) EU,70
like Article 309 EC, refers to the effect of suspending rights of a Member State
upon “natural and legal persons”, rather than upon citizens. Title V EU neces-
sarily concerns relations with third countries, and the Union’s objectives include
the development and consolidation of “democracy and the rule of law”, along
with “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”,71 issues of direct
importance to the citizens of third states. One provision of this Title concerns
the implementation of the citizenship provisions of the EU Treaty.72 As for Title
VI (the “third pillar”), the “chapeau” of Article 29 EU states that the Union’s
objective “shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety” as a conse-
quence of developing criminal and policing policies.
The latter provision, although it does not refer to the precise legal concept
of citizenship of the Union, could be nevertheless be taken to suggest that third
pillar policies could, should or must aim to protect EU citizens alone, as distinct
from citizens of third countries. However, despite the Treaty text, such an exclu-
sion is not borne out by practice. The only third pillar measures which in practice
distinguish between EC nationals and third-country nationals are those relating
to immigration law,73 and these distinctions relate only to immigration status,
not to the nationality of victims or alleged perpetrators of crimes. In fact, these
measures show a clear awareness that third-country nationals may be victims of
crime.74 Other measures concern investigation, prosecution and punishment of
69 See Sections 2.9.4 (working conditions), 3.1 (workers), 3.2 (services) and 3.3 (social
security).
70 This paragraph was Art. 7(2) EU before the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice
on 1 Feb. 2003.
71 Art. 11(1) EU.
72 See Art. 20 EU.
73 Framework Decisions on trafficking in humans (OJ 2002 L 203/1) and on the facili-
tation of illegal entry, movement and residence (OJ 2002 L 328/1). See Chs. 27 and
28.
74 This is expressly clear from the later Directive concerning the immigration status of
third-country national victims of trafficking in persons (Directive 2004/81, OJ 2004
L 261/19); see Ch. 29.
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crime regardless of the nationality of the victims,75 and indeed the Framework
Decision on the status of victims in criminal proceedings applies regardless of
those victims’ nationality.76 It might be objected that these secondary measures
are violating the apparent Treaty injunction to focus only on the safety of Union
citizens, but frankly the Treaty injunction does not make sense. Obviously, for
example, it is not possible for authorities to combat environmental crime on the
basis of victims’ nationality and they will often have no knowledge of the nation-
ality of the victims of child pornography until the end of an investigation, if at
all. It would hardly serve the objective of ensuring citizens’ safety if EU third
pillar measures addressed only crimes committed against EU citizens, since the
perpetrators of crimes committed against third-country nationals would then be
left at large to commit crimes against EU citizens in future. Therefore the refer-
ence to protecting “citizens” should be considered either a rhetorical flourish
or a non-exhaustive indication of the Union’s objectives, rather than a binding
limitation on the personal scope of Title VI.
75 For example, the Framework Decision on environmental crime and the Framework
Decision on child pornography (OJ 2003 L 29/55 and OJ 2004 L 13/44).
76 OJ 2001 L 82/1. See also Directive 2004/80 (OJ 2004 L 261/15) on compensation
for crime victims from the State, which does not limit its scope to EU citizens alone
(recital 2 of the preamble refers to all persons with the freedom to visit another
Member State, not just to EU citizens).
77 Case 238/83 Meade [1984] ECR 2631, para 7.
78 On both points, see Section 3.3 below.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
als” of those Member States. On one reading of the judgment, it is merely the
exclusion of (some) third-country nationals from the secondary legislation that
deprived the applicant of the benefit at issue.
However, another chamber of the Court later ruled on the issue again in the
1998 Awoyemi judgment.79 This case was primarily about transport, but the right
of a third-country national to non-discrimination in the application of penalties
could not be avoided. Mr Awoyemi was a Nigerian national who held a valid
UK driving licence. He was stopped by the police in Belgium and was charged
with driving a motor vehicle without being in possession of a Belgian driving
licence. Although the Court held that Mr. Awoyemi was covered by a transport
law Directive on mutual recognition of driving licences,80 it also held that the
right not to suffer disproportionate penalties arises from the right to free move-
ment of persons, and therefore “a national of a non-Member country who finds
himself in the same position as Mr Awoyemi may not effectively rely on the rules
governing the free movement of persons which, according to the settled case
law, apply only to a national of a Member State of the Community who seeks to
establish himself in the territory of another Member State or to a national of the
Member State in question, who finds himself in the situation which is connected
with any of the situations contemplated by Community law (see for example
Case C-147/91 Ferrer Laderer [1992] ECR-I-4097, paragraph 7).”81
What is not clear from the Court’s judgment is whether the regulation of
movement of third country nationals as workers is beyond the potential scope
of Article 39. After all, its conclusion on the applicability of transport law to
Mr. Awoyemi was based on the personal scope of the relevant legislation, so it
could be argued a contrario that its conclusion regarding free movement law was
also dependent upon the wording of the legislation.82 While the secondary legis-
lation, in particular Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/360 (and now Directive
2004/58), is limited to EU citizens (leaving aside their family members), this may
only be evidence of the fact that the full competence of the Community has yet
to be exercised. It could be argued that within the “legal base” of Article 39, the
Commission could propose and the Council could legitimately adopt a measure
regulating the movement of third country nationals who are already part of the
labour force of the Community.
There remains the question as to whether Article 40, which is the “legal
base” for the adoption of rules on free movement of workers, is wide enough
79 N. 37 above.
80 See s. 2.7 above.
81 Para 28, n. 37 above.
82 The Court’s reference to the Laderer case is, with great respect, quite unconvinc-
ing, for the paragraph it quotes expressly only excludes third-country nationals
from freedom of establishment, which is clearly restricted to EU citizens only by the
explicit wording of Article 43 EC.
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83 See respectively Case C-162/00 [2002] ECR I-1049; n. 49 above; and Case C-438/00
[2003] ECR I-4135.
84 It might be objected that social legislation can govern cross-border situations (for
instance, see Dir. 94/45 on European Works Councils (OJ 1994 L 254/64), but that
it is a different matter from regulating free movement of persons.
85 Art. 39 cannot govern the latter situation, since it only governs movement between
Member States: (Joined Cases 35 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjhan [1982] ECR
3723).
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
137 would still be the only legal base governing access to employment in the
initial Member State.86
Under either alternative, there are two arguments against the application of
Article 137. First, it could be argued that Article 63(3)(a) in Title IV, the legal
base for measures on the conditions of residence for third-country nationals, is a
better legal base for measures relating to access to employment for third-country
nationals in the first Member State. However, in fact Article 137 is more specific,
because the Title IV clause does not expressly refer to employment. Secondly, it
might be objected that Article 137 only extends to working conditions, and does
not cover access to employment at all in any Member State. But now that the
previous Article K.1(3)(b), which gave the Union third pillar powers over “access
to employment” of third-country nationals, has been rescinded, the social policy
clause is the most specific legal base governing their access to employment. This
interpretation also best respects the earlier Germany v Commission judgment.87
It should be emphasised that whatever limits may apply to hiring third-
country nationals as employees pursuant to the free movement provisions, there
is no logical reason to restrict third-country nationals from invoking the Treaty
provisions on free movement of workers as employers, as EU citizens can do.88
Third-country nationals are consequently also bound as employers by the Treaty
provisions to observe the Treaty rules.89 For example, this means that an Ameri-
can expatriate living in London may employ a French housekeeper, and the UK
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
office of the American firm which the expatriate manages may employ a Swedish
personal assistant. If Member States place restrictions on the ability of third-
country nationals to employ persons, such restrictions must not discriminate
between EC nationals as potential employees. This interpretation is in keeping
with the text of the Treaty and secondary legislation, which do not suggest any
restriction as regards the nationality of employers.90 Moreover, this interpreta-
tion is certainly in keeping with the intent of the Treaty, as it would enhance
employment opportunities for migrant Community workers.
90 For example, Art. 2 of Reg. 1612/68 (OJ 1968 L 257/2) refers to “[a]ny national of a
Member State” as an employee, on the one hand, and “any employer” on the other,
suggesting a contrario no restriction on the employer’s nationality.
91 On the former point, see Pasha, [1993] 2 CMLR 350 (IAT); on the latter point,
see judgment of 14 Oct. 2004 in Case C-299/02 Commission v Netherlands, not yet
reported.
92 See also Art. 54, which refers expressly to Article 49, para. 1.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
established in the Community. This Article is subject to the deadline for estab-
lishing the internal market set out in Article 14(1),93 but the Commission did
not submit proposed legislation implementing this provision until 1999 and the
Council lacked the political will to agree the relevant proposal, despite its Treaty
obligations, so the proposal was withdrawn in 2004.94 In any event, EC compa-
nies can send their third-country nationals abroad as an aspect of their right
to provide services as corporate persons.95 In 1999, the Commission proposed
a Directive with the legal base of Articles 47 and 55 to facilitate the exercise of
this right; this proposal has been withdrawn, but a proposed general Directive
on the provision of services (under discussion in the Council as of 1 Jan. 2006)
now contains provisions on this issue.96
What is the borderline between the services chapter and Title IV? Following
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the UK government argued
that important aspects of the Commission’s two 1999 proposals were governed
by Title IV, rather than Articles 57 (with 66) and 59 EC (now Articles 47, 55 and
49 EC).97 Frankly, this argument is highly unconvincing. First of all, we submit
that the Commission used the correct legal bases for the two proposals when it
93 The Art. 14(1) deadline logically refers only to the powers regarding third-country
nationals in para. 2, since no other part of Art. 49 provides a “legal base” for adopt-
ing measures. Even if one regards Art. 14(1) more broadly, as referring to the Coun-
cil’s powers to adopt services legislation by means of other Treaty provisions (an
implausible interpretation, since Art. 14(1) also refers expressly to Arts. 47 and 80),
Art. 14(1) still must include an obligation to adopt rules on third-country nationals
in addition to EC nationals. If the drafters of the Single European Act (SEA) had
wished to confine the obligation in Art. 14(1) only to EC nationals’ service provi-
sion, they could have done so by referring in Art. 14(1) only to the first para. of Art.
49, just as Art. 54 does. This interpretation of Art. 14(1) also recognises the context
of the SEA’s principal goal of ensuring completion of the internal market, since
Art. 49 was among those internal market Treaty Articles never used before 1986 and
the SEA also relaxed the voting rule in Art. 49 from unanimity to qualified majority.
On the relevance of the SEA’s changes in voting rules, see Case 165/87 Commission v
Council [1988] ECR 5545. While the judgment in Wijsenbeek (Case C-378/97 [1999]
ECR I-6207) rules out the direct effect of Art. 14, it does not rule out the prospect
that the Article creates binding obligations for EC institutions.
94 COM (1999) 3, 26 Feb. 1999; amended version in COM (2000) 271, 8 May 2000. For
the withdrawal, see COM (2004) 542, 1 Oct. 2004, pp. 23-24.
95 Cases C-43/93 Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803 and C-445/03 Commission v Lux-
embourg [2004] ECR I-10191. See also Cases C-168/04 Commission v Austria and
C-244/04 Commission v Germany (Opinion of 15 Sept. 2005), both pending.
96 N. 94 above (initial proposals and withdrawal); COM (2004) 2, 5 March 2004 (gen-
eral services proposal), Art. 25.
97 See House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 17th and 27th reports
(1998-99) and 8th, 13th and 23rd reports (1999-2000).
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
originally made its proposals, shortly before the Treaty of Amsterdam entered
into force. Since the right to post workers to other Member States is simply a
corollary of EC companies’ freedom to provide services, the proposal on posted
workers had (and still has) the correct legal bases. Although the Court only
answered questions relating to work permits in Van der Elst, this was simply
because these were the only questions referred. The Court did not indicate that
the entry and residence of the workers fell outside the scope of the corporate
right to post employees; in fact the Advocate-General expressly argued that the
host Member State was obliged to let the employees enter the territory. A right
to post workers without a right to insist upon their entry and residence would
clearly be deprived of any effet utile, as the corporation logically could not pro-
vide the relevant services unless its employees are present.98 The same reasoning
applies mutatis mutandis to rules on expulsion from the Member State. Since the
corporate right to provide services can only be restricted on grounds of public
security, public policy and public health pursuant to Articles 46 and 55 EC, it
follows that the corporate employees must be subject to the legislation govern-
ing expulsion of EC nationals (and their family members) which was adopted
pursuant to those Treaty provisions. As for the other proposal, since the prior
Article 59(2) EC expressly referred to the powers to “extend the provisions of
this Chapter” to third-country nationals, it logically followed that the Council
had powers to extend every aspect of the free movement of services to estab-
lished third-country nationals. The provisions of the two proposed Directives
governing readmission of third-country nationals must be regarded as corollary,
for it was logically necessary for the Directives to set out what will happen if the
conditions for movement of third-country nationals pursuant to the Directive
were no longer met. It is useful to draw an analogy between the corporate right
to post third-country national workers and EU citizens’ right to family reunion
with their third-country national family members and equal treatment of their
family members. In either case, there must be full equal treatment of the third-
country nationals as long as the link with the EC national is maintained, since
their position is an indispensable corollary to the free movement and any restric-
tion placed upon them would place a major obstacle to free movement.
98 For more on this point, see Peers, “Building Fortress Europe: The Development of
EU Migration Law”, 35 CMLRev. (1998) 1235 at 1262-1265. On the Commission’s
view, which summarises the Council legal service’s objections, see SEC (1999) 1879,
12 Nov. 1999; for the alternative view, which does not address the issue from the
perspective that Article 49 grants rights to EC employers in this scenario, see Hail-
bronner, Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy of the European Union (Kluwer,
2000), 201-209.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
Did the Treaty of Amsterdam change the legal position? We submit that it
did not.99 There are several provisions of the new Title IV that expressly set out
the relationship between other Treaty provisions and the new Title.100 Addition-
ally, the Treaty drafters deleted certain provisions as a consequence of the new
Title,101 and inserted a reference to the Title in a “mainstream” Treaty clause.102
So the Treaty drafters were certainly keenly conscious of the relationship between
Title IV and other parts of the Treaty, but they still inserted no Treaty language
to govern the relationship between the services provisions and Title IV, and did
not provide in Title IV for any powers governing aspects of the provision of ser-
vices by established third-country nationals that are more specific than Article
49 EC. Article 63(4), which admittedly governs resident third-country nationals’
right of residence in another Member State, is nonetheless not as specific as the
services provisions. It must logically follow that the scope of the services chapter
as regards the position of third-country nationals is exactly the same as it was
before the Treaty of Amsterdam. This interpretation also respects the logic of
the Treaty, since Article 49 was part of the original provisions regarding creation
of a common market and then part of the SEA provisions regarding completion
of the internal market. Posting of third-country national employees is a natural
corollary of their employers’ free movement and the provision of services by
established third-country nationals is obviously closely linked to the internal
market, and does not raise the broader issues connected with the establishment
of the area of “freedom, security and justice”.
The next issue is whether third-country nationals can be recipients of ser-
vices within the Community. From the text of the Treaty, they obviously can,
as it is only necessary for the services to be provided to a “person” in another
Member State. The drafters of Article 49 were clearly aware of the distinctions
between EC nationals and third-country nationals and so the wording should
be taken to be conscious and deliberate. Moreover, a wide personal scope of
potential recipients enhances EC nationals’ right to provide services in other
Member States.103 The Court apparently accepted this interpretation in Svens-
son, a case concerning Swedish nationals resident in Luxembourg before Swed-
99 The Council and Commission have therefore correctly excluded the provision of
services by resident third-country nationals from legislation and proposals made
pursuant to Title IV: see Art. 3(2)(e) of Directive 2003/109 on long-term residents
(see Ch. 20) and Art. 3(3)(i) of the proposed Directive on migration for employment
or self-employment (COM (2001) 386, 11 July 2001; see Ch. 21).
100 Arts. 61(a), 62(1), 67(2), 67(4) and 68(1) EC.
101 The former Arts. 100c and 100d EC.
102 Art. 3(1)(d).
103 There is an obvious analogy with the right of third-country nationals to employ
migrant EC nationals: see s. 3.1 above.
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
3.4 Article 12 EC
Next, we come to Article 12 EC, the non-discrimination clause. It should be
noted at the outset that this well-known provision does not expressly distinguish
between EC nationals and non-EC nationals: it states simply that “[w]ithin the
scope of application of the Treaty, and without prejudice to any special pro-
visions contained therein, any prohibition on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited”. The case law does not yet specify expressly whether the provision
can currently apply in any respect to third-country nationals. One line of cases,
concerning the particular issue of education rights in other Member States, only
mentions EC nationals,112 but then all the cases referred on this subject have
concerned EC nationals. In the important line of case law on the application of
Article 12 decided since Cowan,113 the Court has until recently taken great care
not to rule that Article 12 applies only to nationals of Member States. Rather
it has consistently stated instead that “[b]y prohibiting ‘any discrimination on
110 Joined Cases C-95/99 to C-98/99 and C-180/99 [2001] ECR I-7413. See case note by
Peers, 39 CMLRev. (2002) 1395.
111 COM (1997) 561, 10 Dec.1997; later replaced by a proposal and adopted Regulation
based on Art. 63(4) EC. This Regulation, and the correct “legal base” for proposals
on this issue, is discussed in Ch. 23. The judgment in Meade (n. 77 above) only con-
cluded that not all third-country nationals were within the scope of the Regulation
at the time; the Court was not asked about the competence of the Community to
include them.
112 Case 152/82 Forcheri [1983] ECR 2323; Case 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593; Case
24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379; Case 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161.
113 Case 186/87 [1989] ECR 195.
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
grounds of nationality’, Article [12] of the Treaty requires that persons in a situ-
ation governed by Community law be placed on a completely equal footing with
nationals of the [host] Member State.”114 It has also consistently referred to
“non-discrimination against persons to whom Community law gives the right to
equal treatment”, along with insisting separately that Article 12 prohibits mea-
sures which restrict the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC
Treaty.115 On the latter point, the Court has consistently found that rules which
“are liable to affect the economic activity of traders from other Member States”
or have “effects on intra-Community trade in goods and services” fall within the
scope of Article 12.116 Since, as discussed above, the Treaty rules on goods and
to some extent services apply to third-country nationals, it follows that Article
12 should apply to them to that extent at least.
In other cases, the most convincing interpretation of the personal scope of
Article 12 is that it should apply whenever third-country nationals are governed
by Community rules on a given subject. So, for instance, Article 12 should apply
to prohibit discrimination in respect of the freedom to travel provided by the
“Schengen acquis” and in respect of third-country national family members of
migrant EC nationals, but it would only be relevant to third-country nationals
who wish to move to another Member State once Directive 2003/109 on long-
term residents becomes applicable. The alternative “extreme” interpretations
(that Article 12 only applies to Community nationals and that Article 12 already
applies to prohibit all discrimination in any context as regards third-country
nationals) should be rejected. The exclusionary interpretation fails to consider
that third-country nationals have always expressly fallen within the scope of the
Treaty to some extent, whichever approach we adopt to interpreting its personal
scope. If the Treaty drafters had wanted to exclude third-country nationals from
Article 12 altogether or subject its application to them to the Council’s discre-
tion, they could have done so expressly as they did with Articles 42 and 49 EC.
Conversely, to interpret Article 12 to require abolition of any discrimination
between EC nationals and third-country nationals would fail to take account of
the “special provisions” of the Treaty as regards the differences between the legal
situation of EC and non-EC nationals, which are also evident on any interpreta-
tion of the Treaty.
114 Para. 11 of the judgment (emphasis added); the key phrase is repeated at para. 13 of
that judgment and subsequently in para. 32 of Phil Collins (Joined Cases C-92/92
and C-326/92 [1993] ECR I-5145); para. 16 of Data Delecta (Case C-43/95 [1996]
ECR I-4661; para. 18 of Hayes (Case C-323/95 [1997] ECR I-1711); and para. 25 of
Saldanha (Case C-122/96 [1997] ECR I-5325).
115 Para. 19 of Cowan; see subsequently para. 12 of Data Delecta para. 13 of Hayes,
and paras. 17, 19 and 21 of Saldanha (ns. 113 and 114 above).
116 Paras. 13 to 15 of Data Delecta; paras. 14 and 18 of Hayes (n. 114 above).
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
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Chapter 4 Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law
4 Conclusion
In this article we began by placing the discussion about the personal scope of
EU law within the context of the tensions of globalisation and European inte-
gration. The legal argument that third country nationals are in general excluded
from the scope of Community law is better understood within the framework
of the evolving concept of sovereignty. As we have shown, in fact there are only
exceptional parts of Community law, primarily relating to the free movement of
workers as agents of their own movement, from which third country nationals
are excluded. We have further argued that this exclusion is not structural to the
EC Treaty itself, but rather a result of the choice of implementation through
secondary legislation.
It is clear that the EC Treaty was designed and worded with the inten-
tion that its provisions would in principle apply to all persons within its scope
general principle would have personal and/or material broader scope than Art. 12
EC.
122 See respectively Ch. 8 and Council doc. 10572/02, 10 July 2002. The latter indicates
that the legal service believes that EC free movement law cannot prescribe that a
residence permit is equivalent to a visa for a third-country national family member.
This is logically correct where those family members cross borders independently of
their EC national sponsor, but not when they cross them together.
123 Case C-60/00 [2002] ECR I-6279. See also the judgments in Case C-200/02 Chen
[2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911, and par-
ticularly paras. 37-38 and 52-53 of the Opinion in the latter case; and the Opinion of
10 Mar. 2005 in Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain, pending.
124 See respectively Arts. 4 and 5 of Directive 2004/58 (OJ 2004 L 229/35) and Arts.
2(7)(b) and 3(a) of the proposed Code (COM (2004) 391, 26 May 2004).
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Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers
and jurisdiction, including third country nationals. The exceptions were speci-
fied. This “presumed inclusion” approach is hardly surprising, for third-coun-
try nationals play a significant part in the economy, society and culture of the
Union. However, between 1957 and 2005, the framework within which the
Treaty is understood has changed. The crisis of the nation state as the main
source of authority and legitimacy has had consequences for the interpretation
of the Treaties. As sovereignty has become increasingly synonymous with the
right to control movement of third country nationals, the Treaty has become
the victim of revisionist interpretation. In order to give legitimacy to the argu-
ment that the Member States as nation states are still “in control”, “control”
has become increasingly defined as control over the movement of third country
nationals and “in control” as a reserve of Member State authority to the exclu-
sion of Community law.
This re-interpretation of the Treaties cannot withstand critical legal analysis
as we have shown in this article. The positioning of the nation state’s symbolic
power in the right to control who is the “other” and what that “other” may do, is
misguided. Already the engagements of the Member States in Community law
make this an unsafe place and definition of power. Those Member States, such
as the UK, which have invested heavily in this definition of their sovereignty in
the end have only made their own compliance with Community law more dif-
ficult but no less inevitable.
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order:
Practical Relevance for EC Immigration
and Asylum Law
Steve Peers
1 Introduction
To what extent does the protection for human rights1 guaranteed by the EU
legal system affect EC immigration and asylum law? This chapter answers that
question, first by examining the extent of human rights protection relevant to
immigration and asylum law within the current EU legal framework,2 domi-
nated by the “general principles of law” with a limited role for the EU’s Charter
1 The EU’s Court of Justice and other EU institutions usually refer to “fundamental
rights”, instead of “human rights”, probably because of the German tradition of
referring to “fundamental rights”. However, there is no evidence to suggest that
there is any difference between the two concepts in the EC legal order and it is
assumed throughout this chapter that the two concepts are equivalent. The phrase
“human rights” is used instead here because of its wider use in international law,
including the European Convention on Human Rights.
2 This chapter focuses on the judicial mechanisms within the EU for protection of
human rights. The current or planned non-judicial mechanisms are not examined.
They include particularly: Article 7 EU (permitting the EU to warn a Member State
off from committing potential serious and persistent breach of human rights, or to
suspend a Member State commits such a breach); the European Parliament’s annual
reports on human rights; the Commission’s Committee of Independent Experts on
Human Rights; the EU’s Ombudsman; and the planned Human Rights Agency. On
the latter, see the discussion paper from the Commission (COM (2004) 693, 25 Oct.
2004), and analysis of the role of the Agency regarding civil and political rights in
Peers, “Civil and Political Rights: the Role of an EU Human Rights Agency” in
Alston and De Schutter, eds., Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU: The Con-
tribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency (Hart, 2005). The Commission has now
proposed legislation to create the agency: COM (2005) 280, 30 June 2005.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 115-137.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Steve Peers
of Fundamental Rights, then examining the system for human rights protection
which would be established if the EU’s Constitutional Treaty is ratified.
It will be seen that both the current and the future system for human
rights protection within the EU could potentially have an important practical
impact on immigration and asylum issues within the scope of EC law. With
an ever-growing number of immigration and asylum issues covered by EC law,
this means that a full understanding of immigration and asylum law in the EU
requires an in-depth knowledge of how the EU’s human rights rules apply to
these issues.
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order
existence of the general principles raises a series of key issues: the scope of the
human rights protection, the sources of the rights protected, and the legal effect
of those rights.
The scope of these general principles comprises acts of the EU institutions,
acts of Member States implementing EU measures, and acts of Member States
derogating from EC free movement law.4 The Court of Justice has not yet had
the opportunity to establish whether or not Member States’ derogations from
EU or EC measures in other areas, in particular within the sphere of immigra-
tion and asylum law, falls within the scope of the general principles. At some
point, given the number of important derogations from EC immigration and
asylum legislation, the issue is bound to arise; it will be necessary to argue vig-
orously that EC free movement law should not be considered as a special case,
and that the importance of ensuring effective human rights protection in the
EU legal order requires confirmation that the human rights principles apply to
national derogations from any EU rule in any area of law, in particular immigra-
tion and asylum law.
It follows in any event that, whatever the scope of the application of the EU
principles to national derogations, there are limits on the scope of the EU general
principles: they do not apply where there is an insufficient link to Community
law. An example of this limitation is the well-known Demirel judgment, where
the Court of Justice refused to rule on the human rights argument for the family
reunion of a Turkish worker resident in the Community with his spouse resident
in Turkey, because the EC-Turkey Association Agreement did not regulate the
initial admission of family members of Turkish nationals.5 Of course, the scope
of Community law (and therefore the scope of the general principles) continues
to develop: a dispute such as the Demirel case does fall within the scope of EC
Human Rights”, in Alston, ed., The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999), 859, with
further references.
4 See particularly Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609 (national implementation)
and Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925 (derogations).
5 Case 12/86 [1987] ECR 3719. On the right to family life under Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, see, for instance, from an extensive lit-
erature, van Dijk, “Protection of ‘Integrated’ Aliens against Expulsion under the
European Convention on Human Rights” in Guild and Minderhoud, eds., Security
of Residence and Expulsion: Protection of Aliens in Europe (Kluwer, 2001) 23. On
the intersection between the ECHR rights and EC law, including a critical analysis
of the ECHR case law, see (on non-protection cases) Peers, “Family Reunion and
European Community Law”, in Walker, ed., Towards an Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice (OUP, 2004) and (on protection cases) Peers, “EC law on family
members of persons seeking or receiving international protection” in Shah, ed., The
Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (Cavendish, 2005).
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Steve Peers
law after October 2005, following expiry of the deadline for Member States to
implement the EC’s family reunion Directive.6
The sources of the general principles comprise human rights protection as
set out in national constitutions and international treaties on which Member
States have collaborated; the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
has a particularly prominent place as a source of standards.7 The Court of Jus-
tice has never explicitly accepted that national constitutional sources or interna-
tional sources, even the ECHR apply as such within the EC legal order; rather
these sources set out guidelines to be followed. As for permissible limitations on
the rights, the Court of Justice has developed what might be called a “Commu-
nity standard”: “restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of [human] rights,
in particular in the context of a common organisation of the markets, provided
that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pur-
sued by the Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued,
a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of
those rights”. The Court often also states that “fundamental rights are not abso-
lute rights but must be considered in relation to their social function.”8
In this context, the relationship between the EU/EC and the ECHR is par-
ticularly relevant. The EU’s Court of Justice has ruled that, within the current
legal framework, the EC cannot become a party to the European Convention
on Human Rights, because ratification of the Convention would entail the intro-
duction of a different institutional system for the protection of human rights in
the Community legal order.9 A recurring question, given this institutional frame-
work, is the extent to which the interpretation of rights in the ECHR diverges
between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.10
The Court of Justice has not yet had the opportunity to confirm whether the
Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and the UN Convention against
Torture (now ratified by all Member States) can be considered sources of the
6 Directive 2003/86 (OJ 2003 L 251/12). For more on that Directive, see Ch. 19. On
the other hand, the EC-Turkey Association Agreement still does not cover the ini-
tial admission of family members. It should also be recalled that the UK, Ireland
and Denmark opted out of the family reunion Directive.
7 Case law beginning with Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651.
8 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture [2003] ECR I-7411, para.
68, quoting established case law. For an analysis of the issue of limitations of rights
under the general principles of law and the Charter of Rights, see Peers, “Taking
Rights Away? Derogations and Limitations” in Peers and Ward, eds., The EU Char-
ter of Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Hart, 2004) 141.
9 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759.
10 From a huge literature on the ECJ/ECtHR relationship, see Spielmann, “Human
Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsisten-
cies and Complementarities” in Alston, ed. (n. 3 above), 757.
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order
general principles of Community law. If they are, then the next question would
be whether “soft law” such as the UNHCR Handbook and Executive Commit-
tee Conclusions, and the decisions of the Committee Against Torture, are also
sources of the general principles. There are good arguments that all of these
measures should be considered to be such sources, in particular in light of the
references to the Geneva Convention in the EC Treaty itself and in EC legisla-
tion.11 It appears that the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is a source of the general principles, although the Court of Justice
took a dismissive view of the impact of the opinions of the Human Rights Com-
mittee set up to monitor the implementation and application of the Covenant.12
The Court of Justice has also been willing to examine the compatibility of EC
legislation with international treaties if that legislation asserts its compatibility
with those treaties in its preamble;13 this rule could presumably also be applied
wherever the preamble or main text of EC immigration and asylum legislation
refers to human rights treaties, as much of that legislation does.
In any event, the Court of Justice has certainly confirmed that the protec-
tion of private and family life set out in Article 8 ECHR is among the rights
protected by the general principles of EC law, a finding of great importance
to immigration and asylum cases. This principle has indeed been applied in a
number of cases involving family members of EU citizens,14 although the Court
has not had had an opportunity to confirm its relevance to family members
of third-country nationals.15 But the Court has not yet had the opportunity to
confirm whether the human rights protected in the general principles of EC law
include a “Soering effect” protecting against (direct or indirect) removal to a
country where there is a real risk that the human rights of an individual would
11 For more detailed argument on these issues, see Peers, “Human Rights, Asylum and
European Community Law”, 24 RSQ (2005) 2:24.
12 Case C-249/96 Grant [1998] ECR I-621. On the ECJ’s references to international
human rights treaties other than the ECHR, see Rosas, “The European Union and
International Human Rights Instruments”, in Kronenberger, ed., The EU and the
International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (Asser Press, 2001).
13 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v EP and Council [2001] ECR I-7079.
14 Cases 249/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1263; C-60/00 Carpenter [2002]
ECR I-6079; C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591; C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002]
ECR I-7091; C-257/00 Givane [2003] ECR I-345; C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR I-
9607; and C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopolous and Olivieri [2004] ECR I-5257. Not
all of these judgments refer expressly to Article 8 ECHR, but some refer to judg-
ments of the Strasbourg Court (Carpenter, Akrich and Orfanopolous and Olivieri)
See further Peers in Walker, ed. (n. 5 above).
15 On this issue, see Demirel (n. 5 above) and the Opinions in Cases C-65/98 Eyup
[2000] ECR I-4747, C-275/02 Ayaz [2004] ECR I-8765, para. 44, and C-540/03 EP v
Council (pending).
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Steve Peers
16 See the case law of the European Court of Human Rights starting with Soering v
UK (A-161), and particularly the decision in T.I. v U.K, 7 March 2000.
17 This applies where Member States control the territory or administration of another
country by invasion or consent, or where their authorities undertake actions on that
other country’s territory or which produce effects there: see particularly the Stras-
bourg Court’s decision in Bankovic v UK and others (Reports 2001-XII).
18 Although Protocols 4 and 7 have not been ratified by all Member States, the Court
of Justice and Court of First Instance have referred to rights which appear in both
Protocols (see respectively Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-3265, para. 22, and
Case T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland [2003] ECR II-2597, para. 85 (with further
references)). Besides the Singh judgment, the Court of Justice has referred to the
right of entry and non-expulsion of citizens in a number of other cases, although
the Singh judgment is the only occasion upon which the Court recognised the rule
as a human right: for the relevant cases, see note 31 in Peers, “Civil and Political
Rights” (n. 2 above). In any event, the ICCPR has been ratified by all Member
States.
19 See particularly Cases C-377/98 Netherlands v EP and Council (n. 13 above) and C-
36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609.
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order
wider scope than the ECHR right. This is particularly the case with the proce-
dural rights conferred by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. Article 6 has no application
to immigration or asylum proceedings,20 but the Court of Justice has confirmed
repeatedly that the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy nevertheless applies
wherever there is a link to a right conferred by Community law, and has in par-
ticular expressly confirmed the application of this principle to disputes concern-
ing the admission of third-country nationals.21 The implication of this is that at
least some, and possibly all, immigration and asylum proceedings linked to EC
legislation are covered by the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy (the
precise scope of the principle depends on the question of whether a Community
law right is at issue). Depending on the scope of this principle, the question of
whether the procedural rights in the ICCPR and Protocol 7 ECHR concern-
ing expulsion of legal migrants form part of the general principles of EC law
(discussed above) may be moot, as third-country nationals could enjoy extensive
procedural rights in most or all proceedings concerning admission or expulsion
that fall within the scope of EC law.22 Even where EC legislation appears to
set out a minimum set of procedural rules, the general principles nevertheless
appear to require Member States to set a higher standard if necessary to ensure
effective procedural protection;23 this is obviously relevant to much EC immigra-
tion and asylum legislation, in particular the asylum procedures Directive. It is
also arguable that where the EC sets out certain rights in legislation (such as the
right to be recognised as needing subsidiary protection)24 but does not set out
any relevant procedural rules in its legislation, procedural rights nevertheless
exist by virtue of the general principles of EC law.
Finally, a dormant issue yet to be explored by the Court of Justice is the
potential application of Article 307 EC to human rights issues. This Article
specifies that in case of a conflict between EC law obligations and obligations
established by Member States’ international treaties concluded prior to their
membership of the EU, the conflicting EC obligations are inapplicable in the rel-
evant Member State(s). However, there is an eventual obligation for the relevant
Member States to amend or denounce any such external obligations that conflict
with their obligations to the Community.25 It might be arguable, in light of the
role of human rights treaties as sources of the general principles of EC law, that
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Steve Peers
26 This particular issue might be addressed by the Court in a pending case (Case C-
145/04 Spain v UK), in which Spain is challenging the UK’s decision to extend voting
rights in European Parliament elections to residents of Gibraltar, in order to imple-
ment its ECHR obligations (see judgment of the Strasbourg Court in Matthews
v UK, n. 51 below), as a breach of EC law. The Court of First Instance appears
to assume that there is no obligation for Member States to attempt to amend or
denounce their UN obligations pursuant to Article 307: see Cases T-306/01 Yusuf
and T-315/01Kadi, judgments of 21 Sept. 2005, not yet reported.
27 Opinion 2/94 (n. 9 above).
28 Art. 46(d) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Amster-
dam.
29 For instance, see the Order in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665.
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foreign policy and justice and home affairs matters established by the Treaty of
Amsterdam.30
Human rights issues reach the EU judicial system by several means. Since
individuals have the greatest interest in enforcing human rights, many claims
are brought by individuals directly against the EU institutions in the Court of
First Instance; an appeal lies from that Court’s judgments to the Court of Jus-
tice. However, due to strict standing rules on challenging the validity of EU
acts directly, individuals often have to begin their challenges to EU acts in the
national courts, which can refer the question of invalidity to the Court of Justice
pursuant to Article 234 EC. Under the same procedure, the Court can receive
references from national courts on the interpretation of EU acts in light of
human rights principles, including references on the compatibility of national
legislation or decisions falling within the scope of EC law with the EU’s human
rights principles. There have also been several cases in which a Member State has
challenged the compatibility of an EU act with human rights principles,31 and
human rights issues are also occasionally raised when the Commission brings
infringement proceedings against Member States for alleged breaches of EC
law.32 In principle, the Commission could also sue to annul an act of the Council,
or Council and European Parliament, for breach of human rights principles.
In the sphere of immigration and asylum, the standing rules will likely
prevent any direct challenges to EC acts by individuals in the Court of First
Instance, and indirect challenges by individuals (or judicial review proceedings
brought by NGOs) will have to reach the final courts of Member States before
they can be referred, due to the restrictions on the Court’s rule set out in Article
68 EC. Also, with increased qualified majority voting in the Council,33 it is more
likely that an outvoted Member State will sue to annul EC action, possibly on
human rights grounds. This could well arise, for example, if the Council adopts
a list of supposed “safe countries of origin” by outvoting some Member States
which object to including some countries on that list on human rights grounds.34
The issue could be relevant to future infringement actions by the Commission as
well, so NGOs active in the field of immigrant or refugee protection should not
ignore the avenue of complaining to the Commission with a view to triggering
30 See Art. Art. 46(a), (b), (c) and (e) TEU as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam
(since amended by the Treaty of Nice) and in particular, the restrictions applying to
immigration and asylum (Article 68 EC).
31 Netherlands v EP and Council (n. 13 above); Case C-280/93 Germany v Council
[1994] ECR I-4973 (see also interim measures ruling in this case, [1993] ECR I-
3667); and Case C-122/95 Germany v Council [1998] ECR I-973.
32 See Cases 249/86 Commission v Germany (n. 14 above) and C-62/90 Commission v
Germany [1992] ECR I-2575.
33 See Chs. 2 and 3.
34 See Ch. 14.
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Steve Peers
35 The most obvious candidate for an annulment action is all or part of the asylum
procedures Directive, which was adopted in December 2005 (see Ch. 14). The EP
could also attack the validity of implementing or secondary legislation on (inter alia)
human rights grounds: an example could (again) be the “safe country of origin”
lists that the Council plans to adopt pursuant to the asylum procedures Directive
(idem.)
36 See notably Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025.
37 See Akrich (n. 12 above), Case C-63/99 Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I-6369 and Case C-
235/99 Kondova [2001] ECR I-6427.
38 Case C-442/00 Rodriguez Caballero [2002] ECR I-11915.
39 On this, see Peers, “The European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights: Comparative Approaches”, in Orucu, ed., Judicial Comparativism
in Human Rights Cases, Orucu, ed. (UKNCCL, 2003), pp. 107-129.
40 See n. 14 above.
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tice made clear that it had to take account of the judgments of the Strasbourg
Court.41 This has entailed greater reference by the EU Courts to ECHR rules
on the limitation of rights, but the EU Courts have in some cases mixed the
ECHR rights with the EC limitation standard.42 The EU Courts’ approach to
Strasbourg case law inevitably reduces the concern that the standards of human
rights protection will “diverge” between the two Courts,43 although it should be
noted that this concern is misplaced (from a human rights perspective) as long
as the standard of protection in EU law is higher (rather than lower) than that
of the ECHR, since the ECHR sets only a minimum standard of human rights
protection.44 This approach also means that the Court of Justice is less likely
to require a higher standard of human rights protection than required by the
Strasbourg case law, where ECHR rights are concerned.
Moreover, it appears that in some circumstances at least, Strasbourg judg-
ments have an effect on EC law beyond simply serving as a source of the human
rights principles. In the K.B. judgment,45 the Court of Justice stated that national
legislation which was “in breach of the ECHR” (as determined by a judgment
of the European Court of Human Rights) and thus prevented persons from
fulfilling a requirement to benefit from an EC law rule “must be regarded as
being, in principle, incompatible with the requirements of Article 141 EC” (con-
cerning equal pay between men and women). However, in this case it was up
to the national courts to determine whether Article 141 could be invoked in
practice, since “the European Court of Human Rights has accepted” that “it is
41 See Case C-94/00 Roquette Freres [2002] ECR I-9011 (“For the purposes of deter-
mining the scope of [a human rights principle] ..., regard must be had to the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights subsequent to the [ECJ] judgment in
Hoechst”); Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99
P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P LVM and others (“PVC II”) [2002] ECR I-8375,
para. 274 (“[t]he parties agree that, since Orkem, there have been further develop-
ments in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which the Commu-
nity judicature must take into account when interpreting the fundamental rights”);
Case C-276/01 Steffensen [2003] ECR I-3735, para. 72 (“account must be taken
of ... the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal, as laid down in Article 6(1) of
the ECHR and as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights”); and C-
105/03 Pupino, judgment of 16 June 2005, not yet reported, para. 59 (“The Frame-
work Decision must thus [because of Article 6(2) EU] be interpreted in such a way
that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to a fair trial as set out
in Article 6 of the Convention and interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights, are respected”).
42 For example, see Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez and de
Gaulle and others [2001] ECR II-2823.
43 On the divergence issue, see Spielmann (n. 10 above).
44 Art. 53 ECHR.
45 Case C-117/01 [2004] ECR I-541.
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Steve Peers
for the Member States to determine the conditions under which” the breach of
the relevant ECHR right was remedied. This judgment appears to suggest that a
“breach of the ECHR”, as determined by the Strasbourg Court, interacts with
the application of Community law and could therefore be enforceable within that
context. Arguably it is only because the Strasbourg Court left it to the Member
States to establish remedies for implementing its judgment that the Court of
Justice did not insist on the national courts giving full effect to Community law
in this case – which could have entailed setting aside the national legislation
pursuant to the supremacy of Community law, a power that is not available
to any national courts in the UK where human rights issues alone are at stake.
Potentially, there may be immigration and asylum cases where, like K.B., there is
an enhanced effect of the ECHR within the framework of Community law.
The Court of Justice has also recently confirmed that in some cases, EC
legislation aims to give effect to rights set out in the ECHR, and so must be
interpreted in light of the ECHR, including the judgments of the Strasbourg
Court.46 This reasoning could be relevant to issues such as family reunion and
subsidiary protection, which are similarly addressed by EC law and within the
scope of the ECHR.
Another important recent development is the affirmation of the Court of
First Instance that human rights are jus cogens rules that take priority over the
international obligations of the Community, even those stemming from Security
Council resolutions. 47 Logically, this must also mean that jus cogens rules can
be taken into account when determining the validity or interpretation of Com-
munity law, in addition to or in the alternative to the general principles of law.
In any event, a decision by the Security Council requiring Member States to (for
example) return a person to face torture or other inhuman or degrading treat-
ment would be easily open to challenge.
A final point is a recent change in the dynamics of the protection of human
rights in the EU legal order. As noted above, the European Parliament gained
the power, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, to challenge any act
of the Commission or Council in the Court of Justice, regardless of whether its
“legislative prerogatives” were affected or not. This has meant that the EP can
bring challenges against acts for breaches of human rights protection, and it has
been willing to do so as regards immigration legislation48 and measures indi-
rectly connected to immigration policy.49 An important substantive issue raised
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by the first case is the link between human rights protection and the adoption of
EC measures setting only minimum standards. This point is particularly relevant
to immigration and asylum law, where the Community has to date largely set
only minimum standards for Member States, with certain exceptions where the
law has been more fully harmonised.50 Do the general principles oblige the Com-
munity, when it adopts minimum standards legislation, to set those minimum
standards at a minimum level required by the general principles of Community
law? Or is it sufficient to adopt minimum standards that might fall below the
level which the general principles would require if the Community harmonised
a subject more fully, leaving it to the Member States to meet any national or
international human rights obligations that require Member States to set higher
standards than those set out in the EC legislation? If the EC is bound by the
general principles to set a certain level of protection when adopting minimum
standards legislation, what should that level of protection be?
Hopefully the Court’s judgment will answer these important questions.
If the answer is that minimum standards legislation is obliged to set minimum
standards for human rights protection at a level required by the general prin-
ciples, this could have implications for the validity and interpretation of other
EC immigration and asylum law as well. In this case, the other legislation could
be vulnerable to indirect challenges in the national courts, taking account of
the principles developed by the Court of Justice. There is an underlying issue
at stake, too: will the EC’s immigration and asylum law follow the model of
the EC’s internal market (entailing mutual recognition of other Member States’
decisions) or the model of human rights law (requiring or permitting Member
States to disregard the decisions of other Member States)?51
nically, this is an issue of data protection law, not immigration or asylum law.
50 For example, the rules on allocation of responsibility for asylum applications (see
Ch. 10).
51 On this point more generally, see Peers “EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Internal
Market Model or Human Rights Model?”, in Tridimas and Nebbia, eds., EU Law
for the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. 1 (Hart, 2004).
52 See respectively Reports 1996-V and Reports 1999-I.
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Steve Peers
clarified some key issues.53 In its judgment, the Human Rights Court said that
where Member States had some discretion in the application of EC law, then
normal standards of review of Member States’ actions for compatibility with
the Convention would apply. However, where Member States have no discretion
but to implement EC law, then they would be subject to a lower standard of
review: as long as it could be shown that the EC guaranteed ‘equivalent’ protec-
tion for the human rights set out in the Convention (which means ‘comparable’,
rather than ‘identical’ protection), then their actions would be presumed to be
in compliance with the Convention, unless it could be shown on a case-by-case
basis that there was a manifest deficiency in application of the Convention.
The Court then ruled that in light of the protection of the substantive ECHR
rights as part of the general principles of EC law, and the procedural guarantees
offered to individuals by the normal rules of the EC judicial system, the EC
provided equivalent protection. Since the proceedings in this case (concerning
seizure of an airline pursuant to EC legislation implementing UN sanctions)
therefore benefited from the presumption, then the substantive arguments were
not reviewed by the Court in detail.
The crucial question following this judgment is whether immigration and asylum
issues fall within the scope of this principle. Given the Human Rights Court’s
stress in the Bosphorus Airways judgment on the importance of the preliminary
rulings system for the effective enforcement of ECHR rights within the scope
of EC law, then it is arguable that immigration and asylum cases linked to EC
law are not subject to lower standards of review by the Human Rights Court
as long as there is an extremely restrictive access to the Court of Justice for
individuals bringing claims in such cases via national courts. In any event, it
should be recalled that the lower standards of review for EC law as set out in
the Bosphorus Airways judgment only apply when a Member State lacks discre-
tion to act. Wherever the EC sets minimum standards (as is the case throughout
most immigration and asylum law, but not visas and borders law) then Member
States retain some discretion to act, and so arguably, to the extent that they
act within that discretion, they would be subject to the full review of the Stras-
bourg Court. In any of these cases, (hypothetical) disappointing judgments of
the Court of Justice on asylum and immigration could still be subject to full
review in Strasbourg, as long as there is a “victim” within the meaning of the
ECHR and an ECHR issue that could be the subject of a complaint. There will
likely also remain some immigration and asylum cases outside the scope of EC
legislation, in which case the Strasbourg court would certainly be able to exercise
full review.
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54 OJ 2000 C 364/1.
55 For instance, see Case C-245/01 RTL Television [2003] ECR I-12489.
56 See Appendix I to Peers and Ward (n. 8 above). Notable examples are the Opinions
in Case C-353/99 P Hautala [2001] ECR I-9565 and Case C-173/99 BECTU [2001]
ECR I-4881.
57 See Appendix I to Peers and Ward (ibid.), and particularly Case T-177/01 Jego-
Quere [2002] ECR II-2365 and Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01
and T-272/01 Philip Morris and others [2003] ECR II-1.
58 See in particular the cases and Opinions cited in notes 56 and 57.
59 See Appendix I to Peers and Ward (n. 8 above).
60 The following adopted EC immigration and asylum measures refer explicitly to the
Charter in their preambles: Directive 2003/9 on asylum-seekers’ reception condi-
tions (OJ 2003 L 31/18); Reg. 343/2003 on asylum responsibility (OJ 2003 L 50/1);
Reg. 859/2003 on social security for third country nationals (OJ 2003 L 124/1);
Directive 2003/86 on family reunion (n. 6 above); Directive 2003/109 on long-term
residents (OJ 2004 L 16/44); the Decision on financing expulsion (OJ 2004 L 60/55);
the Decision on the Visa Information System (OJ 2004 L 213/5); Directive 2004/81
on victims of trafficking (OJ 2004 L 261/19); the Decision on joint expulsion flights
(OJ 2004 L 261/28); Directive 2004/83 on refugees and subsidiary protection (n.
24 above); Reg. 2007/2004 establishing the EU Borders Agency (OJ 2004 L 349/1);
Directive 2004/114 on the admission of students and others (OJ 2004 L 375/12); the
Decision establishing the second European Refugee Fund; (OJ 2004 L 381/52); the
Decision establishing a migration management service (OJ 2005 L 83/48); Directive
2005/71 and two Recommendations on researchers (OJ 2005 L 289); and Directive
2005/85 on asylum procedures (OJ 2005 L 326/13).
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Steve Peers
immigration and asylum law is concerned,61 the “affirming” role of the Char-
ter therefore reinforces the protection that the EC general principles currently
give to rights such as the protection of family life.62 But, more importantly, the
Charter contains some ECHR rights relevant to immigration and asylum law (in
particular, the right to life, freedom from torture or other inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment, restrictions on detention) which have not yet been recognised by
the Court of Justice as forming part of the general principles of Community
law.63 While it is unlikely that the Court of Justice would have rejected the inclu-
sion of these rights as part of the general principles, their express inclusion in
the Charter nonetheless strengthens the argument that they form part of the
general principles. The Charter also contains a right derived from the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights: the right to not to be removed to
countries where torture et al or the death penalty would be carried out.64 Again,
it is unlikely in light of its respect for ECtHR case law that the Court of Justice
would reject the existence of such a principle as part of EC law, but the express
inclusion of the principle in the Charter strengthens the argument that the prin-
ciple exists.
Also, the Charter contains some relevant rights not found in the ECHR or
the Strasbourg case law, in particular the right to human dignity and the right to
asylum.65 The former right has already been recognised as forming part of the
general principles,66 but its reiteration in strong terms in Article 1 of the Charter
suggests that it is an independent right with a strong effect, bolstering the case
for a robust interpretation of the right, inter alia in immigration and asylum
cases, as detailed above. The latter right is more tenuous as it appears in only a
minority of national constitutions and does not appear as such in any interna-
tional treaty binding the Member States, so its appearance within the Charter
could prove crucial in arguing that it is a general principle of Community law.67
This brings us to the question of interpreting the Charter. The current Char-
ter contains an Article 52 with three paragraphs, setting out a general rule on
61 On the Charter and immigration and asylum law, see Guild, “Citizens, Immigrants,
Terrorists and Others” in Peers and Ward, eds. (n. 8 above) 231; and Peers, ‘‘Immi-
gration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 3
EJML (2001) 141.
62 This point has been specifically noted in the Opinions in Baumbast, Carpenter,
MRAX (n. 14 above) and EP v Council (Case C-540/03, n. 15 above).
63 Arts. 2, 4 and 6 of the Charter. The Court did mention Arts. 2 and 3 ECHR in pass-
ing in Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
64 Art. 19 of the Charter.
65 Arts. 1 and 18 of the Charter. However, the Strasbourg case law indicates that human
dignity underpins the express Convention rights: Pretty v UK (Reports 2002-III).
66 See the case law cited, n. 19 above.
67 For elaboration, see Peers, n. 11 above.
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order
68 For more detailed analysis regarding immigration and asylum law, see Peers, n. 60
above; for more detailed analysis of the Charter interpretation rules in general, see
Peers, n. 8 above.
69 Moreover, these references have not considered Art. 53: see the Opinions in Baum-
bast (n. 14 above), Hautala (n. 54 above), Bidar (Case C-209/03 [2005] ECR I-2119)
and EP v. Council (n. 15 above).
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Steve Peers
the Charter applies to Member States when they are derogating from EU law.70
In any event, the wording does not suggest that the scope of the Charter is any
wider that the general principles are as regards Member States’ activities.71 So
it appears that the Charter adds nothing to the general principles as far as the
scope of EC human rights principles is concerned, whether in the area of immi-
gration and asylum law or any other area.
The proposed Treaty sets out a three-part system for protection of human rights
within the EU legal order. All three parts are set out in Article I-9 of the Treaty,
which provides that:
1. The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II.
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect
the Union’s competences as defined in the Constitution.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.
These three elements (Charter, ECHR and general principles) will be examined
in turn.
70 See detailed analysis with further references by Carozza, “The Member States”, in
Peers and Ward, eds. (n. 8 above).
71 There is only one Advocate-General’s Opinion commenting on Art. 51 of the Char-
ter, arguing that the Charter has the same scope as the EC general principles: Opin-
ion in Omega (n. 19 above), para. 55 and note 29.
72 The text of the Constitutional Treaty is set out in OJ 2004 C 310.
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First Instance that the Charter reaffirms the existing general principles, or to
wonder whether some provisions of the Charter in fact do not reaffirm the
existing principles to some extent. For if the Charter becomes a legally binding
document, all of the analysis of the text of the Charter as set out above would
become fully relevant, as the Charter could be relied on in its own right.
This does leave several important questions. One would be the temporal
scope of the binding effect of the Charter; if it only becomes binding as from
the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, it would be crucial to estab-
lish whether the Charter is indeed simply a reaffirmation in full of the general
principles, or whether there are some differences (of scope, substantive rights or
interpretation rules) between the two sources of human rights rules. If there are
some differences, it would be necessary to determine what falls within the tem-
poral scope of the binding Charter, and what falls only within the scope of the
general principles. The best approach would be to apply a “continuing effect”
test, similar to that applicable to the ECHR after its ratification by States.73
Another important question would be the legal effect of the Charter. As
a part of the Constitutional Treaty it would presumably have at least the same
effect as the general principles, serving as a rule applying to the validity and
interpretation of EU and national acts (where the national acts fall within the
scope of the Charter). But a new issue would arise: as Articles of the Consti-
tutional Treaty, could the provisions of the Charter (apparently unlike the gen-
eral principles) confer directly effective rights? This appears to be ruled out for
certain Charter rights (as discussed below), but it remains a possibility for the
others – including the rights most relevant to immigration and asylum law. Also,
as a set of Treaty Articles, the Charter, like all other EU law, has primacy over
all measures of Member States within its scope;74 that means that all national
courts and tribunals must be able to set aside provisions of national law, even
parliamentary legislation and national constitutions, that conflict with the Char-
ter.75 This is, for example, a stronger power than UK national courts have under
the Human Rights Act; it also applies to a wider range of rights and can be exer-
cised by a wider range of courts and tribunals.
A final key new question would be the effect of the four new provisions
which would be added by the Constitutional Treaty to the “interpretation”
clause, Article 52 of the Charter. Two of these new provisions appear to be irrel-
evant to immigration and asylum law. First of all, none of the main Charter
provisions relevant to immigration and asylum appear to set out “principles” as
distinct from “rights”, and so none of them would be subject to the attempt to
73 See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Kluwer, 1998) pp. 11-13.
74 Article I-6 of and Declaration 1 to the Constitutional Treaty.
75 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 and Case C-213/89 Factortame [1991]
ECR I-2433.
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Steve Peers
limit the legal effect of such principles, as set out in Article 52(5) of the Charter.
Secondly, none of the relevant Charter provisions refer to potential limitations
set by national law, and so none would be caught by the new clause requiring
deference to national law in such cases (Article 52(6)).
That leaves two relevant new provisions. Article 52(4) requires Charter
rights based on national constitutions to be interpreted “in harmony” with
national traditions. It is not clear which clauses are covered by this provision
or what it means to interpret in harmony with those traditions; the authors of
this paragraph should perhaps take up writing music, instead of legal texts. It is
certainly arguable that the right to asylum is covered by this provision, but there
is a further argument that many of the rights corresponding to ECHR rights,
including rights such as the right to family life, are also rights derived from
national constitutions. In such cases, it is not clear whether the right is governed
by Article 52(3), Article 52(4), or both – or indeed alternatively or additionally
by the general limitations rule in Article 52(1).76
The other relevant new clause is Article 52(7), which requires the EU and
national courts to interpret the Charter having “due regard” to the explana-
tions of the Charter drawn up when the Charter was initially drafted, and then
revised during the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty,77 which now appear
as Declaration 12 to the Constitutional Treaty. The implication of this change
for immigration and asylum issues is that the notes should be carefully examined
in any case where a Charter right might be relevant (including cases where the
“horizontal” rules in Articles 51-54 of the Charter could be relevant). In fact, it is
worth examining the current and revised versions of these notes even before the
entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, as both versions have already been
referred to on several occasions by Advocates-General of the Court of Justice.78
Readers will find that the notes are very clear and helpful on some points, and
very unclear and unhelpful on others. For example, the notes give a very full list
and explanation of the cases in which the Charter rights wholly or partly “cor-
respond” to ECHR rights, and state clearly that the limitations and derogations
on those Charter rights must match the parallel limitations and derogations on
rights set out in the ECHR. They also state clearly that Charter standards can
never drop below those of the ECHR. However, they do not explain clearly what
the reference to Union law adopting more extensive protection could entail. Nor
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order
do they give any clear explanation of what the right to asylum entails – although
this leaves the door open to argue about the implications of this Charter right.
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Steve Peers
3.4 Cross-overs
With three apparently distinct sources of human rights rules under the Con-
stitutional Treaty, it will be necessary to determine which source (or sources)
apply to a given case. In the absence of anything to indicate that only one of the
sources can be relied on, it will presumably be open to rely on as many as pos-
sible, suggesting a wide spectrum of possibilities for arguments to be brought,
particularly in immigration and asylum cases where more than one right set out
in each of the three sources could be relevant. It might be expected that the EU
Courts will strive for a consistent and coherent interpretation of the multiple
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Chapter 5 Human Rights in the EU Legal Order
sources. Nonetheless, the Constitutional menu lists a wide variety of rights that
a discerning legal diner could attempt to order from the judicial kitchen.
4 Conclusions
The interaction of EC immigration and asylum law with the system for the pro-
tection of human rights in EC law is a critical issue in the practical application
of EC immigration and asylum legislation. This is obviously true if the Consti-
tutional Treaty is ratified, entailing human rights protection by means of a com-
bination of the Charter, ECHR accession by the EU, and the general principles
of EU law. But it is already true now, by virtue of the general principles of EC
law, comprising also an indirect impact of the ECHR (via the case law of the
Court of Justice and the indirect review of EU actions by the Strasbourg Court)
and entailing a limited role for the EU’s Charter of Rights.
It is therefore critical that anyone involved in disputes or proceedings which
fall within the scope of EC immigration and asylum legislation is sufficiently
familiar with both the current basic system for the protection of human rights
in the EC legal order and (if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified) with the system
provided for under the EU’s proposed Constitutional Treaty. This entails famil-
iarity with the sources of the basic rights that can be protected within the system,
the circumstances in which those rights can be invoked (the scope of the EC
rules) and the remedies which invoking those rights could entail (the legal effect
of the EC rules).
As discussed above, the sources certainly include the ECHR and the case law
of the ECtHR, but also include national constitutional principles (such as human
dignity, and potentially the right to asylum) and other international treaties,
potentially even treaties that do not have full effect in the domestic law of some
Member States (like the ICCPR or the Convention on the Rights of the Child)
and ECHR Protocols which some Member States have not ratified. The potential
impact of the Geneva Convention on Refugee Status and connected soft law upon
the development of EC human rights principles will be a critical issue.
It should always be recalled that the scope of the legal rules covers not just the
EU institutions, but also the Member States when implementing EU rules – which
will mean that most asylum decisions and many immigration decisions taken at
national level will fall within the scope of the human rights principles once the
deadlines for applying with the relevant legislation have passed. An important
issue still to be resolved definitively is whether national derogations from EC
immigration and asylum law fall within the scope of the EC human rights rules.
Finally, EC human rights rules benefit from the strong legal effect of Com-
munity law, and so can be used to attack the validity of national rules (even
national legislation) as well as the validity of Community measures. The obli-
gation to interpret national and Community law in light of the human rights
principles will be important also.
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
Judit Tóth
1 Parallels
The recent and forthcoming enlargement has led to consideration of institu-
tional transformation of the European Union due to its plan to agree accession
of a great number of new Member States. Enlargement raises issues such as
qualified majority voting in the Council, extension of the influence of the Euro-
pean Parliament in the decision making process and wider implementation of
enhanced co-operation. The necessary reforms were agreed before enlargement,
as decided at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. Regardless of the
success of this institutional transformation, accession negotiations had to be
opened with the most advanced candidate countries. In the light of these conclu-
sions the declaration on the future of the EU attached to the Nice Treaty, signed
on 26 February 2001 and in force 1 February 2003, envisaged the inter-govern-
mental conference (IGC) dealing with institutional reforms, with the involve-
ment of candidate Member States which signed accession treaties beforehand.
The Treaty of Accession with ten new Member States was signed in April 2003.
This proves that internal institutional transformation and eastward enlargement
can apply simultaneously.
With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the field of “Visas,
asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons”
came under the first pillar, in the form of European Community law, under Title
IV of the EC Treaty (Articles 61-69). An area of freedom, security and justice
had to be implemented over a five-year period after the entry into force of the
Amsterdam Treaty, by May 2004.
The following fields moved into EC jurisdiction:
– border controls;
– the issue of visas;
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 139-165.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Judit Tóth
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
Member States with the candidate states defined the institutions for dialogue,
the timescale for preparation and the legal obligations for associated countries
concerning approximation of legislation and reform of their public administra-
tion. Their implementation required an executive mechanism in the Community
as well as in the candidate states. Although the Europe Agreements contained no
special references on asylum and migration, the executive mechanism respon-
sible for home affairs had to be established in the second phase of the accession
efforts, when accession negotiations started. Further on, the Accession Treaties
include not only institutional, decision-making provisions, but also an obliga-
tion to apply the Schengen acquis without advantages in new Member States, a
temporary opportunity for (old) Member States to limit the movement of work-
ers from newly joined countries and for implementation of safety closure.
The Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe was adopted in June
2004.2 The ceremonial signature in late October 2004 and its entry into force by
2007 would mean a continuous development in the EU with an extended area of
freedom, security and justice, as follows:
– Forming of an area of freedom, security and justice is not only an objec-
tive of the Union (Art I-3(2)) but it belongs to the shared competence of
the Member States with the Union (Art. I-14(2)(j)) although justice and
home affairs will become not a totally community policy, and protection of
public order and national security shall be considered as basic function of
Member State in Art. I-16(1) and III-262. The principle of subsidiarity, soli-
darity and the flexibility clause (Arts. I-11 (3), I-18 and I-44) also frame the
practice of this competence.
– Chapter IV (Arts. III-257-277) of Part III repeats the name and some com-
ponents of Title IV in force, such as:
– free movement of persons across the internal borders,
– common policy on asylum, immigration and control on external border
crossing (reception and legal status of refugees, temporary protected per-
sons, protection against refoulement, conditions of visa, entry and residence
permits, fight against illegal migration, integration of lawfully resident
migrants)
– combating extremism (racism, xenophobia) and crime including preven-
tion,
– but it is extended on co-operation in civil and criminal law matters (e.g.
through the mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions) and
police issues in which the European Parliament and Member States obtain
entitlement for stronger control and legislative initiative (Art. I-42). The
pillar system would be dismantled, including the common foreign, security
and defence policy with specific decision making procedure (Art. I-16, I-40-
41).
2 OJ 2004 C 310.
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Judit Tóth
– The regular voting rule will be based on majority in the Council (I-23(3)),
while unanimity in certain justice issues, enhanced co-operation, dominant
European framework laws provide more manoeuvring room for state sov-
ereignty in this field.
2 Pan-European Security
The values underlying the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere European
Council Presidency conclusions (15-16 October 1999) are encapsulated in the
upper cited phrase, “area of freedom, security and justice” that implies much
greater emphasis on legal and political rights and on benefits to the European
citizens than was the case in previous justice and home affairs co-operation,
which emphasised security. After the catastrophic events of 11th September
2001, and in particular of 11th March 2004 in Madrid and July 2005, security
has been put on the agenda again as a priority, and international developments
upgraded the Union’s external action on justice and home affairs. Beyond the
generalised threat, the enhanced co-operation between the border guards, intel-
ligence services and immigration and asylum authorities of the state concerned
and in EU level (e.g. an anti-terorist interministerial co-ordinating body was
set up in Hungary,3 the National Security Concept of Estonia was submitted
to the parliament evaluating the nation’s security situation, foreign policy goals
and activities necessary for achiving them4, or the co-operation among intelli-
gent services is enhanced in the framework of SITCEN5). The newly introduced
restrictions on entry or residence can violate human rights. For instance, “the
summary rejection of asylum-seekers at borders or points of entry may amount
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
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Judit Tóth
“The enlargement process makes Europe a safer place for its citizens and
contributes to conflict prevention and control in the wider world.”8 For this
reason in the same document the Commission emphasised that: “Enlargement
will also bring new challenges. It will heighten the need for the EU and its neigh-
bours to work closely on issues such as justice and home affairs. The EU is likely
to attract migrants from its neighbours and will want to develop with them ways
of planning for legal migration while combating illegal migration and trafficking
in human beings. Border management will take on increased importance with
close co-operation in areas ranging from customs and veterinary controls to
combating organised crime and drugs trafficking ... .The future borders of the
Union must not become a new dividing line”. Just for this purpose the Schengen
system will apply to all new Member States. But “full participation in it will be
based on a two-step process. The new Member States will first need to achieve
a high level of external border control upon accession whereas the lifting of
internal border controls with current Member States will take place only at a
later stage, subject to a separate decision by the Council.” This extended security
approach has upgraded the legislation for combating organised crime, terror-
ism, punishment of legal persons in candidate (and new member) states while
the accession efforts in visa, border control, and alien policing issues have been
developing slowly. This has been due partly to the regional context and partly to
high expenses. For instance, the Hungarian Government defined the necessary
measures and legislation related to the European Council’s extraordinary meet-
ing on 21st September 2001. The Government issued its own Resolution (No.
2298 of 2001) on 19th October and all of these measures were adopted by the
Minister of the Interior, the Government or the Parliament by 31st December
2001 (such as the Act Amending the Penal Code, No. 121 of 2001, Act on Com-
bating terrorism and Aggravation of Rules on Prevention of Money Laundering
No. 83 of 2001, Government Decree No. 299 as executive rules to the Act on
Prevention and Restraining of Money Laundering No.24 of 1994). These provi-
sions were passed relatively smoothly, targeting the universal enemies of terror-
ism and organised crime and their financing, although they introduced severe
limitations on civil rights.
On the other hand, the participation of candidates in the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) has been evaluated on its merits only in a regional
context. For instance, the Commission Regular Report on Poland (1998) can enu-
merate only the Polish participation on regular meetings of political directors,
correspondents and working groups of CFSP and negotiations with NATO.9
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The other Reports took the same totally formal approach. The real develop-
ments and conflicts are indicated exclusively in the regional security framework.
For example, the previously mentioned Polish Report said: “Poland diverged
from the EU’s demarche on Belarus following the expulsion of European dip-
lomats.…Poland’s notable record of facilitating regional security has been rein-
forced with a positive chairmanship of the OSCE in 1998. In terms of regional
foreign policy Poland’s constructive relations with Lithuania have continued to
deepen.” Or the Commission’s Report on Hungary (2001) stresses that Hungary
“has continued to develop good-neighbourly relations with surrounding coun-
tries and promoted regional co-operation”, such as playing an active role in the
South East European Stability Pact, holding the presidency of the Visegrad dia-
logue and participating in the South East Co-operative Initiative.10
The enlargement makes the foreign policy a rather security oriented, while
the area of freedom, security and justice as part of communitarisation has a
local and regional dimension. “For the EU’s part, the whole range of the Union’s
policies (foreign, security, trade, development, environment and others) will need
to rise to meet this challenge. Stability, security and prosperity must be practi-
cal, achievable goals for both the EU and its neighbours.”11Consistency of the
new neighbourhood policy means the stronger co-operation with also Ukraine,
Russia or Moldavia in fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, efforts towards the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts
and regular co-operation in justice and home affairs through the proper instru-
ments (MEDA, TACIS, budget contribution) as European Neighbourhood Instru-
ments (ENI).12 The Committee of Region points out that guaranteeing domestic
security is in many cases the task of regional and local level. The efforts for
establishing the area of freedom, security and justice is not being implemented
in an abstract legal space, but in the concrete context of each particular region
or locality, with its own particular characteristics, such as high concentration of
migrants, exclusion or marginalisation. Thus it recommends measures to main-
tain the level of security through cross-border co-operations (opening border
crossing, co-operation between local police authorities, youth work, etc.).13
Perhaps these prove the complexity of various aspects of regional security
and relations that are relevant to Title IV, area of freedom, security and justice and
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CFSP including the newborn neighbourhood policy issues during the enlargement
process and even afterward.
3 A Common Policy
Until the Maastricht Treaty, migration and asylum matters in the EC fell squarely
into the sovereign realm of the Member States. Since then, however, particu-
larly after the Amsterdam Treaty, the policy of asylum, the free movement of
persons, visa policy, rules governing the crossing of the EU’s external borders,
immigration policy and the rights of third country nationals, have all become
full Community responsibilities. The special meeting of the European Council
in Tampere agreed that “the separate but closely related issues of asylum and
migration call for the development of a common EU policy”. It elaborated the
political guidelines for the next years, including in the field of asylum and immi-
gration. Thus it was recognised that the EU needed a common immigration and
asylum policy composing of the following elements: partnership with countries
of origin; a common European asylum system; fair treatment of third country
nationals; and an effective management of migration flows. These developments
within the EU have direct implications for the rest of Europe, particularly for
acceding states.14
The main objective of refugee policy is the protection of persecuted indi-
viduals. All Member States have to give the same high level of protection to
such persons in accordance with international human rights obligations but
with clear differences between asylum and immigration policies. Migration is
a focus for demographic and economic reasons. In order to maintain its pres-
ent level of economic and social performance while its population is ageing,
the EU’s Member States may need migrants in the near future. The establish-
ment and further development of a common market requires the removal of
barriers for the free movement of persons between the Member States. The free
movement of legally residing third country nationals – including the residents
of candidate countries – should be promoted, as well as the free movement of
EU nationals. Third-country nationals also should profit from labour mobility,
student exchanges and the provision of services across internal borders. Both
immigration and asylum policies have to deal with the issues of visas, border
controls, family unification, criteria for admission, authorisation of residence,
social integration, equal treatment and anti-discrimination. In this way, only
common immigration and asylum policies can be effective. However, recognition
of de facto immigration15 is not enough to operate effectively a co-ordination
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mechanism in the area of immigration that aims to set up a method for monitor-
ing the development of national immigration policies.16
The candidate and new member countries together form a new migration
space. In the last decade they may be characterised by the common patterns of
migratory movements and migration policy observed in Central Europe. The
number of immigrants has climbed whilst the number of emigrants has declined
or remained stable. The major groups of people coming into this region from the
East and South are migrant workers, small-scale traders, asylum seekers, refu-
gees and transit migrants trying to get further West. This region is also attrac-
tive for both lawful and illegal business entrepreneurs and criminal networks,
and there is an informal and formal side to these activities. The high number
of border crossings and vouchers granted to “tourists” in a visa free regime
disguises the fact that many are engaged in economic activities such as working,
trading, smuggling or trying to cross the border into the EU illegally. This kind
of migration is called “a circulation”, “a complex mosaic” or a “quasi-migra-
tion”, and poses challenges to traditional migration theories.17 In addition this
new space of migration has own special features in each state, such as ethnic
migration. The candidate and new member states consider themselves as non-
destination countries, and asylum seekers and migrants are in transit, thus immi-
grants cannot become residents, taxpayers or potential contributors to reducing
the demographic deficit. Growing prejudice toward all groups of migrants (at
least in Hungary, see Figures 1 and 2) cannot be reduced with economic delib-
erations.18 However, acceding states have not made economic and labour analy-
ses of the benefits of migration in receiving countries. Taking into account these
facts, a comprehensive asylum and migration policy was not prepared before acces-
sion.
The non-governmental sector has an important role to play in the shaping
of European immigration and asylum policies. It attempts to influence the deci-
sion-making process through information exchange, voicing concerns, inspir-
ing public debates and drawing up proposals for legislative measures, such as
the Amsterdam Proposals (2000) containing six proposals for directives on Title
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19 The Amsterdam Proposals or how to influence policy debates on asylum and immigra-
tion, Niessen and Rowlands, eds. (ENAR-ILPA-MPG, 2000).
20 Regular Report on Czech Republic’s Progress towards Accession (1998).
21 Tóth, Judit: The NGO sector and its participation in legislation process in Hungary.
Conference paper (Central European University, 25/26 April 2002, Budapest)
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protection in two pages, must draw the conclusion: “Despite these considerable
and acknowledged efforts, the integration of the Roma into economic and social
fabric is only at the beginning of what may be a long process”.22 In order to take
a short cut, the Accession Partnership included various Roma programmes.
According to surveys three interconnected factors appear to be very impor-
tant for explaining the patterns of destination for asylum seekers creating a chain
migration: existing communities of compatriots, colonial bonds and knowledge
of the language.23 Due to the absence of these major links, the candidate and
new member states are supposed to remain transit areas for (potential) asylum
seekers for the near future. Despite these facts, this context has been neglected
or instead addressed only as part of the issue of the prevention of trafficking of
human beings and illegal migration into the continent. Where is the dialogue on
these subjects? One of the objectives is to assist countries of origin and transit,
but its execution means “helping third countries to cope with their readmis-
sion obligations toward the Union and the Member States” or “development of
common minimum standards on repatriation” (see Commission Green Paper,
April 2002). What is the supposed role of candidate or newly acceded states
as transit countries while they are marching toward membership? The existing
documents deal with non-candidate countries.
An open method of co-operation for the immigration policy within a coherent
EU framework as it was proposed by the Commission 24neither can be endorsed
by, nor be widely discussed in the candidate (and new member) states due to the
absence of institutionalised domestic channel of communication of actors in
concern. “As the Communication proposed, setting up a national Action Plan
on Immigration Policy will be a real novelty, in particular its regular review and
evaluation that would inspire the establishment of co-operation between stake-
holders at national level in new member states”.25The ECOSOC urges the social
partners, civil society organisations and immigrant associations to participate
actively in the co-ordination and exchange of experiences, and it “can act as an
institutional focal point for the social organisations and work with the Commis-
sion, Parliament and Council on immigration and integration policy.”26 Briefly,
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the institutional and political frame is forming for a common immigration and
integration policy involving all stakeholders in various level of development for
the open (never-ended) co-operation, and these circumstances can influence on
domestic dialogue with social partners and civil society in newly acceded coun-
tries.
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration,
integration and employment” (COM (2003) 336 final, Brussels, 10 December 2003).
27 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the “Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council and the European Parliament : Towards more accessible, equi-
table and managed asylum system” (27 January 2004)
28 Regulation No.491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council establish-
ing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas
of migration and asylum (AENEAS) (10 March 2004)2004.
29 96/198/JHA Council Decision of 4 March 1996 on alert and emergency procedure
for burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence pf displaced per-
sons on a temporary basis; 2000/596/EC Council Decision of 28 September 2000
establishing a European Refugee Fund; 2001/275/EC Commission Decision of 20
March 2001 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Decision
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
relevant and rather applicable for the new, peripheral member states and can-
didates unless they will be frightened at huge administrative requirements of
co-finance and mechanism can survive.
The provisions in the Council Directive on temporary protection following
mass influxes in the wake of crisis situations will be rather relevant to the periph-
ery of the (enlarged) EU, namely for candidate members. The Directive con-
cerns measures on reception and admission of forced migrants in a mass influx,
including especially financial support from the European Refugee Fund in prac-
tice. Involvement of the applicant countries in the preparation of secondary
and supplementary legislation was necessary due not only to their geographical
position but also to the absence of legal rules and clear practice on temporary
protection in those states – with certain exceptions. For instance, there are two
aspects to asylum rules in Slovenia. Beyond the recognition of refugees on the
basis of 1951 Geneva Convention, the Law on Temporary Refuge (No.1139 of
1997) and the Alien Act (No.1 of 1999) provide temporary residence on humani-
tarian grounds and temporary refugee status including different rights and sup-
ports. The law recognises temporary refuge to persons in danger, who have fled
from their country of origin in masses due to war, occupation or due to massive
violations of human rights. Temporary residence on humanitarian grounds is
issued because of the implementation of the non-refoulement principle in con-
nection with torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. In 1999 only about 4400
persons obtained protected migrant position while the total number of accom-
modated migrants in the country was 172,000 between 1992 and 1998. It means
that they were assisted and their residence was authorised on the base of tem-
porary rules.30 In Hungary the autonomous legislative regulation on temporary
protection in case of mass influx (Act No.139 of 1997) was replaced by a simple
reference on EU institution’s legal source, while the temporary protection for
individual applicants has been gradually restricted since 2001 regardless of prior
experiences and the growing number of migrants in legal limbo.
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31 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/studies/docs/study_
one_stop_shop_en.pdf>.
32 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such
persons and bearing the consequences.
33 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
“A more efficient common European asylum system: the single procedure as the next
step” (COM (2004) 503 final, 19 July 2004)
34 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national.
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
153
Judit Tóth
faced long debates before agreement and adoption in 2003.39 At the same time,
the existing gap between the status of nationals and foreigners in the candidate
countries will not be narrower due to reluctant consent in the EU. For instance,
foreigners were excluded from more than 100 legally regulated [professions] in
the Hungarian legal system in 2001,40and its revision has remained in a mosaic
due to fast amendments on the eve of accession and to absence of clear immi-
gration policy. In addition to this, nationals of the candidate states will not be
able to enjoy the fruits of emancipation in the current Member States as an
important element of socialisation before becoming European Union citizens
on accession. Moreover, the temporary restrictions in free movement of workers
of the new member states toward (old) member states may raise a conflict with
EEA workers residing and employed freely in the territory of new member states in
the hallmark of legal status.
The major challenge facing the Czech and Polish governments now is to
establish the structures necessary to recognise the status of refugees and to inte-
grate them in society. According to the Amendment to the Act on Employment
(2001) all asylum seekers can seek employment without a labour permit. Despite
this significant change, their entry into the labour market is doubtful. This is due
to language barriers and the poor orientation of asylum seekers in the labour
market. Most problems related to social welfare for refugees are due to the fact
that the whole procedure is slow and leaves asylum seekers with no financial
means in the time before their application for social benefits is dealt with. Sev-
eral NGOs have suggested that the Ministry of Interior would offer migrants
with tolerated status a loan, which would be reimbursed from received social
benefits. There have been changes in family reunion policy related to refugees,
but the new Act on the Residence of Foreigners does not allow aliens staying
legally in the Czech Republic to extend that status to their children41.
This is crucial to promote social cohesion and to combat the rise of racism
and growing xenophobia in the whole continent. Fair treatment of third country
nationals inspires measures aimed at enhancing non-discrimination and fight-
ing racism and xenophobia but applying generally to all persons residing in the
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territory of the EU. Both aspects of this fairness must be accepted by the can-
didate and new member states, in which the level of prejudice against groups of
nationals (Romas) as well as aliens are apparent. Figures 1 and 2 from Hungary
illustrate the rate of prejudice in public opinion,42as well as the Figure 3 that
demonstrates the growing extramism is Slovakia.43 For this reason, training of
police or to punish racist actions in accordance with a proposed EU framework
decision (Commission’s proposal on racism and xenophobia, November 2001)
would also radiate to the officers in the CEE states through the pre-accession
partnership.44 Finally, this approach implies an inclusive definition of national
identity which embraces people of all origins and faiths.45
Among the third country nationals residing as migrant workers, family
members or students there are more and more persons from the candidate coun-
tries. For them, enlargement will mean personally tangible benefits but the other
citizens living at home will face a transition period with certain limitations on
their mobility within the EU. The details of the transition period for new member
states’ citizen are known today. Would it be better to be a legally residing third
country national in the EU than a citizen of a newly acceded Member State?
How can the candidate states handle jointly the non-discrimination and emanci-
pation in the entire society? “Roma continue to suffer from widespread discrimi-
nation. Political commitment from the Bulgarian Government to remedy their
problems has still not been matched by concrete action.” Also, “steps have been
taken to combat the precarious situation of Roma minority in Poland”; “[t]he
integration of recognised refugees into society is still difficult and the Hungarian
Government would need to take appropriate measures”; and “efforts to inte-
grate non-citizens need to be continued in Latvia”.46 The answers and solutions
may also influence the inclusive or exclusive definition of national identity and
vice versa.
42 Toth-Sik, n. 18 above.
43 Annual Report on situation and development of extremism in the territory of the
Slovak Republic in 2001 (Bratislava, 2002) <www.minv.sk/en/ex/extrem.htm>.
44 COM (2001) 664, 28 Nov. 2001; OJ 2002 C 75 E/269.
45 Lewis, “An Immigration Policy for the European Union”, 20:2 Refugee Survey Quar-
terly (2001) 40.
46 Commission Strategy report (n. 4 above).
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
the upgraded combat hinder the respect for human rights that are newly received
and admitted in acceding states? Finally, EU co-operation has been reinforced to
achieve domestic policy objectives concerning the restriction of unwanted immi-
gration without public debate or discourse either in the Member States or in the
candidate countries.48 And new EU policy on immigration and asylum co-opera-
tion allows Member States to avoid domestic legal and political constraints that
inhibited their ability to restrict irregular migration.49
8 Mutual Trust
We can speak of trust of one another inside the EU and between the EU and
acceding states. The “Scoreboard” monitors progress in the adoption and imple-
mentation of the impressive range of measures needed to meet the targets set
by the Amsterdam treaty and the European Council. It is based on the gen-
eral acceptance of approximation or unification of different judicial traditions
and structures in the matters of asylum and migration. This regular monitoring
provides up-to date account of the results in the race for successful commu-
nautarisation. Citizens and political actors will be convinced that the most chal-
lenging issues facing society, such as migration, terrorism or crime can only be
usefully addressed at the level of the Union rather than by the Member States
acting alone. This tight co-operation demands further Community competences,
including common rules and joint actions. For instance, the incorporation of
the Schengen acquis has had an apparent impact on the Union’s work, Commu-
nity law or development of common practice, particularly as regards visas and
border controls at external borders.
Criteria of accession cover the ability of the candidate countries to imple-
ment the acquis that naturally include Community legislation in force as well as
mechanisms of co-operation in the field of asylum and migration. Negotiations
on aspects of justice and home affairs have been considered to be a prominent part
of the enlargement process diminishing the security risks as much as possible.
For this reason the candidate states must accept and be ready to implement the
Schengen acquis in its totality from the first moment of accession in principle,
subject to the “two-step” approach to applying Schengen in the new Member
States discussed above. This approach may contribute to a feeling of unequal
partnership.
In order to monitor the progress toward membership the Commission has
issued yearly reports measuring how the candidate countries meet the require-
ments of the acquis and JHA accession requirements since 1998. Also, the
Community has supported the applicant countries’ preparatory work via spe-
48 Geddes, “Asylum in Europe: States, the European Union and the International
System”, 20:2 Refugee Survey Quarterly (2001) 59.
49 Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making
as Venue Shopping”, 38 JCMS (2000) 251.
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cific projects under the Phare programme. Agenda 2000 and similar bilateral
mechanisms with Member State also relate to accession; and participation in
JHA programmes has made a material and professional contribution to can-
didate states’ ability to assume the obligations of membership. The pre-acces-
sion instruments financed by the Community provide support for institution
building and investment to strengthen the regulatory infrastructure needed to
ensure compliance with the acquis, including technical assistance. For instance,
the Phare programme allocated to Hungary during the period 1992 to 2001 was
1239.6 million EURO including the sum for Cross-Border Co-operation Pro-
grammes.50 These pre-accession instruments have provided considerable support to
border control, visa policy and combatting illegal migration while efforts to ensure
non-discrimination or create better conditions for asylum seekers have instead
been urged verbally. When setting the priorities for the accession partnerships
and the national programmes for the adoption of the acquis in applicant states,
the establishment of general preconditions of the rule of law, respect for fundamen-
tal rights and international obligations and their institutional guarantees should
have preceded the introduction of the special requirements of the acquis. It seems
that the accession criteria could become only rhetoric in the applicant states,
endangering the fragile new-born constitutional democracies.
Moreover, the accession process is administered by the government,
strengthening executive powers and diluting the powers of national parliaments in
each applicant country. This unintended consequence of pre-accession efforts
and negotiations comes partly from the internal division of competences in
the organisation of the Community, partly from the weakness of institutions
of public power in practice in the applicant states. In parallel with a profound
transformation of parliamentary functions, its institutional connections, and
internal activities can be demonstrated. In terms of new functions it is clear that
the legitimacy function of parliament has increased, not only in new democra-
cies where the existence of parliament is a proof of democratisation but also
in old democracies where its stability strengthens the democratic tradition. For
this reason government-parliament connections are relevant during the whole
period of integration, which is obviously influenced by accession. For instance,
there is a need to improve Polish MPs’ professionalism (according to surveys
their self-perceived level of political professionalism and knowledge about soci-
ety and methods and techniques of public activity must be developed). Also
MPs were hardly satisfied with the moral integrity of many of their colleagues.51
The prestige of the parliamentary committees is different but the Committee for
European Integration set up in 2000 belongs to the group with low-prestige in
the Czech Republic. It can be attributed to the fact that this committee is rather
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Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
new and is still defining the field of its activities.52 Consequently, the extent of
legal and political control which parliaments apply to government is less than the
constitution provides for in principle. Also the legality of the accession process
would be regularly scrutinised by the Constitutional Court or other responsible
organ. These kinds of control require non-confidential documents on accession
stages (e.g. position papers of the government), expertise in the controlling agen-
cies and a transparent mechanism.
Not only public trust in an evolving democracy but the equal partnership of
applicant states and the EU is challenged by accession. Due to blatant inequali-
ties in the history of the applicant states the sense of equality might be wounded
by the limited involvement in preparatory acts in the field of irregular migration
and security and control measures that are evaluated during the whole process of
enlargement. For instance, the European management concept on border control
emphasises the rapid inclusion of the applicant states in the closer co-operation,
thus the “High Impact Operation” also focused mainly on co-operation with
the candidate countries in the area of border control. Moreover, these initia-
tives highlighted the need to increase the efficiency of external border controls,
taking into account forthcoming EU enlargement. In this way the document on
this concept urged assistance to candidate states to organise controls at Europe’s
future external borders, by instituting operational co-operation. Despite all of
this, the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum only invited
the candidate countries to only one meeting per year as a minimum,53 and their
presence did not involve “strategic” co-operation, consultation or consent.
Public opinion can dispute the equality of applicant states by rejecting acces-
sion during a referendum on membership, raising tangible evidence of bene-
fits of membership: restrictions on freedom of movement and an absence of
common currency inside the EU for a defined period of time while citizens of
current Member States (and third country nationals) will come and work in the
current Member States without similar restrictions. Are we equal indeed? The
ambivalences, fears for legal and cultural traditions, mass influx of labourers,
offenders, and uncertainties are reflected in the changing level of opposition
toward accession to the EU, not only in Hungary (see Figure 2) decreasing the
mutual trust that has been strong enough to create consent to adopt framework
decisions on European arrest warrant or combating terrorism.
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9 Flexibility
The notion of flexibility has spread widely in political rhetoric including chances
to implement the acquis in a gradual way due to half-ready administrative capacity
or to obtain exceptions in the applicant states mainly for political reasons. Two
major fields of flexibility have been suggested or discussed: the visa and border
control regimes. They are overlapping in part each other as well as interrelated
to external and regional relations, economic losses and minority connections to
the kin-state. Allow us to give two examples.
In parallel to the development of secondary rules on visa restrictions, on
the format of visas, on the criteria to issue a visa and on the exchange of infor-
mation concerning the visa regime at EU-level, a “Schengen panic” rose among
ethnic Hungarians. They fear the rise of new walls on the Eastern borders of
Hungary, including border guards, visa requirements, mobile units, police and
labour authorisations, readmission agreements and immigration rules regulating
the entry and residence of third country nationals. Although several bricks of
the wall are already in place, the visas are considered to be the most brutal and
final element of the new construction. Not only Cuba or Mongolia but Mol-
dova, Belarus, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Russian Fed-
eration and the CIS countries in Asia have been recently put on the list of states
whose nationals must be in possession of a visa in order to enter Hungary. The
visa-free system with Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia was kept until accession in
order to allow migrations of ethnic minorities into the country and to prevent stron-
ger anti-European feelings in public opinion. The principle or hope of flexibility
of the visa system was proved by deletion of Romania from the EU’s visa “black
list” from 1 January 2002. At the same time, the Law on Hungarians Living in
Neighbouring Countries entered into force, providing a one-sided regulation by
a kin-state in favour of ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary who would
get beyond the new walls. It raised controversies with some neighbouring coun-
tries, some of whose citizens would receive benefits on economic, social, cultural
and labour matters by virtue of the Law on the principle of ethnic membership
in Hungarian communities. The Council of Europe’s Commission for Democ-
racy through Law criticised the law’s apparent conflict with prevailing European
standards of minority protection. Unilateral measures are granting benefits to
kin-minorities living in and citizens of other states are only legitimate if the
principles of territorial sovereignty of states, pacta sunt servanda, friendly rela-
tions among states and respect of human rights and freedoms, in particular the
prohibition of discrimination is respected.54 The European Commission passed
stricture on absence of due consultation with the neighbouring states in prepa-
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ration process. In addition, some provisions “will need to be aligned with the
acquis at the latest upon accession, since it is currently not in line with the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination laid down in the Treaty”.55 Following the adoption
of the Venice Commission’s Report, including by Hungary itself, Hungary has
however committed itself to comply with the Report’s findings, and bilateral
consultations have also started. Finally, the Law was modified in order to main-
tain exclusively cultural encouragement for Hungarian community in adjacent
states (Act.No.57 of 2003). The fate of the Law expresses how a state is looking
for compensatory measures against disadvantages of exclusion and visa restric-
tions and how measures intended to support national cohesion and to keep alive
the cultural heritage of ethnic minorities will impact on accession efforts, inter-
national legal obligations and political discourses.
The priority of the EU is to ensure that the new member states will be able
to implement the existing Schengen rules, including the new visa requirements.
The priority of the applicant states is to clear the way for accession to the EU as
soon as possible. Neither side has therefore yet given sufficient attention to the
need to make the new external Schengen frontiers of the EU as friendly as pos-
sible for the new borderland neighbours. The EU has not yet developed a posi-
tive, pro-active approach to minimising these problems. Many ways exist which
could alleviate undesired restrictive effects of the Schengen regime on the move-
ment of honest citizens in and out of the EU, without prejudice to the security
objectives of the EU. Examples include (1) provision of adequate consular ser-
vices for people living in frontier regions as well as capital cities, (2) upgrading of
border facilities to provide for rapid passage of large numbers without the long
queues as often experienced today, (3) special bilateral agreements for border
regions, such as long-term multi-entry national visas at low or zero charge, very
short-term visas for one or two days to facilitate local family contacts, tourism
and small scale commerce, and (outside the scope of Schengen rules) permanent
resident permits; (4) customer-friendly border services, with training of personnel
to eliminate the undignified interrogation styles, cut visa queues and delays, and
make available application forms by post or from internet sites; (5) planning in
neighbouring states for visa-free status, with help from the EU to prepare action
programmes for approaching the conditions under which visa requirements
may be lifted; (6) development of Euro-region programmes to boost co-opera-
tive regional development across the EU’s new external frontier, with revision
of segmented EU aid programmes to make them more border-region friendly;
(7) clarification of the rights of movement, residence and employment in the EU
of stateless persons, (8) sequencing in the introduction of Schengen, taking care
in managing the inevitably progressive application of the full Schengen regime
so as to minimise frictions between candidates and third countries; (9) possible
55 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Accession (n. 6 above) SEC (2001)
1748, 13 Nov. 2001).
161
Judit Tóth
easing of immigration policy by EU member states (or later by the EU). This
process should be launched by a Political Declaration from leaders of the Euro-
pean Union, in favour of a “Friendly Schengen Border Policy” (FSBP) giving due
weight to the external policy objective of the European Union. It may avoid new
dividing lines on the EU’s Eastern frontiers, alongside its internal policy priority
to achieve security objectives, social cohesion and solidarity, too.56
As these examples prove, applicant countries have different perspectives to
those of existing members on asylum and immigration policy, the significance
of the external border, and the methods of cross-border crime control. It may
promote a more flexible and open Union. The scope of flexibility is defined in
the Accession Treaties including temporary limitations of free movement and
mobility of citizens from the new Member States. An intellectually sound strat-
egy would be policy adapted to the enlarged Union which would avoid: con-
flict with other policy objectives; the inevitable public disillusionment where few
practical results flow from a general declaration of policy; erroneous policies
based on a commonly believed but perhaps exaggerated external threat (for
instance, the flood of immigrants) to the internal security of the EU; and a rigid
distinction between the “safe” region inside the EU (freedom through effective
law enforcement) and an “unsafe” region outside (the source of criminal threats,
corrupt law enforcement and political disorder).57
10 Summary
The issue of enlargement is connected in many ways to making European inte-
gration wider and deeper, to a large extent through the development of immi-
gration, asylum and home affairs rules. The new members will have to meet
the requirements of communautarisation of immigration and asylum policy, as
defined in the criteria for accession. On the other hand, the enlargement issues
are relevant to matters of asylum and migration as regards: (1) upgraded secu-
rity internally and externally; (2) preparation of secondary and supplementary
legislation in order to establish the area of freedom and justice, including asylum
and migration of third country nationals; (3) creation of migration and asylum
policies framing the co-operation and common actions with sending, destina-
tion and transit countries, such as applicant states and states surrounding them;
(4) institutional reform of the EU, in particular the decision making process
in Title IV matters and related competences, as well as through co-operation
162
Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
in readiness for enlargement; and (5) establishing mutual trust and flexibility
through Accession Partnerships, consultations, negotiations and a set of fair
Accession Treaties. However, the close linkage does not mean either an equal
interplay between these ongoing processes or a relaxation in the application of
an eternally changing and evolving acquis by the acceding states. Interactions
between the EU and its applicants have been unbalanced so far, and it is neces-
sary to establish partnership in the spirit of solidarity, cohesion and democratic
control with common aims and values, such as the rule of law, freedom of move-
ment, security and justice in the enlarged Europe.
The reform in institutional meaning (for instance passing towards majority
voting, Eurojust, Europol, Eurodac, immigration liaison offices network, Visa
Information System, EUMC), combating illegal migration, extremism and ter-
rorism through new legal instruments has been speeded up and strongly influ-
enced by eastward enlargement. On the other side, the parallels of accession and
reforms just in the field of justice and home affairs belonging to state souver-
eignty have reduced the chances of equal partnership with recently independent
candidate states with less developed human rights experiences, civil society and
professional policy makers to develop jointly the new area of freedom and jus-
tice. As the starting point of the history of Community was the sharing political
risks, the wider Europe also is built on common security policy. Transparency,
subsidiary, participating democracy and social inclusion of migrants are prom-
ises of the Treaty of the Constitution of Europe that is larger than the European
Union.
163
Judit Tóth
Figure 1 Would you agree that Hungary should accept all refugees, or none of
them, or some of them?” (%)
100
90
80
70
60 All
50 Some
40 None
30
20
10
0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001
02 08 02 11 02 10 11
Figure 2 The expectation regarding the social effects of migration in the course
of EU accession of Hungary (%)
164
Chapter 6 Enlargement of the EU and Title IV
165
Section II Visas and Border Controls
Chapter 7 Border Controls
1 Summary of Content
1.1 Schengen Rules
The “Schengen acquis” on border controls was integrated into the European
Union legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam and ensuing Council Deci-
sions in 1999. As with other parts of the Schengen rules, the core provisions of
the acquis date from the 1990 Schengen Convention,1 with supplementary acts
adopted later by the Schengen Executive Committee. The Convention contains
the core obligation to abolish internal border checks in Chapter 1 of Title II
(Article 2), subject to the possibility to re-impose border checks in certain situa-
tions and the power to impose checks further inside national territory in place of
boder checks. External borders rules appear in Chapter II of that Title (Articles
3-8).
Article 3 sets out the obligation to cross border points only at fixed opening
hours. More detailed rules, including exceptions for minor border traffic and
exceptions for “special categories of maritime traffic”, were to be adopted by
the Executive Committee. Article 3(2) obliges the Member States to establish
penalties for crossing of borders at unauthorised points. According to Article 4,
airline passengers must be checked at the last airport before leaving the Schen-
gen area and the first airport at which they enter it, but (implicitly) not during
“internal” flights.
The central rules on crossing an external Schengen border for short-term
visits of less than three months are set out in Article 5.2 These rules are also
1 OJ 2000 L 239/19.
2 For a detailed analysis, see Cholewinski, “No Right of Entry: The Legal Regime on
Crossing the EU External Border” in Groenendijk, Guild and Minderhoud, eds., In
Search of Europe’s Borders (Kluwer, 2003) 105 at 115-127. On the national case law
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 169-184.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
relevant for obtaining a short-term visa (see Article 15),3 and for exercising the
freedom to travel (Articles 19-21). There are five criteria: possession of valid
documents determined as necessary to cross the border; possession of a visa if
required;4 “if applicable submission of documents substantiating the purpose of
the visit and sufficient means of support; absence from the list of persons banned
from entry set up within the Schengen Information System (SIS); and absence of
a “threat to public policy, national security or the international relations” of any
of the Schengen states. Article 5(2) permits entry of a person who does not meet
these criteria, if a Member State “considers it necessary” to derogate from the
criteria on humanitarian grounds, national interest or international obligations;
but in such a case the permission to enter should be limited to the territory of
that Member State.
Article 6 provides for detailed rules concerning checks on the external bor-
ders, with more thorough checks required on persons entering than persons
exiting. Article 7 concerns cooperation between the Member States as regards
exchange of information, training and the use of liaison officers. Finally, Article
8 gives the Executive Committee powers to adopt rules on the practical aspects
of border checks and surveillance.
As for secondary rules, the most important measure is the Common Manual
on border controls.5 There were also measures solely concerning internal border
abolition,6 measures solely concerning external border checks,7 and measures
partly concerning external checks.8
on the issue, see Staples, “Adjucating the Schengen External Border” in idem., 215
at 233-234.
3 See Ch. 9.
4 On the question of who needs a visa to enter the territory, see Ch. 8.
5 A consolidated text of the Manual updated to Dec. 2002, absent certain classified
provisions, is at OJ 2002 C 313/97. The Manual has been amended since by various
Council Decisions (see discussion below) and by the 2003 Treaty of Accession (OJ
2003 L 236, pages 727-751).
6 Decisions on obstacles to traffic flows, bringing the Convention into force and pro-
cedures for reintroducing border checks (OJ 2000 L 239/154, 130 and 133).
7 Decisions on introducing the Schengen system and the activities of a task force (OJ
2000 L 239/168 and 191).
8 Decisions on entry and exit stamps, an action plan to combat illegal immigration
and a manual of documents to which visas may be affixed (OJ 2000 L 239/166, 203
and 298).
170
Chapter 7 Border Control
ders”. In turn, Article 62(2)(a) EC gives the Community power to adopt mea-
sures concerning “standards and procedures to be followed by Member States in
carrying out checks on persons” at the external borders.
No measures based on Article 62(1) had been adopted by 1 January 2006,
although the Commission proposed a Regulation establishing a Borders Code,
including provisions on both internal and external border checks, in May 2004.9
Moreover, the Court of Justice has made clear that Article 14 EC, the core obli-
gation to abolish internal border controls between Member States, does not
create directly effective rights but depends upon action by Community institu-
tions for its implementation.10 So the legal position is still entirely based on the
Schengen acquis.11
As for external border checks, the first measure adopted in this area was
a technical Regulation, based on Article 62(2)(a) and 62(2)(b) EC (concerning
the EC’s visa powers), enabling the Council to amend most provisions of the
Common Manual by means of adopting implementing rules.12 This Regulation,
like the parallel Regulation concerning amendment of the Common Consular
Instructions (CCI),13 irritated the Commission because it arguably breaches the
principle in Article 202 EC that the Commission should usually be granted the
power to implement Community acts. As a result, the Commission sued the
Council to annul the Regulation, but this challenge was unsuccessful.14
Article 1 of the Regulation permits the Council to amend many provisions
of the Common Manual, acting unanimously on a proposal from a Member
State or the Commission. From 1 January 2005, this Article was amended so
that the Council acts by a qualified majority.15 Article 2 permits changes to be
made to certain provisions by a Member State acting alone. Unlike the parallel
Regulation on amendment of the CCI, there is no obligation of prior consulta-
tion with other Member States first. Article 4 provides that thirteen Annexes of
the Common Manual can be amended only by means of that parallel Regula-
171
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
tion, since they are identical to those CCI Annexes. Between these provisions,
every Annex of the Common Manual and most operative provisions of Parts I
and II can be amended by means of an implementing procedure.
This power has been exercised four times. The first two Decisions amend-
ing the Common Manual were essentially technical changes designed to update
the Manual and to “prune” it of provisions deemed not strictly necessary. The
first amendment, adopted in April 2002, deleted two Annexes concerned largely
with national law and made some detailed changes to Part I of the Manual. In
turn, the second amendment, adopted in July 2002, made a number of technical
changes to Part II, which included a reference to the legal position of EC nation-
als and their family members.16 The third amendment required border guards
to pay attention to all minors, not just where (as before) they were travelling
unaccompanied, while the fourth amendment added a standard form to be used
where admission was refused at the border.17 Also, several other amendments
to the Common Manual have been made incidentally alongside amendments
to the CCI,18 or as consequential amendments when EC visa legislation was
adopted.19
There have been five other adopted measures on external border control.
In April 2004, the Council adopted a Greek initiative for a Decision concern-
ing signs used by Member States’ authorities at external borders (updating the
Schengen rules on this issue) as well as a Spanish initiative for a Directive on
the transmission of passenger data to border authorities.20 In October 2004, the
Council adopted a Regulation establishing a European Borders Agency, which
began operations as of 1 May 2005.21 Finally, in December 2004, the Council
adopted a Regulation to regulate the stamping of travel documents at external
borders,22 along with a Regulation which sets out standard rules for security
172
Chapter 7 Border Control
23 Reg. 2252/2004, OJ 2004 L 385/1. See the parallel proposal on biometrics and short-
term visas, discussed in Ch. 9.
24 COM (2003) 502, 14 Aug. 2003. See the Commission staff working paper on this
subject (SEC (2002) 947, 9 Sep. 2002; Council doc. 11933/02, 16 Sep. 2002) and the
Commission’s later Communications on the Council’s 2002 Action Plans (COM
(2003) 323, 3 June 2003 and SEC (2003) 1349, 25 Oct. 2004).
25 COM (2005) 56, 23 Feb. 2005.
26 N. 9 above. See earlier the Commission’s working paper (SEC (2003) 736, 20 June
2003; Council doc. 10843/03, 24 June 2003) and also the Thessaloniki European
Council conclusions (Annex 5).
27 COM (2005) 381, 22 Aug. 2005.
28 Council doc. 10588/05, 18 July 2005.
29 OJ 2005 C 53; see Annex 6. See also the Hague implementation plan (OJ 2005 C
198).
173
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
that can provide rapid technical and operational assistance to Member States
requesting it, following proper risk analysis by the Border Management Agency
and acting within its framework, on the basis of a proposal by the Commis-
sion on the appropriate powers and funding for such teams, to be submitted in
2005”; the establishment of a “Community border management fund by the
end of 2006 at the latest”; and a proposal “to supplement the existing Schengen
evaluation mechanism [which inter alia checks whether Member States comply
the Schengen acquis on external borders] with a supervisory mechanism, ensur-
ing full involvement of Member States experts, including unannounced inspec-
tions”. The possible creation of a European border guard will be examined when
the tasks of the Borders Agency are reviewed.
To implement the Hague Programme in part, the Commission has proposed
a Regulation establishing a European Borders Fund,30 which is under discussion
in the Council.
174
Chapter 7 Border Control
technical support facility and new technical equipment for border guards; qual-
ity management; centres for border police and customs at external borders; and
a common core curriculum.
The institutional framework for this cooperation was initially very light.
There was no agreement to set up a secretariat to assist with further detailed
coordination as the sixteen elements got going, because some Member States did
not want to give the appearance of the institutionalisation of borders coopera-
tion. Instead, the activities of the ad hoc centres were simply to be coordinated
by the meetings of the heads of border guards. Each of the sixteen issues was
to be coordinated by one or more lead Member States, and it was also possible
for a Member State to coordinate more than one. It was up to Member States to
volunteer for this task, and so between July and September 2002 many Member
States submitted detailed suggestions for operations they could lead.33 Other
Member States could then decide which of the projects they wished to partici-
pate in. The Council plan also provided for continued joint operations, which to
some extent crossed over with the work of the ad hoc centres.
The plan was endorsed by the Seville European Council in June 2002,
which set deadlines to achieve several elements: end 2002 for joint operations,
pilot projects and a network of immigration liaison officers, and June 2003 for a
common risk analysis model, a common core curriculum and consolidation of
EU border rules and a Commission study on EU financial support for border
control.34
An initial batch of project proposals comprised Austrian and Swedish pro-
posals on border guards’ curriculum, a German proposal for the exchange of
personnel and the organisation of operations at external land borders, a Finn-
ish proposal on risk analysis and French proposals on coordinating criminal
33 For further details of the developments described here, see Council docs. 10919/02,
11 July 2002 (initiation of joint operations); 11030/02, 19 Sep. 2002 (overview of
project proposals); 11388/02, 29 July 2002 (French proposals for projects); 11401/02,
29 July 2002 (guidelines for joint operations); 11438/02, 31 July 2002 (Greek pilot
project on control of the Eastern external land borders); 11829/02, 10 Sep 2002
(note by Portuguese delegation); 11905/02, 11 Sep. 2002 (visa control operation in
international airports); 11974/02, 12 Sep. 2002 (interim report on project on cur-
riculum for training border guards); 11967/02, 12 Sep. 2002 (project for operation
of control and assessment of risks posed by illegal immigration in the ports of the
European Union); 11996/02, 13 Sep. 2002 (joint operations for the control of the
south-eastern external maritime borders of the Mediterranean EU Member States);
11994/02, 13 Sep. 2002 (Centre of Excellence at Dover--Mobile Detection Unit);
12129/02, 25 Sep. 2002 (common projects on sea border control); 12765/02, 7 Oct.
2002 (inclusion of candidate countries in projects); 12361/02, 25 Sep. 2002 (network
of centres for forged documents); and 11399/02, 12448/02 and 12518/02, 2 Oct. 2002
(outcome of proceedings of SCIFA+, 22 July, 15 Sep. and 26 Sep. 2002).
34 See Annex 5.
175
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
176
Chapter 7 Border Control
177
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
17 countries, “the aims and objectives…were not entirely met during the course
of the operation, nor was it possible to assess the threat posed to the EU by this
type of visa abuse”. In fact, “there were no cases of suspicion of facilitation
whatsoever and in the three cases where visa requirements were reportedly not
met, only one suggests overt criminal intent”.
Given this operational evidence, one might that that the EU would rethink
the idea of spending hundreds of millions of euro to establish a Visa Identifica-
tion System. But in fact, the Thessaloniki European Council simply reaffirmed
its intention to establish such a System. More broadly, at no point does the
report indicate how much each operation cost the taxpayers of the participating
States, or how much EU taxpayers paid through support from the ARGO pro-
gramme. There is also no indication of how many irregular migrants would have
been intercepted at the relevant borders in the absence of the operations, which
would indicate how much “added value” each operation had.
As for the institutional structure, the June 2003 JHA Council agreed in
light of practice to strengthen the institutional framework, redubbing SCIFA+
as the “Practitioners’ Common Unit” and assigning it a more operational role,
with SCIFA in charge of strategy, in particular the monitoring, evaluation and
analysis of operations. Centres at the air borders and sea borders to match the
land borders centre should be created, and the EU aimed at the widest pos-
sible participation by candidate States. The Council’s General Secretariat was to
assist the Common Unit, assisted by detached experts from Member States.
By the autumn of 2004, a Commission report on the implementation of
the Council’s borders plan reported that a Training Centre had established a
core curriculum for border guard training and run courses; that the risk analysis
model had been developed and applied to produce some general and specific
risk analyses; and that the sea, land and air centres had been involved in further
activities, in particular as regards the application of a detailed plan on increas-
ing controls on the EU’s maritime borders, approved by the Council in 2003.37
This institutional structure has now been superseded by the creation of the
European Borders Agency, which has taken over running the various opera-
tional projects as of 1 May 2005.
37 For the Commission’s 2004 report, see n. 24 above. For the maritime borders plan,
see Council doc. 15445/03, 28 Nov. 2003, adopted by JHA Council, 27/28 Nov.
2003. For the prior feasibility study, see Council doc. 11490/1/03, 19 Sep. 2003. On
the application of the plan, see Council doc. 6885/04, 27 Feb. 2004.
178
Chapter 7 Border Control
publish the Manual, on the grounds that it remained confidential.38 The JHA
Council then decided in November 2000 to declassify Part I of the Manual and
almost all of the Annexes.39 Only the three Annexes of the Manual which corre-
spond to confidential CCI Annexes remain confidential. A further declassifica-
tion of the entire Part II of the Manual was agreed in April 2002.40 At that point,
the Schengen classification rules were repealed as far as they relate to the CCI
and the Common Manual. Instead, from now on the Council’s general security
rules govern the classification of these Annexes.41
The proposed Regulation on granting the Council the power to implement
the borders Manual was circulated during the Portuguese Presidency early in
2000, but the Council decided to wait for progress on the parallel proposal on
powers to implement the CCI. Finally, the proposal was published and sent to
the EP for consultation early in 2001.42 However, as the EP always objects in
principle to the Council conferring implementing powers upon itself, it rejected
the proposal by a large majority.43 The Council nonetheless adopted it, despite
Dutch misgivings. When the proposal was formally adopted, the Commission
and the Netherlands issued statements objecting to the principle of conferring
powers on the Council, identical to their objections to the parallel Regulation
on the CCI.44
The subsequent measures exercising implementing powers were largely
uncontroversial, with the exception of the provisions of the second amending
Decision referring to EU citizens’ family members. Objecting to these provi-
sions, the Commission released a Statement asserting that third-country national
family members of EC nationals exercised rights under EC free movement law,
and so could not be covered by a Decision concerning the external borders.45
However, the Commission did not follow through on its threat to sue the Coun-
cil.
As for the development of external borders policy, it should be emphasised
that the idea of enhanced border controls pre-dates the perceived rise in the
political sensitivity of immigration and asylum issues in the spring of 2002. In
179
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
fact, the idea of moving toward “European border management” was first raised
during the Belgian Council Presidency in autumn 2001.46 At that time it was
agreed that the chiefs of EU border police would meet regularly in the forum
of SCIFA (in the format later dubbed “SCIFA+”). By the spring of 2002, Italy,
assisted by other Member States, had prepared a detailed plan for a movement
toward a “European border guard”, the Commission had released a Commu-
nication on the same subject and a workshop managed by Finland, Belgium
and Austria and funded by the EU’s Oisin programme had also examined the
topic.47 Elements from these three programmes (but particularly the Italian proj-
ect) were then merged in a matter of weeks into the detailed Council border
control programme approved in June 2002 – without waiting for any input from
national parliaments, the European Parliament or civil society.
3 Legal Analysis
The issue of the allocation of implementing powers to amend the Common
Manual is considered elsewhere, alongside the issue of the validity of the paral-
lel Regulation on amendments to the CCI.48 Similarly, the issue of the inclusion
of EU nationals’ family members within the border control rules is considered
along with other issues on the personal scope of EC law.49
The first issue considered here is the joint “legal base” of Articles 62(2)(a)
and 62(2)(b) for adoption of Regulation 790/2001. Was this possible? Until 1
May 2004, Article 62(2)(a), concerning external border controls, required a
unanimous vote in the Council after a proposal by the Commission or an ini-
tiative by a Member State for adoption of a measure. But Article 62(2)(b) is
sub-divided into four areas, two of which follow the same legislative procedure
but two of which follow the communautaire procedure of a proposal solely from
the Commission and a qualified majority vote. It is also arguable that the list of
visa powers in Article 62(2)(b) is not exhaustive and that other visa powers exist.
In that case such powers would be subject to the usual Title IV procedure of a
unanimous Council vote with a shared power of initiative.50 The Council did
not make clear whether it was using some or all of the listed powers in Article
62(2)(b), and which specific powers it was using if it was only using some of
them. Similarly there was no indication of whether the Council was alterna-
tively or additionally using the non-exhaustive powers in this provision. As a
result, quite apart from the question of the validity of conferring implementing
180
Chapter 7 Border Control
powers on the Council, the validity of the Regulation was questionable whether
the Council intended to use the communautaire parts of Article 62(2)(b) EC
or not. If the Council did intend to use those powers, the Regulation is invalid
beyond any doubt, because it was adopted unanimously following the proposal
of a Member State while Article 62(2)(b)(i) and (iii) require a qualified majority
vote following the proposal of the Commission. If it did not intend to use those
powers, the reasoning for adoption of the Regulation would appear to be defec-
tive, for the Council has an obligation to clearly indicate which legal base it is
using when it adopts legislation.51
The second legal question is the correct “legal base” for EU external borders
measures. It seems clear that some of the projects undertaken as part of the EU
borders policy do not actually concern border controls at all (the French project
on expulsion, the Portuguese proposal for in-country checks of foreigners), and
the external borders agency seems likely to conduct expulsion operations at least.
Since these operations appear to be significant, rather than purely ancillary to
external borders control, the Border Agency will be exercising powers in relation
to irregular migration as well as external borders control. Therefore, clearly a
different legal base than the “external borders” legal base should have been used
to confer power on the Agency to conduct such activities (although at the time
of adoption of the Regulation establishing the External Borders Agency, the
issue was moot, because the adoption of measures concerning irregular migra-
tion was subject to the same procedure as measures concerning external border
control). Furthermore, it is misleading to develop such projects under the rubric
of external borders control.
The next legal issue is whether the EC had any power under the current legal
framework to adopt the passports Regulation, using the legal base of Article
62(2)(a) or any other legal base.52 It is submitted that it did not, because Article
18(3) EC clearly specifies that the EC has no power to harmonise passport leg-
islation pursuant to the EC’s citizenship law powers, and the use of passports
is only connected in part with external border control; it is also connected with
internal border controls, in-country proof of identity and checks by non-EU
countries.
Next, it seems clear that the present Article 64(1) EC, which specifies that
Title IV “shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safe-
guarding of internal security”, rules out the creation of a European border con-
trol force with coercive powers, such as exercising surveillance of the external
51 See Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493. The legal obligation to state
reasons for the EC institutions’ actions is set out in Art. 253 EC.
52 The following comments are based on an analysis for Statewatch, online on the
Statewatch website: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/feb/27legal-analysis-
EU-biometric-passports.htm>.
181
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
4 Comments
If the EU intended to create a “European border guard” in the short term, the
issues of accountability, legality and control would be starkly obvious already.
However, even with this idea on the back burner for the time being, the alterna-
tive approach of establishing a complex system of coordination between national
border authorities still raises questions as to the adequacy of arrangements for
accountability, and many aspects of the EU’s developing plans raise serious civil
liberties concerns.
For one thing, there will be extensive deployment of one Member State’s
guards on the territory of another Member State. The German plan for exchange
of personnel foresees integration of guest border guards into the “work shifts”
of the host state, and “as soon as possible the border police officers active in the
host country will be given intervention powers at the lowest level, for example the
right to stop and interview persons”. This is to lead to standardisation of inter
alia, “command and control/tactics”. Moreover, the German plan makes exten-
sive reference to a number of such exchanges already agreed with the German
53 For a full version of this argument, see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd
edition (forthcoming).
54 Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05 United Kingdom v Council, pending.
182
Chapter 7 Border Control
authorities,55 and the German authorities have more recently called for EC leg-
islation that would grant “guest” border guards extensive powers Obviously the
powers enjoyed by guards in this scenario would extend to “basic frontier control
duties”, even though such duties were ruled out in the agreed rules concerning
joint operations. But there is no system of accountability planned or foreseen.
However, it should be kept in mind that the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights imposes liability for acts of a Member State’s forces outside its
territory, and that the ECHR (as regards Convention rights) and other interna-
tional treaties (more broadly) ban discrimination by State authorities, even if
they are exercising their powers on the territory of another country.56
Secondly, there is the issue of the participation of the UK, which has for-
mally opted out of EU border control rules. Despite this, the UK has expressed
an intention to participate in the German land borders project, the Finnish risk
analysis project, the French expulsion project and the new joint operation on
visa checking at airports, on top of proposing three projects of its own. One can
ask why the UK considers it legitimate to participate in these measures when
it has not abolished internal border checks with other Member States. For the
UK, the “external borders” are its own ports, airports, coastline, land border
with Ireland and Channel tunnel exit in Kent – not the sea, air or land borders
of any other Member State. But the UK clearly wishes to have it both ways.
Thirdly, there is a tendency to expand the plan beyond the normal scope of
border controls. The French plan on mass expulsions clearly concerns persons
already inside the country, and similarly the Portuguese argued that the new
joint operation should concern visa checks not just at airports, but in-coun-
try – effectively arguing for a massive coordinated check on “foreign-looking”
persons inside the EU. Although the Portuguese were rebuffed for now, the
French programme was approved. Member States will thus be participating in
joint expulsion operations without regard for whether the other participating
Member States meet the same basic standards on expulsions, and there may be
pressure to speed up and/or increase the number of expulsions in order to par-
ticipate in the plan. Furthermore, such measures would exceed the Community
powers over border controls, as noted above.
183
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
184
Chapter 8 Visa List
1 Summary of Content
1.1 Regulation 539/2001
Regulation 539/2001 harmonises the list of third countries whose nationals do,
or do not, need a visa to cross the external borders of the Member States.1 It is
applicable to Denmark, but not to the UK and Ireland.2 As a measure build-
ing on the “Schengen acquis”, Norway and Iceland are also bound to apply
it in principle.3 It entered into force on 10 April 2001.4 A first amendment to
the Regulation was adopted in December 2001,5 and a second amendment was
adopted in March 2003.6 The 2003 Accession Treaty also resulted in a technical
amendment (to remove the new Member States from the lists).7 Finally, a fourth
amendment was adopted in June 2005.8
Article 1(1) of the Regulation specifies that Annex I sets out a definitive list
of those third countries whose nationals must have visas to cross the external
borders (a “negative list”), while Article 1(2) specifies that Annex II sets out the
list of third countries whose nationals do not need visas to cross the external
borders of the Member States (a “positive list”). However, Article 8(2) initially
1 OJ 2001 L 81/1.
2 See recital 4 in the preamble.
3 See recital 3 in the preamble.
4 See Art. 8(1); the Regulation was published on 21 March 2001.
5 Reg. 2414/2001 (OJ 2001 L 327/1).
6 Reg. 453/2003 (OJ 2003 L 69/10).
7 OJ 2002 L 236/725. It should be noted that the new Member States were obliged to
apply the visa lists as from the date of accession.
8 Reg. 851/2005 (OJ 2005 L 141/3).
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 185-200.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
specified that the abolition of visas provided for in Article 1(2) would not apply
to nationals of countries listed in Annex II and designated with an asterisk,
until the Council took a further legislative decision following a report from the
Commission on “the undertakings [that country] is prepared to enter into on
illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of persons from
that country who are illegally resident”. In fact, the only country in Annex II
designated by an asterisk was Romania.
The negative list consisted initially of 130 countries and three “entities and
territorial authorities” which at least one Member State does not recognise (East
Timor, the Palestinian Authority and Taiwan). The positive list consisted ini-
tially of 44 countries and two “Special Adminstrative Regions” of China (Hong
Kong and Macao). In addition, nationals of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein
are exempt from a visa requirement when crossing the external borders of the
Member States, but the Regulation does not include them in the positive list,
because the visa exemption for these three countries flows from the agreement
on the European Economic Area.9
Geographically, the positive list initially included every other state in West-
ern Europe and all twelve states in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe which
were in 2001 negotiating membership of the European Union.10 As noted above,
the 2003 Accession Treaty later removed the ten new Member States of the EU
from the lists in the Regulation as from the enlargement of the EU on 1 May
2004, because Member States of the EU are not subject to the visa list legisla-
tion.11 Furthermore, as also noted above, visa abolition for Romanians was ini-
tially delayed. Elsewhere in Europe, the positive list includes only Croatia, which
leaves Albania, Turkey, the rest of the former Yugoslavia,12 and the remaining
European successor states of the former Soviet Union on the negative list.13 Out-
side Europe, the positive list includes most Latin American states: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador (initially), Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela in
South America, and Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama and Salvador in Central America. Only Peru, Surinam, Guyana, Belize
and Colombia were on the negative list initially. The positive list also includes
the USA and Canada, but all Caribbean states are on the negative list.
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Every state in Africa, without exception, is on the negative list. The majority
of Asian states are also on the negative list, but there are important exceptions:
Japan and South Korea in North-East Asia, Israel in West Asia, and Brunei,
Malaysia and Singapore in South-East Asia (along with the Chinese regions of
Hong Kong and Macao). Finally, Australia and New Zealand are on the posi-
tive list, but all the “micro-states” in the Pacific are on the negative list.
Article 1(3) sets out rules which apply in the event that the third countries
listed in the two Annexes break apart. The successor states will automatically
be subject to the same list which applied to their predecessor state, unless the
Council decides otherwise by means of the legislative procedure to amend the
Regulation.
Article 1(4) set out a complex procedure in the event that any state on the
positive list imposes a visa requirement upon any Member State. Intially, the
Regulation provided that in that case, a Member State could inform the Com-
mission and the Council of this fact, with the result that a visa requirement
would automatically be imposed upon nationals of that third state 30 days after
notification unless the Council decided otherwise by a qualified majority. This
planned re-introduction must be published in the EU’s Official Journal. Also, the
Commission had to consider a request from a Member State or the Council that
it propose an amendment to the Regulation to move the third state in question
to Annex I from Annex II. If the third state waives the visa requirement on EU
nationals before the adoption of amendments to the Annexes by this procedure,
the Member State concerned must inform the Commission and Council, with
such notification published in the Official Journal. As a result, the provisional
re-introduction of visas shall be repealed seven days after publication of this
notice. This procedure was amended in June 2005 (see discussion below).
Article 2 defines “visa” for the purpose of the Regulation. The Regulation
only governs short-stay visas (for periods of less than three months) but does
not govern visas “for transit at an airport”.
Article 3 concerns stateless persons and recognised refugees, as defined by
the relevant international conventions. They must have a visa if they come from
a negative list country, but may be exempted for the visa requirement (at the
discretion of each Member State) if they come from a positive list country. This
provision is without prejudice to the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on the
abolition of visas for refugees.
Article 4 permits Member States to allow further exemptions. There are
three possible exemptions, which in turn permit Member States to derogate from
either list, from the negative list, or from the positive list. First of all, Article 4(1)
lists five categories of persons (essentially transport, emergency and diplomatic
personnel) who may be either exempted from a visa requirement or subject to
it, irrespective of whether they have the nationality of a state or entity on the
positive list or the negative list. Secondly, Article 4(2) allows Member States to
exempt school pupils from a visa requirement if they are travelling in a school
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party from a positive list country. Finally, Article 4(3) allows Member States to
impose visa requirements on persons from positive list countries if they are car-
rying out a paid activity during their stay.
According to Article 5, information on the options which Member States
choose pursuant to Articles 3 or 4 must be communicated to the Commission
and published in the Official Journal.14 Article 6 states that the Regulation is
without prejudice to Member States’ competence regarding recognition of states
and other entities, and travel and identity documents issued by their authori-
ties.
Finally, Article 7 repeals or amends other instruments. Article 7(1) repeals
the 1999 Regulation on this issue, which listed only those third countries whose
nationals need a visa to cross the external borders of all Member States (a nega-
tive list).15 Article 7(2) alters the Annexes to the Schengen Common Consular
Instructions (CCI) and Common [Borders] Manual which set out the common
list.16 Article 7(3) repeals two Schengen Executive Committee Decisions dealing
with the same subject, which had almost fully harmonised the visa lists of the
Schengen states before the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force.17
14 Two such reports have been published: see OJ 2001 C 363/21 and OJ 2003 C 68/2.
15 Reg. 574/1999 (OJ 1999 L 72/2).
16 On these measures, see further Ch. 9. For the text of the CCI as it stood then,
see the Schengen Executive Committee Decision consolidating the CCI (OJ 2000 L
239/317). The consolidated text of the Border Manual was classified at that time; for
the subsequently published text, see OJ 2002 C 313/97.
17 For the text of these Decisions, see OJ 2000 L 239/186 and 206.
18 N. 5 above.
19 N. 6 above.
20 See EC-Swiss treaty on free movement of persons (OJ 2002 L 114).
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21 OJ 2005 C 172.
22 OJ 2005 C 251.
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Since the publication of this first set of notifications was dated 11 October 2005,
the Commission must report regarding these notifications by 9 January 2006 at
the latest. The list above includes those states which admit citizens of some EU
Member States without a visa requirement, but only for a shorter time (such as
14 days or 30 days) than the 90-day visa-free period applied by EU States. An
earlier notification (technically under the previous version of the Regulation)
was made by the Czech Republic, listing Brazil, Brunei and Canada as countries
which maintained the visa requirement.23
A second batch of notifications indicated that visa requirements (as just
defined) were maintained by:24
– Brazil for Austria;
– Venezuela for Sweden and Austria;
– Nicaragua for Austria;
– Brunei for Sweden and Austria; and
– Australia for Denmark, Sweden and Austria
23 OJ 2005 C 277.
24 OJ 2005 C 163.
25 OJ 2005 C 310.
26 OJ 2005 C 327.
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Chapter 8 Visa Lists
siderably more (seven for Brazil, nine for the USA, seven for Canada, eighteen
for Brunei and seventeen for Australia). It remains to be seen how effective the
EU will be in demanding that visa requirements be dropped by relatively wealthy
and powerful countries that are subject to domestic pressure to maintain strict
immigration controls.
27 The adoption of rules on visa formats (see Ch. 9) was also subject to a communau-
taire procedure.
28 Reg. 2317/95 (OJ 1995 L 234/1). For an analysis of this Regulation, see Peers, “The
Visa Regulation: Free Movement Blocked Indefinitely” 21 ELRev. (1996) 150. On
the Community’s powers under the TEU, see Hailbronner, “Visa Regulations and
Third Country Nationals in EC law” 31 CMLRev. (1994) 969.
29 Case C-392/95 EP v Council [1997] ECR I-3213.
30 Reg. 574/1999 (n. 15 above).
31 See OJ 1996 C 379; OJ 1997 C 180; OJ 1998 C 101; OJ 1999 C 133; and OJ 2000 C
272.
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pursuant to the Community powers to adopt a visa list instead.32 The Court of
Justice ruled for the Council, on the grounds that since persons in the airport
transit visa procedure had not crossed the legal borders of the Member States,
such persons were not participating in the internal market.33
While the 1999 Regulation required the Commission to consider propos-
als regarding further harmonisation of the visa lists in 2001, the Commission
proposed what became Regulation 539/2001, fully harmonising the visa lists, in
January 2000.34 The reason for the early proposal was the entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam and the call in the Vienna Action Plan for an early adop-
tion of a measure on this subject.35 Also, in the meantime, the Schengen states
had almost completely agreed on a common visa list between them.36
Both the negative and positive lists in the proposed Regulation were almost
entirely simply taken over from those applied by the Schengen states, who had
proved able to agree on common negative and positive lists almost entirely by
end 1998. The only country left on the so-called “grey list”, which remained sub-
ject to visa requirements in some Schengen states but not others, was Colombia.
In its proposal, the Commission suggested amending the Schengen list only add
Colombia to the negative list and to shift of Romania, Bulgaria, Hong Kong
and Macao to the positive list.
The EP gave its opinion on the Commission proposal in July 2000.37 It sug-
gested the deletion of a proposed clause exempting residents of one Member
State from needing a visa to enter another Member State while in transit to their
usual Member State of residence. The EP also wanted to permit Member States
the option to drop visa requirements for students participating in EU youth pro-
grammes, to specify that Member States retained competence over recognition
of travel documents and to specify expressly that other aspects of the visa rules
in the Schengen acquis were not repealed by the new rules.
In the meantime, the Council working party on visas had begun to discuss
the measure, considering it at its meetings in March and April 2000.38 Follow-
ing further meetings of the visa working party and SCIFA, the key outstand-
ing issues were identified as the reciprocal imposition of visa requirements, the
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attempts to prevent illegal residence of their nationals in the Member States and
readiness to accept their readmission.46
The main changes made during negotiation of the text of Regulation
539/2001 were the deferred abolition of visa requirements for Romania; the reci-
procity provisions in Article 1(4); the deletion of the proposed Article 3, which
would have required Member States to exempt from the visa requirement per-
sons from negative list countries crossing the external borders who hold a resi-
dence permit from another Member State; deletion of the obligation to exempt
refugees and stateless persons from positive list countries from the visa require-
ment; permission for Member States to impose visa requirements on persons
who are coming to exercise a paid activity (Article 4(3)); and the addition of a
provision regarding Member States’ competence over recognition of states and
travel documents was added (Article 6).
Other technical amendments were made. Article 1(2) was clarified to specify
that visa abolition was only applicable for three months; the definition in Article
2 was aligned on the wording of Schengen provisions; and the definitions of two
of the categories of persons subject to Member States’ discretion to impose or
waive visa requirements were altered (Article 4(1)(d) and (e)).
46 COM (2001) 61, 2 Feb. 2001. See the Belgian statement (number 27/01) regarding
Bulgaria, issued when the Regulation was adopted (summary of Council acts in
March 2001: Council doc. 8051/01, 19 Apr. 2001).
47 COM (2001) 361, 29 Jun. 2001.
48 COM (2001) 570, 8 Oct. 2001; OJ 2002 C 25 E/495.
49 Council doc. 13133/01, 26 Oct. 2001.
50 Council doc. 14869/01, 4 Dec. 2001.
51 Reg. 2414/2001, n. 5 above. The EP voted in favour on 29 Nov. 2001 (OJ 2002 C 153
E/233).
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Chapter 8 Visa Lists
with the EU acquis on border controls, visa policy, travel and identity docu-
ments, immigration and asylum law, legislation on citizenship and statelessness,
readmission of third-country nationals and the “economic and social dimen-
sion”.52 Of this list, only the security of documents and readmission of a state’s
own nationals are in fact relevant to the requirement of a visa for that state, and
there is no EC acquis for several items.
3 Legal Analysis
The Council’s legal service issued two legal opinions during the course of nego-
tiation of this proposal. First of all, it gave its view on the application of the pro-
posal to Denmark, the question of whether the proposal built on the Schengen
52 See statement 161/01 in the Dec. 2001 summary of Council acts (Council doc.
15585/01, 13 Jan. 2002).
53 See outcome of proceedings of the visa working party, 21 Oct. 2002 (Council doc.
13660/02, 31 Oct. 2002).
54 See Council doc. 15392/02, 10 Dec. 2002, following SCIFA meeting on 9 Dec.
2002.
55 COM (2004) 437, 19 July 2004.
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acquis and the possibility of adding a reciprocity clause.56 Secondly, it gave its
view on the effect of the Regulation on Member States’ pre-existing visa abo-
lition treaties with third states.57 It is not known what view the Council legal
service took on these issues, but it might be doubted whether Denmark could
be covered by the positive list obligations in the Regulation as matters of Com-
munity law, comparing the wording of Article 62(2)(b)(i) EC with the former
Article 100c(1) EC and the Protocol on Denmark.
Similarly, the non-application of the visa list Regulation to the UK and
Ireland raises questions. It could be argued on technical grounds that Regu-
lation 574/1999 still continues to apply to those two Member States, because
they did not participate in Regulation 539/2001, which repealed the 1999 mea-
sure. However, it seems unlikely that this was the intention of the drafters of the
Regulation. Also, the Regulation does not expressly limit the reciprocity provi-
sion in Article 1(4) to cases where a third country imposes a visa requirement
upon a Member State which participates in the Regulation. But it is arguable
that “Member State” for the purpose of Article 1(4) can logically only refer to a
Member State which is participating in the Regulation.
The Regulation excludes airport transit visas, presumably because of the
previous judgment of the Court of Justice in the Airport Transit Visas case.58 It
is not clear that this is correct, because the former Article 3(c) EC, which was the
basis for the Court’s decision in that judgment, is now worded differently.
Although the Regulation, like its predecessors, expressly only applies to
crossing the external borders, it appears to be regarded as relevant to crossing
internal borders as well. This was the implicit view of the Court of Justice in its
judgment in MRAX,59 and was confirmed by the 2004 Directive on the rights of
EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely.60
There is no doubt that the positive list obligation is legally binding in Com-
munity law, and requires all participating Member States to drop visa require-
ments against all states in Annex II. This is an improvement upon the situation
prevailing under the Schengen acquis, where the legal effect of the positive list
was unclear.
The deletion of Article 3 of the Commission’s original proposal, concern-
ing an exemption from the visa requirement for persons crossing the external
border who hold residence permits from a Member State, is dubious. While it
is true that such an obligation is already set out in the Schengen Convention,
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4 Comments
The removal of visa requirements from certain third states is the most signifi-
cant aspect of Regulation 539/2001. However, this raises a number of questions.
First of all, the Commission, the Council and the EP apparently only consid-
ered changes to the status of five states or entities when adopting Regulation
539/2001. While the Commission, in its explanatory memorandum, claimed to
61 OJ 2001 L 150/4.
62 See the discussion in Peers, n. 28 above.
63 ETS 31. It has been ratified by all of the “old” Member States except Austria and
Greece, plus the Czech Republic and Malta among the new Member States. Outside
the EU, it has been ratified by Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland, Romania and Swit-
zerland.
64 OJ 2000 C 239/19.
65 On the interpretation of this clause, see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law
(Longman, 2000), 80-81.
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take various factors into account when proposing the text, its nearly complete
transposition of the Schengen acquis suggests otherwise.66 To take one example,
do all the Pacific micro-states on the negative list really represent a threat of ille-
gal immigration into the Community? If the UK can live without a visa require-
ment for South Africans and several States in the Caribbean Commonwealth,
do continental Member States really need to impose such a requirement? For
that matter, the Commission did not consider whether any states on the Schen-
gen positive list ought to be moved to the negative list.
It can only be hoped that the Commission embarks upon a more objective
review of all the countries on the negative list, with a view to considering the
transfer of as many third states as possible to the positive list. It is questionable
whether the application of the current criteria in practice complies with non-dis-
crimination obligations imposed by international human rights law.67 However,
there is nothing to indicate that it did this when it first reviewed the list in 2002.
Moreover, despite the ostensibly objective test for deciding whether to apply a
visa requirement, the Commission offered no explanation why Colombia, the
one state left on the Schengen “grey” list, should be moved to the negative list
rather than the positive list. More recently, the Commission referred to evidence
for moving Ecuador to the negative list but did not give any further informa-
tion about this evidence, preventing any effective public debate about the alleged
problems and possible alternative solutions. Also, it does not appear that the
Commission has determined and applied any criteria for determining whether a
State should move to the positive list, instead of to the negative list.
While Bulgarians and (following the later amendment) Romanians are
doubtless pleased to be relieved of the requirement to obtain a visa to enter most
Member States, it may be questioned whether it was appropriate for the Com-
munity to demand as much as it did from these states before abolishing the visa
requirement.68 Certainly, before abolishing a visa requirement for a third state,
it is appropriate to consider whether that third state takes effective measures to
prevent counterfeiting of its passports and fraudulent means of passport acqui-
sition, and whether that state is willing to readmit its own nationals if they enter
the territories of the EU Member States illegally. However, it may be seriously
questioned whether it is appropriate in this context to demand any changes to
Romanian and Bulgarian policy as regards non-nationals of those states. What
66 Similarly, the Commission’s initial proposal for a visa “negative list” in 1993 simply
suggested adoption of the existing Schengen list without amendment: see Peers, n.
22 above. For detailed criticism of the criteria for the negative list and the list itself,
see Guild, “The Border Abroad: Visas and Border Controls” in Groenendijk, Guild
and Minderhoud, eds., In Search of Europe’s Borders (Kluwer, 2003) 87 at 98-103.
67 See Cholewinski, Borders and Discrimination in the European Union (ILPA, 2002), s.
1.3.1.
68 See further ibid.; Ch. 32 of this volume; and Guild, n. 66 above.
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rational connection is there between such policies and the admission of Roma-
nians and Bulgarian nationals to Community territory?
The abolition of visa requirements for Romanians and Bulgarians has set
a precedent. If it was unacceptable in 2001 for some applicant states negotiat-
ing to join the European Union to be subject to visa requirements while others
were not, then it cannot be acceptable in 2006 for Turkey to be subject to the
visa requirement while Croatia is not (membership negotiations with both States
began in October 2005).69 Similarly, it cannot be acceptable to maintain visa
requirements for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia if membership
negotiations begin with that country.70 More broadly, if the EU has sufficient
confidence that an applicant state is close enough to the criteria to qualify for
EU membership to endorse opening negotiations for membership, it is hard to
see any credible justification for continuing to impose a visa requirement on that
applicant state. In any event, in light of the standstill in a Protocol to the EC-
Turkey association agreement forbidding any new restrictions on establishment
and provision of services by Turkish nationals after 1973, it is arguable that
Community and national visa requirements imposed since that date on at least
some Turkish nationals are invalid.71
The British opt-out from participation in the EC visa list rules means that
the UK can maintain its own visa list, which in some respects is more liberal
than the EC regime, allowing entry of nationals of without a visa for nationals
of twenty-eight more states (the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Domi-
nica, Grenada, Kiribati, Lesotho, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
Micronesia, Namibia, Nauru, Northern Marianas, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vin-
cent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuata and Western Samoa), and which in some respects
is more conservative, requiring visas for nationals of three more states (Bulgaria,
Croatia and Romania). In light of the UK’s opt-out from EC visa law, the legal-
ity of the UK’s imposition of visas on Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania cannot
be challenged as a breach of EC law (and neither can the UK’s remaining visa
exemptions for Commonwealth states in southern Africa, the Caribbean and
69 Since only one month passed between the decision to start accession negotiations
with Romania and Bulgaria in December 1999 and the Commission’s proposal to
drop the visa requirement for these States, the lack of a similar proposal regarding
Turkey was, in comparison, already overdue by December 2005.
70 The December 2005 European Council (summit meeting) decided that this State
should be considered a candidate for accession, but did not yet approve the start
of negotiations for accession, so it cannot yet be said that FYROM is in the same
position that Romania and Bulgaria were in 2000 and 2001.
71 On the standstill, see Case C-37/98 Savas [2000] ECR I-2927, Joined Cases C-317/01
and C-369/01 Abatay and others [2003] ECR I-12301 and Cases C-16/05 Tum and
Dari and C-296/05 Gunes, both pending.
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Pacific). But there is an obvious political argument that the UK and the rest of
the EU should be learning from each other about best practices: surely the UK
should take into account the success of the visa exemption applied by other
Member States to Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, just as the other Member
States should consider the success of the British visa exemption for a number of
Commonwealth countries?
Finally, the reluctance of Member States to allow admission of refugees
and stateless persons with travel documents from positive list countries without
a visa is disappointing. It is hard to see how a large number of such persons
could successfully claim asylum in the Community, given the provisions of the
existing Resolutions and the proposed Directive on asylum procedures.72 If there
is a concern that positive list countries will be unwilling to readmit such per-
sons, this could be addressed by agreeing in the Council on a list of positive list
countries where there is not such a threat, by encouraging more states to ratify
the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on visa abolition for refugees and by
considering bilateral or multilateral agreements to agree similar obligations with
non-European countries and to adopt equivalent rules for stateless persons.
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
1 Summary of Content
1.1 Existing Schengen Rules
The starting point for the EU’s visa policy is the rules on visas (for stays of under
three months) contained in the 1990 Schengen Convention.1 Visas are addressed
in Chapter 3 of Title II of the Convention, with comprehensive rules on short-
stay visas in Section 1 (Articles 9-17) and a provision on long-stay visas in Sec-
tion 2 (Article 18), which is limited to providing that persons with a long-stay
visa from a Member State have the right to cross the external borders of another
Member State in transit without having to obtain a visa to do so.
Basic rules on visa policy are set out in Article 9. Article 9(1) requires the
parties to establish a common policy on visas and as a consequence, Article
9(2) requires unanimous consent to any changes to national visa policy that was
already common when the Convention was signed or later. In “urgent” circum-
stances, a Member State can take a unilateral decision subject to prior consulta-
tion with other Member States.
Basic rules on a uniform visa (known as the “Schengen visa”) are set out
in Articles 10 and 11. Article 10(1) specifies that a uniform visa valid for all the
(Schengen) Member States for a period of three months shall be introduced.
Article 10(2) governs the transitional period prior to the introduction of the
uniform visa, while Article 10(3) permits each Member State to restrict the ter-
ritorial validity of a visa as a derogation, in accordance with common arrange-
ments. Article 11(1) defines the type of Schengen visas available, specifying that
they may either be a travel visa valid for one or more entries within a six month
period or a transit visa valid for five days maximum permitting travel through the
1 OJ 2000 L 239/19.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 201-218.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
EU territory on the way to a third state. Article 11(2) permits the Member States
to issue another visa with limited territorial validity within that half year.
Articles 12-16 set out the conditions and procedures for the issue of Schen-
gen visas. The visa shall be issued by the diplomatic or consular authorities or
by another authority designated by the Schengen Executive Committee (Arti-
cle 12(1)). Article 12(2) specifies that the State responsible for considering the
application is the State of principal destination, or alternatively the state of
first entry, and Article 12(3) gives the Executive Committee power to determine
implementing arrangements and criteria. Next, Articles 13 and 14 governs the
relationship between travel documents and visas. Article 15 sets out the underly-
ing criteria for receiving a visa. An applicant must meet the same criteria as he
or she would need to cross the border according to Article 5 of the Convention:
possession of valid documents determined as necessary to cross the border; “if
applicable” submission of documents substantiating the purpose of the visit and
sufficient means of support; absence from the list of persons banned from entry
set up within the Schengen Information System (SIS); and absence of a “threat
to public policy, national security or the international relations” of any of the
Schengen states.2 However, if these criteria are not met, it is still possible to issue
a visa limited to the validity of a single Member State if that Member State
“considers it necessary” to issue a visa on humanitarian grounds, national inter-
est or international obligations (Article 16).
Finally, Article 17 sets out three categories of implementing powers for the
Executive Committee. According to Article 17(1), it must set out common rules
for considering visa applications and ensure they are enforced correctly. Article
17(2) requires it to agree rules on prior consultation with authorities of other
Member States prior to issue of a visa in certain circumstances. There are six
further powers granted by Article 17(3), comprising rules on: affixing a visa to
travel documents; the bodies responsible for issuing visas; the conditions govern-
ing the issue of visas at borders; the form, content and validity of visas “and the
charges to be imposed for their issue”; the conditions for extension and renewal
of visas; procedures for limiting territorial validity; and criteria for preparing a
common list of persons to be refused entry.
To give effect to the powers granted by the Convention, the Executive Com-
mittee adopted thirteen Decisions which the Council considered fell within the
scope of the EC’s visa powers and six Decisions which the Council believed fell
partly within the scope of those powers.3 The former comprise Decisions on:
extending the uniform visa; procedures for cancelling the uniform visa; issuing
uniform visas at the border; introducing a computerised procedure for the con-
sultation provided for in Article 17(2); a common visa policy; representation of
2 Art. 5 also requires the person crossing the border to possess “a valid visa if
required”, but this criterion obviously does not apply to visa applications.
3 See Council Decision “allocating” the Schengen acquis (OJ 1999 L 176/17).
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
other Member States when issuing visas; issuing visas at the borders to seamen
in transit; harmonisation of visa policy; exchange of visa statistics at local level;
stamping of passports of visa applicants; abolition of the visa “grey list”; the
manual of documents to which a visa may be affixed; and the introduction of a
harmonised form for sponsorship.4 The latter comprise Decisions on: the acqui-
sition of common entry and exit stamps; exchanges of statisical information on
visas; an action plan to combat illegal immigration; the coordinated deployment
of document advisors; the adoption of a consolidated text of the Common Con-
sular Instructions (CCI); and a manual of documents to which a visa may be
affixed.5 Certain provisions of the CCI are still confidential.6
4 Published at OJ 2000 L 239/151, 154, 163, 165, 175, 180, 182, 186, 196, 200, 206, 207
and 299.
5 Published at OJ 2000 L 239/166, 173, 203, 298, 308 and 317.
6 See Schengen Executive Committee Decisions on confidentiality (OJ 2000 L 239/127
and 139), now repealed by Decision 2004/16 (OJ 2004 L 5/78), which specifies that
Annex 5 to the CCI is still classified.
7 See respectively Ch. 8 and Reg. 1091/2001 (OJ 2001 L 150/4).
8 OJ 2001 L 116/2.
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Section II – Visa and Border Controls
States acting unilaterally (Article 2(1)).9 In several cases, other Member States
must be given a prior opportunity to comment before the latter amendments are
made (Article 2(2)). These procedures apply to the entirety of the two manu-
als, to six of the eight sections of the CCI,10 and to thirteen of the fifteen CCI
Annexes.11 The only CCI Annexes not subject to the implementing powers of
the Council are provisions relating to visa issues covered by the “normal” Com-
munity method (visa lists and visa format, in Annex 1 and Annex 8), and the
only CCI sections not subject to these powers are Parts I and IV on the scope of
visas and legal basis, which consist entirely of references to the 1990 Schengen
Convention. The Council acted unanimously until 1 January 2005, after which
point it votes by a qualified majority.12
Article 202 EC does permit the Council to confer implementing powers
upon itself, by way of exception to the normal rule. But the Commission took
the view that the Council had supplied insufficient reasons for this decision, and
so (unsuccessfully) sued the Council to annul the Regulation,13 along with the
parallel Regulation concerning amendments to the Common [Border] Manual.14
Despite voting for the proposal, the Dutch government intervened to support
the Commission’s position.15
The next two measures both concern visa formats, and were both based on
Article 62(2)(b)(iii) EC. Regulation 334/2002 amends the pre-Amsterdam Regu-
lation 1683/95 on a common visa format,16 by updating the committee procedure
for assisting the Commission when it implements the Regulation,17 extending the
Commission’s implementing powers and providing for a photo to be included
9 Arts. 1 and 2.
10 The exceptions are Part I (scope of visas) and Part IV (legal basis), which consists
entirely of references to the 1990 Schengen Convention.
11 The exceptions are Annex 1, which lists countries whose nationals do or do not
require a visa to cross the external borders and Annex 8, which comprises the Coun-
cil Regulation on the uniform visa format.
12 Art. 3(1) of the Decision amending decision-making rules for Title IV (OJ 2004 L
396/45).
13 Case C-257/01 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-345. See Statement 30/01,
reproduced in the monthly summary of Council acts for April 2001 (Council doc.
9018/01, 21 May 2001).
14 Reg. 790/2001 (OJ 2001 L 116/5). See parallel Statement 32/01 (ibid).
15 See Statements 31/01 and 33/01 (ibid.) and subsequently Statements 50/02 and 51/02
in the monthly summary of Council acts for April 2002 (Council doc. 9250/02, 3
June 2002).
16 OJ 2002 L 53/7.
17 Such an update was necessary because new rules on committees which assist the
Commission when exercising its implementation powers (“comitology” rules) had
been agreed by Council Decision 1999/468 in 1999 (OJ 1999 L 184/23).
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
within the visa. Regulation 333/2002 establishes a common format for attaching
a visa sticker for a different category of persons, those who have travel docu-
ments from an entity which is not recognised.18 It has the same system as Regula-
tion 334/2002 for implementing the common format.
Fourth, in February 2003 the Council adopted Regulation 415/2003, based
on Article 62(2)(b)(ii) EC, which concerns examination of border applications
for a visa and issuing visas to seamen.19 This consolidated and recast the two
relevant Schengen Executive Committee Decisions and added the possibility of
issuing collective visas to seamen. Fifth and sixth, following agreement between
the EU and Russia on the future status of Kaliningrad, the Council adopted in
April 2003 Regulations 693/2003 and 694/2003 to implement the agreement.20
Seventh, in July 2003 the Council adopted a Regulation setting out special rules
for admission in relation to the summer 2004 Olympic Games.21 Eighth, in June
2004 the Council adopted a Decision establishing the Visa Information System.22
Finally, in December 2005, the Council and EP adopted a Regulation setting out
special rules for admission in relation the 2006 Winter Olympics. 23
Of the fourteen implementing measures, two are secret and thus unpub-
lished. First, a Decision from April 2001 updates Annex 10 of the CCI and
Annex 8 of the Schengen Consultation Network (dealing with technical speci-
fications). The confidential Annexes concern instructions on writing entries in
the section of a visa to be electronically scanned, while the consultation network
is a system to facilitate contacts between different Member States’ visa authori-
ties. Second, a Decision from December 2002 makes further amendments to the
Schengen Consulation Network.24
Of the remaining twelve measures, three are purely technical updates to
the CCI following other decisions. These measures simply give effect to changes
consequential on the extension of the Schengen area to Nordic countries, on the
adoption of Regulation 1091/2001 concerning freedom to travel for holders of
long-stay visas and on the adoption of Regulations 333/2002 and 334/2002 on
18 OJ 2002 L 53/4.
19 OJ 2003 L 64/1. For the initial proposal (by Spain) see OJ 2002 C 139/6.
20 OJ 2003 L 99/8 and /15. For the initial proposals, see COM (2003) 60, 5 Feb. 2003.
These Regulations are not considered in detail in this book.
21 Reg. 1295/2003, OJ 2003 L 183/1. For the proposal, see COM (2003) 172, 8 Apr.
2003. The Regulation is not considered in detail in this book.
22 OJ 2004 L 213/5. For the proposal, see COM (2004) 99, 12 Feb. 2004. The Decision
is not considered in detail in this book.
23 Reg. 2046/2005, OJ 2005 L 334/1. For the proposal, see COM (2005) 412, 7 Sep.
2005. The Regulation is not considered in detail in this book.
24 See Press Release of the JHA Council, 19 Dec. 2002 and Council doc. 13189/02, 4
Nov. 2002.
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Section II – Visa and Border Controls
25 See Decisions amending CCI Part VI and Annexes 3, 6 and 13 (OJ 2001 L 116/32);
Parts V and VI and Annex 13 (OJ 2001 L 150/47); and Part VI (OJ 2002 L 187/48).
26 See Art. 7(2) of Reg. 539/2001 (OJ 2001 L 81/1); Art. 2 of Reg. 1091/2001 (OJ 2002
L 150/4), amending Section 2.2 of Part I; Art. 2 of Reg. 333/2002 (n. 18 above); Art.
5(4) of Reg. 453/2003 (n. 19 above); and Art. 11(1) of Reg. 693/2003 (n. 20 above).
27 Decisions amending Annex 2, Schedule A of the CCI (OJ 2003 L 198/13) and Annex
3, Part 1 of the CCI (OJ 2003 L 198/15).
28 Decision 2002/44 amending Part VII and Annex 12 of the CCI (OJ 2002 L 20/5).
29 Decision 2002/354 amending Part III and creating a new Annex 16 CCI (OJ 2002 L
123/50).
30 Decision amending Parts III and VIII of CCI (OJ 2002 L 187/44).
31 OJ 2003 L 152/82.
32 See Decisions amending different provisions of Part V of the CCI (OJ 2004 L 5/74
and OJ 2004 L 5/79); and Part II of the CCI, also adding a new Annex (OJ 2004 L
5/76).
33 OJ 2003 L 236, pp. 718-725.
34 OJ 2002 C 313/1, OJ 2003 C 310/1 and OJ 2005 C 326/1.
35 OJ 2005 L 289/23.
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
Finally, there were several visa policy measures under discussion at the start
of 2006. First, the Commission’s proposals concerning local border traffic con-
tain provisions relevant to visa policy.36 Secondly, the Commission proposed in
September 2003 to amend the EC’s standard visa format, to insert “biometric”
data (fingerprints and digital photographs).37 Thirdly, the Commission made a
second proposal to set out more detailed rules for the functioning of the “Visa
Information System” in December 2004.38 Fourth, a proposed Decision con-
cerning transit through new Member States has “legal bases” concerning both
external borders and visas.39
One planned initiative initially fizzled out: the idea of joint consular offices
of the Member States, with a pilot project in Pristina, failed to take off due to
lack of interest.40 The idea of a joint consular office in Kinshasa was mooted in
spring 2003, but did not come to fruition.41 Similarly, an attempt by the Danish
Council Presidency to begin the process of harmonising appeal procedures for
visas was dropped due to opposition from Member States.42
The Hague Programme, setting out a further multi-year programme for
Justice and Home Affairs Law, and adopted in November 2004,43 contains a
number of objectives concerning visas: a Commission communication on
“inter-operability” of the VIS and other EU information systems (the SIS and
Eurodac) in 2005; Commission proposals on common visa application centres in
2005 and on a proposal concerning the CCI in early 2006 at the latest, following
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Section II – Visa and Border Controls
a review of the CCI; the application of the VIS in practice in two phases (end
2006 for data and photographs; end 2007 for biometric data); and the possible
agreement on visa facilitation treaties with non-EU countries, in return for read-
mission treaties.44 The implementation plan fleshing out the Hague programme
refers further to proposals coming in 2005 concerning amendment of the CCI
as regards biometrics and visa fees.45 By the start of 2006, the Commission had
released its discussion paper on interoperability,46 and had reached agreement
with Russia on the first Community visa facilitation treaty.47
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
list and defined rules on a uniform visa.49 Discussions on the first two issues
petered out;50 the third topic was agreed within the two-year deadline;51 and dis-
cussions never began on the fourth issue. Within five years, the EU was to adopt
further measures on the visa format and the Schengen representation system; as
we have seen, it had addressed both issues by the end of 2003.
Subsequently, the Tampere conclusions called for a “common active policy
on visas and false documents...including closer co-operation between EU con-
sulates in third countries and, where necessary, the establishment of common
EU visa issuing offices.” As noted above, the idea of common offices has not
progressed yet. The Laeken European Council at the end of 2001 referred again
to the idea of common consular offices and asked the Council and the Member
States “to set up a common visa identification system”. Next, the Seville Euro-
pean Council of June 2002 specified dates for further steps setting up the visa
identification system; the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 called
for further development of the VIS and legislation on inclusion of “biomet-
ric” data in travel documents, starting with visas; and the October 2003 summit
called for agreement on the ensuing proposals by the end of 2003.52
49 See Annex 3.
50 On the former issue, French proposals from 2000 and 2004 were discussed but not
agreed; on the latter issue, see the Finnish proposal mentioned in Ch. 1.
51 See Ch. 8.
52 On the summit conclusions, see Annexes 4 and 5.
53 See outcome of proceedings of visa working party on 18 June 1999 (Council doc.
9858/99, 6 July 1999).
54 See outcome of proceedings of visa working party on 22 Sep. 1999 (Council doc.
12387/99, 4 Nov. 1999).
55 The first draft was Council doc. 12973/99, 18 Nov. 1999; see later docs. 12973/1/99,
11 Jan. 2000; 12973/2/99, 9 Feb. 2000; and 12973/3/99, 6 Mar. 2000, before the
formal transmission of the text to the EP.
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Section II – Visa and Border Controls
prior consultation with other Member States before they were adopted, and to
alter the wording of the crucial recital that explains the Council’s reasons for
deciding to confer implementing powers on itself. Originally this recital referred
to “the enhanced role of the Member States in this policy area, and in view of
the need of the need to meet the operational requirements of the requisite con-
sular authorities with the requisite degree of urgency” as grounds for conferring
powers on the Council, but the text which the Council first intended to send to
the EP referred to the Member States’ enhanced role as “reflecting the political
sensitivity of this area”.56 This was amended in the formal text sent to the EP
to refer to the enhanced role of the Member States as “reflecting the sensitivity
of this area, in particular involving political relations with third countries”.57
Later on, the Council decided to add the Schengen consultation network to the
scope of the proposal.58 Unsurprisingly, the EP, traditionally a supporter of the
Commission’s implementing powers, rejected this initiative.59
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
visa” and “other conditions necessary for implementation of the uniform format
for visas”. Discussion of these proposals in the Council’s visa working party
resulted in deletion of the Commission’s broad power to adopt “other condi-
tions”, limitation of the Commission’s other powers to “additional measures
and security requirements” and “the technical methods and procedures” to be
used to fill in the visa, and an extension from one to two months for Member
States’ delegations to control the Commission in the event of a dispute over
a draft implementing measure.63 The Spanish delegation also insisted that the
Regulation should expressly not limit Member States’ competence over recogni-
tion of states, territorial entities and documents, and another new clause con-
cerned consequential changes to the CCI and the Common [Borders] Manual.
Then, following the events of 11 September 2001, the Commission issued a
fresh version of the proposal, which would require the insertion of a photo into
the visa.64 This would apply five years after adoption of the technical standards
to combat counterfeiting; the Commission would also have powers to amend the
colours on the visa sticker to combat counterfeiting. The Council’s visa work-
ing party quickly reached agreement on this proposal,65 and following the EP’s
vote in favour (with proposed amendments) in December 2001, the Regulation
was subsequently formally adopted in February 2002, applying from 15 March
2002.
The initial proposal for the Regulation on visas for persons with docu-
ments from unrecognised entities was nearly identical to Regulation 1683/95,
and so the Council’s visa working party first reached agreement on the proposed
amendments to that Regulation before discussing this proposal.66 Agreement
was then very quick, with amendments to the Commission’s text corresponding
to the amendments agreed to the parallel proposal, although this form of visa
will not include a photo. Subsequently, after the EP’s vote in favour, this measure
was formally adopted at the same time as its sister Regulation. It applied from
23 February 2002.
Finally, as noted above, the September 2003 proposal to bring forward the
date of including biometric photos in the standard visa format and to include
fingerprints of visa applicants also was quickly agreed in principle at the JHA
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Section II – Visa and Border Controls
Council of November 2003, but it had not yet been adopted officially by 1 Janu-
ary 2006.67
3 Legal Analysis
The main legal issue arising within the scope of EC visa policy has been the issue
of implementing powers. In practice, the question as to whether the Commis-
sion or the Council exercises these powers matters, because the Commission is
more likely to adopt an implementing decision that at least one Member States
disagrees with, especially where (as in the case of amending the CCI, associated
manuals and the Common Manual until 2005) the Council has limited itself to
67 For the agreed text, see Council doc. 14969/1/03, 21 Nov. 2003.
68 Council doc. 5015/02, 7 Jan. 2002. See Belgian comments in Council doc. 6324/02,
15 Feb. 2002.
69 See revised text in Council docs. 10883/02, 11 July 2002 and 11230/02, 16 Aug. 2002
(following the frontiers working party meetings on 28 May and 15 July 2002). On
specific German concerns, see Council doc. 9067/02, 22 May 2002.
70 See Council docs. 12477/02, 10 Oct. 2002 and 13382/02, 6 Nov. 2002.
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Chapter 9 Visa Policy
213
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
can be doubted whether the Council has powers to confer implementing powers
over the entire CCI to either the Commission or the Council. Some of the pro-
visions of the CCI arguably set out “essential elements” of the rules relating to
consideration of visa applications, and it has long been established that the such
basic elements of EC rules cannot be adopted by implementing measures, but
must be subject to the full legislative procedure.74 The distinction between legis-
lation and implementing rules became even more important after the EP gained
“co-decision” powers over the underlying legislative decisions from 1 May 2004.
It is possible that the original idea, noted above, of separating the “operative”
provisions of the CCI from the others might have met this test, but this idea was
for some reason dropped before the presentation of an official proposal.
In the view of the Court of Justice, the Council was justified in confer-
ring implementing powers upon itself even though the reasons for doing so
were “general and laconic”, because the issue had only recently come within
EC competence, was furthermore subject to a transitional decision-making
period, concerned clearly circumscribed matters and was due for review at the
end of the transitional period. Also, the Council was justified in conferring cer-
tain powers upon Member States because Member States had not automati-
cally lost the powers conferred upon them by provisions of the Schengen acquis
which permitted them to amend certain Schengen rules, so the Council could
confer powers to amend rules upon the Member States in the “quite specific and
transitional situation” applying before the Schengen rules were developed in the
Commuinity framework. Also, the Commission’s argument that some of those
provisions which Member States could amend unilaterally had an effect upon
other Member States was dismissed by the Court, on the grounds that the Com-
mission had not established why a uniform procedure was necessary to amend
those provisions.
The Court’s reasoning is, with the greatest respect, wholly unconvincing. On
the first point, it is not appropriate for the Court to insert additional reasoning
based on the “context” of the legislation to supplement the reasoning which the
Council inserted into the Regulations’ preambles. As to the specific reasons the
Court provides, many issues have come within Community competence for the
first time since the comitology provisions were inserted into the Treaty in 1987,
but this has never before been accepted (or asserted) as a reason to disapply the
normal rule that implementing powers must be conferred upon the Commis-
sion. Although there was a transitional period for Community decision-making,
Articles 67 and 68 EC make no mention of any derogation as regards comitol-
ogy rules; the better argument is that as exceptions from the Treaty rules should
be interpreted narrowly and the Member States had ample opportunity to insist
upon further derogations from EC rules besides those listed expressly in Articles
67 and 68, no further derogations from EC rules are permitted apart from those
214
Chapter 9 Visa Policy
listed. A literal reading of the text based on the a contrario principle also sup-
ports this interpretation. Next, the derogation does not concern “clearly circum-
scribed matters” but, as the Court admits, nearly the whole of the CCI and the
Common Manual; while there are matters outside the scope of the derogation,
they are quite limited. As pointed out above, the Council conducted no analysis
to assess which issues were genuinely sensitive, particularly as compared to the
issue of which States to place on the visa list. Finally, as noted at the outset,
Council has not in fact conducted a review of the derogations as promised.
On the second point, there is nothing in the text of the EC Treaty or the
Schengen Protocol to suggest that a special rule could permit the Council to
confer powers upon Member States, rather than the Council or Commission.
Article 202 EC clearly appears exhaustive as regards the issue of implementing
powers and makes no suggestion that any further category of measures imple-
menting legislation exists. As for the Schengen Protocol, it expressly aims to
incorporate the Schengen acquis within the framework of the EC legal system
and states that the Schengen Executive Committee has been replaced by the
Council, not the Member States. The Court’s interpretation therefore clearly
violates both the text and context of the Protocol. Finally, the Court’s analysis
of the specific provisions referred to by the Commission transfers the burden of
proof to the Commission and places a high standard of proof upon it to suc-
ceed with its objections. But since the Council derogated from the Treaty rules
by inventing a wholly new system of implementing powers, it should bear the
burden of proving that such a decision was justified; and given the effect of the
relevant measures upon other Member States, the Treaty reference to powers
over a “uniform visa” and the need to harmonise the relevant law in connec-
tion with the abolition of internal border controls (as recognised by the Court
in its Wijsenbeek judgment),75 there is a very strong prima facie argument that
the Member States should not retain any unilateral power to amend any of the
relevant measures.
Next, the Decision requiring Member States to charge fees for visa appli-
cations raises some specific issues. The Commission argued when the Council
adopted this measure that Article 17 of the 1990 Schengen Convention only
refers to adoption of rules concerning charges for issuing visas, and so the Coun-
cil had to adopt a legislative measure dealing with this issue, not an implementing
measure.76 Since the Council expressly limited itself when adopting Regulation
789/2001 to conferring power on itself to adopt certain implementing measures
within the scope of Article 17 of the Convention, the Commission’s argument
appears to be well founded. Although the Commission did not sue to annul
the Council’s decision, it would be possible to challenge its validity through the
215
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
4 Comments
As noted at the outset of this Chapter, the rules on the issue of short-term visas
to individuals are an important part of the Community’s relations with develop-
ing countries and countries in transition. For those who can afford to visit the
Community as a tourist or who need to visit for family or business reasons, the
visa regime can be a significant financial, legal and technical barrier.78 If the
Community wants to take its commitment to development and its WTO com-
mitments seriously, it should ensure provision for a fair, coherent and efficient
visa regime. In fact, it can be argued that visas for family visits fall within the
216
Chapter 9 Visa Policy
scope of Article 8 ECHR,79 with the result that Article 13 ECHR requires that
an effective remedy be available where there is an arguable case for issue of a visa
to maintain family links. The compatibility of the EC visa rules with interna-
tional non-discrimination obligations can also be doubted.80 Also, the Schengen
Executive Committee apparently never exercised its power to adopt common
rules on agreeing the Schengen “blacklist” of individuals, but it is essential in
order to secure effective protection for human rights and civil liberties that fair
and transparent rules on the operation of Article 96 of the Schengen Conven-
tion, including amendment of that provision of the Convention, should be
adopted.81
How should EC visa policy since the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam be judged in this context? It was initially thought that the existing
tangle of Schengen rules appearing in the main Convention and a variety of
secondary measures would be consolidated within a short period.82 But this has
not happened; the only consolidation has been brought about by the completion
of the common visa list and the Regulation on the issue of visas at the border.83
Moreover, this is the only area of immigration and asylum policy where the
Commission has not yet released a discussion paper intended to spark a full
public debate on the substance of the policy. Rather a Commission working
paper from 1999 concerned itself only with the technical questions of the scope
of various “legal bases” and the territorial scope of the visa rules.84 Such ques-
tions are legally and practically important, but somehow the Community insti-
tutions never asked themselves basic questions about the role and purpose of
visa policy, or even considered how to consolidate the existing measures into
79 The European Court of Human Rights has clearly confirmed that in some circum-
stances, a family member must be admitted to enter the territory: see Sen v Nether-
lands (judgment of 21 Dec. 2001, not yet reported). Logically it should follow that,
given the limited impact on Member States of granting a short-term visa for family
visits, Article 8 entails an obligation to issue visas in such cases. The Strasbourg
Court has not yet ruled on the issue one way or the other.
80 See Cholewinski, Borders and Discrimination in the European Union (ILPA/MPG,
2002), s. 1.3.2.
81 For detailed analysis, see Eicke, “Paradise Lost? Exclusion and Expulsion from the
EU” in Groenendijk, Guild and Minderhoud, eds., n. 76 above, 147 at 159-165 and
Colvin, The Schengen Information System: A Human Rights Audit (Justice, 2000).
On the limitations revealed by national litigation concerning the SIS, see Staples, n.
76 above at 229-233.
82 Kuiper, “Some Legal Problems Associated with the Communitarization of Policy
on Visas, Asylum and Immigration under the Amsterdam Treaty and Incorporation
of the Schengen Acquis”, 37 CMLRev. (2000) 345 at 358.
83 On the first point, see Ch. 8.
84 SEC (1999) 1213, 16 July 1999.
217
Section II – Visa and Border Controls
85 This would be consistent with the Commission proposal to recast the EU’s border
rules (see Ch. 7).
86 For example, see proposed Directive 2000/04 in The Amsterdam Proposals (ILPA/
MPG, 2000). The Commission has now proposed, in the context of establishing a
new generation of the Schengen Information System, more harmonised rules on
this issue, including appeal rights: COM (2005) 236, 31 May 2005.
218
Section III Asylum
Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
1 Summary
Council Regulation 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application
lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national was adopted
by Council on 18 February 2003. It entered into force on 17 March 2003 fol-
lowing publication in the Official Journal and was applicable to asylum applica-
tions from 1 September 2003. It should be read in conjunction with Commission
Regulation 1560/20031 which sets out the detailed rules for the application of
Regulation 343/2003. The UK and Ireland have opted into the Regulation, but
Denmark could not; relations between Denmark and the “old” Member States
are still governed by the Dublin Convention, although Denmark and all other
EC Member States have negotiated a treaty (not yet in force as of 1 January
2006) which will apply the Dublin II rules between them.2 Norway and Iceland
apply the Regulation pursuant to a treaty with the EC ratified in 2001,3 and
Switzerland will apply it pursuant to its own treaty with the Community (not yet
in force as of 1 January 2006).4
The Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention determining which
Member State was responsible for determining an asylum claim, and does not
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 221-257.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section III – Asylum
222
Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
Where the residence document or visa expired in the last 2 years or 6 months
respectively and this enabled the asylum seeker to enter the territory of a Member
State and he has not left the EC then the above criteria apply. Where the resi-
dence document or visa expired more than 2 years or 6 months ago respectively,
then it is the Member State in which the application is lodged which is respon-
sible. Visas or residence permits issued on false statements or invalid documents
do not prevent the criteria above from applying, unless fraud was committed
after the visa or residence permit was issued.
The next category relates to those who irregularly crossed borders (Article
10). Where an asylum seeker enters a Member State irregularly from a non-
Member State, that Member State will be responsible for the asylum applica-
tion. This responsibility ceases 12 months after entry. After this period or where
illegal entry cannot be established, if it can be shown that the person remained
in a Member State for 5 months or more then that Member State is responsible.
If a person has been living for 5 months in multiple Member States then it is the
last Member State in which he or she lived which is responsible.
Those with visa waivers are dealt with next in the hierarchy (Article 11). If
asylum seeker enters a Member State on a visa waiver, then that Member State
is responsible. If he or she applies for asylum in another State where visa waiver
is also applied then the latter Member State becomes responsible. Article 12
relates to those applicants who are in airports. Where an application is made
in an international transit area of an airport, that Member State is responsible.
Finally, the “default” responsibility rule, if none of the other criteria apply, is
that the Member State where the application is made is responsible for consider-
ing it (Article 13).
Article 14 relates to applications by family members made simultaneously
or close together. If family members make applications on the same date or
close enough together in the same Member State, then the Member State which
has received the most number of applications from the family members will
determine them all. Failing this, then the Member State which has received the
application of the oldest family member will determine the rest of the applica-
tions as well. Article 15 is a humanitarian clause. Even if a Member State is
not responsible under the criteria, it may bring together family members as well
as other dependent relatives on humanitarian grounds. More broadly, Article
3(2) permits a Member State in any case (humanitarian or not) to opt to take
responsibility for an asylum application which is not its responsibility under the
criteria. The procedure and time limits to be followed in a taking charge case are
laid down in Articles 16 to 19.
Article 4(5) states that an applicant for asylum who is present in one
Member State and makes an application for asylum there having withdrawn
an asylum application made in another Member State shall be taken back by
the latter Member State. The procedure for “taking back” an asylum applicant
are laid down in Article 20. Where the asylum seeker has lodged an application
223
Section III – Asylum
7 See respectively SEC (2000) 522 of 21 March 2000 and SEC (2001) 756, 13 June
2001.
8 N. 2 above.
9 In the Commission’s proposal, this would only have applied fully to family members
in the “regular” procedure as defined in its initial proposal for a Directive on asylum
procedures (see Ch. 14).
224
Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
The first meeting of the Council’s asylum working party to consider the
proposed Regulation was held in October 2001,10 and the working party was
able to complete a first reading of the entire text. A number of objections to the
proposal were raised, in particular as regards the application of the proposal to
all forms of international protection, the point at which the Regulation would
no longer apply, the definitions of “family members” and “visas”, a reference to
application of the “safe third country” principle (in this context, meaning coun-
tries outside the EU), and the application of the rules to persons who withdraw
their claims. As regards the responsibility criteria, at least one delegation argued
that the Member State responsible should be that in which an application was
lodged, and there were objections to every one of the proposed criteria listed by
the Commission. Furthermore, there were a number of detailed reservations on
the humanitarian clause and the procedural Chapter V, including on the aboli-
tion of the possible suspensive effect of an appeal against removal to another
Member State, which was considered “likely to give rise to problems in rela-
tion to” the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). On the final two
chapters, the only reservations concerned minor points related to data protec-
tion, certain bilateral agreements which would be permitted pursuant to Article
24(1)(c) of the original proposal, and the non-discrimination clause.
Subsequently, the Spanish Council Presidency convened a meeting of the
Council’s asylum working party in February 2002 to continue discussions based
on its proposed redraft of Articles 1-15 of the proposal, including the defini-
tions and responsibility criteria.11 The Presidency suggested six changes to the
Commission’s proposal. “Family members” would not include persons besides
spouses, unmarried partners or unmarried children, who would be minors (not
merely under eighteen); unmarried spouses would only be covered if they were
treated in the same way as spouses under immigration law. Secondly, an “appli-
cant” would be a person who had not yet been subject to a positive decision or
a negative decision allowing expulsion. Thirdly, the Regulation would require
Member States to “undertake to examine” an asylum application, reproduc-
ing the wording of the Dublin Convention. Fourthly, the proposed Article 4(3),
which would have purported to require Member States to apply the Regulation
even after a person withdrew all claims for Geneva Convention refugee status,
would be deleted.12 Fifthly, Article 8 of the proposal would apply a criterion
of family reunion with asylum-seekers in all forms of procedure, not just the
“normal” procedure for considering claims (although obviously the effect of
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this was reduced by the narrower definition of “family member”). Finally, the
proposed Article 10 (irregular border crossing) would be switched with the pro-
posed Article 11 (legal entry), so that the latter criterion would have priority over
the former, although these provisions were switched back some months later.
Intense efforts to agree the text during the Spanish Presidency culminated
in a discussion of the most intractable issues at the JHA Council in June 2002,
although this did not result in agreement on the text. During the spring discus-
sions in the working party,13 some Member States held out for a wider definition
of “family members”, at least in the context of some of the responsibility crite-
ria. Cross-references to the proposed directive on asylum procedures, now due to
be agreed later, were dropped. The obligation to examine an asylum application
was ultimately retained, and was joined by another Dublin Convention provi-
sion allowing Member States to send an applicant to a third country. However,
the dubious idea of applying the Regulation after withdrawal of a claim was
provisionally dropped (following attempts to resurrect a compromise version
of this principle), although some Member States were still holding out for its
retention.
As for the responsibility criteria, the Article on unaccompanied minors was
restricted to cases in which the family member of the minor was legally present.
However, a new provision provided that in the absence of a family member,
unaccompanied minors would have “applicant’s choice” of where to submit
their claim. Some Member States wanted to extend family reunion with family
members enjoying another form of protection. The “humanitarian clause” was
redrafted several times, but still disputed.
When discussions began on the subsequent chapters, it was agreed that
Member States should be granted discretion (as in the Dublin Convention) over
whether or not challenges to Dublin decisions should have suspensive effect,
although such effect could not be automatic, but applied only on a case-by-case
basis by courts or review bodies. A new clause defining time limits more precisely
was added. Furthermore, the provisions on non-discrimination and rules on
penalties to be applied by Member States were deleted. It was decided that many
of the detailed rules concerning proof and evidence presently found in imple-
menting Decisions of the Article 18 Committee (the intergovernmental commit-
tee which adopted implementing measures concerning the Dublin Convention)
would be integrated into the Regulation, with the result that they could only be
amended by the full legislative procedure,14 rather than adopted and amended
13 Council docs. 6344/02, 26 Feb. 2002; 6485/02, 26 Mar. 2002; 8207/02, 23 Apr. 2002;
8752/02, 17 May 2002; 9305/02, 28 May 2002; 9305/1/02, 28 May 2002; and room
docs asile 4/02, 14 Mar. 2002 and 10/02, 14 May 2002.
14 As noted above, following the insertion of Article 67(5) into the EC Treaty by the
Treaty of Nice, any amendments to the Regulation must be adopted by a qualified
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
majority vote in the Council with co-decision of the European Parliament (see fur-
ther Ch. 3).
15 An Italian attempt to keep the Dublin Convention’s Article 18 Committee in exis-
tence was rebuffed. This would clearly have been illegal: see Art. 202 EC, which
provides that implementing powers for EC legislation can be conferred on the Com-
mission or exceptionally the Council, not Member State officials.
16 Council docs. 9563/02, 3 June 2002 and 9563/1/02, 7 June 2002. For more detail, see
ILPA European Update, June 2002.
17 Council doc. 11139/02, 18 July 2002. For more detail, see ILPA European Update,
Sep. 2002.
18 Council doc. 12154/02, 20 Sep. 2002.
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Section III – Asylum
were left to the interior ministers meeting in the JHA Council. In the meantime,
the UK and French governments had settled a bilateral dispute over the San-
gatte refugee camp, thus rendering agreement on new rules more likely.
After further detailed and bitter negotiations in the October and Novem-
ber 2002 JHA Councils,19 the Danish Presidency produced a compromise text
that each Member State was reluctant to accept but which could not easily be
changed.20 To end the stand-off, the Presidency applied an obscure tactic known
as the “silent procedure”, which left Member States a week to decide if they were
willing to accept the text. It appeared that they were, and a “political agreement”
on this text was noted on 6 December 2002, followed by formal adoption of the
Regulation early in 2003.
During the final stages of negotiations, the idea of applying the rules to
withdrawn claims, strongly supported by the UK, was finally dropped. Secondly,
instead of adding four new criteria for responsibility, the Council only added
two, relating to unaccompanied minors (first criterion) and family reunion
with asylum-seekers (third criterion, following the Dublin I criterion for family
reunion with recognised refugees, which was ultimately unchanged). As noted
above, the criterion on crossing the border irregularly was ultimately supple-
mented by fiercely contested additional provisions terminating responsibility on
such grounds after twelve months and transferring responsibility in the event
of five months’ stay in the territory of a Member State. Next, the criterion con-
cerning the state responsible for controlling the entry of a non-visa national was
retained (despite the Commission’s initial proposal for amendments). A final
compromise was reached on a revised text of the old “humanitarian” clause,
which now focuses on family reunion alone. As for the procedural rules, the
Council split the difference between the leisurely periods for the application of
the Dublin Convention and the Commission’s proposal for significant shorten-
ing of those periods. Furthermore, the Council agreed that an electronic system
for sending requests between administrations, including proof of receipt of a
request, would be set up shortly. One can only imagine how many requests for a
transfer have been “lost in the post”.
There is no indication that the Council considered the EP’s proposals for
modest amendments in April 2002, which suggested that responsibility would
also apply where extended family could take care of unaccompanied minors, that
the “humanitarian clause” should cover extended family and that the exchange
of data should be more clearly limited.21
19 See Council docs. 12381/02, 30 Sep. 2002; 12616/02, 8 Oct. 2002; 13365/02, 23 Oct.
2002; 13596/02, 31 Oct. 2002; 13915/02, 8 Nov. 2002; 14330/02, 15 Nov. 2002; and
14651/02, 21 Nov. 2002.
20 Council doc. 14990/02, 29 Nov. 2002.
21 Plenary vote of 9 Apr. 2002 (OJ 2003 C 127 E/151).
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
3 Legal Analysis
The legal issues arising from the Regulation relate to its interrelationship with
the European Convention on Human Rights and its compatibility with the 1951
UN Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and other international
instruments. It is certainly arguable that the Regulation does not comply with
the ECHR, and in particular the obligation under Article 3 taken together with
Article 1 to secure rights within a Contracting State. Just as with the Dublin
Convention, an agreement between certain States which seeks to transfer a
person from one State to another without examination of the individual case,
will risk transferring that person in breach of the ECHR.
As the European Court of Human Rights observed in the case of T.I. v
United Kingdom22 “where States establish international organisations, or muta-
tis mutandis international agreements, to pursue co-operation in certain fields of
activities, there may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It
would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention if Contract-
ing States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in
relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution”.
For as long as there remains a difference in interpretation of international
refugee law amongst Member States of the European Union, it must be the case
that there is a risk that removal to one of the States with more restrictive inter-
pretation will lead to removal in breach of Article 3 ECHR.23
In addition, the lack of de facto family reunification rights for those who
have been granted subsidiary protection may constitute a breach of Article 8
ECHR.24 Finally, the failure to recognise the wishes of asylum applicants, their
social, cultural and other needs will inevitably act as a real barrier to their inte-
gration and contribution to their host States.
As regards other international human rights instruments, as observed below,
whilst the Geneva Convention envisages a degree of choice for applicants about
where to claim asylum, the Regulation does not. UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion 15 makes clear that an asylum applicant with close links or connec-
tions in a particular State should be allowed to claim asylum there.
22 7 March 2000.
23 With the adoption of the Refugee Definition Directive, Council Directive 2004/83/
EC, this risk is reduced or at least will be once the ECJ has had the opportunity of
ensuring uniform interpretation of concepts in that Directive
24 On this issue, see Peers, “EC law on family members of persons seeking or receiving
international protection”, in Shah, ed., The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems
(Cavendish, 2005).
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4 Comments
4.1 General Comments
The Dublin Convention and its successor have been the subject of considerable
debate both amongst Member States and the wider public. The Commission’s
working paper entitled “Revisiting the Dublin Convention: developing Commu-
nity legislation for determining which Member State is responsible for considering
an asylum application submitted in one of the Member States” set out a number
of options for the successor to the Dublin Convention in terms of the criteria
to determine the State responsible for processing an asylum claim. The options
included continuing to tie responsibility for examining an asylum application
with responsibility for the applicant’s entry into the European Union or basing
the determination of an application on where it is in fact lodged.
However, when the Commission put forward its proposal for this Regula-
tion it did not take the opportunity to revise the criteria for determining respon-
sibility and that the proposed Regulation based on the same principles as the
Dublin Convention. This was of considerable disappointment to a number of
observers. The House of Lords’ Select Committee concluded that “serious con-
sideration should be given to the development of an alternative to Dublin”.25
The right to seek asylum contained in the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights is drastically undermined by a system which links allocation of responsi-
bility for asylum applications to responsibility for entry controls. This is because
such a system encourages individual Member States to prevent asylum appli-
cants from ever reaching their territory through an ever increasing variety of
control measures, including for example the extensive use of stringent sanctions
against carriers.26
Whilst the Commission’s proposal had offered an expanded definition of
“family member” to include persons with a blood relationship and in unmar-
ried relationships, the Regulation restricts family members to spouse, unmar-
ried partners where such relationships are recognised in domestic law and minor
children. This is not in keeping with the wider definition of family endorsed by
the European Court of Human Rights as well as UNHCR in its Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. The Regulation fails to
take into account complex and wide concepts of “family” and de facto relation-
ships which exist in different cultures.
Article 3 refers to the general principles for determining which Member
State will be responsible for examining an asylum claim. It is notable that unlike
the Dublin Convention there is no reference in this provision to Member States’
international obligations. Clearly Member States are bound by their obligations
under international law, such as the European Convention on Human Rights
25 Paragraph 110 of the House of Lords Select Committee Report, 28 March 2002,
19th Report, Asylum Applications Who Decides? HL Papers 100
26 See Chapter 26 on Carrier Sanctions.
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
and the Convention against Torture, when they undertake to examine asylum
applications; such obligations are also sources of the general principles of Com-
munity law.
Article 3(2) replicates a similar provision in the Dublin Convention and
permits a Member State to derogate from the normal criteria and to examine
an asylum claim even if it is not that State’s responsibility to do so. This is an
important provision, which allows for derogation where humanitarian or other
concerns compel a State to consider an asylum application outside the normal
criteria for determining responsibility. However, in practice, the equivalent pro-
vision of the Dublin Convention was rarely invoked. This was due to the non-
binding nature of the provision, the lack of enforceability and in the lack of
guidance about appropriate cases for its application. It is notable that there is no
requirement to obtain the consent of the asylum applicant for derogation from
the normal criteria. Whilst the Commission in its explanatory memorandum to
the its proposal suggested that it is unnecessary to obtain such consent, since the
asylum application is lodged in the Member State concerned by the applicant,
it is a safeguard which nonetheless States should apply. An asylum applicant
may be compelled to lodge an asylum application for a number of reasons. This
might not preclude there being valid reasons for preferring the asylum applica-
tion to be considered in another Member State. Whilst such situation might be
thought to be rare, there is no empirical data to suggest that this is necessarily
so.
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
occasions the legal approaches in other Member States. This tears apart the soli-
darity of the Community and will ultimately undermine the “harmonisation”
process envisaged by the Tampere European Council. This will remain the case
even with the adoption of various measures including the Refugee definition
Directive,28 since it is likely that there will emerge a divergence in application and
interpretation of that Directive until the European Court of Justice definitively
rules on the correct interpretation of all controversial aspects of the Directive.
This may take some time to achieve as long as only the final courts of Member
States can send questions on EC asylum legislation to the Court. Member States
have proven in the past to be deeply wedded to existing law and practice relating
to refugees and asylum seekers, and it will take a considerable shift in mindset
for States to adopt a uniform and harmonised approach.
The experience from the operation of the Dublin Convention demonstrates
that in practice only a small number of asylum applicants are in fact transferred
to another Member State. Thus the Regulation relates to an extremely small
proportion of asylum applications in any event. However, the cost of operating
such system is disproportionately high.
Apart from the general observations that one might make about the Regula-
tion’s criteria, there are a number of other points in relation to enforcement and
interpretation that arise in respect of the criteria. Article 10 refers to the irregu-
lar crossing of borders into a Member State of the European Union and circum-
stances where the applicant has been “living” on the territory of a Member State
in order to determine responsibility. Experience of the operation of the Dublin
Convention demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to prove that a person has
been present in another Member State unless that Member State has properly
recorded their presence. Undoubtedly it is envisaged that the operation of Euro-
dac will facilitate this. However, the first two years of the operation of Eurodac
suggests that the incentive for those States at the borders of the EU to avoid
recording the presence or entry of the asylum applicants remains.29 Again it will
be extremely difficult for one Member State to prove that another Member State
that a person has been living on its territory without authorisation, because
invariably this would have been outside legal frameworks and systems of con-
trol. This will inevitably lead to distrust between Member States.
Article 13 provides that where no Member State responsible for examining
the asylum application can be designated it is the first Member State in which
the asylum application is lodged which should be responsible for examining it.
Unlike the preceding criteria, this should be less bureaucratic and therefore more
straightforward to apply.
Article 15, which sees the retention of the humanitarian clause from the
Dublin Convention, is welcome. However as with the Dublin Convention the
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4.3 Procedure
Chapter V is concerned with the procedure and time limits for taking charge and
taking back. The shorter time periods for requests and taking back than existed
under the Dublin Convention were seen as essential by Member States which
considered that delay was a main cause of ineffectiveness of the Dublin Con-
vention.32 There are foreseeable problems particularly in relation to the deemed
responsibility provisions in Article 18(7) which makes failure to act “tantamount
to accepting the request”. They may result in the bouncing of asylum applicants
from one Member State to another where a Member State is deemed to accept
responsibility in the absence of any decision or indeed a person being excluded
from the asylum system of any Member State altogether, thus compromising
the right to claim asylum protected by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
30 See for instance, the UK Court of Appeal case of R (on the application of G) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 546.
31 Article 11 of Regulation 1560/2003.
32 In the UK, the Court of Appeal has ruled that the failure to comply with time limits
by a sending State does not create any rights or remedies for the individual asylum
seeker, Mohammed Abdi Omar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]
EWCA Civ 285.
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
Directive), to send an asylum seeker to a third country (Article 3(3)). This pro-
vision implicitly permits Member States to enter into readmission agreements
with non-EU countries. There is obvious concern that any such agreements are
not a mechanism to circumvent an asylum applicant’s procedural rights. The
increasing use of readmission agreements will inevitably increase the risks of
refoulement in breach of obligations under the Geneva Convention, particularly
due to the weakness of mechanisms to ensure that such obligations are met.
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Section III – Asylum
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged
in one of the Member States by a third-country national
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63, first paragraph, point (1)(a),
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee,
Whereas:
(3) The Tampere conclusions also stated that this system should include, in the
short term, a clear and workable method for determining the Member State
responsible for the examination of an asylum application.
(4) Such a method should be based on objective, fair criteria both for the
Member States and for the persons concerned. It should, in particular,
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
(6) Family unity should be preserved in so far as this is compatible with the
other objectives pursued by establishing criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum applica-
tion.
(7) The processing together of the asylum applications of the members of one
family by a single Member State makes it possible to ensure that the appli-
cations are examined thoroughly and the decisions taken in respect of them
are consistent. Member States should be able to derogate from the respon-
sibility criteria, so as to make it possible to bring family members together
where this is necessary on humanitarian grounds.
(8) The progressive creation of an area without internal frontiers in which free
movement of persons is guaranteed in accordance with the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community and the establishment of Community poli-
cies regarding the conditions of entry and stay of third country nationals,
including common efforts towards the management of external borders,
makes it necessary to strike a balance between responsibility criteria in a
spirit of solidarity.
(9) The application of this Regulation can be facilitated, and its effectiveness
increased, by bilateral arrangements between Member States for improving
communications between competent departments, reducing time limits for
procedures or simplifying the processing of requests to take charge or take
back, or establishing procedures for the performance of transfers.
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Section III – Asylum
(10) Continuity between the system for determining the Member State respon-
sible established by the Dublin Convention and the system established by
this Regulation should be ensured. Similarly, consistency should be ensured
between this Regulation and Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11
December 2000 concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the com-
parison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Conven-
tion.
(12) With respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this
Regulation, Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of
international law to which they are party.
(13) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Regulation should
be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June
1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission.
(15) The Regulation observes the fundamental rights and principles which are
acknowledged in particular in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. In particular, it seeks to ensure full observance of the
right to asylum guaranteed by Article 18.
(16) Since the objective of the proposed measure, namely the establishment of
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by
a third-country national, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and, given the scale and effects, can therefore be better achieved at
Community level, the Community may adopt measures in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accor-
dance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this
Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that
objective.
(17) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
and Ireland gave notice, by letters of 30 October 2001, of their wish to take
part in the adoption and application of this Regulation.
(19) The Dublin Convention remains in force and continues to apply between
Denmark and the Member States that are bound by this Regulation until
such time an agreement allowing Denmark’s participation in the Regula-
tion has been concluded,
CHAPTER I
SUBJECT-MATTER AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
This Regulation lays down the criteria and mechanisms for determining the
Member State responsible for examining an application for asylum lodged in
one of the Member States by a third-country national.
Article 2
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240
Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
CHAPTER II
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 3
3. Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to
send an asylum seeker to a third country, in compliance with the provisions
of the Geneva Convention.
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Section III – Asylum
Article 4
1. The process of determining the Member State responsible under this Regu-
lation shall start as soon as an application for asylum is first lodged with a
Member State.
2. An application for asylum shall be deemed to have been lodged once a form
submitted by the applicant for asylum or a report prepared by the authori-
ties has reached the competent authorities of the Member State concerned.
Where an application is not made in writing, the time elapsing between the
statement of intention and the preparation of a report should be as short
as possible.
3. For the purposes of this Regulation, the situation of a minor who is accom-
panying the asylum seeker and meets the definition of a family member
set out in Article 2, point (i), shall be indissociable from that of his parent
or guardian and shall be a matter for the Member State responsible for
examining the application for asylum of that parent or guardian, even if
the minor is not individually an asylum seeker. The same treatment shall be
applied to children born after the asylum seeker arrives in the territory of
the Member States, without the need to initiate a new procedure for taking
charge of them.
The applicant shall be informed in writing of this transfer and of the date
on which it took place.
5. An asylum seeker who is present in another Member State and there lodges
an application for asylum after withdrawing his application during the
process of determining the Member State responsible shall be taken back,
under the conditions laid down in Article 20, by the Member State with
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
which that application for asylum was lodged, with a view to completing
the process of determining the Member State responsible for examining the
application for asylum.
This obligation shall cease, if the asylum seeker has in the meantime left the
territories of the Member States for a period of at least three months or has
obtained a residence document from a Member State.
CHAPTER III
HIERARCHY OF CRITERIA
Article 5
1. The criteria for determining the Member State responsible shall be applied
in the order in which they are set out in this Chapter.
Article 6
Where the applicant for asylum is an unaccompanied minor, the Member State
responsible for examining the application shall be that where a member of his
or her family is legally present, provided that this is in the best interest of the
minor.
In the absence of a family member, the Member State responsible for examining
the application shall be that where the minor has lodged his or her application
for asylum.
Article 7
Where the asylum seeker has a family member, regardless of whether the family
was previously formed in the country of origin, who has been allowed to reside
as a refugee in a Member State, that Member State shall be responsible for exam-
ining the application for asylum, provided that the persons concerned so desire.
Article 8
If the asylum seeker has a family member in a Member State whose application
has not yet been the subject of a first decision regarding the substance, that
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Section III – Asylum
Member State shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum,
provided that the persons concerned so desire.
Article 9
2. Where the asylum seeker is in possession of a valid visa, the Member State
which issued the visa shall be responsible for examining the application
for asylum, unless the visa was issued when acting for or on the written
authorisation of another Member State. In such a case, the latter Member
State shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum. Where
a Member State first consults the central authority of another Member
State, in particular for security reasons, the latter’s reply to the consultation
shall not constitute written authorisation within the meaning of this provi-
sion.
3. Where the asylum seeker is in possession of more than one valid residence
document or visa issued by different Member States, the responsibility for
examining the application for asylum shall be assumed by the Member
States in the following order:
(a) the Member State which issued the residence document conferring the
right to the longest period of residency or, where the periods of valid-
ity are identical, the Member State which issued the residence docu-
ment having the latest expiry date;
(b) the Member State which issued the visa having the latest expiry date
where the various visas are of the same type;
(c) where visas are of different kinds, the Member State which issued the
visa having the longest period of validity, or, where the periods of
validity are identical, the Member State which issued the visa having
the latest expiry date.
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
visas which have expired more than six months previously and enabled him
actually to enter the territory of a Member State and where he has not left
the territories of the Member States, the Member State in which the appli-
cation is lodged shall be responsible.
5. The fact that the residence document or visa was issued on the basis of a
false or assumed identity or on submission of forged, counterfeit or invalid
documents shall not prevent responsibility being allocated to the Member
State which issued it. However, the Member State issuing the residence doc-
ument or visa shall not be responsible if it can establish that a fraud was
committed after the document or visa had been issued.
Article 10
If the applicant has been living for periods of time of at least five months in
several Member States, the Member State where this has been most recently
the case shall be responsible for examining the application.
Article 11
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Section III – Asylum
2. The principle set out in paragraph 1 does not apply, if the third-country
national lodges his or her application for asylum in another Member State,
in which the need for him or her to have a visa for entry into the territory
is also waived. In this case, the latter Member State shall be responsible for
examining the application for asylum.
Article 12
Article 13
Where no Member State responsible for examining the application for asylum
can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this Regulation, the first
Member State with which the application for asylum was lodged shall be respon-
sible for examining it.
Article 14
Where several members of a family submit applications for asylum in the same
Member State simultaneously, or on dates close enough for the procedures for
determining the Member State responsible to be conducted together, and where
the application of the criteria set out in this Regulation would lead to them
being separated, the Member State responsible shall be determined on the basis
of the following provisions:
(a) responsibility for examining the applications for asylum of all the members
of the family shall lie with the Member State which the criteria indicate is
responsible for taking charge of the largest number of family members;
(b) failing this, responsibility shall lie with the Member State which the criteria
indicate is responsible for examining the application of the oldest of them.
CHAPTER IV
HUMANITARIAN CLAUSE
Article 15
1. Any Member State, even where it is not responsible under the criteria set
out in this Regulation, may bring together family members, as well as
other dependent relatives, on humanitarian grounds based in particular on
family or cultural considerations. In this case that Member State shall, at
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
the request of another Member State, examine the application for asylum
of the person concerned. The persons concerned must consent.
4. Where the Member State thus approached accedes to the request, responsi-
bility for examining the application shall be transferred to it.
CHAPTER V
TAKING CHARGE AND TAKING BACK
Article 16
247
Section III – Asylum
4. The obligations specified in paragraph 1(d) and (e) shall likewise cease once
the Member State responsible for examining the application has adopted
and actually implemented, following the withdrawal or rejection of the
application, the provisions that are necessary before the third-country
national can go to his country of origin or to another country to which he
may lawfully travel.
Article 17
1. Where a Member State with which an application for asylum has been
lodged considers that another Member State is responsible for examining
the application, it may, as quickly as possible and in any case within three
months of the date on which the application was lodged within the mean-
ing of Article 4(2), call upon the other Member State to take charge of the
applicant.
2. The requesting Member State may ask for an urgent reply in cases where
the application for asylum was lodged after leave to enter or remain was
refused, after an arrest for an unlawful stay or after the service or execution
of a removal order and/or where the asylum seeker is held in detention.
The request shall state the reasons warranting an urgent reply and the
period within which a reply is expected. This period shall be at least one
week.
3. In both cases, the request that charge be taken by another Member State
shall be made using a standard form and including proof or circumstantial
evidence as described in the two lists mentioned in Article 18(3) and/or rel-
evant elements from the asylum seeker’s statement, enabling the authorities
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
The rules on the preparation of and the procedures for transmitting requests
shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article
27(2).
Article 18
1. The requested Member State shall make the necessary checks, and shall
give a decision on the request to take charge of an applicant within two
months of the date on which the request was received.
2. In the procedure for determining the Member State responsible for examin-
ing the application for asylum established in this Regulation, elements of
proof and circumstantial evidence shall be used.
3. In accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 27(2) two lists shall
be established and periodically reviewed, indicating the elements of proof
and circumstantial evidence in accordance with the following criteria:
(a) Proof:
(i) This refers to formal proof which determines responsibility pur-
suant to this Regulation, as long as it is not refuted by proof to
the contrary.
(ii) The Member States shall provide the Committee provided for in
Article 27 with models of the different types of administrative
documents, in accordance with the typology established in the list
of formal proofs.
(b) Circumstantial evidence:
(i) This refers to indicative elements which while being refutable may
be sufficient, in certain cases, according to the evidentiary value
attributed to them.
(ii) Their evidentiary value, in relation to the responsibility for exam-
ining the application for asylum shall be assessed on a case-by-
case basis.
4. The requirement of proof should not exceed what is necessary for the
proper application of this Regulation.
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Section III – Asylum
Article 19
1. Where the requested Member State accepts that it should take charge of
an applicant, the Member State in which the application for asylum was
lodged shall notify the applicant of the decision not to examine the appli-
cation, and of the obligation to transfer the applicant to the responsible
Member State.
2. The decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall set out the grounds on which
it is based. It shall contain details of the time limit for carrying out the
transfer and shall, if necessary, contain information on the place and date
at which the applicant should appear, if he is travelling to the Member State
responsible by his own means. This decision may be subject to an appeal or
a review. Appeal or review concerning this decision shall not suspend the
implementation of the transfer unless the courts or competent bodies so
decide on a case by case basis if national legislation allows for this.
3. The transfer of the applicant from the Member State in which the applica-
tion for asylum was lodged to the Member State responsible shall be carried
out in accordance with the national law of the first Member State, after
consultation between the Member States concerned, as soon as practically
possible, and at the latest within six months of acceptance of the request
that charge be taken or of the decision on an appeal or review where there
is a suspensive effect.
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
The Member State responsible shall inform the requesting Member State,
as appropriate, of the safe arrival of the asylum seeker or of the fact that he
did not appear within the set time limit.
4. Where the transfer does not take place within the six months’ time limit,
responsibility shall lie with the Member State in which the application for
asylum was lodged. This time limit may be extended up to a maximum of
one year if the transfer could not be carried out due to imprisonment of the
asylum seeker or up to a maximum of eighteen months if the asylum seeker
absconds.
Article 20
1. An asylum seeker shall be taken back in accordance with Article 4(5) and
Article 16(1)(c), (d) and (e) as follows:
(a) the request for the applicant to be taken back must contain informa-
tion enabling the requested Member State to check that it is respon-
sible;
(b) the Member State called upon to take back the applicant shall be
obliged to make the necessary checks and reply to the request addressed
to it as quickly as possible and under no circumstances exceeding a
period of one month from the referral. When the request is based on
data obtained from the Eurodac system, this time limit is reduced to
two weeks;
(c) where the requested Member State does not communicate its decision
within the one month period or the two weeks period mentioned in
subparagraph (b), it shall be considered to have agreed to take back the
asylum seeker;
(d) a Member State which agrees to take back an asylum seeker shall be
obliged to readmit that person to its territory. The transfer shall be car-
ried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting Member
State, after consultation between the Member States concerned, as
soon as practically possible, and at the latest within six months of
acceptance of the request that charge be taken by another Member
State or of the decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspen-
sive effect;
(e) the requesting Member State shall notify the asylum seeker of the deci-
sion concerning his being taken back by the Member State responsible.
The decision shall set out the grounds on which it is based. It shall
contain details of the time limit on carrying out the transfer and shall,
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Section III – Asylum
The Member State responsible shall inform the requesting Member State,
as appropriate, of the safe arrival of the asylum seeker or of the fact that he
did not appear within the set time limit.
2. Where the transfer does not take place within the six months’ time limit,
responsibility shall lie with the Member State in which the application for
asylum was lodged. This time limit may be extended up to a maximum of
one year if the transfer or the examination of the application could not be
carried out due to imprisonment of the asylum seeker or up to a maximum
of eighteen months if the asylum seeker absconds.
3. The rules of proof and evidence and their interpretation, and on the prepa-
ration of and the procedures for transmitting requests, shall be adopted in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 27(2).
CHAPTER VI
ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Article 21
252
Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
4. Any request for information shall set out the grounds on which it is based
and, where its purpose is to check whether there is a criterion that is likely
to entail the responsibility of the requested Member State, shall state on
what evidence, including relevant information from reliable sources on the
ways and means asylum seekers enter the territories of the Member States,
or on what specific and verifiable part of the applicant’s statements it is
based. It is understood that such relevant information from reliable sources
is not in itself sufficient to determine the responsibility and the competence
of a Member State under this Regulation, but it may contribute to the eval-
uation of other indications relating to the individual asylum seeker.
5. The requested Member State shall be obliged to reply within six weeks.
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Section III – Asylum
7. The information exchanged may only be used for the purposes set out in
paragraph 1. In each Member State such information may, depending on
its type and the powers of the recipient authority, only be communicated to
the authorities and courts and tribunals entrusted with:
(a) the determination of the Member State responsible for examining the
application for asylum;
(b) examining the application for asylum;
(c) implementing any obligation arising under this Regulation.
8. The Member State which forwards the information shall ensure that it is
accurate and up-to-date. If it transpires that that Member State has for-
warded information which is inaccurate or which should not have been for-
warded, the recipient Member States shall be informed thereof immediately.
They shall be obliged to correct such information or to have it erased.
9. The asylum seeker shall have the right to be informed, on request, of any
data that is processed concerning him.
If he finds that this information has been processed in breach of this Regu-
lation or of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data(8), in
particular because it is incomplete or inaccurate, he is entitled to have it
corrected, erased or blocked.
10. In each Member State concerned, a record shall be kept, in the individual
file for the person concerned and/or in a register, of the transmission and
receipt of information exchanged.
11. The data exchanged shall be kept for a period not exceeding that which is
necessary for the purposes for which it is exchanged.
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
Article 22
Article 23
CHAPTER VII
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 24
1. This Regulation shall replace the Convention determining the State respon-
sible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member
States of the European Communities, signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990
(Dublin Convention).
255
Section III – Asylum
tion has been lodged after the date mentioned in the second paragraph of
Article 29, the events that are likely to entail the responsibility of a Member
State under this Regulation shall be taken into consideration, even if they
precede that date, with the exception of the events mentioned in Article
10(2).
Article 25
2. Requests and replies shall be sent using any method that provides proof of
receipt.
Article 26
As far as the French Republic is concerned, this Regulation shall apply only to
its European territory.
Article 27
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Chapter 10 Responsibility for Applications for Asylum
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set
at three months.
Article 28
At the latest three years after the date mentioned in the first paragraph of Article
29, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on
the application of this Regulation and, where appropriate, shall propose the nec-
essary amendments. Member States shall forward to the Commission all infor-
mation appropriate for the preparation of that report, at the latest six months
before that time limit expires.
Having submitted that report, the Commission shall report to the European
Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation at the same
time as it submits reports on the implementation of the Eurodac system pro-
vided for by Article 24(5) of Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000.
Article 29
This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following that of its pub-
lication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply to asylum applications lodged as from the first day of the sixth
month following its entry into force and, from that date, it will apply to any
request to take charge of or take back asylum seekers, irrespective of the date on
which the application was made. The Member State responsible for the examina-
tion of an asylum application submitted before that date shall be determined in
accordance with the criteria set out in the Dublin Convention.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the
Member States in conformity with the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity.
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Chapter 11 Eurodac
1 Summary
The Eurodac Regulation, adopted in December 2000 with the legal base of
Article 63(1)(a) EC,1 sets up a system for taking and comparing fingerprints of
asylum-seekers and certain other persons in order to facilitate the application of
the Dublin Convention (and now “Dublin II”, the planned replacement Regula-
tion).2 Although the Regulation entered into force on 15 December 2000 (Article
27(1)), it did not apply in practice until 15 January 2003, when both the Com-
mission and Member States had made the necessary technical arrangements
(Article 27(2)).3 Also, the Council adopted a further Regulation implementing
the Eurodac Regulation.4
Chapter I of the parent Regulation (Articles 1-3) addresses the purpose
and scope of Eurodac, sets out definitions and describes the basic structure
of the system, which consists of a central unit located in the Commission and
national units in each Member State. Chapter II (Articles 4-7) sets out rules on
taking and transmitting fingerprints of a first category of persons, asylum-seek-
ers. Member States must take the fingerprints of every asylum-seeker over the
age of fourteen and transmit it to the central database for comparison with the
fingerprints of other asylum-seekers, to see if multiple applications for asylum
have been made by the same person. In that case the person must be returned to
the Member States responsible for considering the asylum application accord-
ing to the Dublin rules. The fingerprints and specified additional data shall be
1 Reg. 2725/2000 (OJ L 316/1). On the issues covered in this Chapter, see also Brou-
wer, “Eurodac: Its Temptations and Limitations”, 2 EJML (2002) 231.
2 See further Ch. 10.
3 OJ 2003 C 5/2.
4 Reg. 407/2002 (OJ 2002 L 62/1).
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 259-296.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section III – Asylum
stored for ten years, but must be deleted earlier if the person concerned gains the
citizenship of the EU.
Chapter III (Article 8-10) sets out rules on a second category: persons
apprehended following irregular crossing of the external borders. Again Member
States have an obligation to take and transmit the fingerprints of all such per-
sons over the age of fourteen, but in this case the information will only be com-
pared with fingerprints of asylum-seekers which are subsequently transmitted,
not with fingerprints of earlier asylum-seekers or other border crossers. More-
over, this data will be stored for only two years, and must be deleted earlier if the
person concerned has been issued a residence permit, has left the territory of the
EU or has acquired the citizenship of a Member State. The purpose of taking
and comparing these fingerprints is solely to assist in the application of the
“irregular border crossing” criterion in the Dublin Convention (now replaced by
Regulation 343/2003, “Dublin II”).
A third category of persons is persons found illegally present in a Member
State, whose fingerprints may be taken in accordance with Article 11 (Chap-
ter IV). These fingerprints shall not be stored on the central database at all,
but simply checked against the existing database of asylum-seekers’ fingerprints
when they are transmitted. The purpose of this procedure is to check whether
the person concerned has previously applied for asylum in another Member
State, and the Regulation suggests that “[a]s a general rule, there are grounds for
checking” this when a person mentions he or she has made a previous asylum
application in another Member State, argues that return to another country
would be unsafe but does not claim asylum formally or refuses to assist in deter-
mining his or her identity. Of course, the second of these categories will usually
correspond to persons making a claim pursuant to Article 3 ECHR. It appears
that this a non-exhaustive list of cases where the fingerprints of illegal residents
can be checked.
Next, there is a special rule concerning fingerprint data on persons who
become recognised refugees (Chapter V, Article 12). For a transitional period of
five years after Eurodac starts operations, the data on recognised refugees will
be blocked once the refugee status of a person is recognised. At the end of that
period, on the basis of statistics concerning the number of recognised refugees
who apply for asylum in another Member State, the EU institutions must decide
either to store the data and use it in the same way as data on asylum-seekers, or
to erase all data as soon as a person has been recognised as a refugee.
Chapter V, the longest Chapter in the Regulation (Articles 13-20) governs
the issue of data protection. It sets out detailed rules on the responsibility for
data use, data security, access to and alteration of Eurodac data, record-keeping,
liability, rights of the data subject, and national and EU-level data protection
supervisory authorities. The EU-level authority is to be replaced by the EU data
protection authority to be set up pursuant to Article 286 EC, and in fact the
Regulation establishing this authority was adopted within a month of the adop-
260
Chapter 11 Eurodac
tion of the Eurodac Regulation.5 Subsequently the rules on the operation of this
authority were adopted and the data protection supervisor was appointed early
in 2004.6
Finally, Chapter VII sets out general and final provisions (Articles 21-
27). These rules provide that the costs of the operation of the central unit are
charged to the EU budget (Article 21), that the Council adopts most implement-
ing measures (Article 22) with a residual role for the Commission (Article 23),
that the Commission must issue an annual report and certain special reports
on the operation of Eurodac (Article 24), including an initial report one year
after Eurodac began operations, and that the territorial scope of the Regulation
matches that of the Dublin rules (Article 26). Council decisions on implement-
ing measures are adopted by a qualified majority vote, with unanimous voting
when the measures affect the operational expenses of the Member States.
The rules in the Regulation were extended to Norway and Iceland from 1
April 2001 pursuant to an agreement with the Community, which also entails
application of the Dublin Convention and its planned replacement to those
states.7 Similar agreements were negotiated with Switzerland and with Denmark
(which could not opt in to the Regulation as such, due to its ‘opt-out’ from Title
IV of the EC Treaty).8 The new Member States were bound by the Regulation as
from the date of their EU membership (1 May 2004).
The Commission released its initial report on the operation of Eurodac in
spring 2004.9 Its report notes that in practice, the Commission has not been called
upon to adopt any implementing rules, so has never held a meeting of the rel-
evant “comitology” committee. Also, as mooted above, the special Eurodac data
protection body only met briefly, as it was replaced by the EU’s Data Protection
Supervisor from January 2004. In its first year, Eurodac registered 271,573 sets
of fingerprints: 246,902 from asylum-seekers, 7,857 from illegal border-crossers,
and 16,814 of illegal residents (all Member States are sent information on this
third category in 2003, albeit sporadically). The Commission took the view that
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Section III – Asylum
the second figure was “very low” considering the figure of 400,000 that it (and
the Member States) were expecting. In its opinion, “[i]n light of the high illegal
migratory pressure, in particular at the Southern European borders” and the
“broad interpretation” of the relevant criteria by the Council, this “indicates
that a large number of cases may be missing from the Eurodac Central Unit”.
A subsequent report from the Commission was released in summer 2005.10
In the year 2004, the ten new Member States began operating the Eurodac
system, most immediately upon accession and the last two by July 2004. Euro-
dac registered 287,938 sets of fingerprints: 232,205 from asylum-seekers, 16,183
from illegal border-crossers, and 39,550 from illegal residents (all Member States
except France, Estonia and Portugal used the option to submit fingerprints of
the latter category in 2004). It can be seen that the total number of fingerprints
registered increased slightly in the second year, with a drop in the number of
asylum-seekers’ fingerprints outweighed by a large increase in fingerprints pro-
cessed from the other two categories, although the Commission again concluded
that “a large number of cases of illegal border crossing may be missing” from
the Eurodac system. The Commission stated that there were no data protection
issues in practice as regards its operation of the system, but did notice a “sur-
prising” number of “special searches” conducted by Member States for data
protection purposes.
According to these two reports, after a slow start, inevitable because Euro-
dac started with an empty database, by autumn 2003 Eurodac recorded about
2,000 “hits” a month comparing fingerprints of asylum-seekers from different
Member States, and about 500 “hits” a month comparing fingerprints of asylum-
seekers within the same Member State (not all Member States ask Eurodac to
carry out the latter comparison). There were 200-250 “hits” per month compar-
ing asylum-seekers’ fingerprints to the fingerprints of illegal border-crossers and
a similar number of hits comparing illegal residents’ fingerprints to those of
asylum-seekers. The percentage of multiple asylum applications detected was 7%
during Eurodac’s first year, and 13.5% in the second year (both figures included
some comparisons with fingerprints submitted by the same Member State).
The Commission was not able in 2003 to link the Eurodac data to the appli-
cation of the Dublin II Regulation, but in the 2004 report it estimated that Euro-
dac requests constitute two-thirds of the requests to take persons back pursuant
to the Dublin II rules. However, it is not clear whether the Commission was
able to establish any sort of casual link between the Dublin II figures and the
Eurodac figures, or to assess whether Eurodac has played a contribution to the
effectiveness of the Dublin system. On this point, it is striking that the number
of successful “hits” in the various categories reached a plateau from September
2003, the date from which the Dublin II Regulation took effect, and that the
numbers of monthly hits remained flat or declining (between 1,700 and 2000 a
262
Chapter 11 Eurodac
month) from September 2003 to May 2004, the month of EU enlargement. Fol-
lowing enlargement, the numbers then took a large leap in June 2004, to above
2,500 a month, then rose steadily until November 2004 to above 3,000, plateau-
ing for the month of December 2004.
11 See this report in Bunyan, ed., Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the Euro-
pean Union (Statewatch, 1997) 73-74.
12 Council doc. 11079/97, 2 Oct. 1997.
13 OJ 1998 C 34/131.
14 An early proposal concerning temporary protection was under discucssion simulta-
neously: see Ch. 15.
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Section III – Asylum
15 Council docs. 5945/98, 13 Feb. 1998; 6191/98, 20 Feb. 1998; and 6191/1/98, 27 Feb.
1998.
16 Council docs. 7566/98, 8 Apr. 1998 and 7566/1/98, 23 Apr. 1998 (drafts of report);
doc. 8441/1/98, 18 May 1998 (final report and latest draft of Convention).
17 It appears from the documents that the Germans and Dutch were particularly keen
to use this option.
18 See May 1998 JHA Council press release and doc. 8441/1/98, n. 13 above.
19 These were the “normal” EC system; the “third pillar” system allowing all courts to
refer but with opt-outs for Member States objecting to any jurisdiction or wanting
to limit jurisdiction to final courts only; or references by final courts only.
20 Support was 11-3 for the Commission, with France, Denmark and Germany
opposed and the UK neutral.
264
Chapter 11 Eurodac
two-thirds majority within the Council.21 After this point, the only remaining
issues were the precise role of the Court of Justice and the decision to grant
management power to the Commission, which were finally settled at the Decem-
ber 1998 JHA Council.22 The Council then “froze” the text, with the intention
of replacing it with a Community act after the imminent entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam.23
In the meantime, work began in earnest on the planned Protocol. The Euro-
dac working party examined the definition of “illegal” immigrant and the period
of data storage, while the Belgians objected to illegals having any data protec-
tion rights.24 A full draft Protocol, similar to the final text except that it was lim-
ited to illegal entrants, was then submitted.25 At the insistence of the majority of
Member States, illegal residents were included (with Sweden and Luxembourg
eventually withdrawing their objections) but as an option for Member States
and with the proviso that their fingerprints would only be compared, not stored.
The three examples of cases where an illegal resident could be subjected to a
Eurodac check were added; the two-year limit on storage of illegal entrants’ data
(with two exceptions) was accepted as a compromise; and the Belgians secured
the right to prevent access by data subjects. This Protocol was in turn agreed and
then “frozen” by the JHA Council in March 1999.26 In the meantime, the EP had
recommended rejection of the Protocol by a very narrow margin.27
Within a month of the entry into force of the new Treaty in May 1999, the
Commission proposed a Regulation taking over the text of both the Convention
and the Protocol.28 The Commission’s proposal suggested a number of changes
compared to the Convention and Protocol. Most of these were purely formal
changes needed to take account of the changed legal context of the proposal.
21 At the time, this was the normal rule for adoption of measures implementing Con-
ventions (former Art. K.3 TEU), but the Council could choose unanimous voting if
it wished.
22 It was agreed to establish an “opt-out” system for the Court, to be replaced by the
rules in Art. 68 EC when the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. France had
held out against management powers for the Commission until the last moment.
23 See late drafts in Council docs. 10221/98, 19 July 1998; 11868/98, 27 Oct. 1998;
11868/1/98, 5 Nov. 1998; and the agreed text in 12942/98, 17 Nov. 1998.
24 Council docs. 10221/98 (ibid.) and 11646/98, 1 Oct. 1998.
25 Council doc. SN 4595/98, 7 Oct. 1998.
26 See Council docs. 11844/98, 8 Oct. 1998; 11868/98 and 11868/1/98, n. 20 above;
12298/98 (text sent to EP for consultation), 12943/98 and 12944/98, all 17 Nov.
1998; and 6324/99, 26 Feb. 1999 (final text). Luxembourg also withdrew the sugges-
tion that objecting Member States could prevent others from checking the prints of
illegal residents against the prints of asylum-seekers.
27 Vote of 14 Apr. 1999.
28 COM (1999) 260, 26 May 1999; OJ 2000 C 337 E/37.
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Section III – Asylum
For example, there was no longer a need to set out rules on accession or on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. But there were several important substan-
tive changes, particularly relating to data protection. Since EC data protection
legislation now applied to Eurodac, the data protection rules previously agreed
had to be reconsidered. In particular this meant that it was no longer possible to
restrict illegal entrants from gaining access to their data. It also meant that fol-
lowing the normal rules on measures implementing Community acts, the Com-
mission should have implementing power, not the Council. The Commission
“strongly” recommended reducing the ten-year limit for storing data, at least
exempting long-term residents and persons who leave the EU from its scope.
It also argued that data on illegal entrants would lose its purpose if another
Member State accepted responsibility for an asylum claim and so the Council
should consider deletion of data in such a case. In any event, it proposed a clari-
fication to make clear that data on persons gaining EU citizenship would always
be deleted immediately, whether they were illegal entrants or asylum-seekers.
It also wanted the Council to consider the idea of blocking data on recognised
refugees, and suggested major amendments to the data protection rules, particu-
larly to apply the principles of EC data protection legislation and to give illegal
entrants and immigrants the right to data access in all cases.
The EP’s Opinion of November 1999 essentially suggested six amendments
to the proposal.29 In the EP’s view, the Regulation should refer to “third-country
nationals” rather than “aliens”; the title of the Regulation should be changed
to restrict its application more clearly to the operation of the Dublin Conven-
tion; fingerprints should only be taken of those over the age of eighteen; data
should be erased once a person gained some form of legal status in a Member
State; there should be a direct reference to the ECHR and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child; and there should be express restrictions on further use
of Eurodac data, both by national authorities and by the authorities of third
states.
The Commission then offered an amended version of its proposal in March
2000 which accepted three of these amendments fully and two in part, rejecting
the amendment relating to the age of fingerprinted persons because it was cer-
tain that the Council would not accept it.30 Of the two amendments accepted in
part, firstly the Commission inserted a provision preventing transfer of Eurodac
data to third states with an exception following conclusion of an agreement with
the Community on asylum responsibility, but argued that there was no need for
an express provision preventing use of the data by other agencies. Secondly the
Commission now agreed that data should be erased as soon as refugees were
recognised, particularly since it planned to propose that refugees should enjoy
free movement between Member States once they gained long-term residence
29 OJ 2000 C 189/227.
30 COM (2000) 100, 15 Mar. 2000; OJ 2001 C 29 E/1.
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Chapter 11 Eurodac
status. But it argued that it was necessary to keep data when persons gained
other forms of status, at least for the time being pending the long-term residence
proposal.31
In the meantime the Council had reached agreement on the text, following
rapid negotiations lasting from July to December 1999.32 Obviously the high
speed of negotiations was due both to the prior agreement on the texts and to
the Member States’ interest in getting Eurodac operational as soon as possible,
in the hope that implementation of the Dublin Convention would be improved.
The main change from the Commission’s proposal was the decision to confer
most implementing powers on the Council, and during the negotiations the
Spanish held out successfully for the use of unanimous voting where operat-
ing costs were increased.33 A provision on the obligation of Member States to
impose penalties was also weakened. As for the EP’s amendments, they were
considered shortly after the EP’s vote; the Council agreed to the amendments
concerning references to human rights treaties and express limits on transmis-
sion of Eurodac data to third states.34
Furthermore, because of the major changes to the procedure for adopting
implementing rules, it was deemed that the EP had to be reconsulted.35 When
giving its second opinion, the EP suggested changes only to the committee pro-
cedure, taking its traditional position that implementing powers should only be
conferred on the Commission, not the Council.36 The Council ignored this view.
After rejecting the EP’s proposed amendments, the Council adopted the Regula-
tion by written procedure in December 2000. At that time, two statements were
noted for the record and six statements were entered in the Council minutes. The
most important concerned the further definition of crossing the external bor-
ders and the Commission’s criticism of the Council’s approach to implement-
ing powers and Member States’ obligations to impose penalties.37 In the former
31 Ultimately, it was agreed to exclude refugees from the scope of this subsequent pro-
posal, which did not suggest amendments to the Eurodac Reg., although the Com-
mission has agreed to propose a further Directive which would bring them within its
scope. See further Ch. 20.
32 Council docs. 10530/99, 2 Aug. 1999; 11396/99, 1 Oct. 1999; 12582/99, 5 Nov. 1999;
13052/99, 17 Nov. 1999; 13408/99, 26 Nov. 1999; and 13603/99, 30 Nov. 1999.
33 In fact, this was a restrictive voting rule than had been agreed in the “third pillar”
context.
34 The changes were made in November (see Council doc. 13408/99, 26 Nov. 1999).
The Council had already agreed to change the title of the Reg. at the start of its
discussions (see Council doc. 10530/99, ibid.).
35 On the obligation to reconsult the EP following major changes in the text of a pro-
posal, see for example Case C-392/95 EP v Council [1997] ECR I-3215.
36 OJ 2001 C 146/87.
37 Council doc. 14497/00, 11 Dec. 2000.
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Section III – Asylum
Statement, the Council asserted that the Regulation would also apply when per-
sons were “apprehended beyond the external border, where [the person] is still en
route and there is no doubt that he/she crossed the external border irregularly”.
Finally, the Council’s implementing Regulation was adopted at the JHA
Council of February 2002. This text was held up because of French concerns
about letting the Commission staff decide on any technical requirements. It was
agreed unanimously, presumbly because it affects Member States’ operating
expenditure.38
3 Legal Analysis
The Eurodac Regulation raises a number of important legal questions: its com-
patibility with human rights law, the validity of the Council’s approach to con-
ferring implementing powers, the application of EC data protection rules and
the use of Eurodac data or the Eurodac system for other purposes.
The first and most important question is whether the Regulation is invalid
in whole or part for violation of human rights law. This question is inevitably
sparked by the Council legal service’s opinion that while gathering and compar-
ing fingerprint data on illegal entrants can be justified, compiling fingerprint
data on illegal residents is not. First, is the Council correct to conclude that the
latter operation breaches human rights law? Second, can the compilation and
comparison of fingerprint data on illegal entrants or asylum seekers be justified
on human rights grounds?
The first problem here is the analysis of the UK Presidency, which seemed
to suggest that it is sufficient to show a “pressing social need” to justify an inter-
ference with the right to private life set out in Article 8 ECHR. But “pressing
social need” is not a separate ground of justification, but rather an aspect of the
test for applying a justification. Do any of the exhaustive grounds for justifica-
tion listed in Article 8(2) ECHR justify the Eurodac system? In fact, there is no
ground which clearly applies. It would be possible for Member States to argue
that the economic justification applies, although there is a counter-argument
that migration is in Member States’ economic interest, particularly taking into
account the large cost of running the Eurodac system and border controls. Use
of the “national security”, “crime prevention” or “public safety” grounds would
be dubious since such a threat must be proved in individual cases; the grounds
will obviously not be applicable to all asylum- seekers, some of whom will have
a good protection claim in any event.
In any event, even presuming that there is a possible ground of justifica-
tion, restrictions on Article 8 rights must still be prescribed by law and meet the
tests of necessity and proportionality. The rules in the Regulation are precise
enough to meet the “prescribed by law” test as regards asylum-seekers, but the
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39 Alternatively it could be argued that in such cases the intensity of applying the “pre-
scribed by law” requirement is more limited for the EC. There would still have to be
a sufficiently adequate “skeleton” of rules governing the interference.
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Eurodac Regulation should have been amended alongside the Dublin II rules; it
should now be amended immediately.
As for the application of the Eurodac Regulation to illegal residents, there
is an insufficient link the fingerprint data and the application of the Dublin Con-
vention (or the Dublin II Regulation) except where there is cogent evidence of a
prior claim to asylum in another Member State. This is because the Dublin rules
aim solely to allocate responsibility for asylum-seekers; in the absence of an
indication that a person is or has been an asylum-seeker there is no necessity to
take or compare fingerprints. Furthermore, if harmonised EC rules on deemed
withdrawal of applications are agreed,40 there will be even more cases where the
necessity of storing, taking and checking fingerprints is clearly unneccessary.
The next question is the validity of the Council’s decision to confer the great
majority of implementing powers upon itself. These powers comprise powers to
implement Article 4(7), concerning implementation of Article 4 on collecting,
transmitting and comparing fingerprints, extended to other categories of data
in accordance with Articles 9(2) and 11(4); and Article 12 as regards procedures
and compilation of statistics relating to blocked data. In contrast, the Com-
mission only has powers to carry out certain statistical tasks (Article 3(4)). The
case for the Council’s extensive implementing powers is stated in the preamble,
which refers to the involvement of the Member States and taking, sending and
assessing fingerprints and the impact of these measures on civil liberties. During
the negotiations on the Regulation, France had argued also that it was wrong
in principle for the Commission to adopt implementing measures since it was
managing the system, but this principle is not referred to in the final Regula-
tion. The Council’s rationale makes sense as regards taking prints, transmitting
them and checking comparisons, but not as regards recording, comparing, or
transmitting the results back to the Member States, which is the responsibility
of the Commission.41 Similarly, the mechanism for blocking the data of refugees
and the compilation of statistics for the relevant report should both logically fall
within the power of the Commission as these two elements concern the opera-
tion of the central unit.
As for the argument about civil liberties, it rings rather hollow given
Member States’ decision to circumvent the advice of the Council legal service
about the human rights implications of the Regulation. Applying the argument
to this case, the Council’s reasoning does not adequately explain why conferring
implementing powers on the Commission is more likely to raise civil liberties
problems. Finally, as for the French argument, there are surely many examples
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of cases when an executive adopts rules to govern operations that the same exec-
utive will actually be carrying out.
The third question concerning the Regulation is whether the Community’s
data protection Directive applies to Eurodac, as the Commission had proposed.
During negotiation of the Regulation, the Council legal service was asked for
an opinion on this issue.42 The Council then proceeded to make detailed refer-
ence to the data protection Directive in the Eurodac Regulation, asserting that
it applied to Member States’ use of data within the framework of the Regula-
tion. Was this correct? Certainly the EC Directive applies to the Commission,
as regards the operation of the Central Unit, by virtue of Article 286 EC, which
expressly applies the EC measures to the institutions’ processing of data. This
position has now been supplemented by the specific Regulation on data protec-
tion and the EC institutions.43 But does the same position apply to the Member
States? Opinions by an Advocate-General of the Court of Justice suggested that
the scope of the EC Directive might be more restricted than some had thought,44
but in its first judgments concerning the Directive, the Court of Justice took a
broad view of its scope.45 In any event, even if the Directive is limited to “inter-
nal market” situations, there is nothing to preclude the EC institutions decid-
ing to extend its application to other situations within EC competence if they
choose. The Court has also ruled that data protection forms part of the general
principles of EC law, and the right to data protection is also listed in the EU’s
Charter of Rights.46
Finally, the fourth question is the use of Eurodac data for other purposes.
It is sometimes simplistically assumed that Eurodac is just another EU database
that already is, or might as well be, simply merged with the other databases.
Both assumptions are clearly incorrect. Eurodac has been established for clearly
defined purposes and any further access to or use of Eurodac data, or further
taking, transmitting and storage of fingerprints, would not only require fresh
legislation, which would have to use the correct legal bases, but also would have
to satisfy the legal requirements of data protection law and human rights law.
For example, it would arguably be unneccesary, disproportionate and discrimi-
natory to give access to Eurodac data to Europol, the EU’s police agency. Simi-
larly, the purposes of the SIS are so different from that of Eurodac that there
is no possible justification for linking the relevant data. The Council has agreed
that fingerprints will be added to the SIS when the “SIS II” system is developed,
42 Council doc. 12799/99, 11 Nov. 1999. The legal service’s view is not known.
43 Reg. 45/2001, n. 5 above.
44 Opinion in Case C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971, and in Joined Cases C-
465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Neukomm [2003] ECR I-4989.
45 Judgment of 20 May 2003 in Neukomm (ibid.).
46 See respectively Case C-369/98 Fisher [2000] ECR I-6751 and Art. 8 of the Charter
(OJ 2000 C 364).
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but even assuming such a development would be compatible with human rights
and data protection law, there will still have to be a detailed justification for any
form of merger of the data. This issue has particular salience in light of the
Council’s March 2004 conclusions on anti-terrorism and the November 2004
Hague Programme, both of which call for “interoperability” between Eurodac,
the planned Visa Information System (which will store fingerprints of visa appli-
cants and is intended in part for use in establishing responsibility for asylum
applications), and the second-general Schengen Information System (which will
have the capacity to store fingerprints). A Commission communication on this
issue was released in November 2005.47
4 Comments
Do turkeys vote for Christmas? The Council seems to think that they do. The
only result of fingerprinting a person who crosses the external borders irregu-
larly is that the Member State taking and transmitting the fingerprints to the
Commission is increasing the chance that the person concerned will ultimately
be returned to that Member State pursuant to the Dublin rules. On top of the
cost of policing the external borders on behalf of destination Member States,
Member States of transit will be incurring the perceived economic and social
cost of an increased numbers of asylum-seekers. In effect, they will be extending
charity to wealthier Member States. In any event, the difficulty of thoroughly
checking all external sea and land borders of the European Union means that
the principle will be hard to apply fully, even with the development of an EU
border management policy.48 To some extent, then, the idea is symbolic, although
it is possible that there will be a least a modest increase in the number of persons
stopped, fingerprinted and later sent back as a consequence of EU attempts to
step up external border controls in practice. Also, from the initial evidence of
its operations presented by the Commission, the Eurodac system has certainly
uncovered situations of multiple asylum applications in different Member States
(and even in the same Member State).
As to the specific details of the Regulation, by the 21st century the word
“aliens” in English clearly suggests a profound distinction between third-coun-
try nationals and EU citizens, and thus an implicit unwillingness to accept the
realities of migration and the extent of protection for foreign nationals pro-
vided for by international human rights law. Perhaps the Council wanted to be
consistent with the wording of the Dublin Convention, but it would have been
simple to provide in a definitions clause that “third-country national” had the
same meaning as “alien” in the Dublin Convention. The EC Treaty refers solely
to powers to regulate “nationals of third countries” throughout Title IV, and in
particular Article 63(1)(a). In fact, the word “alien” does not occur anywhere in
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the EC Treaty (or, for that matter, in the TEU either prior to or after the Treaty
of Amsterdam). Moreover, the proposed and final text of the Dublin II Regula-
tion also refers to “third-country nationals”,49 so logically the wording of the
Eurodac Regulation should be changed at the earliest opportunity.
On the application of Article 11 in practice, it should be remembered that
the Dublin rules do not apply to persons who withdraw their claims for Con-
vention refugee status, and indeed the Commission’s proposal to change this
position with the adoption of the “Dublin II” Regulation was unsuccessful. So
a withdrawal of a claim for refugee status in another Member State will immedi-
ately prevent a Member State from applying Article 11. But the very existence of
the possibility of sending fingerprints of irregular migrants pursuant to Article
11 of the Regulation risks a classic “race to the bottom” development, entail-
ing a competition between Member States to use the possibility more and more
often, because of the prospect that the Article 11 data (unlike the data on irregu-
lar border crossers) would result in finding that a person should be removed to
another Member State because a prior asylum application was made there, thus
reducing the perceived economic and social cost of keeping that person on the
territory. Indeed, as noted above, the registration of fingerprints of this category
of persons increased between 2003 and 2004. Of course, it is unlikely that a
sufficient number of irregular residents will make a prior asylum application in
another Member State to justify the cost of extensive fingerprinting of irregular
residents, even assuming such fingerprinting would be legal. But unfortunately
Member States do not always take such decisions rationally.
As for Article 12, the Council clearly paid no attention to its power pursu-
ant to Article 63(4) EC to facilitate the movement of third-country nationals
between Member States, or to the 1980 Council of Europe Convention on the
transfer of responsibility for of refugees, which most of the first fifteen Member
States have ratified,50 and which sets out rules requiring the transfer of respon-
sibility for refugee status after a certain period if Contracting States permit a
refugee to reside on their territory for lengthy periods. The Commission was
obviously right in its amended proposal of 2000 to point out that this provi-
sion is anachronistic when the Community has and may well use the power to
adopt rules assisting recognised refugees to move between Member States. It
can only be hoped that as soon as the forthcoming proposal to extend long-term
residence status to refugees is adopted,51 the Commission will table a proposal
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Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63 point (1)(a) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) Member States have ratified the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951, as
amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, relating to the
Status of Refugees.
(2) Member States have concluded the Convention determining the State
responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the
Member States of the European Communities, signed in Dublin on 15 June
1990 (hereinafter referred to as “the Dublin Convention”).
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of the electronic means of transmission between the Member States and the
central database.
(6) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take finger-
prints of every applicant for asylum and of every alien who is apprehended
in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member
State, if they are at least 14 years of age.
(7) It is necessary to lay down precise rules on the transmission of such finger-
print data to the Central Unit, the recording of such fingerprint data and
other relevant data in the central database, their storage, their comparison
with other fingerprint data, the transmission of the results of such compari-
son and the blocking and erasure of the recorded data. Such rules may be
different for, and should be specifically adapted to, the situation of different
categories of aliens.
(8) Aliens who have requested asylum in one Member State may have the
option of requesting asylum in another Member State for many years to
come. Therefore, the maximum period during which fingerprint data should
be kept by the Central Unit should be of considerable length. Given that
most aliens who have stayed in the Community for several years will have
obtained a settled status or even citizenship of a Member State after that
period, a period of ten years should be considered a reasonable period for
the conservation of fingerprint data.
(12) In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the
Treaty, the objective of the proposed measures, namely the creation within
the Commission of a system for the comparison of fingerprint data to assist
the implementation of the Community’s asylum policy, cannot, by its very
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(13) Since the Member States alone are responsible for identifying and classify-
ing the results of comparisons transmitted by the Central Unit as well as for
the blocking of data relating to persons admitted and recognised as refu-
gees and since this responsibility concerns the particularly sensitive area of
the processing of personal data and could affect the exercise of individual
freedoms, there are specific grounds for the Council reserving for itself the
exercise of certain implementing powers, relating in particular to the adop-
tion of measures ensuring the safety and reliability of such data.
(16) By virtue of Article 286 of the Treaty, Directive 95/46/EC also applies to
Community institutions and bodies. Since the Central Unit will be estab-
lished within the Commission, that Directive will apply to the processing of
personal data by that Unit.
(17) The principles set out in Directive 95/46/EC regarding the protection of
the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably their right to privacy, with
regard to the processing of personal data should be supplemented or clari-
fied, in particular as far as certain sectors are concerned.
(19) Member States should provide for a system of penalties to sanction the use
of data recorded in the central database contrary to the purpose of Euro-
dac.
(20) The United Kingdom and Ireland, in accordance with Article 3 of the Pro-
tocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the
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Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity, have given notice of their wish to take part in the adoption and
application of this Regulation.
(21) Denmark, in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the posi-
tion of Denmark annexed to the said Treaties, is not participating in the
adoption of this Regulation and is therefore not bound by it nor subject to
its application.
(23) This Regulation should serve as legal basis for the implementing rules
which, with a view to its rapid application, are required for the establish-
ment of the necessary technical arrangements by the Member States and
the Commission. The Commission should be charged with verifying that
those conditions are fulfilled,
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
The rules governing Eurodac shall also apply to operations effected by the
Member States as from the transmission of data to the Central Unit until
use is made of the results of the comparison.
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3. Without prejudice to the use of data intended for Eurodac by the Member
State of origin in databases set up under the latter’s national law, fingerprint
data and other personal data may be processed in Eurodac only for the pur-
poses set out in Article 15(1) of the Dublin Convention.
Article 2 Definitions
2. The terms defined in Article 2 of Directive 95/46/EC shall have the same
meaning in this Regulation.
3. Unless stated otherwise, the terms defined in Article 1 of the Dublin Con-
vention shall have the same meaning in this Regulation.
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on behalf of the Member States. The Central Unit shall be equipped with a
computerised fingerprint recognition system.
3. The Central Unit shall draw up statistics on its work every quarter, indicat-
ing:
(a) the number of data sets transmitted on applicants for asylum and the
persons referred to in Articles 8(1) and 11(1);
(b) the number of hits for applicants for asylum who have lodged an appli-
cation for asylum in another Member State;
(c) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 8(1) who have
subsequently lodged an application for asylum;
(d) the number of hits for persons referred to in Article 11(1) who had pre-
viously lodged an application for asylum in another Member State;
(e) the number of fingerprint data which the Central Unit had to request a
second time from the Member States of origin because the fingerprint
data originally transmitted did not lend themselves to comparison
using the computerised fingerprint recognition system.
At the end of each year, statistical data shall be established in the form of
a compilation of the quarterly statistics drawn up since the beginning of
Eurodac’s activities, including an indication of the number of persons for
whom hits have been recorded under (b), (c) and (d).
The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State.
4. Pursuant to the procedure laid down in Article 23(2), the Central Unit may
be charged with carrying out certain other statistical tasks on the basis of
the data processed at the Central Unit.
CHAPTER II
APPLICANTS FOR ASYLUM
1. Each Member State shall promptly take the fingerprints of all fingers of
every applicant for asylum of at least 14 years of age and shall promptly
transmit the data referred to in points (a) to (f) of Article 5(1) to the Central
Unit. The procedure for taking fingerprints shall be determined in accor-
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dance with the national practice of the Member State concerned and in
accordance with the safeguards laid down in the European Convention on
Human Rights and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child.
2. The data referred to in Article 5(1) shall be immediately recorded in the cen-
tral database by the Central Unit, or, provided that the technical conditions
for such purposes are met, directly by the Member State of origin.
3. Fingerprint data within the meaning of point (b) of Article 5(1), transmit-
ted by any Member State, shall be compared by the Central Unit with the
fingerprint data transmitted by other Member States and already stored in
the central database.
4. The Central Unit shall ensure, on the request of a Member State, that the
comparison referred to in paragraph 3 covers the fingerprint data previ-
ously transmitted by that Member State, in addition to the data from other
Member States.
5. The Central Unit shall forthwith transmit the hit or the negative result of
the comparison to the Member State of origin. Where there is a hit, it shall
transmit for all data sets corresponding to the hit, the data referred to in
Article 5(1), although in the case of the data referred to in Article 5(1)(b),
only insofar as they were the basis for the hit.
Direct transmission to the Member State of origin of the result of the com-
parison shall be permissible where the technical conditions for such pur-
pose are met.
Information received from the Central Unit relating to other data found to
be unreliable shall be erased or destroyed as soon as the unreliability of the
data is established.
7. The implementing rules setting out the procedures necessary for the appli-
cation of paragraphs 1 to 6 shall be adopted in accordance with the proce-
dure laid down in Article 22(1).
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2. After recording the data in the central database, the Central Unit shall
destroy the media used for transmitting the data, unless the Member State
of origin has requested their return.
Each set of data, as referred to in Article 5(1), shall be stored in the central data-
base for ten years from the date on which the fingerprints were taken.
Upon expiry of this period, the Central Unit shall automatically erase the data
from the central database.
Data relating to a person who has acquired citizenship of any Member State
before expiry of the period referred to in Article 6 shall be erased from the cen-
tral database, in accordance with Article 15(3) as soon as the Member State of
origin becomes aware that the person has acquired such citizenship.
CHAPTER III
ALIENS APPREHENDED IN CONNECTION WITH THE
IRREGULAR CROSSING OF AN EXTERNAL BORDER
1. Each Member State shall, in accordance with the safeguards laid down in
the European Convention on Human Rights and in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, promptly take the fingerprints of
all fingers of every alien of at least 14 years of age who is apprehended by
the competent control authorities in connection with the irregular crossing
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by land, sea or air of the border of that Member State having come from a
third country and who is not turned back.
2. The Member State concerned shall promptly transmit to the Central Unit
the following data in relation to any alien, as referred to in paragraph 1,
who is not turned back:
(a) Member State of origin, place and date of the apprehension;
(b) fingerprint data;
(c) sex;
(d) reference number used by the Member State of origin;
(e) date on which the fingerprints were taken;
(f) date on which the data were transmitted to the Central Unit.
1. The data referred to in Article 5(1)(g) and in Article 8(2) shall be recorded
in the central database.
Without prejudice to Article 3(3), data transmitted to the Central Unit pur-
suant to Article 8(2) shall be recorded for the sole purpose of comparison
with data on applicants for asylum transmitted subsequently to the Central
Unit.
2. The procedures provided for in Article 4(1), second sentence, Article 4(2)
and Article 5(2) as well as the provisions laid down pursuant to Article 4(7)
shall apply. As regards the comparison of data on applicants for asylum
subsequently transmitted to the Central Unit with the data referred to in
paragraph 1, the procedures provided for in Article 4(3), (5) and (6) shall
apply.
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CHAPTER IV
ALIENS FOUND ILLEGALLY PRESENT IN A MEMBER STATE
2. As a general rule there are grounds for checking whether the alien has previ-
ously lodged an application for asylum in another Member State where:
(a) the alien declares that he/she has lodged an application for asylum but
without indicating the Member State in which he/she made the appli-
cation;
(b) the alien does not request asylum but objects to being returned to his/
her country of origin by claiming that he/she would be in danger, or
(c) the alien otherwise seeks to prevent his/her removal by refusing to
cooperate in establishing his/her identity, in particular by showing no,
or false, identity papers.
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The fingerprint data of such an alien shall not be recorded in the central
database, nor shall they be compared with the data transmitted to the Cen-
tral Unit pursuant to Article 8(2).
6. Once the results of the comparison have been transmitted to the Member
State of origin, the Central Unit shall forthwith:
(a) erase the fingerprint data and other data transmitted to it under para-
graph 1; and
(b) destroy the media used by the Member State of origin for transmitting
the data to the Central Unit, unless the Member State of origin has
requested their return.
CHAPTER V
RECOGNISED REFUGEES
1. Data relating to an applicant for asylum which have been recorded pursu-
ant to Article 4(2) shall be blocked in the central database if that person
is recognised and admitted as a refugee in a Member State. Such blocking
shall be carried out by the Central Unit on the instructions of the Member
State of origin.
2. Five years after Eurodac starts operations, and on the basis of reliable
statistics compiled by the Central Unit on persons who have lodged an
application for asylum in a Member State after having been recognised and
admitted as refugees in another Member State, a decision shall be taken
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, as to whether the
data relating to persons who have been recognised and admitted as refugees
in a Member State should:
(a) be stored in accordance with Article 6 for the purpose of the compari-
son provided for in Article 4(3); or
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Section III – Asylum
(b) be erased in advance once a person has been recognised and admitted
as a refugee.
3. In the case referred to in paragraph 2(a), the data blocked pursuant to para-
graph 1 shall be unblocked and the procedure referred to in paragraph 1
shall no longer apply.
5. The implementing rules concerning the procedure for the blocking of data
referred to in paragraph 1 and the compilation of statistics referred to in
paragraph 2 shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down
in Article 22(1).
CHAPTER VI
DATA USE, DATA PROTECTION AND LIABILITY
2. In accordance with Article 14, the Member State of origin shall ensure the
security of the data referred to in paragraph 1 before and during transmis-
sion to the Central Unit as well as the security of the data it receives from
the Central Unit.
3. The Member State of origin shall be responsible for the final identification
of the data pursuant to Article 4(6).
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4. The Commission shall ensure that the Central Unit is operated in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Regulation and its implementing rules. In
particular, the Commission shall:
(a) adopt measures ensuring that persons working in the Central Unit use
the data recorded in the central database only in accordance with the
purpose of Eurodac as laid down in Article 1(1);
(b) ensure that persons working in the Central Unit comply with all
requests from Member States made pursuant to this Regulation in
relation to recording, comparison, correction and erasure of data for
which they are responsible;
(c) take the necessary measures to ensure the security of the Central Unit
in accordance with Article 14;
(d) ensure that only persons authorised to work in the Central Unit have
access to data recorded in the central database, without prejudice to
Article 20 and the powers of the independent supervisory body which
will be established under Article 286(2) of the Treaty.
The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of
the measures it takes pursuant to the first subparagraph.
Article 14 Security
1. The Member State of origin shall take the necessary measures to:
(a) prevent any unauthorised person from having access to national instal-
lations in which the Member State carries out operations in accordance
with the aim of Eurodac (checks at the entrance to the installation);
(b) prevent data and data media in Eurodac from being read, copied,
modified or erased by unauthorised persons (control of data media);
(c) guarantee that it is possible to check and establish a posteriori what
data have been recorded in Eurodac, when and by whom (control of
data recording);
(d) prevent the unauthorised recording of data in Eurodac and any unau-
thorised modification or erasure of data recorded in Eurodac (control
of data entry);
(e) guarantee that, in using Eurodac, authorised persons have access only
to data which are within their competence (control of access);
(f) guarantee that it is possible to check and establish to which authorities
data recorded in Eurodac may be transmitted by data transmission
equipment (control of transmission);
(g) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or erasure of
data during both the direct transmission of data to or from the central
database and the transport of data media to or from the Central Unit
(control of transport).
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Section III – Asylum
1. The Member State of origin shall have access to data which it has transmit-
ted and which are recorded in the central database in accordance with the
provisions of this Regulation.
3. Only the Member State of origin shall have the right to amend the data
which it has transmitted to the Central Unit by correcting or supplement-
ing such data, or to erase them, without prejudice to erasure carried out in
pursuance of Article 6, Article 10(1) or Article 12(4)(a).
Where the Member State of origin records data directly in the central data-
base, it may amend or erase the data directly.
Where the Member State of origin does not record data directly in the cen-
tral database, the Central Unit shall amend or erase the data at the request
of that Member State.
4. If a Member State or the Central Unit has evidence to suggest that data
recorded in the central database are factually inaccurate, it shall advise the
Member State of origin as soon as possible.
If a Member State has evidence to suggest that data were recorded in the
central database contrary to this Regulation, it shall similarly advise the
Member State of origin as soon as possible. The latter shall check the data
concerned and, if necessary, amend or erase them without delay.
5. The Central Unit shall not transfer or make available to the authorities of
any third country data recorded in the central database, unless it is specifi-
cally authorised to do so in the framework of a Community agreement on
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Chapter 11 Eurodac
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the State responsible for exam-
ining an application for asylum.
1. The Central Unit shall keep records of all data processing operations
within the Central Unit. These records shall show the purpose of access,
the date and time, the data transmitted, the data used for interrogation and
the name of both the unit putting in or retrieving the data and the persons
responsible.
2. Such records may be used only for the data-protection monitoring of the
admissibility of data processing as well as to ensure data security pursu-
ant to Article 14. The records must be protected by appropriate measures
against unauthorised access and erased after a period of one year, if they
are not required for monitoring procedures which have already begun.
Article 17 Liability
1. Any person who, or Member State which, has suffered damage as a result
of an unlawful processing operation or any act incompatible with the provi-
sions laid down in this Regulation shall be entitled to receive compensation
from the Member State responsible for the damage suffered. That State
shall be exempted from its liability, in whole or in part, if it proves that it is
not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.
2. If failure of a Member State to comply with its obligations under this Regu-
lation causes damage to the central database, that Member State shall be
held liable for such damage, unless and insofar as the Commission failed to
take reasonable steps to prevent the damage from occurring or to minimise
its impact.
3. Claims for compensation against a Member State for the damage referred
to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be governed by the provisions of national law
of the defendant Member State.
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2. In each Member State any data subject may, in accordance with the laws,
regulations and procedures of that State, exercise the rights provided for in
Article 12 of Directive 95/46/EC.
3. In each Member State, any person may request that data which are fac-
tually inaccurate be corrected or that data recorded unlawfully be erased.
The correction and erasure shall be carried out without excessive delay by
the Member State which transmitted the data, in accordance with its laws,
regulations and procedures.
5. If it emerges that data recorded in the central database are factually inaccu-
rate or have been recorded unlawfully, the Member State which transmitted
them shall correct or erase the data in accordance with Article 15(3). That
Member State shall confirm in writing to the data subject without excessive
delay that it has taken action to correct or erase data relating to him/her.
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6. If the Member State which transmitted the data does not agree that data
recorded in the central database are factually inaccurate or have been
recorded unlawfully, it shall explain in writing to the data subject without
excessive delay why it is not prepared to correct or erase the data.
That Member State shall also provide the data subject with information
explaining the steps which he/she can take if he/she does not accept the
explanation provided. This shall include information on how to bring an
action or, if appropriate, a complaint before the competent authorities or
courts of that Member State and any financial or other assistance that is
available in accordance with the laws, regulations and procedures of that
Member State.
7. Any request under paragraphs 2 and 3 shall contain all the necessary par-
ticulars to identify the data subject, including fingerprints. Such data shall
be used exclusively to permit the exercise of the rights referred to in para-
graphs 2 and 3 and shall be destroyed immediately afterwards.
9. In each Member State, the national supervisory authority shall assist the
data subject in accordance with Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46/EC in exer-
cising his/her rights.
10. The national supervisory authority of the Member State which transmit-
ted the data and the national supervisory authority of the Member State in
which the data subject is present shall assist and, where requested, advise
him/her in exercising his/her right to correct or erase data. Both national
supervisory authorities shall cooperate to this end. Requests for such assis-
tance may be made to the national supervisory authority of the Member
State in which the data subject is present, which shall transmit the requests
to the authority of the Member State which transmitted the data. The data
subject may also apply for assistance and advice to the joint supervisory
authority set up by Article 20.
11. In each Member State any person may, in accordance with the laws, regu-
lations and procedures of that State, bring an action or, if appropriate, a
complaint before the competent authorities or courts of the State if he/she
is refused the right of access provided for in paragraph 2.
12. Any person may, in accordance with the laws, regulations and procedures of
the Member State which transmitted the data, bring an action or, if appro-
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1. Each Member State shall provide that the national supervisory authority
or authorities designated pursuant to Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC
shall monitor independently, in accordance with its respective national law,
the lawfulness of the processing, in accordance with this Regulation, of per-
sonal data by the Member State in question, including their transmission to
the Central Unit.
2. Each Member State shall ensure that its national supervisory authority
has access to advice from persons with sufficient knowledge of fingerprint
data.
2. The joint supervisory authority shall have the task of monitoring the activi-
ties of the Central Unit to ensure that the rights of data subjects are not
violated by the processing or use of the data held by the Central Unit. In
addition, it shall monitor the lawfulness of the transmission of personal
data to the Member States by the Central Unit.
5. The joint supervisory authority shall have access to advice from persons
with sufficient knowledge of fingerprint data.
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6. The Commission shall assist the joint supervisory authority in the perfor-
mance of its tasks. In particular, it shall supply information requested by
the joint supervisory body, give it access to all documents and paper files as
well as access to the data stored in the system and allow it access to all its
premises, at all times.
7. The joint supervisory authority shall unanimously adopt its rules of proce-
dure. It shall be assisted by a secretariat, the tasks of which shall be defined
in the rules of procedure.
10. The joint supervisory authority shall be consulted on that part of the draft
operating budget of the Eurodac Central Unit which concerns it. Its opin-
ion shall be annexed to the draft budget in question.
11. The joint supervisory authority shall be disbanded upon the establishment
of the independent supervisory body referred to in Article 286(2) of the
Treaty. The independent supervisory body shall replace the joint supervi-
sory authority and shall exercise all the powers conferred on it by virtue of
the act under which that body is established.
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CHAPTER VII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 21 Costs
2. The costs incurred by national units and the costs for their connection to
the central database shall be borne by each Member State.
3. The costs of transmission of data from the Member State of origin and of
the findings of the comparison to that State shall be borne by the State in
question.
1. The Council shall adopt, acting by the majority laid down in Article 205(2)
of the Treaty, the implementing provisions necessary for
– laying down the procedure referred to in Article 4(7),
– laying down the procedure for the blocking of the data referred to in
Article 12(1),
– drawing up the statistics referred to in Article 12(2).
Article 23 Committee
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set
at three months.
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1. The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council
an annual report on the activities of the Central Unit. The annual report
shall include information on the management and performance of Eurodac
against pre-defined quantitative indicators for the objectives referred to in
paragraph 2.
2. The Commission shall ensure that systems are in place to monitor the func-
tioning of the Central Unit against objectives, in terms of outputs, cost-
effectiveness and quality of service.
3. The Commission shall regularly evaluate the operation of the Central Unit
in order to establish whether its objectives have been attained cost-effec-
tively and with a view to providing guidelines for improving the efficiency
of future operations.
4. One year after Eurodac starts operations, the Commission shall produce
an evaluation report on the Central Unit, focusing on the level of demand
compared with expectation and on operational and management issues
in the light of experience, with a view to identifying possible short-term
improvements to operational practice.
5. Three years after Eurodac starts operations and every six years thereafter,
the Commission shall produce an overall evaluation of Eurodac, examining
results achieved against objectives and assessing the continuing validity of
the underlying rationale and any implications for future operations.
Article 25 Penalties
Member States shall ensure that use of data recorded in the central database
contrary to the purpose of Eurodac as laid down in Article 1(1) shall be subject
to appropriate penalties.
1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the
Official Journal of the European Communities.
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2. This Regulation shall apply, and Eurodac shall start operations, from the
date which the Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the
European Communities, when the following conditions are met:
(a) each Member State has notified the Commission that it has made the
necessary technical arrangements to transmit data to the Central Unit
in accordance with the implementing rules adopted under Article 4(7)
and to comply with the implementing rules adopted under Article
12(5); and
(b) the Commission has made the necessary technical arrangements for
the Central Unit to begin operations in accordance with the imple-
menting rules adopted under Article 4(7) and Article 12(5).
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the
Member States in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity.
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Chapter 12 Minimum Standards for Reception
1 Summary of Content
Directive 2000/9/EC1 establishes the minimum standards of reception condi-
tions for asylum seekers in the European Union which are deemed sufficient to
ensure them an adequate standard of living, with specific provisions on school-
ing, employment, access to vocational training, health care and freedom of
movement. Member States were obliged to comply with the Directive by 6 Feb-
ruary 2005. This Directive is binding for twenty-three Member States, as the UK
exercised its right to “opt in” to the Directive and is thus bound by it; Ireland did
not opt in; and Denmark could not opt in.
The scope of the Directive is restricted to those applicants for asylum under
the Geneva Convention and (at Member States’ discretion) their close family
members as defined by the Directive.2 It is left to Member States’ discretion
whether or not to extend the minimum standards laid down in the proposal to
those who claim other forms of international protection. In principle, the Direc-
tive applies to all those who are allowed to remain on the territory of a Member
State prior to a final decision on their asylum application being made “as long as
they are still allowed to remain on the territory as asylum seekers”.3
Article 5 requires that asylum applicants are informed within 15 days after
lodging their application of the rights and benefits to which they are entitled and
the obligations placed on their in order to comply with the reception conditions.
Article 6 provides that (subject to certain exclusions) applicants for asylum and
1 OJ 2003 L 31/8.
2 Article 3 of the Directive. On the definition of “family member”, see Art. 2(d).
3 Article 3 of the Directive. “Final decision” is not defined in the Directive.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 297-322.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section III – Asylum
their family members are to be given a document certifying their status or that
they are legally on the territory.
Article 7 endorses the principle of freedom of movement for asylum appli-
cants in the territory of a Member State or in a restricted area. Member States
are able to decide however that asylum applicants and their family members
must live in a specific residence where it is deemed necessary in order to enable
applications for asylum to be processed swiftly or for reasons of public order or
public interest. Applicants may be “confined” where it proves necessary to do
so.
Under Article 10 minors are to given access to education on similar condi-
tions as own nationals, although Member States are granted a degree of flex-
ibility in this respect. Article 11 provides that if the asylum application has
not been processed at first instance within a year, conditions for access to the
labour market for the applicant will need to be decided by the Member State.
Member States are permitted to give priority in the labour market to EU and
EEA citizens as well as legally resident third country nationals. Article 12 makes
provision for access to vocational training in the Member States at their discre-
tion, although Member States must give access to vocational training which is
linked an employment contract, to the extent that applicants have labour market
access.
Member States must make provisions on material reception conditions to
ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of
ensuring their subsistence. Article 13 permits material reception conditions to be
provided in kind, in the form of financial allowances or in the form of vouchers.
It further provides that Member States may require applicants to contribute to
the cost of their material reception conditions if they can afford to do so.
Article 14 leaves flexible the models of housing granted to asylum appli-
cants including accommodation centres and private houses. Applicants are to
be ensured the possibility of communicating with legal advisors and relatives.
Article 15 provides that all necessary health care must be provided to applicants,
which at a minimum includes essential treatment and emergency care.
Article 16 makes it permissible for Member States to reduce or withdraw
reception conditions in certain circumstances including where the applicant has
abandoned his place of residence, failed comply with reporting duties or attend
an interview or where he has concealed financial resources. Furthermore recep-
tion conditions may be refused to those who do not apply for asylum as soon
as reasonably practicable after arrival in the Member State. Sanctions may be
applied to those who breach accommodation centre rules or those who behave
in a seriously violent manner. Article 16(4) sets out procedural safeguards in
relation to withdrawal or reduction of reception conditions.
Furthermore, Article 21 provides that an applicant with a dispute relating
to the granting of benefits or who is subject to a decision taken in accordance
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with Article 7 has the right to bring an appeal, and ultimately is entitled to an
appeal or review before a judicial body.
Article 17 requires Member States to take account of the special needs of
vulnerable groups such as minors, elderly persons, disabled persons and victims
of torture in providing reception conditions. Article 18 requires that the best
interests of the child are made a primary consideration. Unaccompanied minors
are to be appointed with a guardian to ensure that the minor’s needs are met.
The Directive sets a number of priorities for placing unaccompanied minors, the
first of which is that the child is placed with adult family members and thereafter
with a foster family. Member States are required to trace family members if it is
deemed to be in the best interests of the child. Article 20 specifies that victims
of torture and organised violence are to be given specialised treatment for the
effects of their traumas.
The remainder of the Directive is concerned with the efficiency of the recep-
tion system and the implementation of the directive. To that end the Directive
requires that Member States will be required to provide data to the Commission
to allow the Commission to report to the European Parliament and Council on
implementation by 6 August 2006.
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placed persons and other persons seeking international protection”.5 The results
of the study demonstrated the widely divergent practices in the Member States
on a range of issues relating to reception conditions of asylum seekers.
In June 2000 the French delegation to the Asylum Working Party submitted
a discussion paper on conditions for the reception of asylum seekers.6 The paper
emphasised the need to harmonise reception conditions as “disparity between
reception arrangements in Europe makes certain Member States more attractive
than others for asylum applicants”. It argued for a comprehensive approach to
reception conditions based on a need to allow individuals to live with dignity
and recognising the asylum applicant’s right to stay whilst awaiting the outcome
of an application. The paper was emphatic in the view that asylum applicants
should not have the right to work as “then many asylum applications are made
for purely economic reasons”. The paper considered that it would be difficult to
include within the scope of a future Community instrument, the conditions of
reception for those who apply for international protection other than under the
Geneva Convention.7 The paper emphasised the need for asylum applicants to
be made aware of their rights and the benefits which they may claim rapidly and
for asylum applicants to be given specific authorisation to remain whilst their
claim was being considered. The paper saw no reason in principle to restrict the
free movement of asylum applicants in the territory of the Member State.
Reception conditions were discussed at the Council meeting in December
2000. The Council Conclusions of that meeting recalled the need for a Com-
munity instrument to harmonise reception conditions of asylum applicants and
provided guidelines to the Commission to be taken into account in drafting such
an instrument.8 The guidelines left open the question of whether the scope of
the future instrument would include those persons seeking international pro-
tection other than under the Geneva Convention. The need to inform asylum
seekers rapidly of their rights was emphasised as was the need to give asylum
applicants some form of evidence of their permission to remain on the terri-
tory of a Member State. The guidelines were undecided on the question of the
5 DG for Justice and Home Affairs, “Study on the legal framework and administrative
practices in the Member States of the European Communities regarding reception
conditions for persons seeking international protection”, Final Report, November
2000, carried out by PLS RAMBOLL Management on behalf of the European
Commission (DG for Justice and Home Affairs). The opinions expressed by the
authors do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Commission.
6 Note from French Delegation to the Asylum Working Party “Conditions for the
reception of asylum seekers”, Brussels, 23 June 2000, Doc no. 9703/00, ASILE 28.
7 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, Geneva.
8 2314th Council Meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection, Brussels, 30
November and 1 December 2000, Doc no. 13965/00 (Presse 457 – G) “ Conditions
for the Reception of Asylum Seekers – Council Conclusions”.
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Chapter 12 Reception Conditions
3 Legal Analysis
There is clear legal basis for the adoption of this Directive under Article 63(1)(b)
of the EC Treaty which provides that the Council shall adopt measures relating
to the reception conditions of asylum seekers in Member States. The Conclu-
9 Reference is made to these consultation with Member States and NGOs in the Com-
missions Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed Directive. It is not clear from
that Memorandum which NGOs were consulted with.
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sions of the Presidency at the Tampere European Council in October 1999 called
for minimum conditions of reception for asylum seekers to be agreed.
The most complex legal issues arise in relation to the compatibility of the
provisions of the Directive with the European Convention on Human Rights, in
particular Articles 3, 5 and 8 thereof. The greatest areas of concern here relate
to the use of detention and the withdrawal of support.
Compatibility with the ECHR dictates that use of detention should be
restricted to circumstances where it is strictly necessary and in accordance with
the standards of Article 5 ECHR, which provides that the right to liberty may
only be removed in certain limited circumstances which in relation to immigra-
tion control are “lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being
taken with a view to deportation or extradition” (Article 5(1)(f)). Those circum-
stances are to be narrowly construed and detention must be limited to those
circumstances and yet the Directive fails to refer to Article 5 ECHR. Compat-
ibility with Article 5 also dictates that persons who are detained are given access
to a court in order to challenge the legality of their detention speedily. In this
context it should be recalled that “legality” does not simply refer to whether
the detention is in accordance with national law, but also refers to whether the
detention is arbitrary, has not be unduly prolonged and that the alternatives to
detention have been carefully considered and rejected. As a minimum safeguard,
the Directive should have provided for mandatory bail hearings before a court
and a right to bail without sureties.
Compatibility with the ECHR further dictates that it is imperative that stan-
dards of detention centres and accommodation centres are good. In this regard
the case of Dougoz v Greece10 is relevant, as the European Court of Human
Rights found that the conditions of detention for an immigration detainee fell
below the standards of Article 3 and thus constituted inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment.
The compatibility of withdrawal of reception conditions with Articles 3
and 8 of the ECHR is also questionable if the result of that withdrawal would
have consequences on the applicant that affect his or her physical or moral integ-
rity. Given the absolute nature of Article 3 it is difficult to see that the behaviour
of the applicant, no matter how negative or reprehensible, would permit the
withdrawal or reduction of support if that would inhuman or degrading to the
applicant. In the Council minutes of 27 January 2003, the meeting at which the
Directive was adopted, a statement is included which confirms that Member
States will comply with their international obligations including the ECHR in
decisions relating to the withdrawal and reduction of support.11 In particular,
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4 Comment
The provisions of this Directive setting out guarantees for applicants appear to
meet the conditions for direct effect, in particular Articles 5-8, 10-15 and 17-21.
NGOs, for the large part, had been broadly welcoming of the Commission’s
proposed Directive although certain aspects gave rise to considerable concern
and debate. It was acknowledged that several provisions of the Directive (as
originally proposed) set adequate minimum standards and noted the inclusion
of provisions on information and documentation, access to NGOs and legal
advisors, access to primary health care and the reaffirmation of the best inter-
ests of the child as well as the recognition of the need to maintain family unity
and take account of the needs of vulnerable groups.12 A number of organisa-
tions also welcomed the fact that the Commission’s proposed Directive clearly
stated its intended adherence to provision of dignified living conditions. They
welcomed the provisions relating to those with special needs and the provisions
relating to information and documentation provided to asylum applicants.13
12 The Promise of Protection: Progress towards a European Asylum Policy since the
Tampere Summit 1999, November 2001.
13 Joint Comments on the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive laying down
minimum standards on the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States
COM (2001) 181 final, September 2001, Caritas Europa, Churches Commission
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reason and the asylum seekers are therefore allowed to remain on the territory,
they should have access to support if they are not to be left destitute in breach
of Article 3 ECHR.
The minimum level of material assistance is not closely defined although
and much left to discretion of the Member States. However the principles of
the Directive, namely that conditions should be sufficient for the health of the
applicant, must be adhered to in setting the level of assistance.
There were vocal objections to the provisions allowing States to reduce or
withdraw support following certain types of “negative behaviour” set out in
the Directive. However it should be noted that the grounds for withdrawing or
reducing reception conditions are clearly limited to those listed in Article 16 of
the Directive.
Too often in the recent past Member States have sought to restrict access to
employment, social security and other forms of social support in the belief that
such benefits may act as pull factors to asylum seekers who are without genuine
asylum claims. The wish on the part of Member States to dissuade such asylum
seekers negates their obligations to provide a just, humane and secure situation
for the asylum applicants; the position should be that only the highest standards
of reception conditions are acceptable.
The increasing obsession that Member States have with secondary move-
ments and removing pull factors for asylum applicants is founded ultimately in a
lack of political will to truly live up to international human rights standards and
a lack of understanding of driving forces behind the behaviour of most asylum
applicants.
The differentiation in terms of treatment and reception conditions of those
seeking different forms of international protection as well as those at different
stages of an asylum procedure is again reprehensible. Not only is it unjustifi-
able to exclude other binding international protection requirements, particularly
deriving from Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, from
the Directive, it will inevitably lead to disparities in practice across Europe.
The failure to provide legal and social assistance to those in need of inter-
national protection in general may arguably lead to breaches of the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is difficult to see how, for instance, leaving a
person destitute and without permission to work, cannot at least potentially
breach Articles 3 or 8 of the European Convention. In certain circumstances
that will almost certainly be the case, and particular regard should be had for
the age, vulnerability and other special needs of the individual. The absolute
nature of Article 3 essentially means that whatever the “negative behaviour” of
the asylum-seeker, leaving him in a situation which is inhuman or degrading is a
breach of that Article 3.
The provision that the UK Government insisted on being included in the
Directive relating to the ability of Member States to deprive asylum seekers from
support provisions if they do not claim asylum as soon as reasonably practical
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after arrival for instance has already proven entirely unworkable in the UK. The
UK Courts have had to intervene on numerous occasions to ensure that human
rights obligations are not breached by the denial of support to persons who are
otherwise destitute and unable to provide for themselves.14
The political reality of the Title IV process and the working methods of the
Council dictated that the agreement of the Directive was certainly at the cost
of lower standards. Last minute additions by some Member States agreed to by
others for reasons of political expediency in particular led to considerable criti-
cism of the process by outsiders.
Nevertheless the adoption of common minimum reception conditions is
undoubtedly necessary for the coherence of a harmonised European asylum
system for a number of reasons. The Commission, by way of justification for
its initial proposal for a Directive, pointed out in its Explanatory Memoran-
dum that a divergence in reception conditions risks undermining an otherwise
harmonised procedure if asylum seekers make secondary movements within
the European Union based on reception conditions. Whilst there is little or no
evidence that secondary movements are made on this basis, if secondary move-
ments are to be restricted in the harmonised system and asylum applicants are
not given any choice as to where their asylum applications are to be processed,
they should certainly be entitled to the same minimum standards of reception in
any Member State of the European Union.
Clearly uniformity in terms of the minimum standards of reception condi-
tions is to be welcomed providing that these minimum standards are interpreted
with sufficiently high standards to ensure that asylum seekers are able to live in
dignity with humane living conditions whilst they await the outcomes of their
asylum claims. Compatibility with international human rights standards will
dictate that standards are kept sufficiently high.
14 See for instance R (Q) v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 364, [2003] 2 All ER. See most
recently UK House of Lords’ decision in R (on the application of ADAM and others)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66
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Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular point (1)(b) of the first subparagraph of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,
Whereas:
5. This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European. Union. In particular this Directive seeks to ensure full respect
for human dignity and to promote the application of Articles 1 and 18 of
the said Charter.
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6. With respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this
Directive, Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of
international law to which they are party and which prohibit discrimina-
tion.
7. Minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers that will normally
suffice to ensure them a dignified standard of living and comparable living
conditions in all Member States should be laid down.
15. It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States have
the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for third
country nationals and stateless persons who ask for international protec-
tion from a Member State.
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16. In this spirit, Member States are also invited to apply the provisions of this
Directive in connection with procedures for deciding on applications for
forms of protection other than that emanating from the Geneva Conven-
tion for third country nationals or stateless persons.
18. Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely to establish minimum
standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member States cannot be
attained by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale
and effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community,
the Community may adopt measures in accordance with the principles of
subsidiarity set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the prin-
ciple of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
19. In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom
gave notice, by letter of 18 August 2001, of its wish to take part in the
adoption and application of this Directive.
20. Pursuant to Article 1 of the said Protocol, Ireland is not participating in the
adoption of this Directive. Consequently and without prejudice to Article
4 of the aforementioned Protocol, the provisions of this Directive do not
apply to Ireland.
21. In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the adoption
of this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it nor subject to its application,
CHAPTER I
PURPOSE, DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE
Article 1 Subject-matter
The purpose of this Directive is to establish minimum standards for the recep-
tion of asylum seekers in Member States.
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Article 2 Definitions
(a) “Geneva Convention” shall mean the Convention relating to the status of
refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as supplemented by the New York
Protocol of 31 January 1967;
(b) “application for asylum” shall mean the application filed by a third coun-
try national or a stateless person which can be understood as a request
for international protection from a Member State, under the Geneva Con-
vention. Any application for international protection is presumed to be an
application for asylum unless a third-country national or a stateless person
explicitly requests another kind of protection that can be applied for sepa-
rately;
(c) “applicant” or “asylum seeker” shall mean a third country national or
a stateless person who has made an application for asylum in respect of
which a final decision has not yet been taken;
(d) “family members” shall mean, in so far as the family already existed in the
country of origin, the following members of the applicant’s family who
are present in the same Member State in relation to the application for
asylum:
(i) the spouse of the asylum seeker or his or her unmarried partner in a
stable relationship, where the legislation or practice of the Member
State concerned treats unmarried couples in a way comparable to mar-
ried couples under its law relating to aliens;
(ii) the minor children of the couple referred to in point (i) or of the appli-
cant, on condition that they are unmarried and dependent and without
distinction according to whether they were born in or out of wedlock
or adopted as defined under the national law;
(e) “refugee” shall mean a person who fulfils the requirements of Article 1(A)
of the Geneva Convention;
(f) “refugee status” shall mean the status granted by a Member State to a
person who is a refugee and is admitted as such to the territory of that
Member State;
(g) “Procedures” and “appeals” shall mean the procedures established by
Member States in their national law;
(h) “unaccompanied minors” shall mean persons below the age of eighteen
who arrive in the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an
adult responsible for them whether by law or by custom, and for as long
as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person; it includes
minors who are left unaccompanied after they have entered the territory of
Member States;
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(i) “reception conditions” shall mean the full set of measures that Member
States grant to asylum seekers in accordance with this Directive;
(j) “material reception conditions” shall mean the reception conditions that
include housing, food and clothing, provided in kind, or as financial allow-
ances or in vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance;
(k) “detention” shall mean confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member
State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her
freedom of movement;
(l) “accommodation centre” shall mean any place used for collective housing
of asylum seekers.
Article 3 Scope
1. This Directive shall apply to all third country nationals and stateless per-
sons who make an application for asylum at the border or in the territory
of a Member State as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory
as asylum seekers, as well as to family members, if they are covered by such
application for asylum according to the national law.
2. This Directive shall not apply in cases of requests for diplomatic or territo-
rial asylum submitted to representations of Member States.
3. This Directive shall not apply when the provisions of Directive 2001/55/EC
of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in
the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting
a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and
bearing the consequences thereof are applied.
4. Member States may decide to apply this Directive in connection with pro-
cedures for deciding on applications for kinds of protection other than that
emanating from the Geneva Convention for third-country nationals or
stateless persons who are found not to be refugees.
Member States may introduce or retain more favourable provisions in the field
of reception conditions for applicants for asylum and other close relatives of the
applicant who are present in the same Member State when they are dependent
on him or for humanitarian reasons insofar as these provisions are compatible
with this Directive.
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CHAPTER II
GENERAL PROVISIONS ON RECEPTION CONDITIONS
Article 5 Information
1. Member States shall inform asylum seekers, within a reasonable time not
exceeding fifteen days after they have lodged their application with the com-
petent authority, of at least any established benefits and of the obligations
with which they must comply relating to reception conditions.
Member States shall ensure that applicants are provided with information
about organisations or groups of persons that provide specific legal assis-
tance and organisations that might be able to help or inform them in rela-
tion to the available reception conditions, including health care.
Article 6 Documentation
1. Member States shall ensure that, within three days after an application is
lodged with the competent authorities, the applicant is provided with a
document issued in his or her own name certifying his or her status as an
applicant for asylum or testifying that he or she is allowed to stay in the ter-
ritory of the Member State while his or her application is pending or being
examined.
If the holder is not free to move within all or a part of the territory of a
Member State, the document shall also certify this fact.
2. Member States may exclude the application of this Article when the asylum
seeker is in detention and during the examination of an application submit-
ted at the border or within the context of a procedure to decide on the right
of the applicant to legally enter the territory of a Member State. In specific
cases, during the examination of an application, Member States may pro-
vide applicants with other equivalent evidence to the document referred to
in paragraph 1.
3. The document referred to in paragraph 1 need not certify the identity of the
asylum seeker.
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4. Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to provide asylum seek-
ers with the document referred to in paragraph 1, which must be valid for as
long as they are authorised to remain in the territory of the Member State
concerned or at the border thereof.
5. Member States may provide applicants for asylum with a travel document
when serious humanitarian reasons arise that require their presence in
another State.
1. Asylum seekers may move freely within the territory of the host Member
State or within an area assigned to them by that Member State. The assigned
area shall not affect the unalienable sphere of private life and shall allow
sufficient scope for guaranteeing access to all benefits under this Directive.
2. Member States may decide on the residence of the applicant for asylum
for reasons of public interest, public order or when necessary, for the swift
processing and effective monitoring of his orher application.
3. When it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of public
order, Member States may confine an applicant to a particular place in
accordance with their national law.
5. Member States shall provide for the possibility of granting applicants tem-
porary permission to leave the place of residence mentioned in paragraphs
2 and 4 and/or the assigned area mentioned in paragraph 1. Decisions shall
be taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons shall be given
if they are negative.
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Article 8 Families
Member States may require medical screening for applicants on public health
grounds.
The Member State concerned may stipulate that such access must be con-
fined to the State education system.
Minors shall be younger than the age of legal majority in the Member State
in which the application was lodged or is being examined. Member States
shall not withdraw secondary education for the sole reason that the minor
has reached the age of majority.
2. Access to the education system shall not be postponed for more than three
months from the date the application has been lodged by the minor or the
minor’s parents. This period may be extended to one year where specific
education is provided in order to facilitate access to the education system.
3. Where access to the education system as set out in paragraph 1 is not pos-
sible due to the specific situation of the minor, the Member State may offer
other education arrangements.
Article 11 Employment
1. Member States shall determine a period of time, starting from the date on
which an application for asylum has been lodged, during which an appli-
cant shall not have access to the labour market.
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2. If a decision at first instance has not been taken within one year of the pre-
sentation of an application for asylum and this delay cannot be attributed
to the applicant, Member States shall decide the conditions for granting
access to the labour market for the applicant.
3. Access to the labour market shall not be withdrawn during appeals proce-
dures, where an appeal against a negative decision in a regular procedure
has suspensive effect, until such time as a negative decision on the appeal is
notified.
4. For reasons of labour market policies, Member States may give priority to
EU citizens and nationals of States bound by the Agreement on the Euro-
pean Economic Area and also to legally resident third-country nationals.
Member States may allow asylum seekers access to vocational training irrespec-
tive of whether they have access to the labour market.
1. Member States shall ensure that material reception conditions are available
to applicants when they make their application for asylum.
Member States shall ensure that that standard of living is met in the specific
situation of persons who have special needs, in accordance with Article 17,
as well as in relation to the situation of persons who are in detention.
3. Member States may make the grant of all or some of the material reception
conditions and health care subject to the condition that applicants do not
have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for their health
and to enable their subsistence.
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2. Member States shall ensure that applicants provided with the housing
referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) are assured:
(a) protection of their family life;
(b) the possibility of communicating with relatives, legal advisers and rep-
resentatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) recognised
by Member States.
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Chapter 12 Reception Conditions
4. Member States shall ensure that transfers of applicants from one housing
facility to another take place only when necessary. Member States shall pro-
vide for the possibility for applicants to inform their legal advisers of the
transfer and of their new address.
1. Member States shall ensure that applicants receive the necessary health care
which shall include, at least, emergency care and essential treatment of ill-
ness.
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CHAPTER III
REDUCTION OR WITHDRAWAL OF RECEPTION CONDITIONS
1. Member States may reduce or withdraw the reception conditions in the fol-
lowing cases:
(a) where an asylum seeker:
– abandons the place of residence determined by the relevant
authority without informing it or, if requested, without permis-
sion, or
– does not comply with reporting duties or requests to provide
information or to appear for personal interviews concerning
the asylum procedure during a reasonable period laid down in
national law, or
– has already lodged an application in the same Member State.
When the applicant is traced or voluntarily reports to the relevant
authority, a duly motivated decision, based on the reasons for the dis-
appearance, shall be taken on the reinstallation of the grant of some
or all of the reception conditions;
(b) where an applicant has concealed financial resources and has therefore
unduly benefited from material reception conditions.
If it transpires that an applicant had sufficient means to cover material
reception conditions and health care at the time when these basic needs
were being covered, then Member States may ask the asylum seeker for
a refund.
2. Member States may refuse conditions in cases where an asylum seeker has
failed to demonstrate that the asylum claim was made as soon as reason-
ably practicable after arrival in that Member State.
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Chapter 12 Reception Conditions
5. Member States shall ensure that material reception conditions are not with-
drawn or reduced before a negative decision is taken.
CHAPTER IV
PROVISIONS FOR PERSONS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS
1. Member States shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable
persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly
people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children and persons
who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psycho-
logical, physical or sexual violence, in the national legislation implementing
the provisions of Chapter II relating to material reception conditions and
health care.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply only to persons found to have special needs after an
individual evaluation of their situation.
Article 18 Minors
1. The best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration for Member
States when implementing the provisions of this Directive that involve
minors.
2. Member States shall ensure access to rehabilitation services for minor chil-
dren who have been victims of any form of abuse, neglect, exploitation,
torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or who have suffered
from armed conflicts, and ensure that appropriate mental health care is
developed and qualified counselling is provided when it is needed.
1. Member States shall as soon as possible take measures to ensure the nec-
essary representation of unaccompanied minors by legal guardianship, or
where necessary, representation by an organisation which is responsible for
the care and well-being of minors, or by any other appropriate representa-
tion. Regular assessments shall be made by the appropriate authorities.
2. Unaccompanied minors who make an application for asylum shall, from the
moment they are admitted to the territory to the moment they are obliged
to leave the host Member State in which the application has been lodged or
is being examined, be placed:
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Section III – Asylum
As far as possible, siblings shall be kept together, taking into account the
best interests of the minor concerned and, in particular, his or her age and
degree of maturity. Changes of residence of unaccompanied minors shall
be limited to a minimum.
4. Those working with unaccompanied minors shall have had or receive appro-
priate training concerning their needs, and shall be bound by the confiden-
tiality principle as defined in the national law, in relation to any information
they obtain in the course of their work.
Member States shall ensure that, if necessary, persons who have been subjected
to torture, rape or other serious acts of violence receive the necessary treatment
of damages caused by the afore-mentioned acts.
CHAPTER V
APPEALS
Article 21 Appeals
1. Member States shall ensure that negative decisions relating to the granting
of benefits under this Directive or decisions taken under Article 7 which
individually affect asylum seekers may be the subject of an appeal within
the procedures laid down in the national law. At least in the last instance the
possibility of an appeal or a review before a judicial body shall be granted.
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Chapter 12 Reception Conditions
2. Procedures for access to legal assistance in such cases shall be laid down in
national law.
CHAPTER VI
ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF
THE RECEPTION SYSTEM
Article 22 Cooperation
Member States shall regularly inform the Commission on the data concerning
the number of persons, segregated by sex and age, covered by reception condi-
tions and provide full information on the type, name and format of the docu-
ments provided for by Article 6.
Member States shall, with due respect to their constitutional structure, ensure
that appropriate guidance, monitoring and control of the level of reception con-
ditions are established.
2. Member States shall allocate the necessary resources in connection with the
national provisions enacted to implement this Directive.
CHAPTER VII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 25 Reports
By 6 August 2006, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and
the Council on the application of this Directive and shall propose any amend-
ments that are necessary.
Member States shall send the Commission all the information that is appropri-
ate for drawing up this that report, including the statistical data provided for by
Article 22 by 6 August 2006.
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After presenting the report, the Commission shall report to the European Par-
liament and the Council on the application of this Directive at least every five
years.
Article 26 Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 6 February 2005.
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When the Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a refer-
ence to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the
occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how
such a reference is to be made.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provi-
sions of national law which they adopt in the field relating to the enforce-
ment of this Directive.
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Article 28 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary
Protection
1 Summary
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons
who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted was adopted on 29 April 2004 after intense and protracted negotiations
(see the Annex). A draft Directive was first proposed by the European Com-
mission in September 2001 following considerable consultation with Member
States.1 The Directive defines who is a refugee and who is otherwise in need of
international protection. It is quite proscriptive in its formulation. The most
controversial issue initially was the inclusion of non-state agents of persecu-
tion, which contradicts both German and French law. Other controversial issues
included the definition of who is otherwise in need of international protection
and the exclusion clauses.
The scope of the Directive includes 1951 Convention refugees and those
otherwise in need of protection (subsidiary protection) (Article 1). The Direc-
tive limits eligibility for refugee status or subsidiary protection to “third country
nationals or stateless persons” (Article 2(d) and (e)). It is thus not applicable to
nationals of EU Member States. There is no standstill clause in the Directive
although States may retain more favourable provisions (Article 4).
There are facts and evidence that should be taken into account in assess-
ing a claim including a presumption that past persecution will be repeated in
the future (Article 4(4)) and that failure to produce documentary evidence is
not fatal to a claim providing his general credibility is established (Article 4(5)).
Whilst persecution may be based on events which have taken place since the
applicant left his or her country of origin, Member States may determine a claim
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 323-366.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section III – Asylum
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
According to Article 19, Member States must revoke or refuse to renew subsid-
iary protection status if the person ceases to qualify in accordance with Article
16 or if the person should have been excluded in accordance with Article 17(1)
or misrepresented or omitted facts which were decisive for the granting of status
(Article 19(3)(b)).
Articles 20 to 34 deal with the content of international protection and the
rights accruing to those who qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection.
Unless otherwise stated the rights apply to both those with refugee status and
subsidiary protection status (Article 20(2)). Member States are instructed to take
into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons including unaccom-
panied minors, disabled persons, single parents and victims of torture (Article
20(3)). Rights can be reduced for persons with either refugee status or subsidiary
protection status where that status has been obtained “on the basis of activities
engaged in for the sole or main purpose” of obtaining that status (Article 20(6)
and (7)).
The general principle of non-refoulement is recalled in Article 21. However,
if international law does not prevent refoulement where that person represents a
danger to the security of the EU Member State or having been convicted of seri-
ous crime he constitutes a danger to the community, Member States may refoule
the person (Article 21(2)).
The Directive provides for “maintaining” of family unity for those with ref-
ugee status or subsidary protection (Article 23). However, Member States may
define the conditions applicable to the family members of those with subsid-
iary protection status for obtaining the benefits set out in the Directive (Article
23(2)).
The beneficiaries of refugee status and their families are to be issued with
residence permits valid for at least three years (Article 24(1)), whilst those with
subsidary protection status are to issued with residence permits valid for at least
one year (Article 24(2)). There is no minimum period of validity of the residence
permit issued to the family members of those with subsidiary protection (Article
24(2)).
Article 24 provides for travel documents to be issued for refugees in accor-
dance with the 1951 Convention and when serious humanitarian reasons arise
for those with subsidary protection.
Those with refugee status are to be given immediate access to the labour
market whereas in relation to those with subsidiary protection status Member
States may take into account the situation in the labour market for a limited
period of time (Article 26).
All minors are to be granted full access to the education system, whereas
adults are to given access to further education on the same conditions as other
third country nationals legal resident in a State (Article 27).
The Directive provides that beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protec-
tion status are given equal access to social welfare as nationals of Member States
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Section III – Asylum
(Article 28(1)). However Member States may limit social assistance granted to
those with subsidiary protection status to core benefits only (Article 28(2)).2
Likewise, both beneficiaries of refugee and subsidariy protection status are to
be granted equal access to health care as own nationals, although in the case of
those with subsidary protection status this can be limited to core benefits only
(Article 29).3
Special provisions for unaccompanied minors are included in the Direc-
tive such as a requirement to arrange to establish a legal guardianship and their
placement in suitable accommodation (Article 30). Where possible, siblings are
to be kept together.
Those granted refugee or subsidiary proteciton status are to have equal
access to housing and the same rights of free movement as compared to other
third country nationals legally resident in the State (Articles 31 and 32). Member
States are directed to make provision for integration programmes for refugees
(Article 33(1)) and where it is considered appropriate those with subsidiary pro-
tection status are to be granted access to such programmes (Article 33(2)).
Articles 35 and 36 include provisions about administrative cooperation and
the appointment of national contact points for liaison between Member States
and the Commission.
The final provisions of the Directive include an obligation for the Commis-
sion to report on the application of the Directive in the Member States by 10
April 2008 (Article 37). The Commission must consider making amendments,
by way of priority, to the Articles defining subsidiary protection and concern-
ing employment and integration. Member States have until 10 October 2006
to transpose the provisions of the Directive into their national laws (Article
38). The temporal scope of the Directive (as regards persons whose application
is pending on this date, or who have already been granted a recognised status
beforehand) is further discussed in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
first reading of the Directive by the Council asylum working group in April 2002
considered Articles 1-12, then the first reading of the provisions on definitions
was completed in June.6 Skipping the usual second reading, the Danish Presi-
dency then submitted suggested amendments to a number of key provisions in
light of delegations’ comments.7 Discussions on the definitions then followed
parallel tracks, with the core definitions of “refugee” and “subsidiary protec-
tion” discussed in one track and the other provisions relating to definitions dis-
cussed in a second track.8 The core definitions were almost agreed at the JHA
Council of October 2002, and were then formally agreed by Coreper shortly
afterward, while the great majority of the other provisions were agreed by the
JHA Council in November 2002.9 The outstanding issues at that time related to
refugees sur place, persecution by non-state agents, persecution on grounds of
gender, revocation of refugee status, exclusion from subsidiary protection status
and revocation of subsidiary protection status. Subsequently, detailed discus-
sion on the content of status began in December 2002 in the Council’s asylum
working party. The Council agreed on all aspects of the Directive in June 2003,
apart from reservations from the German and Austrian delegations regarding
the application of the Directive to victims of “non-state” persecution and cer-
tain issues concerning status. A final compromise agreement on these issues was
brokered during the Irish Presidency early in 2004.10 The Council then reached
political agreement on the proposal in March 2004 and adopted the Directive in
April 2004, just before the legal deadline to adopt it set by Article 63 EC.
A number of changes were made to the text of the Directive during nego-
tiations. As regards the definitons, the final Directive defines “refugee status” as
a recognition of that status by a Member State, rather than a granting of that
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328
Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
does not apply to subsidiary protection claims and moreover only applies to
cases of subsequent applications, a principle not defined in this Directive but in
the asylum procedures Directive.19 Article 6 on agents of persecution or serious
harm was amended to require it to be “demonstrated” that the relevant actors
(including the addition of international organisations) are unable or unwilling
to provide effective protection against non-state agents, and to specify that a
source of persecution or harm can also include parties or organisations control-
ling “a substantial part” of the state.20 A separate Article 7 of the Directive was
drafted on the specific issue of “actors of protection”,21 retaining the principle
that international organisations can provide protection,22 and even adding that
Council acts can give guidance as to whether effective protection is provided by
such bodies. The factors of protection were broadened so that there must be “an
effective legal system” for ensuring such protection, although the final Directive
specifies only that the applicant must have “access” (not “reasonable access”)
to such protection. The “internal protection alternative” in Article 8 will apply
where there is a risk-free part of the country where the applicant “can reasonably
be expected to stay”; the provision setting out a “strong presumption against”
the internal protection alternative where the agent of persecution was the state
(or associated with it) was deleted; the principle can apply in spite of “technical
obstacles to return”; and the personal and general circumstances Member States
must consider before applying the principle were simplified.23
As to the core of refugee status, Article 9 on “acts of persecution” was sim-
plified and now consists of a paragraph on severity of the acts, a paragraph with
a non-exhaustive list of the forms such acts can take, and an obligation to find
a link between the acts and the grounds of persecution.24 The acts must be “suf-
ficiently serious by their nature or repetition” as to constitute a severe violation
of basic human rights, “in particular” the non-derogable rights under Article
15 ECHR, or be “an accumulation of various measures, including violations of
human rights which are sufficiently severe” as to fall within the first criterion.
Six examples are given: acts of violence; legal or similar measures which are
discriminatory; disproportionate or discriminatory prosecution or punishment;
denial of judicial redress resulting in the same outcome; prosecution or punish-
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ment for refusal to serve in a military conflict which would lead to acts falling
within the scope of the exclusion clause;25 and “acts of a gender-specific or child-
specific nature”. As for the grounds of persecution (Article 10),26 the final Direc-
tive includes the Commission’s proposed definitions of “race”, “definition” and
“nationality”, with changes to the definitions of “particular social group” and
“political opinion”. For the former, the final Directive requires that the group
members have an innate characteristic, common background or characteristic
that it would be unjust to force to change and that the group has a distinct iden-
tity; sexual orientation might be a common characteristic but this cannot apply
where the acts would be criminal under the “national law of the Member States”.
At French insistence, the prospect of “gender” as an example of social group is
referred more ambiguously in the final Directive: “gender-related aspects might
be considered, without by themselves alone creating a presumption for the appli-
cation” of the principle. As for “political opinion”, it was broadened to include
any opinion related to the persecutors, not just the policy of a state.
There were significant changes to the cessation and exclusion clauses.
Article 11 on cessation of refugee status was revised so that Member States are
required to “have regard” to whether the change of circumstances is sufficiently
significant and lasting.27 Next, the exclusion clause in Article 12 was revised to
delete several protections proposed by the Commission (judicial review, contin-
ued effect of other international obligations, application only to the “personal
and knowing conduct” of the person),28 and to add two elements not found in
Article 1.F of the Geneva Convention: the exclusion of those who have commit-
ted cruel crimes with an allegedly political objective and of those who “instigate
or otherwise participate” in Article 1.F activities (as redefined).
At the end of the provisions on refugees, the two provisions on “granting”
and “revocation” of refugee status were added during negotiations (Articles 13
and 14), although there are no such concepts in the Geneva Convention.
After difficult discussions, a complex deal was reached on the definition of
subsidiary protection in Article 15 of the Directive. First of all, it will only be
necessary to show a risk of “serious” harm, not “serious unjustified harm” as the
Commission had proposed. Secondly, the Commission had proposed applica-
tion of the concept in the case of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
where there was a “violation of a human right, sufficiently severe to engage the
Member State’s international obligations”, or where there was a threat to “life,
safety or freedom” because of “indiscriminate violence arising in situations of
25 This seems narrower than the approach to conscientious objection in Art. 11(1)(d)(ii)
of the initial proposal.
26 Compare with Art. 12 of the proposed Directive.
27 Compare with Art. 13 of the proposed Directive. See also Art. 14(1) and (2) of the
final Directive.
28 Compare with Art. 14 of the proposed Directive.
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Section III – Asylum
conditions applicable to such benefits” for them, as long as they “ensure that any
benefits provided guarantee an adequate standard of living”.32
Next, residence permits for refugees will only be valid for three years and
renewable, rather than for five years and renewed automatically, and the period
of validity for family members may be shorter. Residence permits for persons for
subsidiary protection must be for at least one year and renewable, rather than
renewable automatically. In both cases, an exception for “compelling reasons
of national security or public order” was added.33 The proposal to extend long-
term residence status to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in accordance with
the proposed EC directive was deleted entirely.34 Furthermore, the obligation to
grant a travel document to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection was subjected
to an exception for “compelling reasons of national security or public order”
and potentially limited to serious humanitarian situations.35
As for employment and self-employment,36 rather than immediate equal-
ity of access for refugees and a six-month wait for beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection, Member States would have to grant access immediately to both cat-
egories; it is not clear whether an equality rule applies. But as part of the final
agreement on the Directive, it was agreed that for beneficiaries of subsidiary pro-
tection, “the situation of the labour market in the Member States may be taken
into account, including for possible prioritisation of access to employment for
a limited time to be determined in accordance with national law.”37 However,
Member States will have to permit a beneficiary of subsidiary protection to take
up a job offer made in accordance with any national rules on priority of access.
Also, the provision requiring equal treatment as regards remuneration, access
to social security and working conditions was amended to read that “the law in
force” on such issues will apply.
Equal treatment regarding recognition of diplomas was limited to foreign
diplomas, and access to certain types of education by adults must be granted
on a footing of equality with third-country nationals, not nationals. It is also
unclear whether family members (particularly children) without protection
status will be fully subject to the education provisions.38 Next, as part of the
final compromise on the Directive, the provisions on social welfare and health
permit Member States to confine their obligation to “core benefits” as regards
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status (although the core benefits would
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
3 Legal Analysis
There are a number of legal issues that arise in relation to this Directive. The first
relates to the relationship that the Directive has to relevant international instru-
ments such as the Geneva Convention, the European Convention on Human
Rights and the Convention against Torture. The Drective fails to make clear the
primacy of international instruments particularly the 1951 Convention. Whilst
the European Court of Justice could be expected to construe the Directive con-
sistently with the Convention and Member States’ obligations under that Con-
39 Compare Arts. 28 and 29 of the final Directive to Arts. 26 and 27 of the proposal.
On the exception, see Arts. 28(2) and 29(2). However, there is no distinction permit-
ted as regards health care where there are “special needs”, as defined non-exhaus-
tively in the Directive (Art. 29(3)); this provision appears to be broader in scope
than proposed by the Commission. For the definition of “core benefits”, see para-
graph 34 of the preamble.
40 Compare Art. 30 of the final Directive to Art. 28 of the proposal.
41 Compare Arts. 31 and 32 of the final Directive to Arts. 29 and 30 of the proposal.
42 Compare Art. 33 of the final Directive to Art. 31 of the proposal.
43 OJ 2003 C 300 E/134.
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4 Comments
The provisions of much of this Directive meet the criteria for direct effect, in
particular Articles 13, 18 and 21-33.
The Commission’s proposal for a Directive was broadly welcomed by
Member States, NGOs and other observers. This was in stark contrast for
instance with the Commission’s proposed Directive on asylum procedures and
probably reflected the extent to which the Commission had consulted Member
States as well as civil society prior to releasing its draft directive.
44 See for instance paragraph 34 of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Euro-
pean Union’s Report on “Defining Refugee Status and Those in Need of Interna-
tional Protection”, Session 2001-02, 28th Report, HL Paper 156.
45 See for instance Matthews v United Kingdom, 18 February 1999, [1999] 28 EHRR
361
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
Concerns do, however, arise from the Directive. As regards the scope of
the Directive, it has been observed that limiting the definition to third country
nationals or stateless persons does not accord with the definition of a refugee as
set out in the 1951 Convention itself and observe that this definition does not
replicate the precise wording of the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Con-
vention. Whilst it is acknowledged that it is very unlikely that nationals on the
present EU Member States would have a need for refugee protection, this does
not justify restricting the definition of a Directive which purports to give effect
to an international instrument.46 Similarly, the protection of Article 3 ECHR is
not limited by nationality and with the accession of 10 new States to the EU in
May 2004 it is not inconceivable that there would still be need to provide inter-
national protection for their nationals.
Furthermore, and probably of most concern, is the “exportability” of EU
concepts and definitions in this field and critics have observed the readiness of
non-EU States to mimic the EU, particularly when there is an incentive in terms
of possible accession or financial benefit in doing so.
It is regrettable that the Directive does not contain a standstill clause. How-
ever, Article 3 may provide an adequate safeguard against the denigrating of
rights, given that those States which already have more favourable provisions are
likely to wish to retain them.
Article 5 provides that a claim for international protection may be based
on events which have taken place since the applicant has left his country of
origin. Article 8(2), however, excludes from protection those who have engaged
in activities for the sole purpose of creating the necessary conditions for making
an application for international protection. A number of critics have expressed
concern at this qualification. As observed by UNHCR the assessment of a claim
for international protection must be based on the need for that protection and
the repercussions for the applicant if they are to be refouled, not on why that
need comes about.47 Whilst there will doubtless be close scrutiny of an appli-
cation that is based on “self serving” activities, if risk of harm is nonetheless
established international protection must be given. There is a real danger that
this provision will result in an over-emphasis in assessment of the motivations
of the applicant rather than the assessment of the well foundedness of the claim
that the applicant faces a risk of persecution on return to his country of origin.
There is overwhelming support amongst commentators and NGOs for the
provision in Article 6 outlining the actors of persecution in that it accords with
the internationally accepted view and common jurisprudence of the majority
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of Member States that non-state actors may be agents of persecution for the
purposes of Article 1(A) of the 1951 Convention.48 In most commentators’ view
there is nothing in the language of the Geneva Convention that can support a
suggestion that persecution must emanate from the State or be attributable to
the State. The opposite view taken by a few Member States in the European
Union caused great difficulty in the working of the Dublin Convention, demon-
strated by the number of cases taken to the courts in the UK, for instance, on
the difference in approach.49
The inclusion of non-State actors as providers of protection, however, is
more problematic. The provision in Article 7(1) that international organisations
and parties may be considered as protectors for the purposes of the Directive
appears to be an import not found in any UNHCR document or guidance. It is
questionable whether non-State or quasi-State bodies can provide “protection”
which is equivalent to that provided by a State. International organisations and
quasi-State authorities are not parties to international human rights instruments
and are therefore unaccountable in international law. This provision does at least
require that non-State bodies must be in “control” of a significant part of a State
and furthermore that they should have in place necessary mechanisms to detect,
prosecute and punish acts constituting persecution or serious harm. This does at
least go some way to meeting the standards of protection set for instance by the
European Court of Human Rights.50
There are numerous examples in the last century of the inadequacy of pro-
tection offered by international organisations, for example in Rwanda, which is
unsurprising given that an international organisation is only likely to have lim-
ited control and authority over territory and will not be able to carry out the full
functions of a State. Quasi-State authorities tend to be similarly transient, they
may be unstable and their control will not necessarily even be accepted. Their
political instability and the fact that they are not parties to international human
rights instruments make them entirely unsuitable as protectors of human rights
standards.
Article 8 provides for the circumstances in which an applicant might be rea-
sonably expected to return to another part of their own country, often referred
to as the internal flight alternative. Notable is the inclusion of the personal cir-
cumstances which should be taken into account when considering the viability
48 See, for instance, the evidence given the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Euro-
pean Union by Professor Guy Goodwin Gill, Professor of International Refugee
Law, University of Oxford, p. 7, Q. 26, HL Paper 156, 16 July 2002.
49 See, for instance, R v the Secretary of State for the Home Department,ex parte Adan,
House of Lords [2001] 2 AC 477.
50 See for instance, Edwards v UK, 14 March 2002; Z and others v UK, 10 May 2001,
[2002] 34 EHRR 3; General Comment 7(16) of the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee.
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the Court of Justice would interpret that phrase. It is likely that “particularly
serious crime” will be more narrowly defined than the legislation of at least one
Member State currently permits.53 It may be one of the tangible benefits of the
Directive that a uniform interpretation of the exclusion clauses will have to be
applied, particularly at a time when some Member States seem intent on exclud-
ing ever growing classes of refugees from the scope of the Geneva Convention.
The provisions in the Directive on qualification for subsidiary protection
are an attempt to give effect to Member States’ obligations under a range of
international human rights law instruments, most particularly Article 3 ECHR
but also the UN Convention against Torture. Member States’ national laws are
notoriously inconsistent and in some cases non-existent and this attempt to har-
monise standards will provide greater legal certainty and uniformity.
However it is the very term “subsidiary protection” which is potentially a
source of future problems particularly in relation to the nature of the rights that
accrue to a person granted such protection. The term suggests an inferiority of
status in comparison to refugee status, perhaps of a more temporary nature,
which may not reflect the reality of the situation.
Furthermore the interrelationship between refugee status and subsid-
iary protection remains unclear under the Directive. It would be tempting for
Member States to favour granting people subsidiary protection as opposed to
refugee status in view of the lesser rights that accrue to the former, but for the
reasons set out elsewhere in this book, this would be an incorrect interpretation
of the Directive, which (along with the asylum procedures Directive) should be
interpreted as establishing an implicit hierarchy giving refugee status priority
over subsidiary protection status.54 Effective monitoring of implementation by
the Commission under Article 37 should include careful examination of the cir-
cumstances in which subsidiary protection is granted. It would be compromising
adherence to the Geneva Convention not to duly recognize refugees and accord
them full rights in accordance with that Convention where they meet the defini-
tion of a refugee.
Article 16 provides for the circumstances in which subsidiary protection
status may be withdrawn. As with the cessation of refugee status, the burden
of proof for establishing that the circumstances in the country of origin have
changed or cease to exist lies with the Member States.55
Article 17 provides for the circumstances in which a person is be excluded
from attaining subsidiary protection status. The provision specifically obliges
53 The UK has a very broad definition of serious crime which would result in the revo-
cation of refugee status under the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002.
It will be for the ECJ to determine the compatibility of such legislation with the
Directive if it remains so broadly construed at the end of the transposition period.
54 See Ch. 14.
55 Article 19(2) of the Directive.
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the Directive does not set out procedural rights concerning expulsion, Member
States remain subject to the obligations on this point in Article 32 of the Geneva
Convention, which moreover contains similar substantive grounds concerning
the expulsion of refugees. Since EC asylum legislation must be, according to the
EC Treaty, “in accordance with the Geneva Convention”, such procedural pro-
tection should be considered as implicitly incorporated into the Directive. The
procedural rights implicit in the general principles of Community law support
the same conclusion,59 and furthermore could also potentially be relied upon to
claim further procedural rights not expressly referred to in the Geneva Conven-
tion, for example, the right to legal aid, to an interpreter, to notification of the
decision and to a fully reasoned decision. Moreover, the general principles of
Community law should confer identical procedural rights upon persons with
subsidiary protection status. This line of argument is supported by a recent judg-
ment of the Court of Justice in the context of the EC-Turkey association agree-
ment, which held that procedural rights to resist expulsion are inherent where
a substantive right to stay is set out.60 That judgment expressly extended this
reasoning to family members with a substantive right to stay as well, so the
same principle should apply to the family members of refugees and persons with
subsidiary protection.
Whereas the Directive provides that refugees should be granted access to
employment and vocational training immediately upon being granted refugee
status, those granted subsidiary protection status may be subject to prioritisa-
tion in the labour market for an undefined period of time. The vagueness of this
provision is unsatisfactory. Furthermore the differentiation between the treat-
ment of refugees and those with subsidiary protection status obviously will lead
to problems of social integration and is not compatible with the goal of tackling
social exclusion in the EU. Moreover, in general any distinction in the benefits
received by refugees and persons receiving subsidiary protection is highly ques-
tionable in light of the non-discrimination principle in Article 14 ECHR (com-
bined with Article 3 ECHR), Article 26 of the ICCPR and the right to equality
as protected by the general principles of Community law.
Finally, although the Directive does not set out any procedural rights to
dispute the withdrawal of benefits for refugees and stateless persons, the general
principles of Community law would support an argument than an implicit right
of access to court to dispute the denial of a benefit to persons with refugee or
subsidiary protection status or their family members must exist, with corollary
procedural rights such as legal representation and reasoned decisions.
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Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular points 1(c), 2(a) and 3(a) of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,
Whereas:
(2) The European Council at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 Octo-
ber 1999 agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum
System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (Geneva Con-
vention), as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967
(Protocol), thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring
that nobody is sent back to persecution.
(3) The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the inter-
national legal regime for the protection of refugees.
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(5) The Tampere conclusions also provide that rules regarding refugee status
should be complemented by measures on subsidiary forms of protection,
offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such protection.
(6) The main objective of this Directive is, on the one hand, to ensure that
Member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons gen-
uinely in need of international protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure
that a minimum level of benefits is available for these persons in all Member
States.
(7) The approximation of rules on the recognition and content of refugee and
subsidiary protection status should help to limit the secondary movements
of applicants for asylum between Member States, where such movement is
purely caused by differences in legal frameworks.
(8) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States should
have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for
third country nationals or stateless persons who request international pro-
tection from a Member State, where such a request is understood to be on
the grounds that the person concerned is either a refugee within the mean-
ing of Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention, or a person who otherwise
needs international protection.
(9) Those third country nationals or stateless persons, who are allowed to
remain in the territories of the Member States for reasons not due to a need
for international protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate
or humanitarian grounds, fall outside the scope of this Directive.
(10) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. In particular this Directive seeks to ensure full respect
for human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and
their accompanying family members.
(11) With respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this
Directive, Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of
international law to which they are party and which prohibit discrimina-
tion.
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(13) This Directive is without prejudice to the Protocol on asylum for nationals
of Member States of the European Union as annexed to the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community.
(15) Consultations with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
may provide valuable guidance for Member States when determining refu-
gee status according to Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.
(16) Minimum standards for the definition and content of refugee status should
be laid down to guide the competent national bodies of Member States in
the application of the Geneva Convention.
(19) Protection can be provided not only by the State but also by parties or
organisations, including international organisations, meeting the conditions
of this Directive, which control a region or a larger area within the territory
of the State.
(22) Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations are
set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations and are, amongst others, embodied in the United Nations Resolu-
tions relating to measures combating terrorism, which declare that “acts,
methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations” and that “knowingly financing, planning and
inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations”.
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(23) As referred to in Article 14, «status» can also include refugee status.
(24) Minimum standards for the definition and content of subsidiary protection
status should also be laid down. Subsidiary protection should be comple-
mentary and additional to the refugee protection enshrined in the Geneva
Convention.
(27) Family members, merely due to their relation to the refugee, will normally
be vulnerable to acts of persecution in such a manner that could be the
basis for refugee status.
(28) The notion of national security and public order also covers cases in which
a third country national belongs to an association which supports interna-
tional terrorism or supports such an association.
(30) Within the limits set out by international obligations, Member States may
lay down that the granting of benefits with regard to access to employment,
social welfare, health care and access to integration facilities requires the
prior issue of a residence permit.
(31) This Directive does not apply to financial benefits from the Member States
which are granted to promote education and training.
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(34) With regard to social assistance and health care, the modalities and detail
of the provision of core benefits to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
status should be determined by national law. The possibility of limiting
the benefits for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status to core benefits
is to be understood in the sense that this notion covers at least minimum
income support, assistance in case of illness, pregnancy and parental assis-
tance, in so far as they are granted to nationals according to the legislation
of the Member State concerned.
(35) Access to health care, including both physical and mental health care, should
be ensured to beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status.
(37) Since the objectives of the proposed Directive, namely to establish mini-
mum standards for the granting of international protection to third coun-
try nationals and stateless persons by Member States and the content of the
protection granted, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the Directive, be
better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures,
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of
the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in
that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to
achieve those objectives.
(38) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom has
notified, by letter of 28 January 2002, its wish to take part in the adoption
and application of this Directive.
(39) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, Ireland has notified, by
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letter of 13 February 2002, its wish to take part in the adoption and appli-
cation of this Directive.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down minimum standards for the quali-
fication of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons
who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted.
Article 2 Definitions
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Member States may introduce or retain more favourable standards for determin-
ing who qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection,
and for determining the content of international protection, in so far as those
standards are compatible with this Directive.
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CHAPTER II
ASSESSMENT OF APPLICATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon
as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for interna-
tional protection. In cooperation with the applicant it is the duty of the
Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application.
4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or seri-
ous harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious
indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such
persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.
5. Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty
of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection
and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by docu-
mentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation, when
the following conditions are met:
(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his applica-
tion;
(b) all relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted,
and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant ele-
ments has been given;
(c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and
do not run counter to available specific and general information rel-
evant to the applicant’s case;
(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest
possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for
not having done so; and
(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.
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(b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the ter-
ritory of the State;
(c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors mentioned in (a)
and (b), including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to
provide protection against persecution or serious harm as defined in Arti-
cle 7.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
CHAPTER III
QUALIFICATION FOR BEING A REFUGEE
1. Member States shall take the following elements into account when assess-
ing the reasons for persecution:
(a) the concept of race shall in particular include considerations of colour,
descent, or membership of a particular ethnic group;
(b) the concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of the-
istic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or absten-
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Article 11 Cessation
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
(c) has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the coun-
try of his or her new nationality; or
(d) has voluntarily re-established himself or herself in the country which
he or she left or outside which he or she remained owing to fear of
persecution; or
(e) can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he
or she has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue
to refuse to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of
nationality;
(f) being a stateless person with no nationality, he or she is able, because
the circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recog-
nised as a refugee have ceased to exist, to return to the country of
former habitual residence.
2. In considering points (e) and (f) of paragraph 1, Member States shall have
regard to whether the change of circumstances is of such a significant and
non-temporary nature that the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer
be regarded as well-founded.
Article 12 Exclusion
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CHAPTER IV
REFUGEE STATUS
Member States shall grant refugee status to a third country national or a state-
less person, who qualifies as a refugee in accordance with Chapters II and III.
2. Without prejudice to the duty of the refugee in accordance with Article 4(1)
to disclose all relevant facts and provide all relevant documentation at his/
her disposal, the Member State, which has granted refugee status, shall on
an individual basis demonstrate that the person concerned has ceased to be
or has never been a refugee in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of
a third country national or a stateless person, if, after he or she has been
granted refugee status, it is established by the Member State concerned
that:
(a) he or she should have been or is excluded from being a refugee in accor-
dance with Article 12;
(b) his or her misrepresentation or omission of facts, including the use of
false documents, were decisive for the granting of refugee status.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
4. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the status granted to a
refugee by a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body,
when:
(a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the
security of the Member State in which he or she is present;
(b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly seri-
ous crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State.
CHAPTER V
QUALIFICATION FOR SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION
Article 16 Cessation
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Section III – Asylum
Article 17 Exclusion
CHAPTER VI
SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION STATUS
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2. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the subsidiary protec-
tion status of a third country national or a stateless person granted by
a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, if after
having been granted subsidiary protection status, he or she should have
been excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance
with Article 17(3).
3. Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the subsidiary protec-
tion status of a third country national or a stateless person, if:
(a) he or she, after having been granted subsidiary protection status, should
have been or is excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection
in accordance with Article 17(1) and (2);
(b) his or her misrepresentation or omission of facts, including the use of
false documents, were decisive for the granting of subsidiary protec-
tion status.
CHAPTER VII
CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
1. This Chapter shall be without prejudice to the rights laid down in the
Geneva Convention.
2. This Chapter shall apply both to refugees and persons eligible for subsid-
iary protection unless otherwise indicated.
3. When implementing this Chapter, Member States shall take into account
the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied
minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents
with minor children and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape
or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence.
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Section III – Asylum
4. Paragraph 3 shall apply only to persons found to have special needs after an
individual evaluation of their situation.
5. The best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration for Member
States when implementing the provisions of this Chapter that involve
minors.
6. Within the limits set out by the Geneva Convention, Member States may
reduce the benefits of this Chapter, granted to a refugee whose refugee
status has been obtained on the basis of activities engaged in for the sole or
main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for being recognised as a
refugee.
3. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the residence
permit of (or to) a refugee to whom paragraph 2 applies.
Article 22 Information
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
2. Member States shall ensure that family members of the beneficiary of refu-
gee or subsidiary protection status, who do not individually qualify for such
status, are entitled to claim the benefits referred to in Articles 24 to 34, in
accordance with national procedures and as far as it is compatible with the
personal legal status of the family member.
In these cases, Member States shall ensure that any benefits provided guar-
antee an adequate standard of living.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not applicable where the family member is or would
be excluded from refugee or subsidiary protection status pursuant to Chap-
ters III and V.
5. Member States may decide that this Article also applies to other close rela-
tives who lived together as part of the family at the time of leaving the
country of origin, and who were wholly or mainly dependent on the benefi-
ciary of refugee or subsidiary protection status at that time.
1. As soon as possible after their status has been granted, Member States shall
issue to beneficiaries of refugee status a residence permit which must be
valid for at least three years and renewable unless compelling reasons of
national security or public order otherwise require, and without prejudice
to Article 21(3).
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Section III – Asylum
2. As soon as possible after the status has been granted, Member States shall
issue to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status a residence permit
which must be valid for at least one year and renewable, unless compelling
reasons of national security or public order otherwise require.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
1. Member States shall grant full access to the education system to all minors
granted refugee or subsidiary protection status, under the same conditions
as nationals.
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Section III – Asylum
core benefits which will then be provided at the same levels and under the
same eligibility conditions as nationals.
2. Member States shall ensure that the minor’s needs are duly met in the
implementation of this Directive by the appointed guardian or representa-
tive. The appropriate authorities shall make regular assessments.
3. Member States shall ensure that unaccompanied minors are placed either:
(a) with adult relatives; or
(b) with a foster family; or
(c) in centres specialised in accommodation for minors; or
(d) in other accommodation suitable for minors.
In this context, the views of the child shall be taken into account in accor-
dance with his or her age and degree of maturity.
4. As far as possible, siblings shall be kept together, taking into account the
best interests of the minor concerned and, in particular, his or her age and
degree of maturity. Changes of residence of unaccompanied minors shall
be limited to a minimum.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
care must be taken to ensure that the collection, processing and circulation of
information concerning those persons is undertaken on a confidential basis.
The Member States shall ensure that beneficiaries of refugee or subsidiary pro-
tection status have access to accommodation under equivalent conditions as
other third country nationals legally resident in their territories.
Member States shall allow freedom of movement within their territory to ben-
eficiaries of refugee or subsidiary protection status, under the same conditions
and restrictions as those provided for other third country nationals legally resi-
dent in their territories.
Article 34 Repatriation
CHAPTER VIII
ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Article 35 Cooperation
Member States shall each appoint a national contact point, whose address they
shall communicate to the Commission, which shall communicate it to the other
Member States.
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Section III – Asylum
Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, take all appropriate mea-
sures to establish direct cooperation and an exchange of information between
the competent authorities.
Article 36 Staff
Member States shall ensure that authorities and other organisations implement-
ing this Directive have received the necessary training and shall be bound by the
confidentiality principle, as defined in the national law, in relation to any infor-
mation they obtain in the course of their work.
CHAPTER IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 37 Reports
2. After presenting the report, the Commission shall report to the European
Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive at least
every five years.
Article 38 Transposition
1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 10 October
2006. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When the Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a refer-
ence to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the
occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such refer-
ence shall be laid down by Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provi-
sions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Direc-
tive.
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Chapter 13 Refugee Definition and Subsidiary Protection
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 40 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
365
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
1 Summary
The Directive on asylum procedures, agreed in principle in April 2004,1 as revised
in November 2004,2 and then formally adopted on 1 December 2005,3 lays down
the minimum procedural guarantees applicable for the granting and withdraw-
ing of refugee status. The UK and Ireland have opted in to the Directive, while
Denmark is automatically excluded from its application. Member States must
apply the Directive within two years after its adoption, so by 1 December 2007
(three years, or 1 December 2008, as regards the rules on legal aid).4
Article 3 defines the scope of the Directive, which is limited to the mini-
mum standards necessary for the granting and withdrawing of refugee status
under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. It does not include
determination of qualification under other international instruments or for per-
sons otherwise in need of protection, in particular “subsidiary protection” or
temporary protection, although Member States are obliged to apply the Direc-
tive it they apply a single procedure for determining refugee claims and claims
for subsidiary protection (Article 3(3)), and they may opt to apply the Direc-
tive to applications for any other kind of international protection (Article 3(4)).
Nor does the Directive explicitly set out any hierarchy between applications
for asylum and applications for subsidiary or temporary protection status.5 It
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 367-452.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section III – Asylum
includes any application for asylum made at the border or on the territory of a
Member State (Article 3(2)). Article 5 provides that Member States are free to
provide for more favourable standards on procedures.
The basic principles and guarantees of the procedures for assessing asylum
claims are contained in Chapter II of the Directive (Articles 6 to 22). Article 6
sets out how access to the procedure is to be ensured and Article 8(1) makes clear
that Member States should not reject or exclude applications on the grounds
that they have not been made as soon as possible, although this is “without
prejudice to” Article 23(4)(i), which provides that Member States might consider
an application “unfounded” if an applicant has failed without reasonable cause
to make an application earlier, where he or she had an opportunity to do so. But
it should be emphasised that the Directive makes clear that any “unfounded”
applications must still be assessed using the basic procedural standards set out
in Chapter II.
Procedures regarding family members and minors are provided for (Article
6(2) to (4)). Article 7 provides that applicants for asylum should be allowed to
remain at the border or in the territory until such time as an initial decision has
been made, with the exception of “subsequent applications” and cases where a
person is surrendered or extradited to another Member State, a non-EU State,
or an international criminal court or tribunal.
The requirements for the examination of applications are set out in Article
8, including the need for precise and up to date country of origin information,
the obligation to examine applications “individually, objectively and impartially”
and the necessity to ensure that decision makers have appropriate expertise.6
Articles 9 and 10 provides certain guarantees for applicants, including the
right to have a decision on the asylum application in writing, the right to have
reasons for a negative decision, the right to be informed of the procedure in a
language that it is “reasonably supposed” that they understand, a right to an
interpreter and a right to notification of decisions in a reasonable time. Articles
12 and 13 set out the procedures and conditions for personal interviews, with a
requirement that all applicants be given an interview with a number of excep-
tions. Article 15 provides the right to legal assistance and the circumstances in
which free legal assistance will be provided. Article 16 sets out the rights of
access to information that a legal adviser should have, along with rules on the
legal adviser’s access to the applicant and to interviews.
Article 17 provides the procedural guarantees for unaccompanied minors
including the right to a representative. Article 18 outlines the circumstances in
which an applicant for asylum may be detained. It makes clear that Member
6 There are some circumstances where a Member State can designate different
authorities to be involved in aspects of the asylum process (Article 4(2)), but these
authorities must nonetheless have “the appropriate knowledge or receive the neces-
sary training to fulfil their obligations” (Article 4(3)).
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States should not hold an applicant for asylum in detention for the sole reason
that he or she is an applicant for asylum. Article 18(2) further specifies that there
must be the possibility of “speedy judicial review” in detention cases. The agreed
Directive does not define the word “detention”.
Articles 19 and 20 outline the procedure in cases where an application for
asylum is explicitly or implicitly withdrawn. Article 21 provides for the role of
UNCHR including the right of access to detention facilities and information
on individual cases. Article 22 prohibits the disclosure of information to the
authorities of the country of origin.
Chapter III, Articles 23-35, is concerned with procedures at first instance
for asylum applications, including accelerated and inadmissibility procedures.
According to Articles 23, 24 and 28, Member States are permitted to have special
or accelerated procedures for a wide range of applications, including unfounded
claims, manifestly unfounded claims, admissibility claims, and repeat applica-
tions, along with two types of special procedures for applications made at the
borders. Article 25 sets out circumstances in which a claim may be rejected as
inadmissible, including applications for which there is another country which
can be considered as the first country of asylum to which applicant has been
admitted (Article 26) or a safe third country (Article 27). Article 27 allows states
to retain or introduce lists of designated safe third countries subject to certain
requirements.
Article 29 sets out the principle of a common EU list on “safe countries
of origin”, along with a procedure for adopting such a list. Article 30 permits
Member States to introduce or national laws regarding “safe countries of origin”.
These must be governed by the same principles as govern the adoption of the
EU common list (see Annex II), but there is a derogation for existing national
lists drawn up according to less stringent requirements (Article 30(2)).
Article 32 makes provision for Member States to have in place specific pro-
cedures derogating from the rules in Chapter II to deal with fresh applications
for asylum after a first application has been rejected or withdrawn, or failure
to go to reception centre or appear before authorities. Furthermore, Member
States may also derogate from the normal procedural rules to put in place par-
ticular procedures for border applications subject to certain safeguards, such
as the right to have access to legal assistance (Article 35). A further derogation
is allowed for border procedures where persons seek illegal entry (Article 36,
known informally as the “supersafe third countries” rule).
Chapter IV (Articles 37 and 38) sets out specific procedures concerning
withdrawal of refugee status. Chapter V (Article 39) sets out the appeals proce-
dure. The principle that applicants for asylum are entitled to an effective remedy
before a court or tribunal is affirmed. Member States must set out rules “where
appropriate” dealing with the question of the suspensive effect of appeals, or
the right to apply for protective measures in the absence of automatic suspen-
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Section III – Asylum
sive effect of appeals; these rules “must be in accordance with [Member States’]
international obligations” (Article 39(2)).
The final provisions are set out in Chapter VI (Articles 40-46). Apart from
the later date to transpose the provisions on legal aid (see above), a notable point
here is the temporal scope: the Directive only applies to applications (and to
procedures for withdrawal of status) made after the deadline for transposition.7
The Commission must report on the application of the Directive two years after
the transposition deadline (so by 1 December 2009), and then every two years
after that.
It is possible that the European Parliament (EP) will bring an annulment
action against the Directive for breach of the human rights protected as general
principles of Community law and for breach of other principles of EC consti-
tutional law (these relevant issues are discussed further below). The EP has until
late February 2006 to bring an action for annulment.
7 On the issue of the temporal scope of EC immigration and asylum law in general,
see Ch. 1.
8 COM (2000) 578, 20 Sep. 2000; OJ 2001 C 62 E/231.
9 SEC (1999) 271, 3 Mar. 1999.
10 Council doc. 11844/01, 20 Sep. 2001 (outcome of proceedings of the working party,
11 and 13 Sep. 2001).
11 Council doc. 11891/01, 17 Sep. 2001.
12 See drafts (Council docs. 14227/01, 21 Nov. 2001 and 14767/01, 3 Dec. 2001) and
final conclusions of the Council (Council doc. 15107/01, 7 Dec. 2001).
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13 Council doc. 15107/1/01, 18 Dec. 2001. See further details in room document Asile
13/01, 18 Oct. 2001, for the asylum working party on 22/23 Oct. 2001.
14 See Annex 5.
15 OJ 2002 C 77 E/94. Within the EP, the initial rapporteur called for highly conserva-
tive amendments that lacked significant support in committee, so a compromise
report (A5-0291/01) had to be drafted by Graham Watson, then the committee
chair.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
cerning the Directive. It was then necessary to reconsult the EP due to the signif-
icant changes made to the text since it was first adopted, and the EP took its time
completing this process, finally delivering its second opinion on 27 September
2005. It called for a number of significant changes to the text and, anticipating
that none of its suggested changes would be adopted, threatened possible legal
action against the Council if it adopted the Directive, due to its alleged breach
of human rights principles.18 The Council took no notice of the EP’s views, and
duly adopted the Directive on 1 December 2005.
Comparing the final Directive as adopted in 2005 to the 2002 version of the
Commission’s proposal, the Council made a number of substantial changes to
the text.19 The definitions clause was amended to narrow the personal scope of
the Directive to third-country nationals and stateless persons only, ie excluding
EU citizens.20 However, the definition of “final decision” was usefully clarified
to make clear that a “final decision” has not been taken until the final possible
appeal has been decided upon, regardless of whether an appeal has suspensive
effect.21 The definition of “withdrawal” of an application has also been clarified,
by reference to Directive 2004/83.22 Although there is no definition of “deten-
tion” in the final Directive,23 this simply means that it will be necessary for the
Court of Justice to develop its own interpretation of the term, if asked to inter-
pret Article 18 of the Directive, which addresses this issue. Finally, the defini-
tions clause in the Directive deleted a reference to remaining in an airport transit
zone as part of the definition of remaining on a Member State’s territory, but
the Directive should nonetheless be interpreted to include such zones as the rel-
evant definition is non-exhaustive.24
Also, the final Directive requires Member States which apply a “single
procedure” for applications for asylum and subsidiary protection as defined in
Directive 2004/83 to apply the provisions of the Directive throughout that pro-
cedure.25 A new clause was added on the definition of “responsible authorities”,
18 Such an action would be comparable to the action the EP brought against three
provisions of the family reunion Directive (Case C-540/03, EP v Council, opinion
of 8 Sept. 2005, pending); see Ch. 19.
19 See also Ackers, “The Negotiations on the Asylum Procedures Directive” 7 EJML
(2005) 1.
20 Compare the 2002 version to the final version of Arts. 2(b), (c), (d), (f) and (g).
21 Compare the 2002 version to the final version of Art. 2(d).
22 Compare the 2002 proposal, Art. 2(k), to the final Art. 2(j). The proposed Art. 2(l),
defining “annulment” of refugee status, was deleted.
23 See Art. 2(j) of the 2002 proposal.
24 Compare the 2002 proposal, Art. 2(m), to the final Art. 2(k).
25 Art. 3(3) of the final Directive.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
nicate in the alternative language used.36 Furthermore, Member States are only
obliged to make a “written report” of an interview, rather than a transcript, and
are not obliged to give access to this report before the determining authority
takes a first instance decision.37
Next, the final Directive amended the proposal as regards legal aid and
legal assistance.38 There is no longer an express provision that lawyers or com-
parable advisers can be consulted at the applicant’s own cost “at all stages of the
procedure”, although in the absence of a specific provision permitting Member
States to restrict access to certain stages of the procedure, it must be inferred
that there is nonetheless no temporal limit permitted.39 Legal aid is consider-
ably more restricted, as Member States are permitted to limit such aid only to
the first stage of appeal against a decision, and/or to limit aid to cases “where
the appeal or review is likely to succeed,” although in the latter case the legal aid
cannot be “arbitrarily restricted”. Member States can also set limits on the total
costs chargeable to legal aid, or set a limit based on comparison with legal aid
which their own nationals could receive. Also, the final Directive sets out fur-
ther exceptions to the disclosure of information to legal advisers and to advis-
ers’ access to their clients in detention centres and similar places, and no longer
requires Member States to allow legal advisers to attend the personal interview
with the applicant.
Member States have a number of possibilities to derogate from the obli-
gation to appoint a personal representative for an unaccompanied minor, and
there is further detail on the issue of medical examinations to determine the age
of the minor; an obligation to consider the “best interests of he child” in this
context was also added.40 A provision concerning establishing the facts in the
procedure was moved (in amended form) to Directive 2004/83.41
Detailed rules about detention of asylum applicants were dramatically
simplified,42 and a specific rule about detention pursuant to the Dublin rules
(“Dublin detention”) was dropped.43 The rules on explicitly and implicitly with-
36 Compare the 2002 proposal, Art. 11, to the final Art. 13.
37 Compare the 2002 proposal, Art. 12, to the final Art. 14.
38 Compare the 2002 proposal, Arts. 13-14, to the final Arts. 15-16.
39 The final Art. 15(1) permits access to advisers “on matters relating to [the appli-
cants’] asylum applications”; this wording is apt to cover every stage of the deter-
mination process. There is no reference to “national law” as regards the timing of
access to an adviser, or any other wording which would suggest that indirect restric-
tions on the access could be permitted.
40 Compare the 2002 proposal, Art. 15, to the final Art. 17.
41 Compare the 2002 proposal for the procedures Directive, Art. 16, to the final Art. 4
of Directive 2004/83.
42 Compare the 2002 proposal, Art. 17, to the final Art. 18.
43 Art. 18 of the 2002 proposal.
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Section III – Asylum
44 Compare Arts. 19 and 20 of the 2002 proposal and of the final Directive.
45 Compare Art. 22 of the 2002 proposal and of the final Directive.
46 Art. 23 of the 2002 proposal; see also Arts. 29 and 32 of the proposal.
47 Art. 24 of the 2002 proposal.
48 Art. 40 of the 2002 proposal.
49 However, express derogations were provided for in Art. 37(2) of the 2002 proposal
and implied derogations appeared in Arts. 33-35.
50 Art. 23(4) of the final Directive.
51 Art. 23(3) of the final Directive.
52 Arts. 23(2) and 39 of the final Directive.
53 See Arts. 23(1), (3) and (4) of the final Directive.
54 Art. 24 of the final Directive.
55 Art. 12(2)(c) of the final Directive, noted above.
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56 Compare Art. 28(2) of the final Directive to Art. 29 of the 2002 proposal. It follows
from Art. 23(1), (3) and (4) of the final Directive that the basic procedural guaran-
tees in Chapter II must still be observed even where a case is considered “manifestly
unfounded”.
57 Compare Art. 25(a) to (c) of the 2002 proposal to Art. 25(1) and (2)(b) and (c) of
the final Directive.
58 Art. 25(2)(a) and (d) to (g) of the final Directive.
59 Art. 25(d) and (e) of the 2002 proposal.
60 See Art. 7(2) of the final Directive, noted above.
61 Art. 26 of the 2002 proposal.
62 Art. 26 of the final Directive.
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Section III – Asylum
63 Compare Art. 27 and Annex I of the 2002 proposal to Art. 27(1) of the final Direc-
tive.
64 Compare Arts. 27(3), third sub-paragraph, and 28(1) of the 2002 proposal to Art.
27(2) of the final Directive.
65 Compare Art. 28(1)(b) of the 2002 proposal to Art. 27(3)(a) and (4) of the final
Directive.
66 Arts. 30 and 31 and Annex II of the 2002 proposal.
67 Art. 29 of the final Directive.
68 Art. 30 of the final Directive.
69 Compare Annex II to the 2002 proposal and to the final Directive.
70 Art. 30(2) to (4) of the final Directive.
71 Compare Art. 31 of the 2002 proposal to Art. 31 of the final Directive.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
clarified somewhat;72 the rules may also be applied in the event of a failure to
appear before the authorities or attend a reception centre.73 The special rules on
border procedures have been made more specific as regards the guarantees which
are applicable; there is a longer time limit (four weeks, rather than two weeks) to
make a decision before the normal rules in the Directive apply, and a possibility
of an indefinite suspension of the normal procedural rules in the event of a large
influx of persons.74 The rule on a second form of border procedure, with much
lower or non-existent procedural standards, was added during negotiations.75
Finally, the rules on withdrawal of status were amended so that only certain
procedural guarantees, rather than all of them, are applicable in such cases.76
The rules on appeals were amended to: specify in more detail which decisions
were covered by the right to an effective remedy,77 delete the express requirement
to consider the merits as well as the law in appeals;78 and to merge and simplify
the separate clauses on appeals in rhe regular and accelerated procedures, inter
alia weakening the standards on suspensive effect of appeals.79
As for the final provisions, the proposed Articles on non-discrimination
and penalties were removed,80 the provisions on appeal by national authorities
and on confidentiality were added,81 and the provisions on transposition were
amended to give Member States an extra year to apply the provisions on legal
aid and to specify that the Directive only applies to applications made after 1
December 2007.82
In conclusion, despite some minor improvements or clarification on specific
aspects, the standards of protection are significantly lower in the final Direc-
tive as compared to the Commission’s 2002 proposal, particularly as regards
appeals, exceptions from core procedural safeguards (especially legal aid and
personal interviews), the definition of “safe third country”, “first country of
72 Compare Arts. 33 and 34 of the 2002 proposal to Arts. 32 and 34 of the final Direc-
tive.
73 Art. 33 of the final Directive.
74 Compare Art. 35 of the 2002 proposal and of the final Directive.
75 Art. 36 of the final Directive.
76 Compare Art. 37 of the 2002 proposal to Art. 38 of the final Directive.
77 Compare Art. 38(1) and (3) of the 2002 proposal to Art. 39(1) of the final Direc-
tive.
78 Art. 38(2) of the 2002 proposal.
79 Compare Arts. 39 and 40 of the 2002 proposal to Art. 39(3) of the final Directive.
See also the specific provisions on other matters in Art. 39(4) and (6) of the Direc-
tive.
80 Arts. 42 and 43 of the 2002 proposal.
81 Arts. 40 and 41 of the final Directive.
82 Arts. 42 and 43 of the final Directive.
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Section III – Asylum
asylum” and “safe country of origin”, the mandatory list of “safe countries of
origin”, and the standards applicable to appeals.
3 Legal Analysis
Article 63(1)(d) EC is the legal base for this measure. Article 63(1)(d) specifically
provides for minimum standards for procedures for granting and withdrawal of
refugee status. As noted above, the Directive does not include procedures for
granting or withdrawing forms of subsidiary protection, despite the fact that
Directive 2004/83 on the definition of a person in need of international protec-
tion83 includes subsidiary protection and Article 63(2)(a) EC gives the EC the
power to adopt measures concerning subsidiary protection, which must logically
include the power to set out procedures for determining whether persons are in
need of such protection.
The major legal issues concern the compatibility of the Directive with inter-
national human rights law and the principles of the Geneva Convention itself.
The Directive makes no reference to international instruments other than the
Geneva Convention and instead invites Member States to apply the standards
set out in the Directive to applications for other kinds of protection (Article
3(4)). This would encompass the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT),
the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article
3 of the ECHR, concerning protection against torture or other inhuman or
degrading treatment. Whilst it is notable that there that no reference is made to
the standards set by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), although there is a reference in the preamble to the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the ECHR standards would clearly bind the Community
and the Member States in interpreting the Directive, due to the status of the
ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a major
source of the general principles of EC law.84
The failure to ensure that Member States apply the standards set by Article
3 ECHR may result in conflict between European Union law and the ECHR.
It will be recalled that the European Court of Human Rights in recent years
has examined the compatibility with Article 3 obligations of the removal of
an asylum seeker from one EU Member State to another EU Member State
where there was a difference in interpretation between those States on obliga-
tions under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and where the failure
to provide sanctuary for a person who feared persecution for non-State agents
might result in the expulsion of that person in breach of Article 3 ECHR.85
Whilst on the facts the Court declined to find the case admissible, it did not rule
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out the application of such principles in the future, and it did make clear that the
expelling Member State had to undertake an examination of the risk of further
removal from the second Member State to a location where there would be a real
risk of an Article 3 violation. It must follow that the same principles apply to
removal of an asylum-seeker from an EU Member State to a non-EU Member
State, regardless of whether the latter has ratified the ECHR or not.
Of course, there is well-known case law of the European Court of Human
Rights on the substantive protection conferred by the ECHR against expulsion
to an unsafe country, entailing liability on the removing State when there is a
sufficiently high risk that treatment in the receiving state will fall short of ECHR
standards.86 The case law has established clearly that such a “Soering effect”
applies whenever removal is sufficiently likely to result in a breach of the stan-
dards of Articles 2, 3 or 6 ECHR in the receiving State; the question of applica-
tion of a “Soering effect” to other ECHR provisions remain open.87
In addition to this substantive protection, the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights has indicated that there are a number of procedural
obligations inherent in Article 3 ECHR, which are incumbent upon States con-
sidering asylum applications. Although the Court has repeatedly held that the
standard system of judicial review applied in English law is adequate to meet
the “effective remedies” requirements of Article 13 ECHR, applied in conjunc-
tion with Article 3 ECHR,88 except where the usual standard is substantially
lower due to alleged security risks,89 it has criticised particular procedural rules
in other countries. In Jabari v Turkey,90 it stated that the ECHR will be violated
if there is no consideration of the merits of an asylum request for procedural
reasons, where there is also no suspensive effect of an appeal or consideration of
the merits on appeal. More broadly, States have obligations to ensure “indepen-
dent and rigorous scrutiny” of claims, entailing the “possibility of suspending”
a removal.
The Court returned to some of these issues in the judgment in Conka v Bel-
gium, stating that Article 13 ECHR would be breached if national authorities
carry out an expulsion before it is determined whether that expulsion is com-
patible with the ECHR, and ruling that the Belgian system denying suspensive
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Section III – Asylum
effect (but permitting an application to a court which might grant it) was in
particular a breach of Article 13.91 Although this judgment concerned collective
expulsions, not Article 3 ECHR, there seems no reason to doubt its applicability
to Article 3, given the Court’s reference to the Jabari judgment by analogy and
the status of Article 3 as a non-derogable right, and one of the most impor-
tant rights protected by the ECHR. It is therefore incompatible with Article 13
ECHR to execute a deportation order before the Article 3 claim has been exam-
ined on appeal. Moreover, it is clear from the Court’s judgment that a system
providing for a discretionary grant of suspensive effect upon application is not
sufficient, as only automatic suspensive effect will satisfy the requirements of the
Convention. The overload of the courts and the “risks of abuse of process” are
not sufficient reasons to convince the Court otherwise.
Apart from the suspensive effect of appeals, what other procedural rights are
conferred by the ECHR as implicit elements of Article 3? It is clear from Jabari
that an absolute and rigid time-limit for presenting applications is a procedural
defect that violates Article 3 ECHR, although it might be remedied if the merits
of a case were nonetheless considered in an appeal which entailed suspensive
effect. Other procedural issues were considered in a decision of the European
Human Rights Commission in Hatami v Sweden,92 a case subsequently settled.
In this case, the government rejected an asylum application, inter alia on the
grounds that the applicant’s story about his transit route. The Commission con-
cluded that a government refusal to recognise a refugee due to alleged inconsis-
tencies resulting from a short interview conducted with inadequate interpretation
facilities, resulting only in a short report lacking any detail and not explained to
the applicant, led to a breach of Article 3 EHCR due to inadequate procedural
safeguards in the State concerned. Moreover, the Commission explicitly placed
great stress on the medical evidence presented by an applicant, where it is con-
sistent with the applicant’s statements concerning torture. It is also clear that,
to avoid an Article 3 violation, instead of an obsessive focus by the authorities
on alleged inconsistencies concerning an applicant’s travel, the asylum determi-
nation process should focus on an applicant’s assertions concerning the threat
of torture, derived from an applicant’s “political affiliations…and his activities,
his history of detention and ill-treatment”. Finally, the Commission made the
important general observation that “complete accuracy is seldom to be expected
by victims of torture”. In a later case, the Human Rights Court ruled that lack
of credibility in an applicant’s story regarding his or her transit should be over-
looked where there was nonetheless a sufficiently strong argument that Article 3
risk would materialise upon return to the country of origin.93
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“with deep regret that the most contentious provisions are all intended to deny
asylum seekers access to asylum procedures...we are concerned about the effect
that this abdication from international law obligations will have on refugee pro-
tection within the EU and elsewhere, as well as on the EU’s credibility in the
international refugee and human rights debate” 94.
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Section III – Asylum
list of “European safe third countries” which the Council shall adopt pursuant
to Article 36, since Member States are not obliged by the Directive to apply the
“European safe third countries” concept at all.
Secondly, it is strongly arguable that the adoption of common lists of “safe
countries of origin” pursuant to Article 29(2) of the Directive and of “European
safe third countries” pursuant to Article 36(3) of the Directive should be subject
to the full legislative procedure – which, following the adoption of the Directive,
is co-decision with the European Parliament – rather than a simplified proce-
dure for the adoption of implementing measures. This is because the adoption
of such lists is an “essential element” of the subject-matter to be regulated, and
the Court of Justice has always made clear that the essential elements of an issue
cannot be the subject of implementing measures, but must be the subject of the
full legislative process.97 The relevant provisions are therefore invalid for breach
of an essential procedural requirement.
Even if the EP chooses not to challenge the validity of the “common list”
provisions on the grounds of lack of competence or breach of an essential pro-
cedural requirement within the deadline, it will be open to persons subjected to
either list when adopted, or to NGOs that wish to challenge the adoption of the
list, to challenge the validity of the list in the national courts on such grounds,
alongside any challenge that might be made to the legality of all or part of the
list on substantive grounds (see discussion below).98
4 Comments
4.1 Introduction
The procedures and appeals for determination of asylum applications are criti-
cal to the safety and acceptability of any system of protection. The key to a
fair system of asylum in Europe lies in the adequacy of the procedures and the
integrity of the officials applying it. The Directive is focused on measures for a
system to deal with asylum applications. A large proportion of the Directive is
dedicated to permitting Member States to set up a system for dealing quickly
with inadmissible and unfounded cases, and furthermore permitting them to set
mum standards” because it does not leave to Member States an unlimited power to
disregard the “safe country of origin” concept entirely, or to disapply the concept
permanently to some countries on the list.
97 Case law beginning with Case 25/70 Koster [1970] ECR 1161. See by analogy the
Opinion in Case C-392/95 EP v Council [1997] ECR I-3213, which argued that any
change in the list of countries whose nationals had to have a visa to enter all EU
Member States was a sufficiently essential change to require reconsultation of the
EP on the proposed legislation.
98 For examples of such challenges brought through the national courts, see Case C-
491/01 BAT [2002] ECR I-11453 (lack of competence) and Case C-408/95 Eurotun-
nel [1997] ECR I-6315 (breach of procedural requirements).
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up special systems that do not expressly even have to comply with all (or in one
case, any) procedural safeguards.
Research demonstrates that the “frontloading” of decision making in an
asylum system, including high quality decision making and adequate legal rep-
resentation at an early stage of the process, leads to more efficient and effective
decision making and a more coherent and fair asylum system.99 To the extent
that the Directive requires Member States to ensure such frontloading, it will
undoubtedly be of practical use to representatives who struggle with increas-
ingly deficient national asylum procedures.
4.2 Scope
The Directive does not, as proposed by the Commission, address the issue of
procedural safeguards in relation to decision-making under the Dublin II Regu-
lation.100 This is unfortunate, since the procedural rules in that Regulation are
limited and potentially in breach of human rights law, because of the lack of a
guarantee that an argument concerning an Article 3 “chain deportation” breach
in the responsible Member State has to be heard by the removing Member
State.101 However, it should logically follow that the Directive does apply to
the initial processing of an application which proves to fall within the scope of
the Dublin II Regulation, until it is ascertained that the Regulation potentially
applies. Moreover, it is beyond any doubt that once a Dublin transfer takes place
and the responsible Member State begins examining the asylum application, it
is bound by the rules in this Directive. This will include any designation of a
“safe third country” or any other removal to a third country by the respon-
sible Member State; on this point, the reference to purely “national law” in the
Dublin II Regulation must be regarded as overtaken by the rules on removal
to third countries in this Directive as from the deadline to apply the latter,102
by application of the lex posteriori principle. By the same token, this Directive,
including the criteria for removal to third countries, would also apply where a
Member State decides to remove a person to a third country rather than transfer
an applicant to another Member State which would be responsible under the
Dublin II rules. As for the Dublin II process itself, it should be recalled that it is
still subject to the “effective remedies” principles of Community law.
As noted above, the Directive does not cover procedures for persons who
make claims for “subsidiary protection” in a Member State, except to the extent
that a Member State applies a single procedure for determining such claims
and claims for Geneva Convention refugee status, even though such persons
99 Crawley, “Breaking Down the Barriers: A Report on the Conduct of Asylum Inter-
views at Ports” (ILPA, 1999).
100 See para. 29 of the preamble.
101 See T.I. v UK (n. xx above), and further discussion in Ch. 10.
102 See Art. 3(3) of Reg. 343/2003 (OJ 2003 L 50/1).
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Section III – Asylum
103 See the Commission communication on a single procedure (COM (2004 503, 15
July 2004; see also SEC (2004) 937, 15 July 2004) and Council conclusions (JHA
Council, 25 and 26 Oct. 2004).
104 See Ch. 13; furthermore the family reunion directive applies to refugees’ family
members, but not the family members of those with subsidiary protection (see Ch.
19).
105 See Art. 2(b) of the Directive.
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106 See Arts. 9(2), 25(2)(d) and (e) and 39(5), which allow derogations from various pro-
visions where the applicant has “a status, which offers the same rights and benefits
under national and Community law as the refugee status by virtue of Council Direc-
tive 2004/83/EC” (Arts. 9(2) and 39(5)) or where the applicant “has been granted a
status equivalent to the rights and benefits of the refugee status by virtue of Council
Directive 2004/83/EC” (Art. 25(2)).
107 See s. 4.3 below, as regards the interpretation of the “first country of asylum” con-
cept.
108 Art. 2(e) of that Directive (see Ch. 13), emphasis added. See also the preamble to
that Directive, points 2 (“full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention”),
3 (the Geneva Convention is the “cornerstone of the international legal regime for
the protection of refugees”) and 5 (subsidiary protection status is “complementary”
to Convention refugee status).
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tion other than that emanating from the Geneva Convention for third-country
nationals or stateless persons who are found not to be refugees.” 109
The next point about the scope to consider is the exclusion of EU citizens.
Since Article 63(1)(d) EC is not limited in scope to third-country nationals, it is
arguable that the failure to adopt a measure concerning asylum procedures for
EU citizens within the five year time limit applying to that provision is a breach
of a Treaty obligation. Member States remain bound by their commitments
under the Geneva Convention and under the ECHR to any EU citizens applying
for asylum or otherwise in need of protection from another Member State.110
Finally, it should be emphasised that the Directive does not provide for
any grounds to suspend consideration of asylum applications when a Member
State wishes to apply a national “temporary protection” scheme. There is sepa-
rate Community legislation allowing for the adoption of a Community-wide
temporary protection scheme, which authorises Member States to suspend con-
sideration of asylum applications from the groups of persons covered by the
scheme for as long as it is applicable.111 Since the asylum procedures Directive
contains no provision suggesting that this prior Directive has been repealed, it
should be assumed that it continues in force and, if applied, could still justify
the suspension of consideration of asylum applications. But in the absence of
anything in the temporary protection Directive or the asylum procedures Direc-
tive that would suggest that any derogations are permitted for purely national
temporary protection regimes, it follows that no national temporary protection
regime which authorises the suspension of examination of asylum applications
is permitted. This interpretation is consistent with other EC asylum legislation.
112
In fact, it is further arguable that the temporary protection Directive by itself
precludes any national temporary protection scheme;113 the other EC asylum
109 Art. 3(4) of that Directive (see Ch. 12), emphasis added. See also the preamble to
that Directive, points 2 (“full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention”).
The “exceptional” nature of temporary protection as compared to the Geneva Con-
vention (see Ch. 15) also supports this interpretation.
110 See further Ch. 13 on this issue. It should also be noted that Art. 307 EC obliges
Member States to give precedence to international treaties concluded before their
EC membership in the event of a conflict with EC law; this obliges Member States
to apply the Geneva Convention rather than the Protocol to the EC Treaty on
asylum for Member States’ nationals, which purports to oblige Member States not
to consider such applications.
111 See Art. 17 of Directive 2001/55 (see Ch. 15).
112 See Art. 3(3) of Directive 2003/9 on reception conditions for asylum-seekers, which
specifies that this Directive is inapplicable when Directive 2001/55 applies, but makes
no derogation at all regarding any national temporary protection scheme (see Ch.
12). Nor does Directive 2004/83 (see Ch. 13) make any derogation for national tem-
porary protection schemes.
113 See further Ch. 15.
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Section III – Asylum
because the “safe country of origin” or “safe third country” rule applies, the
applicant’s statements are inter alia contradictory, the application is a repeat
application with no new elements involved, or the applicant is simply trying
to delay the application of an expulsion decision. It is submitted that Article
12(2)(c) is quite simply invalid for breach of the fundamental rights protected
as general principles of Community law. The importance of effective procedural
rights in asylum cases, in particular in the context of interviews with an asylum
applicant, has been emphasised repeatedly in the case law of the Strasbourg
organs, especially in the Commission decision in Hatami excerpted above. Since
the Directive does not require Member States to hold any other interview with
the applicant or lay down standards relating to the prior information submitted
by the applicant prior to the personal interview where Article 12(2)(c) applies
(compare with Article 12(2)(b), read with Articles 13(5) and 14(4)), then there
would be no effective procedural safeguard at all ensuring that an applicant is
able to submit a full statement of the circumstances of his or her case in the
absence of a personal interview. This is particularly questionable in light of the
possibility of a suspension of the suspensive effect of an appeal, which is espe-
cially likely to be the case where an application is covered by the derogation from
a personal interview, given also the lack of a right to legal aid before the initial
negative decision by the authorities, and the lack of an opportunity to make
comments in lieu (as provided for in Article 12(3) of the Directive). The dero-
gation is also contradictory (and therefore particularly likely to be invalid) as
regards: the “safe country of origin” and “safe third country” exceptions, where
Member States are particularly obliged to examine the individual circumstances
of the applicant according to the express wording of the Directive; the “contra-
dictory statements” exception, where the personal interview would provide an
opportunity for the applicant to clarify any apparent inconsistency, and where
the Hatami case particularly shows the danger of national authorities’ over-
reliance on this exception; and the “expulsion” exception, where the Directive
requires the authorities to decide upon the subjective intentions of the applicant
(“the applicant is making an application merely in order to…”), an issue which
cannot be properly determined without a personal interview.
It might be argued that Article 12(2)(c) is valid because of the procedural
“safeguard” that the interview can only be skipped following a full examina-
tion of the information available, and the further “safeguard” in Article 12(5)
that the lack of a personal interview shall not adversely affect the decision on
the application. As to the first “safeguard”, it is not sufficiently effective in the
absence of any rules on prior contact with the applicant, the information sub-
mitted by the applicant and the absence of a right to prior legal aid or to submit
comments in lieu of the interview.
As to the second “safeguard”, it appears to be inspired by the surreal adven-
tures of Alice in Wonderland. One might as well provide in an EU Framework
Decision that “[t]he absence of a trial shall not adversely affect a court’s deci-
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
115 See, for example, the judgments in Airey v Ireland (A-32) and Steel and Morris v
UK, judgment of 15 Feb. 2005, not yet reported.
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Section III – Asylum
be removed before ever having been able to invoke the right to legal aid. As for
the limitation to cases which are “likely to succeed”, it is also questionable, par-
ticularly in the absence of any requirement for objective and high-quality deci-
sions on legal aid applications, or for any procedural rights in relation to such
applications. Again this limitation is particularly questionable where there is no
suspensive effect of an appeal; and obviously the two limitations are particularly
questionable if applied together, especially if an appeal has no suspensive effect.
It must follow that the limitations must either be considered invalid, or subject
to an implied condition that they can only be applied where an appeal has sus-
pensive effect; and furthermore, that there are implied procedural rights and
decision-making standards in respect of legal aid application decisions.
One technical issue regarding the legal aid clause is its precise temporal
scope. While the Directive as a whole only applies to applications made after 1
December 2007, the legal aid clause only applies from 1 December 2008; but the
clause is not limited in scope to applications made after the latter date. It must
follow that the legal aid clause applies to applications made after 1 December
2007, even though the right to legal aid pursuant to the Directive cannot be
invoked until after 1 December 2008. In other words, the legal aid clause applies
to applications pending on 1 December 2008, as long as those applications were
initially made after 1 December 2007.
As for detention, the Directive does preclude detention of all asylum-seek-
ers, but does not preclude the detention of specific categories of asylum-seek-
ers or provide for any protection against detention other than the requirement
for speedy judicial review. It is arguable that the general principles of Commu-
nity law incorporate the full panoply of protections regarding detention set out
in Article 5 ECHR and the ICCPR.116 So the Directive cannot be interpret to
permit detention for administrative purposes or any other purposes which are
incompatible with ECHR or ICCPR standards.117
116 For a detailed examination and comparison of the ICCPR and ECHR jurispru-
dence, see Wilsher, “Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees and International
Human Rights Law” in Shah, ed., The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (Cav-
endish, 2005) 145.
117 See Saadi v UK, pending before the European Court of Human Rights (admissibil-
ity decision of 27 Sep. 2005, not yet reported).
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
118 In the absence of a reference to national law, the starting point for calculating this
period must be established on the basis of uniform Community rules (see Ch. 1). It
makes sense to calculate the time from the date when the application was lodged.
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Section III – Asylum
Chapter II. This is explicitly clear as regards the “safe third country” concept.119
At first sight, the wording of Article 27(4) arguably suggests the opposite inter-
pretation, since it states that where a “safe third country” refuses to accept the
return of an asylum-seeker, a Member State must consider the application in
accordance with the Chapter II guarantees. But this can only mean that in such
cases, Member States must consider the substance of the application in accor-
dance with the Chapter II guarantees; those guarantees are still applicable up
to the point of any decision on inadmissibility on “safe third country” grounds,
since Article 23(4) expressly states so, and since it would not be necessary to
provide for a possible exception to the personal interview in “safe third country”
cases in Article 12(2)(c) of the Directive unless the Chapter II guarantees would
otherwise be applicable to such cases.
It is true that Article 28(2) goes on to specify that Member States may
optionally consider that a case is “manifestly unfounded” under any of the cir-
cumstances set out in Article 23(4). But this still does not permit Member States
to derogate from the standards set out in Chapter II. This interpretation follows
a contrario from the wording of Articles 12(2)(c) and 24, which indicate that
where the drafters of the Directive wanted to permit Member States to dero-
gate from Chapter II standards, they did so expressly. It also follows from the
wording of Article 28(2), which refers expressly back to Article 23(4), which in
turn explicitly sets out that the standards in Chapter II still apply to accelerated
procedures.
It might be argued that the discretion left to Member States by Articles
23(4) and 28(2) would be rendered meaningless if they were not free to derogate
from Chapter II standards under these circumstances. But Member States would
still be free to provide for swifter time-limits on decision-making, as Article 23(4)
foresees, along perhaps with simplified decision-making, as long as the Chapter
II guarantees are still met. It would also be possible to provide for fewer levels
of appeal or special procedures for bringing appeals (time limits, for example),
again as long as the basic Chapter V guarantees are met.
This interpretation is also consistent with respect for the human rights
guaranteed by the general principles of EU law. As argued above (as regards
administrative procedures) and below (as regards judicial appeals), the mini-
mum standards set by the Directive are already to some extent suspect in light
of international human rights law and any derogations from them are even more
suspect. The derogations must therefore be interpreted narrowly. A narrow inter-
pretation of any derogations will also ensure a greater degree of harmonisation
and would therefore best ensure that the Directive contributes toward the cre-
ation of a Common European Asylum System and contribute to the objective
119 Art. 23(4)(c), second indent, makes such applications subject to the Chapter II guar-
antees, because it is subject to the general rule that those guarantees apply to all of
the special cases listed in Art. 23(4).
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
of avoiding secondary movement of asylum seekers. Look at the issue the other
way around: if Member States were free to derogate from any of the procedural
rights, and/or the appeal rights, in the Directive, where any of the fifteen cir-
cumstances listed in Article 23(4) apply, or indeed in any circumstance at all (if
Article 23(3) is interpreted to grant Member States carte blanche to apply accel-
erated procedures in any circumstances), then the Directive would be largely or
wholly deprived of any meaning whatsoever.
For the same reasons, it must be concluded that Article 24 sets out an
exhaustive list of cases in which Member States can derogate from Chapter II as
regards asylum applications. Although Article 24 does not expressly state that
the three circumstances listed therein are the only cases in which Member States
can derogate from Chapter II (along with the express derogation permitted by
Article 12(2)(c)), this follows from the structure of the Directive and the refer-
ence to the Chapter II guarantees in Article 23(1), (3) and (4); it also follows from
human rights considerations and the objectives of creating a Common European
Asylum System (CEAS) and avoiding secondary movements of asylum-seekers.
Similarly, there can be little doubt that Article 28(2) sets out an exhaustive list
of cases (all those listed in Article 23(4)) which Member States can designate as
“manifestly unfounded”, given the absence of any wording to suggest that this is
a non-exhaustive list and the human rights and CEAS context.
On the other hand, it appears that Article 23(4) is not an exhaustive list of
the circumstances in which Member States can accelerate consideration of an
application to the asylum-seeker’s detriment, given that Article 23(3) states that
“Member States may prioritise or accelerate any application”, and in light of the
broad wording of recital 11 of the preamble.
Moving on to the question of inadmissible cases, the same question again
arises: are the grounds set out in Article 25 an exhaustive list of cases which
Member States can declare inadmissible? Here a recital in the preamble suggests
strongly that the list is exhaustive.120 Again, this interpretation is bolstered by
the human rights and CEAS context, and the objective of avoiding secondary
movements. There is no doubt that the list of such cases set out in Article 25(2)
is optional (“Member States may”). Furthermore, although Article 25(1) does
not expressly specify whether inadmissibility in accordance with the Dublin II
Regulation is optional or not, the Regulation itself does not expressly state that
applications made in the “wrong” Member State must be considered inadmis-
sible, and indeed the Regulation provides for Member States to opt to consider
applications that are not their responsibility.121 As noted above, the procedural
standards in Chapter II must apply to the consideration of admissibility in all
120 Recital 22: “Member States should examine all applications on the substance…
except where this Directive provides otherwise”. See further recitals 23 and 24,
which refer to further exceptions expressly set out in the Directive.
121 Arts. 3(2) and 15 of the Reg. (n. 102 above).
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Section III – Asylum
these cases (except where Article 12(2)(c) permits a derogation relating to inter-
views as regards “safe third countries”).
Turning to the categories of cases in which Member States may treat appli-
cations as inadmissible, the first category (another Member State granting
refugee status) is unobjectionable as long as the other Member State is in fact
complying with Directive 2004/83 and granting the refugee full access to social
and economic benefits as prescribed by that Directive. In the event of a failure
by an national legislature to apply those provisions of that Directive correctly,
and a failure by its national courts to give effect to the relevant provisions of that
Directive (which are directly effective),122 or to refer relevant questions to the
Court of Justice (if possible), then the case might be made that another Member
State must consider the substance of an application for recognition of refugee
status. A question might also arise if a first Member State recognised refugee
status before the deadline to apply Directive 2004/83, and takes the view that
the economic and social benefits set out in that Directive can be denied to refu-
gees because that Directive is limited in temporal scope. As argued elsewhere,
that interpretation of the temporal scope of Directive 2004/83 is wrong,123 and
moreover such a denial of benefits would likely entail a breach of the Geneva
Convention; so again it could be argued that, if the mistake cannot be resolved
by the courts of the first Member State, if necessary with a reference to the
Court of Justice, another Member State has to consider an asylum application
from the person concerned.
The second category (a non-Member State which is a first country of
asylum) is described in Article 26. The wording of Article 25(2)(b) (“pursuant
to Article 26”) suggests that Article 26 sets out the only grounds upon which a
non-EU state can be considered a first country of asylum. There are two alterna-
tive grounds for inadmissibility: the previous recognition of refugee status, if it
can still be availed of, or the enjoyment of “sufficient protection”. In either case,
the principle can only apply if the person “will” be readmitted to the country.
Each of these criteria are absolute, in the sense that their existence clearly must
be proved; a reasonable assumption is not sufficient. It is not specified what hap-
pens if the criteria are not satisfied (for example, if the person is not readmit-
ted),124 but it logically follows that the examination of the asylum application
must continue on the merits. Also, it is specified that Member States may option-
ally take account of the criteria for “safe third country”, as set out in Article
27(1) when applying this principle; this entails that there is no persecution on
Geneva Convention grounds, non-refoulement in accordance with the Conven-
tion, non-removal in breach of Article 3 ECHR and (adapting Article 27(1)(d))
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
refugee status granted in accordance with the Geneva Convention. But in any
case, whether a Member State chooses this option or not, the ground of inadmis-
sibility relating to prior recognition of refugee status can only apply where the
non-EU state has ratified the Geneva Convention and recognised the person’s
status pursuant to it in practice, including granting all of the economic, social
and other benefits set out in Directive 2004/83 at the minimum level required by
that Directive; this clearly follows from the definition of “refugee” in Article 2(f)
of the procedures Directive.
As for the other ground of inadmissibility in this category (the grant of
“sufficient protection”), there is no definition of this concept in the Directive,
but there is no reference to national law either. Given the importance of the
concept in determining the scope of a derogation from the central rule that each
Member State must consider the merits of an asylum application, the concept
must surely be understood to have a uniform meaning in Community law.125 It
must expressly include the principle of non-refoulement, and in the absence of
any other indication this concept must logically be understood as identical to
the Geneva Convention interpretation of non-refoulement; it also follows from
the general principles of EC law (and in particular, the application of the T.I.
decision) that the non-EU state in question must ensure non-removal in line
with ECHR standards (even if that state has not ratified the ECHR). But the
word “including” means that non-refoulement is only one component of “suf-
ficient protection”, indicating that other guarantees must be present; while on
the other hand the word “otherwise” indicates that protection falling short of
that guaranteed by the Geneva Convention would be “sufficient” to consider a
non-EU state as a “first country of asylum”. So what level of treatment should
be considered “sufficient”?
It is unfortunate that the Directive does not use the term “effective protec-
tion”, which has been the subject of attempts to distil its inherent meaning.126
But before considering what “sufficient protection” might mean, it is necessary
to consider to what extent the ECHR permits persons to be removed to another
country, and to what extent Geneva Convention permits applications for asylum
to be dismissed as inadmissible on the grounds that another country is respon-
sible.
The starting point is to assume that the Geneva Convention requires States
in principle to consider applications for recognition of refugee status pursuant
to the Convention submitted to them, leaving aside for now the question of the
precise territorial scope of that obligation (ie, if it applies only on the territory
of the State, or also at the borders, in international territory or on the territory
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Section III – Asylum
of another State). Although the Geneva Convention does not expressly set out
such an obligation, it must surely be assumed that it flows implicitly from the
Convention. Otherwise States would be free to subvert the Convention entirely,
by refusing to consider any applications for recognition of refugee applications
and so never extending the benefits of refugee status to any persons who meet
the definition set out in the Convention. This interpretation cannot possibly have
been the intention of the Convention’s drafters; it would render the Convention
not just of limited effect but entirely nugatory. So in principle, States have to
consider applications for asylum submitted to them.
But when might exceptions to this principle be admitted? On the most
generous interpretation, there are no exceptions at all: the Geneva Convention
requires each State to examine any application for asylum made to it, even if the
applicant has received recognition of refugee status fully in accordance with the
Geneva Convention from another country or if another country applying the
Convention fully has examined the claim and turned it down. If this is correct,
Articles 26 and 27 of this Directive and the Dublin II Regulation are invalid.
Next, it could be argued that the principle of examining all applications can be
waived, but only in the case of recognition of refugee status fully in accordance
with the Geneva Convention from another country. This would justify Article
26(1)(a) of the Directive, but not the rest of Articles 26 or 27. Alternatively, it
could be argued that the obligation to examine applications for asylum could
also be waived if the key elements of refugee status, in particular the non-refoule-
ment principle and basic economic and social rights, have been recognised in
another country. This would justify Article 26(1)(b) of the Directive, depend-
ing on the interpretation of “sufficient protection”, but not Article 27. Next, it
could be argued that the obligation could also be waived where the person could
have sought Convention refugee status in another country he or she is linked to
(the more stringent form of the “safe third country” principle). Following that,
it could be argued that the obligation could even be waived where the person
could have sought Convention refugee status in another country he or she was
not linked to. Finally, it could be argued that the only real obligation upon States
is the principle of non-refoulement, and so a person could be removed anywhere
at all, regardless of the possibility to seek Convention refugee status, as long as
the non-refoulement principle is complied with. A final extreme interpretation
can be imagined – that States need not even consider the non-refoulement prin-
ciple when removing a person claiming to be a refugee, without considering their
claim – but this obviously must be rejected as it clearly contradicts any plausible
interpretation of Article 33 of the Convention, to say nothing of other sources
of law.
A seminal article by Legomsky, after an exhaustive analysis of the issue, con-
cludes that the “first country of asylum” and “safe third country” principles can
only apply where there is: an agreement to readmit the person in the other State
and to accord that person a fair refugee status determination or other “effective
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
protection”; no Convention fear of persecution for the person in the other State;
no risk of refoulement from the other State; no risk of removal from the other
State to face a violation of the other rights in the Geneva Convention; no risk of
violation of any human rights protected by a treaty to which the removing State
is a party; willingness and ability in the other State to provide effective protection
for as long is the person is a refugee or can find another source of durable effec-
tive protection; no violation of the person’s right to family unity; and an appli-
cation of these principles on an individual basis, including suspensive effect of
appeals.127 In light of this detailed and convincing analysis, it should be accepted
by the national courts and the Court of Justice that “sufficient protection” for
the purposes of Article 26 must be interpreted in accordance with these guar-
antees. Furthermore, since these principles should be regarded as incorporated
within the general principles of Community law, the application of the “safe
third country” principle can only be justified where the principles are satisfied,
even though the standards in Article 27(1) of the Directive fall short of the prin-
ciples. In any event, it should be observed that Article 27(1) does not fully list the
provisions of the ECHR to which a “Soering effect” definitely applies, as does
not prevent removal to face the death penalty or a manifestly unfair trial.128 On
the other hand, Article 27(1)(b) should be interpreted as requiring ratification of
the Geneva Convention and a correct application of the non-refoulement clause
of the Convention by the third country concerned, for only in such a case could
that country be considered to ensure respect for that principle “in accordance
with the Geneva Convention”. Also, since the principle is a derogation from the
normal procedural standards applicable to asylum-seekers, Member States are
not free to set lower standards for the “safe third country” concept than those
applicable in the Directive.
As for the application of the principle to individual cases, Article 27(2)
refers to national legislation, but given the importance of the principle to the
central objectives of the Directive, there must nonetheless be some degree of
uniform Community interpretation limiting the extent of Member States’ dis-
cretion.129 The requirement of a “reasonable” connection with a third country
implies an objective test, but applied to the subjective circumstances of each
applicant (“for that person to go to that country”). It follows that there must
be a significant degree of connection with the country concerned, and so it will
rarely if ever be justified to apply the principle in the absence of a close family
connection or a lengthy prior stay there. Conversely it would in any event be
unreasonable to apply the principle where the applicant has closer links, such as
127 Legomsky, “Secondary Refugee Movments and the Return of Asylum Seekers to
Third Countries: the Meaning of Effective Protection” 15 IJRL (2003) 567 at 673-
675.
128 See the case law beginning with the judgments cited in n. 88 above.
129 See Ch. 1
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Section III – Asylum
family, cultural and language links with the Member State seeking to rely on the
principle, or where there are compassionate grounds for that person to remain in
that Member State, justifying consideration of the asylum application there.
The requirement that the authorities must assess either the safety of the
individual applicant and/or the general safety of the countries concerned is
invalid to the extent that Member States are permitted to examine only one of
these issues. A failure to consider the safety of the particular applicant would be
a breach of the non-refoulement principle of the Geneva Convention, and the
failure to consider the general safety of the country concerned is at least dubious
in light of that principle. Article 27(2)(c) correctly applies the T.I. decision of the
European Court of Human Rights, but it is invalid to the extent that it does not
guarantee an examination of an individual claim in cases where ECHR provi-
sions other than Article 3 of the ECHR confer a “Soering effect” (preventing
removal where the person faces a sufficiently high risk that such ECHR provi-
sions will be violated as a result); this applies at least to Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the
Convention.130
Moving on to the “safe country of origin” principle, it should be re-iterated
first that Member States can still introduce or maintain their own national lists
of such countries, additional to the EC common list which must be adopted,
subject to the same criteria and so subject to challenge on grounds that the crite-
ria have not been met. But if the EC has rejected the idea of placing a particular
State on the common list, or removed a particular State from the common list,
the maintenance or addition of that State to a national list which must be based
on the same criteria is surely highly questionable and could more easily be sub-
ject to challenge by invoking the same evidence that the EC used when finding
that the State concerned should not be on the common EC list. Furthermore,
if the Court of Justice has annulled the Council’s decision to place a particular
State on the common EC list on substantive grounds, then it must follow that
such a State can no longer be maintained on Member States’ national lists, since
the EC and national lists are based on the same criteria. By analogy, if the Court
of Justice rules following a reference from a national court or an infringement
proceeding that a particular State was wrongly included on a national list on
substantive grounds, then neither the EC nor any other Member State can list
(or maintain the listing of) that State, unless the situation there changes for the
better.
Despite the common criteria for listing, there are some differences between
the national lists and the EC list. National lists, unlike the EC list, can designate
part of a country as safe. Moreover, the Directive permits Member States to
maintain national lists in force on 1 December 2007 that meet a lower standard
than the Directive requires:131 the difference between the normal criteria and
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
the derogation is that in the latter case, Member States do not need to con-
sider the “democratic system” in the State concerned; they do not need to show
there is generally no threat arising from indiscriminate violence in the context of
armed conflict; they do not need to show the consistency of the absence of the
remaining criteria which they must take into account; and they are not expressly
obliged to consider the particular factors listed in Annex II when assessing the
application of the criteria (national legislation and its application; observance
of the ECHR or ICCPR, including effective remedies regarding rights and free-
doms; and respect of the non-refoulement principle).
In light of these deficiencies, it is doubtful that the national derogation is
valid, because the risk of a breach of human rights for individuals is so much
higher in such cases, in particular since the absence of a criterion regarding the
threat of indiscriminate violence in armed conflict directly contradicts one of
the main grounds for considering whether a person is entitled to subsidiary pro-
tection status in accordance with Directive 2004/83,132 because the consistency
of State practice is obviously relevant to a consideration of the “safety” of a
country, and because the factors of assessment in Annex II and the existence
of a democratic system are obviously good indicators as to whether persecution
and/or torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment are generally carried
out. The derogation could only be considered valid if there were an implied obli-
gation, arising from the general principles of Community law, to consider all the
criteria and factors set out in Annex II when applying the national derogation;
and in that case, the national derogation might just as well be invalid. In any
event, a Court of Justice judgment ruling against the inclusion of a particular
State on the common list or a “normal” national list on substantive grounds
could still be relevant to the validity of including a particular State on a national
list adopted pursuant to this derogation, where there is an overlap between the
applicable criteria (for example, if there was insufficient evidence to prove a gen-
eral lack of persecution in that State).
As for the EC and national “safe country of origin” lists adopted on the
basis of the broader substantive criteria set out in Annex II to the Directive,
the problem with the concept is not so much the criteria in the Annex but their
application to individual cases. Here the Directive sets a relatively high thresh-
old, as the individual must show there are no “serious grounds” for rebutting
the presumption of safety and the lack of grounds for claiming refugee status
in his or her particular circumstances. The difference with the normal refugee
determination process would therefore appear to be a higher standard of proof
placed on the applicant.133 But the intrinsic problem is that the “safe third coun-
try” principle is either dangerous, because the list included countries that are still
refugee producing, or meaningless, because if the country is no longer refugee
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Section III – Asylum
producing then there are unlikely to be more than a handful of applicants from
the country at any one time. The creation of whole system to deal with applica-
tions on such a small scale must be counter-productive. Moreover, the idea of
“safe countries of origin” does not fit with any reasonable interpretation of the
Geneva Convention, taken with the UNHCR Handbook and Executive Com-
mittee Conclusions and, by raising the standard of proof for the applicant, risks
breaching the fundamental principle that each asylum case must be determined
on its own merits. It should also be recalled that the provisions for a common
EC list in Article 29 both exceed the EC’s competence to adopt “minimum stan-
dards” in asylum law and breach an essential procedural requirement by confer-
ring power on the Council to adopt an essential element of the subject-matter
to be regulated in the form of an implementing measure, rather than in the form
of legislation.
Next, the possibility of applying a special border procedure, derogating
from the procedural guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive, only applies to
those Member States which already applied such low standards in their national
law as of 1 December 2007.134 It appears from an a contrario reading of Article
35(3) that Member States are not obliged to extend the guarantees set out in
Articles 6, 8, 9, 10(1)(c) to (e), 10(2), 15(2), 16, 18, 21 or 22 to the persons con-
cerned. This means that a number of basic guarantees do not apply (in par-
ticular, access to the procedure, requirements for examinations and decisions,
guarantees on appeal, legal aid, lawyers’ access to the file, protection regarding
detention, contact with the UNHCR and confidentiality). Taken as a whole, an
asylum decision taken without respecting some or all of these guarantees is likely
to be in violation of the general principles of EC law, as interpreted in light of
Strasbourg jurisprudence. Article 35 (and therefore also Article 24(1)(b)) should
therefore be considered invalid, unless most or all of the missing procedural
guarantees are considered to be applicable nonetheless by virtue of the general
principles of Community law. In fact, this would have the same effect as declar-
ing the Article invalid.
It might be argued that Article 35 should not be considered invalid because
the ECHR does not apply to persons at the border of Member States’ territories.
This argument should be firmly rejected. Since the ECHR in fact applies even
outside Member States’ territories in certain circumstances,135 a fortiori it must
apply at the border of their territories, in particular where persons have come
into contact with a State’s national authorities and so are clearly within their
“jurisdiction” for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. The interpretation is bol-
stered by considering that if the consequence of refusing entry to a person at the
134 Compare Art. 35(2) to the normal requirement to apply Chapter II standards at the
border, as set out expressly in Art. 35(1).
135 For example, Bankovic and others v UK and others (Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 2001-XII) and Issa v Turkey, judgment of 16 Nov. 2004, not yet reported.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
border is that he or she will be subject (for example) to a serious risk of facing
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment in another country, a Member
State is surely as liable for that result as it would be if it expelled or extradited a
person to face such a risk, in particular considering that Article 3 ECHR (as well
as the rest of the Convention) entails not only a negative obligation for States (in
this case, refraining from expulsion) but also positive obligations (in this case,
admission on to the territory).136 Since the Human Rights Court has expressly
found that Article 8 ECHR entails a positive obligation to admit in certain cir-
cumstances,137 it surely cannot be denied that Article 3 ECHR also entails such
an obligation.
As for the “European safe third country” concept set out in Article 36,
it should first of all be observed that while it provides for the adoption of a
“common list”, like the “safe country of origin” provisions, there are a number
of important differences. Member States are not obliged to apply the “European
safe third country” concept; the adoption of a common list will fully replace
any national lists; and there is no procedure for any temporary suspension of
countries on the list while waiting for a decision on their removal. It appears
from the word “shall” that there is an obligation for the Council to adopt such
a list, and while it appears prima facie that the common list must comprise the
name of at least one country, it is surely open to the Council to conclude that
no state meets the criteria for listing set out in Article 36(2), if there are objec-
tive grounds for reaching this conclusion. Unlike the “safe country of origin”
concept, Member States can only maintain any national list if it was pre-existing
on 1 December 2005, and that national list must meet the same criteria as the
common EU list to be adopted; but it follows from the wording of Article 35(7)
that once a common list is adopted, then any Member State can choose to apply
the concept, not just those Member States which applied it on 1 December 2005.
For that reason, it may be preferable that a common list is not adopted at all,
since the “European safe third country” concept will in that case be confined to
those Member States which currently apply it.
Also, the substantive grounds for including countries on the list and the
procedural implications of the list (or of the national lists, pending the adop-
tion of an EU list) are different from the “safe country of origin” rule and from
the general “safe third country” rule. The substantive grounds consist of a clear
obligation that the country in question has ratified and observes the Geneva
Convention (without geographical limitations) and the ECHR, in particular
observing the “effective remedies” principles of the latter; this must especially
require application of the Convention and the effective remedies principle as
136 On the application of the “positive obligations” principle to Art. 3 ECHR, see
Mowbray, The Development of positive obligations under the European Convention
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart, 2004).
137 See Sen v Netherlands, judgment of 21 Dec. 2001, unreported.
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Section III – Asylum
they apply to asylum seekers, and as interpreted by the Strasbourg organs (for
example, the judgments and decisions in T.I., Hatami, Jabari, Conka by analogy,
Chahal, HLR and Bader). It must be inferred that a “third” country cannot be
the country of origin of an asylum application. Also, although Article 36 does
not expressly state that it is limited to people coming from non-EU countries,138
such a limit must be inferred, because applying the concept to persons coming
from EU Member States would constitute an amendment to the Dublin II rules
and the Directive does not contain any express provisions amending those rules.
Moreover, the Directive has the wrong “legal base” for a measure amending
the Dublin rules, and furthermore a measure amending the Dublin rules would
have had to be adopted by a different procedure (a qualified majority vote in
the Council and co-decision of the European Parliament, according to Article
67(5) EC).
At present, therefore, the principle could apply only to the 21 non-EU coun-
tries which have ratified the ECHR,139 assuming that they meet the criterion of
applying it, and in particular applying the effective remedies principle to asylum-
seekers – a point that could likely be contested for some of them. But of these
21 states, four definitely fail the “Geneva Convention” criterion, because they
have not ratified the Convention (Andorra and San Marino), or because they
apply it with a geographical reservation (Turkey and Monaco). The remaining
seventeen states can, of course, only be listed if they actually apply the Geneva
Convention correctly, and furthermore meet the criterion of having “an asylum
procedure prescribed by law”. Arguably, the criterion of applying the Geneva
Convention correctly can only be interpreted with regard to the Community’s
interpretation of the Convention, as set out in Directive 2004/83. Unlike the
“safe country of origin” principle, there is no prospect of designating only part
of a country as safe. Although there is no specific provision on the sources of
information for applying the criteria,140 the Community or a Member State must
surely provide sufficient justification for the listing in light of the criteria set
out in the Directive; for the common EC list, this obligation derives from the
“giving reasons” requirement of Article 253 EC. But are the criteria sufficient?
In light of the Legomsky criteria for the transfer of responsibility for refugees or
asylum-seekers to other States, they are not; Article 36 must therefore be consid-
ered as invalid as it is not subject to all of the criteria which must be satisfied in
order to justify a transfer of responsibility,141 or valid only on the condition that
it is considered to be subject to those criteria by implication.
138 Compare with Art. 25(2)(b) and (c) (and see also Article 23(4)(c), second indent).
139 It should be recalled that Belarus, although it has ratified the Geneva Convention,
has not ratified the ECHR, and so cannot be listed by the EU or a Member State.
140 Compare with Art. 25(2)(b) and (c).
141 Art. 24(2) must therefore be considered invalid as well.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
There are also criteria relating to the situation of the individual concerned:
he or she must have sought to enter or in fact entered illegally, and must have
entered or be seeking to enter have “from” the third country in question. Clearly,
the procedure is not therefore limited to applications at the border, since it can
apply to persons who have already entered the territory; nor is it limited to per-
sons who came directly from the State concerned. But it is limited to persons
who sought to enter, or who entered illegally; therefore since derogations from
procedural rules must be interpreted narrowly, it cannot apply to those persons
who entered legally initially but who overstayed past the validity of their visa or
the period of their authorised entry without a visa (or past the validity of their
residence permit or other form of authorised stay or entry). Nor can it apply to
persons who entered legally but who later violated the conditions of their entry
or stay. In particular, Member States cannot regard persons as entering illegally
merely because they applied for asylum after their initial legal entry, because
such persons were not entering illegally at the time of their entry. Despite this
obligation to interpret this criterion narrowly, it still gives rise to doubts about
the validity of Article 36, because Article 31 of the Geneva Convention obliges
Member States to avoid imposing “penalties on account of their illegal entry or
presence” upon refugees who have come “directly” from a country where their
life or freedom was threatened on Convention grounds “provided they present
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal
entry or presence”. Arguably, Article 31 is not just a reference to criminal penal-
ties and administrative fines, but applies to any form of adverse treatment due
to illegal entry or presence where the conditions of the Article are met; a refusal
to consider an asylum application partly or wholly and to expel a refugee is
surely a “penalty”. Article 36 must therefore be considered invalid for breach of
Article 31 of the Convention (in particular since EC asylum legislation must be
“in accordance with” the Convention, according to Article 63(1) EC), or at least
invalid or inapplicable as regards persons who meet the conditions of Article
31.
As for the requirement that the person must be coming “from” the third
country in question, since the derogation must be interpreted narrowly, this can
only mean that the person concerned travelled directly from that country to the
Member State in question without entering another State (whether an EU State
or a non-EU State). This will have to be proven in individual cases, which may
prove particularly difficult where a person is discovered already on the terri-
tory.
This brings us to the procedural implications of Article 36, which gives
rise to even greater doubts as to the validity of this Article. For Article 36(1)
specifies that Member States can exempt themselves from any examination of an
asylum application at all, or alternative from any full application, and from any
examination of “the safety of the applicant in his/her particular circumstances”.
On the other hand, Article 36(4) requires Member States to make provisions for
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Section III – Asylum
142 This is because it would be unnecessary to set out specific provisions on persons
who enter the territory or seek to enter the territory irregularly (in Art. 31) if such
persons are outside the scope of Art. 33; also an a contrario interpretation of Arts.
32 and 33 (the former protecting refugees against expulsion only where they are
“lawfully in [a State’s] territory”) suggests that Art. 33 must also cover people who
are not lawfully on a State’s territory. Identical reasoning applies as regards persons
at the border: it would be unnecessary for Art. 31 to deal with the topic of illegal
entry unless refugees stopped at the border were within the scope of Art. 33, and the
reference to national territory in Art. 32 compares with the lack of such a criterion
in Art. 33. Also, the wide scope of the wording of Art. 33 (“No Contracting State
shall expel or return…in any manner whatsoever” suggests clearly that persons at
the border are covered by that Article, and indeed that persons who have not yet
reached the border are covered by it (although the latter issue is not material to the
Directive, which is limited to applications made at the border or in the territory of
the Member States). For more on the scope of Art. 33 of the Geneva Convention,
see Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “The scope and content of the principle of non-
refoulement: an Opinion”, in Feller, Turk and Nicholson, eds., Refugee Protection
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on Refugee Protection (CUP,
2003), 87. In any event, as noted above, Article 36 of the Directive applies in part
to persons already on the territory, and there can be no possible doubt that those
persons fall within the scope of the non-refoulement clause.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
not require the examination to meet ECHR standards. There is a strong argu-
ment that the ECHR applies to asylum applications made at the border, for the
reasons set out above regarding Article 35 of the Directive. In that case, Article
36(1) violates the ECHR as regards border applications, for the same reasons as
it violates the ECHR as regards in-country applications.
What should be done with Article 36? Surely it is eligible for some sort of
prize as the single most invalid provision of any EC legislation which has ever
been adopted. It violates the EC Treaty as far as the creation of a common list
is concerned, because of the breach of essential procedural requirements (see
s. 3 above). It furthermore violates the general principles of Community law
(as a breach of the ECHR) and/or the Geneva Convention as regards the cri-
teria for designating countries, the application of penalties to refugees who fall
within the scope of Article 31 of the Geneva Convention, and the non-existent
procedural rights of the persons concerned. Arguably the breach of the general
principles and the Geneva Convention (although not the breach of essential EC
procedural requirements) can be rectified, by inferring the application of those
principles in spite of the express wording of Article 36, in particular by giving
Article 36(4) priority over Article 36(1). But in light of the sheer repugnance of
this Article as expressly worded to many of the most fundamental human rights
which the EC aims to protect (never mind the invalidity of the common list on
procedural grounds), there can surely be no other option than to strike it down
in its entirely.
Finally, as regards the rules on withdrawal of refugee status, it should first
be emphasised that although refugees (or for that matter, persons with subsid-
iary protection) are not (yet) covered by EC legislation on long-term residents,
they are nonetheless covered by Article 8 of the ECHR, which makes it difficult
for Member States to expel persons resident for significant periods on their ter-
ritory in the absence of serious criminal convictions. The withdrawal of refugee
status does not affect the protection conferred by Article 8 ECHR.143
As for the specific provision of this Article, despite the word “shall” in Arti-
cle 37, the same Article goes on to provide that status “may” be withdrawn; the
withdrawal of status must therefore be considered optional for Member States.
In any case, Article 44 of the Directive states expressly that the Directive only
applies to proceedings to withdraw status commenced after 1 December 2007.
It is objectionable that Article 38 of the Directive does not confer upon refugees
all of the procedural rights set out in Articles 10, 15 and 16 or any of the rights
set out in Articles 7 and 17, as well as the full right to a personal interview rather
than a written statement in lieu, particularly since there is no guarantee that an
appeal against a negative decision will have suspensive effect. To the extent that
143 Compare with Chahal v UK, in which the Human rights Court made clear that Art.
3 ECHR had wider scope than Art. 33 of the Geneva Convention; it must follow
that Art. 8 ECHR has wider scope than Art. 1.C of the Geneva Convention.
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Section III – Asylum
withdrawal of status will in practice lead to expulsion from the territory, the
absence of these procedural rights may entail a breach of the general principles
of Community law, in light of Strasbourg jurisprudence.
144 See also Byrne, “Remedies of Limited Effect: Appeals under the forthcoming Direc-
tive on EU Minimum Standards on Procedures” 7 EJML (2005) 71.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
409
Section III – Asylum
will be adopted, and if so, whether its scope or the guarantees it provides for will
be amended in the process.
4.6 Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, there is a strong argument that the following Arti-
cles of the procedures Directive are invalid, unless radically re-interpreted contra
legem in light of the general principles of Community law:
a) Article 7(2), to the extent that it applies to extradition requests from the
country of origin;
b) Article 12(2)(c), the derogation from a right to personal interview;
c) Article 14(2), the possibility of not receiving a report of the personal inter-
view until after the first-instance decision;
d) Article 15(2), to the extent that legal aid is limited to appeals;
e) Article 15(3)(d), potentially limiting legal aid to cases considered likely to
succeed;
f) Article 27(2)(b), to the extent that Member States need not consider both
the safety of individual applicants and the safety of particular countries;
g) Article 27(2)(c), to the extent that Member States need not consider the
risk that treatment contrary to ECHR provisions other than Article 3 could
result (directly or indirectly) from removal to the “safe third country”;
h) Article 30(3), concerning the national derogation from the standards for
“safe countries of origin”;
i) Articles 29-31, regarding the “safe country of origin” concept, and conse-
quentially Article 23(4)(c)(i);
j) Article 35, the special border procedure, and consequentially Article
24(1)(b);
k) Article 36, the “European safe third countries” clause, and consequentially
Article 24(2);
l) Article 38, to the extent that Articles 7, 10, 15, 16 and 17 do not fully apply,
along with the full right to a personal interview, to the extent that with-
drawal of status will in practice lead to expulsion from the territory; and
m) Article 39(3)(a) and (b), as regards the lack of suspensive effect.
Furthermore:
a) Article 29 is invalid for exceeding the EC’s competence, and for breach of
essential procedural requirements; and
b) Article 36(3), and consequentially Article 36(2)(d), is invalid for breach of
essential procedural requirements.
Never before in the history of the Community have so many human rights
breaches – leaving aside the breaches of EC constitutional law – been commit-
ted by a single piece of legislation. The legitimacy of EC asylum law and of
410
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
411
Section III – Asylum
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular point (1)(d) of the first paragraph of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Whereas:
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
(6) The approximation of rules on the procedures for granting and withdraw-
ing refugee status should help to limit the secondary movements of appli-
cants for asylum between Member States, where such movement would be
caused by differences in legal frameworks.
(7) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States should
have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for
third country nationals or stateless persons who ask for international pro-
tection from a Member State, where such a request is understood to be on
the grounds that the person concerned is a refugee within the meaning of
Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention.
(8) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
(9) With respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this
Directive, Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of
international law to which they are party and which prohibit discrimina-
tion.
(10) It is essential that decisions on all applications for asylum be taken on the
basis of the facts and, at the first instance, by authorities whose personnel
has the appropriate knowledge or receives the necessary training in the field
of asylum and refugee matters.
(11) It is in the interest of both Member States and applicants for asylum to
decide as soon as possible on applications for asylum. The organisation of
the processing of applications for asylum is left to the discretion of Member
States, so that they may, in accordance with their national needs, prioritise
or accelerate the processing of any application, taking into account the
standards in this Directive.
(12) The notion of public order may cover a conviction for committing a serious
crime.
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Section III – Asylum
(16) Many asylum applications are made at the border or in a transit zone of a
Member State prior to a decision on the entry of the applicant. Member
States should be able to keep existing procedures adapted to the specific sit-
uation of these applicants at the border. Common rules should be defined
on possible exceptions made in these circumstances to the guarantees nor-
mally enjoyed by applicants. Border procedures should mainly apply to
those applicants who do not meet the conditions for entry into the territory
of the Member States.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
(19) Where the Council has satisfied itself that those criteria are met in relation
to a particular country of origin, and has consequently included it in the
minimum common list of safe countries of origin to be adopted pursu-
ant to this Directive, Member States should be obliged to consider applica-
tions of persons with the nationality of that country, or of stateless persons
formerly habitually resident in that country, on the basis of the rebutta-
ble presumption of the safety of that country. In the light of the political
importance of the designation of safe countries of origin, in particular in
view of the implications of an assessment of the human rights situation in
a country of origin and its implications for the policies of the European
Union in the field of external relations, the Council should take any deci-
sions on the establishment or amendment of the list, after consultation of
the European Parliament.
(20) It results from the status of Bulgaria and Romania as candidate countries
for the accession to the European Union and the progress made by these
countries for membership that they should be regarded as constituting safe
countries of origin for the purposes of this Directive until the date of their
accession to the European Union.
(21) The designation of a third country as a safe country of origin for the pur-
poses of this Directive cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for
nationals of that country. By its very nature, the assessment underlying the
designation can only take into account the general civil, legal and political
circumstances in that country and whether actors of persecution, torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are subject to sanction in
practice when found liable in the country concerned. For this reason, it is
important that, where an applicant shows that there are serious reasons to
consider the country not to be safe in his/her particular circumstances, the
designation of the country as safe can no longer be considered relevant for
him/her.
(22) Member States should examine all applications on the substance, i.e. assess
whether the applicant in question qualifies as a refugee in accordance with
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the
protection granted, except where this Directive provides otherwise, in par-
ticular where it can be reasonably assumed that another country would do
the examination or provide sufficient protection. Especially, Member States
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Section III – Asylum
(23) Member States should also not be obliged to assess the substance of an
asylum application where the applicant, due to a connection to a third
country as defined by national law, can reasonably be expected to seek
protection in that third country. Member States should only proceed on
this basis where this particular applicant would be safe in the third country
concerned. In order to avoid secondary movements of applicants, common
principles for the consideration or designation by Member States of third
countries as safe should be established.
(25) It follows from the nature of the common standards concerning both safe
third country concepts as set out in this Directive, that the practical effect
of the concepts depends on whether the third country in question permits
the applicant in question to enter its territory.
(26) With respect to the withdrawal of refugee status, Member States shall
ensure that the persons benefiting from the refugee status are duly informed
of a possible reconsideration of their status and have the opportunity to
submit their point of view before the authorities can take a motivated deci-
sion to withdraw their status. However, these guarantees can be dispensed
with where the reasons for the cessation of the refugee status is not related
to a change of the conditions on which the recognition was based.
(27) It reflects a basic principle of Community law that the decisions taken on
an application for asylum and on the withdrawal of a refugee status must be
subject to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal in the meaning of
Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The effec-
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
tiveness of the remedy, also with regard to the examination of the relevant
facts, depends on the administrative and judicial system of each Member
State seen as a whole.
(29) This Directive does not deal with procedures governed by Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the Member state responsible for examining
an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third coun-
try national.
(32) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom has
notified, by letter of 24 January 2001, its wish to take part in the adoption
and application of this Directive.
(33) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, Ireland has notified, by
letter of 14 February 2001, its wish to take part in the adoption and appli-
cation of this Directive.
417
Section III – Asylum
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 Purpose
Article 2 Definitions
418
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
(h) “Unaccompanied minor” means a person below the age of eighteen who
arrives in the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an adult
responsible for him/her whether by law or by custom, and for as long as
he/she is not effectively taken into the care of such a person; it includes a
minor who is left unaccompanied after he/she has entered the territory of
the Member States;
(i) “Representative” means a person acting on behalf of an organisation rep-
resenting an unaccompanied minor as legal guardian, a person acting on
behalf of a national organisation which is responsible for the care and
well-being of minors, or any other appropriate representation appointed to
ensure his/her best interests;
(j) “Withdrawal of refugee status” means the decision by a competent author-
ity to revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of a person in accor-
dance with Council Directive 2004/83/EC;
(k) “Remain in the Member State” means to remain in the territory, including
at the border or in transit zones of the Member State in which the applica-
tion for asylum has been made or is being examined.
Article 3 Scope
1. This Directive shall apply to all applications for asylum made in the terri-
tory, including at the border, or in the transit zones of the Member States
and to the withdrawal of refugee status.
2. This Directive shall not apply in cases of requests for diplomatic or territo-
rial asylum submitted to representations of Member States.
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Section III – Asylum
3. Member States shall ensure that where authorities are designated in accor-
dance with paragraph 2, the personnel of such authorities have the appro-
priate knowledge or receive the necessary training to fulfil their obligations
when implementing this Directive.
420
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
CHAPTER II
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUARANTEES
1. Member States may require that applications for asylum be made in person
and/or at a designated place.
2. Member States shall ensure that each adult having legal capacity has the
right to make an application for asylum on his/her own behalf.
Consent shall be requested at the time the application is lodged or, at the
latest, when the personal interview with the dependant adult is conducted.
1. Applicants shall be allowed to remain in the Member State, for the sole
purpose of the procedure, until such time as the determining authority has
made a decision in accordance with the procedures at first instance set out
in Chapter III. This right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a
residence permit.
421
Section III – Asylum
2. Member States can make an exception only where, in accordance with Arti-
cles 32 and 34, a subsequent application will not be further examined or
where they will surrender or extradite, as appropriate, a person either to
another Member State pursuant to obligations in accordance with a Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant or otherwise, or to a third country, or to international
criminal courts or tribunals.
4. Member States may provide for rules concerning the translation of docu-
ments relevant for the examination of applications.
1. Member States shall ensure that decisions on applications for asylum are
given in writing.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
2. Member States shall also ensure that, where an application is rejected, the
reasons in fact and in law are stated in the decision and information on how
to challenge a negative decision is given in writing.
Member States need not state the reasons for not granting the refugee status
in the decision where the applicant is granted a status, which offers the same
rights and benefits under national and Community law as the refugee status
by virtue of Council Directive 2004/83/EC. In these cases, Member States
shall ensure that the reasons for not granting the refugee status are stated
in the applicant’s file, and that the applicant has, upon request, access to
his/her file.
3. For the purposes of Article 6(3), and whenever the application is based on
the same grounds, Member States may take one single decision, covering all
dependants.
1. With respect to the procedures provided for in Chapter III of this Directive,
Member States shall ensure that all applicants for asylum enjoy the follow-
ing guarantees:
(a) they must be informed in a language which they may reasonably be
supposed to understand of the procedure to be followed and of their
rights and obligations during the procedure and the possible conse-
quences of not complying with their obligations and not co-operating
with the authorities. They must be informed about the time-frame, as
well as the means at their disposal to fulfil the obligation to submit the
elements as referred to in Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC.
The information must be given in time to enable them to exercise the
rights guaranteed in this Directive and to comply with the obligations
described in Article 11;
(b) they must receive the services of an interpreter for submitting their
case to the competent authorities whenever necessary. Member States
shall consider it necessary to give these services at least when the deter-
mining authority calls upon the applicant to be interviewed as referred
to in Articles 12 and 13 and appropriate communication cannot be
ensured without such services. In this case and in other cases where
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Section III – Asylum
the competent authorities call upon the applicant, the services shall be
paid for out of public funds;
(c) they must not be denied the opportunity to communicate with the
UNHCR or with any other organisation working on behalf of the
UNHCR in the territory of the Member State pursuant to an agree-
ment with that Member State;
(d) they must be given notice in reasonable time of the decision by the deter-
mining authority on their application for asylum. If a legal adviser or
other counsellor is legally representing the applicant, Member States
may choose to give notice of the decision to him/her instead of to the
applicant for asylum;
(e) they must be informed about the result of the decision by the determin-
ing authority in a language that they may reasonably be supposed to
understand when they are not assisted or represented by a legal adviser
or other counsellor and when free legal assistance is not available. The
information provided shall include information on how to challenge a
negative decision in accordance with the provisions of Article 9(2).
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
Where the Member State does not provide the opportunity for a personal
interview pursuant to this paragraph, or where applicable, to the depen-
dant, reasonable efforts must be made to allow the applicant or the depen-
dant to submit further information.
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Section III – Asylum
2. A personal interview must take place under conditions which ensure appro-
priate confidentiality.
3. Member States shall take appropriate steps to ensure that personal inter-
views are conducted in conditions which allow applicants to present the
grounds for their applications in a comprehensive manner. To that end,
Member States shall
(a) ensure that the person who conducts the interview is sufficiently com-
petent to take account of the personal or general circumstances sur-
rounding the application, including the applicant’s cultural origin or
vulnerability, insofar as it is possible to do so, and
(b) select an interpreter who is able to ensure appropriate communication
between the applicant and the person who conducts the interview. The
communication need not necessarily take place in the language pre-
ferred by the applicant for asylum if there is another language which
he/she may reasonably be supposed to understand and in which he/she
is able to communicate in.
4. Member States may provide for rules concerning the presence of third par-
ties at the personal interview.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
1. Member States shall ensure that a written report is made of every personal
interview, containing at least the essential information regarding the appli-
cation, as presented by the applicant, in terms of Article 4(2) of Council
Directive 2004/83/EC.
2. Member States shall ensure that applicants have timely access to the report
of the personal interview. Where access is only granted after the decision of
the determining authority, Member States shall ensure that access is pos-
sible as soon as necessary for allowing an appeal to be prepared and lodged
in due time.
3. Member states may request the applicant’s approval on the contents of the
report of the personal interview.
Where an applicant refuses to approve the contents of the report, the rea-
sons for this refusal shall be entered into the applicant’s file.
1. Member States shall allow applicants for asylum at their own cost the
opportunity to consult in an effective manner a legal adviser or other coun-
sellor, admitted or permitted as such under national law, on matters relating
to their asylum applications.
3. Member States may provide in their national legislation that free legal assis-
tance and/or representation be granted :
(a) only for the procedures before a court or tribunal in accordance with
Chapter V and not to any onward appeals or reviews provided for
under national law, including a rehearing of an appeal following an
onward appeal or review; and/or
(b) only to those who lack sufficient resources; and/or
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Section III – Asylum
4. Rules concerning the modalities for filing and processing such requests may
be provided by Member States.
1. Member States shall ensure that a legal adviser or other counsellor admit-
ted or permitted as such under national law who assists or represents an
applicant for asylum under the terms of national law shall enjoy access to
such information in the applicant’s file as is liable to be examined by the
authorities referred to in Chapter V, insofar as the information is relevant
to the examination of the application.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
2. Member States shall ensure that the legal adviser or other counsellor who
assists or represents an applicant for asylum has access to closed areas, such
as detention facilities and transit zones, for the purpose of consulting that
applicant. Member States may only limit the possibility to visit applicants
in closed areas where such limitation is, by virtue of national legislation,
objectively necessary for the security, public order or administrative man-
agement of the area or to ensure an efficient examination of the applica-
tion, provided that access by the legal adviser or other counsellor is not
thereby severely limited or rendered impossible.
3. Member States may provide rules covering the presence of legal advisers
or other counsellors at all interviews in the procedure, without prejudice to
this Article or to Article 17(1)(b).
4. Member States may provide that the applicant is allowed to bring with him/
her to the personal interview the legal adviser or other counsellor, admitted
as such under national law.
Member States may require the presence of the applicant at the personal
interview even if he/she is represented under the terms of national law by
such a legal adviser or counsellor and may require the applicant to respond
in person to the questions asked.
The absence of the legal adviser or other counsellor shall not prevent the
competent authority from conducting the personal interview with the appli-
cant.
1. With respect to all procedures provided for in this Directive and without
prejudice to the provisions of Articles 12 and 14, Member States shall:
(a) as soon as possible take measures to ensure that a representative rep-
resents and/or assists the unaccompanied minor with respect to the
examination of the application. This representative can also be the
representative referred to in Article 19 of Council Directive 2003/9/EC
laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers;
(b) ensure that the representative is given the opportunity to inform the
unaccompanied minor about the meaning and possible consequences
of the personal interview and, where appropriate, how to prepare him-
self/herself for the personal interview. Member States shall allow the
representative to be present at that interview and to ask questions or
make comments, within the framework set by the person who conducts
the interview.
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Section III – Asylum
3. Member States may, in accordance with laws and regulations in force at the
time of the adoption of this Directive, also refrain from appointing a rep-
resentative where the unaccompanied minor is 16 years old or older, unless
he/she is unable to pursue his/her application without a representative.
In cases where medical examinations are used, Member States shall ensure
that:
(a) unaccompanied minors are informed prior to the examination of their
application for asylum, and in a language which they may reasonably
be supposed to understand, about the possibility of age determina-
tion by a medical examination. This shall include information on the
method of examination and the possible consequences of the result
of the medical examination for the examination of the application for
asylum, as well as the consequences of refusal on the part of the unac-
companied minor to undergo the medical examination.
(b) unaccompanied minors and/or their representatives consent to carry
out an examination to determine the age of the minors concerned,
and
430
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
The fact that an unaccompanied minor has refused to undergo such a medi-
cal examination shall not prevent the determining authority from taking a
decision on the application for asylum.
6. The best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration for Member
States when implementing the provisions of this Article.
Article 18 Detention
1. Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that
he/she is an applicant for asylum.
2. Member States may also decide that the determining authority can decide
to discontinue the examination without taking a decision. In this case,
Member States shall ensure that the determining authority shall enter a
notice in the applicant’s file.
1. When there is reasonable cause to consider that an applicant for asylum has
implicitly withdrawn or abandoned his/her application for asylum, Member
States shall ensure that the determining authority takes a decision either to
discontinue the examination or to reject the application on the basis that
the applicant has not established an entitlement to refugee status in accor-
dance with Council Directive 2004/83/EC.
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Section III – Asylum
Member States may assume that the applicant has implicitly withdrawn or
abandoned his/her application for asylum in particular when it is ascer-
tained that:
(a) he/she has failed to respond to requests to provide information essen-
tial to his/her application in terms of Article 4 of Council Directive
2004/83/EC or has not appeared for an personal interview as provided
for in Articles 12, 13 and 14, unless the applicant demonstrates within
a reasonable time that his failure was due to circumstances beyond his
control;
(b) he/she has absconded or left without authorisation the place where
he/she lived or was held, without contacting the competent authority
within a reasonable time or he/she has not within a reasonable time
complied with reporting duties or other obligations to communicate.
For the purpose of implementing these provisions, Member States may lay
down time limits or guidelines.
2. Member States shall ensure that the applicant who reports again to the
competent authority after a decision to discontinue as referred to in para-
graph 1 is taken, is entitled to request that his/her case be re-opened, unless
the request is examined in accordance with Articles 32 and 34.
Member States may provide for a time limit after which the applicant’s case
can no longer be reopened.
Member States shall ensure that such a person is not removed contrary to
the principle of non-refoulement.
Member States may allow the determining authority to take up the exami-
nation at the stage which the application was discontinued.
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Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
For the purpose of examining individual cases, Member States shall not:
(a) directly disclose the information regarding individual applications for
asylum, or the fact that an application has been made, to the alleged actor(s)
of persecution of the applicant for asylum.
(b) obtain any information from the alleged actor(s) of persecution in a manner
that would result in such actor(s) being directly informed of the fact that an
application has been made by the applicant in question, and would jeop-
ardise the physical integrity of the applicant and his/her dependants, or the
liberty and security of his/her family members still living in the country of
origin.
CHAPTER III
PROCEDURES AT FIRST INSTANCE
Section I
Member States shall ensure that, when no decision can be taken within
six months,
(a) the applicant concerned shall either be informed of the delay or
(b) receive, upon his/her request, information on the time-frame within
which the decision on his/her application is to be expected. Such infor-
mation shall not constitute an obligation for the Member State towards
the applicant concerned to take a decision within that time frame.
433
Section III – Asylum
434
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
(k) the applicant failed without good reasons to comply with obligations
referred to in Articles 4(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC or
in Articles 11(2)(a) and (b) and 20(1) of this Directive; or
(l) the applicant entered the territory of the Member State unlawfully or
prolonged his/her stay unlawfully and, without good reason, has either
not presented himself/herself to the authorities and/or filed an applica-
tion for asylum as soon as possible given the circumstances of his/her
entry; or
(m) the applicant is a danger to the national security or the public order of
the Member State; or the applicant has enforceably been expelled for
serious reasons of public security and public order under national law;
or
(n) the applicant refuses to comply with an obligation to have his/her
fingerprints taken in accordance with relevant Community and/or
national legislation; or
(o) the application was made by an unmarried minor to whom Arti-
cle 6(4)(c) applies after the application of the parents or parent respon-
sible for the minor has been rejected by a decision and no relevant new
elements were raised with respect to his/her particular circumstances
or to the situation in his/her country of origin.
1. Member States may moreover provide for the following specific procedures
derogating from the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II:
(a) a preliminary examination for the purpose of processing cases consid-
ered within the framework of the provisions set out in Section IV;
(b) procedures for the purpose of processing cases considered within the
framework set out in Section V.
Section II
435
Section III – Asylum
436
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the
competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking asylum will be
treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country con-
cerned:
(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
and
(b) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Con-
vention is respected; and
(c) the prohibition on removal in breach of the right to freedom from
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in
international law is respected; and
(d) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a
refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Conven-
tion.
2. The application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules
laid down in national legislation, including:
(a) rules requiring a connection between the person seeking asylum and
the third country concerned based on which it would be reasonable for
that person to go to that country;
(b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy
themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a par-
ticular country or to a particular applicant. Such methodology shall
include case by case consideration of the safety of the country for a
particular applicant and/or national designation of countries consid-
ered to be generally safe;
(c) rules, in accordance with international law, allowing an individual
examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a par-
ticular applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant to
challenge the application of the safe third country concept on the
grounds that he/she would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
437
Section III – Asylum
4. Where the third country does not permit the applicant for asylum in ques-
tion to enter its territory, Member States shall ensure that access to a pro-
cedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees
described in Chapter II.
Section III
1. Without prejudice to Articles 19 and 20, Member States may only consider
an application for asylum as unfounded if the determining authority has
established that the applicant does not qualify for refugee status pursuant
to Council Directive 2004/83/EC.
438
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
7. The suspensions under paragraphs 4 and 5 shall end after three months,
unless the Commission makes a proposal, before the end of this period, to
withdraw the third country from the minimum common list. The suspen-
sions shall end in any case where the Council rejects, a proposal by the
Commission to withdraw the third country from the list.
8. Upon request by the Council, the Commission shall report to the Council
and the European Parliament on whether the situation of a country on the
minimum common list is still in conformity with Annex II. When present-
ing its report to the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission
may make such recommendations or proposals as it deems appropriate.
439
Section III – Asylum
applications for asylum where they are satisfied that persons in the third
countries concerned are generally neither subject to:
(a) persecution as defined in Article 9 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC;
nor
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
3. Member States may also retain legislation in force at the time of the adop-
tion of this Directive that allows for the national designation of part of
a country as safe or a country or part of a country as safe for a specified
group of persons in that country where the conditions in paragraph 2 are
fulfilled in relation to that part or group.
6. Member States shall notify to the Commission the countries that are desig-
nated as safe countries of origin in accordance with the provisions of this
Article.
and he/she has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the coun-
try not to be a safe country of origin in his/her particular circumstances
in terms of his/her qualification as a refugee in accordance with Council
Directive 2004/83/EC.
440
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
3. Member States shall lay down in national legislation further rules and
modalities for the application of the safe country of origin concept.
Section IV
1. Where a person who has applied for asylum in a Member State makes fur-
ther representations or a subsequent application in the same Member State,
that Member State may examine these further representations or the ele-
ments of the subsequent application in the framework of the examination
of the previous application or in the framework of the examination of the
decision under review or appeal insofar as the competent authorities can
take into account and consider all the elements underlying the further rep-
resentations or subsequent application within this framework.
441
Section III – Asylum
6. Member States may decide to further examine the application only if the
applicant concerned was, through no fault of his/her own, incapable of
asserting the situations set forth in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 in the previous
procedure, in particular by exercising his/her right to an effective remedy
pursuant to Article 39.
7. This procedure may also be applicable in the case of a dependant who lodges
an application, after he/she has in accordance with Article 6(3), consented
to have his/her case be part of an application made on his/her behalf. In
this case the preliminary examination referred to in paragraph 3 will consist
of examining whether there are facts relating to the dependant’s situation
justifying a separate application.
Article 33
Member States may retain or adopt the procedure provided for in Article 32 in
the case of an application for asylum filed at a later date by an applicant who,
either intentionally or owing to gross negligence, fails to go to a reception centre
or to appear before the competent authorities at a specified time.
1. Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum whose application
is subject to a preliminary examination pursuant to Article 32 enjoy the
guarantees listed in Article 10(1).
2. Member States may lay down in national law rules on the preliminary
examination pursuant to Article 32. Those rules may inter alia:
(a) oblige the applicant concerned to indicate facts and substantiate evi-
dence which justify a new procedure;
(b) require submission of the new information by the applicant concerned
within a time limit after which it has been obtained by him or her;
(c) permit the preliminary examination to be conducted on the sole basis
of written submissions without a personal interview.
The conditions shall not render the access of applicants for asylum to a new
procedure impossible nor result in the effective annulment or severe curtail-
ment of such access.
442
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
Section V
1. Member States may provide for procedures, in accordance with the basic
principles and guarantees of Chapter II, in order to decide, at the border or
transit zones of the Member State, on the applications made at such loca-
tions.
443
Section III – Asylum
4. Member States shall ensure that a decision in the framework of the proce-
dures provided for in paragraph 2 is taken within a reasonable time. When
a decision has not been taken within four weeks, the applicant for asylum
shall be granted entry to the territory of the Member State in order for his/
her application to be processed in accordance with the other provisions of
this Directive.
Section VI
Article 36
1. Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of the asylum
application and of the safety of the applicant in his/her particular circum-
stances as described in Chapter II takes place in cases where a competent
authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant for
asylum is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a
safe third country according to paragraph 2.
2. A third country can only be considered as a safe third country for the pur-
pose of paragraph 1 where:
(a) it has ratified and observes the provisions of the Geneva Convention
without any geographical limitations; and
(b) it has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law; and
(c) it has ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and it observes its provisions,
including the standards relating to effective remedies; and
(d) it has been so designated by the Council in accordance with paragraph
3.
444
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
4. Member States concerned shall lay down in national law the modalities
for implementing the provisions of paragraph 1 and the consequences of
decisions pursuant to those provisions in accordance with the principle of
non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention including providing for
exceptions from the application of this Article for humanitarian or politi-
cal reasons or for reasons of public international law.
6. Where the safe third country does not readmit the applicant for asylum in
question, Member States shall ensure that access to a procedure is given
in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees described in Chap-
ter II.
CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF REFUGEE STATUS
Member States shall ensure that an examination may be started to withdraw the
refugee status of a particular person when new elements or findings arise indi-
cating that there are reasons to reconsider the validity of his/her refugee status.
1. Member States shall ensure that, where the competent authority is consid-
ering to withdraw the refugee status of a third country national or stateless
445
Section III – Asylum
In addition, Member States shall ensure that within the framework of such
a procedure:
(c) the competent authority is able to obtain precise and up to date infor-
mation from various sources, such as, where appropriate, information
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
as to the general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of the
persons concerned; and
(d) where information is collected on the individual case for the purpose
of reconsidering the refugee status, it is not obtained from the actor(s)
of persecution in a manner that would result in such actor(s) being
directly informed of the fact that the person concerned is a refugee,
whose status is under reconsideration, nor jeopardise the physical
integrity of the person and his/her dependants, or the liberty and secu-
rity of his/her family members still living in the country of origin.
2. Member States shall ensure that the decision of the competent authority to
withdraw the refugee status is given in writing. The reasons in fact and in
law shall be stated in the decision and information on how to challenge the
decision shall be given in writing.
3. Once the competent authority has taken the decision to withdraw the ref-
ugee status, Articles 15, paragraph 2, 14, paragraph 1 and 21 are equally
applicable.
446
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
CHAPTER V
APPEALS PROCEDURES
1. Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an
effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following:
(a) a decision taken on their application for asylum, including a decision:
(i) to consider an application inadmissible pursuant to Article 25(2),
(ii) at the border or in the transit zones of a Member State as described
in Article 35(1);
(iii) not to conduct an examination pursuant to Article 36;
(b) a refusal to re-open the examination of an application after its discon-
tinuation pursuant to Articles 19 and 20;
(c) a decision not to further examine the subsequent application pursuant
to Articles 32 and 34;
(d) a decision refusing entry within the framework of the procedures pro-
vided for under Article 35 (2);
(e) a decision for the withdrawal of the refugee status pursuant to Arti-
cle 38.
2. Member States shall provide for time limits and other necessary rules for
the applicant to exercise his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to
paragraph 1.
4. Member States may lay down time limits for the court or tribunal pursuant
to paragraph 1 to examine the decision of the determining authority.
5. Where an applicant has been granted a status, which offers the same rights
and benefits under national and Community law as the refugee status by
virtue of Council Directive 2004/83/EC, the applicant may be considered to
447
Section III – Asylum
have an effective remedy where a court or tribunal decides that the remedy
pursuant to paragraph 1 is inadmissible or unlikely to succeed on the basis
of insufficient interest on the part of the applicant in maintaining the pro-
ceedings.
6. Member States may also lay down in national legislation the conditions
under which it can be assumed that an applicant has implicitly withdrawn
or abandoned his/her remedy pursuant to paragraph 1, together with the
rules on the procedure to be followed.
CHAPTER VI
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
This Directive does not affect the possibility for public authorities of challeng-
ing the administrative and/or judicial decisions as provided for in national leg-
islation.
Article 41 Confidentiality
Member States shall ensure that authorities implementing this Directive are
bound by the confidentiality principle, as defined in national law, in relation to
any information they obtain in the course of their work.
Article 42 Report
No later than two years after the date specified in Article 43, the Commission
shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of
this Directive in the Member States and shall propose any amendments that are
necessary. Member States shall send the Commission all the information that is
appropriate for drawing up this report. After presenting the report, the Commis-
sion shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of this Directive in the Member States at least every two years.
Article 43 Transposal
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 1 December 2007. Con-
cerning Article 13, Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 1 Decem-
ber 2008. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
448
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to
this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their
official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be
made.
Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provisions
of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
Article 44 Transition
Member States shall apply the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
set out in Article 43 to applications for asylum lodged after 1 December 2007
and to procedures for the withdrawal of refugee status started after 1 December
2007.
[...]
449
Section III – Asylum
ANNEX I
When implementing the provision of this Directive, Ireland may, insofar as the
provisions of section 17 (1) of the Refugee Act 1996 (as amended) contin-
ues to apply, consider that:
– “determining authority” provided for in Article 2 (e) of this Directive shall,
insofar as the examination of whether an applicant should or, as the case
may be, should not be declared to be a refugee is concerned, mean the Office
of the Refugee Applications Commissioner; and
– “decisions at first instance” provided for in Article 2 (e) of this Directive
shall include recommendations of the Refugee Applications Commissioner
as to whether an applicant should or, as the case may be, should not be
declared to be a refugee.
Ireland will notify the European Commission of any amendments to the provi-
sions of section 17 (1) of the Refugee Act 1996 (as amended).
450
Chapter 14 Asylum Procedures
ANNEX II
In making this assessment, account shall be taken inter alia of the extent to
which protection is provided against persecution or mistreatment through:
(a) the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in which
they are applied;
(b) observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and/or the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and/or the
Convention against Torture, in particular the rights from which derogation
cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the said European Convention;
(c) respect of the non-refoulement principle according to the Geneva Conven-
tion;
(d) provision for a system of effective remedies against violations of these rights
and freedoms.
451
Section III – Asylum
ANNEX III
When implementing the provisions of this Directive Spain may, insofar as the
provisions of “Ley 30/1992 de Régimen jurídico de las Administraciones Públi-
cas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común” of 26 November 1992 and “Ley
29/1998 reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa” of 13 July 1998
continues to apply, consider that, for the purposes of Chapter V, the definition
of “applicant” or “applicant for asylum” in Article 2(c) of the Directive shall
include an “appellant” as established in the above mentioned Acts.
Spain will notify the European Commission of any relevant amendments to the
above mentioned Act.
452
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
1 Summary
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on the minimum standards for giving temporary
protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving and bearing
the consequences thereof1 was the first of the asylum measures under Title IV
EC Treaty to be adopted (leaving aside the European Refugee Fund). Member
States were required to implement the provisions of the Directive into national
law by 31 December 2002 (Article 32), except for Ireland, which opted in later
and had to apply the Directive by the end of 2003.2 In practice, the Directive
had not been invoked as of 15 October 2005. The Commission has brought
infringement proceedings against a number of Member States for failure to
adopt national legislation to implement the Directive on time.3
When the Commission proposed the Directive, it based the rationale for the
Directive on events in Kosovo and the disruption that mass influxes can have on
the asylum systems of Member States. The Directive was designed to provide
temporary measures to provide protection to those displaced without inundat-
ing Member States’ asylum systems.
1 OJ 2001 L 212/12.
2 Commission Decision 2003/690, OJ 2003 L 251/23.
3 As of 1 January 2006, two cases had been decided by the Court of Justice in favour
of the Commission (Cases C-454/04 Commission v Luxembourg, judgment of 2 June
2005 and C-476/04 Commission v Greece, judgment of 17 Nov. 2005, both unre-
ported); two had been withdrawn, presumably due to compliance by the Member
States (Cases C-515/04 Commission v Belgium and C-461/04 Commission v Nether-
lands); and two cases were still pending (Cases C-451/04 Commission v France and
C-455/04 Commission v UK).
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 453-485.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section III – Asylum
The lengthy preamble to the Directive refers to various conflicts in the Bal-
kans and the “lessons” to be learned from response to such crises. The preamble
states that the measures should be based on solidarity between Member States
and compatible with obligations under the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees.
Article 2 defines various concepts in the Directive including “temporary
protection” and “mass influx”. Temporary protection is defined as an excep-
tional procedure provided in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx
of displaced persons unable to return to their country of origin. A mass influx
is defined as the arrival in the European Community of a large number of dis-
placed persons whether their arrival was spontaneous or aided for example
through an evacuation programme.
Article 3 makes clear that temporary protection is not to prejudge refugee
status determination. Member States are required to apply temporary protec-
tion with due respect for human rights. Member States are able to retain more
favourable provisions.
Article 4 provides that temporary protection is for one year, automatically
extendable for 6 month periods for a maximum of one further year. Where con-
ditions persist the Council can decide to extend protection for up to one addi-
tional year (making the maximum period of temporary protection 3 years).
Article 5 makes clear that the existence of mass influx must be established
by a Council Decision adopted by qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission. The Commission’s proposal must specify the groups of people to
which the protection will apply, the date from which it will take effect and some
estimation of the scale of mass influx. The Council Decision is to be based on
an examination of the situation and scale of mass influx, information received
from UNHCR and other organisations and an assessment of the “advisabil-
ity” of establishing temporary measure. The European Parliament is only to be
informed of the Decision.
Article 6 provides for the circumstances in which temporary protection
comes to an end. Prior to the end of the maximum duration period this will be
by Council Decision adopted by qualified majority.
Member States can extend temporary protection to other categories of dis-
placed persons not specified in the Council Decision providing that they are
displaced for the same reasons and are from the same region or country (Article
7).
Articles 8 to 16 set out the obligations of the Member States towards per-
sons with temporary protection. In particular, Member States are to provide
such persons with residence permits (Article 8(1)). Such persons must be able
to engage in employed or self-employed activities as well as vocational and
educational training (Article 12). Member States are to ensure that those with
temporary protection are given suitable accommodation and necessary social
454
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
assistance (Article 13(1) and (2)). Member States are to provide necessary medi-
cal and social assistance with those with special needs (Article 13(4)).
Children with temporary protection should be granted access to education
on a non-discriminatory basis as own nationals in the host member State. Adults
may be permitted access to the general education system (Article 14).
Article 15 obliges Member States to reunite family members who have
become separated during their departure from their country of origin ,either
where the family members are in different Member States or where some family
member remain outside the EU but are in need of temporary protection.
Article 16 obliges Member States to provide unaccompanied minors with
representation or legal guardianship. Member States are directed to place unac-
companied minors with relatives, a foster family, in special reception facilities or
with a person who the minor fled with.
Articles 17 to 19 relate to access to the asylum procedure for those granted
temporary protection. Such persons must be able to lodge an asylum applica-
tion at any time. Examination of that claim must be completed after the end of
the temporary protection period if it was not completed before. Member States
are able to provide that a person cannot be granted temporary protection at the
same time as being treated as asylum seeker. A person denied refugee status or
another form of protection should be granted temporary protection if he or she
is still eligible for that protection.
Article 20 provides that normal laws on protection and aliens will apply
at the end of the temporary protection period. Member States are to facilitate
voluntary return with respect for human dignity (Article 21). Decisions about
voluntary return are to be made with full knowledge of the facts by the person
concerned. If, during the period of temporary protection, the person returns
to his country of origin and then wishes to return to the host Member State,
favourable consideration should be given to such request. Article 22 provides
that Member States are to take into account compelling humanitarian reasons
making a forced return at the end of temporary protection “unreasonable”.
Member States are required to take necessary measures in respect of those who
cannot be removed because of ill-health (Article 23).
Articles 24 to 26 concern Community solidarity and the spirit in which the
Directive is to be implemented. Provision is made for situations where the mass
influx exceeds the reception capacity of a Member State (Article 25(3)). Article
27 concerns the appointment of national contact points for administrative co-
operation.
Article 28 provides that Member States may exclude a person from tempo-
rary protection in certain circumstances based on the conduct of that person.
Persons excluded from the benefit of temporary protection, or from family
reunion, must be able to bring legal challenges (Article 29). There is no further
detail on the procedural rights which must be guaranteed in the event of such
challenges, but the general principles of EC law will require that Member States
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Section III – Asylum
guarantee a fair hearing and an effective remedy.4 The Commission was obliged
to produce a report on the Directive by the end of 2004, including the possible
proposal of any amendments,5 but had not done so by 1 January 2006. In accor-
dance with Article 67(5) EC, any amendments to the legislation, if proposed by
the Commission, would have to be adopted by use of qualified majority voting
in the Council along with the co-decision procedure for the European Parlia-
ment (EP).6
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
term measures for the persons concerned. For the first five years of the regime,
Member States had the option to suspend consideration of applications for
asylum. The Council would have to consider assistance to Member States par-
ticularly affected by the situation.
As for the content of the status, Member States would have to issue a
residence authorisation and permit family reunion with spouses and minor
dependent children. Beneficiaries could take up gainful activity with rules on
remuneration, social security and working conditions the same as those apply-
ing to refugees. Similarly, there would be equality with recognised refugees as
regards housing and education, although in the former case Member States
could provisionally offer temporary housing for one year. Member States would
also have to provide for welfare and health.
In its opinion on the proposal,11 the EP argued that there should be a five-
year maximum for any temporary protection regime, with a three-year maxi-
mum on suspending consideration of asylum applications. Beneficiaries should
continue to have the benefits of temporary protection if their application for
asylum was rejected, and their status at the end of the regime should be more
precise. There should be a more definite obligation to provide financial support
for Member States, with redistribution of persons as a back-up. Beneficiaries’
status should be enhanced by the right to free movement within a Member State
and the issue of documents confirming their rights and obligations, but the EP
suggested a weakening of the right to family reunion.
Within the JHA Council, the proposal was welcomed at the May 1997
meeting, but a discussion at the December 1997 Council revealed major divi-
sions over burden-sharing as regards admission and cost and different views on
whether to have more binding rules on this issue. A note from the incoming UK
Presidency asked Member States to consider what foundations there were for
agreement in light of the great divergence of views.12 In light of the difficulties
of negotiations and the position of the EP, the Commission proposed a revised
text of the Joint Action in June 1998, coupled with a parallel proposal for a Joint
Action on “burden-sharing” among Member States.13
This revised text accepted a number of amendments suggested by the EP,
including a maximum five-year period of temporary protection and a three-year
maximum period for suspending claims (with a possible two-year extension).
These provisions were also supplemented by providing that it would be impos-
sible to retain temporary protection status if a person applied for asylum, but
that (as the EP had suggested), temporary protection status would be retained if
the asylum application was rejected. The rules on status were amended only to
11 OJ 1997 C 339/196.
12 Council doc. 13665/97, 23 Dec. 1997. On the outcome of these discussions, see
Council doc. 8053/98, 28 Apr. 1998.
13 COM (98) 372, 24 June 1998; OJ 1998 C 268.
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Section III – Asylum
provide that persons would have to receive a residence authorisation before they
could enjoy any substantive rights. In the parallel proposal, the Commission
suggested that the principal means of “burden-sharing” should be financial sup-
port, but that movement of people could be considered as an ancillary measure.
The Dublin Convention would apply to responsibility for applications, unless a
Member State suspended consideration of asylum applications.
These new proposals gained wide support from the EP, which pressed for
a maximum of three years’ temporary protection and priority to allocation of
persons, rather than funding. It also pressed again for a document detailing the
rights of beneficiaries and wanted to permit “partners” to enter.14
However, it still proved hard to get agreement in the Council. At the Decem-
ber 1998 JHA Council, most Member States wanted to keep a link between a
temporary protection regime and “solidarity”, most wanted “solidarity” to con-
sist of financial support only, and most believed that decision-making to estab-
lish and terminate a regime should be by a qualified majority vote. However, a
minority took different views on each point and was unwilling to compromise.
To break the deadlock, the German Council Presidency suggested a “pledging
procedure” in which Member States would indicate their capacity to admit per-
sons; this would be linked to financial solidarity.15 The Finnish Presidency fol-
lowed this up with an attempt to restart negotiations on a number of issues,16
but the Council left the issue to one side until the Commission’s proposal the fol-
lowing year. In the meantime, a Joint Action giving modest financial support to
refugees and asylum-seekers, including those entering as a result of the Kosovo
crisis, was adopted.17 Furthermore, during consideration of the proposed tem-
porary protection measures during the Austrian and German Presidencies, the
text on status was watered down so that is was less obligatory and greater stress
was placed on movement of persons than financial support. A readmission obli-
gation and (in line with the EP’s views) a provision on information to the ben-
eficiaries were included.18
Discussions resumed again when the Commission, taking advantage of
the apparent firming of political will on this issue following the Kosovo crisis,
proposed the first EC Directive on asylum law in spring 2000.19 The proposed
Directive followed the structure of the proposed Joint Action, but suggested
458
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
459
Section III – Asylum
23 See Council doc. 6128/01, 16 Feb. 2001; for earlier more technical amendments see
Council doc. 6128/01, 15 Jan. 2001.
24 See Council doc. 6552/01, 27 Feb. 2001; see earlier questions sent to SCIFA (Coun-
cil doc. 6303/01, 16 Feb. 2001).
25 Council doc. 6914/01, 19 Mar. 2001.
26 Council doc. 7602/01, 3 Apr. 2001.
27 See Council doc. 7964/01, 18 Apr. 2001.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
the text,28 and the JHA Council of May 2001 reached an agreement. However,
formal adoption was delayed until July 2001,29 because the German interior
minister believed that his delegation had overstepped its mandate. Various
reservations about the Council voting procedure and the solidarity provisions
were withdrawn and the final changes made consisted essentially of techni-
cal amendments to the provisions on family reunion, the creation of a distinct
clause on legal challenges, allocation of responsibility for asylum applications
to the Member State which has accepted a person’s transfer onto its territory
and acceptance that an extension of the temporary protection regime could only
take place on a proposal from the Commission.
The EP had voted in March 2001 for a number of amendments to the pro-
posal,30 including three which the Council had already agreed to some extent
during negotiations: application of the Directive to evacuation, a reference to
non-refoulement obligations and an extension of the exclusion provisions.31 The
other amendments suggested by the EP, concerning priority for allocation of
persons (rather than use of EC money), immediate assistance to those with pro-
tection needs before deciding on temporary protection status and easier admis-
sion for persons needing temporary protection, were not adopted in any form.
However, the proposal to limit application of the Dublin Convention by allocat-
ing responsibility to the host Member State was subsequently agreed in trun-
cated form. While the EP clearly had a limited impact during discussions on the
Directive, it should be borne in mind that many of the amendments it proposed
to the Joint Actions in 1997 and 1998 are reflected in the final Directive.
3 Legal Analysis
The central question in respect of the temporary protection Directive is com-
patibility with the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and other inter-
national human rights obligations.32 On the one hand, the Directive is at odds
with the 1951 Convention since it permits and seemingly encourages Member
States to delay individual refugee status determination whilst temporary protec-
tion measures are invoked. The 1951 Convention requires Contracting States
to recognise those in need of international protection as refugees. On the other
hand, the Directive could be argued to be an example of a humanitarian mea-
sure, designed to provide status and protection to those who need it in a civil
war or other crisis situation. It is probably fair to observe that if there was a very
28 See room docs. asile 04/01, 27 Apr. 2001; asile 05/01 rev 1, 10 May 2001; asile 6/01,
23 May 2001; and Council doc. 8964/01, 18 May 2001.
29 Directive 2001/55 (n. 1 above).
30 OJ 2001 C 343, adopted 15 Mar. 2001.
31 Compare with Council doc. 6914/01, n. 25 above, which sets out the position as of
5/6 March 2001.
32 On the status of the Convention in EC law, see Ch. 5.
461
Section III – Asylum
4 Commentary
4.1 General Observations
It is interesting that the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for a Direc-
tive refers to events in Kosovo, since as a matter of international law, this crisis
did not directly involve the responsibility of EU Member States. The crisis was
in fact a humanitarian situation taking place in the non-EU countries bordering
Kosovo, which was likely to implode and might have had repercussions for the
EU in the long run. If the Council is likely to invoke the use of the Directive in
situations which do not involve mass influx into the EU territory but instead a
crisis outside the EU, then the Directive is to be welcomed as a refugee responsi-
bility sharing mechanism. It could be very beneficial for the relieving burdens in
regions of conflict in that it could be used in situations to relieve humanitarian
situations in regions of origin of refugees and the neighbouring regions of war
torn countries.33
Less comfortable is the prospect of the Council invoking the Directive in
situations of perceived mass influx of refugees into the EU. The Member States’
obligations to provide refugee protection to those that require it is well-estab-
lished. In those circumstances, the Directive is plainly a mechanism that could
be invoked by Member States to avoid refugee determination and a mechanism
for delaying decision-making until the circumstances in the refugees’ country
of origin has improved, even if that is temporary or marginal. Whilst refugee
protection under the Geneva Convention is not intended to be permanent, it is
intended to provide protection until change in the refugee’s country of origin is
substantial and sustainable.
33 The definition of mass influx in Article 2(d) of the Directive refers to situations of
large movements of people including where they are evacuated into the Commu-
nity.
462
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
It is interesting to note that in the time since the Directive came into force,
despite major international conflict during that period in the Middle East,
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Directive has not been invoked. It was always unlikely
that the Council would feel it appropriate to invoke the Directive to bring large
numbers of refugees into the EU from such regions as a humanitarian measure
given their distance from the EU and the fact that instability in those regions
was unlikely to have a direct impact on stability in the EU itself. However it is
also indicative of the fact that despite such large scale conflicts, which resulted
in huge displacement of people in the regions of origin, the EU remained largely
unaffected by such movements. Perhaps this is the result of the reinforcement of
the fortress Europe and the sure sign that border controls are working in stem-
ming the flows of refugees into Europe.
However, what is more likely is that the lack of need to invoke the Direc-
tive is an indication that the Member States have never been the recipients of
mass influxes, or not at least since the Second World War. Refugee flows are far
greater in other parts of the world and the EU receives only a tiny proportion
of the world’s refugees, putting its responsibility sharing shamefully low. The
question remains whether the negotiation of the temporary protection Directive
was ever really justified and whether it will be consigned to the dusty shelves of
unused legislation. Plainly unless it is invoked to aid relief in regions of origin
from severe overburden and humanitarian crisis, its use is unlikely to ever be
properly justified.
463
Section III – Asylum
guaranteed are far greater than those that are guaranteed under the temporary
protection Directive. Third, the longer that refugee determination is delayed,
the less that individuals remember accurately and more likely that there will
be problems with the consistency and accuracy of accounts given by the appli-
cants. This in turn may lead to real difficulties for Member States in identifying
those who are in need of international protection at the end of the temporary
protection period. Finally, the uncertainty created for the particularly vulner-
able at the end of the temporary protection period may cause further harm to
certain individuals, particularly those with mental health problems. There is a
good argument that their application for refugee status at the very least should
be determined as early as possible to avoid uncertainty and insecurity for those
vulnerable individuals if Member States are to act compatibly with their obliga-
tions under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR.
It might also appear at first sight that Member States could use their discre-
tion, granted by Article 19(1) of the Directive, to preclude persons from enjoying
both asylum-seeker status and temporary protection status, in order to preclude
them from making asylum applications. But this interpretation must be rejected,
since it would undermine the right to submit an asylum application at any time
as set out in Article 17(1) of the Directive, as well as the asylum procedures direc-
tive, which does not provide for any relevant grounds permitting Member States
to preclude persons from making asylum applications. As a derogation from
the normal rule that asylum applications should be examined by the respon-
sible Member State, Article 17 of the temporary protection Directive should be
interpreted as narrowly as possible, so that it only grants a discretion to suspend
consideration of an asylum application, rather than a power to reject it or rule it
inadmissible. In turn, Article 19(1) of this Directive only confers a power upon
Member States to refuse to confer the benefits of temporary protection status
upon an asylum-seeker, rather than a power to refuse to consider a person to be
an asylum-seeker at all. If a Member State applies Article 19(1), and the asylum-
seeker chooses temporary protection status rather than asylum-seeker status, the
asylum application merely remains dormant in accordance with Article 17(1)
of the Directive; it could not be considered explicitly or implicitly withdrawn
pursuant to the asylum procedures Directive.
The lack of a general remedies provision in this Directive is of further con-
cern. Whilst the Directive refers to remedies for those in respect of whom a
Member State has determined should be excluded from temporary protection
by reason of criminal or suspected criminal conduct, there is no express provi-
sion concerning a remedy against the failure to grant temporary protection for
other reasons (except regarding family reunion). It is highly undesirable and
potentially in breach of ECHR obligations, in particular Article 13 ECHR,
for individuals to have no access to a procedure for challenging or questioning
the denial of temporary protection in other circumstances, although it is obvi-
464
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
ously strongly arguable that the general principles of EC law nonetheless require
Member States to provide for such a remedy.35
465
Section III – Asylum
precisely correspond with any of those set out in the Dublin Convention or its
replacement Regulation;39 it should presumably be regarded as a lex specialis rule
applicable if the temporary protection Directive is ever applied. Finally, there is
a link with the EC’s qualifications Directive,40 as it is provided in the temporary
protection Directive that, as noted above, notwithstanding the rejection of an
asylum application, or an application for another form of protection, an appli-
cant will retain temporary protection status under this Directive. This also has
implications for the operation of the EC legislation on asylum procedures, as a
rejection of the merits or admissibility of an application in combination with the
apparent lack of suspensive effect of an appeal under the procedures Directive
could not result in a person being removed pursuant to the temporary protection
Directive, because of the retention of temporary protection status. Equally, the
proposed Directive on expulsion standards (if adopted) would not be applicable
to persons with temporary protection status under this Directive.41
39 On these measures, see Ch. 11; the Reg. was adopted 18 months after the temporary
protection Directive, but makes no reference to it. In the absence of any deroga-
tion, the Eurodac Regulation (see Ch. 10) will also apply to persons with temporary
protection if they apply for asylum, but that would not preclude the operation of
the Directive’s lex specialis rule on responsibility. The combined application of the
family reunion rules in this Directive and the Dublin responsibility rules has not
been thought through and could cause complications in practice: see Peers, “EC
law on family members of persons seeking or receiving international protection” in
Shah, ed., The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (Cavendish, 2005).
40 See Ch. 13.
41 COM(2005) 391, 1 Sept. 2005. In particular, the obligation to issue residence per-
mits pursuant to Art. 8 of the temporary protection directive would preclude con-
sidering temporary protection beneficiaries as “illegally staying” (Arts. 2(1)(b) and
3(b) of the 2005 proposal). The temporary protection Directive is not listed as a
“more favourable” measure trumping the expulsion proposal pursuant to Art. 4(2)
of that proposal, but that list is non-exhaustive (“in particular”). Once temporary
protection has ended, the expulsion proposal (if adopted) could be relevant, sub-
ject to the specific protections laid out in Arts. 21-23 of the temporary protection
Directive. Unfortunately, the list of EC legislation that would trump the obligation
to list a person in the second version of the Schengen Information System is not
expressly non-exhaustive, and does not mention the temporary protection Directive
(Art. 15(2) of proposed SIS II Regulation, COM (2005) 236, 31 May 2005).
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
42 See Art. 3(4) and (5) of the 2000 Decision (OJ 2000 L 252/12) and Art. 3(4) of the
2004 Decision (OJ 2004 L 381/52).
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Section III – Asylum
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular point 2(a) and (b) of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,
Whereas:
(2) Cases of mass influx of displaced persons who cannot return to their coun-
try of origin have become more substantial in Europe in recent years. In
these cases it may be necessary to set up exceptional schemes to offer them
immediate temporary protection.
(3) In the conclusions relating to persons displaced by the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia adopted by the Ministers responsible for immigration at their
meetings in London on 30 November and 1 December 1992 and Copenha-
gen on 1 and 2 June 1993, the Member States and the Community institu-
tions expressed their concern at the situation of displaced persons.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
(5) The Action Plan of the Council and the Commission of 3 December 1998
provides for the rapid adoption, in accordance with the Treaty of Amster-
dam, of minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced
persons from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin
and of measures promoting a balance of effort between Member States in
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving displaced persons.
(9) Those standards and measures are linked and interdependent for reasons of
effectiveness, coherence and solidarity and in order, in particular, to avert
the risk of secondary movements. They should therefore be enacted in a
single legal instrument.
(10) This temporary protection should be compatible with the Member States’
international obligations as regards refugees. In particular, it must not pre-
judge the recognition of refugee status pursuant to the Geneva Convention
of 28 July 1951 on the status of refugees, as amended by the New York
Protocol of 31 January 1967, ratified by all the Member States.
(11) The mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
regarding refugees and other persons in need of international protection
should be respected, and effect should be given to Declaration No 17,
annexed to the Final Act to the Treaty of Amsterdam, on Article 63 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community which provides that consulta-
tions are to be established with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and other relevant international organisations on matters relating
to asylum policy.
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Section III – Asylum
(12) It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States have
the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for persons
enjoying temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced
persons.
(13) Given the exceptional character of the provisions established by this Direc-
tive in order to deal with a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced
persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of
origin, the protection offered should be of limited duration.
(15) The Member States’ obligations as to the conditions of reception and res-
idence of persons enjoying temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons should be determined. These obligations should
be fair and offer an adequate level of protection to those concerned.
(17) Member States should, in concert with the Commission, enforce adequate
measures so that the processing of personal data respects the standard
of protection of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
(18) Rules should be laid down to govern access to the asylum procedure in the
context of temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced
persons, in conformity with the Member States’ international obligations
and with the Treaty.
(19) Provision should be made for principles and measures governing the return
to the country of origin and the measures to be taken by Member States in
respect of persons whose temporary protection has ended.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
a mass influx. The mechanism should consist of two components. The first
is financial and the second concerns the actual reception of persons in the
Member States.
(23) Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely to establish minimum
standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of
displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between
the Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiv-
ing such persons, cannot be sufficiently attained by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of
the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in
that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to
achieve those objectives.
(24) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom
gave notice, by letter of 27 September 2000, of its wish to take part in the
adoption and application of this Directive.
(25) Pursuant to Article 1 of the said Protocol, Ireland is not participating in the
adoption of this Directive. Consequently and without prejudice to Article
4 of the aforementioned Protocol, the provisions of this Directive do not
apply to Ireland.
471
Section III – Asylum
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
The purpose of this Directive is to establish minimum standards for giving tem-
porary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third
countries who are unable to return to their country of origin and to promote a
balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the conse-
quences of receiving such persons.
Article 2
472
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
or custom, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care
of such a person, or minors who are left unaccompanied after they have
entered the territory of the Member States;
(g) “residence permit” means any permit or authorisation issued by the author-
ities of a Member State and taking the form provided for in that State’s
legislation, allowing a third country national or a stateless person to reside
on its territory;
(h) “sponsor” means a third-country national enjoying temporary protection
in a Member State in accordance with a decision taken under Article 5 and
who wants to be joined by members of his or her family.
Article 3
2. Member States shall apply temporary protection with due respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and their obligations regarding
non-refoulement.
4. This Directive shall not apply to persons who have been accepted under
temporary protection schemes prior to its entry into force.
5. This Directive shall not affect the prerogative of the Member States to
adopt or retain more favourable conditions for persons covered by tempo-
rary protection.
CHAPTER II
DURATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
TEMPORARY PROTECTION
Article 4
473
Section III – Asylum
2. Where reasons for temporary protection persist, the Council may decide by
qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also
examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the
Council, to extend that temporary protection by up to one year.
Article 5
3. The Council Decision shall have the effect of introducing temporary protec-
tion for the displaced persons to which it refers, in all the Member States, in
accordance with the provisions of this Directive. The Decision shall include
at least:
(a) a description of the specific groups of persons to whom the temporary
protection applies;
(b) the date on which the temporary protection will take effect;
(c) information received from Member States on their reception capacity;
(d) information from the Commission, UNHCR and other relevant inter-
national organisations.
Article 6
474
Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
2. The Council Decision shall be based on the establishment of the fact that
the situation in the country of origin is such as to permit the safe and
durable return of those granted temporary protection with due respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and Member States’ obligations
regarding non-refoulement. The European Parliament shall be informed of
the Council Decision.
Article 7
2. The provisions of Articles 24, 25 and 26 shall not apply to the use of the
possibility referred to in paragraph 1, with the exception of the struc-
tural support included in the European Refugee Fund set up by Decision
2000/596/EC, under the conditions laid down in that Decision.
CHAPTER III
OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES TOWARDS PERSONS
ENJOYING TEMPORARY PROTECTION
Article 8
1. The Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to provide persons
enjoying temporary protection with residence permits for the entire dura-
tion of the protection. Documents or other equivalent evidence shall be
issued for that purpose.
475
Section III – Asylum
for obtaining the necessary visas, including transit visas. Formalities must
be reduced to a minimum because of the urgency of the situation. Visas
should be free of charge or their cost reduced to a minimum.
Article 9
The Member States shall provide persons enjoying temporary protection with
a document, in a language likely to be understood by them, in which the provi-
sions relating to temporary protection and which are relevant to them are clearly
set out.
Article 10
Article 11
A Member State shall take back a person enjoying temporary protection on its
territory, if the said person remains on, or, seeks to enter without authorisation
onto, the territory of another Member State during the period covered by the
Council Decision referred to in Article 5. Member States may, on the basis of a
bilateral agreement, decide that this Article should not apply.
Article 12
The Member States shall authorise, for a period not exceeding that of tempo-
rary protection, persons enjoying temporary protection to engage in employed
or self-employed activities, subject to rules applicable to the profession, as well
as in activities such as educational opportunities for adults, vocational train-
ing and practical workplace experience. For reasons of labour market policies,
Member States may give priority to EU citizens and citizens of States bound
by the Agreement on the European Economic Area and also to legally resident
third-country nationals who receive unemployment benefit.
The general law in force in the Member States applicable to remuneration, access
to social security systems relating to employed or self-employed activities and
other conditions of employment shall apply.
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Article 13
1. The Member States shall ensure that persons enjoying temporary protec-
tion have access to suitable accommodation or, if necessary, receive the
means to obtain housing.
2. The Member States shall make provision for persons enjoying temporary
protection to receive necessary assistance in terms of social welfare and
means of subsistence, if they do not have sufficient resources, as well as for
medical care. Without prejudice to paragraph 4, the assistance necessary for
medical care shall include at least emergency care and essential treatment
of illness.
Article 14
1. The Member States shall grant to persons under 18 years of age enjoy-
ing temporary protection access to the education system under the same
conditions as nationals of the host Member State The Member States may
stipulate that such access must be confined to the state education system.
2. The Member States may allow adults enjoying temporary protection access
to the general education system.
Article 15
1. For the purpose of this Article, in cases where families already existed in
the country of origin and were separated due to circumstances surrounding
the mass influx, the following persons shall be considered to be part of a
family:
(a) the spouse of the sponsor or his/her unmarried partner in a stable
relationship, where the legislation or practice of the Member State
concerned treats unmarried couples in a way comparable to married
couples under its law relating to aliens; the minor unmarried children
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Section III – Asylum
3. Where the sponsor enjoys temporary protection in one Member State and
one or some family members are not yet in a Member State, the Member
State where the sponsor enjoys temporary protection shall reunite family
members, who are in need of protection, with the sponsor in the case of
family members where it is satisfied that they fall under the description of
paragraph 1(a). The Member State may reunite family members, who are in
need of protection, with the sponsor in the case of family members where
it is satisfied that they fall under the description of paragraph 1(b), taking
into account on a case by case basis the extreme hardship which they would
face if the reunification did not take place.
4. When applying this Article, the Member States shall taken into consider-
ation the best interests of the child.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
Article 16
1. The Member States shall as soon as possible take measures to ensure the
necessary representation of unaccompanied minors enjoying temporary
protection by legal guardianship, or, where necessary, representation by an
organisation which is responsible for the care and well-being of minors, or
by any other appropriate representation.
2. During the period of temporary protection Member States shall provide for
unaccompanied minors to be placed:
(a) with adult relatives;
(b) with a foster-family;
(c) in reception centres with special provisions for minors, or in other
accommodation suitable for minors;
(d) with the person who looked after the child when fleeing.
The Member States shall take the necessary steps to enable the placement.
Agreement by the adult person or persons concerned shall be established
by the Member States. The views of the child shall be taken into account in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
CHAPTER IV
ACCESS TO THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE IN THE
CONTEXT OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION
Article 17
2. The examination of any asylum application not processed before the end of
the period of temporary protection shall be completed after the end of that
period.
Article 18
The criteria and mechanisms for deciding which Member State is responsible for
considering an asylum application shall apply. In particular, the Member
State responsible for examining an asylum application submitted by a
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Section III – Asylum
Article 19
1. The Member States may provide that temporary protection may not be
enjoyed concurrently with the status of asylum seeker while applications
are under consideration.
2. Where, after an asylum application has been examined, refugee status or,
where applicable, other kind of protection is not granted to a person eligi-
ble for or enjoying temporary protection, the Member States shall, without
prejudice to Article 28, provide for that person to enjoy or to continue to
enjoy temporary protection for the remainder of the period of protection.
CHAPTER V
RETURN AND MEASURES AFTER TEMPORARY
PROTECTION HAS ENDED
Article 20
When the temporary protection ends, the general laws on protection and on
aliens in the Member States shall apply, without prejudice to Articles 21,
22 and 23.
Article 21
1. The Member States shall take the measures necessary to make possible
the voluntary return of persons enjoying temporary protection or whose
temporary protection has ended. The Member States shall ensure that the
provisions governing voluntary return of persons enjoying temporary pro-
tection facilitate their return with respect for human dignity.
The Member State shall ensure that the decision of those persons to return
is taken in full knowledge of the facts. The Member States may provide for
exploratory visits.
2. For such time as the temporary protection has not ended, the Member
States shall, on the basis of the circumstances prevailing in the country
of origin, give favourable consideration to requests for return to the host
Member State from persons who have enjoyed temporary protection and
exercised their right to a voluntary return.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
3. At the end of the temporary protection, the Member States may provide for
the obligations laid down in CHAPTER III to be extended individually to
persons who have been covered by temporary protection and are benefiting
from a voluntary return programme. The extension shall have effect until
the date of return.
Article 22
1. The Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the
enforced return of persons whose temporary protection has ended and who
are not eligible for admission is conducted with due respect for human dig-
nity.
Article 23
1. The Member States shall take the necessary measures concerning the con-
ditions of residence of persons who have enjoyed temporary protection
and who cannot, in view of their state of health, reasonably be expected to
travel; where for example they would suffer serious negative effects if their
treatment was interrupted. They shall not be expelled so long as that situa-
tion continues.
2. The Member States may allow families whose children are minors and
attend school in a Member State to benefit from residence conditions allow-
ing the children concerned to complete the current school period.
CHAPTER VI
SOLIDARITY
Article 24
The measures provided for in this Directive shall benefit from the European
Refugee Fund set up by Decision 2000/596/EC, under the terms laid down
in that Decision.
Article 25
1. The Member States shall receive persons who are eligible for temporary
protection in a spirit of Community solidarity. They shall indicate – in
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Section III – Asylum
3. When the number of those who are eligible for temporary protection fol-
lowing a sudden and massive influx exceeds the reception capacity referred
to in paragraph 1, the Council shall, as a matter of urgency, examine the
situation and take appropriate action, including recommending additional
support for Member States affected.
Article 26
1. For the duration of the temporary protection, the Member States shall
cooperate with each other with regard to transferral of the residence of
persons enjoying temporary protection from one Member State to another,
subject to the consent of the persons concerned to such transferral.
4. Where a transfer is made from one Member State to another, the residence
permit in the Member State of departure shall expire and the obligations
towards the persons concerned relating to temporary protection in the
Member State of departure shall come to an end. The new host Member
State shall grant temporary protection to the persons concerned.
5. The Member States shall use the model pass set out in Annex I for transfers
between Member States of persons enjoying temporary protection.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
CHAPTER VII
ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Article 27
CHAPTER VIII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Article 28
1. The Member States may exclude a person from temporary protection if:
(a) there are serious reasons for considering that:
(i) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or
a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instru-
ments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(ii) he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
Member State of reception prior to his or her admission to that
Member State as a person enjoying temporary protection. The
severity of the expected persecution is to be weighed against the
nature of the criminal offence of which the person concerned is
suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an
allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-polit-
ical crimes. This applies both to the participants in the crime and
to its instigators;
(iii) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations;
(b) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to
the security of the host Member State or, having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, he or she is a danger to
the community of the host Member State.
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Section III – Asylum
CHAPTER IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 29
Persons who have been excluded from the benefit of temporary protection or
family reunification by a Member State shall be entitled to mount a legal chal-
lenge in the Member State concerned.
Article 30
The Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringe-
ments of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall
take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties
provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Article 31
1. Not later than two years after the date specified in Article 32, the Com-
mission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the
application of this Directive in the Member States and shall propose any
amendments that are necessary. The Member States shall send the Com-
mission all the information that is appropriate for drawing up this report.
Article 32
1. The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and admin-
istrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December
2002 at the latest. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
2. When the Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a refer-
ence to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the
occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such a refer-
ence shall be laid down by the Member States.
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Chapter 15 Temporary Protection
ANNEX I (OMITTED)
ANNEX II
The providing Member State shall notify any corrected information to the
requesting Member State.
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Temporary Protection
Geza Tessenyi
1 Scope
“Many commentators have outlined dreadful prospects for the future of Afghan-
istan, using words like ‘Lebanization’, ‘Vietnamization’ or ‘Mongolianization’.
It is an unquestioned fact that if outside powers involved themselves more in
Afghanistan’s economic future and less in its politics, the prospects of both would
be far brighter. Afghanistan needs the help of the international community. The
choice is between abandoning the Afghan people to their fate – which can only
mean more suffering and instability, with disastrous effects for Pakistan – or
providing the resources necessary to help them build a future and induce them to
leave the refugee camps.” 1
Aga Khan’s words, with 11 years of perspective, sadly demonstrate how the
international community and Afghanistan itself managed to exceed, by far, any
pessimistic forecasts concerning the country’s future – and its impact on the
outside world. If there were approximately five million Afghan refugees in Paki-
stan and in Iran in the summer of 1990, the situation in November 2001 was no
better except that the country was at war and civil war, and about five millions of
the Afghani population were seeking protection in other countries. It has been
the largest ethnic refugee group in the world – throughout more than a decade.
It was the Afghans who were turned away from the shores of Australia and it
was the Afghans who tried to cross the English Channel from Calais. It was the
Afghans who stayed forgotten in refugee camps in Pakistan for years and it was
1 Sadruddin Aga Khan: Looking into the 1990s: Afghanistan and other Refugee
Crises, Symposium on International Human Rights Law, Yale Law School, 6-7
April 1990.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 487-504.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Geza Tessenyi
also them who were stuck behind the borders of deadly Afghanistan, unable to
flee through the closed borders. There are promises in the air today that this will
not happen again.
If anything, this was a massive flow during the 1990s, bridging to, and cul-
minating in the year 2001, yet it had no effect on the development of the concept
of temporary protection, as we know it in Europe today. The European concept
has also little to do, except in name, with the American temporary protected
status, as the United States Congress in 1990 amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act.2 The birth of the concept dates back3 to wars in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia and related flows of refugees during the 1990s. For a fuller
treatment of the history and development of the concept, there is sufficient liter-
ature of different academic perspectives available.4 We will dwell in the following
pages on international and mainly pan-European standards as they developed,
concerning temporary protection, leaving aside, as much as possible, the inter-
related subject of solidarity and burden (or responsibility) sharing.5 Some less
known dimensions of this development will also be highlighted.
Not only legal but also some political aspects of the concept of tempo-
rary protection will be considered here. Neither national laws nor international
standards are created in a vacuum or in laboratories: state officials charged with
drafting are usually at least as much aware of the political context as of the
existing legal framework. Yet it is usually the political context that makes many
international drafting exercises confused, slow, inefficient and illogical. If, as the
proverb reads, the camel is a horse designed by a committee, then the horse
might become even more of a distant creature when the committee is an inter-
governmental gathering. Even if the result is not always as bad as the process,
no standards are better than bad standards. International standards are bad if
they lower the level of protection already granted by all or some of the states
involved. And international standards are also bad if they are beautiful on paper
but remain unfeasible or irrelevant for implementation. Therefore, what we seek
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Chapter 16 Massive Refugee Flows and Europe’s Temporary Protection
are standards in case of massive and sudden influx which provide adequate pro-
tection for the refugees, but which governments are able and willing to imple-
ment.6
One cannot start from anywhere else than from the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees. As to its aim and applicability today, at a time
of new massive refugee flows in Europe, one might wish to recall a pertinent
legal comment made by a great master of Roman Law, Celsus: “Scire leges non
hoc est, verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem”.7 In 50 years’ perspective, it
should be less relevant to analyze every word of the travaux preparatoires, the
Convention’s drafting process, and more important to see why the international
community still maintains this instrument in 2001. Despite some recent chal-
lenges to an “outdated” instrument,8 yesterday’s and today’s Refugee Conven-
tion is there to provide international protection to those who need it. All forms
of protection, even if considered outside the scope of the Convention, is derived
from, related to, and compared with the Geneva Convention’s definition, sense
and purpose.9
This is why the Convention matters more than its words. Our title uses the
term of massive refugee flows. Beyond a narrow understanding of the words of
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Geza Tessenyi
the Convention definition,10 refugees are, in a broader but still meaningful sense,
people who have been forced to flee their country, crossed one or more interna-
tionally recognized borders and are now in need of the protection of another
state or the international community.11 If international refugee protection makes
any sense, that sense is the effective and meaningful protection of the fundamen-
tal human rights of these people.
10 Art. 1 A. of the Convention “… the term “refugee” shall apply to any person
who: … ( 2 ) [As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and] owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence [as a result of such events] is unable or,
owing to such a fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
11 Consider alternative titles such as: Massive flows of persons in need, or not consid-
ered in need, of international protection. Or the EU Directive’s version of “mass
influx of displaced persons ... who may fall within the scope of Article 1 of the
Geneva Convention or other ... instruments” – Title and Art. 2 ( c ) of the Direc-
tive, op.cit. It is not a co-incidence that the Global Consultations on International
Protection of the UNHCR addressed the “Protection of refugees (my emphasis) in
situations of Mass Influx.” – see n. 28 below.
12 Section I. General, para 1. (my emphasis)
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OAU Convention as the same group of asylum seekers.13 And, by inserting the
word “include” in Conclusion 22, it was made clear that other categories than
these two might also be part of the large-scale influx.
Conclusion 22 is not a very ambitious document. It calls upon states only to
admit asylum seekers in large-scale influx situations in the state where they first
seek refuge, at least on a temporary basis and without discrimination, and to
observe the principle of non-refoulement, as contained in Article 33 of the 1951
Convention. The Conclusion is a bit more detailed on the treatment of asylum
seekers and finds that Article 31 of the Geneva Convention14 does not cover all
aspects of such treatment in situations of large-scale influx. Consequently, the
Conclusion lists some “minimum basic human rights standards”:
– restrictions on freedom of movement should only imposed if necessary in
the interest of public health or public order;
– enjoyment of fundamental civil rights;
– reception of assistance and provision of basic necessities;
– prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
– non-discrimination;
– recognition as persons before the law, free access to courts of law and
authorities;
– accommodation at a safe distance from the frontier of the country of
origin;
– respect for family unity and assistance for tracing relatives;
– special protection for minors, including the unaccompanied;
– permission for free correspondence and for material assistance from friends
and relatives;
– registration, facilitating to obtain a durable solution, transfer of assets;
– the facilitating of voluntary repatriation.
13 Art. 1. para. 2. of the 1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refu-
gee problems in Africa reads: “The term refugee shall also apply to every person
who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seri-
ously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”
14 “Article 31 – Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge – 1. The Contracting
States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence,
on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was
threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. – 2. The Contracting states
shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those
which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in
the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country ... .”
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Geza Tessenyi
Asylum seekers and the UNHCR “shall be” entitled to access to each other and
the UNHCR “shall be” allowed to supervise the well-being of persons in recep-
tion centres.15
The last section (IV) of the Conclusion addresses the large-scale influx
related issues of international solidarity, burden sharing and duties of states.
It is recognized how important links exist between massive or large-scale influx
and international burden-sharing to assist the most affected host countries. This
issue, as mentioned earlier, is not within the scope of our enquiry.
When considering EXCOM Conclusion 22, one may wonder why the inter-
national community, or at least Europe, needed in 1992-93 to embark upon a
discourse on a “new” temporary protection concept. Conclusion 22 was a reflec-
tion in 1981 of large-scale influx situations “in different areas of the world and
especially in developing countries”.16 The Yugoslav and, at that time in particu-
lar, the Bosnian flow happened in Europe. The most affected countries, led by
Germany17 with its 350 000 refugees in one year, made an attempt to develop a
multilateral European burden-sharing scheme in connection with some harmo-
nized “temporary protection” standards of admission and treatment. Officials
of Austria and Germany articulated at every possible opportunity that, in their
view, any international standard on temporary protection in massive influx situ-
ations was meaningless without a burden-sharing arrangement. Less affected
countries, more distant from former Yugoslavia, like France or the UK, were
not amused about developing a scheme and then, as a consequence, receiving
thousands of Bosnian refugees, coming through Germany, Austria, Switzerland
or Sweden.
Yet, there was an interest by European host governments to legitimise,
if possible through UNHCR consent, their developing policies and practices
toward new massive flows. The magic word was: flexibility. Flexibility meant
state discretion in admission, protection, entitlements, reception conditions and
return, instead of applying binding international standards and administrative
and appeal procedures as provided by domestic refugee law. The argument went:
if states had more flexibility (i.e. than the Geneva Convention and national refu-
15 Let us compare in one respect how the language is used in the Conclusion. One of
the difficulties in a drafting process of a non-binding document, such as an EXCOM
conclusion, is how to refer within a “should” oriented text to “shall” that is, to bind-
ing obligations. Conclusion 22 left the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment only at the “should” level while UNHCR-related entitlements are worded
with “shall”. It sounds like less obligatory not to torture than to allow UNHCR to
supervise.
16 Section I. General, para. 1.of the Conclusion.
17 Germany’s lead does not mean that other countries, Croatia and the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia in particular, did not have a much greater number of Bosnian
refugees in their territories.
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Chapter 16 Massive Refugee Flows and Europe’s Temporary Protection
gee regimes allowed), they would be able to be more generous in their admission
policies. As access to safety was the number one concern of the UNHCR, could
it have replied: yes, we want to be strict and legalistic, even at the risk of provid-
ing protection and safety for fewer refugees than otherwise possible?
The dilemma for UNHCR was, and has remained ever since, principles versus
people. If you do not compromise on the protection of principles, you might
have to compromise on the protection, particularly the access to safety, of actual
refugees. But if you compromise on principles, you might damage the protection
rights of future refugees and the future of the present refugees. In Europe, the
complementary protection mechanisms offered by the Refugee Convention and
the European Convention on Human Rights have often been compared. The
Refugee Convention, unlike the ECHR, does not have a supranational judicial
entity to interpret the Convention and enforce such interpretation on state par-
ties. The “duty of supervising the application of the provisions” of the Conven-
tion18 is the “strongest” tool for the UNHCR in this respect. Therefore, it is
the interplay among the UNHCR, governments, local politics, public opinion,
which will set the standards for interpretation of the Refugee Convention and
provide with new tools such as temporary protection. Nicholson in this volume
argues that the focus in recent years on temporary and subsidiary protection has
contributed to a potentially dangerous trend toward “the development of paral-
lel asylum regimes to that of the 1951 Convention which risk undermining the
vital protection it affords”.19 Only an international court of refugee law based on
competence, independence and a responsible balancing of interests could solve
such dilemmas. Criticised from all sides as it is, the European Court of Human
Rights shows the example that this, at least in a regional context, is possible.
In the 1992 Note on International Protection,20 the High Commissioner
stated: “... as a result of recent events involving the massive flows of refugees
from the former Yugoslavia, the notion of temporary protection is advocated
as a possible alternative to established asylum procedures.”21 The Note went
on stating that temporary protection requires minimum standards of protec-
tion against discrimination, refoulement, expulsion, basic standards of humane
treatment and fundamental human rights, in particular, family unity. Temporary
protection in “some parts of the world” was connected with safe return.
A series of “Informal meetings on temporary protection” by representatives
of interested governments and international organizations led to some more
elaborated paragraphs on temporary protection in the High Commissioner’s
1994 Note on International Protection. The new Note was more clearly linked
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Chapter 16 Massive Refugee Flows and Europe’s Temporary Protection
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Geza Tessenyi
there remained enough reason for confusing temporary protection with sub-
sidiary or complementary forms of protection (fleeing for reasons of conflict,
violence, human rights abuses, ethnic or religious persecution, specific personal
protection reasons), the Kosovo Conclusions make it clear that refugees and
other persons in need of international protection should be granted immediate
protection.
In the Conclusions, the minimum standards of treatment mostly echoed
earlier positions:
– admission to safety and non-refoulement,
– respect for basic human rights and dignity, including access to means of
subsistence and possibility for families to stay together and re-unite
– and no return measures applied without internationally verified conditions
of safety and dignity in the country of origin.
There were two new elements in this list. Firstly, the notion of access to “means
of subsistence”, adopted later on also by Council of Europe Recommendation
(2000) 9 on temporary protection, allowed to keep under one roof the host gov-
ernments’ different policies of authorizing (or not) refugees to work while under
temporary protection: access to work (gainful employment or self-employment),
subsidies and accommodation. Secondly, conditions for return must be verified
internationally.
Part 2 of the Conclusions on Kosovo advocated the often criticized concept
of protection in the region (“this would facilitate their future return in safety
and dignity…”). Refugee settlements should be located at a safe distance from
the border. In retrospect, it is easy to say that those worries about the poten-
tial consequences of keeping refugees in the region were ridiculed, within two
months, as hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians spontaneously returned
to Kosovo, not waiting for any return assistance from anyone, not even for land-
mine clearance. But the speed and intensity of the Kosovo outflow and return
flow were not characteristic to most other large-scale refugee situations, from
Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Another concept, new to intergovernmental documents, occurs in the text:
“Refugees should be consulted and encouraged to participate, as far as possible,
in the management of their settlements.”
Facing the consequences of grave humanitarian mistakes during the evacu-
ation process from Macedonia (including the forced separation of families), part
4 dealt with humanitarian evacuation. Humanitarian evacuation is an interest-
ing animal, bred in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. Anybody who would have
thought that taking refugees out of the most refugee-overcrowded neighbor-
ing countries to third countries was burden sharing at its best would have been
wrong. The deed was not re-settlement, either. It was only evacuation to prevent
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any impression of a longer stay, let alone integration. It was “a means of tempo-
rarily sharing the responsibilities by third countries”.29 The basic rules for such
evacuation included the informed choice of those to be evacuated, the provision
of registration and identity documents, the respect for family unity, no separa-
tion of family members against their will and, finally, the departure of vulner-
able persons but only if medically fit to travel.
Against the prevailing practice of the Yugoslav authorities and paramili-
tary of confiscating or destroying documents of fleeing refugees, registration
and documentation of identity and property became an important issue for the
refugees from Kosovo, as addressed by part 5 of the Conclusions. Part 7 on the
“right to return” remained extremely brief and general. Nobody could foresee
at the end of April 1999 the dramatic wave of “massive and sudden” voluntary
return within such a short time, and to talk in any detail about return in the
midst of the outflow and a raging war would have been seen as a heresy. Instead,
the right to return had to be emphasized as an act of rejection of ethnic cleans-
ing.
The Conclusions were spread the next morning “in the field” in Albania
and Macedonia by UNHCR offices and by some of the local authorities.
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and the harmonization process under way there which was recognized as comple-
mentary to the Global Consultations”.
32 Recommendation No. R (2000) 9 of the Committee of Ministers to member states
on temporary protection, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 May 2000.
33 Sixth and seventh paragraphs of the preamble.
34 EC/GC/01/4, 19 Feb. 2001, para 17-18
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according to the logic of chronology, appeared lower on the list but we will look
at it here.
There existed different practices in member states on how to deal with indi-
vidual asylum applications at the time of massive and sudden influx situations.
Some of the member states simply processed them. Some other states allowed
in their legislation the suspension of examination of asylum requests while the
applicants were under temporary protection. Suspension of examination is one
thing, rejection of examination is quite another. The “development of parallel
asylum regimes” was indeed a risk when asylum seekers in some European coun-
tries were offered and encouraged to trade in their right to seek asylum in the
framework of the 1951 Convention in exchange for lower but immediate benefits
under the temporary protection framework. This was particularly dangerous,
as for a “genuine refugee” safety, no doubt, was the first concern. If the refugee
accepted immediate safety in the form of temporary protection, he/she would
have renounced the right to seek refugee protection in the long term. However
broadly Recommendation (2000) 9 tried to accommodate different national leg-
islations and practices, this latter did not surface as an acceptable variation of
state practice in the text.
But, by stating that “... suspension of examination [of individual asylum
applications] should not last longer than can reasonably be justified by the
exceptional circumstances”,42 the recommendation pointed at a new direction.
If the original argument in favor of introducing temporary protection mea-
sures was serious that a sudden and massive influx would have overburdened
national asylum procedures, then one could hardly maintain throughout years
that not examining asylum applications at all was “reasonably justified”. There-
fore, if this provision was earnestly implemented, the practice of not dealing
with asylum applications until temporary protection ended would be completely
undermined.
The next item on the list was the treatment of vulnerable persons whose
protection and assistance needs, according to the recommendation, “should be
met, to the extent possible”.43 This laconic statement would not offer high guar-
antees for the persons concerned who, in the Explanatory Memorandum, were
identified as persons including victims of torture, abuse or sexual violence, single
heads of households, unaccompanied elderly and minors, the seriously ill or
injured and the disabled.
On the issue of entitlements to beneficiaries of temporary protection, apart
from the right to family reunion, four areas were considered by the recommen-
dation:
– access to adequate means of subsistence, including accommodation,
– access to appropriate health care,
42 Para 8, n. 32 above.
43 Para 5, ibid.
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Chapter 16 Massive Refugee Flows and Europe’s Temporary Protection
The last indent was meant to be a contradiction in terms. The words “in confor-
mity with national legislation” meant that in some Member States national leg-
islation prevents beneficiaries of temporary protection from access to the labour
market. On family reunion, the recommendation simply refers to another rec-
ommendation of the Council of Europe.45 Starting from the relevant case law
of the European Court of Human Rights and the principle that “members of
separated families can only enjoy their right to respect for family life through the
reunion of family members in a country where they can lead a normal family life
together,”46 Recommendation (99) 23 arrives at a disappointingly narrow defini-
tion of family members which include only the spouse, dependent minor chil-
dren and other relatives according to the recognition by domestic legislation or
practice in the member states, and ignores relevant European case law on family
links based on exclusive dependency and other considerations. Rights and enti-
tlements of joining family members, according to this recommendation, should
be the same as those of the original beneficiaries (refugees and other persons in
need of international protection).
As international solidarity and co-operation deserved only two rather
general provisions in Recommendation (2000) 9, we turn to the last “main and
disputed issue” on the list: return, integration and resettlement. Leaving aside
integration and resettlement, the recommendation entertained only return as the
main motivation behind the introduction of temporary protection measures in
some member states. As these measures cease to apply when the circumstances
in the country of origin have changed in a manner which enable the return in
safety and dignity,47 the first category of return is voluntary. It should be facili-
tated, through all available means, but the decision of the returnee should be
well-informed, which may include visit to the country of origin. The country of
origin should treat returnees with full respect for their human rights and dignity,
and respect their right to return. Compelling humanitarian reasons which would
make return impossible or unreasonable should be considered by host member
states.
In the end of this brief and selective survey which does not analyze the cor-
responding EU directive, one could conclude that the Refugee Convention could
44 Para 3, ibid.
45 Recommendation (99) 23 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on
family reunion for refugees and other persons in need of international protection,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 December 1999.
46 The fifth paragraph of the preamble of Recommendation (99) 23.
47 Para 9 of Recommendation (2000) 9.
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Geza Tessenyi
continue to serve well during massive and sudden outflow situations48 – in other
words, temporary protection would not be necessary – but temporary protection
is already here with us in Europe and probably will not go away quickly. If this
means that protection in massive influx situations moved from the mostly legal
towards the partly political (remember flexibility), then, firstly, the judicial prac-
tice of national courts and the European Court of Human Rights has an impor-
tant role to play in offering the safety net of refugee law, human rights law and,
to some extent, humanitarian law for those who need international protection.
Secondly, if the flexibility option is chosen by governments, it also requires
the backup of political credibility. In a democratic society, no policy decision
can be credible if those people who are most affected by the policy have no say
in its formulation and implementation at all. If the UN High Commissioner’s
“action” for the “identification and promotion of a global governance struc-
ture for refugees” and the “need to assist all States in establishing good gover-
nance for refugees”49 would result in a substantial involvement of refugees in
that governance structure, that would be a long due achievement. The refugee
protection regime acutely suffers from its democratic deficit of lacking refugee
participation. In massive influx situations it is even more striking that, occasion-
ally, the fate of hundreds of thousands of refugees is decided by everyone else
but themselves. In massive refugee situations in particular, representation of the
displaced in decision making processes is not a luxurious nuance but a necessity
for solutions that work and for policies that deserve credit. As previously said,
what the rules are is significantly influenced by who writes them.
The UNHCR, with the support of a sympathetic UN Secretary General,
could be the best facilitator for refugees quickly to develop everywhere their
own representation structures, as part of the good governance, provided for and
through them, by the international community. Without the genuine participa-
tion of the principal actor, governance just cannot be good.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common European
Asylum System in Line with International
Obligations
Frances Nicholson*
1 Introduction
On 1 May 2004, 10 new States joined the European Union (EU), extending the
borders of the EU significantly both eastwards and southwards and bringing the
number of Member States to 25. The same date also marked the end of the first
phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System, agreed upon
by EU leaders at the Tampere summit in October 1999, thus marking the expiry
of the five-year transitional period applicable to the adoption of EC immigra-
tion and asylum law. The instruments approved during this phase essentially
establish minimum standards for a common asylum policy within the EU and
are among the “building blocks” of what has more popularly and critically been
called “fortress Europe”. The second phase now involves their transposition
into the national law of Member States insofar as the minimum standards they
establish are not already in place. The longer-term goal is defined as a common
asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid
throughout the Union.1
Achieving agreement on this first phase involved sometimes fundamental
compromises, particularly as the May 2004 deadline loomed and agreement on
* MA, MPhil, Cambridge, UK, currently working as a consultant for the Department
of International Protection, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Geneva. Thanks go to Ivor Jackson, Sibylle Kapferer, Anja Klug, Susin
Park and Volker Türk for their helpful and detailed comments on earlier versions of
the chapter, as well as to other colleagues who have also provided useful informa-
tion. The views expressed are the personal views of the author and may not neces-
sarily be shared by the United Nations or UNHCR.
1 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, Oct. 1999, (see Annex 4),
para. 15.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 505-537.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Frances Nicholson
key directives remained elusive. It now remains to be seen how these will be
implemented in practice. The way in which even the minimum standards set
out in the draft instruments originally presented by the European Commission
were whittled down in the Council of Ministers does not, however, augur well
for certain key principles and obligations of international refugee protection
established over the last half century or more, in particular since the adoption
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Yet these obligations
are ones by which all Member States are bound as parties to the 1951 Conven-
tion and key human rights treaties. This chapter analyses some of the concerns
this process has raised, as well as outlining major challenges that States, asylum
seekers, refugees and the international refugee protection regime itself face as
the Common European Asylum System moves into its second phase.
2 See the 1986 Single European Act, which set a deadline of 1992 for the establish-
ment of a “Europe without frontiers”.
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (includ-
ing changes made by 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, hereafter “EC Treaty”), Article
61. See also, European Commission, “Towards a Common Asylum Procedure and
a Uniform Status, Valid Throughout the Union, for Persons Granted Asylum”,
(COM(2000) 755, 22 Nov. 2000).
4 UNHCR, “Asylum Levels and Trends: Europe and Non-European Industrialized
Countries, 2003”, 24 Feb. 2004.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
Increasingly, it had also become evident that asylum policy and practice dif-
fered quite widely from one Member State to another and that this was hamper-
ing the efficient operation of Member States’ asylum systems. The proportion
of asylum seekers from certain countries of origin recognised in different States
sometimes varies significantly, while interpretations of various aspects of the
refugee definition also differ. These range from differing interpretations of obli-
gations towards those fearing persecution by non-State agents5 or gender-related
persecution to different approaches as regards the internal flight or relocation
alternative for persons fleeing generalised violence. A variety of complementary
or subsidiary statuses, generally offering less security and fewer rights than are
available to refugees, were also being increasingly used by Member States.6 Addi-
tionally, such diverging policies and practices have been among factors which
mean that refugees do not necessarily enjoy comparable security of status or
standards of treatment throughout the EU and may seek to move onwards if
their status is not secure. These differences have also undermined the effective-
ness and viability of efforts to share burdens and responsibilities for hosting
refugees and asylum seekers among EU Member States.
In response to these developments, EU Member States first focused on
measures to divert and deter non-citizens from gaining access to territory and
on efforts to enhance the efficiency of asylum procedures. Approaches have
involved the introduction of visa requirements and carrier sanctions, the con-
clusion of readmission agreements, the introduction of admissibility procedures
and/or accelerated procedures for claims deemed to be manifestly unfounded,
restrictions on freedom of movement, including increased use of detention, and
reductions in assistance provided to asylum seekers. Such measures have had the
effect of restricting asylum seekers’ and refugees’ access to asylum procedures
in the EU and ultimately to international protection. These approaches were
adopted first at the national level in a number of Member States and then in
the context of the EU harmonisation process. This phenomenon can be seen as
spreading from the bottom up rather than from the top down, thus belying what
some have described as the “myth of a Brussels dictate”.7
Initial efforts to harmonise asylum policy at the EU level were undertaken
on an intergovernmental and generally non-binding basis. The 1990 Dublin Con-
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Frances Nicholson
8 1990 Dublin Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Appli-
cations for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Commu-
nities. See also below under “10) The consequences of EU enlargement”, for further
discussion of this issue.
9 See E. Guild, “Seeking Asylum: Storm Clouds Between International Commit-
ments and EU Legislative Measures”, 29(2) European Law Review (2004) 198 at
206. Indeed, the Dublin Convention and its successor the Dublin II Regulation, see
n. 19 below, go further and permit Member States to return an asylum seeker to a
third country as long as this is in compliance with the 1951 Convention (Articles
3(5) and 3(3) respectively).
10 1990 Schengen Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on
the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders.
11 Conclusion on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution;
Resolution on manifestly unfounded application for asylum; Resolution on a har-
monised approach to questions concerning host third countries, all approved by the
Council of (Immigration) Ministers, London, 30 November–1 December 1992. For
the texts, see Plender, ed., Basic Documents on International Migration Law (Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1999), 472–80.
12 For a brief outline of these concepts see, UNHCR, “Asylum Processes (Fair and
Efficient Asylum Procedures)”, EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001.
13 Examples of such rulings are in Austria where the second instance asylum author-
ity, the Independent Federal Asylum Senate, has found in a majority of cases that
Hungary, Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were not safe third countries,
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
while the Slovenian Supreme Court found Croatia not to be a safe third country in
2000, prompting the government to remove Croatia from its list of safe third coun-
tries in mid-2002.
14 See, for example, UK House of Lords, R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, ex parte Adan and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Aitseguer, 19 Dec. 2000, [2001] 1 All ER 593 (both cases concerning differing inter-
pretations concerning the agent of persecution in the UK vis-à-vis Germany and
France respectively); Austrian Supreme Court, G 117/00-8, G 146/00-6, G 147/00-6,
8 Mar. 2001 (concerning the transfer of an asylum-seeker to Italy under the Dublin
Convention and ruling that Austria must assume responsibility for assessing the
claim if Articles 3 or 8 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights would
otherwise be violated); Swedish Alien Appeals Board, Minority Bosnians Case, 2
June 1998 (concerning differing practice in Germany regarding the internal flight
alternative, resulting in Swedish government granting humanitarian status in June
2000). More generally, see also European Commission, Evaluation of the Dublin
Convention, SEC(2001) 756, 13 Jun. 2001; Marinho, ed., The Dublin Convention on
Asylum: Its Essence, Implementation and Prospects (EIPA, 2000); Hurwitz, “The
1990 Dublin Convention: A Comprehensive Assessment” 11 IJRL (1999) 646.
15 European Court of Human Rights, T.I. v. United Kingdom, Application No.
43844/98, Decision as to Admissibility, 7 Mar. 2000, p. 15.
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Frances Nicholson
16 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and certain related Acts.
17 It was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union which first formally estab-
lished a second and third intergovernmental “pillar” of the EU. The EU’s common
foreign and security policy came under the second pillar, while justice and home
affairs matters came under the third until the Treaty of Amsterdam brought such
matters under the main “first pillar”.
18 A number of measures are not subject to the five-year deadline. These are listed in
Articles 63(2)(b), 63(3)(a) and 63(4) EC Treaty and concern measures promoting a
balance of effort between Member States, on conditions of entry and residence and
defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries legally
resident in a Member State may reside in other Member States. It would seem that
these measures had lower priority in the eyes of Member State governments.
19 Council Reg. 343/2003 on responsibility for asylum applications (OJ 2003 L 50/1),
effective since 1 Sep. 2003.
20 Council Directive 2003/9 on reception conditions (OJ 2003 L 31/18).
21 Council Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise
need international protection and the content of the protection granted, adopted
April 2004 (OJ 2004 L 304/12).
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
for asylum procedures;22 and (e) minimum standards for temporary protection.23
A detailed commentary on each of these instruments is provided in the preced-
ing chapters 10 and 12–15.
Numerous other instruments agreed over the same period also have an
impact on the ability of persons in need of international protection to access and
enjoy asylum in the EU and are examined in greater detail elsewhere in the book.
They include the common visa regime;24 border measures;25 carrier sanctions;26
the European Refugee Fund;27 the Eurodac regulation and fingerprinting regime
in operation since January 2003;28 the directive on family reunification;29 joint
initiatives to negotiate readmission agreements;30 and measures to coordinate
expulsions and returns, including the return of rejected asylum seekers.
The sections which follow examine the evolution of decision-making, the
emphasis on fundamental rights, the question of judicial and democratic scru-
tiny, continuing variations of approach and application, the impact of the attacks
in the United States on 11 September 2001, the political compromises made to
reach agreement, the consequences of enlargement and the global impact of the
EU harmonisation process. Finally, some of the challenges on the road ahead
are outlined briefly.
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Frances Nicholson
31 Van der Klaauw, “Towards a Common Asylum Procedure”, in Guild and Harlow,
eds., Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart,
2001), 193.
32 See, Guild, n. 9 above at 200.
33 Declaration 17 attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
34 Van der Klaauw, “Towards a Common Asylum Procedure”, n. 31 above, 171.
35 For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see ch. 2.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
In particular, this has been true of key instruments such as those defining who
should benefit from refugee status or complementary protection and the mini-
mum standards for procedures by which this should be ascertained. The Council
requested a revised draft of the latter in which political considerations predomi-
nated to the detriment of international protection principles as is outlined in
greater detail in section 9 below.36
The particular sensitivity of issues relating to asylum and immigration was
recognised in the 2001 Treaty of Nice, which generally provided for a significant
extension of qualified majority voting and use of the co-decision procedure37
from 1 Feb. 2003, when the Treaty entered into force. Where Title IV measures
are concerned, however, this is only partially true, since a shift to such decision-
making is deferred. For the measures on asylum set out in Article 63(1) and
those on temporary and subsidiary protection under Article 63(2)(a) of the EC
Treaty, a new Article 67(5) EC provides that qualified majority voting and co-
decision only applies if the Council has previously adopted Community legisla-
tion defining the common rules and basic principles governing these issues.38
Recognising the need for a flexible approach, if obstacles were to be over-
come and greater convergence in asylum and immigration matters achieved, the
Commission recommended that the legislative process under way at both the
EU and national level be complemented by an “open coordination” approach,
involving strategic guidelines, benchmarking, target-setting and monitoring of
progress.39 Similarly, the Belgian Council Presidency acknowledged in Decem-
ber 2001 that “the changeover to the Community pillar ha[d] not been enough
to give a decisive impetus to work in the asylum and immigration sector” and
that “maintaining the unanimity rule is clearly a serious hindrance to progress”.
It therefore suggested that “a move to qualified majority voting as soon as pro-
vided for in the Treaties would allow proceedings to be speeded up”.40
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Frances Nicholson
The situation has changed again since May 2004. Member States have lost
the right to initiate legislation, which instead lies only with the European Com-
mission. The Council decided as from 1 January 2005 to apply qualified major-
ity voting and the co-decision process to measures on “burden-sharing”.41 But
other asylum measures are still subject to Article 67(5) EC, as described above.
Furthermore, the Council has still not changed the rules relating to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Justice (see discussion below), even though Article 67(2) EC
provides that it “shall” adapt the rules on the Court’s jurisdiction after the end
of the transitional period on 1 May 2004.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture
or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” These are clear com-
mitments to fundamental principles essential to the protection of refugees and
asylum seekers. They serve not only as political statements of intent but also to
confirm that the right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement form part
of the general principles of EC law which are relevant to interpreting that law.
One area of concern relates to the so-called Aznar or Spanish Protocol to
the Treaty of Amsterdam.43 This defines all Member States as safe countries of
origin and takes the view that an asylum application by a national of a Member
State should only be admissible if the country of origin has formally derogated
from its human rights obligations or has been determined, under a political pro-
cess, to be a serious and persistent violator of human rights. According to the
Protocol, consideration of the claim can otherwise only be undertaken (on the
basis that it is manifestly unfounded) if the Member State receiving the applica-
tion decides unilaterally to do so. The Protocol was much criticised by UNHCR,
NGOs and others as contrary to the object and purpose of the 1951 Conven-
tion, as well as other human rights instruments and principles.44
Another key document setting out the rights not only of citizens but of all
within its ambit is the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted
by the European Convention in mid-2003 and signed at the European Council
in October 2004.45 Ratification by Member States, in some countries by referen-
dum, in others by parliament alone, has been problematic and the process is now
stalled. The Constitution not only incorporates the Charter of Fundamental
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Frances Nicholson
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
At first sight it might seem that this change could lead to the ECJ being
overwhelmed with asylum cases. It has, however, been persuasively argued that
such fears are unlikely to be realised, even though reductions in asylum seekers’
appeal rights in recent years in a number of States mean that it may paradoxi-
cally be a much lower court that is able to refer a case to the ECJ.51 As and when
the ECJ begins to consider issues relating to asylum, it would appear that a
degree of convergence of judicial practice is likely to result, although it could be
quite some time before this begins to take place.
One particular question that arises concerns the relationship between ECJ
jurisprudence and that of the European Court of Human Rights.52 Both the
European Commission and Member States have been careful to try and pre-
empt potential conflicts of competence by avoiding specific, detailed reference in
directives to Council of Europe instruments such as the European Convention
on Human Rights. There is nevertheless a general commitment under Article
6(2) of the EU Treaty to uphold the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, while the Charter of Fundamental Rights
declares that it must not be interpreted as restricting rights recognised inter alia
under the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, the human
rights perspective and many of the standards set up within the Council of Europe
framework have of course clearly been shown to apply to refugees and asylum
seekers in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.53 One
possible solution to this dilemma would be for the European Union to accede
to the European Convention on Human Rights and indeed, such a course of
action is referred to in the Hague Programme approved by Member States in
November 2004 as having the advantage of “plac[ing] the Union, including its
institutions, under a legal obligation to ensure that in all its areas of activity,
fundamental rights are not only respected but also actively promoted”.
More broadly, it is worth noting that the ECJ has ruled that international
human rights instruments which Member States have been involved in drafting
are a source of inspiration in establishing the human rights forming part of
general principles of EC law. The Court has found that this applies to the 1966
51 See, Guild and Peers, “Deference or Defiance? The Court of Justice’s Jurisdiction
over Immigration and Asylum”, in Implementing Amsterdam, n. 31 above, 267–89;
Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, “Non-Communitarians: Refugee and Asylum Policies”,
in Alston, ed., The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999), 368 at 373–4.
52 For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see ch. 5.
53 See generally, UNHCR Manual on Refugee Protection and the European Convention
on Human Rights, April 2003 and subsequent updates. In addition, EU Member
States have of course international obligations under international human rights
treaties including the 1984 Convention against Torture and the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which have been shown to be relevant to
refugees. See Guild, n. 9 above at 202.
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Frances Nicholson
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and there is a good case to
be made for this extending to earlier human rights treaties as well as the 1951
Convention.54
As for the role of the European Parliament, this remains modest, even
though its influence over EU asylum and refugee policy has been enhanced
under the Treaty of Amsterdam. As outlined above, once this Treaty came into
effect in 1999, the European Parliament was able to make an increased, but still
limited, contribution. It is, for instance, not empowered to propose amendments
to draft legislation. As noted above, the Treaty of Nice added Article 67(5) to
the EC Treaty to provide for the introduction of the co-decision procedure, as
set out in Article 251 of the latter Treaty, to certain asylum measures if Com-
munity legislation has been adopted defining the relevant common rules and
basic principles.55
The European Parliament has nevertheless begun to assert its powers. In
December 2003, for instance, it challenged the legality of the family reunifica-
tion directive before the ECJ,56 calling on the Court to annul certain provisions as
contrary to the fundamental rights set out in Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter. In
particular, the challenge refers to a provision permitting Member States to carry
out integration tests on immigrant children aged over 12 years arriving indepen-
dently from the rest of their family before deciding whether they can enter and
reside in the country. The outcome could have far-reaching consequences, not
only for the directive concerned but more widely, given the concerns expressed
about other directives.
54 For further details and relevant case law, see Peers, “Challenging the Validity of EC
Immigration and Asylum Law”, 17(1) (Tolley’s) Immigration, Asylum and Nation-
ality Law (2003) 25 at 28–29 and ch. 5.
55 For concerns regarding the development of the Common European Asylum System
expressed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe see, Recom-
mendation 1440 (2000), Restrictions on Asylum in the Member State of the Council
of European and the European Union; Goodwin-Gill, “The Individual Refugee”,
n. 43 above, 162.
56 As provided for under Article 230 of the EC Treaty. On 8 September 2005, an Advo-
cate-General’s Opinion in this case (Case C-540/03) was released, suggesting that
the challenge was inadmissible for procedural reasons but largely sympathising with
the EP on the merits. See Ch. 19.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
mally independent of the EU was used for the Schengen and Dublin Conventions
and involved varying combinations of States, including non-Member States.
At the time the Treaty of Amsterdam was concluded, matters were further
complicated by two protocols to the Treaty, which allow Ireland and the UK
to opt in or out of individual Title IV measures and Denmark to chose which
Title IV measures building on the Schengen acquis it will implement through
national legislation.57 The protocols were the price paid in order to reach agree-
ment on the incorporation of the bulk of justice and home affairs issues under
the “first pillar”.58 Different combinations of States have thus forged ahead in
certain areas where other States have been reluctant to become involved. It has
been termed a process of establishing Europe à la carte or with “variable geom-
etry”.59
In particular, the intergovernmental nature of cooperation has resulted in
varying combinations of States strengthening cooperation in different areas.
For instance, of the 15 Member States of the EU before May 2004, 13 are par-
ties to the Schengen Convention (all excluding Ireland and the UK), and non-
member States (Iceland and Norway) are associated with the Convention.60 The
Schengen acquis has now been incorporated within the EU under the Treaty
of Amsterdam, thus introducing some measure of parliamentary and judicial
control over this hitherto purely intergovernmental area.61 Although the Council
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Frances Nicholson
in May 1999 determined which measures taken under the Schengen Conven-
tion fall under the first “pillar” and which come under the third, there remain
complex variations in the operation of these measures.62 Iceland and Norway
(as non-EU States) may participate in decision-making on Schengen matters
outside the Council in what is known as the Mixed Committee,63 while Denmark
has, as outlined above, opted to incorporate such measures via national legisla-
tion. For their part, the UK and Ireland may participate in Schengen measures
within the Council if they decide to do so. As for the 10 newly acceding States,
the Schengen acquis became binding and applicable on 1 May 2004, although
full participation in the Schengen area and the abolition of internal border con-
trols await a Council decision that adequate external border controls are in place
in those States.
Thus, although at first sight the shift from the third to the first “pillar”
simplified the different decision-making processes, this has not been automatic
and in practice variations persist and are likely to continue. Indeed, one author
has concluded that “the legal translation of the political compromise reached
at Amsterdam on free movement of persons, elimination of border controls,
asylum and immigration has probably become too complicated to work prop-
erly”.64 As another has pointed out, this could “postpone indefinitely the attain-
ment of a single, territorial ‘sovereign’ entity”.65 Although greater cohesion of
structures and working methods have been introduced in recent years, these
remain complex and this has not helped the process of negotiating agreement
on the various legislative building blocks of the Common European Asylum
System. The “variable geometry” of EU harmonisation in this area can be
expected to continue.
62 Council Decision of 20 May 1999 concerning the definition of the Schengen acquis
for the purpose of determining, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the
Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union,
the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the acquis (OJ
1999 L 176/1); Council Decision of 20 May 1999 determining, in conformity with
the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the
Treaty on European Union, the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions
which constitute the Schengen acquis (OJ 1999 L 176/17). See also Kuijper, ibid.,
346–56.
63 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s association with the
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ 1999 L
176/36).
64 Kuijper, “Some Legal Problems”, n. 61 above, p. 366.
65 Goodwin-Gill, “The Individual Refugee”, n. 43 above, at 159.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
In the changed political climate since 11 September 2001, several EU States have
nevertheless introduced various restrictive security measures, which have tended
521
Frances Nicholson
to have the effect of further restricting access to territory and procedures. Gov-
ernments have also resorted more frequently to exclusion from refugee status,69
as well as to extradition and expulsion of persons including asylum seekers and
refugees without necessarily maintaining procedural and other safeguards.70 At
the EU level, measures have included framework decisions on combating terror-
ism and on a European arrest warrant adopted in June 2002.71 As of January
2004, when the latter came into effect, extradition between Member States has
been replaced by a system of surrender based on mutually accepted arrest war-
rants.
Such measures can in part be justified under Article 64(1) EC Treaty which
states that Title IV measures shall not affect Member States’ exercise of their
responsibilities “with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safe-
guarding of internal security”. These responsibilities need, however, to be bal-
anced against Member States’ obligation to respect fundamental rights under
Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty. There is also a danger that the reassessment of the
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with inter-
national protection obligations and instruments, as called for by the Council of
Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 20 September 2001, will be to the detri-
ment of refugees, particularly in terms of respect for the fundamental principle
of non-refoulement and ensuring detention is not arbitrary.72
69 Under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention persons are excluded from refugee status
if there are serious reasons for considering that (a) they have committed a crime
against peace, war crime, or crime against humanity, (b) they have committed a seri-
ous non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to their admission there
as a refugee, (c) they have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.
70 See generally, EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, “The
Balance Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union
and its Member States to the Terrorist Threats”, 31 Mar. 2003, 37–40.
71 Council Framework Decisions on Combating Terrorism (OJ 2002 L 164/3) and
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member
States (OJ 2002 L 190/1). See also Amnesty International EU Office, “Comments
by Amnesty International on the proposal by the Commission for a Council Frame-
work Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures
between Member States [COM(2001) 522 final]”, 19 Oct. 2001; Human Rights
Watch, “Human Rights Implications of European Union Internal Security Pro-
posals and Measures in the Aftermath of the 11 September Attacks in the United
States”, New York, 6 Nov. 2001; Peers, “EU Responses to Terrorism”, 52 ICLQ
(2003) 227.
72 See resulting paper by the European Commission, “The Relationship between
Safeguarding Internal Security and Complying with International Protection Obli-
gations and Instruments” (COM(2001) 743, 5 Dec. 2001); Human Rights Watch,
ibid; Lubbers, “After September 11: New Challenges to Refugee Protection”, in US
522
Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2003, 1-6; and more generally, Peers,
“EU Responses to Terrorism”, 52 ICLQ (2003) 227.
73 For further details, see Kapferer, The Interface between Extradition and Asylum,
UNHCR Department of International Protection, Legal and Protection Policy
Research Series, 2003/05, Nov. 2003, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf ?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3fe84fad4>.
74 For further details see below n. 81.
75 See, for example, European Parliament Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and
Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, “Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamen-
tal Rights in the European Union (2003)”, 2003/2006 (INI), A5-0207/2004, 22 Mar.
523
Frances Nicholson
2004, pp. 47–49; ECRE, “The Promise of Protection: Progress towards a European
Asylum Policy since the Tampere Summit 1999”, London, Nov. 2000, p. 25.
76 European Parliament Committee, “Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamen-
tal Rights in the European Union (2003)”, n. 75 above, pp. 42.
77 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, Oct. 1999; see also text above
at fn. 42.
78 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Seville, Jun. 2002.
79 For an evaluation, see House of Lords European Union Committee, “Handling EU
Asylum Claims: New Approaches Examined”, HL Paper 74, 30 Apr. 2004, avail-
able at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/74/74.
pdf>.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
enable the Union to tackle asylum abuse and inefficiency while fully respecting
the Geneva Convention and its humanitarian traditions”.80 The primary con-
cern has evidently shifted from ensuring “absolute respect for the right to seek
asylum” to tackling “asylum abuse and inefficiency”.
The political compromise and expediency evident in this process have been
detrimental to States which may seek to adopt higher standards. Asylum seekers
can also be expected to find it harder to access procedures and secure interna-
tional protection within the EU if minimum safeguards are all that are in place.
For, while many of the instruments approved refer to minimum standards and
specifically do not preclude higher standards of treatment, the tendency is for
them to become the baseline when transposed into national law. These concerns
are perhaps most serious in relation to the two directives on which agreement
was only reached at the eleventh hour: the qualification and procedures direc-
tives.
With regard to the qualification directive,81 which was adopted in April
2004, this incorporates a number of positive interpretative guidelines not neces-
sarily accepted hitherto in all Member States. Among these is the specific rec-
ognition that non-State actors can be agents of persecution82 and that acts of
a gender-specific or child-specific nature can constitute persecution giving rise
to refugee status.83 Another standard is the provision of a legal basis for the
granting of complementary or subsidiary protection to persons not fulfilling the
1951 Convention refugee definition but still requiring international protection.
There are nevertheless concerns surrounding the definition of subsidiary protec-
tion and as regards the lesser rights accorded to persons enjoying such protec-
tion as opposed to refugees. Concerns also arise as a result of the attempt to
define persecution in the directive. Interpretation of the term as used in Article
1A(2) the 1951 Convention needs to be flexible, adaptable and sufficiently open
to accommodate ever changing forms of persecution and human rights abuses.84
In addition, the mixing in the directive of concepts relating to exclusion from
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Frances Nicholson
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
procedural standards” and allows “scope for states to adopt or continue worst
practices in determining asylum claims”.88 The European Council on Refugees
and Exiles (ECRE) likewise warned that the lack of adequate safeguards in the
directive to ensure that third countries are indeed safe in the individual case
before return there, means that, unless national legislation does provide such
safeguards, “there is a clear risk that EU States will send persons to countries to
face persecution, torture, and death in violation of international law”.89
More generally, there are also substantive differences and gaps in the applica-
bility of the different building blocks of the Common European Asylum System.
For example, the procedures and reception directives as well as the “Dublin II”
Regulation apply only to applications for refugee status, but the qualification
directive defines the criteria which must be met to qualify for both refugee status
and subsidiary or complementary status. As a result, even the minimum stan-
dards set out in the procedures directive do not necessarily apply if someone
applies specifically and solely for subsidiary status. Similarly, if application of
Dublin II were to be avoided by specifically applying for subsidiary protection,
the standards applicable under the reception directive would not apply. There is
also a danger that an asylum seeker could end up being returned to their country
of origin without a full substantive examination of their claim if they move on
after a while from one EU Member State to another and are then returned to
the first Member State, which may in the meantime have closed the case and then
go on to reject the “new” claim as manifestly unfounded or on the grounds that
no new elements are present.90 Some of these issues could be resolved if each
Member State implemented a single asylum procedure under which both refugee
and subsidiary protection needs are considered (as is currently the case in some
of the EU Member States). Agreement on such a procedure is, however, a long
527
Frances Nicholson
91 Bulgaria and Romania signed treaties of accession in April 2005 and are expected
to join in January 2007; negotiations with Turkey and Croatia formally opened in
October 2005; other countries in the Western Balkans may also eventually accede.
92 See also ch. 6; Peers, Mind the Gap! Ineffective Member State Implementation of the
European Union Asylum Measures (ILPA and Refugee Council, 1998).
93 Noll, Negotiating Asylum, n. 59 above, at 156. See also, Lavenex, The Europeani-
sation of Refugee Policies: Between Human Rights and Internal Security (Ashgate,
2001), 135–6.
94 The PHARE programme was an EU-financed pre-accession instrument to assist
Central and Eastern European applicant States in their preparations for accession.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
oped administrative and judicial mechanisms, civil society and/or social safety
nets may well present significant problems for those in need of international
protection. This phenomenon is even more acutely evident in the way these
mechanisms have been adopted well beyond even the EU’s expanded borders as
outlined in the next section.
More broadly, the first 15 EU Member States’ priorities were revealed by
the fact that the main focus of the PHARE programme in this field often seemed
to be on strengthening border controls, rather than on measures to strengthen
capacity to assess asylum claims or to enhance refugee integration. Norms of
asylum policy and practice have also been developed through interaction at sub-
regional level across the apparent divide between old and new Member States,
for instance, between the Nordic and Baltic States, between Germany and
Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, or between Austria and Hungary.95
At whatever level this interaction takes place, there is a clear need to ensure a
balance between enforcing border controls and measures to combat trafficking
and smuggling of individuals on the one hand and humanitarian concerns and
human rights obligations on the other.
There is, in addition, a question as to how the operation of the “Dublin
II” Regulation will affect new Member States. As one expert has noted, if the
Dublin Convention were to function effectively
While the “Dublin II” Regulation takes the principle of family unity into greater
account than its predecessor and allows for some humanitarian exceptions, the
general approach continues to allocate responsibility for assessing the asylum
claim to the Member State responsible for the applicant’s entrance to EU ter-
ritory. More logical criteria might be to ascribe responsibility on the basis of
greater respect for the right to family unity, Member States’ resources, or asylum
seekers’ linguistic or cultural links with EU States.97 The rationale thus contin-
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Frances Nicholson
ues to be penalisation of the State through which the asylum seeker first gained
entry to the Union. The consequence can be expected to be that the operation of
“Dublin II” will be to shift or concentrate the burden of assessing claims onto
the new Member States at the periphery of the EU, which have fewer resources
and a less well-established infrastructure to deal with asylum claims.
This trend is likely to be accentuated by Eurodac, which came into effect in
January 2003 and is intended to enhance the operation of “Dublin II”. In the
first year of operation of this EU-wide database of fingerprints of asylum seek-
ers and illegal entrants, it processed nearly 250,000 asylum seekers’ fingerprints
and detected 17,287 cases representing 7 per cent of the total where individuals
had already made one or more asylum applications in a Member State.98 Again,
since it is the new Member States that are on the periphery and therefore the
most likely point of entry to EU territory, it would appear that more cases will
be able to be returned to the country of entry in the EU under “Dublin II”,
thus placing the asylum systems of these Member States under greater strain.
Possibly this will result in these Member States finding ways to circumvent the
operation of Dublin II and Eurodac. Such action will hardly address the prob-
lem, but rather push it further underground and increase resort, for instance, to
people smugglers, to the detriment of governments seeking to manage asylum
and migration policies more predictably and rationally and of refugees in search
of international protection.
Asylum Submitted in one of the Member States” (SEC (2000) 522, 21 Mar. 2000);
and discussion of the agreed “Dublin II” Regulation (ch. 10).
98 European Commission, “EURODAC Detects 7% of Multiple Asylum Applications
During its First Year of Activity”, press release IP/04/581, 5 May 2004. See further
Ch. 11.
99 See, Rutinwa, “The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature of Refugee Policies in
Africa”, UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 5, May
1999, p. 20; Frelick, “The Year in Review”, World Refugee Survey 1997, US Com-
mittee for Refugees, Washington DC, pp. 14–19.
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Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
in the EU context clearly have global “export value”, as the following examples
indicate.
Among these notions is that of the safe third country. This notion has been
applied in a number of countries, particularly in eastern Europe and central
Asia, including to deny access to the asylum procedure without substantive
examination and/or without the possibility of individual rebuttal.100 There has
been some improvement in the situation in eastern Europe, but when combined
with time limits within which asylum applications must be made, as are imposed
in several States, there is a danger that access to substantive procedures may be
denied. For instance, Belarus defined all neighbouring States as safe until mid-
2003 when new legislation maintained the safe third country notion but instead
of an automatically applied list at least required an individual examination of
each case. The concept is, however, applied broadly and if the Belarusian author-
ities do return an asylum seeker, for instance, to Ukraine on safe third country
grounds, that person was until recently unlikely to be able to submit an applica-
tion since that country imposed a deadline of three working days from the date
of first illegal entry (five working days in case of legal entry) within which an
application for asylum must be presented. In Ukraine, the Law on Refugees of
June 2001 now provides stronger safeguards than before in its definition of a
safe third country while applications must since June 2005 be submitted “with-
out delay”. Return to the Russian Federation is, however, frequently not possible
(and an application there would in any case have to be presented within 24-hours
of illegal entry) with the result that asylum seekers remain in limbo in Ukraine
with no formal, legal status and are at risk of refoulement.101 The Russian Fed-
eration also uses the concept widely, including for Afghans transiting Iran or
Pakistan. Kazakhstan has denied a number of applications on the grounds of
passage through a “safe country”. Tajikistan also issued a decree in June 2000
introducing a list of nine “safe” third countries (including Afghanistan) as a
result of which an asylum seeker who has transited one of them is denied access
to the asylum procedure.
With an increasingly lengthy chain of potential returns, it is difficult to see
how the State where the asylum claim was first presented only to be rejected on
safe third country grounds can be sure that it is upholding its obligation not to
refoule anyone to persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The
picture is better in Africa, however, for although the concept has been applied
100 See UNHCR, “Asylum Processes”, n. 12 above; van Selm, “Access to Procedures
‘Safe Third Countries’, ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ and ‘Time Limits’”, June 2001,
available at <www.unhcr.org> under protecting refugees, Global Consultations,
“third track” Executive Committee meetings.
101 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: On the Margins Rights Violations against
Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union”,
Nov. 2005, available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/ukraine1105/>.
531
Frances Nicholson
in a number of southern African States, the South African High Court ruled in
May 2001 that the directive applying the policy should be withdrawn.102
Another exported concept concerns temporary protection – properly an
exceptional emergency response in countries with individual refugee status
determination systems to an overwhelming situation, where there are self-evi-
dent international protection needs and where there is little or no possibility of
determining such needs on an individual basis in the short term.103 This concept
has also been exported to very different situations. For instance, the concept of
temporary protection which was first developed in Europe in response to the
Bosnian crisis from the mid-1990s has been implemented comprehensively in
Australia to suit a restrictive domestic agenda there. Since October 1999, Aus-
tralian regulations have determined the quality of asylum offered on the basis
of the mode of arrival in the country. Those arriving illegally and recognised as
refugees now receive only a 30-month temporary protection visa (TPV), which
must then be reassessed before the normal range of benefits accorded to other
refugees can be accessed. Since September 2001, an asylum seeker arriving inde-
pendently in Australia who has spent seven days or more in a country where he
or she could have sought and obtained effective protection, who is recognised
as a refugee, only receives a series of temporary three-year visas.104 He or she is
thus never able to gain secure residency, access to travel documents (as stipulated
under Article 28 of the 1951 Convention), or to reunite with his/her family in
Australia. Under such circumstances, temporary protection has become perma-
nent limbo for recognised refugees.105
More generally, harmonisation processes are also under way in other
regions of the world, which may or may not face similar problems and/or have
strongly established judicial systems and/or civil society. For instance, many ele-
532
Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
ments of the EU acquis are being applied by Mercosur States in Latin America,
even though the numbers of asylum seekers involved in the region are a great
deal lower than in western Europe.106
In this respect, UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protec-
tion in 2001–02 offered a useful forum where all States were able to raise and
address concerns at the global level.107 Indeed, the Declaration issued by the
first ministerial meeting of States party to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967
Protocol in December 2001, reaffirmed the “central place” of these instruments
in the international refugee protection regime and that further development of
the regime should be “in a way that complements and strengthens” them. It is
important that EU leaders do not ignore the global impact of the harmonisation
process. Not only do they have obligations at the international level, but their
actions can either undermine or underpin the viability and sustainability of the
international protection regime on which their own efforts, whether nationally
or at the EU level, are premised.
106 See, for instance, Declaration of Mercosur interior ministers, Nov. 2000.
107 For further information, see <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect?id=
3b7cea1b4>.
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Frances Nicholson
108 See Commission proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating racism
and xenophobia (COM(2001) 664, 28 Nov. 2001); Council Conclusions on combat-
ing racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, 26 April 2002.
109 See text at n. 4 above.
110 See Goodwin-Gill, “The Individual Refugee”, n. 43 above, 146; more generally,
Harding, The Uninvited (Profile Books, 2000), 71–7; Amnesty International, “A
Common Asylum System for the European Union: The International Regime for
the Protection of Refugees at Stake?”, Dec. 2000, p. 3.
111 For a useful assessment of these issues, see the House of Lords EU Committee
report “Handling EU Asylum Claims: New Approaches Examined”, n. 79 above.
112 European Commission, “Communication on the Managed Entry in the EU of
Persons in Need of International Protection and the Enhancement of the Protec-
tion Capacity of the Regions of Origin: Improving durable solutions”, 4 Jun. 2004,
COM(2004) 410 final. The idea was also presented in its Nov. 2000 paper referred to
in n. 3 above.
534
Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
535
Frances Nicholson
13 Conclusion
Compared to the early 1990s, there are some positive signs for the develop-
ment of a Common European Asylum System in keeping with international
protection principles. These include more open working methods than before
and greater consultation with UNHCR and NGOs. The changes introduced by
the Treaty of Amsterdam provided a clearer framework than before, sought to
streamline decision-making and introduced greater transparency and account-
ability by strengthening the role of the European Commission, the ECJ and to
a lesser extent the European Parliament. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
and the European Constitution also contain clear commitments to fundamental
rights and obligations as regards asylum. The question as to “whether rheto-
ric can be translated into a working, practical reality; and whether the EU can
remain true, or even close, to the principles, which it claims to endorse”, posed
by Professor Goodwin-Gill in 2001 nevertheless remains as pertinent as ever.113
There is perhaps still some possibility that the Common European Asylum
System currently under construction could become less of a fortress and more
a haven. At this juncture, it nevertheless appears that political considerations,
compromises and trade-offs, not to mention migration concerns or the cur-
rent security climate, have contributed to a serious watering down of the Com-
mission’s initial proposals. Some have even argued that the impression is that
“Member States are seeking to draw up a whole new acquis unencumbered by
their international commitments”.114 These factors are likely to continue to pres-
ent significant obstacles to the principled realisation of the longer-term goal
set at Tampere of a “uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid
throughout the Union”.
At this point, it is perhaps an appropriate moment for interested parties
to stand back a little, to reassess strategic goals and the means to achieve them.
This is so not only at the domestic and European levels but also more widely at
the international level, for regions are no longer isolated from one another, as
the phenomena of globalisation, migration and international terrorism make
very clear. More than ever, providing international protection to those in need
of it cannot be addressed in isolation. It is a collective responsibility requiring
complex and interlocking approaches and solutions that are considerably more
sophisticated and comprehensive than policies which are based on deterrence
and interception focussed primarily on reducing the numbers of asylum seekers
arriving in the EU. States have made some progress in recent years in recognis-
ing these broader issues, from poverty reduction and strengthening protection
536
Chapter 17 Challenges to Forging a Common Euuropean Asylum System
in regions of origin to conflict resolution and tackling the trade in small arms.
Some of these concerns are reflected in the external relations elements of the
Hague Programme approved in November 2004, but the latter nevertheless need
to be developed in a protection-sensitive manner if the integrity and viability of
the emerging Common European Asylum System, not to mention the interna-
tional refugee protection regime itself, are to be assured.
At the same time, Member States are now moving to the second phase of
the establishment of the Common European Asylum System, which the Hague
Programme envisages will be completed by 2010. This involves amongst other
things the implementation at the national level of the instruments they have
agreed, in so far as changes may be necessary. Here too there is an opportunity
to recall that the provision of international protection to those in need of it is a
matter not only of commitment to values intrinsic to democratic and inclusive
societies but also of national and international obligation. If governments are
to adopt legislation and practices in keeping with these obligations on a range
of issues, they are likely either to have to maintain existing higher standards
where these are in place and/or to resist the temptation to introduce only the
minimum standards set out in relevant directives and regulations. A clear focus
on procedures, training and practices at borders to ensure access to territory and
procedures for those seeking asylum coupled with a similar focus on greater con-
sistency and quality of decision-making, especially at the first instance, through
what has been called “frontloading”, are likely to be critical. Clear information
and strong lobbying by UNHCR, civil society and NGOs can also be expected
to be vital. Links at sub-regional level including across the divide between new
and old Member States give scope for sharing protection-sensitive expertise and
experience, if the political will to do so is there.
Thus far, EU Member States’ efforts in recent years in the area of asylum
have focused on constructing a more effective framework to enable the har-
monisation of policy and practice. These efforts have generally been undertaken
from a control-oriented standpoint. As the process shifts to transposition at the
national level, it would be well to remember that ultimately it is States’ obliga-
tions under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, as the pre-eminent legal
instruments of international refugee protection, which must be upheld.
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Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
Why talk about gender in relation to EU asylum law? Reading the commentaries
a person would be forgiven for thinking that the two issues had little to do with
each other. The truth is that gender has an effect all the way through the asylum
status determination process. It affects who travels to Europe to claim asylum,
their experiences of persecution, the evidence that they can present, the way
their credibility is judged and how their cases are evaluated against the criteria
of the Refugee Convention by decision makers and their own representatives.
Some countries both inside and outside the EU have recognised this and
modified their procedures or introduced gender guidelines. In various cases
courts have responded to particular gender issues. Despite such developments
recent studies show that problems still remain.1 The question now is what will
happen at European level and whether those developments will be built on,
improved, ignored or even undone.
This chapter looks
* I am indebted to and wish to thank the following: Elizabeth Dubicka for her com-
ments, Catriona Jarvis and Judge Pearl without whom the Immigration Appellate
Authority Gender Guidelines would not have been written and all those, including
members of the Refugee Women’s Legal Group, who have contributed to the ideas
contained in this chapter.
1 See for example, Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (Ashgate, 2000); Haines,
QC, “Gender-Related Persecution”, chapter commissioned by UNHCR for an
expert roundtable discussion on gender-related persecution, 10 Aug. 2001; Crawley,
Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (Jordans, 2001); Berkowitz, Gender Discrimi-
nation or Not – Spijkerboer’s view of the role of gender in refugee law and process,
IA& NL&P (2002) Vol 16, No 1, 13-18; Crawley and Lester, Comparative analysis
of gender-related persecution in national asylum legislation and practice in Europe,
UNHCR May 2004.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 539-569.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Natalia Berkowitz
1. briefly at terminology
2. at developments at international, national and European levels
3. at some gender issues in relation to the EU draft directives
4. and makes some conclusions.
540
Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
are not some gender specific cases, rather all cases, those of men and of women,
are affected by the issue of gender in the refugee process.3
At least since the cold war period, the dominant conception of a refu-
gee in Europe has been of a man. Refugee laws, jurisprudence and procedures
have, not surprisingly, developed on basis of this dominant conception.4 While
analysis and understanding of the effect of sex and gender in refugee law and
practice has substantially advanced in the past decade in case-law, state-practice
and academic writing,5 refugee cases involving men’s experiences continue to be
seen as standard whereas those involving the particular experiences of women
as deviant from the norm and problematic.6 A recent survey of law and policy
in European states concluded that “there has been limited progress in Europe
towards ensuring gender-sensitive interpretation of the 1951 Convention and
gender-sensitive asylum procedures. Where progress has been made, implemen-
tation of key recognitions is inconsistent.”7
541
Natalia Berkowitz
542
Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
their cultural origin.”12 In 1996 the European Parliament urged member states to
adopt guidelines on asylum claims by female asylum seekers and in November
2003 it adopted a resolution calling member states to take into account persecu-
tion and/or fear of persecution suffered by women on account of their sex.13
543
Natalia Berkowitz
“motives of flight specific to women shall be taken into account.”21 The “pre-
liminary works” of the French Aliens Act 1991 refer to the need to take into
account the UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women when assessing a woman’s need for protection and whether to
grant a residence permit or not?.22 In Sweden the law was also modified.23 The
Irish Refugee Act 1996 states that membership of a social group includes, inter
alia, “membership of a group of persons whose defining characteristic is their
belonging to a group of persons whose defining characteristic is their belonging
to the female or the male sex” and sexual violence is specifically acknowledged
as a form of persecution: a person’s freedom shall be regarded as threatened
“if he/she is likely to be subject to serious assault including that of a sexual
nature”.24
interpreter. However, as female applicants are not always informed of this right, this
is not applied in all cases.”
21 For a lucid discussion of gender and Swiss Asylum law see: Kälin, “Gender-related
Persecution in Swiss Asylum Law” in Chetail and Gowwland-Debbas, eds., Switzer-
land and the International Protection of Refugees Brill, 2002
22 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Social and Legal Conditions for Asylum
Seekers and Refugees in Western Europe 2000.
23 For criticism of the Swedish approach see Folkelius and Noll, “Affirmative Exclu-
sion? Sex, Gender, Persecution and the Reformed Swedish Aliens Act” 10 IJRL
(1998). See also Crawley and Lester, n. 2 above, paras. 111-118 and 401-415.
24 O’Mahony, Chief Executive, Irish Refugee Council in: Canadian Council for Refu-
gees Network on Women Fleeing Gender-Related Persecution Newsletter, Issue 1, 29
May 2000
25 Spijkerboer, n.2 above, page 24, Crawley and Lester, n.2 above, para. 51.
26 Spijkerboer, n. 2 above, 15 –17 and 26.
27 Kofman, Phizacklea, Raghuram and Sales, Gender and Migration in Europe (Rout-
ledge, 2000), 75.
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Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
One of the ways in which third country national women arrive in Europe is
through being trafficked for sexual exploitation. The EU has adopted a Frame-
work Decision on combating trafficking in humans and a Directive on short
term residence permits for victims of trafficking.28 For the protection of the vic-
tims it is essential that they should be entitled to seek and obtain asylum or
subsidiary protection where needed.29 Unfortunately the directive only hints in
the Explanatory Memorandum at the possibility of victims claiming subsidiary
protection. The UK, Ireland and Denmark are not taking part in the directive.
In recent years there has been debate regarding whether female asylum
seekers are statistically discriminated against in Europe. One author has sug-
gested that while gender has a widespread effect in the asylum determination
process there is no statistical discrimination against female asylum seekers and
they may be more likely to be granted refugee or humanitarian status than
male asylum seekers.30 Others point to the lack of clarity in the statistics, the
difficulties in analysing ‘fairness’ solely on the basis of statistical data and to
the fact that, given the difficulties faced by women in leaving their countries of
origin, their claims for asylum may be stronger.31 Simple statistical comparisons
between success rates by female and male asylum seekers are complicated by the
fact that higher proportions of women asylum seekers come from countries of
origin in respect of which there is generally a higher rate of success.32 Moreover
such comparisons seek to answer the wrong question; the question is not, are
the same number of men and women granted protection, but is the Refugee
Convention applied correctly in a manner which responds to the international
protection needs of the individual asylum seeker.
28 Respectively OJ 2002 L 203/1 (see Ch. 27) and Council Directive 2004/81/EC (see
Ch. 29).
29 The UK’s Immigration Appeal Tribunal recognised the fears of a trafficked woman
from the Ukraine as entitling her to refugee status in Dzhygun (00TH00728) 17 May
2000. UNHCR expressed concerns that the EU proposals did not acknowledge the
rights of smuggled and trafficked persons to claim and receive refugee status – see
“UNHCR comments on the French Presidency proposals for a Council Directive
and Council Framework Decision on preventing the facilitation of unauthorised
entry and residence” UNHCR Geneva 22 September 2000.
30 Spijkerboer n.2 above, pages 15 – 40.
31 Berkowitz, n.2 above and Crawley and Lester, n. 2 above paragraphs 58 – 70.
32 Spijkerboer, n.2 above page 24.
33 Haines, n. 2 above, para. 9.
545
Natalia Berkowitz
546
Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
traditional and other laws and practices which “nullify and impair” women’s
protection by the state.37 Thus recognizing that states are not by-standers in rela-
tion to the position of their female citizens and that the protection and opportu-
nities afforded to women within society are rarely, if ever, simply a general state
of affairs, but rather the result of particular power structures within that society
which government may, or may not, take action to change.
States and societies themselves may use women as political symbols; for
example by defining their identity through the moral restrictions they place
upon their women. In the words of the UN Special Rapporteur on violence
against women –
“In short, women become symbolic battlefields where cultural boundaries are
guarded and wars are fought. They have yet to be included in the build-
ing of the peace.” 38
These issues have implications for the application of refugee law and procedures
including in respect of:
– the nature of harm feared and suffered by women
– the availability of state protection
– the interpretation of Convention grounds
– access to the refugee procedures and ability to satisfy evidential require-
ments
37 For State’s obligations in international human rights law see, e.g..Human Rights
Committee General Comment 28 Equality of Rights Between Men and Women
(2000) para 5: States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, cultural or
religious attitudes are not to be used to justify violations of women’s rights to equal
enjoyment of all rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1966 including equality before the law. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women 1979: inter alia, Art 2: State’s Parties condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women
and, to this end, undertake …(b) to adopt legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women, (d) To
refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and
to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this
obligation, (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women by any person, organisation or enterprise and Art 5: States Parties shall take
all appropriate measures: (a) to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and cus-
tomary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.
38 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women its causes and conse-
quences, Yakin Erturk, 26 December 2003, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/66, para 37; see
also, for the use of gender in nation building, Crawley, n. 2 above.
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Natalia Berkowitz
39 Europa – Justice and Home Affairs website “The European asylum system caters
for women’s specific needs”, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/asylum/
women/fsj_asylum_women_en.htm>.
40 This chapter considers the following texts: Council Directive 2004/83/EC on mini-
mum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and state-
less persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection
and the content of protection granted and Council Directive 2005/85 on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee
status (OJ 2005 L 326/13).
41 For the relevance of male based language in international law see Charlesworth &
Chinkin, n. 6 above, 49; for its relevance in refugee law see Spijkerboer, n. 2 above,
204.
42 Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and
status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection COM(2001) 510final, 12 September 2001
and Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on proce-
dures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status COM(2002)326
final2 3 July 2002.
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549
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seekers are granted refugee status or subsidiary protection and whether women
are granted international protection from the sorts of serious harm that they
face. Further, these concepts encapsulate the difficulties which host states face in
criticising others states practices (including, especially in relation to women, the
issue of cultural relativism).46
Gender neutral and internationally consistent interpretations of persecu-
tion and serious harm are most likely to obtained if harm is assessed against
international human rights standards, including those set out in instruments
regarding women. While international human rights law itself has been criti-
cised for gender discrimination47 it does at least provide a clear international
benchmark. In applying human rights standards care needs to be taken to apply
those standards in a non-discriminatory way and in relation but to both those
within the public and within the private family sphere.
The definition of persecution in the Qualification Directive (Article 9) does
contain a link to human rights law. Acts will be considered persecution if –
(a) they are sufficiently serious to be a “severe violation of basic human rights”
in particularly non-derogable rights under ECHR; or
(b) they are an accumulation of measures, including human rights violations,
“sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner”.
The definition is to be applauded for making clear that acts of physical and
mental violence, including sexual violence may be persecution as may be “acts
of a gender-specific ... nature” (Article 9(2)(a) and (f)) and discriminatory state
measures including legal, police, judicial (Article 9(2)(b)-(d)).
However issues remain as to whether this definition will provide protec-
tion from the harms suffered by women. The definition of persecution allows
considerable discretion to Member States. The definition basic human rights in
Article 9(1)(a) is unclear. Article 9(1)(b) is yet less clear – will it, for example, be
46 Lord Justice Ward in Horvath (CA) identified these difficulties: “Persecution is such
an affront to human dignity that international law places the obligation on contract-
ing States to give refuge to the persecuted. That demand undoubtedly creates some
tension. On the one hand the humanitarian aim is to save the refugee from that
persecution ... On the other hand, since persecution involves direct State activity
or non-State activity which the State is unwilling or unable to prevent, then, if only
as a matter of international comity, one State will not lightly find that another has
been directly or indirectly implicated in acts of persecution.” See also the comments
of Lord Hoffman in Islam v SSHD, R v IAT & another ex parte Shah (HL) [1999] 2
AC 629, [1999] 2 WLR 1015, [1999] 2 All ER 545, [1999] Imm AR 283, [1999] INLR
144 and, as an example of cultural relativism, – “even rape, albeit systematic rape ...
is simply an aspect, or may be an aspect, of culture or normal social behaviour such
that in this country it would be looked upon with abhorrence.” R v SSHD ex parte
Sharka, CO/1821/95, High Court, 1 Nov. 1995.
47 Charlesworth & Chinkin, n. 6 above, 201 – 249.
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Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
48 See for example Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet
No. 14 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs14.
htm>.
49 Peters v the Netherlands European Commission on Human Rights, Application No.
21132/93.
50 See IAA Gender Guidelines para 2A.22
51 East African Asians v UK (1973) 3 EHRR 76, Smith & Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR
493.
52 Art. 7(3)(c).
53 Spijkerboer, n. 2 above, 129.
54 Art. 4(2)(c) Qualification Directive.
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552
Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
553
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62 Haines, n. 2 above, para 29. See also Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human
Rights Paradigm, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 15, Spring 2002: “refugee
law is not aimed at holding states responsible; its function is remedial.” <http://
www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss15/anker.shtml>.
63 UNHCR, Position Paper: Gender-Related Persecution, January 2000, <www.unhcr.
ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/hom/opendoc.pdf ?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b83c0ae4>.
64 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women its causes and conse-
quences, Yakin Erturk, 26 December 2003, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/66
65 See for example Venia Magaya v Nakayi Shonhiva Magaya (Supreme Court of Zim-
babwe) Judgement No. SC 210/98, Civil Appeal No. 635/92, 2 November 1998 & 16
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February 1999 referred to in Charlesworth & Chinkin, n . 6 above, 123 and Madhu
Kishwar & others v State of Bihar & Others (1996) SCC 125.
66 For the vulnerabilities of internally displaced women see e.g. Internally Displaced
People: A Global Survey, Earthscan Publications (1998), Norwegian Refugee Coun-
cil.
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Natalia Berkowitz
and social circumstances prevailing in that part of the country, including respect
for human rights, and to the personal circumstances of the applicant, including
age, sex, health, family situation and ethnic, cultural and social links.”67
Article 15 (c) raises concerns for the position of women during international or
international armed conflict. The Refugee Convention does not provide pro-
tection from generalised violence during civil war, but under the jurisprudence
of many states it may provide protection from “serious and individual” threats
during generalised violence – for example where a person fears violence because
they are a member of a particular targeted ethnic group.70 Article 15 would thus
appear to place in the category of serious harm some threats which should enti-
tle a person to refugee status. Further, the recital in the Preamble to the draft
Qualification Directive that “[r]isks to which a population of a country or a
section of the population is generally exposed do normally not create in itself an
individual threat in line with Article 15(c)” may restrict the protection still fur-
ther. In recent years there has been increased awareness of how sexual violence
against women of a particular racial, national or religious group is used as a
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weapon of war, not only in Bosnia and Rwanda, but in many conflicts – such
women are evidently in need of international protection – it is hoped that these
provisions will not be used to deny refugee protection or, at worst subsidiary
protection, to those in need.
6 Convention Grounds
Men and women have many similar experiences in their countries of origin –
such as imprisonment and state violence for political activism, but the nature of
women’s lives mean that their experiences under the Convention grounds may
be different. “Ensuring that a gender-sensitive interpretation is given to each
of the Convention grounds can prove very important in determining whether a
particular applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one
of the Convention grounds.”71
Women’s identities, as mentioned above, are often seen primarily as defined
by their family, male relatives or communities. This may make them particularly
subject to persecution on the basis of imputed/attributed Convention grounds;
they may be seen as sharing their male relative’s political, racial and religious
affiliations and views rather than having independent affiliations of their own.
Inflicting harm on a person’s family and home may be a particularly effec-
tive way of attacking opponents. For example the UN Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women has pointed out that “rape and forced pregnancy of
women affiliated with an enemy group” may be used “in order to dishonour an
entire social group.”72 As a result women may face harm because of the actions
or opinions of her family members even where she herself does not share them.73
Article 10(2) of the Qualification Directive does provide for protection to be
granted in such circumstances.
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harmful act occurred”75 has been deleted from the current version. Understand-
ing the convention grounds through a paradigm of female experiences may assist
to ensure that women’s experiences are not depoliticized and personalized.
6.3 Religion
Religion and religious laws may proscribe, or provide the justification for, codes
of behaviour, particularly for women; for example religion may proscribe dress
codes, prohibition of birth control or abortion, restrictions on sexuality, child
marriage, restrictions on freedom of movement, access to education and employ-
ment, behaviour following widowhood, the particular allocation of property on
inheritance, female genital mutilation/circumcism. Such provisions may them-
selves be persecution or women who transgress them may be subject to perse-
75 Art. 7(d) and in the explanatory memorandum to Art. 7 at (4 Proposal for a Council
Directive on minimum standards for the Qualification and Status of third country
nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as person who otherwise need interna-
tional protection, COM (2001) 510 final, 12 September 2001.)
76 Charlesworth & Chinkin, n. 6 above, 254. For an account of sexual violence against
women and its symbolic role in the partition of India and Pakistan see Butalia, “A
Question of Silence: Partition, Women and the State” in Lentin, ed. Gender and
Catastrophe (Zed Books, 1997).
77 Spijkerboer, n. 2 above, 97 and 105.
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“the concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of theistic, non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal
worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other
religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal con-
duct based on or mandated by any religious belief ”.
The Convention grounds of religion and politics may overlap. This is most obvi-
ous where the state is a theocracy, committed to atheism or secularism.78 But may
also occur in other situations79 including harm where from emanates from reli-
gious non-state agents or where law is based or influenced by religion. In many
countries religion has a powerful role which the state is unwilling or unable to
challenge and religious law may prevail in some areas – such as the family.
78 For a lucid analysis see Re MN Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93, 12 Feb. 1996 (RSAA
New Zealand).
79 For fuller details see Immigration Appellate Authority, Asylum Gender Guidelines,
2000, n.19.
80 Spijkerboer, n. 2 above, 65-94, 104, 128.
81 See Spijkerboer, Women and Refugee Status: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction
(Emancipation Council, 1994).
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82 Crawley, “Gender, persecution and the concept of politics in the asylum determina-
tion process” Forced Migration Review 9, Dec. 2000.
83 Crawley, n. 2 above, 83-4.
84 Dress can be the expression of opinion within the meaning of Art 10 ECHR – see
Stevens v UK Application No 11674/85. Recent disputes in France over the wearing
of the veil in schools show the political import of dress – A Hot Rentree The Econo-
mist 28 August 2004, page 25.
85 For discussion of state policies in Iran and Chile see: Greatbatch, “The Gender
Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse” 1 IJRL (1989); see also UN
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, n. 39 above paras 23 – 34.
86 Fatin v INS [1993] 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Circuit) US Court of Appeals, Crawley, n. 2
above.
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561
Natalia Berkowitz
rately cater for the assessment of women’s protection needs. This has obvious
potential consequences – women may simply slip through the safety net without
the assessment of their protection needs. Nor can a gender neutral procedure be
created just by employing female officials –simply being a woman does not guar-
antee an awareness of gender issues and more fundamental consideration is nec-
essary to ensure that procedures are gender neutral rather than gender blind.
A first step is to acknowledge that men and women, both applicants and
officials, may interact with asylum procedures in different ways and the context
in which male and female applicants can best cooperate with the authorities may
differ. In the view of Dr Hinchelwood of the Medical Foundation of Torture:
“The first and foremost preoccupation [of victims of torture] is with their
asylum claim. There is a noticeable difference between men and women in
the manifestation of this anxiety, with exceptions, of course. Men are often
much more vocal and active in their anxiety, they change solicitors, seek let-
ters, reports, ask to be brought forward in the queue. They cannot settle. Most
women I have seen [over nine years of therapeutic work with survivors of
torture] have just melted into the background after their arrival especially if
they have no children, or have left their children behind. They are frequently
‘befriended’ by a lawyer who does nothing and they stay in the room allocated
to them for weeks, months on end, just putting time and distance between
themselves and their shame.”92
Some of the particular procedural and evidential issues which raise concerns for
women are discussed here.93
7.1 Access
The first problem for women is simply making an asylum application. Where
women enter Europe with male relatives there may be a tendency for immigra-
tion officers to assume that their claims are dependant on the men’s and as a
result not to interview them or to interview them cursorily. In such circum-
stances women’s protection needs may not come to light, even where their claims
are stronger than those of their male relatives. It cannot safely be assumed that
male relatives will know the details of a woman’s protection needs nor that they
will give information about them or even support them.
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Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
7.2 Disclosure
A second difficulty for female asylum seekers is that the procedures and ques-
tions used by states may not facilitate full disclosure of their claims or accurately
pinpoint and unravel their protection needs – for example if the correct ques-
tions are not asked women’s experiences may never come to light.96
The obtaining of oral evidence from women raises many similar issues to
those above. It is essential that the woman should not be asked in the presence of
her family if she wants them to be present during the interview. Women must be
interviewed in private since they may not disclose protection needs in the pres-
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ence of family members, especially where family or sexual matters are involved;97
as an example of why this is important –
“In one case a heavily pregnant mother of two was threatened with refusal of
her [asylum] claim on based on non-compliance with the procedures because
she asked for her interview to be delayed for half an hour to allow her husband
to finish with his own interview and take care of the children. The woman’s
past experience included repeated sexual assault in the presence of her chil-
dren. While the Home Office caseworkers may not have been aware of this,
this is exactly the type of possibility that should automatically be taken into
consideration with respect to interviewing applicants in private.”98
97 In the Procedures Directive (Art. 13(1)), interviews will normally take place without
the presence of family members.
98 Crawley & Lester, n. 2 above para 482.
99 See Crawley, n. 2 above, 199 – 222.
100 IAA Gender Guidelines at 5.15 and 5.27, Swiss and Giller, “Rape as a Crime of War:
A Medical Perspective”, Journal of the American Medical Association, August 4
1992, Vol 470.
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Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
565
Natalia Berkowitz
The EU appears to appreciate that genuine applicants may face evidential dif-
ficulties. Article 4(5) of the Qualification Directive explicitly provides that there
is no need for documentary or other supporting evidence in some cases. How-
ever it is unclear how this will be applied in practice – for example, no support-
ing evidence is required where the general credibility of the applicant has been
109 See Kagwanja, “Ethnicity, Gender and Violence in Kenya”, Forced Migration
Review 9, Dec. 2000.
110 Charlesworth & Chinkin, n. 6 above, 266.
111 Islam v SSHD, R v IAT & another ex parte Shah (HL) [1999] 2 AC 629, [1999] 2
WLR 1015, [1999] 2 All ER 545, [1999] Imm AR 283, [1999] INLR 144.
112 Procedures Directive, Arts. 12(2)(c) and 23(4)(c).
113 Procedures Directive Art. 39.
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established, but without such evidence many may find it difficult to establish
their general credibility in the first place.
114 Wilson J in R v Lavallée [1990] 1 SCR 852 (at 874): “If it strains credulity to imagine
what the ‘ordinary man’ would do in the position of a battered spouse, it is prob-
ably because men do not typically find themselves in that situation. Some women
do, however. The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances
which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the hypothetical ‘rea-
sonable man’.” Quoted in Domestic Violence as a Form of Gender-Related Persecu-
tion: Materials for CRDD [Convention Refugee Determination Division] Members
and RCOs [Refugee Claim Officers], April 2000, A revised and updated version of
materials developed by the Toronto Working Group on Women Refugee Claim-
ants in November 1996 at page 12. also: In order to make “a proper assessment of
credibility in claims based on domestic violence, the decision-maker needs to have
a good understanding of the nature of domestic violence (including the pattern
known as the cycle of violence) and the myths surrounding domestic violence, as
well as an understanding of the impact of domestic violence on its victims.”
115 Domestic Violence as a Form of Gender-Related Persecution: Materials for CRDD
Members and Refugee Claim Officers, April 2000 (a revised and updated version of
materials developed by the Toronto Working Group on Women Refugee Claimants
in November 1996).
116 Spijkerboer, n. 2 above, 56, 64 – 65.
117 The Procedures Directive (Art. 23(4)(i)) enables Member States to apply accelerated
procedures to delayed claims.
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9 Conclusion
Who obtains international protection within Europe must be decided on a logi-
cal and rational basis. Ultimately it has little point unless it ensures that those
people who most need protection obtain it whether they are men or women or
children. Gendered assumptions and stereotypes cannot be said to be a logical
or rational basis. Neither can a decision making framework based on the experi-
ences of 50% of the world’s population.
What is needed is not “special treatment” for women, but definitions and
processes which assess the need for protection in each case by reference to crite-
ria which are responsive to the experiences of both men and women. It is posi-
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Chapter 18 Gender and EU Asylum Law
tive is that the draft Directives show some commitment to gender neutrality,
some understanding that gender does affect the asylum process and that steps
need to be taken to ensure that the definition is gender neutral, but it remains to
be seen what will happen in practice.
The challenge is on Member States to implement international protection
in a gender neutral fashion and ensure that what appears to be good will is not
mere rhetoric. An understanding of gender and of women’s experiences is not
merely a question of being nice to the ladies. Greater knowledge can lead to
better decision making – whether it results in the grant or refusal of interna-
tional protection.
569
Section IV Legal Migration and Integration
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
1 Summary of Content
The JHA Council reached agreement on a proposed Directive on family reunion
for third-country nationals on 27/28 February 2003 and adopted it formally as
Directive 2003/86 in September 2003 (see the Annex). Member States had to
apply the Directive by 3 October 2005, although on that date the Commission
reported that only six of them had done so by the deadline.1 This was the culmi-
nation of a lengthy attempt to agree binding rules in this area, dating originally
back to an initial Commission proposal of 1999, which was then amended in
2000, followed by a significantly revised proposal in May 2002.2 The UK and
Ireland opted out of this Directive, and Denmark was automatically excluded
from its application.
Directive 2003/86 begins with Chapter I (Articles 1-3) concerning the pur-
pose, definitions and scope. Article 3(1) limits the scope of the measure to those
third-country national sponsors who have “reasonable prospects of obtaining
the right of permanent residence”. Persons applying for or receiving protection
status are excluded, except for recognised refugees (Article 3(2)). Members of
the family of EU citizens are also excluded, whether that EU citizen has moved
within the EU or not (Article 3(3)). It is open to the EC, with or without the
Member States, to sign more favourable bilateral treaties; three specified multi-
lateral treaties signed by Member States can also set higher standards (Article
1 See Commission Memo/05/348, 3 Oct. 2005. The six Member States meeting the
deadline were Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.
2 For the original proposal, see COM (1999) 638, 1 Dec. 1999; OJ 2000 C 116 E/66,
amended by COM (2000) 624, 10 Oct. 2000; OJ 2001 C 62 E/99. The 2002 proposal
is in COM (2002) 225, 3 May 2002; OJ 2002 C 203 E/136.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 573-613.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
3(4)). Member States can also set higher standards unilaterally in domestic law
(Article 3(5)), but there is no “standstill” requirement applicable to them.
Article 4 (Chapter II) sets out the family members who may or must be
admitted to join a sponsor. The spouse and minor unmarried children must be
admitted (Article 4(1)), subject to certain qualifications regarding adopted chil-
dren and children whose custody is shared. However, Member States have an
option to retain their existing law which sets a special “integration requirement”
for children as young as 12. Admission of dependent parents or other relatives in
the ascending line, adult disabled children of the sponsor or unmarried partners
of the sponsor along with relevant children is also optional (Article 4(2) and
4(3)). In the event of polygamy, Member States cannot admit additional spouses
once one spouse is resident within the EU, but have the option to admit the chil-
dren of the additional spouse (Article 4(4)). It is presumably up to the sponsor
to determine which of his wives will have the honour of joining him. Member
States can also set age limits for spouses to enter (Article 4(5)). Finally, Member
States can place restrictions on entry of children over 15 (Article 4(6)).
Chapter III (Article 5) sets out procedural rules on the submission and con-
sideration of applications. Next, Chapter IV (Articles 6-8) sets out additional
conditions which may be imposed before entry of family members is authorised.
These concern requirements of “public policy, public security or public health”,
as clarified by the preamble; accommodation, sickness insurance and resources
requirements; an integration requirement; and a waiting period, which should
be a two-year maximum (although Member States can retain an existing three-
year waiting period).
Next, Chapter V (Articles 9-12) sets out specific rules for refugees, although
Member States can confine its scope to refugees whose family relationships pre-
date their entry. The rules are more generous, in that the possible special limits
on children over 12 cannot apply, admission of additional dependent family
members may be authorised, there are special rules on admission of the family
or guardians of unaccompanied minors, the rules on proving a family relation-
ship are more liberal, the integration requirement cannot be applied as strictly;
and the waiting period and accommodation, sickness insurance and resources
requirements are waived.
Chapter VI (Articles 13-15) deals with the status of family members after
entry. They must be given the “facility” to obtain the necessary visas, and a
renewable residence permit of at least one-year permit to start with. They have
the right of access to education, employment, self-employment and training on
the same footing as the sponsor, although access to employment and self-employ-
ment can be restricted for non-nuclear family members or subject to a waiting
period of up to a year for all family members. After five years’ residence at the
latest, the spouse or partner must be given an autonomous residence permit,
although such a permit may or must be granted earlier in the event of “particu-
larly difficult circumstances” and may also be granted to other family members.
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
3 Case C-540/03 EP v Council, pending, attacking the validity of Arts. 4(1), last sub-
paragraph, 4(6) and 8(2). See a summary of the EP’s claim in OJ 2004 C 47/21. An
Advocate-General’s Opinion of 8 September 2005 recommends rejecting the EP’s
challenge as inadmissible for procedural reasons, although sympathising with much
of the EP’s arguments on the merits.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
4 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see (on non-protection cases) Peers, “Family
Reunion and European Community Law”, in Walker, ed., Towards an Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice (OUP, 2004) and (on protection cases) Peers, “EC law on
family members of persons seeking or receiving international protection” in Shah,
ed., The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (Cavendish, 2005).
5 See particularly Joined Cases 35 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] ECR 3723;
but see exceptions and clarifications in: Cases C-370/90 Surinder Singh [1992] ECR
I-4265; C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279; C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607;
C-148/02 Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; and C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. Two
pending cases seek to clarify the meaning of the Akrich judgment (Case C-1/05 Jia
and C-291/05 Eind).
6 OJ 1994 L 1/1; OJ 2002 L 114/1.
7 See Cases C-355/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR I-5113; C-351/95 Kadiman [1997] ECR I-
2133; C-210/97 Akman [1998] ECR I-7519; C-329/97 Ergat [2000] ECR I-1487;
C-65/98 Eyup [2000] ECR I-4747; C-275/02 Ayaz [2004] ECR I-8765; C-467/02
Cetinkaya [2004] ECR I-10895; C-373/03 Aydinli, judgment of 7 July 2005, not yet
reported; and C-325/05 Derin, pending. On access to education, see judgment of 7
July 2005 in Case C-374/03 Gurol, not yet reported. However, the EC/Turkey treaty
does not govern the initial entry of Turkish workers’ family members: Case 12/86
Demirel [1987] ECR 3719. For detailed analysis, see Hedemann-Robinson, “An
Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in relation to Third-
country Nationals resident within the European Union, with particular reference to
the case law of the European Court of Justice” 38 CMLRev. (2001) 525 and Rogers,
A Practitioners’ Guide to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement (Kluwer, 2000).
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
Clearly, this left the majority of cases of family reunion with third-coun-
try nationals unregulated by Community law until the Directive was agreed.
Although there are a number of human rights instruments impacting on the
issue of family reunion,8 none of them set out a comprehensive code of legal
requirements to follow as regards application of the right to family reunion.
Since family reunion is one of the chief reasons for new legal entry of third-
country nationals onto the territory of the EU, there has long been an inevitable
interest in harmonising national law on this issue. But it has been immeasurably
harder to put these harmonising intentions into effect.
The first attempt by EU Member States to harmonise national law on family
reunion law dates back to a Resolution of Member States’ Interior Ministers
adopted in 1993.9 It is useful to recap the history of negotiations on the Resolu-
tion here, because the relevant documents have only recently become available.10
The Resolution began as a precisely drafted text from the Portuguese Presidency
in spring 1992,11 but delegations were concerned that this text appeared too
binding. Therefore it was replaced by a vaguely drafted text submitted by the
UK Presidency, which became the basis of the final Resolution.12 The changes
made during discussions on this text were the addition of a waiting period
before entry, the deletion of the prospect of the entry of fiancees, the deletion
of the principle that a ten-year stay would normally entail an “expectation” of
gaining permanent residence status, the deletion of detailed examples of cases
where extended family would be admitted and the addition of an optional sick-
ness insurance requirement. The most disputed point was the possible grant of
independent status of family members, with France in particular insisting on the
right to obtain independent status (ulitmately after a period to be determined)
8 See Annex to the ILPA response to the 1999 version of the proposal (online at
<www.ilpa.org.uk>), memorandum conncering the proposed family reunion direc-
tive in The Amsterdam Proposals (ILPA/MPG, 2000) and generally Cholewinski,
Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 1997).
9 For the text of the proposal, see Guild and Niessen, The Developing Immigration
and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted Conventions, Resolutions, Rec-
ommendations, Decisions and Conclusions (Kluwer, 1996), 250-257.
10 This is because the Council took the view that while the documents were in its pos-
session, they were “authored” by the Member States, and the EU rules on access to
documents did not yet cover such documents: see Peers, “Building Fortress Europe:
The Development of EU Migration Law”, 35 CMLRev. (1998) 1235 at 1239-1242.
11 WGI 1078, 28 Apr. 1992; see records of discussion in WGI 1094, 13 May 1992 and
WGI 1112, 2 June 1992.
12 WGI 1151 rev 1, 16 Jul. 1992. See later drafts in WGI 1179, 14 Sep. 1992; WGI 1194
rev 1, 15 Oct. 1992; WGI 1250, 4 Nov. 1992 and WGI 1167, 16 Nov. 1992 and see
records of discussion in WGI 1164, 27 July 1992; WGI 1174, 15 Sep. 1992; WGI
1185, 28 Sep. 1992; and WGI 1248, 16 Nov. 1992.
577
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
and the right to work. As a compromise the latter right is only to be granted “if
appropriate”.
The final Resolution does not apply to persons joining EU citizens, whether
or not they have moved within the EU, or to persons joining the citizens of
EEA states.13 Students, persons on fixed-term contracts, and recognised refu-
gees were also excluded. Instead, the Resolution confines its application to
those persons seeking to join someone who had an ‘expectation of permanent
or long-term residence’ as defined by national law. The only family members
included are spouses and unmarried dependent children between the ages of
16 and 18, with extended family only to be admitted in “compelling” circum-
stances. Even admission of step-children is left to the option of Member States.
Member States retain the option of setting a large number of conditions for
entry, including waiting periods, requirements of public policy, et al. and accom-
modation, sickness insurance and resources requirements. They also retain the
option to continue checking that the conditions were fulfilled after entry. As
for the status of family members, the prospect of access to employment and
independent residence rights is also only an option. The later Resolution on the
self-employed applied this Resolution to admission of the family members of
the self-employed, while the Resolution on students left the admission of family
members up to national law and the Resolution on workers was silent on the
issue of family reunion.14
The Dutch Presidency tried to follow-up the implementation of the Resolu-
tion in the first half of 1997.15 There was still a wide variation in Member States’
practice on the issues within the scope of the Resolution, but the Presidency
thought that harmonisation of family reunion rules for refugees, short-term res-
idents and EU nationals, the position of unmarried partners and the principle
of access to independent residence status could be addressed.16
Subsequently, building in part on this discussion, the Commission proposed
a Convention on migration law in 1997 which contained a Chapter on family
13 For more detailed analysis, see Peers, n. 10 above; Guild and Niessen, n. 9 above at
257-273; Hedemann-Robinson, “Third-Country Nationals, European Union citi-
zenship and free movement of persons: A time for bridges rather than divisions?”
16 YEL (1996) 321 at 324-325; Hailbronner, “Migration Law and Policy Within the
Third Pillar of the European Union” in Bieber and Monar, eds., Justice and Home
Affairs in the European Union (European University Press, 1995); and Boeles, et al,
A New Immigration Law for Europe: the 1992 London and 1993 Copenhagen Rules
on Immigration (Standing Committee of Experts on Immigration, 1994).
14 OJ 1996 C 274/7, 10 and 3; see further Chs. 21 and 22.
15 See Council doc. 8285/97, 21 May 1997 (discussion paper).
16 See Council doc. 8928/97, 12 June 1997 (outcome of working party meeting, 29-30
May 1997).
578
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
reunion.17 By the time this Convention was proposed, the Treaty of Amster-
dam had already been agreed, but the Commission was planning to submit a
Community law version of the Convention soon after the new Treaty entered
into force. The proposal suggested extending the rules on family reunion for
migrant EU citizens to family reunion for all EU citizens. But for those join-
ing third-country nationals, the proposal was relatively disappointing. While the
scope of third-country national sponsors covered by the proposal was somewhat
broader than the Resolutions (also covering refugees and students, for instance),
the rules on waiting periods for entry and access to employment would have set
a minimum waiting period without setting any maximum period and would not
have set out substantive rules on independent residence status.18
The Convention was discussed intensively by Member States, but reaction
to the Commission’s proposals varied widely.19 Most Member States objected to
a rigid waiting period before entry, and some questioned the idea of addressing
family members of EC nationals. A number wanted to alter the proposed condi-
tions governing entry and objected to the idea of “favourable consideration” for
admission of extended family members. There were also disputes as to the extent
of the initial residence authorisation. Many Member States objected to a time
limit for access to employment and accepted the principle of gaining indepen-
dent status, although some questioned why the Commission’s proposal only set
out procedural rules for grant of independent status.
Finally, in addition to the Directive discussed in this Chapter, it should
be recalled that the legislation on temporary protection, reception conditions,
responsibility for asylum applications, long-term residence, researchers and the
definition of refugee status contain rules relevant to family members.20
579
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
protection for family reunion provided for in its national law in any way what-
soever.
The 1999 version was similar in structure to the final agreed Directive ver-
sion, but its scope was far wider as regards sponsors and family members and
the rules on conditions of entry and status of family members were noticeably
more generous. In particular, like the proposed Convention, it included a pro-
vision extending the family reunion rules applying to migrant EU citizens to
all EU citizens. It extended to all third-country nationals who had resided for
at least one year, including refugees and persons with subsidiary protection
status, although not to asylum-seekers or persons with temporary protection
status. Member States would have been entitled to apply more favourable family
reunion rules only pursuant to the 1961 Council of Europe Social Charter and
1977 Council of Europe Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, or
pursuant to a treaty between the Community or the Community and its Member
States with non-EU countries.
Member States would have had to admit not only the spouse and minor
unmarried dependent children, but also unmarried partners where national law
treated them equally with spouses, adult children if dependent due to their state
of health, and dependent ascendants if there was no other family support in the
country of origin. Member States could only have set a maximum waiting period
of one year before entry and would have had to reply to applications within
six months, although most conditions would have been waived for refugees and
persons with subsidiary protection. The core family members would have been
entitled to equal treatment with EU citizens as regards access to employment,
self-employment, education and training, but Member States could not have
permitted wider family members to have access to employment, self-employ-
ment or training.
The discussion of the proposed Directive within the European Parliament
indicated the breadth of opinion on this issue. An initial highly conservative
draft report by the original committee rapporteur, Eva Klamt, failed to secure
majority support and so the report was redrafted by Graham Watson, the com-
mittee chairman, who convinced the EP’s committee and the EP plenary to
support a number of largely liberal amendments in September 2000.22 The EP
suggested deleting persons with subsidiary protection from the text of the pro-
posal, but raising the standards in the proposal by permitting Member States to
adopt more favourable rules in national law, adding a “non-regression” clause
exhorting Member States not to lower the standard of protection in areas gov-
erned by the Directive, widening the criteria to require admission of ascend-
ing relatives, enhancing procedural rights and giving wider family members full
access to employment, self-employment, education and training on the same
basis as EU citizens.
22 OJ 2001 C 135/174.
580
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
581
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
of residence and the possibility of withdrawing residence for use of “false docu-
ments” or submission of “false or misleading information” was added. Next,
family members’ access to employment, et al was made identical to the access of
the sponsor, not to EU citizens; the issue of visas would no longer be free; and
Member States were permitted to examine the sponsor’s position after entry.
Several basic questions were then sent to SCIFA in March 2001, along with sev-
eral significant redrafted clauses.30 These concerned the definition of “unmar-
ried partners”, which would more clearly be left to national law; a possible shift
to national discretion over whether to admit non-nuclear family members; an
extension of the time limit to consider applications to nine months; confirming
the possiblity of checking whether the resources criterion was met for two years
after entry, while taking account of family members’ contribution to household
income; an extension of the waiting period to two years; more provisional resi-
dence permits for family members for the first four years, rather than the first
year only; and confirming the limit on access to employment, self-employment,
education and training to the same position as the sponsor. SCIFA broadly
approved these changes,31 and the creation of a separate chapter on refugees
also dates from this point.
The text was then weakened further throughout the spring of 2001. Member
States gained the power to withdraw residence permits in all cases in which the
conditions were no longer met, a provision apparently contradicting the limits
on the power to impose after-entry checks set out in the rest of the text. Also,
the obligation to issue transit visas was dropped, the obligation to consider
certain in-country applications became an option, Member States could with-
draw a permit if “other unlawful means” were used to obtain it, and Member
States could check on family members when permits were renewed, not just
when they were issued. But in return, the Community was empowered to adopt
future treaties setting more favourable standards.32 Next, Member States were
permitted an indefinite extension on the nine-month waiting period for a deci-
sion and the two-year waiting period for entry, the entry of unmarried partners
become optional, the entry of extended family became more clearly optional
and Member States were allowed to set a minimum age for spouses. This time, in
return the Member States were allowed to adopt more favourable standards in
their domestic law.33 The effect of these latest changes were that the only binding
provisions left in the Directive were those concerning family members of EU
nationals, family members of refugees, access to employment, education and
582
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
34 Council docs. 10394/01, 2 July 2001; 10842/01, 12 July 2001; 10922/01, 20 July 2001;
11330/01, 2 Aug. 2001 (outcome of proceedings of the working group, 27 July 2001);
11540/01, 3 Sep. 2001; 11542/01, 11 Sep. 2001; 11881/01, 17 Sep. 2001; 12022/01, 24
Sep. 2001. See also room documents migr 3/01 to 7/01 and 10/01.
35 For the Laeken conclusions, See Annex 5.
36 See also analysis for Statewatch, online at: <http://www.statewatch.org/asylum/
obserasylum2.htm>.
37 Council docs. 8419/01 and 9019/01, n. 33 above, are clearly the source of most of
the revised Commission text. The Belgian proposal concerning aspects of the rules
on penalties (Article 16(1) and 16(3), first appearing in Council doc. 10922/01, n. 34
above) was also adopted by the Commission.
583
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
by any Council Presidency text, although conversely there are a few points where
the Commission instead proposed a higher standard than the Council texts--
although in most cases not a much higher standard.
First of all, there were a number of major changes in the scope of the
proposal. To start with, EU citizens’ family members were excluded. This was a
huge reduction of standards compared to the 2000 version issued by the Com-
mission, and was also below the standard set in any Council text.38 Although
the Commission indicated that it would make a proposal on this group as soon
as the proposed Directive on EC nationals’ right to move and reside freely was
agreed, there was no sign of that proposal by 1 January 2006, over 18 months
after that Directive was adopted.39 It should be kept in mind that the major-
ity of EU nationals with third-country national family members likely have an
immigrant and ethnic minority background. Next, the limitation to cases where
an sponsor has “reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent resi-
dence” was a substantial reduction in standards compared to the 2000 version.
Although it confirmed the position in the May 2001 Council texts, the word-
ing was different: the Council texts referred to “long-term residence”, which is
potentially a different concept and an easier threshold to cross. Furthermore, the
prospect of rules on family reunion for persons with subsidiary protection status
was put further back, with the reference to imminent legislation on this issue
deleted from the preamble to the 2002 version. The explanatory memorandum
to this version indicated the Commission’s belief that such persons should be
dealt with in a second phase of legislation.
The next batch of changes related to the relationship between the Directive
and national law. It would now be possible, following the Council texts of May
2001, for the EC to apply higher standards following conclusion of later inter-
national treaties, not just earlier international treaties. Member States were also
permitted to apply higher standards in their internal law. While these changes
raised standards compared to the 2000 version, the minimum standards set by
the Directive were now so low that granting the power to set higher standards
was inevitable. A more significant change was a proposed “standstill” clause,
which raised standards compared to both the 2000 version and to any Council
texts, which contained no comparable clause. However, this clause was clearly
limited to certain provisions in the Directive (concerning the scope of family
members permitted to join, the “stable resources” criterion and its application,
and the waiting period before entry), but no others. Also, it is arguable that
it would not have had the effect of a “standstill” clause, as it was rather more
similar to a “non-regression” clause found in social legislation, which merely
38 In the May 2001 Council texts, only three Member States had objected to the inclu-
sion of this group.
39 Directive 2004/38 (OJ 2004 L 229/35).
584
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
exhorts the Member States not to lower their standards to the minimum stan-
dards found in EC legislation.
A series of important changes were also made to the core rules on the family
members who can join the sponsor. First of all, admission of unmarried part-
ners and connected children, along with ascending relatives and adult children,
was optional. Also, the adult children now had to be unmarried. This lowered
standards compared to the 2000 version, but confirmed the position from the
May 2001 Council texts, which had attracted reservations. There was still an
obligation to admit the spouse and minor children, but the conditions regarding
minor children have changed. Admission of children when custody is shared was
now optional. More importantly, the option allowing Member States to set an
age for admission as low as twelve for children in certain circumstances was new.
Both these changes lowered standards compared to the 2000 version and all the
Council texts.
As for the rules on submission and examination of the application, the
consideration of in-country applications was now only optional, a lower stan-
dard adopting the wording from Council texts. Also, the time limit of national
authorities to respond to an application within nine months (as compared to
six in the 2000 version), with a 12-month response permissible “in exceptional
circumstances”, was an an improvement on the May 2001 Council texts, which
had suggested no final time limit.
The standards on conditions for entry were also lowered significantly.
Residence permits could now be withdrawn after entry on public policy, etc.
grounds, and the “stable resources” criterion was altered, in particular permit-
ting Member States to apply the test again when renewing the residence permits
for the first time (previously they could do so only on entry), although family
members’ contributions would have to be taken into account. This was the Com-
mission’s attempt at a compromise, as the May 2001 Council texts had suggested
a two-year time limit during which these conditions could still be applied. Fur-
thermore, the potential waiting period was extended from one year to two years,
with a possible extension to three years if existing law permitted it. This was
again at least a more positive approach than the May 2001 Council texts, which
had no absolute time limit.
Next, the rules on refugees’ family members were consolidated into one
Chapter, following the structure of the Council’s texts. However, the scope of
family reunion for refugees was reduced compared to the 2000 version. First,
Member States would now have an option to limit family reunion in this Chap-
ter to those who had family relationships with refugees before their refugee
status, a provision not found in any of the Council’s prior texts. Second, the new
general limitations on the scope of family members permitted to enter would
have a knock-on effect on family members of refugees, adopting the approach in
Council texts, except that the possibility of banning children over 12 from family
reunion would not apply for refugees. On the other hand, admission of unac-
585
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
586
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
On the other hand, there were some calls for more generous rules, with
Sweden holding out for admission of persons living in a “registered partner-
ship” to be mandatory and questioning the possible option of limiting family
reunion to children under 12. Furthermore, the Germans thought there should
be a discretionary possibility to admit collateral relatives in hardship cases and
Germany, Italy and Austria thought the ban on children entering from more
than one polygamous marriage might be “too rigid”.
As for the rules and conditions on admission, Germany and Finland had a
reservation on the 12-month maximum deadline for replying to an application
and Austria wanted to add “the threat to international security” to the grounds
for refusing an application and the possibility of requiring a health certificate
and language ability before entry. Germany also wanted to delete the word
“personal” from the requirement that public policy and domestic security refus-
als must be based on the “personal conduct” of the sponsor, while Germany
and Luxembourg wanted to check sufficient resources any time the permit was
renewed, not just the first time.41 Austria had a reservation on the requirement
of non-discrimination as regards the accommodation, sickness insurance and
resources conditions, and wanted a maximum waiting period before admission
of five years, rather than three years. Finally, Italy wanted to redraft the clause
on the resources conditions, in light of the rules in Italy.42
Similarly, there were objections to the chapter on refugees. Austria and Spain
had scrutiny reservations on the entire chapter, and there were sundry other
objections. Italy had a reservation about admitting family members of unac-
companied minors, and Finland objected to mandatory admission of guard-
ians or more distant family members. Greece, Italy and Belgium had qualms
about admitting refugees’ family members without documentary evidence of the
relationship, while Greece and the Netherlands objected to exempting refugees
from the accommodation, sickness insurance and resources conditions. Finally,
Germany wanted to ban family reunion for persons who have been recognised
as refugees in another Member State, but Belgium took the view that this would
contradict the Dublin Convention.
On the issue of status of family members, several Member States had con-
cerns about giving family members permits of the same duration as the sponsor,
although some of them apparently wanted the leeway to be more generous than
this. Germany, Austria and the Netherlands wanted to link renewed residence
permits to a condition of participation in integration measures. Austria had
reservations about access to education, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands
41 In fact, Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Greece and Austria wanted to delete Article
7(1)(c), sub-para. 2 (setting a limitation on checks after entry), and apply only Arti-
cle 16(1), which they read to permit unlimited checks after admission. The standstill
clause (Art. 3(6)) applied to the former clause, but not the latter.
42 See further room doc migr 6/02, 12 Aug. 2002.
587
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
about access to employment and Greece about access to vocational training. Italy
wanted a six-year deadline to issue an autonomous residence permit, although
Sweden felt that a five-year wait for an autonomous permit was too long. Greece
had a reservation on this point because it only issues such permit in “exceptional
cases”; and Germany noted that it only issues such permits to children reaching
the age of majority where the parents have died or separated. Finally, the Dutch
objected to the planned revision of specified Articles in the future.
In subsequent discussions, Member States insisted upon a number of
reductions in the level of protection in the proposal. First of all, following the
second reading,43 the final time limit of one year to make a decision on an appli-
cation was dropped, the obligation to admit guardians or extended family of
unaccompanied minors became optional and the obligation to issue an indepen-
dent permit only applies “on application, if required”. However, Member States
were given an option to admit adult children of unmarried partners, to permit
the children of unmarried partners to enter and to accept applications without
accompanying travel documents. Secondly,44 the next revised version dropped
the application of the “standstill” clause from rules on checking income on first
renewal of the permit, specified that the conditions for issue of the autonomous
residence permit are established by national law, permitted Member States to
limit family reunion to those refugees who had a family before their entry (rather
than those who had a family before their refugee status) and decided that the
initial residence permit issued to a family member never had to be for the same
length as the sponsor’s permit.
Thirdly, a decisive reduction in standards followed the SCIFA meeting
in November 2002,45 at which the “standstill” clause was deleted, without any
compensating increase in the minimum standards whatsoever. This left Member
States free to lower standards to the very low minimum levels in the Directive.
Next,46 Member States agreed that when more liberal Member States admit
“optional” family members, more conservative Member States can refuse admis-
sion to those persons pursuant to the long-term residents Directive. Also, the
limitation of the “public policy” clause to the “personal conduct” of the person
concerned was deleted, the requirement to take family members’ financial con-
tributions into account was weakened, the requirement of non-discriminatory
application of the sickness insurance, accommodation and sufficient resources
conditions was dropped and Member States were permitted to impose an “inte-
43 Council doc. 11787/02, 30 Sep. 2002, outcome of proceedings of working party 5-6
and 18-19 Sep. 2002.
44 Council doc. 13053/02, 23 Oct. 2002, outcome of proceedings of working party 1-2
Oct. 2002.
45 Council doc. 13968/02, 12 Nov. 2002.
46 Council doc. 14272/02, 26 Nov. 2002, outcome of proceedings of working party 12-
13 Nov. 2002.
588
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
gration” requirement. However, Member States would have the option of treat-
ing persons with a registered partnership on the same footing as spouses.
During January 2003,47 a number of the outstanding scrutiny reservations
were removed, and there was agreement in the Council bodies on several points.
These included agreement on the exception for public policy, et al, rejecting the
idea of an “international relations” exception from the right to family reunion,
but agreeing to state in the minutes that the concept of public policy includes
“cases in which a third-country national belongs to an association which sup-
ports the international terrorism, supports such an association or has extrem-
istic aspirations”. It can obviously be questioned whether an “international
relations” exception would have been compatible with the limitations on family
life permitted by Article 8 ECHR. Refugees could be subjected to integration
measures, but only after the grant of family reunion. Member States were also
permitted to limit access to an autonomous permit in cases of marriage or rela-
tionship breakdown. The most important remaining reservations by Member
States concerned the possible extension of the maximum waiting period, the
application of the Directive to the formation of families and access to employ-
ment by family members.
The JHA Council reached agreement on these remaining points in Feburary
2003, agreeing to retain the maximum waiting period for entry at three years, to
apply the Directive to family formation (subject to a provision allowing more
possibility for later withdrawal of residence permits) and to permit a one-year
wait for access to employment. Member States were also permitted to set a mini-
mum age of 21 for marriage and to restrict applications from children over 15.
Given the huge changes in the 2002 text compared to the earlier proposal,
the EP was reconsulted. The EP plenary voted in April 2003 to suggest a return
to all of the key provisions in the 2000 text, with the exception of the rules in
that version on family reunion for EU citizens.
The Commission’s strategy of accepting much of the Council’s spring 2001
texts and even going below the standards of those texts on many points was pre-
sumably based on a realpolitik assumption that Member States were unwilling
to agree even a modest level of minimum standards in this area. Instead, as with
asylum procedures,48 the alternative strategy was to suggest minimum standards
just above the lowest common denominator, with a standstill clause to ensure
that the Member States with higher standards did not lower them and “red-
lining” clauses permitting Member States with particularly low standards on
crucial points to keep such standards on condition that they were strictly limited
to those States. The problem with this strategy from a human rights perspec-
tive was that the standstill clause was too limited in scope and weak in effect.
47 Council docs. 5508/03, 23 Jan. 2003 and 5881/03, 3 Feb. 2003, outcome of proceed-
ings of working party on 23 Jan. 2003 and SCIFA on 29 Jan. 2003.
48 See Ch. 14.
589
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
It is unfortunate that the Commission did not attempt initially to suggest high
minimum standards coupled with a “red-lining” clause for a greater number of
Member States falling below those standards, for at least with such an approach
the “norm” would be higher. In any event, the reaction to the Commission’s
revised proposal suggested that its strategy had not worked, with conservative
Member States successfully pressing for even lower standards than they had been
willing to accept the previous year and unwilling to accept the major changes
which had been made towards their position in a spirit of compromise. This out-
come also suggests that liberal Member States made a tactical error by refusing
to accept a compromise text in May 2001, as the effect of delay was the further
weakening of standards.
3 Legal Analysis
During the Swedish Presidency, the Council legal service was asked to comment
on whether the draft Directive permitted Member States to agree treaties with
third states setting higher standards than the Directive. It is not known what view
the legal service took.49 However, the position is clear following a subsequent
amendment to the proposal agreed in the Council (and contained in the 2002
version of the proposal and the final text of the Directive) permitting Member
States to set higher standards in national law. The Court of Justice has consis-
tently held that where EC legislation sets only minimum standards internally,
Member States retain external freedom to act to agree treaties to exceed those
standards.50 Before the proposal was amended, it could indeed have been argued
that since the text aimed to set fully harmonised standards internally, Member
States would lose external competence as a consequence; but this begged the
question as to whether the proposal could fully harmonise national law.
The other legal question is whether access to employment by third-country
nationals falls within the scope of Article 63 EC. As argued elsewhere in this
volume, the better view is that the powers over this issue are contained in Article
137 EC, or failing that, within Article 63 EC.51
It should also be kept in mind that many of the persons who will be covered
by the Directive will also be covered in part by EC treaties with third states.
So, for example, initial admission of the family members of Turkish workers
will be covered by the Directive, but continued residence and access to employ-
ment after three years will be governed by the rules adopted pursuant to the EC/
Turkey Association Agreement, except where the Directive sets higher standards
or addresses issues not covered by the agreement.52 A large number of nationals
590
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
of third states will be covered by the rules on equal treatment in working condi-
tions pursuant to various treaties,53 and in a number of cases family members
will also be covered by rules on equal treatment in social security.54
4 Comments
4.1 1999 and 2000 Versions 55
A number of NGOs commented on the 1999 and 2000 versions of this pro-
posal.56 For example, ILPA suggested that the Directive might not be compliant
with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, because of the prospect that the ECHR juris-
prudence could become more critical of distinctions between EC nationals and
non-EC nationals as regards family reunion. It also argued that the proposal
did not conform to the Tampere principles of EU migration and asylum policy,
in particular the principle of granting the EU’s third country nationals rights
comparable to those of EU citizens. Rather, the proposal would intensify differ-
ences of treatment between these two categories. Also, ILPA criticised the wide
discretion that would be left to Member States concerning the conditions of
entry, the lack of a “standstill” clause (with the risk that there would be collec-
tive EU pressure to reduce to a lowest common denominator), and the lack of a
provision permitting Member States to adopt higher standards, even where such
standards derived from from pre-existing agreements with third countries.
ECRE argued that the Directive should apply to all persons with subsidiary
protection status, even if they did not hold a permit renewable for more than one
year.57 It also suggested that Member States be allowed to set higher standards
wait, to take up the same employment as the sponsor; then Decision 1/80 will confer
employment and residence rights upon them as family members after three and five
years. It appears from the judgment in Aydinli (n. 7 above) that Turkish workers’
family members within the scope of Article 7 of Decision 1/80 cannot, however,
rely on Article 6 of Decision 1/80 in in order to renew their work permit after one
year of employment with the same employer, although this is inconsistent with the
Court’s prior approach to the relationship between Articles 6 and 7 of the Decision
(see Kadiman and Eroglu, n. 7 above, and particularly Case C-188/00 Kurz [2002]
ECR I-10691).
53 See Cases C-416/96 El-Yassini [1999] ECR I-1209; C-162/00 Pokrzepowicz-Meyer
[2002] ECR I-1049; C-438/00 Kolpak [2003] ECR I-4135; C-171/01 Birklite [2003]
ECR I-4301; C-465/01 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-8291; and Case C-265/03
Simutkenov [2005] ECR I-2579.
54 See case law beginning with Case C-18/90 Kziber [1991] ECR I-199 (Maghreb) and
Case C-262/96 Surul [1999] ECR I-2625 (Turkey).
55 For an analysis of the Commission proposal as compared to suggestions by NGOs,
see Boeles, “Directive on Family Reunion: Are the Dilemmas Resolved?” 3 EJML
(2001) 61.
56 See n. 8 above.
57 The ECRE comments are in Council doc. 7984/00, 28 Apr. 2000.
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592
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
no European directive than to have one that endorses violations of the right to
family life perpetrated by certain Member States.”
The UNHCR had concerns about the new version, even though refugees
were exempted from some of the more restrictive provisions. It objected to the
narrower definition of the family, the exclusion of persons with subsidiary pro-
tection, and what it believed was an option for the Member States to apply a
waiting period for refugees’ family reunion.
Finally, the churches’ organisations (now joined by the Quaker Council for
European Affairs) expressed serious concern about the reduction in standards in
the new version of the proposal. In particular, they objected to the narrowing of
the concept of family, the more limited access to employment and other forms
of status and the greatly increased stringency of the conditions for reunion.
60 The following is adapted from a detailed analysis of the family reunion Directive in
s. 5 of Peers, “Family Reunion”, n. 3 above, which also examines the relationship
between the Directive and EC association agreements.
61 See Ch. 13.
62 See Art. 13 of Directive 2003/109 (Ch. 20).
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63 Arts. 2(a) and 3(2)(b) and (c) of each Directive are identical; Art. 6 in each Direc-
tive are deliberately similar; Art. 5 of the long-term residence Directive is identical
to Art. 7 of the family reunion Directive (leaving aside the accomodation require-
ment, exemption for refugees and consideration of the number of family members
in the latter); and Arts. 2(e), 16 and 21 of the long-term residence Directive refer to
the family reunion Directive. Also, in the Commission’s explanatory memorandum
to the revised version of the family reunion directive in 2002 (n. 2 above), it was
expressly stated that Arts. 13 and 15 of the proposal were being being aligned with
the long-term residents’ proposal. See Council doc. 5533/03, 3 Feb. 2003, which
makes several references to alignment of a number of provisions.
64 See Ch. 20.
65 For detailed argument, see Peers, n. 3 above.
66 See Case C-356/98 Kaba I [2000] ECR I-2623.
67 Articles 4(1), 4(6), 5(4), 7(2), 8 and 15(4) and implicitly in Article 18.
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
595
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
70 Arts. 2(2), 3, 4(1) and (3) of Directive (OJ Spec. Ed., 1963-64, 117).
71 On checking family members’ names in the Schengen Information System and the
application of Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions to
family members, see the analysis in s. 4.2 of Ch. 20, which applies mutatis mutandis
to family members.
72 See Berrehab v Netherlands (Series A, no. 138) and Ciliz v Netherlands (Reports of
Judgments and Decisions, 2000-VIII).
73 See Case 249/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1263.
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
74 For example, by the long-term residents’ Directive (see Ch. 20) and/or EC-Turkey
Association Council Decision 1/80 (see Peers, n. 3 above).
75 For example, Article 9 of Decision 1/80 on Turkish workers’ children access to edu-
cation; on this issue, see the judgment in Gurol, n. 7 above.
597
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
5 Conclusions
How low can minimum standards go? In this Directive, they went very low
indeed. Given the deletion of the proposed “standstill” requirement, there is a
serious risk that Member States will move towards the very low “floor” estab-
lished by the Directive. The huge distinctions between this Directive and the
family reunion standards applicable to EU citizens amount to indirect discrimi-
nation on racial and religious grounds. Coupled with the specific conditions in
the Directive, they also result in class discrimination and hostility to those whose
families differ from the married heterosexual norm. It is clear that the Tampere
principles of comparable treatment for third-country nationals generally and
equal treatment for long-term residents in particular were simply disregarded
when the Directive was discussed and agreed.
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
Whereas:
(3) The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 Octo-
ber 1999, acknowledged the need for harmonisation of national legislation on
the conditions for admission and residence of third-country nationals. In this
context, it has in particular stated that the European Union should ensure
fair treatment of third-country nationals residing lawfully on the territory of
the Member States and that a more vigorous integration policy should aim
at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of citizens of
the European Union. The European Council accordingly asked the Council
rapidly to adopt the legal instruments on the basis of Commission proposals.
The need for achieving the objectives defined at Tampere were reaffirmed by
the Laeken European Council on 14 and 15 December 2001.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(5) Member States should give effect to the provisions of this Directive with-
out discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opin-
ions, membership of a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or
sexual orientation.
(6) To protect the family and establish or preserve family life, the material con-
ditions for exercising the right to family reunification should be determined
on the basis of common criteria.
(7) Member States should be able to apply this Directive also when the family
enters together.
(9) Family reunification should in any case apply to members of the nuclear
family, that is to say the spouse and the minor children.
(10) It is for the Member States to decide whether they wish to authorise family
reunification for relatives in the direct ascending line, adult unmarried chil-
dren, unmarried or registered partners as well as, in the event of a polyga-
mous marriage, minor children of a further spouse and the sponsor. Where
a Member State authorises family reunification of these persons, this is
without prejudice of the possibility, for Member States which do not recog-
nise the existence of family ties in the cases covered by this provision, of not
granting to the said persons the treatment of family members with regard
to the right to reside in another Member State, as defined by the relevant
EC legislation.
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
(12) The possibility of limiting the right to family reunification of children over
the age of 12, whose primary residence is not with the sponsor, is intended
to reflect the children’s capacity for integration at early ages and shall ensure
that they acquire the necessary education and language skills in school.
(13) A set of rules governing the procedure for examination of applications for
family reunification and for entry and residence of family members should
be laid down. Those procedures should be effective and manageable, taking
account of the normal workload of the Member States’ administrations, as
well as transparent and fair, in order to offer appropriate legal certainty to
those concerned.
(14) Family reunion may be refused on duly justified grounds. In particular, the
person who wishes to be granted family reunification should not constitute
a threat to public policy or public security. The notion of public policy may
cover a conviction for a serious crime. In this context, it has to be noted
that the notion of public policy and public security covers also cases in
which a third-country national belongs to an association which supports
the international terrorism, supports such an association or has extremistic
aspirations.
(15) The integration of family members should be promoted. To that end, they
should be granted a status independent of that of the sponsor, in particular
in cases of breakup of marriages and partnerships, and access to education,
employment and vocational training on the same terms as the person with
whom they are reunited, under the relevant conditions.
(16) Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely the establishment of
a right to family reunification for third-country nationals to be exercised
in accordance with common rules, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and impact of the
action, be better achieved by the Community, the Community may adopt
measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Arti-
cle 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principles of proportionality as
set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary
in order to achieve those objectives.
(17) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, and without preju-
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(18) In accordance with Article 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Denmark does not take part in the adoption of
this Directive, and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
The purpose of this Directive is to determine the conditions in which the right
to family reunification may be exercised by third-country nationals residing law-
fully in the territory of the Member States.
Article 2
602
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
Article 3
1. This Directive shall apply where the sponsor is holding a residence permit
issued by a Member State for a period of validity of one year or more who
has reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence, if
the members of his or her family are third-country nationals of whatever
status.
3. This Directive shall not apply to members of the family of a Union citi-
zen.
5. This Directive shall not affect the possibility for the Member States to adopt
or retain more favourable provisions.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER II
FAMILY MEMBERS
Article 4
1. The Member States shall authorise the entry and residence, pursuant to
this Directive and subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in
Chapter IV, as well as in Article 16, of the following family members:
(a) the sponsor’s spouse;
(b) the minor children of the sponsor and of his/her spouse, including
children adopted in accordance with a decision taken by the compe-
tent authority in the Member State concerned or a decision which
is automatically enforceable due to international obligations of that
Member State or must be recognised in accordance with international
obligations;
(c) the minor children including adopted children of the sponsor where
the sponsor has custody and the children are dependent on him or her.
Member States may authorise the reunification of children of whom
custody is shared, provided the other party sharing custody has given
his or her agreement;
(d) the minor children including adopted children of the spouse where
the spouse has custody and the children are dependent on him or her.
Member States may authorise the reunification of children of whom
custody is shared, provided the other party sharing custody has given
his or her agreement.
The minor children referred to in this Article must be below the age of
majority set by the law of the Member State concerned and must not be
married.
By way of derogation, where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives inde-
pendently from the rest of his/her family, the Member State may, before
authorising entry and residence under this Directive, verify whether he or
she meets a condition for integration provided for by its existing legislation
on the date of adoption of this Directive.
2. The Member States may, by law or regulation, authorise the entry and resi-
dence, pursuant to this Directive and subject to compliance with the condi-
tions laid down in Chapter IV, of the following family members:
(a) first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line of the sponsor or his
or her spouse, where they are dependent on them and do not enjoy
proper family support in the country of origin;
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
(b) the adult unmarried children of the sponsor or his or her spouse, where
they are objectively unable to provide for their own needs on account
of their state of health.
3. The Member States may, by law or regulation, authorise the entry and
residence, pursuant to this Directive and subject to compliance with the
conditions laid down in Chapter IV, of the unmarried partner, being a
third-country national, with whom the sponsor is in a duly attested stable
long-term relationship, or of a third-country national who is bound to the
sponsor by a registered partnership in accordance with Article 5(2), and
the unmarried minor children, including adopted children, as well as the
adult unmarried children who are objectively unable to provide for their
own needs on account of their state of health, of such persons.
Member States may decide that registered partners are to be treated equally
as spouses with respect to family reunification.
By way of derogation from paragraph 1(c), Member States may limit the
family reunification of minor children of a further spouse and the spon-
sor.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER III
SUBMISSION AND EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION
Article 5
3. The application shall be submitted when the family members are outside
the territory of the Member State in which the sponsor resides.
4. The competent authorities of the Member State shall give the persons, who
has submitted the application, written notification of the decision as soon
as possible and in any event no later than nine months from the date on
which the application was lodged.
Reasons shall be given for the decision rejecting the application. The conse-
quences of no decision being taken by the end of the period provided for in
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
5. When examining an application, the Member States shall have due regard
to the best interests of minor children.
CHAPTER IV
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT
TO FAMILY REUNIFICATION
Article 6
1. The Member States may reject an application for entry and residence of
family members on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health.
When taking the relevant decision, the Member State shall consider, besides
Article 17, the severity or type of offence against public policy or public
security committed by the family member, or the dangers that are emanat-
ing from this person.
3. Renewal of the residence permit may not be withheld and removal from the
territory may not be ordered by the competent authority of the Member
State concerned on the sole ground of illness or disability suffered after the
issue of the residence permit.
Article 7
607
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 8
The Member States may require the sponsor to have stayed lawfully in their ter-
ritory for a period not exceeding two years, before having his/her family mem-
bers join him/her.
CHAPTER V
FAMILY REUNIFICATION OF REFUGEES
Article 9
Article 10
1. Article 4 shall apply to the family members of refugees. The third subpara-
graph of paragraph 1 thereof shall not apply to the children of refugees.
608
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
Article 11
Article 12
1. By way of derogation from Article 7, the Member States shall not require
the refugee and/or family member(s) to provide, in respect of applications
concerning those family members referred to in Article 4(1), the evidence
that the refugee fulfils the requirements of accommodation, sickness insur-
ance and stable resources.
Member States may require the refugee to meet the conditions referred to
in Article 7(1) if the application for family reunification is not submitted
within a period of three months after the granting of the refugee status.
2. By way of derogation from Article 8, the Member States may not require
the refugee to have resided in their territory for a certain period of time,
before having his/her family members join him/her.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER VI
ENTRY AND RESIDENCE OF FAMILY MEMBERS
Article 13
1. As soon as the application for family reunification has been accepted, the
Member State concerned shall authorise the entry of the family member
or members. In that regard, Member States shall grant such persons every
facility for obtaining the requisite visas.
2. The Member State concerned shall grant the family members a first resi-
dence permit of at least one year’s duration. This residence permit shall be
renewable.
Article 14
1. The sponsor’s family members shall be entitled, in the same way as the
sponsor, to:
(a) access to education;
(b) access to employment and self-employed activity;
(c) access to vocational guidance, initial and further training and retrain-
ing.
2. Member States may decide according to national law the conditions under
which family members shall exercise an employed or self-employed activ-
ity. These conditions shall set a time-limit which shall in no cases exceed 12
months, during which Member States may examine the situation of their
labour market before authorising family members to exercise an employed
or self-employed activity.
Article 15
1. Not later than after five years of residence, and provided that the family
member has not been granted a residence permit for reasons other than
family reunification, the spouse or unmarried partner and a child who has
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Chapter 19 Family Reunion
Member States may limit the granting of the residence permit referred to
in the first sub-paragraph to the spouse or unmarried partner in cases of
breakdown of the family relationship.
CHAPTER VII
PENALTIES AND REDRESS
Article 16
1. Member States may also reject an application for entry and residence for
the purpose of family reunification, or, if appropriate, withdraw or refuse to
renew a family member’s residence permit, in the following circumstances:
(a) where the conditions laid down by this Directive are not or are no
longer satisfied.
When renewing the residence permit, where the sponsor has not suf-
ficient resources without recourse to the social assistance system of
the Member State, as referred to in Article 7(1)(c), the Member State
shall take into account the contributions of the family members to the
household income;
(b) where the sponsor and his family member(s) do not or no longer live in
a full marital or family relationship.
(c) where it is found that the sponsor or the unmarried partner is married
or is in a stable long-term relationship with another person.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
2. Member States may also reject an application for entry and residence for
the purpose of family reunification, or withdraw or refuse to renew the
family member’s residence permits, where it is shown that:
(a) false or misleading information, false or falsified documents were used,
fraud was otherwise committed or other unlawful means were used;
(b) the marriage, partnership or adoption was contracted for the sole pur-
pose of enabling the person concerned to enter or reside in a Member
State.
When making an assessment with respect to this point, Member States
may have regard in particular to the fact that the marriage, partnership
or adoption was contracted after the sponsor had been issued his/her
residence permit.
3. The Member States may withdraw or refuse to renew the residence permit
of a family member where the sponsor’s residence comes to an end and the
family member does not yet enjoy the autonomous right of residence under
Article 15.
4. Member States may conduct specific checks and inspections where there
is reason to suspect that there is fraud or a marriage, partnership or adop-
tion of convenience as defined by paragraph 2. Specific checks may also be
undertaken on the occasion of the renewal of family members’ residence
permit.
Article 17
Member States shall take due account of the nature and solidity of the person’s
family relationships and the duration of his residence in the Member State and
to the existence of family, cultural and social ties with his/her country of origin
where they reject an application, withdraw or refuse to renew a residence permit
or decide to order the removal of the sponsor or members of his family.
Article 18
The Member States shall ensure that the sponsor and/or the members of his/her
family have the right to mount a legal challenge where an application for family
reunification is rejected or a residence permit is either not renewed or is with-
drawn or removal is ordered.
The procedure and the competence according to which the right referred to in
the first subparagraph is exercised shall be established by the Member States
concerned.
612
Chapter 19 Family Reunion
CHAPTER VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 19
Periodically, and for the first time no later than 3 October 2007, the Commission
shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of
this Directive in the Member States and shall propose such amendments as may
appear necessary. These proposals for amendments shall be made by way of
priority in relation to Articles 3, 4, 7, 8 and 13.
Article 20
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than 3 October
2005. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. When Member
States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive
or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publica-
tion. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by the Member
States.
Article 21
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Union.
Article 22
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
613
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
1 Summary
The Commission proposed a Directive on the status of long-term resident third-
country nationals in the European Union in March 2001. After lengthy discus-
sions, the JHA Council agreed in principle on the final text of this Directive in
June 2003, and Directive 2003/109 was formally adopted in November 2003.1
The UK and Ireland opted out of the Directive, and Denmark was automati-
cally excluded from it. All other Member States must apply the Directive by 23
January 2006.
Chapter I of the Directive (Articles 1-3) sets out its purpose, definitions
and scope. It applies to all lawful residents of a Member State, except for: dip-
lomats; persons who are seeking or who have received refugee status, tempo-
rary protection or subsidiary protection; students; temporary residents such as
au pairs, seasonal workers, cross-border service providers, workers posted by
a cross-border service providers, or persons whose “residence permit has been
formally limited” (Article 3(2)). A later separate proposal suggested extending
the Directive to persons with subsidiary protection status, but this was rejected
for now.2 Although the Commission committed itself to making a separate pro-
posal within a year at the latest to extend the scope of this Directive to refugees
and persons with subsidiary protection, that proposal had not yet appeared by
1 January 2006.
The Directive is without prejudice to more favourable provisions of existing
EC or mixed agreements with third states, pre-existing treaties of Member States
and certain Council of Europe migration treaties (Article 3(3)).
1 For the original proposal, see COM (2001) 127, 13 Mar. 2001; OJ 2001 C 240 E/79.
For the adopted text, see OJ 2004 L 16/44 (reproduced in Annex).
2 See Ch. 13.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 615-660.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
3 This issue was not addressed by the proposed Directive on migration for employ-
ment or self-employment (Ch. 21). Art. 6 of that proposal only listed the categories
of persons who have preference over a third-country national applying for entry
into the EU on economic grounds, or applying to change jobs during the first three
years of residence. It did not set out a ranking of preference within the categories
of persons who have preference, and in any event those categories did not expressly
include a third-country national with long-term resident status under the long-term
residents’ Directive.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
“core” family members as defined by the family reunion Directive,4 but the
second Member State retains the option to decide whether to admit other family
members (Article 16). Again, sickness insurance and sufficient resources tests
can apply. Admission of long-term rsidents and their family members can also
be refused not just on grounds of public policy and public security (Article 17),
but also public health (Article 18).
The potential “second” Member State must process the application within
four months, with a potential three-month extension. If the various conditions
are met, the second Member State must issue the long-term resident and his/her
family members with a renewable residence permit (Article 19). Reasons must
be given if the application is rejected, and there is a “right to mount a legal chal-
lenge” where an application is rejected or a permit is withdrawn or not renewed
(Article 20). Once they have received their residence permit, long-term residents
have the right to equal treatment (as defined in Article 11) in the second Member
State, “with the exception of social assistance and study grants”, and subject to
a possible one-year delay in full labour market access (Article 21). Family mem-
bers have the same status as family members under the family reunion Directive
as regards access to employment and education, once they have received their
long-term residence permit.
Before the long-term resident gains long-term resident status in the second
Member State, that Member State can remove or withdraw his or her residence
permit and expel the long-term resident and family in accordance with national
procedures on grounds of public policy or public security, where the conditions
for admission are no longer met and where the third-country national “is not
lawfully residing” there (Article 22). The first Member State must readmit such
persons although if there are “serious grounds of public policy or public secu-
rity” the person concerned can be expelled outside the EU. Once the conditions
for obtaining long-term resident status are satisfied in the second Member State,
the long-term resident can apply for long-term resident status there, subject to
the same procedural rules that apply to initial applications for long-term resi-
dent status (Article 23).
Finally, Chapter IV (Articles 24-28) sets out final provisions, including a
“rendez-vous” clause, which requires the Commission to propose amendments
in future by way of priority to the Articles concerning the calculation periods for
status, the conditions of resources and sickness insurance, withdrawal or loss of
status and movement to additional Member States.
617
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
618
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
the transfer of long-term residence status. Several wanted to follow the wording
of the more restrictive Council Resolution, to impose additional conditions on
the acquisition of long-term residence (an issue that recurred when discussing
the proposed Directive) and to make more references to national law, rather than
EC-wide rules. Several thought the Convention could be more generous and
there were also questions about the meaning of “enhanced protection” in expul-
sion cases (an issue the Commission addressed in more detail in its proposal
for a Directive).9 For its part, the EP voted to exclude the long-term residents’
chapter from the proposed Convention altogether, although it suggested that the
Commission should come forward with a separate proposal on this subject.10
The European Council clearly chose the principle of equality with EU citizens,
rather than the competing approaches it could have considered (basing the text
on existing national law, extending the personal scope of existing international
instruments or extending the rules in EC association agreements).12 In turn, the
619
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Commission, following a detailed study of Member States’ law,13 based its pro-
posal on the same principles.
The Commission’s initial proposal differed in a number of important
respects from the final text agreed in the Council. Recognised refugees were ini-
tially covered by the proposal, as were students who were studying for a doctor-
ate.14 There was no exclusion for persons whose residence permit was formally
limited. Family members of migrant EC nationals were expressly covered by the
Directive, but on the condition that they could gain long-term residence status
only once they had attained permanent residence status in that Member State
pursuant to EC free movement law; this obviously assumed prior agreement on
the Commission’s subsequent proposal concerning the rights of EU citizens and
their family members, which was not adopted until April 2004, five months after
the long-term residents’ Directive was adopted.15 There was no provision per-
mitting Member States to maintain pre-existing bilateral agreements, but there
was a clause providing that the Directive was “without prejudice” to Article 33
of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees or Article 3 ECHR; presumably
the deletion of refugees from the scope of the Directive rendered this clause
unnecessary.16 Also, there was a non-discrimination clause in the main text of
the Directive, which was moved to the preamble instead.17
The Commission’s proposal on calculating the time period to obtain status
differed from the final text by including a requirement to include time spent as
an asylum-seeker or pursuant to temporary protection if the person were a refu-
gee. Time spent as a doctoral student would not have been discounted. The basic
principle of only six consecutive months away was retained by the Council, but
the Commission had proposed more rigid additional rules, which would have
exempted all time outside the country related to certain grounds, including time
spent as a family member of a long-term resident or an EC national who moves
to another Member State.18
As for the other conditions to acquire status, the original proposal for
the “stable resources” test would only have required resources higher than the
level of the minimum social security pension, rather than the minimum wage.
620
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
Originally the requirements for resources and sickness insurance would not
have applied to refugees and those born in a Member State, but the Council
deleted this exception and added the optional exception for integration require-
ments. The next condition was originally a “public policy and domestic security”
exception, which could only have been applied where the “personal” conduct of
the person was an “actual” threat to “public order or domestic security”, with
the extra proviso that criminal convictions could not “in themselves automati-
cally warrant” refusal. These criteria were similar to those applying in EC free
movement law.19 In addition to deleting these protections, the Council inserted a
clause in the preamble relating to the concept of public policy (specifying that it
could cover a conviction for committing a serious crime), along with a provision
on the criteria for Member States to take into account when taking the relevant
decision. These criteria are clearly based on the Article 8 ECHR case law con-
cerning expulsion.20
The initial proposal did not include the optional requirements for Member
States to insist that an applicant for long-term resident status submit a valid
travel document or certified copy, or documentation regarding accommodation,
with his or her application for long-term resident status. Also, it would have set
an absolute limit of six months to reply to the migrant’s application for long-
term resident status and would have required Member States to allow additional
time if an element of the application was missing. It would have specified that
the long-term residence permit was valid for ten years, rather than five years, and
would have required Member States to issue the permit free of charge or for the
same sum as nationals’ identity cards.
As for loss of status, the Commission had proposed a period of two consec-
utive years’ absence from the host Member State (rather than two years’ absence
from Community territory) in order to lose status. However, the Commission’s
proposal had given Member States less flexibility to waive the limits. The origi-
nal proposal also had contained a more limited right to stay in the country on
another ground where long-term residence status is cancelled, overlooked the
issue of whether Member States should provide an expedited procedure for re-
acquisition of status in certain cases and contained a provision that resident
third-country nationals should have the right to apply again for long-term resi-
dent status following an initial refusal if their circumstances changed.
The Commission’s proposals for equal treatment were also more generous.
Its original proposal differed from the final text because it did not contain the
“national law” rule on equality in education or the restrictive preambular clause
621
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
on this issue; it did not include a “national procedures” rule regarding recogni-
tion of diplomas, et al or a “national law” criterion regarding social security,
social assistance and social protection; it included references to “social benefits”
and “health-care” (although arguably these are still covered); it did not contain
a “public policy and public security” exception regarding freedom of associa-
tion; it lacked the “security” exception applying to free movement; and it did not
permit limitations of equal treatment on grounds of residence, limited priority
for economic acitivity, additional tests for access to education or training or
limiting of social rights to “core benefits”.
Equally the Commission took a far more liberal approach to protection
against expulsion. It proposed that Member States could only expel a person
based on his “personal conduct”, and further proposed a paragraph spelling
out that there was no “sufficiently serious threat” unless a Member State took
“severe enforcement measures” against its own nationals committing the same
offences. Again the Commission had suggested that criminal convictions could
not automatically lead to expulsion. All of these points were based on the pro-
tection available to EU citizens. The Commission had also proposed that chal-
lenges to expulsion decisions should have suspensory effect, and that emergency
expulsion proceedings should be prohibited.
As for movement to other Member States, the Commission had proposed
a simple right to move whenever the long-term resident wanted to take up activ-
ity, without any provision for labour market priority, quotas on third-country
nationals or special rules on seasonal workers or cross-frontier workers. In the
original proposal, only long-term residents moving for non-economic purposes
would have had to meet resources and sickness insurance criteria, and moreover
the resources test would have simply required that the long-term resident would
not be a burden on the second Member State. Again, there was no possibility of
imposing integration requirements, or any reference to documenting the accom-
modation situation of the long-term resident. As a requirement to obtain the
right to move, the Commission’s proposal did not refer to national law to test
whether the long-term resident had the funds to exercise a self-employed activ-
ity or had been hired by an employer. Nor did it allow Member States to limit
movement of family members to the spouse and minor children alone, or to
impose a higher resources threshold (measured against minimum wages, rather
than recourse to social assistance) upon them. As in other parts of the Directive,
the Commission had proposed that only the personal conduct of a long-term
resident or his or her family members could justify a rejection of a residence
application on grounds of public order or public security threats, along with a
criterion of “actual” threat and a proviso that criminal convictions could not
automatically justify refusal.
The Commission’s proposal on the examination of applications was also
more favourable. It had proposed a three-month time limit which could only be
extended if the applicant had not supplied all of the necessary evidence. Again,
622
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
the Commission proposed that the residence permits should be issued for free or
for the same amount required for nationals’ identity cards, and that applicants
have access to the courts for disputes over residence (as distinct from “mount-
ing a legal challenge”). The Commission had suggested full equal treatment for
long-term residents moving to another Member State as soon as their application
was accepted, without any prospect of limiting workers and the self-employed
to specified activities for up to a year and limiting any or all access to economic
activity for those who move initially for non-economic grounds.
During the transitional period before long-term resident gained long-term
resident status in the second Member State, the Commission had proposed that
removal should only be possible where the public policy exception applied or
where the conditions of residence were no longer met. There would have been
no possibility of expulsion outside the EU or for a permanent ban on residence
in the second Member State, and no mention of a possible move by the long-
term resident to a third Member State to avoid expulsion. The Commission had
also proposed detailed rules on maintenance of status in the first Member State
before obtaining status in the second Member State, as well as detailed rules per-
mitting economically active long-term residents to retain their status as workers
in the second Member State (presumably pending acquisition of full long-term
residence status in that Member State).21 The former set of rules were in part
rendered redundant by the Council’s decision to provide that long-term resi-
dents cannot lose status on grounds of absence except for a departure from EC
territory. However, the deletion of the proposed rules could cause problems for
family members of long-term residents who have not yet acquired the status
themselves, because the Commission had suggested that they continue to retain
residence permits in the first Member State and to accrue the right of indepen-
dent status in that State.22
623
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
resident status, the rights to be acquired in the first Member State, and to the
details of the right to move to another Member State. Particular objections were
raised to many aspects of the principle of equality between long-term residents
and EU nationals, suggesting that some delegations overlooked the principle
established by Tampere. On the other hand, some delegations were objecting to
any weakening of the text, making it difficult to see how a compromise could be
reached. During the second reading, the Spanish Council Presidency suggested
a few amendments, concerning disregard of the period before the issue of an
initial residence permit, expansion of the grounds on which a long-term resident
could be removed from a second Member State, and allowing for expulsion of
the long-term resident by the second Member State to a country outside the
European Union during the transitional period in certain circumstances.
In the meantime, the EP suggested a number of amendments to the pro-
posal.24 These would have enhanced the equality provisions of the Directive in
several respects, as well as strengthened the references to international human
rights instruments. They would also have made explicit reference to EC legisla-
tion on expulsion of EU citizens and extended the Directive’s expulsion protec-
tion for long-term residents. However, they would have weakened the equality
principle by removing the protection against emergency expulsion, permitting
lifetime bans to be issued against long-term residents, allowing Member States
full discretion to determine a “sufficiently serious” threat to public policy and
permitting unspecified derogations from the obligation to apply the rules gov-
erning expulsion of EU citizens. Unfortunately even the EP does not always have
full regard to the Tampere principles. Also, they would have permitted Member
States to insist that third-country nationals had equal retirement provision to
nationals in the same situation before gaining the status of long-term resident
– an absurd suggestion where a person has spent part of his or her working life
outside the EU.
During the spring and summer of 2002, intense negotiations continued in
the Council’s bodies, moving to discussions on the basic disagreements between
Member States on the proposal. Discussions during the Spanish Presidency first
focussed on possible restrictions in the scope of the proposal (Articles 1-5), ini-
tially dropping both recognised refugees and doctoral students, but with some
Member States wishing to retain refugees within the scope of the Directive.25
Discussions then moved on to Chapters II and III of the proposal, on the basis
of proposed Presidency changes.26
624
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
(outcome of proceedings of working party, 22 Mar. 2002) and 9636/02, 18 July 2002
(outcome of proceedings of working party, 28 and 29 May 2002).
27 Council doc. 10462/02, 3 July 2002.
28 See Council doc. 11360/02, 30 July 2002 (outcome of proceedings of SCIFA, 22 and
23 July 2002).
29 Council doc. 11932/02, 20 Sept. 2002.
30 Council docs. 12383/02, 30 Sept. 2002 and 12624/02, 9 Oct. 2002.
625
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
The Danish and Greek Presidencies also continued discussion on the more
technical aspects of Chapters I and II of the proposed Directive.31 By January
2003, the draft permitted Member States to retain prior bilateral agreements
with non-Member States setting out more favourable conditions. The special
provision on the status of family members of migrant EC nationals and the non-
discrimination provision (Articles 3(3) and 4) were deleted, although the latter
Article was placed in the preamble. The exception for military and other reasons
from the obligation to spend five years in the host Member State continuously
before obtaining status was broadened by adding a reference to civilian service
obligations, but the detailed calculation of the time spent abroad would in most
cases be left to national law. Next, the draft proposed to give Member States the
option to require third-country nationals to “comply with integration measures,
in accordance with national law”. The public policy, et al conditions for gaining
status were to be rendered less similar to the rules for EC nationals by deleting
the proviso that criminal convictions alone could not justify refusal of status.
However, the Directive would refer to a “public security” exception rather than a
“domestic security” exception. National administrations would also be allowed
more time to consider the application for status, as there could be an indefinite
time period for an administration to respond to a request for long-term resident
status in the first Member State, and the fee for a permit (in the first or second
Member State) would not expressly have to be equal to charges for national
identity permits, another move away from equality with EC nationals. Member
States would no longer have to issue residence permits to former long-term resi-
dents in cases when an expulsion had been ordered but could not be carried out,
and residence permits would only have to be valid for at least five years, not at
least ten years.
Next, the right to equality was weakened in response to objections from
some Member States. The Danish Presidency had suggested that the “equal
treatment” clause be restructured to require equal treatment for some matters,
but that a more qualified equality right apply to other matters, including access
to employment (with related rights, including equality in working conditions)
and access to social benefits. Also, if the first Member State granted equal treat-
ment for matters not mentioned in the Directive, any other Member States the
long-term resident moves to would not have to recognise it. Finally, the protec-
tion against expulsion was weakened, with the deletions of the provisos that
expulsion from the first Member State should not happen for criminal convic-
tions alone, of the requirement to permit possible suspensive effect of a chal-
lenge and of the ban on emergency expulsions of long-term residents. However,
the Directive would again refer to a “public security” exception in place of a
“domestic security” exception. A new Chapter IIa would bring together all of
31 Council docs. 13700/02, 9 Dec. 2002; 15483/02, 20 Dec. 2002; and 5533/03, 3 Feb.
2003.
626
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
the provisions on refugees in the original Directive, which were unchanged from
the Commission’s original proposal except for the proviso that the five-year resi-
dence period would only be calculated from the time of recognition of refugee
status.
As for the position in the second Member State (Chapter III), activity as a
cross-border worker would be excluded, leaving Member States free to regulate
this issue. Conditions and requirements would be increased: an accommoda-
tion requirement was added; travel documents would have to be provided; the
relevant resources requirements would be defined by national law; and a long-
term resident would have to apply for long-term residence status in the second
Member State within five years, or s/he could lose that status in the first Member
State. At this point it was suggested that long-term residents would not initially
have the right to study or maintenance grants in the second Member State. More-
over, expulsion would be allowed on public health grounds and on grounds of
unlawful residence, expulsion to the country of origin would be permitted and a
permanent ban on return could be imposed in a number of cases.32
Following further intensive detailed discussions, the May 2003 JHA Coun-
cil reached agreement on the status of long-term residents in their first Member
State, although Italy still held out for a six-year period for acquisition of long-
term residence status.33 In particular, the JHA Council deleted refugees from the
scope of the Directive, on condition that the Commission proposed a new Direc-
tive within a year applying the long-term Directive to both recognised refugees
and persons with subsidiary protection. Of course, there is no guarantee that the
Commission proposal will be agreed; and as noted at the outset of this Chapter,
by 1 Jan. 2006, the proposal had not even been submitted yet. The other changes
made between January and May 2003 were: the exclusion of persons whose resi-
dence permit has been “formally limited” from the scope of the Directive; the
substantial amendment of the rules for calculating residence; more flexibility
for Member States in applying the “sufficient resources” requirement; deletion
of the exemption of third-country nationals born in the relevant Member State
from meeting the resources and employment conditions; deletion of the require-
ment to issue long-term residence permits for free or at cost; amendment of the
rules on withdrawal or loss of status so that loss follows one year’s absence from
EC territory, rather than two years’ absence from the relevant Member State,
inclusion of a six-year maximum absence from the Member State granting the
status is permitted, along with rules on re-acquisition of status; deletion of the
clause allowing for later applications for long-term resident status if the first
32 See also French proposal on the application of Council Directive 2001/40 on the
mutual recognition of expulsion orders (meeting doc. migr 3/02, 22 Mar. 2002).
33 For the agreed text, see Council docs. 9025/03, 6 May 2003 and 9389/03, 16 May
2003.
627
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
application is rejected; and revision of the equality rules (although there were
still some reservations here).
The May 2003 JHA Council also held a discussion on the key issues related
to movement to the second Member State. By May, the Council working group
had agreed to refer to long-term residents’ “right to reside” in the Directive and
had dropped the idea of an express accommodation requirement, but conversely
had agreed that the right could be limited on grounds of labour market priority
or the setting of a total quota for third-country nationals. The provision on reten-
tion of worker status in the event of difficulties during the transitional period
had also been deleted. It had also been agreed to amend the other conditions
and procedures for moving to the second Member State and obtaining long-term
resident status there to align them with the rules on first obtaining long-term resi-
dence status. The proposed detailed rules on the status of long-term residents and
their family members during the first five years in the second Member State had
been deleted, although there would no longer be an express obligation to apply
for status after five years. It would now be possible to remove a person who was
not “lawfully residing” before obtaining long-term residence status in the second
Member State But there were still wide differences of view on the extent of equal
treatment that long-term residents should enjoy in the second Member State
before they obtained long-term status there. The final text on withdrawal of the
residence permit and the obligation to readmit had been agreed by this point.
This left a hard core of difficult issues to negotiate by the June 2003 JHA
Council, which agreed a final compromise on four issues: the period for acquisi-
tion of status (Italy finally relinquished its objection); additional restrictions on
equal treatment as regards study grants and social benefits; the issue of family
members (with Austria accepting it could not impose a quota on family mem-
bers of long-term residents in return for other Member States accepting that an
overall quota on third-country nationals in a member State could be imposed);
and treatment in the second Member State (where it was accepted that access to
social assistance and study grants would be permitted during the study period in
return for a prospect of revoking residence if social assistance were applied for,
and where the one-year delay in full access to the labour market splits the differ-
ence between those who wanted no delay and those who wanted two years).
3 Legal Analysis
A standard criticism of some Member States regarding the Commission’s immi-
gration and asylum proposals is the alleged restriction on the EC’s competence
over access to employment for third-country nationals. As argued elsewhere, the
EC has competence to regulate this issue under Article 137 EC, or failing that
Article 63 EC; Article 39 EC could govern those who move within the EC to
take up employment in a second Member State.34
628
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
4 Comments37
Of course, any legislation which creates a right for third-country nationals to
move between Member States is an accomplishment because any such move-
ment was otherwise wholly at the discretion of the Member States (leaving aside
the EEA, Switzerland, the position of third-country national family members
of EU nationals and third-country national employees of EU companies, whom
their employers have the right to post to other Member States as part of their
right to provide services).38 Given that the equal treatment principle as set out
629
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
630
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
that status during certain periods. Since the Directive does not refer to national
law for the meaning of “lawful” residence, and there are frequent express refer-
ences to “national law” or “national procedures” for definition of other parts
of the Directive, it should follow by a contrario reasoning that the concept of
“lawful residence” has a standard Community meaning. In addition, a standard
Community meaning will ensure greater uniformity in the application of the
Directive; this can also be justified on the grounds that admission of persons
under the Directive will impact on all Member States
It also follows that the Directive applies to family members of third-coun-
try nationals who meet the criteria to obtain long-term residence status, along
with third-country national family members of EU citizens, whether those per-
sons have moved within the EU with their sponsors (and are therefore covered
by EC free movement law) or not.
As for the exception for persons who have only a limited residence permit,
it should follow from the reasoning set out above that the definition of limited
residence permits is again an issue of Community law, not national law. The best
interpretation of this exception is that it can only apply to persons whose resi-
dence permit cannot in principle be extended under the relevant applicable rules
for more than a certain period.
Finally, in the absence of wording to the contrary the Directive should
apply to persons who were already resident in the Member States at the time
of its adoption (as well as those who enter later) and any persons who already
meet the criteria for long-term residence as of January 2006 (or who satisfy the
criteria during the following five years) should be able to claim status from Janu-
ary 2006 or during the following five years, rather than wait until five years have
passed from the deadline date for application of the Directive.
631
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
EC law, the right to “mount a legal challenge” must include the right to argue
the merits of any issue falling within the scope of the Directive (not just the
renewal of residence permits) before a court or tribunal.
Although the Council was particularly contemptuous of the Tampere prin-
ciples when agreeing rules on equal treatment for long-term residents, it is impor-
tant to examine the text closely to see exactly when equality can (and cannot) be
restricted. First, there is no possibility to restrict equality to “core benefits” as
regards “social security”. Second, the various references to “national law” and
“national procedures” should not be interpreted to permit restriction of equal
treatment, except where the Directive expressly permits a restriction of equal-
ity).
Next, as noted above, the Tampere principles have been further disregarded
as regards protection against expulsion. However, it is still arguable that a “per-
sonal conduct” test applies here, along with a requirement that criminal con-
victions will not automatically lead to expulsion and the procedural protection
granted by EC free movement law, in the absence of wording to the contrary. The
Directive should also limit Member States from placing a long-term resident’s
name in the Schengen Information System (SIS) or using SIS data to cases where
the public policy, etc. criteria for expulsion or refusing status in this Directive
are met. Similarly, while Directive 2001/40, on mutual recognition of expulsion
measures,40 could apply to long-term residents, where relevant Member States
have to consider the restrictions on expulsion in the long-term residents’ Direc-
tive when enforcing an expulsion pursuant to the earlier measure.
632
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
States to join a sponsor in another Member State. This means that such persons
will only have to satisfy the criteria for obtaining long-term residents’ status, and
may therefore avoid the limitations and conditions set out in the family reunion
Directive or EC free movement law. It will also be possible for a family member
who was originally sponsored into a Member State to obtain the status of long-
term resident, then move to another Member State and act as a sponsor for
the person who originally sponsored his or her entry. The long-term residents’
Directive also replaces the family reunion Directive for most rules relating to
movement to the second Member State, thus removing a number of onerous con-
ditions in the latter Directive restricting entry of families. Since family members
in the second Member State gain the same rights in the second Member State
as the sponsor regarding employment, self-employment, education and voca-
tional training, once a residence permit has been issued,41 their status regarding
these issues also flows from the long-term residents’ Directive. Next, it appears
that the family member can gain independent or long-term resident status in the
second Member State, in accordance with the relevant rules.
633
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
tria? For that matter, what if a sibling of the Russian with long-term residence
status sought to join him or her in Austria, even though siblings are not covered
at all by the family reunion Directive? In all these scenarios, the status of the
Russian in Austria is irrelevant, since the family members would be moving there
to exercise their own right of residence as long-term residents.42 If the Russian
were a long-term resident there, it could be argued that Article 16(5) of the long-
term residents’ Directive precludes subsequent entry of family members except
under the conditions set out in the family reunion Directive; but in the absence
of express wording to the contrary, this should be seen as a lex specialis dealing
with entry of family members who do not already have their own long-term resi-
dent status. Of course, in each case, a family member using his or her status as a
long-term resident would have to meet the criteria for long-term residence and
subsequent residence in a second Member State under the Directive, but there is
nothing to preclude support from a relative being considered to satisfy the suf-
ficient resources requirement for movement to the second Member State.
Does this Directive permit such movement? Or should such activity be
ruled out, as a form of evasion of the rules in the family reunion Directive (or
other family reunion rules)? Surely the Directive does permit such movement as
long as the long-term residents have gained that status and exercise the right to
residence based on the criteria in the Directive. The position is really no different
from EC free movement law, where a French national in Austria could be joined
by his or her adult independent child, his unmarried companions of both sexes
and his siblings, as long as they are all EU citizens who independently meet the
criteria for exercising free movement rights, even though EC free movement law
denies the French national the right to bring such people into Austria as family
members. EC free movement law does not allow Member States to examine the
subjective reasons for moving, but gives a right to move whenever objective cri-
teria are met,43 and there is nothing in the text of the long-term residence Direc-
tive to suggest that it should be interpreted any differently.
Building on this analysis, there is nothing to preclude the simultaneous
application of EC free movement law and the long-term residence Directive,
where a family contains both EU citizens and long-term residents. This could
apply where the long-term residents do not meet the family criteria in EC free
movement law: for example, a French national moving to Austria with his or her
American unmarried companion. At first sight, it could also be useful where the
EU citizen is wholly dependent upon the long-term resident, for example where
a French national moves with his or her American spouse to Austria, and the
42 However, if the family member already in Austria were an EU citizen exercising free
movement rights, it is hard to see any advantage to use of the long-term residents’
Directive as compared to the free movement rules, except for family members falling
outside the scope of the latter rules (siblings and unmarried companions).
43 For example, see Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035.
634
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
former is not earning any income at all. But it would be better to treat these as
cases falling within the scope of Directive 90/364, which permits EU citizens to
move if they can support themselves without assistance from the host Member
State, for that Directive applies to all Member States and allows family mem-
bers to take up any employment in the host Member State without the possible
restrictions permitted by the long-term residents Directive.44
A parallel question is whether a long-term resident can move from one
Member State to another with “non-core” family members who are long-term
residents in their own right. For example, can an American long-term resident
move with his American unmarried partner from France to Austria, if both
are long-term residents? At first sight, the Directive appears to preclude this,
because it only gives a right of entry in Article 16 to the movement of family
members who “fulfill the conditions of ” Article 4(1) of the family reunion Direc-
tive; Member States have discretion to admit family members “other than those
referred to” in Article 4(1). But in the absence of express wording to the con-
trary, Article 16 should be seen as a lex specialis dealing with the admission of
family members who do not meet the conditions for long-term residence status
and subsequent exercise of the right of residence in their own right.
We now move to the situation of family members who fall within the express
rule for admission of family members set out in Article 16. Here, the most useful
approach to analysing their position is to compare it to that under the family
reunion Directive, given the express connections drawn within the Directive.45
The first issue in family reunion law is that of the definition of sponsors. This is
easily dealt with, as long-term residents moving to a second Member State are
automatically presumed to be sponsors for the purpose of family reunion.46
The second issue is the definition of family members. What does the long-
term residence Directive mean when it refers to admission of family members
who “fulfil the conditions” in Article 4(1) of the family reunion Directive? The
temporal scope of this clause is important; it does not refer to those admitted
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the other Directive, but only those who fulfil the
conditions. So family members admitted before the application of the family
reunion Directive, or born in the first Member State, or who were already resi-
dent there on other grounds, are covered. Similarly, it is possible that a person
who originally sponsored a family member to join him or her in the first Member
44 The long-term residents’ Directive could still be significant in this scenario if the
family later breaks up. On the interpretation of Directive 90/364, see Case C-200/02
Chen [2004] ECR I-9925.
45 Unfortunately, the final Directive does not contain the Commission’s proposed pre-
ambular clause providing that “[t]he right of residence should be exercised on terms
similar to those enjoyed by citizens of the Union when they exercise their right to
free movement”.
46 See the discussion of Art. 3(1) of the family reunion Directive in Ch. 19.
635
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
State, or who married a third-country national resident there, can switch to the
status of family member for the purpose of the move to the second Member
State, with the family member who gained, or who already had, the status of
long-term resident now acting as sponsor. So, for example, if a Turkish man
resident in Austria sponsors the entry of an American woman as his wife, and
she later gains long-term residence status and meets the criteria to exercise the
right of residence in France, he can now accompany or join her as her family
member.47 By virtue of the reference to Article 4(1) of the family reunion Direc-
tive, it follows that none of the other criteria in Article 4 of that Directive apply.
So all that need be shown is that the spouse or child meets the criteria set out in
Article 4(1). The possible derogation to stop independent entrance of children
over 12 is irrelevant at this point since Article 16(1) of the long-term residence
Directive only applies to family members who have been “constituted in” the
first Member State. Article 16(5) applies to those family members who have not
been “constituted in” the first Member State, and so the host Member State
will be able to refuse the subsequent entry of such children if the derogation in
Article 4(1) of the family reunion Directive applies.48 But the other conditions
in Article 4(4), (5) and (6) of that Directive (regarding children of polygamous
marriages, a minimum age for marriage, and special rules for applications of
children over 15) cannot apply to those family members who have already been
constituted in the first Member State.
Next, the third issue is the conditions for entry. Since the only cross-refer-
ences to the family reunion Directive are in Articles 16 and 21(3) of this Direc-
tive, and this Directive expressly refers to family members in Articles 17-19, 21
and 22 (and implicitly in Article 20), the long-term Directive applies in place of
the family reunion Directive for all the isues dealt with in these Articles. So in the
absence of wording to the contrary, the long-term residence Directive implic-
itly prohibits any waiting period for admission of family members as set out in
Article 8 of the family reunion Directive. The application process is addressed
by Articles 16(3), 16(4), 19 and 20 of this Directive, so implicitly Article 5 of the
family reunion Directive does not apply and there is a fixed time period to reply
47 It is irrelevant in this scenario whether the Turkish husband has long-term residence
status, or whether the admission of the American wife was pursuant to the family
reunion Directive.
48 This analysis is based on a presumption that where the family has been partly con-
stituted in the first Member State, Article 16(1) or (2) applies to the move of those
already in that State to the second Member State, and Article 16(5) applies to the
later admission of family members. Since the Directive does not specifically address
the situation of partly constituted families, it could be argued it prohibits later
admission of family members not yet constituted in the first Member State, but such
an intepretation would clearly breach the objectives of both the relevant Directives
and violate the ECHR (see Sen v Netherlands, discussed in Ch. 19).
636
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
to applications. As for the substantive criteria for entry, Articles 16(4), 17 and 18
of this Directive apply,49 rather than Articles 6 and 7 of the family reunion Direc-
tive; this means that no accommodation requirement or integration requirement
applies.50 As for entry of the family member, it is implicit in Article 15(1) of this
Directive (referred to in Article 16(3)) that the family member is already present
when the application for a permit is submitted, so the second Member State has
to admit the family member as soon as the right of residence is exercised by the
long-term resident, as confirmed by the wording of Article 16(1).51 The second
Member State must issue the family member with a renewable residence permit
of the same duration as the sponsor.52 However, it should be emphasised that
the overall limit on the number of third-country nationals permitted by Arti-
cle 14(4) of this Directive cannot apply to family members, since Article 14(4)
expressly only applies to Article 14(1), which concerns the right of residence for
long-term residents.
As for the status of family members, it is clear that they gain the same rights
in the second Member State as the sponsor regarding employment, self-employ-
ment, education and vocational training once a residence permit has been issued,
by reference to the family reunion Directive.53 In fact, since the sponsor’s position
is also set out in the long-term residents’ Directive, family members’ status can
also be determined on the basis of the Directive. Next, can the family member
gain independent status in the second Member State? It is unfortunate that the
Council dropped the Commission’s proposal on this issue. In its absence, there
is no reference in this Directive to Article 15 of the family reunion Directive, but
since there is no replacement rule in this Directive dealing with this subject, it
should follow that family members will begin accruing independent status in the
second Member State (pursuant to the family reunion Directive) from scratch.
Their ability to retain independent status or to continue acquiring it in the first
Member State will depend on how that first Member State deals with absence in
its national rules on acquiring and retaining such status. There will be parallel
issues concerning the retention of status under Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey
Association Council. However, there is nothing to prevent the family member
from obtaining long-term resident status in the second Member State if the cri-
teria are met.
Next, Article 22 of this Directive is ambiguous as to whether it covers loss
of status by and expulsion of family members independently or only in the case
where the sponsor loses status. If the former interpretation is correct, this Direc-
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
tive would replace Articles 16 and Article 17 of that Directive in all cases. If
the latter interpretation is correct, then this Directive would only replace those
Articles in some cases. As as observed above, Articles 17 and 22 of this Directive
do not adequately address the possible development of family and private life
in the second Member State or the retention of such links in the first Member
State. In any event, it is arguable that if family members have long-term resident
status in their own right, Member States must appraise their status and expul-
sion wholly independently. It should be recalled that despite the reference to
“readmission” to the first Member State, the family members might have been
born in the second Member State or admitted there having lived in a third coun-
try, or have lived in the first Member State but left it many years before the spon-
sor. According to the case law on Article 8 ECHR, this will certainly strengthen
their position (and indirectly that of the expellee). The family members might
even be EU citizens, with rights under free movement law if they have exercised
free movement rights or absolute rights to remain if they are citizens of the
second Member State. In either case, their status should strengthen the position
of the sponsor.
Finally, the right to a legal challenge for family members is covered in Arti-
cle 20(2) of this Directive, rather than Article 18 of the family reunion Direc-
tive.
54 See “Controlling our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain. A Five Year
Strategy for Asylum and Migration” (Home Office, Feb. 2005), pp. 21-22.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
“an employer cannot find the skills they need within the UK or the EU”,55 it is
not known yet whether this test will require preference for EU citizens only, or
non-EU residents of other Member States. In any event, even if the UK decides
to give preferential treatment to long-term residents of other Member States, the
other Member States will be under no obligation to reciprocate, and will likely
be unenthusiastic about doing so.
5 Conclusion
Since it will be awkward for Member States to run parallel national and Com-
munity systems regarding long-term residence status, there is a good chance that
many or all Member States will align themselves on the EC model. This is desir-
able if the EC system represents an improvement on the national system, but if
it does not, then the Directive will have resulted in a reduction of standards.
The detailed analysis above shows that the Directive has the potential to
enhance the position of long-term residents considerably if intepreted in light of
the objectives of ensuring mobility, equality and integration, despite the reduc-
tion in the level of protection proposed by the Commission. The core right to
move between Member States if the conditions are met remains, and this is cer-
tainly a novel right of both practical and symbolic imporatnce to third-country
nationals. However, Member States have many opportunities to set stringent
limits on the right, so it is possible that few if any third-country nationals will be
able to move in practice. The practical usefulness of this Directive will therefore
depend on Member States’ approach to exercising its numerous options.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63(3) and (4) thereof,
Whereas:
(3) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.
(5) Member States should give effect to the provisions of this Directive with-
out discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
(6) The chief criterion for acquiring the status of long-term resident should
be the duration of residence in the territory of a Member State. Residence
should be both legal and continuous in order to show that the person has
put down roots in the country. Provision should be made for a degree of
flexibility so that account can be taken of circumstances in which a person
might have to leave the territory on a temporary basis.
(8) Moreover, third-country nationals who wish to acquire and maintain long-
term residence status should not constitute a threat to public order and
domestic security. The notion of public policy may cover a conviction for
committing a serious crime.
(9) Economic considerations should not be a ground for refusing to grant long-
term resident status and shall not be considered as interfering with the rel-
evant conditions.
(10) A set of rules governing the procedures for the examination of application
for long-term resident status should be laid down. Those procedures should
be effective and manageable, taking account of the normal workload of the
Member States’ administrations, as well as transparent and fair in order to
offer appropriate legal certainty to those concerned. They should not con-
stitute a means of hindering the exercise of the right to residence.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(13) With regard to social assistance, the possibility of limiting the benefits for
long-term residents to core benefits is to be understood in the sense that
this notion covers at least minimum income support, assistance in case of
illness, pregnancy, parental assistance and long-term care. The modalities
for granting such benefits will be determined by national law.
(14) The Member States should remain subject to the obligation to afford access
for minors to the educational system under conditions similar to those laid
down for their nationals.
(15) The notion of study grants in the field of vocational training does not cover
measures which are financed under social assistance schemes. Moreover,
access to study grants may be dependent on the fact that the person who
applies for such grants fulfils on his/her own the conditions for acquiring
long-term resident status. As regards the issuing of study grants, Member
States may take into account the fact that Union citizens may benefit from
this same advantage in the country of origin.
(18) Establishing the conditions subject to which the right to reside in another
Member State may be acquired by third-country nationals who are long-
term residents should contribute to the effective attainment of an internal
market as an area in which the free movement of persons is ensured. It
642
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
(19) Provision should be made that the right of residence in another Member
State may be exercised in order to work in an employed or self-employed
capacity, to study or even to settle without exercising any form of economic
activity.
(20) Family members should be able to settle in that other Member State with
long-term residents in order to preserve family unity and to avoid hinder-
ing the exercise of the long-term resident’s right of residence. With regard
to the family members who may be authorised to accompany or to join the
long-term residents Member States should pay special attention to the situ-
ation of disabled adult children and of the first degree relatives in the direct
ascending line who are dependent on them.
(21) The Member State in which a long-term resident intends to exercise his right
of residence should be able to check that the person concerned meets the
conditions for residing in its territory. It should also be able to check that
the person concerned does not constitute a threat to public order, public
security or public health.
(24) Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely the the determination
of terms for granting and withdrawing long-term resident status and the
rights pertaining thereto and terms for the exercise of rights of residence by
long-term residents in other Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and impact
of the action, be better achieved by the Community, the Community may
adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out
in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principles of proportion-
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
ality as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is
necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(25) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, and without preju-
dice to Article 4 of the said Protocol, these Member States are not partici-
pating in the adoption of this Directive and are not bound by or subject to
its application.
(26) In accordances with Article 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Denmark does not take part in the adoption of
this Directive, and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(a) the terms for conferring and withdrawing long-term resident status granted
by a Member State in relation to third-country nationals legally residing in
its territory, and the rights pertaining thereto; and
(b) the terms of residence in Member States other than the one which con-
ferred that status on them for third-country nationals enjoying that status.
Article 2 Definitions
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
national and in which that long-term resident exercises the right of resi-
dence;
(e) “family members” means the third-country nationals who reside in the
Member State concerned in accordance with Council Directive 2003/.../EC
of …. on the right to family reunification.
(f) “refugee” means any third-country national enjoying refugee status within
the meaning of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees of 28
July 1951, as amended by the Protocol signed in New York on 31 January
1967;
(g) “long-term resident’s EC residence permit” means a residence permit issued
by the Member State concerned upon the acquisition of long-term resident
status.
Article 3 Scope
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER II
LONG-TERM RESIDENT STATUS IN A MEMBER STATE
2. Periods of residence for the reasons referred to in Article 3(2), (e) and (f)
shall not be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the period
referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Periods of absence from the territory of the Member State concerned shall
not interrupt the period of legal and continuous residence referred to in
paragraph 1 and shall be taken into account for its calculation where they
are shorter than six consecutive months and do not exceed in total ten
months within the period referred to in paragraph 1.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
The evidence referred to in the first sub-paragraph may also include docu-
mentation with regard to appropriate accommodation.
2. The competent national authorities shall give the applicant written notifica-
tion of the decision as soon as possible and in any event no later than six
months from the date on which the application was lodged. Any such deci-
sion shall be notified to the third-country national concerned in accordance
with the notification procedures under the relevant national legislation.
Any consequences of no decision being taken by the end of the period pro-
vided for in this provision shall be determined by national legislation of the
relevant Member State.
3. If the conditions provided for by Articles 4 and 5 are met, and the person
does not represent a threat within the meaning of Article 6, the Member
State concerned shall grant the third-country national concerned long-term
resident status.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
3. Member States may provide that the long-term resident shall no longer be
entitled to maintain his/her long-term resident status in cases where he/she
constitutes a threat to public policy, in consideration of the seriousness of
the offences he/she committed, but such threat is not a reason for expulsion
within the meaning of Article 12.
4. The long-term resident who has resided in another Member State in accor-
dance with Chapter III shall no longer be entitled to maintain his/her long-
term resident status when such a status is granted in another Member State
pursuant to Article 23.
In any case after six years of absence from the territory of the Member
State that granted long-term resident status the person concerned shall no
longer be entitled to maintain his/her long term resident status in the said
Member State.
The said procedure shall apply in particular to the cases of persons that
have resided in a second Member State on grounds of pursuit of studies, as
provided for in Article 14(2)(b).
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
The conditions and the procedure for the re-acquisition of long-term resi-
dent status shall be determined by national law.
7. Where the withdrawal or loss does not lead to removal, the Member State
shall authorise the person concerned to remain in its territory if he/she ful-
fils the conditions provided for in its national legislation and/or if he/she
does not constitute a threat to public policy or public security.
1. Reasons shall be given for any decision rejecting an application for long-
term resident status or withdrawing that status. It shall be notified in writ-
ing to the third-country national concerned. The notification shall specify
the redress procedures available and the timewithin which he may act.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
2. With respect to the provisions of paragraph 1, points (b), (d) (e), (f) and (g),
the Member State concerned may restrict equal treatment to cases where
the registered or usual place of residence of the long-term resident, or that
of family members for whom he/she claims benefits, lies within the territory
of the Member State concerned.
3. Member States may restrict equal treatment with nationals in the following
cases:
a) Member States may retain restrictions to access to employment or self-
employed activities in cases where, in accordance with existing national
or Community legislation, these activities are reserved to nationals,
EU or EEA citizens;
b) Member States may require proof of appropriate language proficiency
for access to education and training. Access to university may be sub-
ject to the fulfilment of specific educational prerequisites.
4. Member States may limit equal treatment in respect of social assistance and
social protection to core benefits.
5. Member States may decide to grant access to additional benefits in the areas
referred to in paragraph 1.
Member States may also decide to grant equal treatment with regard to
areas not covered in paragraph 1.
651
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER III
RIGHT OF RESIDENCE IN THE OTHER MEMBER STATES
Article 14 Principle
652
Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
For reasons of labour market policy, Member States may give preference
to Union citizens, to third-country nationals, when provided for by Com-
munity legislation, as well as to third-country nationals who reside legally
and receive unemployment benefits in the Member State concerned.
5. This Chapter does not concern the residence of long-term residents in the
territory of the Member States:
(a) as employed workers posted by a service provider for the purposes of
cross-border provision of services; or
(b) as providers of cross-border services.
Member States may decide, in accordance with national law, the conditions
under which long-term residents who wish to move to a second Member
State with a view to exercising an economic activity as seasonal workers
may reside in that Member State. Cross-border workers may also be subject
to specific provisions of national law.
1. As soon as possible and no later than three months after entering the terri-
tory of the second Member State, the long-term resident shall apply to the
competent authorities of that Member State for a residence permit.
Member States may accept that the long-term resident submits the appli-
cation referred to in the first sub-paragraph to the competent authorities
of the second Member state while still residing in the territory of the first
Member State.
2. Member States may ask the persons concerned to provide evidence that
they have:
(a) stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain them-
selves and the members of their families, without recourse to the social
assistance of the Member State concerned. For each of the catego-
ries referred to in Article 14(2) Member States shall evaluate these
653
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
resources by reference to their nature and regularity and may take into
account the level of minimum wages and pensions.
(b) sickness insurance covering all risks in the second Member State nor-
mally covered for its own nationals in the Member State concerned.
This condition shall not apply where the third-country nationals concerned
have been required to comply with integration conditions in order to be
granted long-term resident status, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5(2).
The evidence referred to in the first sub-paragraph may also include docu-
mentation with regard to appropriate accommodation.
In particular:
(i) in case of exercise of an economic activity the second Member State
may ask the person concerned to provide evidence:
(a) if they are in employed capacity, that they have an employment
contract, a statement by the employer that they are hired or a pro-
posal for an employment contract, under the conditions provided
for by national legislation. Member States shall determine which
of the said forms of evidence is required.
(b) if they are in a self-employed capacity, that they have the appro-
priate funds which are needed, in accordance with national law,
to exercise an economic activity in such capacity, presenting the
necessary documents and permits.
(ii) in case of study or vocational training the second Member State may ask
the person concerned to provide evidence of enrolment in an accredited
establishment in order to pursue studies or vocational training.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
3. With respect to the submission of the application for a residence permit, the
provisions of Article 15(1) apply.
4. The second Member State may require the family members concerned to
present with their application for a residence permit:
(a) their long-term resident’s permit or residence permit and a valid travel
document or their certified copies;
(b) evidence that they have resided as members of the family of the
long-term resident in the first Member State;
(c) evidence that they have stable and regular resources which are sufficient
to maintain himself/herself without recourse to the social assistance of
the Member State concerned or that the long-term resident has such
resources and insurance for them, as well as sickness insurance cover-
ing all risks in the second Member State. Member States shall evaluate
these resources by reference to their nature and regularity and may
take into account the level of minimum wages and pensions.
5. Where the family was not already constituted in the first Member State,
Directive 2003/…/EC [on the right to family reunification] shall apply.
1. Member States may refuse applications for residence from long-term resi-
dents or family members where the person concerned constitutes a threat to
public policy or public security.
When taking the relevant decision, the Member State shall consider the
severity or type of offence against public policy or public security commit-
655
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
1. Member States may refuse applications for residence from long-term resi-
dents or their family members where the person concerned constitutes a
threat to public health.
2. The only diseases or infirmities that may justify a refusal to allow entry or
the right of residence in the territory of a Member State shall be the dis-
eases as defined by the relevant applicable instruments of the World Health
Organisation’s and such other infectious or contagious parasite-based dis-
eases as are the subject of protective provisions in relation to nationals in
the host country. Member States shall not introduce new more restrictive
provisions or practices.
3. Diseases or infirmities contracted after the first residence permit was issued
in the second Member State shall not justify a refusal to renew the permit
or expulsion from the territory.
2. If the conditions provided for in Articles 14, 15 and 16 are met, then, sub-
ject to the provisions relating to public policy, public security and public
health in Articles 17 and 18, the second Member State shall issue the long-
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
3. The second Member State shall issue members of the long-term resident’s
family with renewable residence permits valid for the same period as the
permit issued to the long-term resident.
1. Reasons shall be given for any decision rejecting an application for a resi-
dence permit. It shall be notified in writing to the third-country national
concerned in accordance with the notification procedures under the rele-
vant national legislation. The notification shall specify the possible redress
procedures available and the time limit for taking action.
1. As soon as they have received the residence permit provided for by Article
19 in the second Member State, long-term residents shall in that Member
State enjoy equal treatment in the areas and under the conditions referred
to in Article 11.
Member States may provide that the persons referred to in Article 14(2)(a)
shall have restricted access to employed activities different than those for
which they have been granted their residence permit under the conditions
set by national legislation for a period not exceeding twelve months.
Member States may decide in accordance with national law the conditions
under which the persons referred to in Article 14(2)(b) or (c) may have
access to an employed or self-employed activity.
3. As soon as they have received the residence permit provided for by Article
19 in the second Member State, members of the family of the long-term
resident shall in that Member State enjoy the rights listed in Article 14 of
Directive 2003/.../EC [on the right to family reunification]
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
2. If the second Member State adopts one of the measures referred to in para-
graph 1, the first Member State shall immediately readmit without formali-
ties the long-term resident and his family members. The second Member
State shall notify the first Member State of its decision.
3. Until the third-country national has obtained long-term resident status and
without prejudice to the obligation to readmit referred to in paragraph 2,
the second Member State may adopt a decision to remove the third-country
national from the territory of the Union, in accordance with and under
the guarantees of Article 12, on serious grounds of public policy or public
security.
In such cases, when adopting the said decision the second Member State
shall consult the first Member State.
When the second Member State adopts a decision to remove the third-
country national concerned, it shall take all the appropriate measures to
effectively implement it. In such cases the second Member State shall pro-
vide to the first Member State appropriate information with respect to the
implementation of the removal decision.
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Chapter 20 Long-term Residents
1. Upon application, the second Member State shall grant long-term residents
the status provided for by Article 7, subject to the provisions of Articles 3,
4, 5 and 6. The second Member State shall notify its decision to the first
Member State.
2. The procedure laid down in Article 7 shall apply to the presentation and
examination of applications for long-term resident status in the second
Member State. Article 8 shall apply for the issuance of the residence permit.
Where the application is rejected, the procedural guarantees provided for
by Article 10 shall apply.
CHAPTER IV
FINAL PROVISIONS
Periodically, and for the first time no later than 23 January 2011, the Commis-
sion shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of this Directive in the Member States and shall propose such amendments as
may be necessary. These proposals for amendments shall be made by way of
priority in relation to Articles 4, 5, 9, 11 and to Chapter III.
Member States shall appoint contact points who will be responsible for receiving
and transmitting the information referred to in Articles 19(2), 22(2) and 23(1).
Article 26 Transposition
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 23 January 2006 at the
latest. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to
this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their
official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down
by Member States.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
This Directive shall enter into force on the on the day of its publication in the
Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 28 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
660
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and
Self-employment
1 Summary of Content
In July 2001, the Commission proposed a Directive which would set out gen-
eral rules on migration for employment and self-employment into the European
Union.1 However, the Council has held only brief discussions on this proposed
Directive, and due to strong opposition to the Directive from some Member
States, discussions on the proposal stalled. The Commission issued a Green
Paper early in 2005 to relaunch discussions on the issue, and subsequently with-
drew the proposed Directive entirely in September 2005, and EU action was e
reconsidered. Ultimately, in a “policy plan” on legal migration issued at the end
of 2005, the Commission announced plans to propose two Directives in 2007
(on the admission of highly-skilled workers and for a general framework on
the status of all persons admitted for employment), one Directive in 2008 (on
seasonal workers) and two Directives in 2009 (on intra-corporate transferees
and remunerated trainees).2 Nevertheless, the 2001 proposal for a Directive is
presented and discussed here as the relevant provisions of the proposal may well
form the starting point for the planned future proposals; in any event, the issues
raised by the proposal will have to be addressed again in the planned future pro-
posals. Ireland opted in to discussions on the Directive, but the UK opted out,
while Denmark was not eligible to participate.
In March 2004, the Commission proposed a Directive (and two Recom-
mendations) regarding migration for employment (in effect) of a very specific
category of persons: researchers. The Council was able to reach agreement on
the proposed Directive quickly, in November 2004, and it formally adopted the
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 661-723.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Directive in October 2005. The text of this Directive is also presented and dis-
cussed in this Chapter. Again, Ireland opted in this Directive, the UK opted out,
and Denmark was not eligible to participate.3
3 The UK decision not to opt in is explained in the 35th report of the House of Com-
mons Select committee on European Scrutiny (2003-2004).
4 See discussion of the case law in Ch. 22.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
5 For the text of the 1999 proposals, see COM (1999) 3, 26 Feb. 1999. In the mean-
time, these proposals have been withdrawn (COM (2004) 542, 1 Oct. 2004) but
posted workers (as distinct from the self-employed) are covered by a more general
proposal on services issued early in 2004 (COM (2004) 2, 5 March 2004), and still
under discussion in the Council and EP as of end-2005.
6 Case C-43/93 [1994] ECR I-3803. The Van der Elst judgment has since been supple-
mented by the Court’s judgment in Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004]
ECR I-10191. See also Cases C-168/04 Commission v Austria and C-244/04 Com-
mission v Germany, both pending (an Opinion in the latter case was released on 15
Sep. 2005).
7 See Ch. 12.
8 See Chapters 13 and 15.
9 COM (2005) 391, 1 Sep. 2005.
663
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
10 OJ 1968 L 257/2.
11 Subsequently, the Council and EP adopted a Directive that will consolidate all the
rules on family members of migrant EU citizens, as from April 2006: Directive
2004/38 (OJ 2004 L 229/35).
12 See Ch. 19.
13 See Ch. 13.
664
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Pursuant to Article 6(2), this preference rule was “deemed to be fulfilled” if a job
had been offered through “several” Member States for over four weeks, particu-
larly through the use of EURES, the employment clearance system established
by Regulation 1612/68. But Article 6(2) also referred to job applications from
nationals of countries which have begun negotiations to join the EU (twelve
countries at the time of the Commission’s proposal and four countries as the end
of 2005); it is not clear how such persons would have fitted in to the system.
Articles 6(3) to 6(5) listed options for Member States as regards possible
automatic exemptions from the Article 6(2) procedure (a “sectoral labour short-
age” test, a “high-income” test and a “compensating payment” test). The explan-
atory memorandum explained that the Commission envisioned Member States
competing in this context to show which one has the best model. The first option
also gave preference to citizens of applicant countries, without any procedure
for implementing this preference.
Articles 5 and 6 did not make a distinction between unskilled and skilled
workers per se, although in practice it may have been that it would have been
easier to find a “domestic” applicant for an unskilled job. While the option in
Article 6(4) regarding automatic exemption for high-paying jobs would in prac-
tice have favoured many highly skilled employees (although sadly it will not
apply to academics unless the threshold is quite low!), even if a Member State
uses this option Article 6(2) would still have applied as regards lower-paid (pre-
dominantly unskilled) workers. The Directive did not state expressly whether or
not a permit must be issued if the criteria in Articles 5 and 6 were met (excluding
any application of the exceptions), but that was certainly an arguable interpreta-
tion.
Articles 7 to 10 concerned revocation and renewal of the permit. There
was an underlying rule, also present in Articles 5 and 6, that the position of the
worker had to be simplified after three years’ legal employment (or three years
out of the last five). The explanatory memorandum (but not the main text of
the proposed Directive) made reference to the application of the proposed long-
term residents’ directive (since adopted) after five years.14 Member States would
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
have been left full discretion as regards the period of validity of the permit and
of any renewals, according to Article 7.
Article 11 contained provisions on equal treatment for workers. Certain
matters (such as social assistance) were omitted, and certain exclusions were
allowed. There was no reference to equal treatment from the employment ser-
vices as regards employment assistance.
The special cases listed in Section 2 of Chapter II were subject to the same
rules as in Section 1, unless otherwise specified. They comprised rules for sea-
sonal workers, transfrontier workers, intra-corporate transferees, remunerated
trainees and au pairs.
Chapter III (Articles 17-24) contained the provisions on self-employment.
It was worded similarly to Chapter II, although there were no “special cases”.
Here the key test was that an investment would employ the applicant and have
a favourable impact on employment or economic development in that Member
State.15 Member States had the option to create “sectoral” or “large investment”
exceptions.16
Chapter IV (Articles 25-28) contained “horizontal” rules applying to the
employed and self-employed. The key provision here was Article 26, which
allowed Member States to prohibit or reduce the number of permits issued,
“taking into account the overall capacity to receive and to integrate third coun-
try nationals on their territory or in specific regions thereof ”. The proposed
Directive did not specify what criteria could be used to issue permits within
any quota, although there were procedural requirements for the exercise of this
exception in Article 30. Article 27 comprised a simplified version of exceptions
relating to public security, public health and public order, and Article 28 was a
“public employment” and “official authority” exception.
Finally, Chapter V (Articles 29-31) contained procedural rules; and Chapter
VI (Articles 32-37) contained general and final provisions. The former Chapter
in particular required a decision on applications within six months, and set out
a series of transparency requirements.17 The latter Chapter contained a non-dis-
crimination rule, although it did not extend to non-discrimination on grounds
of nationality.18
1.2 Researchers
In order to increase the number of research workers in the EU with a view to
meeting the “Lisbon agenda” objective of making the EU the world’s most com-
petitive and dynamic knowledge economy by 2010, the Commission proposed
15 Art. 19(1).
16 Art. 19(2) and (3).
17 Arts. 29 and 30.
18 Art. 32.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
30 Art. 5.
31 Art. 6.
32 Art. 7(3).
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
financial responsibility from the host institution; and a lack of threat to public
policy, public security or public health.33 Member States may also check the
hosting agreement’s terms.34 Member States must issue residence permits for at
least one year, unless the period of project is less than one year’s duration, and
the permit must be renewed if the conditions for its renewal are still met.35 How-
ever, as in the Directive on admission of students and others, Member States will
have a further two-year period before they are obliged to issue permits to per-
sons covered by the Directive in the form of residence permits.36 A provision on
family members specifies that their residence permit shall have the same validity
as that of the researcher, if the validity of their travel documents allows it; but
Member States may shorten such permits’ validity in “duly justified” cases.37
Moreover, the period of residence of family members shall not be made depen-
dent on a minimum period of residence of the researcher. However, there is no
explicit right of family reunion, although a recital to the preamble encourages
family members’ admission. Member States may withdraw or refuse to renew a
permit if it was acquired by fraud, if the holder no longer meets the conditions
of the permit or is residing for other purposes, or on grounds of public policy
or public security.38
Chapter III of the Directive concerns researchers’ rights. Research-
ers admitted under the Directive may teach in accordance with national law,
although Member States may set a maximum number of teaching hours per
year.39 They have the right to equal treatment as regards recognition of diplo-
mas, certificates and qualifications, working conditions (including pay and dis-
missal), social security as defined under EC free movement legislation, subject to
the limitations allowed by the Regulation extending those rules to third-country
nationals, tax benefits, and access to goods and services made available to the
public.40 Finally, a researcher has the right of mobility to other Member States
to conduct part of his or her research project there.41 If the period of mobility
is less than three months, the second Member State cannot insist on a new host-
ing agreement, although the mobility is subject to meeting a sufficient resources
test and requirements of public policy, et al in the second Member State. After
33 Art. 7(1).
34 Art. 7(2).
35 Art. 8.
36 Art. 18 of the Directive.
37 Art. 9. There is no definition of “family members”.
38 Art. 10.
39 Art. 11.
40 Art. 12. On the social security legislation applicable to third-country nationals, see
Ch. 23.
41 Art. 13.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
three months, the second Member State may insist on the negotiation of a new
hosting agreement. Any necessary visas or residence permits must be issued “in
a timely manner” and Member States cannot require the researcher to leave their
territory while the application is processed.
The procedural rules in Chapter IV of the Directive comprise first of all an
option for Member States to determine whether the researcher or the research
organisation submits the application. An application can be submitted in the
researcher’s country of residence or in a Member State, and Member States have
an option to consider applications made by persons who are already present.42
Member States must respond to applications “as soon as possible”, but with no
deadline set. Persons must be notified of negative decisions and have a right to
“mount a legal challenge before the authorities” of the relevant Member State
in the event of a dispute.43
42 Art. 14. A clause in the preamble states that holders of residence permits “should”
be able to make an application for researcher status without leaving the territory.
43 Art. 15.
44 OJ 1996 C 274/3 and 7.
45 On the resolutions, see Peers, “Building Fortress Europe: the Development of EU
Migration Law” 35 CMLRev. (1998) 1235 at 1242-1251 and Guild and Niessen, The
Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted Con-
ventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions (Kluwer, 1996)
at 311-330 and 361-375.
46 COM (97) 387, 30 July 1997; OJ 1997 C 337/9. For comments, see Peers, “Raising
Minimum Standards or Racing to the Bottom? The Commission’s Proposed Migra-
tion Convention”, in Guild, ed., The Legal Framework and Social Consequences of
Free Movement of Persons in the European Union (Kluwer, 1999) 149 at 156-157 and
Hedemann-Robinson, “From Object to Subject? Non-EC Nationals and the Draft
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
admissions, permitting entry of persons where posts could not be filled “in the
short term” by EU citizens, legally resident third-country nationals in the “regu-
lar labour market” of a Member State, or “long-term residents” (presumably as
defined by the Convention). The only specific rules concerned seasonal work-
ers and trans-frontier workers, while trainees were addressed in the “students”
chapter of the Convention and au pairs in the chapter on “others”. To obtain
admission for self-employment, applicants would have to show that their activity
would have a beneficial effect on employment in that Member State. Switching
between categories would be highly restricted and in principle all applications
would have to be submitted while the applicant was outside the territory of the
EU. It was not clear whether Member States would be permittted to provide for
more favourable treatment for migrants than that set out in the Convention, or
rather whether the Convention would set out fully harmonised rules.
In its response to the proposed Convention, the EP suggested deletion of
the strict rules requiring applications from outside the EU and limiting switch-
ing between categories. The labour migration rules would be amended by per-
mitting Member States to establish quotas or “other measures” instead of a
labour market test, and requring the Commission to set up a Europe-wide moni-
toring system on admissions for employment. Applicants would have to show
only the offer of a work contract 47 As for the Council, various Member States
objected to many points of detail in the proposal, in particular the merger of
work and residence permits, the proposed conditions for admission, the restric-
tions on renewal of permits, the lack of possible exemptions and the length of
the admission permit. Some thought that the rules on self-employment in the
draft Convention were too rigid, although others thought a proposed two-year
entry permit was too generous.48
Proposal of the Commission for a Council Act Establishing the Rules for Admission
of Third-Country Nationals to the Member States” 18 YEL (1998) 289 at 308-311.
47 OJ 1999 C 150/187.
48 Council doc. 6488/98, 8 Apr. 1998.
49 See Annex 5.
50 See Council doc. 7557/02, 10 June 2002 (outcome of proceedings of migration
working party, 21 March 2002).
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
legal basis of the proposal, suggesting that Article 63(3)(a) does not extend to
competence over labour migration. The Council legal service was asked to give
its view on this matter.51 A number of Member States indicated that other min-
istries besides interior ministries had to be involved in the discussions on the
proposal, and expressed doubts about merging the decision-making regarding
work and residence permits.
The same meeting first discussed Articles 1-4 of the proposal in detail, and
the minutes record Member States’ doubts about the connection between deci-
sions on migration for employment and self-employment and the issue of visas
to the persons concerned. Some of the definitions in Article 2 were questioned,
in particular because some Member States wished to retain a distinction between
work and residence permits and the distinction between students and trainees
was unclear. There was some discussion of whether, instead of permitting “more
favourable” rules for certain categories of persons in Article 3(4), the Directive
should permit “more specific” rules--meaning that the groups listed could be
worse off under national legislation. Some Member States wanted to make this
list non-exhaustive. Taken together, those two amendments would render the
Directive virtually meaningless, as Member States would be free to apply better
or worse treatment to any category of workers. Other Member States wanted
to add a category of “highly qualified workers” and widen the exception for
“journalists”. As for Article 4, several Member States wanted the Directive to
state explicitly that there was no obligation to issue permits to persons if the
criteria were met, and four Member States objected to a merger between work
and residence permits.
Subsequently, the “core” Articles 5-10 were discussed at working party
meetings in April and June 2002.52 Member States made detailed objections
about nearly every provision. First, some Member States objected to the idea
that only employees could make applications. Second, one or more Member
States wanted exceptions in limited circumstances from the obligation to hold
a residence permit in order to undertake employment. Third, some Member
States objected to the possibility to submit an application while in-country.
As to the conditions of employment, some Member States wanted more
conditions added before a permit could be granted (accommodation, require-
ment of integration or commitment of employer to pay expenses). On the other
hand, one Member State wanted the possibility to offer admission without a
specific job offer already received; at least one Member State wanted to make
the “good conduct” condition mandatory; and others wanted to impose crimi-
nal record and “public order” requirements as regards the application. All of
the core labour market conditions for admission for employment and the pos-
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
sible exceptions to them set out in Article 6 were controversial, with the appar-
ent exception of the prospect of simplifying admission for those offered a job
paying above an income threshold in Article 6(4).
There were also differing views about the status of workers and the self-
employed after admission. Member States disagreed on the prospect of impos-
ing a maximum three year validity on the first residence permit, including the
obligation to submit an application for renewal three months or more before
expiry of the existing permit. At least one Member State had reservations about
exempting persons holding a permit for over three years from renewed checks.
A majority wanted a more flexible approach to the obligation to restrict workers
initially to specified professional fields or fields of activities; this would entail
simplification of checks on changes in employment during the first three years.
Finally, as might be expected, Article 10(3) concerning the position following
unemployment was highly controversial, with several delegations wanting the
deletion of this provision or major changes to it.
The Directive was discussed again in July 2003, and then not discussed
again until a Council working party meeting of October 2003, which concluded
the first reading of the proposal.53 It emerged from further discussions that many
Member States had objections to the proposed rules on the rights of third-coun-
try nationals set out in Article 11. Objections were also raised to the proposed
rules on all the special categories of workers in the Directive, except for the rules
on youth exchange schemes/au pairs.
As for self-employment, some Member States questioned the Community’s
competence on this issue and the need for Community rules on admission of the
self-employed. Other objections concerned separate work and residence permits
for this category of persons, the issue of retaining separate rules on the initial
entry of the self-employed, and the question of the extent of Member States’
discretion in deciding on admission. There were also objections to the text on
procedures for obtaining a residence permit for self-employment, including the
question of whether persons present on a tourist visa could apply for one, and
to some items on the detailed list of documents which an applicant would have
to provide. Several Member States also had concerns about the proposed sub-
stantive criteria which would apply to applications for self-employment. It was
assumed that Member States had reservations on the general rules concerning
self-employment (rules on issue, limitations upon and removal of a residence
permit, and rules on equal treatment) which matched their reservations about
the general rules on admission for employment.
Next, Member States had reservations about most of the horizontal provi-
sions, with objections to the proposed text regarding fees, Member States’ right
to set quotas, and the limitation of the “public policy or public security” limita-
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
tion to the “personal conduct” of the individual concerned. Some Member States
even objected to the need for a “public policy” et al restriction, on grounds that,
in their view, there was no need for such criteria because the proposal would not
create a right of immigration. However, there were no objections to the “public
employment” and “official authority” exception.
There were objections to most of the remaining substantive provisions, in
particular those concerning procedural rights and transparency, on the grounds
that these rules would create an undue burden for national administrations and
were redundant in light of the lack of “rights” for the individuals concerned.
The Council working party was able to reach some limited agreement on the
final provisions, agreeing to move the “non-discrimination” clause to the pre-
amble, to delete the “penalties” clause and to set a date for implementation of
two years after the Directive’s adoption.
The “state of play” as regards discussions on the Directive was mentioned
at the JHA Council at end November 2003, and this was the final time that the
Council made any effort to discuss the Directive before its withdrawal by the
Commission. It appears from Member States’ reactions during the first reading
of the Directive in the Council that it would be very difficult to agree this pro-
posal, despite the Commission’s apparent tactic of trying to overcome opposi-
tion to the detail by suggesting a general “escape” clause. There seemed to be a
general unwillingness (seen also in other immigration and asylum discussions at
EU level) to change current national law and practice in any way, with Member
States wanting so much flexibility on top of the flexible approach already sug-
gested by the Commission that little or no common minimum rules would be left
if Member States had their way.
As for the European Parliament, it adopted a resolution on the proposed
Directive in Feburary 2003, suggesting considerable liberalisation.54 Corporate
transferees would need only to have been employed for six months before the
transfer; the definition of “trainees” would have been clarified so that the link
with employment would have been clearer; the list of possible special rules autho-
rised by Article 3(4) would have been widened and rendered non-exhaustive;
six-month permits to seek employment would have been issued; the conditions
concerning work contracts and certificates of good conduct would have been
clarified; Member States could only have required a job to be advertised for three
weeks, not four, before the labour market test would have been deemed satisfied;
an employer would have been exempt from further labour market testing if the
third-country national employee left the job within a year; and it would poten-
tially have been mandatory to consult the social partners in individual cases.
After employment, the restriction on employment to a particular region would
have been dropped and other restrictions would have been dropped on the first
renewal of the permit. There would have been simplified approval for a person
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
taking a new job in the same field, and Member States would not have been able
to withdraw a permit where a person was receiving unemployment benefit. The
EP also suggested equal treatment as regards education and study grants, social
assistance for housing and access to legal aid, and proposed family reunion for
persons covered by the Directive. As for the special categories of workers, the
EP wanted corporate transferees to have the right to move to all Member States
and advocated a new special category of employees of contractual service pro-
viders (presumably from outside the EU). Finally, the EP suggested changes to
the horizontal provisions, including limitation of the costs which Member States
can charge, the ability for Member States to provide for more favourable rules
and an obligation to respond to applications within three months. However, the
improvement in status for working three years within the last five years would
have been tightened so that it would only apply following three years’ work in
the last six years.
2.2.2 Researchers
The Council made a number of changes to the Commission’s proposal as a result
of intensive negotiations in the Council’s migration working group throughout
2004. The definitions in Article 2 of the Directive were amended so that a “resi-
dence permit” is defined as any permit issued by a Member State designating the
holder as a “researcher”, not just permits issued “under this Directive”. The def-
inition of “researcher” was made more flexible, and the definition of “research
organisation” no longer refers explicitly to a “private firm”, but only a “private
organisation”, leaving open the question of whether a “firm” could be consid-
ered an “organisation”. As for the scope of the Directive, the Council specified
that it only applied to persons applying for admission to carry out a research
project,55 and dropped a proviso that Member States could choose to apply the
Directive to persons requesting permission to enter and teach at a “higher edu-
cation establishment” as defined in national law.56 Instead, a clause in the pre-
amble states that Member States may choose to apply “similar” rules to persons
who apply to carry out such teaching “in the context of a research project”.
As for the special procedure for admission, the Council granted more flexi-
blity to Member States.57 First of all, it simplified the proposed rules on autho-
rization of the institutions and publication of the list of approved institutions.
Next, it allowed more control over authorization of research institutions: the
Commission had proposed proposed an unlimited period of authorization for
public institutions, and a five-year minimum period of authorization for pri-
vate firms, without any possibility of “exceptional” approval for a more lim-
55 Art. 3(1).
56 Art. 3(2) of the proposal.
57 Art. 5.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
ited period. The rules on responsibility for costs of an illegal researcher were
simplified; these rules and the rule on proof that the research was carried out
became optional, rather than mandatory. Also, the threshold for Member States
to remove approval for a research institution was raised and the possibility of a
five-year ban before reapplication became optional, rather than mandatory. The
provision on research agreements was amended so that the institutions will not
be required to issue a statement to the researcher that it assumes responsibility
for his or her health, residence and return costs; there is rather only an option
for Member States to require issuing a statement in respect of the costs of stay
and return if the researcher resides illegally.58
The admission conditions were amended by the Council to refer to a require-
ment to hold a travel document as defined in national law, rather than a valid
passport or travel document.59 Also, the Council added the proviso that Member
States may require the travel document to have longer validity than the research
period. The Council dropped the requirement of a condition to show proof of
funding and a certified copy of the researchers’ degree, but it added instead the
option for Member States to check the basis of the hosting agreement. On the
issue of renewal, the original proposal had provided for annual renewal of the
permit, but the agreed text still provides for a renewal obligation.60 The provision
on family members is entirely new.61 As for withdrawal or non-renewal of resi-
dence permits,62 the Council dropped the proposed requirement for mandatory
withdrawal of the permit in cases of fraud;63 this matches an amendment made
to Directive 2004/114 on admission of students and others.64 Also, the Council
removed a reference to withdrawal or non-renewal on grounds of public health,
as well as a limitation which the Commission proposed upon the application of
the public policy and public security exception.
A number of changes were also made to Chapter III, on researchers’ rights.
Article 10 of the Commission’s proposal, concerning the right for researchers
to enter and reside on the territory and carry out the research agreement, along
with the facility to obtain entry visas, was deleted, but it appears that Articles
6(3) and the last part of Article 14(2), both added by the Council, cover the same
ground, except for the lack of an explicit right to carry out the research agree-
ment. Article 11 initially provided that researchers admitted under the Direc-
tive may teach in “higher education establishments” as defined by national law
58 Art. 6.
59 Art. 7.
60 Art. 8.
61 Art. 9.
62 Art. 10.
63 Art. 9 of the Commission proposal.
64 See Ch. 22.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
or practice; the text agreed by the Council states instead that researchers “may
teach”, and the Council dropped the apparent obligation for Member States
to set a maximum number of teaching hours per year. The equal treatment
clause was amended to cover “tax benefits” (instead of “tax concessions”) and
to “social security” by reference to EC legislation (rather than “social insurance”
as defined by national law).65 As for the right to mobility of researchers between
Member States, Article 13 of the proposal was revised to provide more clearly
for a distinction between moves for less than and more than three months, with
the waiver of any obligation to sign a new hosting agreement if the stay is less
than three months, and to permit Member States to impose visa or residence
permit requirements.
As with other EC immigration and asylum legislation, the procedural safe-
guards were significantly weakened. The Commission had proposed that an
application could be submitted while the researcher was lawfully present in a
Member State,66 and had suggested a deadline of 30 days for deciding on appli-
cations (with exceptional extensions possible), with reasons given for negative
decisions and the right to appeal to the courts against them.67 All these pro-
visions were dropped by the Council, as were a provision limiting fees to the
administrative costs involved and a detailed proposed provision on transparency
requirements.68
Finally, two clauses were added to the final provisions, concerning a delayed
obligation to issue residence permits to the persons concerned, and the status of
Ireland.69
In April 2005, the plenary EP adopted a resolution giving its opinion on the
proposed Directive, although the Council subsequently changed the text only to
add one clause to the preamble (point 7), which in fact concerns researchers who
are EU citizens.
3 Legal Analysis
It is not known what view the Council legal service took of the EC’s competence
to adopt the 2001 proposal for a general Directive on economic migration. But
for the reasons set out elsewhere in this book, it is arguable that Article 137 EC
governs access to employment for third-country nationals, while Article 63(3)(a)
EC governs their access to self-employment and the rules related to the entry and
65 Art. 12.
66 Art. 14 of the proposal.
67 Art. 15 of the proposal.
68 Arts. 16 and 17 of the Commission’s proposal. Both issues are addressed in the
preamble, although there is no reference there to the idea of a limit on fees.
69 Arts. 18 and 19 of the agreed text.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
residence of both groups.70 But if Article 137 does not govern the issue of access
to employment for third-country nationals, it is clear that Article 63(3)(a) would
do so in their first Member State of residence. This conclusion is based on a wide
interpretation of the concept of “conditions” of entry and residence which the
Community has power to regulate pursuant to Article 63(3)(a), in the absence of
any express limitation on the scope of that power. Logically the “conditions” of
entry and residence also comprise the grounds on which persons are permitted
to stay and reside. These cannot merely be negative conditions because Article
61 refers expressly to the Community objective of “safeguarding the rights” of
third-country nationals. Furthermore, the broad objective of Title IV is to grant
the EC powers to regulate the “entry and movement” of third-country nationals,
according to Article 3(1) EC. There is nothing in this objective to prevent the EC
from regulating labour migration.71 For that matter, the posting of third-country
national managers of an EC company to another Member State arguably falls
within the scope of Article 44 EC.72
A second legal issue is the cross-over between the status of paid trainees in
the 2001 proposal and unpaid trainees in the parallel proposal (since adopted)
on the status of students and others. This issue was eventually addressed by
excluding persons admitted for employment from the Directive on students and
others, but if negotiations on the issue of admission for employment resume, the
Council will have to be careful to consider the possible overlap between the two
measures.73
4. Comments
4.1 General Rules
Despite many positive elements to the 2001 proposal, there were a number of
potential conflicts with international treaties on labour migration and a number
of further potential issues, including compatibility with the “Tampere princi-
ples” of EU immigration and asylum law.74
70 See Ch. 3. This is similar to the distinction between Reg. 1612/68, n. 10 above, and
Dir. 68/360 (OJ 1968 L 257/13) as regards EC national workers and their family
members.
71 For further comments on the scope of Art. 63(3)(a), see Ch. 3.
72 See Ch. 4.
73 See further Ch. 22.
74 For the Tampere principles, see Annex 4. The following analysis is in part adapted
from comments prepared as a contribution to ILPA’s comments on the Directive.
See: <www.ilpa.org.uk>.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
concluded by the EC, the Member States or both, if those treaties were more
favourable. However, a number of provisions in those treaties were not found in
the proposed Directive. This is troubling because, in the case of certain Council
of Europe treaties (the European Social Charter, the European Convention on
Migrant Workers and the European Convention on Establishment), Member
States would thus have been applying a preferential standard for nationals of
European states, thus perpetuating a distinction on the labour force between
various groups of third-country employees. In the case of obligations that
Member States must secure for all persons as a result of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), International Labour Organisation (ILO) Con-
ventions, and UN Covenants, the Directive would have had to be in accordance
with such obligations as a result of Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty (for the ECHR)
and the general principles of EC law (which are inspired by all international
human rights treaties on which Member States have collaborated, as the Court
of Justice has repeatedly made clear). Also, in these cases, including lower stan-
dards in this Directive could have discouraged Member States from ratifying or
fully applying such measures.
Certain provisions of the proposed Directive did adequately implement
international obligations. However, other international rules were omitted,
and in some cases, the Directive clearly set a lower standard than international
instruments dealing with the same topic.75
Article 7 of the proposal provided for unspecified periods for renewal of the
permit. However, Article 8(3) of the European Convention on Migrant Workers
(ECMW) specifies that permits must be renewable for at least a one-year period.
Article 8 of the proposal allowed for limited occupational and geographic mobil-
ity for up to three years. On the former point, Article 14a of ILO Convention
143 requires equal treatment after two years, or the conclusion of the first work
contract, if that period is shorter. On the latter point, Article 8(2) of the ECMW
prohibits restrictions on a worker’s locality for more than one year.
Article 10(3)(a) of the proposed Directive allowed workers to be limited to
a three-month period of stay if they become unemployed during their first two
years. However, Article 9(4) ECMW requires states to permit workers to stay for
a five-month period, if they are unemployed due to illness or accident, or invol-
untarily unemployed. Moreover, Article 19(8) of the European Social Charter
(ESC) and Article 3(1) of the European Convention on Establishment (ECE)
prohibit any expulsion except for national security, public policy or public moral-
ity. Article 8(1) of ILO Convention 143 specifies that termination of a contract
does not necessarily mean that a worker is in an irregular situation.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 11 of the proposal did not include the rights to equal treatment as
regards help and assistance from the employment services. This right is set out
in Articles 10(2) and 27 ECMW. Article 19(1) ESC requires free assistance for
migrant workers from the employment services. Nor did Article 11 include an
obligation as regards teaching the language of the host state, as found in Article
14(2) ECMW and Article 19(11) of the revised ESC. Article 11 was also miss-
ing a provision requiring transfer of earnings and savings of migrant workers,
found in Article 17 ECMW, Article 10(9) ESC and Article 9 ILO Convention
97. There was no provision on equality in taxation, despite Article 19(5) of the
ESC, Article 23 ECMW, Article 6(1)(c) ILO Convention 97 and Article 21(1)
ECE. There was no provision on equal access to the courts, as found in Article
26 ECMW and Articles 7 and 8 ECE (including legal aid).
Article 11(1)(d) did not refer to free movement within the Member State of
residence, as provided for in Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR. Article
11(1)(f)(i) on equal treatment in working conditions, pay and dismissal, con-
formed to Article 16(1) ECMW, Article 19(4)(a) ESC, Article 6(1)(a)(i) of ILO
Convention 97 and Article 17(1) ECE. However, there was no provision equiva-
lent to Article 16(2) ECMW, preventing derogation by contract. Nor was there a
provision applying equal treatment as regards occupational diseases and indus-
trial accidents, or occupational rehabilitation (Article 20 ECMW) or as regards
inspection of working conditions (Article 21 ECMW). While the inclusion of
dismissal conformed to Article 24(2) ECMW, there was no reference to equality
as regard expiry of contracts, as required by Article 24(1) ECMW.
Article 11(1)(f)(ii) only included equality rights as regards “vocational
training” connected to the residence permit. However, Article 14(1) ECMW
requires equal treatment as regards general education and retraining, along with
the admission requirements to higher education (although Article 14(3) ECMW
apparently leaves equal treatment as regards scholarships to higher education to
the discretion of Member States). Similarly, Article 13 of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) recognises a right to
education, and Article 3(1)(e) of the UNESCO Convention on Discrimination
in Education bans discrimination in access to education as regards resident for-
eign nationals, although Article 3(1)(c) appears to accept inequality as regards
scholarships. There is no time limitation on these wider rights, unlike the limit
proposed in Article 11(2). Article 11(1)(f)(iii), on qualifications, conformed to
Article 15 ECE.
Article 11(1)(f)(iv), on social security and health care, conformed to Article
12(4) ESC as regards equality of treatment in social security, but not as regards
aggregation of benefits. It also conformed to Article 1 of the First Protocol to the
ECHR, in conjunction with Article 14, and the right to social security in Article
9 of the ICESR. However, it was questionable whether Article 11(3) complied
with those obligations, as it appeared to be a derogation from the equal treat-
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
ment principle. There was no right to equal treatment as regards social assis-
tance, unlike Article 13(4) ESC and Article 1 of the European Convention on
Social and Medical Assistance.
Article 11(1)(f)(v) only included equality rights as regards “public hous-
ing”. However, Article 13(1) ECMW requires equal treatment as regards “hous-
ing and rents”. Article 19(4)(c) ESC and Article 6(1)(a)(iii) ILO Convention 97
require equal treatment as regards accommodation. Article 11(1) ICESR grants
a right to housing. None of these three instruments allow for any temporal limi-
tation, as would have been permitted by Article 11(2) of the proposal, and all
three instruments have a wider scope, covering private housing to the extent
regulated by the authorities. Moreover, Article 12(2) to (4) ECMW places obli-
gations on states as regards fitness of accommodation, suitability of housing,
and protection from exploitation in respect of rents.
Article 11(1)(f)(vi) conformed to Article 19(4)(b) ESC, Article 6(1)(a)(ii)
ILO Convention 97, Article 28 ECMW, Article 22 ICCPR and Article 8
ICESCR. However, it did not extend to the “participation” equality right found
in Article 29 ECMW.
Article 25 of the Directive allowed for a charge that “may” be limited to
the costs involved. However, Article 18(2) ESC requires the reduction or aboli-
tion of existing dues and charges placed upon workers and employers. Similarly,
Article 21(2) ECE and Articles 4(3) and 9(2) ECMW require that the charge
should be no greater than the administrative costs of processing.
Article 29(4) conformed to the standards set by Article 9(5) ECMW, as
regards appeal rights against withdrawal of a permit. However, there was no pro-
vision in the Directive allowing appeals against breaches of the equality rights
in the Directive. To the extent that such rights implement the ECHR, this would
have been a breach of Article 13 ECHR, requiring effective remedies to secure
the rights in the ECHR. More generally, it would have been a breach of the
“effective remedies” principle of EC law, which requires Member States to allow
for proceedings to enforce any right provided for in EC law. This principle is now
set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Also, Article 19(7) ESC and
Article 6(1)(d) ILO Convention 97 require states to provide for access to a court
to enforce any of the employment rights set out in the relevant Articles.
Article 29 lacked a provision concerning expulsion, which might be ordered
pursuant to a separate proceeding following the withdrawal or non-renewal of
a permit. Article 13 ICCPR sets out procedural rights including the right to
submit reasons against the expulsion and the right to appear before a competent
authority. Similar provisions appear in Protocol 7 of the ECHR.
Article 31 did not go as far as Article 19(1) ESC, Article 3(1) ILO Conven-
tion 97 and Article 6(3) ECMW, which also require Member States to take steps
to prohibit misleading information. Also, Article 19(1) ESC, Article 2 ILO Con-
vention 97 and Article 6(1) ECMW require such information to be free.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Did the proposed Directive satisfy these principles? Article 11 of the pro-
posal did require equal treatment between third-country national migrants and
EU nationals in some circumstances. This would have been a useful contribution
to ensuring equality between third-country nationals and EU citizens, and the
provision would clearly have conferred directly effective rights.76 However, there
were several issues where the treatment of third-country nationals is not “com-
parable” with EU citizens. First of all, there were detailed substantive and pro-
cedural rules concerning expulsion and refusal of entry of EU citizens,77 which
would not fully have applied as such to third-country nationals covered by the
2001 proposal. Having said that, the proposal would have applied some of the
substantive rules derived from EC free movement law (the “personal conduct”
test and the restriction of application of the public health exception to pre-exist-
ing illness or disability), and the general principles of EC law could have required
application of some or all of the procedural protections against expulsion guar-
anteed by EC law.78 Secondly, the 2001 proposal would not expressly have per-
mitted third-country nationals who were formerly employed or self-employed in
a Member State to stay there as long as they are looking for employment and
could show there is a reasonable prospect of finding it, if they are relying on
their own assets or an entitlement to social benefits which they have qualified
for in the host Member State (at least until the expiry of their residence permit),
although the provisions on this issue in Articles 10(3) and 23(3) of the proposal
would nonetheless have offered a degree of useful protection to third-country
nationals in this situation. Finally, Article 11 of this proposal did not go as far
as Regulation 1612/68, which ensures equal treatment as regards social and tax
advantages, housing and trade union rights for EC national workers and their
family members.79
As for definitions set out in the proposed Directive, it would certainly have
been useful, as proposed by the Commission, to combine residence permits
with work or self-employment permits (Article 2(d) and (e)). A single document
would have streamlined costs and procedures for employers, employees and the
public authorities. The scope of the proposed Directive was unclear in one area
in particular: the exclusion for persons involved in short-term activities linked
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with the supply or goods or services (Article 3(2)). It would in particular have
been unclear when this Directive would have applied to persons governed by the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commitments of the Com-
munity and the Member States. It might be opportune to consider this point in
future in light of the EC’s offer to expand its GATS commitments in the current
round of world trade discussions.
It would have been useful that the Directive would have allowed Member
States to adopt more favourable rules for distinct categories of persons (Arti-
cle 3(4)), but it would have been better if this clause were widened to permit
Member States to apply more favourable rules for any category of workers and
self-employed persons, to avoid lowering existing national standards or unneces-
sarily restraining Member States from developing higher standards in future. In
the same vein, there would have been a strong case for a standstill provision to
prevent more favourable existing national law from being lowered to the mini-
mum standards set out in the Directive, in order to safeguard the rights of those
who already enjoy higher standards.
Moving on to the general rules on paid employment, the extent of exami-
nation of entry applications by Member States’ consular offices is crucial to the
practical application of any system of labour market migration. So it would have
been useful to clarify that consular offices can only investigate the background
to applications to the extent strictly necessary. Having said that, the proposal to
allow third-country nationals to submit the application in the Member State in
which they are already legally present or resident was eminently sensible, as it
would have prevented a pointless return to the country of origin.
As for the labour market test, the term “acceptable application” was
extremely vague and subjective. There was no clear indication when an “accept-
able” job application would have been deemed to have been received. For exam-
ple, there could be numerous job applications for a particular post which are
acceptable on the face of it, but it might turn out following job interviews that
the candidates are not really suitable for the job after all.
The next point particularly worth mentioning is the absence of skill thresh-
olds in the labour market test. Whenever there is a demand for lesser skilled and
unskilled labour from third-countries, it is unrealistic to attempt to prevent such
migration from happening at all, as this will only lead to additional irregular
migration and unauthorised employment, leaving employees without adequate
social protection and creating unfair competition for legally employed workers.
An avenue for legal recruitment for both skilled and unskilled migrant labour is
therefore essential.
Finally, the idea of restricting residence permits to specific professional
activities, fields of activities or even regions is simply not in keeping with the
flexibility required of modern economies and touted by the EU as an essential
factor in the EU’s plans (since modified) to create the world’s most competitive
economy. Employees’ skills may be transferable across a range of different sec-
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
tors, and it is illogical to prevent companies from hiring the best person for the
job because he or she is restricted to working in a particular region, as the result
may be that the company has to look for an employee who is outside the EU.
As for the provisions on self-employment, again the possibility of making
applications “in-country”, the exemption from demonstrating economic benefit
for those who have held a self-employed residence permit for three years and the
flexibility for businesses suffering “temporary commercial difficulties” were all
eminently sensible. On the other hand, again the possibility for a Member State
to restrict self employment to specific activities or fields of activities and indeed
to specific regions seems even more archaic in light of modern business practice.
The regional restrictions would often be logically impossible to apply in any
meaningful sense to information technology specialists, or to any person who
can use information technology to carry out most or all of his or her activities.
Finally, as for the horizontal provisions, Article 26 of the proposal was obvi-
ously designed to reassure Member States that the Directive would not prevent
them from limiting the numbers of third-country nationals entering the country.
Any perceived “swamping” or “flood” could therefore have been stopped by per-
mitting Member States to impose quotas or stop issuing permits altogether. It
seems from the wording of Article 26 that such decisions could have been made
on the basis of the Member State’s political willingness to take foreign nation-
als. Legally speaking, Article 26 was vague as to how any quota could be applied
and how this should reflect the other provisions in the Directive, for example,
as regards ranking of categories of migrants. But the underlying problem was
that decisions on quotas could be driven by political and not economic con-
siderations. Thus, racial unrest resulting from action by far-right wing groups
against third-country national communities, even in certain regions, could have
led a Member State to invoke Article 26. The far right would thus have had a
licence to attempt to take control of the immigration agenda. Logically, for the
reasons set out above, there is no need for rules restricting entry of third-country
nationals above and beyond the labour market and economic benefits tests set
out elsewhere in the Directive. If there must be a residual power to invoke quotas
simply in order to gain political agreement on a future proposal (and now in
light of the reservation of competence on this issue to Member States by the
proposed Constitutional Treaty, if it is ratified), Member States should only be
able to invoke that power on economic grounds, for example following serious
labour market problems or a specified rise in unemployment.
As for the future, it is paradoxical that a fundamentally economic Com-
munity should have no directive on economic migration. At the very least, the
EC should use its powers to regulate the social and legal rights of economic
migrants, to ensure that the migrant labour force is not exploited; this will
reduce unfair competition between Member States’ industries as well as assist
in securing decent living and working conditions for migrant workers and native
workers alike – contributing to two key objectives of the Community. Further-
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more, as long as there are jobs available that the local labour force cannot or is
unwilling to do, the absence of legislation in this area leaves open the attraction
of irregular entry and stay, which could be reduced by enlarging the avenue of
legal entry.
4.2 Researchers
It is evident that the Commission’s proposal was a considered attempt to ensure
that Member States actually direct their immigration systems toward securing
admission of a category of migrants whose admission would be in the economic
interests of the European Union. The adopted Directive would go some way
towards achieving this objective, particularly in light of the special procedure for
admission, the implied abolition of work permit requirements and quotas, the
provisions on family members, the rights to equal treatment, mobility and (argu-
ably) academic employment, the right to renewal of residence permits, and the
absence of any economic needs test. The provisions of Articles 7(3), 8, 9(1) (first
sentence), 11, 12, 13 and 15 are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to
confer directly effective rights, so the Directive inter alia provides a right of entry
and residence for researchers once the criteria for admission are met initially,
and a right of continued residence if the conditions for admission are still met.
However, with the weakening of the proposed procedural standards, in
particular the removal of the proposed provisions on speedy responses to appli-
cations and the right to submit in-country applications, there will remain a pros-
pect that delays in issuing long-term visas or residence permits could frustrate
the intention of the Directive. Furthermore, the absence of any provision grant-
ing a right to family reunion (or any status for family members after entry, such
as the right to work) could deter researchers from seeking entry, if the family
reunion rules are set at the lowest standard permitted by Directive 2003/86 or
if the Member State takes the view that the researchers, when they are initially
admitted, do not even meet the conditions for application of that Directive
at first, given its application only to persons with a “reasonable prospect” of
obtaining permanent residence.80 In that case, even lower national standards on
family reunion, perhaps even entailing a complete ban, could apply, although the
researchers’ Directive clearly at least precludes banning entry of family members
based solely on the time period of the researchers’ entry.
Of course, the question of applicability of the family reunion Direc-
tive depends in part upon application of the long-term residents’ Directive to
researchers.81 There is no provision in the researchers’ Directive on its relationship
with Directive 2003/109 on long-term residents. However, it can be assumed that
in the absence of any explicit derogation in either Directive that researchers will
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
87 See the explanatory memorandum to the Directive, which makes clear that the legal
nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research institution will
be governed by the hosting agreement; this may entail an employment relationship
or another type of relationship. On this point, see Art. 6(2)(d) of the agreed Direc-
tive.
88 See Case C-36/96 Günaydin [1997] ECR I-5143, Case C-98/96 Ertanir [1997] ECR
I-5179, Case C-188/00 Kurz [2002] ECR I-10691 and Opinion of 6 Sep. 2005 in Case
C-230/03 Sedef, pending.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
research work as part of their doctoral studies. There is a risk that such students
will fall under neither Directive, with the result that a category of persons who
could potentially make a contribution to the EU economy and research base
would not be regulated by Community law, even though it would be desirable for
EC rules to facilitate the admission of such persons.
Article 5 of this Directive could be interpreted to mean that research insti-
tutions could be liable for the cost of an illegally resident researcher for a lengthy
period, particularly where expulsion of the researcher is impossible in practice.
Here, the EC law principle of proportionality is relevant; surely research institu-
tions could only be liable for the costs of stay and return where the expulsion of
the illegal resident can be carried out within a reasonable period. It could even
be argued that it would be disproportionate to make research institutions liable
for any such costs unless they have been negligent or there has been a causal link
between the action or inaction of the research institution and the illegal resi-
dence of the individual concerned. After all, research institutions cannot issue
or enforce expulsion orders. Any Member State which tries to enforce such a
liability rule enthusiastically may find its research institutions under such finan-
cial strain that the goal of increasing the number of researchers (even EU citizen
researchers) is jeopardised.
As for Member State’s withdrawal of approval of a research institution,
it is arguable that national authorities would need to show proof of fraud to
a criminal standard in relation to allegations of fraudulent approval or host-
ing arrangements; negligence regarding signing of research agreements should
have to be shown to a civil standard. The proportionality rule would also be
relevant to the consequences to innocent researchers who would be affected by
any cancellation of approval of research institutions. Since their status could
not really be considered illegal or irregular, as long as they had entered legally
in good faith, Member States should not be entitled to take criminal proceed-
ings against them or any persons who assisted their entry in good faith, or to list
such persons in the Schengen Information System. There would be an ethical,
and arguably a legal, obligation for a Member State to ensure that such innocent
researchers could complete their research project in another institute if possible.
After all, such an approach would best ensure that the Directive’s objective of
assisting the Member States’ need for legitimate researchers is met.
As for the clause on family members, it is hard to see when it would be “duly
justified” to limit the duration of residence of family members. In the absence
of a reference to national law, the concept should be considered a concept of
Community law. The obligation for due justification implies a duty to give objec-
tive reasons to the person concerned and since the potential limitation would
amount to an exception to a rule in the Directive, it should be interpreted nar-
rowly. In cases where the family reunion directive applies to admission of family
members of researchers, there will be a curious situation because the family
members will only be entitled under EC law to take up work as a researcher (if
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
the researcher has an employment contract), until the researcher gains long-
term residence rights.89 Obviously Member States will have to consider whether
insisting on such a limit on family members’ employment is likely to assist the
objective of recruiting more researchers.
As for the rights of researchers, the absence of a specific reference to a right
to carry out the research agreement (as proposed by the Commission) cannot
mean that no such right exists. Such a right exists implicitly; in its absence, the
Directive would have no practical effect, especially in light of the right to enter
and reside. It might also be questioned whether, in the agreed version of the
Directive, there is still a right for researchers to teach. Here it is arguable that the
reference to national law allows Member States to place reasonable and propor-
tionate limits on the right to teach, but a complete or nearly-complete ban on
teaching would violate the Directive. After all, the provision appears in a chapter
entitled “researcher’s rights”, so there is an implied limitation upon the discre-
tion conferred upon Member States. As a purely practical matter, it may not be
realistic for research institutions to sign non-EU citizens to research agreements
unless the researchers can take up some of the teaching load of the institution (if
the institution has students); and any deterrent to signing such agreements will
make the objectives of the Directive harder to achieve.
Finally, as in other EC immigration and asylum law measures, the weak pro-
cedural standards are objectionable in principle. But in light of the procedural
rights inherent in the general principles of EC law,90 Member States’ authorities
nevertheless have a duty to give reasons for negative decisions, and Member
States must allow challenges to such decisions in the courts.
89 See Art. 14(1)(b) of the family reunion Directive (OJ 2003 L 251/12).
90 On the use of the general principles of EC law to guarantee procedural rights rel-
evant to EC immigration and asylum law, see further Ch. 5.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Proposal for a
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the pur-
pose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,
Whereas:
(2) The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 Octo-
ber 1999, acknowledged the need for approximation of national legislation
on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals
and it requested to this end rapid decisions by the Council, on the basis of
proposals by the Commission.
(4) All Member States have regulated access of third country nationals to
work with detailed national administrative rules and a successfully operat-
ing Community policy in this field should be put in place progressively. As
a first step it should be aimed at laying down certain common definitions,
criteria and procedures, which give a common legal frame to the discretion
of Member States.
(5) The newly established Community rules should be based on concepts, which
have already been successfully applied in Member States.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(6) In an increasingly global labour market and faced with “skills-gaps” in cer-
tain sectors of the European labour market the Community should rein-
force its competitiveness to recruit and attract third country workers, when
needed. This should be facilitated by administrative simplification and by
facilitating access to relevant information. Transparent and harmonised
rules on the conditions under which third country nationals may enter
and stay in the Community to pursue economic activities, and their rights,
should be laid down.
(7) Provision for a single national application procedure leading to one com-
bined title, encompassing both residence and work permit within one
administrative act, should contribute to simplifying and harmonising the
diverging rules currently applicable in Member States.
(8) The chief criterion for admitting third country nationals to activities as
an employed person should be fulfilment of a test demonstrating that a
post cannot be filled from within the domestic labour market. The chief
criterion for admitting third country nationals to self-employed economic
activities should be fulfilment of a test demonstrating an added value for
employment or the economic development of the host Member State.
(9) Several ways and options for demonstrating fulfilment of these tests in
the form of individual or horizontal assessments should provide a flexible
frame allowing all interested parties including Member States to react flex-
ibly to changing economic and demographic circumstances.
(11) Whenever Member States adopt national provisions as provided for by this
Directive, they should comply with certain procedural and transparency
requirements and in particular an obligation to notify to the Commission,
in order to allow for an exchange of views, further consideration and com-
plementary action within the context of an open co-ordination mechanism
on Community immigration policy.
(12) Member States should lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringe-
ments of the provisions of this Directive and ensure that they are imple-
mented. Those penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
(13) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Article 2
693
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
national to enter and reside in its territory and to exercise activities as a self
employed person;
(f) “seasonal workers” means third-country nationals who retain their legal
domicile in a third country but are employed in the territory of a Member
State in a sector of activity dependent on the passing of the seasons, under
a fixed-term contract for a specific job;
(g) “transfrontier workers” means third-country nationals resident in the fron-
tier zone of a neighbouring country who are employed in the frontier zone
of an adjacent Member State and who return to the frontier zone of the
neighbouring country each day or at least once a week;
(h) “intra-corporate transferees” means third-country nationals working
within a legal person and being temporarily transferred into the territory
of a Community Member State to either the principal place of business or
an establishment of that legal person. The natural person concerned must
have worked for the legal person concerned for at least the year immediately
preceding the transfer;
(i) “trainees” means third-country nationals whose presence in the territory of
a Member State is strictly limited in duration and closely connected with
increasing their skills and qualifications in their chosen profession before
returning to their own country to pursue their career.
Article 3
2. The provisions of this Directive shall not apply to the exercise of activi-
ties which are directly linked to the supply of goods or services from third
countries to the Community, as long as third country nationals carrying out
these activities do not stay for more than three months in the Community.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
CHAPTER II
ENTRY AND RESIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PAID EMPLOYMENT
Section 1
General Rules
Article 4
1. Member States shall only authorise third country nationals to enter and reside
in a Member State for the purpose of exercising activities as an employed
person where a “residence permit – worker” has been issued by the compe-
tent authorities of that Member State in accordance with this Directive.
Article 5
695
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
696
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Article 6
697
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 7
Article 8
Article 9
1. After a “residence permit – worker” has been issued, its holder must notify
any changes to the information provided in accordance with Article 5 to the
competent authorities. If these changes relate to Article 5(3) (b) and (c) they
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Article 10
Article 11
1. During the period of its validity, a “residence permit – worker” shall entitle
its holder at a minimum to the following:
(a) entry to the territory of the Member State issuing the “residence permit
– worker”;
(b) re-entry to the territory of the Member State issuing the “residence
permit – worker” after temporary absence;
(c) passage through other Member States in order to exercise the rights
under point (a) and (b);
(d) residence in the Member State issuing the “residence permit –
worker”;
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
2. Member States may restrict the rights conferred under paragraph 1 (f) (ii)
to third country nationals who have been staying or who have the right to
stay in its territory for at least one year.
They may restrict the rights conferred under paragraph 1 (f) (v) with respect
to public housing to third country nationals who have been staying or who
have the right to stay in its territory for at least three years.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Section 2
Special Cases
Article 12
Article 13
Article 14
701
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 15
2. The overall validity of a “residence permit – trainee” shall not exceed one
year. This period may be extended exclusively for the time needed to obtain
a professional qualification recognised by the Member State concerned in
the sphere of activity of the trainee.
Article 16
702
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
CHAPTER III
ENTRY AND RESIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXERCISING
SELF EMPLOYED ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
Article 17
1. Member States shall only authorise third country nationals to enter and
reside in a Member State for the purpose of exercising activities as self-
employed persons where a “residence permit – self-employed person” has
been issued by the competent authorities of that Member State in accor-
dance with this Directive.
Article 18
703
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 19
2. Member States may adopt national provisions according to which the require-
ment laid down in paragraph 1 is deemed to be fulfilled, or not fulfilled for
specific self-employed economic activities in specific sectors and, – if appro-
priate, – in a specific region without the need for an individual assessment.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Article 20
2. Applicants for renewal who have been holding a “residence permit – self-
employed person” in the Member State concerned for more than three years
shall not be required to provide the evidence of fulfilment of the require-
ment laid down in Article 19(1).
Article 21
Article 22
705
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 23
Article 24
The rules set out in Article 11 shall also apply to holders of a “residence permit
– self-employed person”
CHAPTER IV
HORIZONTAL PROVISIONS
Article 25
Member States may request applicants to pay fees for handling applications in
accordance with this Directive. The level of fees must be proportionate and may
be based on the principle of the service actually provided.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
Article 26
Member States may decide to adopt national provisions limiting the issuing of
permits in accordance with this Directive to a defined ceiling or suspending or
stopping the issuing of these permits for a defined period, taking into account
the overall capacity to receive and to integrate third country nationals on their
territory or in specific regions thereof. These national provisions must state in
detail which groups of persons are covered by or exempted from the measure. If
these national provisions impose ceilings, they shall lay down in detail the crite-
ria according to which applications for permits in accordance with this Directive
shall be ranked when the number of applications received exceeds the defined
ceilings.
Article 27
Article 28
CHAPTER V
PROCEDURE AND TRANSPARENCY
Article 29
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
2. Member States shall make public the average time necessary for its authori-
ties to issue, modify or renew permits in accordance with this Directive and
inform applicants thereof upon receipt of an application.
Article 30
Article 31
Each Member State shall ensure that an exhaustive and regularly updated set
of information concerning the conditions of entry and stay of third-country
nationals to its territory for the purpose of pursuing activities as employed or
self-employed person is made available to the general public.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
CHAPTER VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 32
The Member States shall give effect to the provisions of this Directive without
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic
characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opinions, mem-
bership of a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or sexual orienta-
tion.
Article 33
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements
of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all
measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided
for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall
notify those provisions to the Commission by the date specified in Article 38 at
the latest and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent amendment affect-
ing them.
Article 34
No later than four years after the date specified in Article 35 the Commission
shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of
this Directive in the Member States and may propose such amendments as may
appear necessary.
Article 35
Member States shall adopt and publish, before 1 January 2004 the provisions
necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith inform the Com-
mission thereof.
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to
this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their
official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be
made.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63(3)(a) and (4) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Whereas:
(2) Endorsing the European Research Area, the Lisbon European Council
set the Community the objective of becoming the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010.
(3) The globalisation of the economy calls for greater mobility of research-
ers, something which was recognised by the sixth framework programme
of the European Community, when it opened up its programmes further to
researchers from outside the European Union.
(4) The number of researchers which the Community will need to meet the
target set by the Barcelona European Council of 3% of GDP invested in
research is estimated at 700,000. This target must be met through a series
of interlocking measures such as making scientific careers more attractive
to young people, extending the opportunities for training and mobility in
research, improving the career prospects for researchers in the Commu-
nity and opening the Community up to third-country nationals who could
potentially be admitted for research purposes.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
munity more attractive to researchers from around the world and to boost
its position as an international centre for research.
(6) Implementation of this Directive should not encourage a brain drain from
emerging or developing countries. Back-up measures to promote research-
ers’ integration into their countries of origin as well as the movement of
researchers should be taken in partnership with the countries of origin with
a view to establishing a comprehensive migration policy.
(7) For the achievement of the objectives of the Lisbon process it is also impor-
tant to foster the mobility within the Union of researchers who are EU citi-
zens, and in particular researchers from the Member States which acceded
in 2004, for the purpose of carrying out scientific research.
(8) Given the openness imposed by changes in the world economy and the
likely requirements to meet the 3% target, third-country researchers poten-
tially eligible under this Directive should be defined broadly in accordance
with their qualifications and the research project which they intend to carry
out.
(9) As the effort to be made to achieve the 3% of GDP target for investment
in research largely concerns the private sector, which must therefore recruit
more researchers in the years to come, the research organisations poten-
tially eligible for the Directive belong to both the public and private sec-
tors.
(10) Each Member State should ensure that the most comprehensive informa-
tion possible, regularly kept up to date, is made publicly available, via the
Internet in particular, on the research organisations, approved under this
Directive, with which researchers could conclude a hosting agreement, and
on the conditions and procedures for entry and residence on its territory for
the purposes of carrying out research, as adopted under this Directive.
(12) At the same time, the traditional avenues of admission (employment, work
placement, etc.) should be maintained, especially for doctoral students car-
711
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
rying out research as students, who must be excluded from the scope of the
Directive and are covered by Council Directive 2004/114 on the conditions
of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil
exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service.
(13) The specific procedure for researchers is based on the collaboration between
the research organisations and the immigration authorities in the Member
States: it gives the former a key role in the admission procedure with a view
to facilitating and speeding up the entry and residence of third-country
researchers in the Community, while preserving Member States’ preroga-
tives with respect to immigration policing.
(16) The Directive adds a very important improvement in the field of social
security as the non-discrimination principle also applies directly to persons
coming to a Member State directly from a third country. Nevertheless, it
has to be emphasized that the Directive should not confer more rights than
those already provided in existing Community legislation in the field of
social security for third-country nationals who have cross-border elements
between Member States. The Directive furthermore should not grant rights
in relation to situations which lie outside the scope of Community legisla-
tion like for example family members residing in a third country.
(18) Special attention should be paid to the facilitation and support of the pres-
ervation of the unit of family members of the researchers, according to the
712
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
(19) In order to preserve family unity and to enable mobility, family members
should be able to join the researcher in another Member State under condi-
tions determined by the national law of such Member State, including its
obligations arising from bilateral or multilateral agreements.
(21) Member States should have the right to charge applicants for the processing
of applications for residence permits.
(22) This Directive should not affect in any circumstances the application of
Council Regulation 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform
format for residence permits for third-country nationals.
(24) Member States should give effect to the provisions of this Directive with-
out discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opin-
ions, membership of a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or
sexual orientation.
(25) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
713
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(27) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European Community, Ireland has given notice by
letter of 1 July 2004 of its wish to participate in the adoption and applica-
tion of this Directive.
(28) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, and without preju-
dice to Article 4 of the said Protocol, [the] United Kingdom is not partici-
pating in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to
its application.
(29) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Denmark does not take part in the adoption of
this Directive, and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 Purpose
This Directive lays down the conditions for the admission of third-country
researchers to the Member States for more than three months for the pur-
poses of carrying out a research project under a hosting agreement with a
research organisation.
Article 2 Definitions
714
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
(e) “Residence permit” means any authorisation bearing the term “researcher”
issued by the authorities of a Member State allowing a third-country
national to stay legally on its territory, in accordance with Article 1(2)(a) of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002.
Article 3 Scope
2. This Directive shall not affect the right of Member States to adopt or retain
more favourable provisions for persons to whom it applies.
715
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS
Article 5 Approval
4. Member States may provide that, within two months of the date of expiry
of the hosting agreement concerned, the approved organisation shall pro-
vide the competent authorities designated for the purpose by the Member
States with confirmation that the work has been carried out for each of the
research projects in respect of which a hosting agreement has been signed
pursuant to Article 6.
5. The competent authorities in each Member State shall publish and update
regularly lists of the research organisations approved for the purposes of
this Directive.
716
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
717
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER III
ADMISSION OF RESEARCHERS
Member States shall check that all the conditions referred to in points (a),
(b), (c) and (d) are met.
2. Member States may also check the terms upon which the hosting agree-
ment has been based and concluded.
3. Once the checks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 have been positively con-
cluded, researchers shall be admitted on the territory of the Member States
to carry out the hosting agreement.
Member States shall issue a residence permit for a period of at least one year
and shall renew it if the conditions laid down in Articles 6 and 7 are still met. If
the research project is scheduled to last less than one year, the residence permit
shall be issued for the duration of the project.
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Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
2. The issue of the residence permit to the family members of the researcher
admitted to a Member State shall not be made dependent on the require-
ment of a minimum period of residence of the researcher.
2. Member States may withdraw or refuse to renew a residence permit for rea-
sons of public policy, public security or public health.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCHERS’ RIGHTS
Article 11 Teaching
Researchers admitted under this Directive may teach in accordance with national
legislation.
Member States may set a maximum number of hours or of days for the activity
of teaching.
719
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
3. If the researcher stays more than 3 months, Member States may require a
new hosting agreement to carry out the research in the Member State con-
cerned. At all events, the conditions set out in Articles 6 and 7 have to be
met in relation to the second Member State.
5. Member States shall not require the researcher to leave their territory in
order to submit applications for the visas or residence permits.
720
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
CHAPTER V
PROCEDURE AND TRANSPARENCY
1. The Member States shall determine whether applications for residence per-
mits are to be made by the researcher or by the research organisation con-
cerned.
2. The application shall be considered and examined when the third country
national concerned is residing outside the territory of the Member States to
which he / she wishes to be admitted.
4. The Member State concerned shall grant the third country national who
has submitted an application and who meets the conditions of Articles 6
and 7 every facility to obtain the requisite visas.
721
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 16 Reports
Periodically, and for the first time no later than three years after the entry into
force of this Directive, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament
and the Council on the application of this Directive in the Member States and
shall propose any amendments that are necessary.
Article 17 Transposition
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of
their official publication. Member States shall determine how such refer-
ence is to be made.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main
provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this
Directive.
Article 18
By way of derogation from the provisions set out in Chapter III, Member States
are not obliged to issue permits in accordance with this Directive in the form of
a residence permit for a period of up to two years, after the date referred to in
Article 17(1).
Article 19
Nothing in this Directive shall affect the right of Ireland to maintain the Common
Travel Area arrangements referred to in the Protocol, annexed by the Treaty of
Amsterdam to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, on the application of certain aspects of Article 14 of
the Treaty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and
Ireland.
722
Chapter 21 Migration for Employment and Self-employment
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 21 Addressees
723
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
1 Summary of content
Directive 2004/114 concerning the entry and stay of students, certain school
pupils, unremunerated trainees and volunteers was adopted in December 2004,
following a “political agreement” on the proposed text at the March 2004 JHA
Council.1 The Directive has a “legal base” of Article 63(3)(a) EC, concerning
legal migration, and Article 63(4) EC, concerning residence in another Member
State. Member States have to implement the Directive by 12 January 2007, there-
fore the Directive will begin to impact upon students or school pupils from the
academic year 2007-2008. The UK and Ireland both opted out of this Directive,
and Denmark was not eligible to participate in it.
Chapter I of the Directive (Articles 1-4) sets out general provisions, com-
prising the purpose of the Directive, definitions and scope. It is clear from Arti-
cle 1 that the Directive will only cover stays of over three months. As for the
scope (Article 3(1)), Member States are only obliged to apply the Directive to
students; application of the rules in the Directive to the other three categories
of persons remains optional. There are specific exclusions from the scope of
the Directive (Article 3(2)) for asylum-seekers, persons on temporary protection
or subsidiary protection schemes, persons whose expulsion is suspended, long-
term residents within the scope of Directive 2003/109, third-country nationals
who are the family members of EU citizens who have moved within the Com-
munity and persons defined as employees or self-employed persons according
to national law. Member States are free to provide for more favourable rules
in national law or by international treaties; the Community (alone or with the
1 OJ 2004 L 375/12. The Commission’s original proposal can be found in COM (2002)
548, 7 Oct. 2002.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 725-752.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
2 Cases 152/82 Forcheri [1983] ECR 2323; 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593; 24/86
Blaizot [1988] ECR 379; 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161; 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR
3205; 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365; C-42/87 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR
726
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
have the right to move as students to receive “vocational training” on the basis
of Articles 12 and 150 of the EC Treaty, as found by the Court of Justice in
its 1992 Raulin judgment.3 This right was also facilitated by legislation on the
subject, originally set out in Directive 90/366 agreed by the Council in 1990, but
subsequently set out in Directive 93/96 agreed in 1993,4 following the annulment
of the earlier Directive for having the wrong “legal base”.5 It is now clear that
the right to reside of students and the ancillary right of access to funding have
a broader scope due to the introduction of the formal status of citizenship of
the Union.6
EC nationals who move to another Member State as workers also have the
right to take up education in the host state, and can claim maintenance grants as
“social advantages” even if unemployed, if the education they seek is connected
to their prior employment in that Member State or if unemployment forces
retraining in another area.7 Their children can also claim the right to equal treat-
ment in education, including maintenance grants,8 as can other family members
as “social advantages”.9 It appears that the children of the self-employed must
5445; C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447; and C-47/93 Commission v Belgium [1994]
ECR I-1593.
3 Case C-357/89 [1992] ECR I-1027.
4 See respectively OJ 1990 L 180/30 and OJ 1993 L 317/59. On this Directive, see fur-
ther Case C-424/98 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-4001 and the cases of Grzelc-
zyk and Bidar (n. 6 below).
5 Case C-295/90 Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4193.
6 On the implications of EU citizenship for students, see particularly Cases C-184/99
Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6293, C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, the Opinion in
Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187, and Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005]
ECR I-2119. On the issue of EU citizen students, see also Case C-65/03 Commission
v Belgium ([2004] ECR I-6507) and the judgment of 7 July 2005 in Case C-147/03
Commission v Austria, not yet reported.
7 See Art. 7(2) of Reg. 1612/68 (OJ 1968 L 257/2), as interpreted in Lair and Brown, n.
2 above and the judgment in Ninni-Orasche, ibid.; Case C-3/90 Bernini [1992] ECR
I-1071; Case 235/87 Matteucci [1988] ECR 5589; and Raulin, n. 3 above.
8 See Art. 12 of Reg. 1612/68 (ibid.), as interpreted in Cases 9/74 Casagrande [1974]
ECR 773; C-389/87 and 390/87 Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723; C-308/89 Di
Leo [1990] ECR I-4185; C-7/94 Gaal [1995] ECR I-1031; C-337/97 Meeusen [1999]
ECR I-3289; Bernini, ibid; and Brown, n. 2 above.
9 In Bernini, n. 7 above, and Meeusen (ibid.), the Court found that education grants
for children were “social advantages” for workers pursuant to Art. 7(2) of Reg.
1612/68. Since “social advantages” for other family members are also covered by
that provision (see for example, Case 32/75 Cristini [1975] ECR 1085), it follows
that other family members are entitled to equal treatment as regards educational
grants.
727
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
be given identical treatment.10 The various rights have been consolidated, clari-
fied and arguably enhanced by the 2004 Directive on EU citizenship rights.11
Students from Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland have identi-
cal rights pursuant to treaties with the Community and its Member States, with
the exception of a Protocol to the European Economic Area agreement that
denies students from the first three states equal treatment in tuition fees. As
for Turkey, the EC-Turkey Association Agreement has been supplemented by
implementing rules giving Turkish graduates, after completion of a course of
vocational training in a Member State, the right to take up employment in that
Member State on an equal footing with EC nationals if one of their parents is
or has been employed in that Member State.12 The EC-Turkey rules also address
access to education.13
Other third-country nationals are covered to some extent by rules in the
proposed or adopted directives on reception conditions, the content of refugee
and subsidiary protection status, temporary protection, migration for employ-
ment or self-employment, family reunion, long-term residence and victims of
trafficking and facilitation of illegal entry and residence.14
10 Meeusen, n. 8 above.
11 Directive 2004/38 (OJ 2004 L 229/35). But see the judgment in Bidar, n. 6 above,
which indicates that rights for students above and beyond those set out in the Direc-
tive may be derived from the principle of EU citizenship.
12 See Article 7, part 2 of EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/80, as interpreted
in Case C-355/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR I-5113 and Case C-210/97 Akman [1998] ECR
I-7519. See generally annotation of Akman by Peers, 36 CMLRev. (1999) 1027.
13 See Article 9 of Decision 1/80, as interpreted in the judgment of 7 July 2005 in
Case C-374/03 Gurol, not yet reported. See generally annotation of Akman by Peers,
ibid.
14 See respectively Arts. 10 and 12 of Directive 2003/9 on reception conditions (Ch.
12); Arts. 26(4) and 27 of Directive 2004/83 on refugee and subsidiary protection
status (Ch. 13); Art. 14 of Directive 2001/55 on temporary protection (Ch. 15); Arts.
11 and 24 of the proposed Directive on migration for employment or self-employ-
ment (Ch. 21); Art. 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/86 on family reunion (Ch. 19); Art. 11
of Directive 2003/109 on long-term residents (Ch. 20); and Art. 11(2) of Directive
2004/81 on victims of trafficking or smuggling (Ch. 29).
15 OJ 1996 C 274/10. For the history of negotiations on this proposal, see Peers, “Build-
ing Fortress Europe: The Development of EU Migration Law”, 35 CMLRev. (1998)
1235 at 1252. For further analysis, see Guild and Niessen, The Developing Immigra-
tion and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted Conventions, Resolutions,
Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions (Kluwer, 1996), 347-360.
728
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
Resolution was narrower in scope and far vaguer and less detailed than the later
Directive. For instance, it expressly excluded school pupils, and in view of its
clear limitation to students in formal education institutions, it excluded most
or all unremunerated trainees and all volunteers.16 Unlike the Directive, it was
not clear whether “professional schools” were included. Family members of
students were mentioned, but it was up to national law to decide whether to
admit them. The Resolution, unlike the Directive, exempted persons admitted
for family reunion from its scope. Member States had the option of requiring
proof of continuity between prior studies and planned studies. The rules on
residence permits were roughly the same, although in principle employment was
prohibited, with an option for Member States to allow “short-term or subsid-
iary jobs”.
In 1995, the Council considered a proposed measure to adopt standard
rules on the admission of “others” not covered by the Resolutions on family
reunion or admission for employment, self-employment or studies. Admission
would be for one year at first, with subsequent extensions. However, it proved
impossible to reach agreement on this proposal.17
In 1997, the Commission proposed a Convention on migration which
inter alia covered the status of students and “others”.18 This proposal brought
together rules relating to trainees and students in a single chapter, and was simi-
lar to the prior Resolution, with the most significant change an obligation to
permit students to take up short-term and subsidiary work. The provisions on
“others” were also similar to the proposal considered in 1995. When considering
the proposal,19 several Member States thought that the types of establishments
covered were too narrow, with some wanting secondary schools within the scope
of the Convention also. The prospect of a ban on changing courses appeared
too restrictive to many Member States, although conversely some wanted to
set additional conditions for students. Several Member States objected to the
proposed chapter on “others” from both the liberal and conservative points of
16 The exclusion of trainees was also perhaps implicit in the express exclusion of
“apprentices”.
17 See Peers, n. 14 above, at 1247-1248.
18 COM (1997) 387, 30 July 1997; OJ 1997 C 337/9. For analysis, see Hedemann-
Robinson, “From Object to Subject? Non-EC Nationals and the Draft Proposal
of the Commission for a Council Act Establishing the Rules for Admission of
Third-Country Nationals to the Member States” 18 YEL (1998) 289 at 311-315 and
Peers, “Raising Minimum Standards or Racing to the Bottom? The Commission’s
Proposed Migration Convention”, in Guild, ed., The Legal Framework and Social
Consequences of Free Movement of Persons in the European Union (Kluwer, 1999)
149 at 157-159. On the Convention proposals regarding other categories of migrant,
see Chs. 19-21.
19 Council doc. 6488/98 add 1, 1 Sep. 1998.
729
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
view, and there were different views on whether au pairs should be covered in the
Convention (the Commission said they were covered by the “others” chapter).
20 Arts. 2(b) and 2(c) of the proposal; Art. 2(b) of the final Directive.
21 The original proposal had defined a preparatory course as a “preparatory year”,
while the final Directive contains a recital in the preamble stating that the duration
and conditions of preparatory courses shall be defined in national legislation.
22 Art. 2(d) of the proposal; Art. 2(c) of the final Directive.
23 Art. 2(g) of the proposal; Art. 2(e) of the final Directive.
24 Art. 2(f) of the proposal.
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Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
take place “in accordance with national law”.25 As for the definition of “volun-
tary service scheme”, the Council amended the definition so that such schemes
are not defined by reference to national regulations or practice, or “operated
by a non-profit organisation”, but rather are “based on a Community or State
scheme”.26 Finally, the Council added a new definition to the Directive, defining
“residence permit” by reference to an EC Regulation standardising the format
of such permits.27
In order to address the concerns of Member States which do not admit
all of the categories of persons covered by the Directive, the Council added the
proviso that the rules were only mandatory as far as students are concerned. The
Council also added the exclusion from the Directive for persons considered to be
employees or self-employed under national law as well as two connected recitals
to the preamble, specifying that unremunerated trainees or volunteers consid-
ered to be employed under national law should be excluded from the Directive
and that admission of students planning specialist medical studies “should be
determined by the Member States”.
As for the rules on admission, the Council deleted a proviso that required
the prior issue of a residence permit before admission of any persons pursuant
to the Directive.28 The Council also amended the general conditions of entry to
specify that national law will determine what travel document will be required
for admission, and to delete a proviso that the “public policy” and “public secu-
rity” grounds apply exclusively to the personal conduct of the individual. The
latter amendment was accompanied by a detailed new recital in the preamble.29
The specific rules on admission of students were amended to simplify the
criterion that the student obtain admission to a higher educational institution
first, to add a recital in the preamble permitting Member States to require further
evidence from the applicant “in order to fight against abuse and misuse of the
procedure” and to delete a specific clause on language schools.30 Also, the mobil-
ity clause relating to students was amended by the Council to limit its application
731
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
732
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
733
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
3 Legal Analysis
Since this Directive does not expressly exclude persons admitted for family
reunion from its scope, there could be confusion as regards the access to educa-
tion of family members as distinct from persons admitted as students or pupils
under this Directive. This is relevant because Member States appear to have
more discretion over admission to education under this Directive than under the
family reunion Directive.
As to the EC’s competence to adopt measures on access to employment
within the scope of this Directive, it is argued elsewhere that the EC has compe-
tence under either Article 63 EC or Article 137 EC to regulate this issue.46
In the explanatory memorandum, the Commission argues that it was
unnecessary for the proposed Directive to state expressly that non-resident
third-country nationals cannot claim maintenance grants, on the grounds that
third-country nationals are not covered by Article 12 of the EC Treaty. This
argument raises the complex question of the application of Article 12 to third-
country nationals, an issue considered elsewhere in this volume.47 In any event,
at the time of the Commission’s initial proposal, the argument missed the point,
since the case law of the Court of Justice at that point had held that Article 12
did not grant the right to equal treatment in maintenance grants even for EU
citizens if they moved as students.48
The other legal question relevant to this Directive is its relationship with
Community powers over education pursuant to Articles 149 and 150 EC, which
grant relatively limited powers to the Community, preventing it from harmonis-
ing national law.49 Should the Directive have been adopted pursuant to those
powers, or alternatively do the limits on EC powers in those provisions preclude
adoption of this Directive? It seems obvious in the absence of more explicit
wording in the provisions of the Treaty (such as the wording of Articles 49 and
137 EC) that Article 63(3) (taken with Article 63(4) for cross-border movement
within the EU) is lex specialis as regards rules on the entry, residence and status
of third-country nationals. Although Articles 149 and 150 include the issue of
“mobility” of students and trainees, in comparison with Article 63 there is no
explicit reference to powers over migration law and so it follows that “mobility”
734
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
4 Comments
A fundamental question regarding the Directive is the extent of discretion left
to Member States to control the numbers of persons entering pursuant to the
Directive, or to set conditions for entry other than those specified within the
Directive (on top of the discretion Member States have as to whether to apply
the Directive at all to three of the categories of persons within its scope). There
is no provision of the Directive expressly indicating whether such further discre-
tion, limits and conditions are permissible or not. On the one hand, Article 8 of
the Directive, which obliges Member States to permit student mobility within
the EU when the relevant conditions are met, suggests a contrario that the other
provisions on entry and residence of students leave entry of persons essentially
to the discretion of Member States even where the conditions for entry are sat-
isfied. On the other hand, the right to bring complaint proceedings as regards
application of the Directive and the option of Member States to apply the Direc-
tive only to one, two or three of the four categories within its scope implies that
the rules in the Directive are the sole rules that apply to national authorities as
regards admission of students and (at Member States’ option) the other catego-
ries of persons. Furthermore, the general principles of Community law, includ-
ing equality and proportionality, will apply to national decisions taken pursuant
to the Directive, or (if permissible) any additional national rules. The better view
therefore is that while Member States may in principle impose rules such as an
overall limit on persons admitted as students or for other purposes, such rules
could be struck down if they infringe the general principles of Community law.
Alternatively it could be argued that such rules fall within the “public policy”
exception permitted by the Directive. In any case, an absolute discretion for
authorities over admission would not be permissible.
In any case, it is clear from the wording of Articles 8 and 12 that Member
States must permit mobility of students if the relevant conditions are met, and
must renew students’ residence permits if the conditions set out in Article 6 and
7 are still met; the wording of the latter provision can only be interpreted to
mean that the conditions in Articles 6 and 7 are exhaustive as regards renewal
of residence permits. In fact, it is arguably implicit from the wording of Article
12 that Articles 6 and 7 also set out an exhaustive list of criteria applying to the
initial admission of students.
A closely connected issue is the question of whether the Directive obliges
Member States to permit the entry and residence of persons covered by the
Directive, aside from the clear obligations to permit entry and continued resi-
dence set out in Articles 8 and 12. There is no convincing reason why Article 5(2)
restricts itself to an obligation to “facilitate” admission of persons who meet
735
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
the criteria for admission on EU schemes. If those persons meet the criteria for
inclusion on those schemes as well as the specific criteria in Articles 6-10, why
should Member States not be under an obligation to admit them? Similarly,
there is no convincing reason why the provisions in the proposed Directive on
entry into the territory of the Member States for all the persons within the scope
of the Directive were dropped, considering that the adoption of rules on entry
and residence of third-country nationals are the entire point of Articles 63(3)(a)
and 63(4). However, it could be argued that there is an implied obligation to
ensure the entry and residence of all persons who meet the criteria for admis-
sion set out in the Directive (and who also meet any further national criteria
for admission, if such criteria are permitted), as a corollary of the rules set out
within it; otherwise the Directive would lose much of its effet utile.50
The extended scope of this Directive as compared to the prior Resolution
on students is welcome, but it would have been preferable to include all persons
not covered by other EC migration legislation. Such an approach would have
guaranteed that minimum standards on entry and residence apply to all persons
who have been legally authorised to reside by a Member State. It would also
have been preferable to retain the Commission’s initial approach of requiring
Member States to apply the rules concerning all four categories of migrants, not
just students. There seems little purpose to including “rules” on the other three
categories in the Directive if those rules are not binding at all. Moreover, there is
no “rendez-vous” clause directing the Commission to consider proposing amend-
ments on this issue (or any other specific issue) when it reviews Member States’
application of the Directive.51 The result is that, in at least those Member States
that opt out of this Directive’s rules, the EU has not fundamentally achieved any
more harmonisation of the rules on admission of “other” categories than it had
following the failed attempts to agree soft law on such admission in 1995. In the
absence of any obligation to publish information in the EU’s Official Journal on
the options chosen by Member States, it may not even be clear which Member
States have opted to apply the Directive’s rules on the three “other” categories
of migrant.
Also, it is disappointing that family members, at least of students, are
not included within the scope of the Directive, particularly as family members
of any sponsors resident for more than one year were within the scope of the
Commission’s first family reunion proposal.52 The presence of family members
could facilitate students’ integration into the life of the host state and provide
736
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
them with financial and emotional support; some of the best students might be
deterred from entry if they cannot bring their family members with them.
Next, it appears that the final Directive clarifies to some extent (although
not fully) the question of whether students doing a “year abroad” as one year
within their degree (where that degree will be awarded by an institution outside
the EU), or even a term abroad (if that term is longer than the three-month min-
imum in the Directive) in the same circumstances, are covered by this proposal.
In the original proposal, the answer to this question was unclear because of the
lack of a definition of “course of study”. The final Directive refers to courses
of study as recognised by a Member State; but it is still possible that a Member
State could be considered to “recognise” a course of study offered by a non-EU
university or college.
As regards the rules on residence permits, the limitations on stay are under-
standable as regards students and school pupils. To a large extent they are
understandable as regards trainees, on the assumption that since it is possible
that it will take longer than two years to obtain a qualification in some cases,
the “exceptional” renewal of residence permits can last for longer than one year.
As for volunteers, given the applicable conditions for a volunteer permit in the
Directive, there seems little point to a one-year limitation on stay with only an
exceptional possibility of renewal, rather than an obligation to meet the origi-
nal conditions in order to secure a renewed permit (as suggested in the 1995
proposal on “others”). In any event, these rules are subject to the proviso that
Member States can adopt more favourable rules for the persons concerned.
It would have been preferable to specify clearly that fraud has to be proved
before residence status is withdrawn pursuant to the Directive, although the
Directive could still be interpreted to this effect. As for expulsion or refusal to
admit on grounds of public policy, et al, it would have been preferable to retain
the Commission’s proposed limits on use of such criteria in order to provide for
“fair” treatment of third-country nationals and “comparable” to that of EU citi-
zens, in line with the Tampere conclusions. Nevertheless, in the absence of a ref-
erence to national law for interpreting such concepts, it could still be argued that
the restrictions for public policy, et al have an EC-wide meaning, possibly even a
meaning identical or comparable to that applicable to EU citizens. In any event,
it could be argued that the EC law principle of “proportionality” would limit a
Member State’s expulsion. For example, if a Member State refuses to renew a
resident permit where the student is not making sufficient progress in studies,
the decision could be disproportionate if the student’s lack of progress is due to
extenuating circumstances, or a change in course; and it should in any event be
sufficient to meet this criterion that the student is passing his or her studies, or
at least willing to switch to another course if having difficulty with the original
course of studies (for example, switching from a Ph.D. to an M.Phil.).
The right of employment for students is welcome, but the final Directive is
very vague on this point. They do not appear to enjoy a right of equal access to
737
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
53 On the issue of procedural rights in immigration and asylum law and the general
principles of EC law, see further Ch. 5.
738
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular points (3)(a) and (4) of the first subparagraph of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee,
Having regard to the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions,
Whereas:
(1) For the gradual establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice,
the Treaty provides for measures to be adopted in the fields of asylum,
immigration and the protection of the rights of third-country nationals.
(2) The Treaty provides that the Council is to adopt measures on immigration
policy relating to conditions of entry and residence, and standards on pro-
cedures for the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence
permits.
(3) At its special meeting at Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, the European
Council acknowledged the need for approximation of national legislation
on the conditions for admission and residence of third-country nationals
and asked the Council to rapidly adopt decisions on the basis of proposals
by the Commission.
(4) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the princi-
ples recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.
(5) The Member States should give effect to the provisions of this Directive
without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other
opinions, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age
or sexual orientation.
739
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(7) Migration for the purposes set out in this Directive, which is by definition
temporary and does not depend on the labour-market situation in the host
country, constitutes a form of mutual enrichment for the migrants con-
cerned, their country of origin and the host Member State and helps to
promote better familiarity among cultures.
(8) The term admission covers the entry and residence of third-country nation-
als for the purposes set out in this Directive.
(9) The new Community rules are based on definitions of student, trainee, edu-
cational establishment and volunteer already in use in Community law, in
particular in the various Community programmes to promote the mobility
of the relevant persons (Socrates, European Voluntary Service etc.).
(10) The duration and other conditions of preparatory courses for students cov-
ered by the present Directive should be determined by Member States in
accordance with their national legislation.
(13) Fellowships may be taken into account in assessing the availability of suf-
ficient resources.
(14) Admission for the purposes set out in this Directive may be refused on duly
justified grounds. In particular, admission could be refused if a Member
State considers, based on an assessment of the facts, that the third-coun-
try national concerned is a potential threat to public policy or public secu-
740
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
rity. The notion of public policy may cover a conviction for committing a
serious crime. In this context it has to be noted that the notions of public
policy and public security also cover cases in which a third-country national
belongs or has belonged to an association which supports terrorism, sup-
ports or has supported such an association, or has or has had extremist
aspirations.
(16) The mobility of students who are third-country nationals studying in sev-
eral Member States must be facilitated, as must the admission of third-
country nationals participating in Community programmes to promote
mobility within and towards the Community for the purposes set out in
this Directive.
(17) In order to allow initial entry into their territory, Member States should be
able to issue in a timely manner a residence permit or, if they issue residence
permits exclusively on their territory, a visa.
(18) In order to allow students who are third-country nationals to cover part of
the cost of their studies, they should be given access to the labour market
under the conditions set out in this Directive. The principle of access for
students to the labour market under the conditions set out in this Directive
should be a general rule; however, in exceptional circumstances Member
States should be able to take into account the situation of their national
labour markets.
(19) The notion of prior authorisation includes the granting of work permits to
students who wish to exercise an economic activity.
(20) This Directive does not affect national legislation in the area of part-time
work.
(21) Provision should be made for fast-track admission procedures for study
purposes or for pupil exchange schemes operated by recognised organisa-
tions in the Member States.
(22) Each Member State should ensure that the fullest possible set of regularly
updated information is made available to the general public, notably on the
741
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(23) This Directive should not in any circumstances affect the application of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uni-
form format for residence permits for third-country nationals [4].
(24) Since the objective of this Directive, namely to determine the conditions
of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of study, pupil
exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States and can, by reason of its scale or
effects, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt
measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Arti-
cle 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as
set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary
to achieve that objective.
(25) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European Union
and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and without prej-
udice to Article 4 of the said Protocol, these Member States are not taking
part in the adoption of this Directive and are not bound by it or subject to
its application.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
742
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
(b) the rules concerning the procedures for admitting third-country nationals to
the territory of the Member States for those purposes.
Article 2 Definitions
Article 3 Scope
743
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER II
CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION
Article 5 Principle
744
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
2. Member States shall facilitate the admission procedure for the third-coun-
try nationals covered by Articles 7 to 11 who participate in Community
programmes enhancing mobility towards or within the Community.
745
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
2. The requirements referred to in paragraph 1(c), shall not apply in the case
where the student, in the framework of his/her programme of studies, is
obliged to attend a part of his/her courses in an establishment of another
Member State.
3. The competent authorities of the first Member State shall, at the request of
the competent authorities of the second Member State, provide the appro-
priate information in relation to the stay of the student in the territory of
the first Member State.
746
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
(d) provides evidence that the pupil exchange organisation accepts respon-
sibility for him/her throughout his/her period of presence in the
territory of the Member State concerned, in particular as regards sub-
sistence, study, healthcare and return travel costs;
(e) be accommodated throughout his/her stay by a family meeting the
conditions set by the Member State concerned and selected in accor-
dance with the rules of the pupil exchange scheme in which he/she is
participating.
747
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER III
RESIDENCE PERMITS
748
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
CHAPTER IV
TREATMENT OF THE THIRD-COUNTRY
NATIONALS CONCERNED
1. Outside their study time and subject to the rules and conditions applicable
to the relevant activity in the host Member State, students shall be entitled
to be employed and may be entitled to exercise self-employed economic
activity. The situation of the labour market in the host Member State may
be taken into account.
2. Each Member State shall determine the maximum number of hours per
week or days or months per year allowed for such an activity, which shall
not be less than 10 hours per week, or the equivalent in days or months per
year.
3. Access to economic activities for the first year of residence may be restricted
by the host Member State.
749
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
CHAPTER V
PROCEDURE AND TRANSPARENCY
750
Chapter 22 Admission of Students and Others
Article 20 Fees
Member States may require applicants to pay fees for the processing of applica-
tions in accordance with this Directive.
CHAPTER VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 21 Reporting
Periodically, and for the first time by 12 January 2010, the Commission shall
report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this
Directive in the Member States and propose amendments if appropriate.
Article 22 Transposition
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 12 January 2007. They
shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to
this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their
official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down
by Member States.
By way of derogation from the provisions set out in Chapter III and for a period
of up to two years after the date set out in Article 22, Member States are not
obliged to issue permits in accordance with this Directive in the form of a resi-
dence permit.
751
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 26 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
752
Chapter 23 Social Security
1 Summary
Regulation 859/2003, on the coordination of social security for third-country
nationals,1 has applied since 1 June 2003. The UK and Ireland opted into the
Regulation, and Denmark was unable to participate. This Regulation has the
“legal base” of Article 63(4) EC, which confers powers on the EC to adopt
measures on the rights of third-country nationals who move between Member
States.
The text of the Regulation is quite straightforward. Article 1 extends the
EC legislation on social security coordination to all third-country nationals and
members of their families who are not already covered by that Regulation, on
two conditions: they must be “legally resident” and there must be a cross-border
dimension within the EU (meaning that the person concerned must have lived
in more than one of the EU Member States).2 Article 2 sets out the details of
the transitional application of the Regulation; third-country nationals had to
apply for equal treatment within two years (so by 1 June 2005), otherwise they
would be limited to equal treatment from the time of their application, unless a
Member State chooses to be more generous. Article 3 sets the date of application
of the Regulation. Finally, an Annex provides that in Germany, only persons in
possession of a particular permit will qualify for certain family benefits, while
Austria is permitted to set out special additional conditions for access to family
allowances.
1 OJ 2003 L 124/1.
2 Reg. 1408/71 (OJ 1971 L 149/2).
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 753-767.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
3 COM (97) 561, 12 Nov. 1997. EC national survivors of third-country nationals were
also covered already.
4 OJ 1998 C 313/8.
5 At the time, both these provisions called for consultation of the EP and a unanimous
vote of the Council. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
Art. 42 became subject to the “co-decision” procedure while retaining unanimity in
the Council.
6 See Council doc. 8807/99, 1 June 1999 (outcome of proceedings of working party
on 27 May 1999).
754
Chapter 23 Social Security
contrast to the Commission, the Council legal service took the view that the new
Article 63(4) EC was now the correct legal base.7
The Finnish Presidency tried to move the debate forward by proposing the
lowest common denominator of the extension of the provisions on posted work-
ers and medical care, based on Articles 42 and 308 EC coupled with a request
to the planned Inter-governmental Conference (which ultimately culminated in
the Treaty of Nice) to address this issue.8 But it soon proposed an even narrower
extension, to posted workers only.9 However, it became clear that despite such
compromises on the substance, and the support of all Member States except
Denmark for the extension of some of the EC rules to third-country nation-
als, some delegations were still unwilling to agree the text as long as the “legal
base” issue remained under dispute. In particular, the UK, Ireland and Den-
mark (the “opt-out” Member States) supported the use of Article 63(4), the
Dutch eventually supported Article 308 only, and the remaining eleven Member
States supported Article 42. The matter was referred to the employment Council
in November 1999, but the deadlock remained, and the next three Council Presi-
dencies saw no point in revisiting the issue.10
The matter was revived by the Belgian Council Presidency in the second
half of 2001, and the employment Council of October 2001 asked Coreper to
examine the “legal base” issue again. Shortly afterward, the Court of Justice
delivered its judgment in the cases of Khalil and others and Addou.11 In its judg-
ment, which concerned refugees and stateless persons, the Court concluded that
the Council had validly included such categories of persons within the scope of
the EC’s existing social security Regulation by using what was originally Article
51 EEC as a “legal base”. But the Court also ruled that the legislation only
governed the position of refugees and stateless persons when they moved within
the Community. Since, unlike Community nationals and their family members,
refugees and stateless persons have no right of free movement under EC law, the
EC social security rules would therefore be of little use to them.
7 Council doc. 9745/99, 1 July 1999 (not released, but the content of the opinion can
be surmised from other documents). The legal service had issued a legal opinion in
1998 on the “legal base” of the proposal prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, but it is
not known what view it took then.
8 Council docs. SN 4079/99, 15 Sep. 1999; SN 4079/1/99, 17 Sep. 1999; and 11043/99,
17 Sep. 1999. Ultimately the issue of the legal base for social security rules gov-
erning third-country nationals was discussed extensively during the Treaty of Nice
negotiations, but no relevant Treaty amendment was agreed.
9 Council docs. 11746/99, 13 Oct. 1999 and SN 4079/2/99, 20 Oct. 1999.
10 Council docs. 12830/99, 11 Nov. 1999; 12831/99, 12 Nov. 1999; and 13186/99, 22
Nov. 1999.
11 Joined Cases C-95/99 to 98/99 Khalil and others and C-180/99 Addou [2001] ECR
I-7413.
755
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
The Council legal service analysed this judgment shortly afterwards.12 Its
view is not known, but it seems likely that it reiterated its previous view on the
legal base, for the Belgian Presidency proposed Conclusions supporting the legal
base of Article 63(4), which the employment Council agreed in December 2001.13
To implement this agreement, in Februrary 2002 the Commission proposed a
fresh Regulation based on Article 63(4), with essentially the same content as the
prior Regulation.14 Article 1 extended the application of Regulation 1408/71 to
all third-country nationals not already covered by it, “provided they are legally
resident within the territory of a Member State and move legally within the
Community”, while Article 2 set out transitional provisions.
The proposal was swiftly discussed in the Council’s working group on social
policy, and the Employment and Social Policy Council duly reached a “general
approach” on the text in June 2002.15 There were limited amendments to Article
1 of the text and to the preamble, concerning the requirement of legal residence
for its beneficiaries and to clarify more clearly that the proposal only covers
those who move between Member States (see particularly recitals 11 to 13).
Some Member States had misgivings about extending family benefits, unem-
ployment benefits and the equality principle fully even to this limited group of
third-country nationals. Ultimately, Finland withdrew its objections on family
benefits and Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands withdrew their objec-
tion on unemployment benefits, but Germany and Austria insisted on the limits
ultimately set out in the Annex to the Regulation. Their argument was the cost of
extension plus “reverse discrimination” between migrant third-country nation-
als and “non-migrant” third-country nationals, the latter being worse off. The
compromise was to keep family benefits within the scope of the proposal, with a
limited exception for those Member States.
Rather tardily, the EP adopted its opinion on the proposal in November
2002, approving it with five amendments despite its view that the “legal base”
should still be Articles 42 and 308.16 It suggested one amendment to the main
text, extending the period for claiming under the Regulation from two years to
four years. The four suggested amendments to the preamble expanded upon
the reference to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, referred to the “great
756
Chapter 23 Social Security
757
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
while the equal treatment provisions of this Decision are directly effective,21 the
coordination rules cannot apply until the EC adopts internal legislation to apply
them.22 Such an internal measure will presumably be unnecessary following
the adoption of Regulation 859/2003. Finally, nationals of the Maghreb States
(Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) are also covered by equal treatment rules by
virtue of association agreements.23
The social security position of nationals of all other non-EU countries is
governed by adopted Title IV measures are or would be governed by adopted
or proposed Title IV measures. These rules appear in the adopted Directives on
temporary protection, refugee and subsidiary protection status, long-term resi-
dents, and researchers, and the proposed Directive on migration for employment
and self-employment (since withdrawn).24 It is not clear whether persons with
refugee status can rely on the association agreements if they have the relevant
nationality,25 although it seems clear that persons with dual nationality of an
EU Member State and a non-EU country cannot rely on the association agree-
ments.26
It should also be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has
ruled in the case of Gaygusuz v. Austria that discrimination on grounds of
nationality, as regards at least contributory social security benefits, infringed the
right to property as guaranteed by the First Protocol to the ECHR, taken with
Article 14 ECHR, which requires non-discrimination in respect of the rights in
the Convention and its Protocols.27 A later judgment in Poirrez v France con-
firmed that the equal treatment principle also bans nationality discrimination as
758
Chapter 23 Social Security
3 Legal Analysis
The central legal question in this case is whether Regulation 859/2003 needed to
be adopted on the basis of Article 63(4) EC or Article 42 EC. Although both
provisions call for unanimous voting in the Council, there are several important
differences: Article 42 requires “co-decision”, rather than mere consultation,
with the EP; the UK, Ireland and Denmark have an opt-out as regards Article
63(4);30 and only final courts can refer questions on measures adopted pursuant
to Article 63(4).31 There is something of a “Catch-22” here in that Denmark
was opposed in principle to the concept of extending the social security rules to
third-country nationals – even before the election of a Danish government with
even more conservative views on the treatment of third-country nationals. So
Danish participation might have prevented adoption of this Regulation.
In the Court’s view, “the Council cannot be criticised for having, in the exer-
cise of the powers which have been conferred on it under Article 51 of the EEC
Treaty, also included stateless persons and refugees resident on the territory of
the Member States in order to take into account [Member States’] international
obligations.”32 It also noted that instead of using the EC coordination legisla-
tion, Member States would otherwise have had to establish a second, separate
regime for the coordination of social security for this category of persons.
28 Judgment of 30 Sep. 2003, not yet reported (particularly para. 37). See earlier judg-
ment of 11 June 2002 in Willis v UK, para. 35 and admissibility decision in Wessels-
Bergervoet v Netherlands, 3 Oct. 2000; and subsequently admissibility decision of 16
Dec. 2003 in Van den Bouwhuijsen and Schuring v Netherlands, not yet reported and
Grand Chamber judgment of 28 April 2004 in Azinas v Cyprus, not yet reported
(particularly dissenting judgment of judges Costa and Garlicki).
29 For more detailed analysis, see Verschueren, “EC Social Security Coordination
Excluding Third-Country Nationals: Still in Line with Fundamental rights After
the Gaygusuz judgment?” 24 CMLRev. (1997) 991.
30 However, the UK and Ireland exercised their “opt-in” in this case.
31 Another distinction is that Member States could propose measures based on Art.
63(4) up until 1 May 2004, whereas only the Commission can propose measures
based on Art. 42. But this is something of a moot point, since the Commission pro-
posed this measure in any case and the Member States have since lost their right of
initiative now that the date of 1 May 2004 has passed.
32 Para. 56 of the judgment (n. 11 above).
759
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
In its conclusions of December 2001, the Council stated simply that Article
42 EC, “interpreted in light of the case law of the Court of Justice, in particular
the judgment in the Khalil case…does not appear to be an adequate legal basis
for such an extension” and stated that Article 63(4) is the legal basis for decid-
ing on the conditions under which third-country nationals can reside in other
Member States.
There is little detailed reasoning in either the Court’s conclusions or the
Council’s. However, the Court seemed to place particular stress on the interna-
tional legal obligations of the Member States, with the administrative conve-
nience of establishing a single coordination scheme as an ancillary reason for
concluding that Article 42 EC applied. To what extent does the same reason-
ing apply to other third-country nationals? As noted above, the Gaygusuz judg-
ment (confirmed by the subsequent Poirrez judgment) of the European Court of
Human Rights made clear that there is an obligation to afford equal treatment
to social security without discrimination on the basis of nationality. So there is
an international legal obligation binding the Member States as regards all third-
country nationals, which also dates from a pre-existing international treaty. In
fact, the agreed Regulation acknowledges the ECHR in its preamble. Moreover,
there are other international treaties placing more precise obligations of non-
discrimination in social security on the Member States.33 As for the argument
that a single social security coordination system is easier to administer, this is
undoubtedly correct; but this consideration applies equally to all third-country
nationals, not just to refugees and stateless persons. Indeed, the preamble to
Regulation 859/2003 expressly acknowledges this.
Can it be argued that with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
the legal position on this issue changed? If Regulation 859/2003 were intrin-
scially connected with the free movement of third-country nationals, it would
indeed be arguable that Article 63(4) EC was the correct legal basis. But it clearly
is not; again the preamble to the Regulation expressly asserts that the Regula-
tion gives persons no right to enter, stay or reside in a Member State. It is thus
disconnected from the heart of the power conferred upon the EC by Article
63(4) EC. Of course, the extension of the coordination regime will facilitate free
movement of third-country nationals, but one can have free movement without
social security coordination or conversely social security coordination without
free movement. Self-employed EC nationals were in the former position before
1981, and refugees and stateless persons have always been in the latter position
to date. The UK and Ireland have placed themselves in the latter position as
regards long-term resident third-country nationals, and all Member States will
be in this position to some extent, since the agreed Regulation does not confine
its application to long-term residents and the long-term residents’ Directive will
not apply for some time after the Regulation does.
760
Chapter 23 Social Security
It is even arguable, in light of the human rights case law and the general
principle of equality discussed above, that the Annex to the Regulation is invalid
for setting impermissible limitations on the right to non-discrimination as
regards social security.
4 Comments
The extension of equal treatment to third-country nationals after such a lengthy
period is obviously welcome. Of course, the EC’s success in adopting this mea-
sure must be weighed against the practical limitation that the Regulation is con-
fined to third-country nationals in cross-border situations, meaning only those
third-country nationals posted by their EC employers across borders were cov-
ered by the Regulation as of right at the outset.34 It must also be weighed against
the exclusions from the scope of the Regulation in Germany and Austria and
the inability of lower courts and tribunals, at least at present, to send questions
about its application (or the validity of these exclusions) to the Court of Justice.
Because of the distinctions in personal and material scope (as well as ECJ juris-
diction) between the Regulation on EC nationals’ social security (as extended to
certain countries by association agreements) on the one hand, and Regulation
859/2003 on the other hand, it will still be important to ascertain which Regula-
tion a person is covered by. For example, the limits on certain German and Aus-
trian benefits in the extension Regulation do not apply to refugees and stateless
persons, as they are covered by the general EC regime; and despite the limits on
the geographical scope of the extension Regulation, a number of persons can
already claim equality in social security in one Member State without having to
move within the EC, because of agreements between the EC and third countries
discussed above.
The real importance of the extension Regulation will be obvious once
Member States apply Directive 2003/109 on long-term residents,35 which pro-
vides for the right for long-term resident third-country nationals (subject to
many qualifications) to move between Member States. The deadline for them to
do so is 23 January 2006. At that point the scope of the persons covered by the
Regulation in practice is bound to increase, and the legally questionable limits
on benefits in certain Member States could well come under challenge. However,
the long-term residents’ Directive does not at present cover refugees or persons
with subsidiary protection – so oddly the one group of persons (refugees) who
34 Case C-43/93 Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803 and Case C-445/03 Commission v
Luxembourg, judgment of 21 Oct. 2004, not yet reported. See also Cases C-168/04
Commission v Austria and C-244/04 Commission v Germany, both pending (an
Opinion in the latter case was issued on 15 Sep. 2005). Of course, any refugees and
stateless persons who are posted to another Member State by their employer are
already covered by the existing EC rules.
35 See further Ch. 20.
761
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
have always been covered by the EC social security coordination rules will still
be excluded even from the limited form of free movement right granted to most
third-country nationals by the Directive.36 In any event, given the limitations on
the scope of the long-term residents’ Directive and upon long-term residents’
ability to move between Member States, for most third-country nationals, the
most relevant challenge will still be to ensure that EC legislation ensures their
right to equal treatment in social security in their first Member State of resi-
dence.
Finally, the peculiar position of the UK and Ireland should be exam-
ined. These Member States have opted into this Regulation, but not Directive
2003/109. So in practice, leaving aside refugees and stateless persons, the Regula-
tion will only apply in the UK and Ireland to those third-country nationals who
have been posted by their EC employer pursuant to Article 49 EC, and to any
other third-country nationals previously resident elsewhere in the Community
which those Member States choose to admit pursuant to their national immigra-
tion law.
36 Conversely, however, stateless persons are not as such excluded from the scope of the
long-term residents Directive (unless they fall within another exclusion, such as the
exclusion for refugees).
762
Chapter 23 Social Security
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community and in par-
ticular Article 63, point 4 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) As its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, the European
Council proclaimed that the European Union should ensure fair treatment
of third-country nationals who reside legally in the territory of its Member
States, grant them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citi-
zens, enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and
approximate their legal status to that of Member States’ nationals.
(2) In its resolution of 27 October 1999, the European Parliament called for
prompt action on promises of fair treatment for third-country nationals
legally resident in the Member States and on the definition of their legal
status, including uniform rights as close as possible to those enjoyed by the
citizens of the European Union.
(3) The Economic and Social Committee has also appealed for equal treat-
ment of Community nationals and third-country nationals in the social
field, notably in its opinion of 26 September 1991 on the status of migrant
workers from third countries.
(4) Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Union shall
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community
law.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
(5) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the princi-
ples recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, in particular the spirit of its Article 34(2).
(6) The promotion of a high level of social protection and the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life in the Member States are objectives of
the Community.
764
Chapter 23 Social Security
(16) This Regulation is without prejudice to rights and obligations arising from
international agreements with third countries to which the Community is a
party and which afford advantages in terms of social security.
(17) Since the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects
of the proposed action, be better achieved at Community level, the Com-
munity may take measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiar-
ity enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty. In compliance with the principle
of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve these objectives.
(18) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, Ireland and the United
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
Article 1
Article 2
1. This Regulation shall not create any rights in respect of the period before 1
June 2003.
4. Any benefit that has not been awarded or that has been suspended on
account of the nationality or the residence of the person concerned shall,
at the latter’s request, be awarded or resumed from 1 June 2003, provided
that the rights for which benefits were previously awarded did not give rise
to a lump-sum payment.
766
Chapter 23 Social Security
5. The rights of persons who prior to 1 June 2003, obtained the award of a
pension may be reviewed at their request, account being taken of the provi-
sions of this Regulation.
Article 3
This Regulation shall enter into force on the first day of the month following
that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the
Member States in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity.
ANNEX
SPECIAL PROVISIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1
I. GERMANY
In the case of family benefits, this Regulation shall apply only to third-country
nationals who are in possession of a residence permit meeting the definition in
German law of the “Aufenthaltserlaubnis” or “Aufenthaltsberechtigung”.
II. AUSTRIA
In the case of family benefits, this Regulation shall apply only to third-country
nationals who fulfil the conditions laid down by Austrian legislation for perma-
nent entitlement to family allowances.
767
Chapter 24 The Socio-Economic Agenda of
EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
1 Introduction
The socio-economic agenda related to EU immigration and asylum policy is
characterised by the emergence of a Community-wide labour market, which has
been matched by attempts to manage it at the European level. The drive for a joint
labour market strategy gained momentum after the inclusion of an Employment
Title in the Amsterdam Treaty, which declared employment a matter of common
concern. This formed the basis for the European Employment Strategy, which
was initiated at the 1997 Luxembourg Jobs Summit. An annual cycle of pro-
gramming, reporting, peer review, assessment and adjustment of the objectives
was established and formally adopted as an “open method of co-ordination” at
the 2000 Lisbon European Council. As Member States set the goal for the Union
to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the
world capable of sustained economic growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion”, the Employment Strategy became an important vehicle
for setting objectives and measuring progress. Other dimensions of the so-called
Lisbon strategy are addressed through an Open Method on Social Inclusion,
one on pensions, and related policy instruments.
This chapter charts the gradual (re-) insertion of immigration on the
European Union’s socio-economic agenda. Demographic changes and labour
market mismatches led to the recognition that without immigration, achieving
the ambitious “Lisbon goals” would be even more difficult. While the European
Commission set out the rationale for moving away from zero immigration in
successive Communications, Member States began to mention immigration in
their National Action Plans submitted under the European Employment Strat-
egy. While alternative strategies to increase labour supply, such as raising the
participation rates of women and of older workers and encouraging the mobil-
ity of EU nationals continued to play a prominent role, immigration came to be
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 769-783.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
1 Jobs, Jobs, Jobs – Creating more Employment in Europe (2003). Report of the
Employment Task Force chaired by Wim Kok, p.12. See now the Green Paper on
Confronting Demographic Change (COM (2005) 94, 16 March 2005).
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Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
2 COM(2000)757.
3 COM (2001)387.
4 For details, see Ch. 21.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
The 2000 Joint Employment Report, for instance, mentioned the tightening
of the labour market supply of high tech professionals, leading to adaptations
of immigration policies in a few Member States.5 Specifically, the report identi-
fied a tightening of the labour market supply in Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Northern Italy and Belgium. Adjustment in immigration provi-
sions for high tech professionals was recorded for Germany, Denmark, Sweden,
Ireland, the UK and Finland. However, the report only mentioned these devel-
opments in passing, moving on to point out the importance of lifelong learning
and training initiatives in Member States.
The 2001 Joint Employment Report reported on Member States’ answers
under Guideline 6, which asked Member States to identify and prevent emerging
bottlenecks. It commented on the National Action Plans, in which Italy, Finland,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and France stated that their labour shortages were
mainly limited to a few occupations/sectors and regions. At the other end of the
spectrum, it noted that Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands found themselves
in very tight labour markets, with shortages in both high and low skill occupa-
tions. It concluded that “most Member States anticipate the problems becoming
more serious in the near and mid term future, based on combined economic and
demographic forecasts”. In commenting on the policies adopted to alleviate this
problem, the report noted that Luxembourg and Ireland resort to bringing in a
significant number of foreign workers compared to other Member States, with
Ireland conducting active recruitment campaigns inside and outside the Euro-
pean Union. The United Kingdom, Finland, Austria, Germany and Portugal
were listed as reforming their system on work permits to allow for more flexible
recruitment of foreign workers for bottleneck occupations. Policies to legalise
ethnic minorities and migrant workers were recorded for Portugal and Greece.6
The worsening economic climate was apparent in the 2002 NAPs, in which
references to immigration were made only by Finland, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Ireland, and Austria. Nevertheless, the Draft Joint Employment Report
2002 summed up that “several Member States present labour immigration as
part of the solution to labour shortages, thus recognising the importance of a
better-integrated European labour market”.7
After five years of operation, the Employment Strategy was reviewed and
modified in some of its aspects. In particular, Member States decided that the
Strategy should be co-ordinated more closely with economic policy instruments.
In a new “streamlined” process, the Commission now presents an “implementa-
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Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
tion package” each January, which includes the Broad Economic Policy Guide-
lines Implementation Report, the Draft Joint Employment Report and the
Implementation Report on the Internal Market Strategy.
The 2003/2004 Draft Joint Employment Report notes that immigration is
considered by most Member States as an important source of additional labour
supply, but only for professions or sectors encountering recruitment difficulties.8
Belgium, Germany, Spain and Ireland are cited as aiming to simplify the system
of work permits and regulations for recruiting immigrants. The report suggests
that most Member States give increased attention to migrants currently living
in the EU, responding to the fact that the unemployment gap between EU and
non-EU nationals remains stable at the high level of 7.7%. Indeed, the Swedish
NAP of 2003 notes that 37.0% of foreign-born women and 27.2% of foreign-
born men aged 16-64 are excluded from the labour market and says that it is
necessary to study the causes of this high percentage, “particularly in view of
the future efforts that will be necessary to make full use of the potential labour
supply”. Similarly, the Dutch NAP sets the target of increasing labour force
participation amongst ethnic minorities to 54% by 2005. Beyond that, the Neth-
erlands maintains that it is “pursuing a restrictive, demand-driven labour migra-
tion policy”, but one which “allows for the (temporary) admission of highly
qualified migrants, in particular, to combat labour shortages, or to boost the
knowledge economy on a demand-driven basis”. Finland most explicitly refers
to demographic changes and announces that “preparations are being made for
a possible increase in the immigration of foreign labour through an immigration
policy programme that will be ready in spring 2005. If the economic depen-
dency ratio so requires, the Government will promote immigration in support
of labour supply”.
The brief overview shows that within the context of the Employment Strat-
egy, immigration has been considered as a possible policy response to both the
projected overall drop in labour supply and specific skill shortages and mis-
matches. It also shows that immigration has been considered most seriously
in times of high economic growth and widespread labour shortages. While the
economic downturn has not completely eliminated references to immigration
from Member States’ National Action Plans, a recent report states that ‘at this
time of job cuts and increasing unemployment, there is a real danger that the
more serious structural challenges of economic transformation and demograph-
ics will be forgotten’.9 The future of the “immigration option” on the European
socio-economic agenda, then, depends partly on the foresight of policy makers.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
774
Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
EU’.13 Member States must make use of the additional labour supply resulting
from immigration. This is also recognised within the Open Method on pensions,
which was launched by the 2001 Laeken European Council. The 2003 Joint
Report on Pensions14 cites Spain and Greece as countries expecting that immi-
grants will generate an important extra supply of labour. The Spanish report in
particular stresses the important contribution of foreign workers to the current
favourable financial situation of the social insurance system, as the number of
foreigners covered by the social security system more than doubled from 332,000
in 1999 to 792,000 in 2002.
3 Mobility
The free movement of persons has been a part of European Union integra-
tion from the beginning, and has consistently been extended and promoted by
Member States. For instance, free movement rights were extended from workers
to students, pensioners and others not taking up a gainful activity. With the
completion of the internal market (i.e. the removal of internal border control
between most of the Member States) and the introduction of EU citizenship in
the early 1990s, the movement of Member States nationals from one Member
State to another ceased to be regarded as migration. These persons were merely
exercising their free movement rights. Intra-Union migration became simply
“internal mobility”. Member States promote internal mobility because the free
movement of persons is one of the four freedoms anchored in the 1957 Treaty
establishing the European Community, alongside the freedom of movement for
services, capital and goods. They also promote internal mobility because of its
contribution to a genuinely pan-European labour market, which could alleviate
skills gaps and labour market mismatches in individual countries.
These efforts are long-standing and cover a wide range of areas and mecha-
nisms. They have intensified significantly since the 2000 Nice European Council
which stressed the need to break down barriers to mobility. An Action Plan for
mobility was adopted which included a “toolbox” of 42 measures, ranging from
financial support to linguistic and cultural preparation for mobility.15 The 2001
Stockholm European Council endorsed this Plan.
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
776
Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
777
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
4 Integration
In the framework of the Employment Strategy, the labour market integration of
migrants is a priority in the Commission guidelines and many National Action
Plans. For instance, the 2003 Guidelines propose a related target to be achieved
by 2010, namely to achieve a significant reduction in the unemployment gaps
between non-EU and EU nationals.24 In 2002, the unemployment rate was more
than twice as high among non-EU nationals than among EU nationals. The
biggest gaps were reported for Belgium and France. Moreover, the employment
rate of non-EU nationals is on average much lower than for EU nationals (13.8
percentage points lower in 2002). The gap is wider for women (17.6 percentage
points lower) than for men (10.0 percentage points lower). In Belgium, the over-
all gap is 30 percentage points, and it exceeds 20 percentage points in Denmark,
the Netherlands, Sweden and France. On the other hand, employment rates are
lower for EU nationals than for non-EU nationals in Spain, Greece and Por-
tugal. With regard to wages, the non-adjusted wage gap between EU nationals
and non-EU nationals in 2000 amounted to 6 percent (10 percent for women
and 4 percent for men).25 Summarising the above developments, a recent report
argued that more attention to the integration of minorities and immigrants in
the labour market was especially needed in Belgium, France, Sweden, Finland,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Within the new Member
States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, as well as the Baltic countries,
face a particular challenge in integrating minorities.26
Besides the Employment Strategy, the Social Inclusion Process also addresses
the socio-economic situation of migrants. The Social Inclusion Process was ini-
tiated at the 2000 Lisbon Summit and the ideas developed there were further
detailed in a Commission communication on the European Social Agenda.27
The 2001 Stockholm European Council called for a social inclusion programme,
saying that ‘the fight against social exclusion is of utmost importance for the
Union’. Building on this work, the 2000 Nice European Council approved the
European Social Agenda, which includes the goal of “fighting poverty and
all forms of exclusion and discrimination in order to promote social integra-
tion”. It also called for an “open method” approach such as that followed by
the Employment Strategy, with the difference that Member States would submit
their National Action Plans every two years instead of every year.
The first National Action Plans against poverty and social exclusion were
submitted in 2001. In the Common Outline for the second round – due in July
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Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
2003 – making a drive to reduce poverty and social exclusion of immigrants and
ethnic minorities was made a key priority.28 As a result, the higher risk of pov-
erty and social exclusion linked to immigration or as a result of coming from an
ethnic minority was highlighted far more in the 2003 NAPs by many Member
States.
The second Joint Inclusion Report29 summarises the particular aspects
mentioned by Member States, including difficulties in finding accommodation,
acquiring a well-paid job, and barriers in access to training, especially in lan-
guages. While the German NAP highlights older immigrants, Sweden refers to
the poorer health of many immigrants and gender differences are also high-
lighted (as they are in the Irish NAP). However, in its evaluation of the NAPs,
the Commission notes that the lack of data on vulnerable groups, and in par-
ticular migrant and ethnic groups continues to be a major problem. Only a small
number of countries (including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands,
Spain and France) list data or indicators for people of immigrant origin. In
the Commission’s view, the lack of detailed data and indicators hinders any
thorough analysis of the situation facing these groups. Moreover, only a few
countries attempt to identify trends, negative or positive, in the living and work-
ing conditions of immigrants. Few NAPs give clear evidence that the situation
facing migrant populations has improved since the submission of the first action
plans in 2001.
In its Joint Inclusion Report, the Commission also voices grave concerns
about the lack of rights-based integration policies in many Member States. It
criticizes that little attention is paid to promoting the access of immigrants and
ethnic minorities to resources, rights, goods and services, in particular to social
protection schemes, to decent and sanitary housing, to appropriate healthcare
and to education. Rather, the report identifies a ‘narrow integrationist approach,
comprising mainly language and training measures’ and notes that ‘in many
cases the emphasis is on the need for immigrants to adapt’.30
At the European level, integration has steadily gained prominence since the
2002 Danish Presidency. A group of National Contact Points on Integration is
meeting regularly under the coordination of the European Commission’s DG
Justice and Home Affairs. The group was set up following the October 2002 Jus-
tice and Home Affairs Council and was endorsed at the 2003 Thessaloniki Euro-
pean Council. It is currently working on producing a Handbook on Integration,
including general guidelines and principles as well as best practice examples. A
new budget line on the integration of third country nationals (INTI) came into
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Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
existence in 2003 with a budget allocation of four million Euros for the first year.
The INTI programme funds pilot projects for the integration of third country
nationals, with an emphasis on promoting dialogue with civil society, developing
integration models, seeking out and evaluating best practices in the integration
field and setting up networks at European level.
The social and economic integration of refugees is supported through the
European Refugee Fund, which was established in 2000. 216 million Euros were
allocated in total; the budget available for the year 2003 was 2,113.550 Euros.
Integration activities accounted for 28% of national activities supported by
the Fund between 2000 and 2002. Aid went in particular to language training;
activities promoting employability and providing advice on housing, education,
understanding and accessing social benefits; public information campaigns on
refugee issues; and to developing partnerships between public authorities, com-
munity organisations, and employers and housing associations. In its initial
form, the European Refugee Fund (ERF) came to an end in December 2004.
The second ERF (ERF II, running from 2005-2010) gives more detail on integra-
tion measures to be funded, suggesting that eligible actions could include: social
assistance; participation in civil and cultural life; education, vocational training
and recognition of qualifications; actions designed to enable [these persons] to
provide for themselves; and actions to promote contact and dialogue with “key
partners” such as local authorities, the general public or refugee associations
(Article 6).31 As in the ERF’s first phase, the target group includes recognized
refugees as well as asylum seekers and those with subsidiary protection.
5 Anti-discrimination
The Commission’s recent Social Inclusion report warns that the Social Inclu-
sion Process may not have a close enough connection to anti-discrimination. It
observes that only four Member States highlight the Council Directive on com-
bating discrimination on the grounds of ethnic or racial origin, which was to be
implemented into national law during 2003.
The Amsterdam Treaty provides a legal basis for Community measures to
combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. In 2000, European legislation
was adopted in the form of the Directive implementing the principle of equal
treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the Racial Equality Directive)
and Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in
employment and occupation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of reli-
gion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (the Framework Directive).
The provisions of the Racial Equality Directive and the Framework Directive
are largely parallel, with some distinctions for individual grounds. Both Direc-
31 See the first ERF Decision (OJ 2000 L 252/12) and the second ERF Decision (OJ
2004 L 381/52).
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Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
32 The following overview considers first and foremost the provisions of the Racial
Equality Directive.
781
Section IV – Legal Migration and Integration
on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. In addition, the Directives are without
prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry and residence of
third-country nationals and stateless persons in the territory of Member States,
and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of third-country nation-
als and stateless persons.
States may provide that “a difference in treatment which is based on a char-
acteristic related to any of the protected grounds shall not constitute discrimi-
nation where, by reason of the particular occupational activities concerned or
the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a
genuine and determining occupational requirement provided that the objective
is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate”. However, these exceptions
may occur “in very limited circumstances” and must be included in the informa-
tion provided by Member States to the European Commission. Special excep-
tions related to the ethos of religious organisations may be maintained. This
may allow churches to insist that teachers in their religious schools are of that
religion, although the same could not be said for posts such as care takers or
cleaners whose religion should be irrelevant to the completion of their tasks.
In order to achieve equality it may be necessary to treat (groups of) indi-
viduals differently. Positive action measures can be taken to overcome disadvan-
tages of a particular group. The provision on positive action in the Directives is
likely to be interpreted in accordance with the European Court of Justice’s rul-
ings on positive action in relation to sex discrimination, in particular the require-
ments that measures be limited in time to the period necessary to overcome the
disadvantage being targeted, and that they be sufficiently flexible to allow excep-
tions in particular cases. Measures should be assessed and evaluated on a regular
basis.
The anti-discrimination Directives set out a series of guarantees designed to
improve the chances of justice for victims of discrimination. Firstly, all persons
who consider themselves wronged must have access to judicial or administrative
procedures, and conciliation procedures may provide an additional alternative
forum to seek justice. These remedies must be available even after the relation-
ship in which the discrimination took place has ended. Secondly, associations,
organisations or other legal entities with a legitimate interest in ensuring compli-
ance with the Directives’ provisions may engage in proceedings in support of or
on behalf of the complainant with their approval. Member States must define the
criteria that govern the rights of associations to support a complainant, and “a
legitimate interest” should not be construed narrowly. Member States can go yet
further by providing that organisations can act in their own name or by allowing
class actions. The Directives provide for a partial shift in the burden of proof to
the defender of the discrimination claim once the complainant has established
facts from which discrimination can be presumed. It is for the national authori-
ties to determine the point at which such facts have been established.
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Chapter 24 Socio-economic Agenda of EC Immigration and Asylum Policy
783
Section V Irregular Migration
Chapter 25 Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions
1 Summary
Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions on the
expulsion of third country nationals entered into force on 2 June 2001. It aims to
ensure greater effectiveness in enforcing expulsion decisions and better coopera-
tion between Member States though mutual recognition of expulsion decisions.
The preamble to the Directive recalls that decisions on expulsion must be taken
in accordance with fundamental human rights standards and in particular the
European Convention on Human Rights. The UK and Ireland have opted into
this Directive. Member States were required to make legislative and administra-
tive provision for the implementation of the Directive by 2 December 2002, and
to inform the Commission about these provisions (Article 8). The Commission
has brought infringement proceedings to enforce this deadline.1
Article 1 of the Directive set out the purpose of the Directive, which oper-
ates without prejudice to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agree-
ment. Article 1(1) makes clear that the Directive applies to expulsion decisions
taken against third country nationals only but does not apply to expulsion deci-
sions taken against the family members of citizens of the Union.
Article 3 set out the type of expulsion decisions which are the subject of the
Directive. Article 3(1)(a) refers to expulsion decision based on serious and pres-
ent threat to public order or national security following conviction of an offence
1 Two judgments largely supported the Commission, except as regards the applica-
tion of Art. 7 of the Directive: Cases C-462/04 Commission v Italy and C-448/04
Commission v Luxembourg, both judgments 8 Sept. 2005, unreported. Two other
cases were withdrawn, presumably after late compliance by the Member States con-
cerned: Cases C-474/04 Commission v Greece, withdrawn 9 March 2005, and C-
450/04 Commission v France, withdrawn 29 Sept. 2005.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 787-798.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
2 COUNCIL DECISION of 23 February 2004 setting out the criteria and practical
arrangements for the compensation of the financial imbalances resulting from the
application of Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions on the
expulsion of third-country nationals (2004/191/EC), 27.02.2004 OJ L 60/55.
3 COM (2005) 391, 1 Sept. 2005. This proposal is too recent to be considered in detail
in this chapter.
4 Art. 16 of the proposal.
5 Art. 20 of the proposal.
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Chapter 25 Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions
6 Council doc. 9896/00, 30 June 2000. The official proposal (Council doc. 10130/00,
20 July 2000) was published in OJ 2000 C 243/1.
7 On ECHR protection against expulsion of irregular migrants, see D. v. United King-
dom and Dahlia v. France.
8 Council doc. 11119/00, 15 Sep. 2000.
9 Council doc. 14404/00, 21 Dec. 2000.
10 The text agreed by the Council was set out in Council doc. 13968/00, 29 Nov. 2000.
789
Section V – Irregular Migration
apply the law of the enforcing Member State, that even suspended sentences
could result in an expulsion order, that it was “without prejudice” to the Dublin
Convention and readmission agreements, and that all expulsion decisions “must
comply with” the ECHR “and other applicable international instruments”.11
The provisions on remedies were weakened, the provision on the connection
between residence permits and expulsion was clarified and the exclusion (based
on French law) for persons under the age of majority was dropped. On the other
hand, the Council agreed to exempt all family members of EC citizens who have
moved within the Community and provided for the adoption of a subsequent
measure on compensating Member States for applying the Directive. As a result
of the Directive’s application to such persons, the Council asserted that it builds
upon the Schengen acquis.
Formal adoption of the Directive had to wait several months because the
EP was still deliberating on the text, and had waited to consider the amend-
ments agreed by the Council. Ultimately, the EP voted to reject the Directive in
March 2001 on the ground that Article 63(3)(b) EC was not an adequate “legal
base” for the adoption of such an act.12 Ignoring this view, the May 2001 JHA
Council then formally adopted the Directive.13 In the meantime, there had been
some changes to the text. The final version of Article 3(2) weakens protection
for human rights, so that Member States need no longer “comply with” but must
simply have “due regard” to the relevant agreements. A number of additional
references to the Schengen Convention were also inserted. In fact this followed
a last-minute intervention from the Council legal service, which had sought to
delete any reference to human rights protection from the main text of the Direc-
tive and moreover had suggested the repeal of part of Article 96 of the Schengen
Convention.14
Finally, the Council inserted two statements into the minutes when adopt-
ing the Directive. Finland called for “appropriate harmonisation of national
legislation in this area in future”, and the Council urged the Commission to pro-
pose the compensation measure at the earliest opportunity.15 In fact, the Com-
mission waited until winter 2003 to make this proposal, which was adopted, as
noted above, the following February.
11 Council docs. 11120/00, 15 Sep. 2000; 11384/00, 18 Oct. 2000; 11384/00 Add 1, 25
Oct. 2000; 12323/00, 13 Oct. 2000; 12957/00, 3 Nov. 2000; 13168/00, 9 Nov. 2000;
13095/00, 9 Nov. 2000; 13095/1/00, 17 Nov. 2000; 13095/2/00, 24 Nov. 2000.
12 OJ 2001 C 343.
13 OJ 2001 L 149/34.
14 See Council doc. migr. 8/01, 17 May 2001, following the previously agreed text in
Council doc. 7859/01, 27 April 2001. The text following this intervention can be
found in Council docs. migr. 9/01, 18 May 2001, and 7859/1/01, 22 May 2001.
15 See Statements 49/01 and 50/01, in the monthly summary of Council Acts for May
2001 (Council doc. 10571/01, 4 July 2001).
790
Chapter 25 Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions
3 Legal Analysis
The potential for this Directive to conflict with a range of international and
other EU instruments is wide. First and most importantly, the lack of specific
and detailed human rights safeguards is notable. Whilst Article 3(2) of the Direc-
tive requires Member States generally to apply the Directive with due respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, this provision is very vague and does
not adequately guide Member States on the specific approach to be taken. In
particular, plainly any expulsion decision may only be enforced if it expulsion is
compatible with Articles 3 and 8 ECHR and the provisions of the 1951 Conven-
tion on the Status of Refugees. All of these provisions require an assessment
of the conditions facing the expellee in the country to which he will be expelled
which is to be made at the time of expulsion. The potential for the enforcing
Member State to rely on the assessment of compatibility with these standards
made by the issuing Member State is high. This is dangerous and may lead to
potential breaches of these standards if the expulsion decision was taken some
time prior to proposed enforcement or on the basis of incomplete information.
In any event changing circumstances in the country of origin of the person to be
expelled can mean that an expulsion decision may quickly become incompatible
with those human rights standards.
Furthermore there is a lack of reference or recognition of the rights of
long-term resident third country nationals. Again expulsion of such persons
may raise questions of compatibility with Article 8 ECHR16 and the Council
of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2000) 15 concerning the
security of residence of long-term migrants.17
Apart from potential conflict with international human rights standards
there is potential in the Directive for conflict with European Community free
movement law. Article 1(3) makes clear that the Directive does not apply to
the family members of European Union citizens who are exercising free move-
ment rights . However no mention is made of the family members of other EEA
nationals, namely of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Area provides for expulsion of nationals of these
States and their family members in strict conformity with the EC Treaty and
Directive 64/221. The Directive on expulsion decisions cannot override the pro-
visions of the EEA Treaty. Furthermore no mention is made in the Directive
on the family members of the Swiss nationals who are exercising free move-
ment rights under the terms of the EC-Swiss Agreement on Free Movement of
Persons. Again such persons are to be protected from expulsion except in strict
conformity with Council Directive 64/221. Finally no mention is made in the
16 See for instance C v. Belgium, 7 August 1997, Judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights
17 On the relationship between this Directive and the Directive on long-term residents,
see Ch. 20.
791
Section V – Irregular Migration
Directive of Turkish nationals or their family members who fall within the scope
of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement 1963 and its Additional Protocol. The
Court of Justice has already held that such persons are to be protected by the
standards of Council Directive 64/221.18
4 Comments
There are considerable differences across the Member States in the manner in
which expulsion decisions are taken, the grounds for taking such decisions and
the manner of execution. The problem with a Directive on mutual recognition
is that to some extent it takes on trust that decision-making in this area will be
relatively uniform. That is not borne out by reality. Although the expulsion deci-
sions to which this Directive applies are limited to specific types of decision, the
criteria for determining whether an expulsion decision falls within the scope of
such types of decision is relatively broad and will encompass a broad range of
decisions.
Whilst this Directive is a Title IV measure it plainly builds on Article 96
of the Schengen Convention. Some commentators have objected to the UK in
particular seemingly becoming an indirect party to that controversial provision
in the Schengen Convention without becoming a full Schengen State.19 In par-
ticular the lack of safeguards regarding data emanating from the UK is high-
lighted.
There are plainly inherent problems with Member States enforcing the
expulsion decisions made by other Member States. A lack of information or
data is likely to be the foremost problem in enforcing the decision and ensur-
ing that the enforcement of decision is compatible with human rights obliga-
tions. The problem for the enforcing Member State is that if it is considering
enforcing a decision made by another Member State it will have the administra-
tive and judicial burden of possible challenges to that expulsion. It will have to
consider for itself if the enforcement can take place in light of human rights
considerations at that time. Such obligations exist notwithstanding that another
Member State may have carried out such assessment at an earlier stage since
it is not possible for one Member State to hide behind the decision making of
another Member State to avoid obligations under the ECHR or other human
rights instruments.20
18 Cases C-340/97 Nazli v Stadt Nürnberg [2000] ECR I–957, C-467/02 Cetinkaya
[2004] ECR I-10895 and C-136/03 Dorr and Unal (judgment of 2 June 2005, not yet
reported).
19 See for instance ILPA’s response to the French Presidency Proposals of November
2000, submitted to the House of Lords European Sub Committee enquiry.
20 See for instance T.I. v United Kingdom, Application no. 43844/98, Admissibility
Decision of European Court of Human Rights, 7 March 2000.
792
Chapter 25 Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions
793
Section V – Irregular Migration
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63(3) thereof,
Having regard to the initiative of the French Republic,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) The Treaty stipulates that the Council is to adopt measures on immigration
policy within areas comprising conditions of entry and residence as well as
illegal immigration and illegal residence.
(2) The Tampere European Council on 15 and 16 October 1999 reaffirmed its
resolve to create an area of freedom, security and justice. For that purpose,
a common European policy on asylum and migration should aim both at
fair treatment of third country nationals and better management of migra-
tion flows.
(5) In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the objective of the pro-
posed action, namely cooperation between Member States on expulsion
of third country nationals, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the effects of the envisaged action, be
better achieved by the Community. This Directive does not go beyond what
is necessary to achieve that objective.
794
Chapter 25 Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions
(6) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom has
given notice by letter of 18 October 2000 of its wish to take part in the
adoption and application of this Directive.
(7) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the adoption of
this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it or subject to its application.
Given that this Directive aims to build upon the Schengen acquis under the
provisions of Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
in accordance with Article 5 of the abovementioned Protocol, Denmark
will decide within a period of six months after the Council has adopted this
Directive whether it will transpose this decision into its national law.
(8) As regards the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, this Direc-
tive constitutes a development of the Schengen acquis within the meaning
of the agreement concluded on 18 May 1999 between the Council of the
European Union and those two States. As a result of the procedures laid
down in the agreement, the rights and obligations arising from this Direc-
tive should also apply to those two States and in relations between those
two States and the Member States of the European Community to which
this Directive is addressed,
Article 1
795
Section V – Irregular Migration
3. This Directive shall not apply to family members of citizens of the Union
who have exercised their right of free movement.
Article 2
Article 3
2. Member States shall apply this Directive with due respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
796
Chapter 25 Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions
Article 4
The Member States shall ensure that the third country national concerned may,
in accordance with the enforcing Member State’s legislation, bring proceedings
for a remedy against any measure referred to in Article 1(2).
Article 5
Without prejudice to Articles 101 and 102 of the Schengen Convention, per-
sonal data files shall be used in the context of this Directive only for the pur-
poses laid down therein.
Article 6
The authorities of the issuing Member State and of the enforcing Member State
shall make use of all appropriate means of cooperation and of exchanging infor-
mation to implement this Directive.
The issuing Member State shall provide the enforcing Member State with all
documents needed to certify the continued enforceability of the decision by the
fastest appropriate means, where appropriate in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the SIRENE Manual.
The enforcing Member State shall first examine the situation of the person
concerned to ensure that neither the relevant international instruments nor the
national rules applicable conflict with the enforcement of the expulsion deci-
sion.
797
Section V – Irregular Migration
Article 7
Member States shall compensate each other for any financial imbalances which
may result from application of this Directive where expulsion cannot be effected
at the expense of the national(s) of the third country concerned.
Article 8
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than 2
December 2002. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion
of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be
laid down by Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main
provisions of domestic law which they adopt in the field governed by this
Directive.
Article 9
This Directive shall enter into force the day of its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.
Article 10
This Directive is addressed to the Member States, in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
798
Chapter 26 Carrier Sanctions
1 Summary
The Directive supplementing the Convention implementing the Schengen
Agreement re financial penalties on carriers transporting third-country nation-
als without correct documentation1 came into force on 19 August 2001 with
implementation necessary by 11 February 2003. One Member State has been
condemned by the Court of Justice for failure to implement the Directive on
time,2 while another two Member States escaped sanction by implementing the
Directive while proceedings before the Court of Justice were underway.3
As the preamble makes clear, this Directive builds on the Schengen acquis,
in accordance with the Protocol integrating it into the framework of the Euro-
pean Union, as laid down by Annex A to Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20
May 1999 concerning the definition of the Schengen acquis the purpose of deter-
mining, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the
European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the legal basis for
each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the acquis. In accordance
with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ire-
land annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, the United Kingdom has given notice of its wish to take
part in the adoption and application of this Directive. Ireland and Denmark,
however, did not participate in the adoption of this Directive. Although Ireland
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 799-808.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
4 See Council Decision on Irish participation in Schengen (OJ 2002 L 64/20), Arts.
2(2)(c) and 6(3).
5 OJ 2000 L 239/1.
6 Art. 3 of the Directive.
7 Art. 5 of the Directive.
800
Chapter 26 Carrier Sanctions
ified in the Convention.8 Article 26(1)(b) requires carriers to ensure that third-
country nationals have the travel documents required for entry. To enforce this
obligation, Article 26(2) and 26(3) require Member States to impose (unspeci-
fied) penalties on carriers which transport, by air, sea or coach, third-country
nationals who do not possess the necessary travel documents from a third state
to their territories. The UK and Ireland have opted into this provision of the
Schengen acquis.9
The French Council Presidency in the second half of 2000 proposed
a Directive that would have applied alongside these provisions. As originally
proposed, the Directive would have altered the carriers’ obligations under the
Convention.10 First, where persons were refused entry owing to lack of travel
documents or visas, the carrier would have to “take charge” of those persons
and return them to the state of origin, the state issuing them a travel document,
or any other state willing to guarantee their entry. Second, the same obligations
would apply to persons in transit to a third state if that state refused to admit
them and sent them back, or if a carrier refused to transport them. Third, if a
carrier could not return such persons, it would have to find means of onward
transportation immediately and bear the costs; if onward transportation were
not possible, the carrier would have to “take charge” of them. Also, the Direc-
tive would have specified that Member States’ penalties for transporting persons
without travel documents or visas should be at least €2000 a person, but this
would not apply where persons were “admitted to the territory for asylum pur-
poses”. Member States would be free to impose more stringent penalties on car-
riers, and could apply the Directive to crossing of internal Community borders
if they applied checks on internal borders as provided for by derogation from
the Schengen Convention. This latter provision was obviously a reflection of the
particular situation of France, which had retained such checks on its borders
with Belgium and Luxembourg.
Significant changes to the text were made in the Council working group on
migration.11 First, the text was redrafted so that it would only supplement the
provisions of Article 26 of the Schengen Convention, rather than run alongside
and apparently alter it. Also, the revised proposal would not alter the existing
rules concerning persons refused entry into a Member State. Instead, the pro-
8 The State from which that person came, the State issuing that person a travel docu-
ment, or any other State willing to guarantee entry of that person.
9 See Decisions on UK and Irish Schengen participation (OJ 2000 L 131/43 and n. 4
above).
10 OJ 2000 C 269/8. A slightly different version had been proposed beforehand (Coun-
cil docs. 10186/00, 7 July 2000 and 10186/1/00, 31 July 2000).
11 Council docs. 11761/00, 27 Sep. 2000; 12488/00, 18 Oct. 2000; 13161/00, 9 Nov.
2000; 13138/00, 10 Nov. 2000; 13510/00, 16 Nov. 2000; 13510/1/00, 21 Nov. 2000;
13510/2/00, 28 Nov. 2000; and 14074/00, 29 Nov. 2000.
801
Section V – Irregular Migration
posal would simply extend those rules to persons denied transport to or returned
from a third state. Carriers would still have obligations to move, or in default,
“take charge” of persons, and there would be options as regards penalties: either
a maximum amount of €5,000 per person, a minimum amount of €3,000 per
person or a lump sum with a maximum amount of at least €500,000. The exemp-
tion for persons admitted for asylum was gone, after at least one delegation
expressly argued that this exemption “could make penalties for carriers inef-
fective and increase asylum applications”.12 However, a vague clause requiring
Member States to grant “effective rights of defence and appeal” against penal-
ties was added.
Since there were still some reservations from Member States and the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) had not yet voted on the proposal, discussions contin-
ued during the Swedish Presidency in the first half of 2001. Eventually the EP,
in plenary session, rejected the proposed Directive in March 2001, although
the Council was unfazed by this.13 SCIFA reached a compromise in May 2001
that consisted of three amendments.14 First, the obligation for carriers to “take
charge” of a person was replaced by an obligation to pay for stay and return.
Second, at the behest of Belgium and Sweden, a weak form of the “asylum
exemption” was re-inserted: the obligation to impose penalties is “without preju-
dice to Member States’ obligations in cases where a third-country national seeks
international protection”. Third, the proposed clause concerning reimposition
of carrier sanctions if a Member State reimposed checks on its internal borders
was deleted.
The Directive was agreed politically at the May 2001 JHA Council and then
formally adopted by the Transport and Telecoms Council of 27/28 June 2001. A
declaration in the Council minutes concerning the definition of the absence of
travel documents was also adopted.15
3 Legal Issues
As noted above, according to Article 4(2) of the Directive, the imposition of pen-
alties is “without prejudice to Member States’ obligations in cases where a third-
country national seeks international protection”. This meagre substitute for a
provision exempting carriers from penalties in cases where the person claims
asylum places the Member States potentially in breach of its obligations under
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. The “without prejudice” provi-
sion does not appear to expressly disallow the imposition of penalties in such
802
Chapter 26 Carrier Sanctions
cases. However if the obligations imposed on Member States under the Refugee
Convention were to be interpreted in good faith there is a good argument for
suggesting mechanisms designed to prevent the travel of asylum seekers from
their countries of origin strike at the heart of the Refugee Convention: the right
to seek asylum in country other than that of habitual residence or nationality.16
Furthermore, the Refugee Convention explicitly recognises that some refugees
will have no option but to use illegal means of entry and prohibits States from
imposing penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence.
Insofar as carrier sanctions legislation is designed to prevent irregular or illegal
entry, it is certainly arguable that such legislation is broadly inconsistent with
Article 31, which accepts that there is justification for illegal entry by refugees.
The lack of proper procedural safeguards contained in the Directive poten-
tially raises issue of compatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. It might be tempting for Member States bearing in mind the
requirements of the Directive to impose mandatory penalties on carriers and
the weakness of the provision relating to appeals to impose automatic sanctions
on a carrier thus reversing the burden of proof. Principles of justice contained
within Article 6, particularly Article 6(3), mean that the burden should be on the
authorities to prove the offence, rather than the carrier to disprove it.
Furthermore it is questionable whether provisions permitting the confisca-
tion of vehicles or other forms of transport owned by the carrier are compatible
with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR and the right to property. Depending
on the nature of the offence, confiscation of a carrier’s transport could be seen
as disproportionate to any aim of the authorities in preventing the carrying of
illegal immigrants.17
4 Comments
Carriers sanction legislation has been controversial both from the point of view
of the carriers and of those representing passengers, particularly vulnerable
groups. Whether or not they are legally impermissible for reasons of conflict
with the Refugee Convention, as discussed above, a number of non-governmen-
803
Section V – Irregular Migration
tal organisations for moral and practical reasons oppose the use of carrier sanc-
tions as a means of preventing asylum seekers from travelling to assert their
claims.18 They have argued that not only does the use of sanctions give the car-
rier the role of immigration officer, but it ignores the fact that there is no avail-
able means whereby asylum seekers can get pre-clearance to come to countries
within the EU to assert their claims for asylum in any event. The consequential
“demonising” of all asylum seekers trying to get to the EU as “illegal immi-
grants”, despite the fact that the Refugee Convention requires that an asylum
seeker be outside his or her country of feared persecution in order to make a
claim to be a refugee in any event, is reprehensible. Putative refugees have, by
reason of the carrier sanctions regimes in place, no alternative but to resort to
the use of false documents to travel and the extreme measures sought to be taken
to make their claims.
There are other fundamental criticisms to be made of carrier sanctions leg-
islation. The increasing use of such legislation and the strict liability which is
placed on carriers means that they have no choice but to undertake the role of
immigration officers. Whilst neither trained in the complex immigration laws of
the Member States nor granted the legal power to make immigration decisions
on behalf of Members States, carriers are forced to decide for Member States
who shall be allowed to travel and who shall not.19 Not only does this place
carriers in the invidious position of taking on the role of immigration officer
on behalf of the Member State but it is highly unsatisfactory for the passen-
ger rejected by the carrier. Whereas any passenger refused entry or a visa by a
Member State may avail himself of the legal remedies available for challenging a
refusal, the passenger will have little or no redress against the carrier for refusing
passage. This not only affects the ability of refugees to reach places of sanctu-
ary but potentially interferes with the passengers’ rights to family and private
life. Even if the refused passenger were able to bring some form of civil action
against the carrier for wrongly refusing passage, for many passenger the relief
obtained would be too late depending on the reasons for travel.
804
Chapter 26 Carrier Sanctions
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 61(a) and Article 63(3)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the initiative of the French Republic,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) In order to combat illegal immigration effectively, it is essential that all the
Member States introduce provisions laying down the obligations of carri-
ers transporting foreign nationals into the territory of the Member States.
In addition, in order to ensure a greater effectiveness of this objective, the
financial penalties currently provided for by the Member States for cases
where carriers fail to meet their control obligations should be harmonised
to the extent possible, taking into account the differences in legal systems
and practices between the Member States.
(2) This measure is among the general provisions aimed at curbing migratory
flows and combating illegal immigration.
(4) The freedom of the Member States to retain or introduce additional mea-
sures or penalties for carriers, whether referred to in this Directive or not,
should not be affected.
(5) Member States should ensure that in any proceedings brought against car-
riers which may result in the application of penalties, the rights of defence
and the right of appeal against such decisions can be exercised effectively.
(6) This Directive builds on the Schengen acquis, in accordance with the Proto-
col integrating it into the framework of the European Union, as laid down
by Annex A to Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999 concerning
805
Section V – Irregular Migration
(7) In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom gave
notice, by letter of 25 October 2000, of its wish to take part in the adoption
and application of this Directive.
(9) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the adoption
of this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it or subject to its applica-
tion. Given that this instrument aims to build upon the Schengen acquis
under the provisions of Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, in accordance with Article 5 of the abovementioned Protocol,
Denmark shall decide within a period of 6 months after the Council has
adopted this Directive whether it will implement it in its national law.
(10) As regards the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, this Direc-
tive constitutes a development of the Schengen acquis within the meaning
of the Agreement concluded on 18 May 1999 by the Council of the Euro-
pean Union and those two States concerning the lattter’s association with
the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis,
Article 1
806
Chapter 26 Carrier Sanctions
Article 2
Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the obligation of
carriers to return third country nationals provided for in the provisions of Arti-
cle 26(1)(a) of the Schengen Convention shall also apply when entry is refused
to a third-country national in transit if:
(a) the carrier which was to take him to his country of destination refuses to take
him on board;
(b) or the authorities of the State of destination have refused him entry and have
sent him back to the Member State through which he transited.
Article 3
Member States shall take the necessary measures to oblige carriers which are
unable to effect the return of a third-country national whose entry is refused to
find means of onward transportation immediately and to bear the cost thereof,
or, if immediate onward transportation is not possible, to assume responsibility
for the costs of the stay and return of the third-country national in question.
Article 4
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the penal-
ties applicable to carriers under the provisions of Article 26(2) and (3) of
the Schengen Convention are dissuasive, effective and proportionate and
that:
(a) either the maximum amount of the applicable financial penalties is
not less than EUR 5000 or equivalent national currency at the rate of
exchange published in the Official Journal on 10 August 2001, for each
person carried, or
(b) the minimum amount of these penalties is not less than EUR 3000 or
equivalent national currency at the rate of exchange published in the
Official Journal on 10 August 2001, for each person carried, or
(c) the maximum amount of the penalty imposed as a lump sum for each
infringement is not less that EUR 500000 or equivalent national cur-
rency at the rate of exchange published in the Official Journal on 10
August 2001, irrespective of the number of persons carried.
807
Section V – Irregular Migration
Article 5
This Directive shall not prevent Member States from adopting or retaining, for
carriers which do not comply with the obligations arising from the provisions of
Article 26(2) and (3) of the Schengen Convention and of Article 2 of this Direc-
tive, other measures involving penalties of another kind, such as immobilisation,
seizure and confiscation of the means of transport, or temporary suspension or
withdrawal of the operating licence.
Article 6
Member States shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions stipulate that carriers against which proceedings are brought with a view to
imposing penalties have effective rights of defence and appeal.
Article 7
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Direc-
tive not later than 11 February 2003. They shall forthwith inform the Com-
mission thereof.
2. When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion
of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be
laid down by Member States.
Article 8
This Directive shall enter into force 30 days after its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.
Article 9
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
808
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Human Beings
1 Summary
The Council Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings1
entered into force on 1 August 2002, and Member States had to implement it by
1 August 2004.2 Its aim is to contribute to the fight against and prevent of traf-
ficking in human beings by complementing other instruments in this area.3
The preamble to the Framework Decision recognises that trafficking in
human beings represents serious violations of fundamental rights and human
dignity, which involves the use of ruthless practices and violence. It also recog-
nises the particular vulnerability of women and children to trafficking, and
states that action against trafficking in human beings must take place at both a
national and European level. The Framework Decision affirms that it is neces-
sary to introduce sanctions on perpetrators which are sufficiently severe.
Article 1 defines the concept of trafficking in human beings for the purpose
of labour or sexual exploitation. The Member States must punish any form of
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring of a person who has been
deprived of his/her fundamental rights in this context. Thus, all criminal con-
duct which abuses the physical or mental vulnerability of a person as defined by
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 809-826.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
None of the above means need to be used for the acts to be punishable if the
victim is a child.4
Article 2 provides that Member States should take action to make insti-
gating trafficking in human beings and being an accomplice or attempting to
commit a crime punishable.
Article 3 states that penalties provided for by national legislation must
be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” The maximum penalty is to be
no fewer than eight years imprisonment if certain conditions are met includ-
ing whether the offence has deliberately endangered the life of the victim, there
has been a use of serious violence or harm to the victim or where the victim is
particularly vulnerable. Additionally the maximum penalty will apply where the
crime is committed within the framework of a criminal organisation as defined
by Joint Action 98/733/JHA.5
Articles 4 and 5 create obligations on Member States to have in place mea-
sures necessary to ensure that criminal or civil liability attaches to legal persons
as well as natural persons. Legal persons will be held liable for offences com-
mitted for their benefit by any person acting either individually or a part of the
organ of the legal person, or who exercises a power of decision.
Penalties on legal persons must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”;
they must include criminal or non-criminal fines and specific sanctions such as
a temporary or definitive ban on commercial activities, a judicial dissolution
measure or the exclusion from public benefits or advantages.
Article 6(1) provides that a Member State is to establish jurisdiction over
offences committed in whole or part within their territories, where the offender
is one of its nationals or where the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal
person established in the territory of that Member State, although Article 6(2)
4 Art. 1(3).
5 OJ 1998 L 351/1. In the meantime the Commission has proposed a Framework
Decision which would replace this Joint Action (COM (2005) 6, 19 Jan. 2005; see
Art. 9); as of Jan. 2006 it was still under discussion in the Council.
810
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
permits Member States to limit this obligation to offences wholly or partly com-
mitted within their territory.
Article 6(3) makes clear that if a Member State does not extradite its own
nationals it must exercise jurisdiction over and prosecute an offence committed
by one of its nationals outside its territory.
Article 7 provides that the investigation or prosecution of offences will not
be dependant on the reporting or accusation made by a victim of the offences.
Child victims of trafficking are entitled to special assistance, in accordance with
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal pro-
ceedings.6
Article 9 repeals a prior measure, Joint Action 97/154/JHA, as regards com-
bating trafficking in human beings.7
Member States had to transmit to the General Secretariat of the Coun-
cil and to the Commission the provisions transposing the Framework Decision
into their national legislation. On the basis of a written report drawn from this
information, and a written report submitted by the Commission, the Council
had to check by 1 August 2005 that the Member States have taken the necessary
measures to implement the Framework Decision.8 In fact, the Commission had
not submitted its report, and the Council had not yet assessed national imple-
mentation, as of 1 January 2006.
6 OJ 2001 L 82/1.
7 OJ 1997 L 63. That Joint Action remained in force as regards sexual exploitation of
children, although it was later rescinded by a further Framework Decision on that
issue: see s. 2 below.
8 Article 10 of the Framework Decision.
9 N. 7 above.
10 COM (2000) 854, 21 Dec 2000; OJ 2001 C 62 E/324.
11 OJ 2001 L 30/44.
12 OJ 2004 L 13/44. Member States must apply this Framework Decision by 20 Jan.
2006 (Art. 12(1)).
811
Section V – Irregular Migration
13 Council doc. 8599/01, 14 May 2001; see also 8599/01 cor 2, 15 May 2001.
14 Council doc. 8599/1/01, 23 May 2001.
15 See the JHA Council Press Release and also the outcome of proceedings on this
issue (Council doc. 9009/01, 1 June 2001).
812
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
tion must constitute an offence, even without any of the listed forms of control.
Finally, the agreed text also specified that the consent of the victim would be
irrelevant.
Instead of a normal maximum sentence of at least six years with exten-
sions to ten years in certain circumstances as the Commission had proposed, the
normal sentence must simply consist of custodial penalties, with extensions to
eight years in some circumstances. Those circumstances were also more precisely
defined, now consisting of circumstances endangering the life of the victim, oth-
erwise involving inhuman or degrading treatment, or entailing involvement of
organised crime as defined in the very broad EU Joint Action on the concept of
“criminal organisation”.16 However, this issue was still open to debate.
The agreed text also deleted the provision on cooperation between Member
States proposed by the Commission and completely redrafted the provision con-
cerning protection of victims, replacing a general obligation to ensure adequate
legal protection and standing with specific rules on protection of children by ref-
erence to a Framework Decision on victims’ rights and permitting investigations
or prosecutions to begin in the absence of a complaint by a victim.
In June 2001, the EP delivered its opinion on the proposal, but it had little
effect on the Council, which had already reached a consensus on so much of the
text.17 A number of the amendments in any event reflected agreements within
the Council on the definition of the crimes. However, an important amendment
suggested exempting “[a]ssistance given on humanitarian grounds to persons
not in possession of the proper papers who are seeking entry and residence”
from the scope of the measure, and a further safeguard clause would specify
that nothing in the measure would “adversely affect the rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, including
international humanitarian law and international human rights law”, includ-
ing the Geneva Convention on refugees “in particular”.18 These amendments
would have aligned the trafficking measure more closely with the two facilitation
measures,19 with the significant distinction that the humanitarian exception here
would be mandatory. There would also be further protection for victims, includ-
ing the possibility of a temporary residence permit.20
16 N. 5 above.
17 OJ 2002 C 53 E/121.
18 Amendments 14 and 35, suggesting new Arts. 1(1a) and 8a.
19 See Ch. 28.
20 See amendments 24, 30, 32, 33, 56, 44 and 47, suggesting new Arts. 4(2a), 6(ea) and
7a and an amendment to Art. 8.
813
Section V – Irregular Migration
21 See Council docs. 9401/01, 18 June 2001; 10313/01, 26 June 2001; and 11911/01, 17
Sep. 2001.
22 Council doc. 13149/01, 24 Oct. 2001 (outcome of proceedings). For the agreed text
following consideration of the EP’s Opinion, see Council doc. 14216/01, 3 Dec.
2001. The only substantive difference was the addition of a clause extending the
measure to Gibraltar.
23 N. 1 above.
24 Statements 129 to 131/02 in the Monthly Summary of Council Acts for July 2002
(Council doc. 12399/02, 27 Sept. 2002).
25 See Ch. 29.
26 OJ 2003 C 137/1.
27 OJ 2003 C 260/4.
28 OJ 2003 L 79/25. The later reports and opinions of the group are online at: <http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/crime/trafficking/doc_crime_
human_trafficking_en.htm#>.
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Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
has committed the Commission and Council to adopt an action plan against
trafficking in persons by the end of 2005,29 and an action plan was adopted by
the Council in December 2005.30 The Commission has also proposed that the
EC conclude the Protocol to the UN organised crime Convention,31 and in the
meantime, the Council of Europe has drawn up its own Convention against traf-
ficking in persons,32 which the EC may ultimately sign and conclude.33
More broadly, there is an EU Framework Decision on the status of victims
in criminal proceedings,34 and an EC Directive on state compensation for victims
of crime.35 The Directive essentially only applies where there is a cross-border
element within the EU, but it does require Member States to establish a system
of state compensation for victims of “violent intentional crime”, although the
detailed requirements for such national systems are not set out.36 The meaning
of “violent intentional crime” is not expressly defined in the Directive, but in
the absence of any contrary indication, it is a concept of Community law which
must have a uniform meaning if the Directive is to achieve its intended effects.37
Obviously the victims of trafficking should often, or perhaps always, be able to
claim that the crimes committed against them were violent and intentional, in
light of the definitions in this Framework Decision and the general consider-
ations set out in its preamble. However, the cross-border aspects of the Directive
will only apply where a person is “habitually resident” in a Member State, thus
815
Section V – Irregular Migration
precluding any trafficking victim habitually resident outside the EU from relying
upon those provisions. However, the obligation to establish national schemes
does not contain such a territorial limitation, so it should follow by a contrario
reasoning that the national schemes must compensate all persons who suffered
an intentional violent crime while present on the territory of a Member State,
whatever their immigration status.
Member States had to set up a national scheme for compensation by 1 July
2005, and had to comply with the rest of the Directive by 1 January 2006.38
Finally, it should be emphasised that the Directive is not based on Title IV EC,
but on Article 308 EC, the “residual powers” clause in the EC Treaty. So the
Directive applies to all Member States, including the UK, Ireland and Denmark,
and any national court or tribunal may (or, in the case of final courts, must) refer
questions about it to the Court of Justice.
3 Legal Analysis
The first legal issue that needs consideration is the legal effect of a Framework
Decision in EU law. The EU’s Court of Justice has considered this issue in
the context of the Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal
proceedings39 in the case of Pupino.40 In that case the Court of Justice made
clear that framework decisions have indirect effect, placing an obligation on the
authorities of Member States and national courts to interpret domestic law in
conformity with the Framework Decision. The Member States are given latitude
in the manner of implementation of the Framework Decision but the decision
binds the Member State as to the result to be achieved. However, the Court also
confirmed that like Directives, Framework Decisions cannot aggravate criminal
liability until a Member State transposes them into national law. The Court also
observed that criminal trials to implement Member States’ obligations under
Framework Decisions must comply with the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by
Article 6 ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.
Following a subsequent decision of the Court of Justice,41 it might now be
questioned whether the Framework Decision falls in part within EC compe-
tence, at least to the extent that the requirement to adopt criminal penalties (and
penalties against legal persons) against trafficking in persons falls within the
EC’s powers concerning “illegal migration”.42
38 Art. 18.
39 N. 6 above.
40 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, Case C-105/03, Judgment of 16 June
2005, not yet reported.
41 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council, judgment of 13 Sept 2005, not yet reported.
42 See further Ch. 3.
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Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
817
Section V – Irregular Migration
with the alleviation of social conditions and the need for public information
campaigns.
4 Comments
The proposal for a Framework Decision was commented upon most notably by
Human Rights Watch and Anti-Slavery International.51 They offered a guarded
welcome to the Commission’s proposal although criticised it for the lack of
attempt to tackle the root causes of trafficking in the proposal despite the refer-
ences to root causes in the draft preamble.
Regrettably any reference to root causes of trafficking has been removed
in the final adopted Framework Decision. The preambles only refer to the need
for co-operation and harmonisation of legal approach to the judicial and law
enforcement against trafficking human beings. In this regard the Framework
Decision is clearly lacking. The call for further actions in the “fight against traf-
ficking in women” in the EU’s Vienna Action Plan on the development of JHA
law and policy52 must logically include action to combat the causes of trafficking
which have their roots in violence against women and children in their coun-
tries of origin as well as lack of opportunities for those women and children.
There was a clear opportunity for the EU to take co-ordinated and concerted
efforts to tackle the causes of trafficking through social programmes, advertising
campaigns, education of social workers, teachers and employers and redressing
imbalances in educational and employment opportunities for women and chil-
dren both within the European Union and outside it.
There is no explicit recognition in the Framework Decision that the traffick-
ing of human beings can involve the co-operation or complicity of state officials
or state agents. Although such individuals can plainly be subject to the penalties
set out in Article 3, the involvement of state officials should have been subject
of specific provision to ensure that Member States take appropriate measures
against such individuals.
The provisions on the protection of and assistance to the victims of traf-
ficking are extremely weak. Under Article 7 the only “protection and assistance”
that adult victims receive is that they should not have to report or make any
accusation in order for a Member State to bring a prosecution. The only “protec-
tion” is afforded to children, where Member States are obliged to take measures
to ensure “appropriate assistance” for his or her family. It is certainly arguable
that the protection measures should have included protection against prosecu-
tion for victims of trafficking (including for breach of immigration laws or for
prostitution). Furthermore the parallel Directive on the victims of traffick-
ing, adopted two years later, does not do enough to require Member States to
51 <http://www.antislavery.org/archive/other/trafficking-framework.htm>.
52 The Action Plan of the Council and Commission, OJ C 19, 23.1.1999, p.1.
818
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
provide sanctuary and social and health services as appropriate to the victims
of trafficking.53
It has to be appreciated that unless and until the root causes of traffick-
ing are tackled, the trafficking and exploitation of humans is likely to continue.
Furthermore the lack of any sufficient attempt to provide protection and basic
needs for the victims of trafficking will surely only serve to ensure that victims
do not come forward to report their traffickers and the traffickers remain unpun-
ished and undetected. At the very least the Framework Decision should have
set standards for legal assistance to be provided to the victims of trafficking
to ensure that both civil and criminal proceedings can be brought against the
perpetrators of such crimes and the victims can effectively participate in such
proceedings.54 The potential involvement in a criminal prosecution for a victim
of trafficking can often be bewildering and frightening, unless legal, social and
psychological assistance is given to him or her.
The Framework Decision is also silent on the co-operation and co-ordi-
nation of efforts with third countries, either countries of origin and countries
of transit. Since much of human trafficking into the European Union has an
external dimension, the Framework Decision should have created obligations
for such co-operation and co-ordination.
819
Section V – Irregular Migration
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29,
Article 31(e) and Article 34(2)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) The Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to imple-
ment the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom,
security and justice, the Tampere European Council on 15 and 16 October
1999, the Santa Maria da Feira European Council on 19 and 20 June 2000,
as listed in the Scoreboard, and the European Parliament in its Resolution
of 19 May 2000 on the communication from the Commission “for further
actions in the fight against trafficking in women” indicate or call for legisla-
tive action against trafficking in human beings, including common defini-
tions, incriminations and sanctions.
820
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
(5) Children are more vulnerable and are therefore at greater risk of falling
victim to trafficking.
(9) This Framework Decision should contribute to the fight against and pre-
vention of trafficking in human beings by complementing the instruments
adopted in this area such as Council Joint Action 96/700/JHA of 29 Novem-
ber 1996 establishing an incentive and exchange programme for persons
responsible for combating trade in human beings and sexual exploitation
of children (STOP)(7), Council Joint Action 96/748/JHA of 16 December
1996 extending the mandate given to the Europol Drugs Unit, Decision
No 293/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
January 2000 adopting a programme of Community action (the Daphne
programme) (2000 to 2003) on preventive measures to fight violence against
children, young persons and women, Council Joint Action 98/428/JHA of
29 June 1998 on the creation of a European Judicial Network, Council
Joint Action 96/277/JHA of 22 April 1996 concerning a framework for the
exchange of liaison magistrates to improve judicial cooperation between the
Member States of the European Union and Council Joint Action 98/427/
JHA of 29 June 1998 on good practice in mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters.
821
Section V – Irregular Migration
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the
following acts are punishable:
4. For the purpose of this Framework Decision, “child” shall mean any person
below 18 years of age.
822
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the instiga-
tion of, aiding, abetting or attempt to commit an offence referred to in Article
1 is punishable.
Article 3 Penalties
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that an
offence referred to in Articles 1 and 2 is punishable by effective, proportion-
ate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that an
offence referred to in Article 1 is punishable by terms of imprisonment with
a maximum penalty that is not less than eight years where it has been com-
mitted in any of the following circumstances:
(a) the offence has deliberately or by gross negligence endangered the life
of the victim;
(b) the offence has been committed against a victim who was particularly
vulnerable. A victim shall be considered to have been particularly vul-
nerable at least when the victim was under the age of sexual majority
under national law and the offence has been committed for the pur-
pose of the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, including pornography;
(c) the offence has been committed by use of serious violence or has
caused particularly serious harm to the victim;
(d) the offence has been committed within the framework of a criminal
organisation as defined in Joint Action 98/733/JHA, apart from the
penalty level referred to therein.
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal
persons can be held liable for an offence referred to in Articles 1 and 2, com-
mitted for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part
of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal
person, based on:
(a) a power of representation of the legal person, or
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person, or
(c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 1, each Member
State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be
823
Section V – Irregular Migration
3. Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude crimi-
nal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators or
accessories in an offence referred to in Articles 1 and 2.
4. For the purpose of this Framework Decision, legal person shall mean any
entity having such status under the applicable law, except for States or other
public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public international
organisations.
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal
person held liable pursuant to Article 4 is punishable by effective, proportionate
and dissuasive sanctions, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and
may include other sanctions, such as:
(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid, or
(b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial
activities, or
(c) placing under judicial supervision, or
(d) a judicial winding-up order, or
(e) temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used
for committing the offence.
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish its juris-
diction over an offence referred to in Articles 1 and 2 where:
(a) the offence is committed in whole or in part within its territory, or
(b) the offender is one of its nationals, or
(c) the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in
the territory of that Member State.
2. A Member State may decide that it will not apply or that it will apply only in
specific cases or circumstances, the jurisdiction rules set out in paragraphs
1(b) and 1(c) as far as the offence is committed outside its territory.
3. A Member State which, under its laws, does not extradite its own nation-
als shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over and
824
Chapter 27 Trafficking in Humans
4. Member States shall inform the General Secretariat of the Council and the
Commission accordingly where they decide to apply paragraph 2, where
appropriate with an indication of the specific cases or circumstances in
which the decision applies.
3. Where the victim is a child, each Member State shall take the measures
possible to ensure appropriate assistance for his or her family. In particular,
each Member State shall, where appropriate and possible, apply Article 4
of Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA to the family referred to.
Article 10 Implementation
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this
Framework Decision before 1 August 2004.
825
Section V – Irregular Migration
2005 at the latest, on the basis of a report established on the basis of this
information and a written report transmitted by the Commission, assess
the extent to which Member States have taken the necessary measures in
order to comply with this Framework Decision.
This Framework Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in
the Official Journal.
826
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Irregular Entry, Residence
and Movement
1 Summary
Two measures relating to facilitation of “unauthorised entry, transit and resi-
dence” were adopted in November 2002: Council Framework Decision on the
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised
entry, transit and residence,1 and Council Directive defining the facilitation of
unauthorised entry, transit and residence.2 The two are intended to complement
one another. The Framework Decision lays down minimum rules regarding pen-
alties for facilitation of irregular entry, transit and residence whereas the Direc-
tive defines the nature of facilitation of irregular entry, transit and residence.
The Framework Decision is adopted under Title VI of the EU Treaty. As
the preamble states it is considered part of common action in the fields of police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. However it supplements measures
adopted under Title IV of the Treaty relating to trafficking in human beings for
instance. The preamble states that as the Framework Decision is a “develop-
ment” of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, the arrangements for Iceland
and Norway regarding Schengen3 are extended to the Framework Decision. The
United Kingdom and Ireland are stated in the preamble to be taking part in the
Framework Decision in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol integrating
the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union annexed to the
EU Treaty and EC Treaty.
Article 1 directs Member States to ensure that infringements set out in the
related Directive are punishable by “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 827-844.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
828
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
The Council Directive makes clear that it is adopted under Title IV of the
EC Treaty (Article 61(a) and Article 63(3)(b) EC). The preamble states that the
purpose of the Directive is to provide a definition of the facilitation of illegal
immigration and to make “more effective” the Framework Decision on facilita-
tion. Both the UK and Ireland take part in the adoption and application of the
Directive.
Articles 1 and 2 define what acts are to be sanctioned. Article 1 sets out
the general infringement which includes where a person intentionally assists a
non-national to enter or transit the territory of a Member State in breach of its
immigration laws or where for financial gain the person intentionally assists a
non-national to reside in the territory of a Member State in breach of its laws.
Article 1(2) provides that Member States may decide not to impose sanctions
where the aim of the activity is “to provide humanitarian assistance”.
Article 2 directs Member States to adopt sanctions in respect of any person
who is the instigator of, an accomplice in or who attempts to commit one of
the infringements in Article 1. Article 3 provides that the sanctions adopted by
Member States are to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.
The Directive had to be implemented by 5 December 2004. Article 27(1)
of the 1990 Schengen Convention, which had provided more generally that
Member States had to establish penalties for facilitation of irregular migration
for “financial gain” (see below), was repealed by the Directive on that date. There
is no provision for a report on or a review of the Directive.
4 OJ 2000 L 239/19.
5 OJ 1999 L 176/17.
6 See Decisions on UK and Irish Schengen participation (OJ 2000 L 131/43 and OJ
2002 L 64/20).
829
Section V – Irregular Migration
The proposal from the French Presidency on this topic came initially
solely in the form of a third pillar Framework Decision.7 Shortly afterward,
after objections from the Council legal service, that proposal was split into a
Directive (concerning the definition of facilitation of irregular entry, residence
or movement) and a Framework Decision (setting out the criminal penalties
that must apply along with rules on jurisdiction).8 This reflected the allocation
of Article 27 of the Schengen Convention between the first and third pillars. The
initial version of the Directive would have required Member States to treat as an
offence “the act of facilitating intentionally, by aiding directly or indirectly, the
unauthorised entry, movement or residence in its territory” of a third-country
national (emphasis added). Participation, instigation and attempt would also
have had to be included, and the “financial gain” requirement from the Schengen
rules would have been dropped. Member States could optionally have exempted
close relatives from liability. According to the proposed Framework Decision,
penalties had to include custodial sentences and possibly also confiscation of
transport, practice of an occupation and deportation. Penalties would have been
increased by an unspecified amount in “aggravating circumstances”, defined as
commission by a member of a criminal organisation or for the purpose of traf-
ficking in humans, sexual exploitation or employment. Legal persons would also
have been made liable.
Compared to Article 27(1) of the Schengen Convention, the French propos-
als were narrower in scope on one point: they only applied to breach of immi-
gration law in one Member State, not other Member States. However, they were
wider in that: their legal force was clearer; the extent of penalties was more pre-
cise, and included both exemptions and penalties in “aggravated” circumstances;
the “financial gain” requirement would be dropped; more inchoate offences were
covered; and there were provisions on jurisdiction and liability of legal persons.
However, at this point the legal relationship between the French proposals and
the Schengen rules was not clear.
The proposals were redrafted following discussion in the Council’s crimi-
nal law working group.9 First, the group agreed to extend their scope to the
impugned activity within any Member State (as in the Schengen rules). As a
compromise between those Member States who wanted to retain the “financial
gain” test and those who wanted to abolish it, the text would distinguish between
assistance to enter or transit within a Member State (where the “financial gain”
test would apply) and assistance to reside within a Member State (where it would
830
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
not). The optional exemption for family members was deleted, but a mandatory
“savings clause” for the Geneva Convention on refugees and other human rights
rules relating to refugee protection was added. In parallel, the list of “aggravat-
ing circumstances” was lengthened, then shortened again, so that it would apply
to any of the general or inchoate offences defined in the Directive, on the double
condition that the “financial gain” criterion applied and that the case involved
either organised crime or a threat to the lives of migrants. But this provision also
became more precise, as the majority wanted to provide for a maximum custo-
dial sentence of at least eight years when such circumstances applied. However
some Member States were concerned that the strengthening of sanctions was
insufficient attention to protection needs. The JHA Council/Mixed Commit-
tee of 30 November and 1 December 2000 discussed the proposal, and showed
interest in adding a humanitarian exception to address these concerns.
Much effort was then expended during the Swedish Council Presidency to
agree the wording of such an exception. In addition, some Member States were
still concerned about the width of the “aggravating circumstances” obligation
and the level of penalties to be attached.10 Ultimately, “political agreement” was
reached at the JHA Council/Mixed Committee in May 2001, subject to scru-
tiny reservations from Sweden, Denmark and the UK.11 The final deal was that
Member States could apply an optional humanitarian exception. However, the
“aggravated” penalties only apply where a person assisted irregular entry or tran-
sit or instigated such activity, not to the offence of irregular residence or to other
inchoate offences. Moreover, it was agreed that Member States could reduce the
maximum sentence to at least six years if necessary to preserve the coherence of
national penalty systems. But conversely, in a statement in the Council minutes,
several Member States asserted their intention to subject the impugned conduct
to custodial penalties of over ten years.
Several more technical amendments were also agreed at this point. The appli-
cation of the aggravated penalties to activities of “criminal gangs” was replaced
by a reference to activities of a criminal organisation as defined in a 1998 EU
Joint Action. A standard requirement for Member States to either prosecute
or extradite when the relevant conduct is committed by its own nationals out-
side its territory was added. Also, the provisions of Article 27(2) and (3) of the
Schengen Convention were added to the Framework Decision, and as a result
it was decided that the two measures between them will repeal Article 27 of the
10 Council docs. SN 5410/00, 30 Nov. 2000; 14920/00, 22 Dec. 2000; 5186/01, 11 Jan.
2001; 5645/01, 31 Jan. 2001; 6254/01, 15 Feb. 2001; 6465/01, 23 Feb. 2001; 6766/01,
9 Mar. 2001; 7671/01, 2 Apr. 2001; 8164/01, 24 Apr. 2001; 8115/01, 26 Apr. 2001;
8242/01, 26 Apr. 2001; 8522/01, 8 May 2001; 8632/01, 11 May 2001; and 8632/01
add 1, 21 May 2001.
11 See Council doc. 9403/01, 12 Jun. 2001; for a consolidated agreed text, see Council
doc. 10075/01, 5 July 2001.
831
Section V – Irregular Migration
3 Legal Analysis
Despite the declaration that the Directive and the Framework Decision build on
the Schengen acquis and that they replace Article 27(1) of the Schengen Conven-
tion, there are significant differences from the Schengen provisions. Article 2 of
the Directive includes those who have “indirect” involvement with facilitation
such as those who are accomplices rather only those with direct involvement.16
The use of Title VI as the legal base for the Framework Decision is highly
questionable. Article 31(e) of the EU Treaty relates for instance to “progressively
adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to … penalties in the
fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking”. The Framework
Decision however does not confine itself to activities relating to organised crime
although this can be an aggravating factor. As noted above, the Commission has
argued that the Framework Decision should have been a first pillar measure;
indeed, following a Court of Justice judgment on the scope of the Community’s
criminal law powers,17 the Commission has argued that the Framework Deci-
sion must be replaced by a Directive.18 It remains to be seen whether the Council
832
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
will accept this analysis. From either perspective, the validity of the Framework
Decision could therefore be questioned.
The difference in legal base chosen for the Framework Decision and that
chosen for the Directive creates legal problems particularly in relation to jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Justice and the general applicability of EC law. Whereas the
interpretation of the definition of what “acts” are to be sanctioned are subject
to the ultimate jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the Framework Definition
imposing penalties for such acts is only partly within the Court’s jurisdiction,
as it is a Title VI measure.19 In theory, in some Member States, this could lead
to a situation where an accused person is able to rely on EC law, and ultimately
seek a reference to the Court of Justice on the question of interpretation of the
Directive, in the context of an appeal against conviction but not in relation to an
appeal against sentence.
The Framework Decision and the Directive do not compare favourably
with the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air.20 The UN Protocol has a stronger savings provision than that contained in
Article 6 of the Framework Decision in that it provides that it refers to the pro-
tection afforded by international human rights law and the obligations imposed
on a State by such law, as opposed confining itself to the Geneva Convention
and its Protocol.21 The UN Protocol defines “smuggling” and is clearly aimed at
people smuggling for material gain.22 Article 5 of the UN Protocol makes clear
that the victims of smuggling shall not be liable to the prosecution provided for
in the Protocol themselves. The UN Protocol contained far tighter definitions
and provisions relating to criminalisation of activities. Unlike the Framework
Decision and the Directive, the UN Protocol is much more clearly aimed at
targeting those criminal organizations and networks who smuggle persons for
19 There are no infringement actions for breach of Title VI measures and only fourteen
Member States have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction to receive references for a
preliminary ruling from national courts on the interpretation or validity of Title VI
measures (for the latest list, see OJ 2005 L 327/19); of these, two only permit final
courts to send questions.
20 Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, General Assembly resolution 55/25, annex III. The Community has signed
the Protocol (OJ 2001 L 30/44), but not yet ratified it (see Commission proposal
to ratify, COM (2003) 512, 22 Aug. 2003). As of 6 Jan. 2006, thirteen Member
States had ratified the Protocol, which entered into force on 28 Jan. 2004 (Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain). The other twleve Member States had signed the Pro-
tocol, but not ratified it (Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK). The EC has ratified the
main UN Convention on organised crime (OJ 2004 L 261/69).
21 Article 19 of the UN Protocol.
22 Article 3 of the UN Protocol.
833
Section V – Irregular Migration
financial gain rather than any person or persons who assist others to enter or
remain in the territory of the Member States unlawfully. The UN Protocol is
confined to addressing the smuggling of migrants by organized criminal groups
and not to mere migration or migrants, even in cases where it involves entry or
residence that is illegal under the laws of the State concerned.23 Furthermore
the UN Protocol recognizes the difference between smuggling and trafficking
of persons. The major differences lie in the fact that, in the case of trafficking,
offenders recruit or gain control of victims by coercive, deceptive or
abusive means and obtain profits as a result of some form of exploitation of
the victims after they have been moved. Finally the UN Protocol is clearly aimed
only at smuggling of persons from one State to another, whereas the Framework
Decision and Directive are not confined to illegal entry but attempt to cover
activities such as illegal residence that may have no transnational element. It
is regrettable that the European Union did not attempt to align itself with the
precedent set by the UN and has adopted measures that rather than reinforce
the UN Protocol, detract from it through a lack of clarity and precision.
4 Comments
There are inherent difficulties with the adoption of these two measures. Apart
from the peculiarity of attempting to use different legal bases for the two mea-
sures, both measures apparently ignore the extensive work carried out by the
Commission, amongst others, in the area of trafficking and smuggling. There is
little attempt in either of the measures to take account of the fact that there are
different type of “facilitation” employing different methods, with varying objec-
tives and varying impact on immigration control and public order. Although the
Framework Decision provides a short list of aggravating factors, there is no real
attempt to separate trafficking from people smuggling and those who exploit
others, including children, from those who assist others to remain unlawfully.
There is further example of the lack of precision in these measures in the
Framework Decision where there is no attempt to distinguish between degrees
of culpability in the liability imposed on legal persons for lack of supervision or
control. It is certainly arguable that there should have been a distinction made
between corruption and negligence.
A lack of harmonisation of immigration and criminal laws and practices
including penalties, defences, evidence and standard and burden of proof in
criminal cases between Member States is likely to cause considerable problems
with the “extra-territorial” provisions in the Framework Decision. Unless there
is harmonisation in this area or a provision that prosecution in the prosecuting
Member State was only permissible in so far as the laws and penalties of that
State are no more restrictive that those of the State in which the offence was
834
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
committed, there is a real risk of a breach of Article 7(1) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights “no punishment without law”.
The sanctions included in Article 3 of the Framework Decision also poten-
tially conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights since these
include “non-criminal fines”. Any attempt to exclude sanctions imposed on
“offending” legal persons from the scope of Article 6(2) and (3) of the Con-
vention protection would run counter to the constant jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights. The nature of the offences clearly bring the
sanctions within the scope of “criminal charges” within the terms of Article 6
of the Convention.
The potential sanctions listed in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision
also potentially raises conflict with Community law and international human
rights law in so far as “deportation” is suggested as a sanction. Clearly before
making any deportation order Member States must have regard for any claim
to refugee status under the Refugee Convention or claim that the deportation
would infringe the person’s rights under the Convention on Human Rights law.
Furthermore Member States must have regard to any rights the person may have
under Community law, for instance as a third country family member of Union
citizen or under the terms of any Association Agreement or Cooperation Agree-
ment between the EC and a third country.
Finally it is regrettable that the “humanitarian aid” provision in Article 1(2)
of the Directive permitting Member States not to impose sanctions on those
who provide humanitarian assistance is not more strongly worded to make
such exception mandatory. It is plainly undesirable to make the work of refugee
organisations and other bona fide legal representatives capable of criminalisa-
tion.
835
Section V – Irregular Migration
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Union, and in particular
Article 29, Article 31(e) and Article 34(2)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the initiative of the French Republic,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) One of the objectives of the European Union is to provide citizens with a
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by devel-
oping common action among the Member States in the fields of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
(2) In this framework, measures should be taken to combat the aiding of illegal
immigration both in connection with unauthorised crossing of the border
in the strict sense and for the purpose of sustaining networks which exploit
human beings.
836
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the associa-
tion of those two States with the implementation, application and devel-
opment of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in
Article 1(E) of Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain
arrangements for the application of that Agreement.
(7) The United Kingdom is taking part in this framework Decision in accor-
dance with Article 5 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into
the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European
Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and Arti-
cle 8(2) of Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the
request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to
take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.
(8) Ireland is taking part in this framework Decision in accordance with Arti-
cle 5 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of
the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the
Treaty establishing the European Community, and Article 6(2) of Council
Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland’s request to
take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis,
Article 1 Penalties
1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the
infringements defined in Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 2002/90/EC are pun-
ishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties which
may entail extradition.
3. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, when
committed for financial gain, the infringements defined in Article 1(1)(a)
and, to the extent relevant, Article 2(a) of Directive 2002/90/EC are punish-
837
Section V – Irregular Migration
able by custodial sentences with a maximum sentence of not less than eight
years where they are committed in any of the following circumstances:
– the offence was committed as an activity of a criminal organisation as
defined in Joint Action 98/733/JHA,
– the offence was committed while endangering the lives of the persons
who are the subject of the offence.
1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that legal
persons can be held liable for the infringements referred to in Article 1(1)
and which are committed for their benefit by any person, acting either indi-
vidually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading posi-
tion within the legal person, based on:
– a power of representation of the legal person,
– an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person, or
– an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 1, each Member
State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person can
be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a person referred
to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of the infringements
referred to in Article 1(1) for the benefit of that legal person by a person
under its authority.
3. Liability of a legal person under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude crimi-
nal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators or instigators
of or accessories in the offences referred to in paragraph 1.
1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that a legal
person held liable pursuant to Article 2(1) is punishable by effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive sanctions, which shall include criminal or non-
criminal fines and may include other sanctions such as:
(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
838
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
2. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that a legal
person held liable pursuant to Article 2(2) is punishable by effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive sanctions or measures.
Article 4 Jurisdiction
1. Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to establish its juris-
diction with regard to the infringements referred to in Article 1(1) and com-
mitted
(a) in whole or in part within its territory;
(b) by one of its nationals, or
(c) for the benefit of a legal person established in the territory of that
Member State.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article 5, any Member State may decide that it
will not apply, or that it will apply only in specific cases or circumstances,
the jurisdiction rule set out in:
– paragraph 1(b),
– paragraph 1(c).
1. (a) Any Member State which, under its law, does not extradite its own
nationals shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over
the infringements referred to in Article 1(1) when such infringements are
committed by its own nationals outside its territory.
(b) Each Member State shall, when one of its nationals is alleged to have
committed in another Member State the infringements referred to in Arti-
cle 1(1) and it does not extradite that person to that other Member State
solely on the ground of his nationality, submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if appropriate. In order to enable
prosecution to take place, the files, information and exhibits relating to the
offence shall be transmitted in accordance with the procedures laid down in
839
Section V – Irregular Migration
This framework Decision shall apply without prejudice to the protection afforded
refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with international law on refugees or
other international instruments relating to human rights, in particular Member
States’ compliance with their international obligations pursuant to Articles 31
and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, as amended by
the Protocol of New York of 1967.
Article 9 Implementation
1. Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to comply with the pro-
visions of this framework Decision before 5 December 2004.
2. By the same date, Member States shall transmit to the General Secretariat
of the Council and to the Commission the text of the provisions transpos-
840
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
ing into their national law the obligations imposed on them by this frame-
work Decision. On the basis of a report established using this information
by the Commission, the Council shall, before 5 June 2005, assess the extent
to which Member States have complied with the provisions of this frame-
work Decision.
Article 10 Repeal
The provisions of Article 27(2) and (3) of the 1990 Schengen Convention shall
be repealed as from 5 December 2004. Where a Member State implements this
framework Decision pursuant to Article 9(1) in advance of that date, the said
provisions shall cease to apply to that Member State from the date of implemen-
tation.
This framework Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in
the Official Journal.
841
Section V – Irregular Migration
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 61(a) and Article 63(3)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the initiative of the French Republic,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) One of the objectives of the European Union is the gradual creation of an
area of freedom, security and justice, which means, inter alia, that illegal
immigration must be combated.
842
Chapter 28 Facilitation of Illegal Entry, Residence and Movement
(7) The United Kingdom and Ireland are taking part in the adoption and
application of this Directive in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Treaties.
(8) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption
of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given
that this Directive builds upon the Schengen acquis under the provisions of
Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 5 of the said Protocol, decide
within a period of six months after the Council has adopted this Directive
whether it will implement it in its national law,
2. Any Member State may decide not to impose sanctions with regard to the
behaviour defined in paragraph 1(a) by applying its national law and prac-
tice for cases where the aim of the behaviour is to provide humanitarian
assistance to the person concerned.
Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the sanc-
tions referred to in Article 1 are also applicable to any person who:
(a) is the instigator of,
(b) is an accomplice in, or
843
Section V – Irregular Migration
Article 3 Sanctions
Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the infringe-
ments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 are subject to effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions.
Article 4 Implementation
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 5 December
2004. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion
of their official publication. The methods of making such a reference shall
be laid down by the Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main
provisions of their national law which they adopt in the field covered by this
Directive, together with a table showing how the provisions of this Direc-
tive correspond to the national provisions adopted. The Commission shall
inform the other Member States thereof.
Article 5 Repeal
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.
Article 7 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
844
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
1 Summary
Directive 2004/81 was formally adopted by the JHA Council on 29 April 2004
(text in Annex).1 It does not apply to the UK, Ireland or Denmark. Member
States are obliged to apply the Directive by 6 August 2006.2 Article 1 sets out the
purpose of the Directive: to define the conditions for issuing a limited residence
permit, linked to the length of the judicial proceedings, to persons who coop-
erate in the fight against trafficking or the facilitation of illegal immigration.
The Directive defines trafficking and the facilitation of illegal immigration by
reference to the EU acts concerning these issues, but not exhaustively; so further
national definitions could also apply.3 The definition of “measure to enforce an
expulsion order” in the Directive will apply to both judicial and administrative
decisions.4 “Unaccompanied minors” are also defined.5
Member States are obliged to apply the Directive to victims of trafficking
in persons, although it is specified that the Directive also applies to those who
did not enter legally.6 Its application to persons who have been “the subject of
an action to facilitate illegal migration” is optional.7 Its application to minors
1 OJ 2004 L 261/19.
2 Art. 17.
3 Art. 2(b) and (c). See the Framework Decision and Directive 2002/90 on facilitation
of illegal entry and residence (OJ 2002 L 328/1 and 17) and the Framework Decision
on trafficking in persons (OJ 2002 L 203/1), discussed in Chs. 27 and 28.
4 Art. 2(d).
5 Art. 2(e).
6 Art. 3(1).
7 Art. 3(2).
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 845-862.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
8 Art. 3(3).
9 Clauses 4 and 7 in the preamble.
10 Art. 4.
11 Art. 5.
12 Art. 6(1).
13 Arts. 6(2) and 7.
14 Art. 6(3).
15 Art. 6(4).
16 Art. 10(1).
17 Art. 8(2).
18 Art. 8(3).
19 The scope of the uniform permit (Art. 1(2)(a) of Reg. 1030/2002, OJ 2002 L 157/1)
is identical to the definition of “residence permit” in Art. 2(e) of this Directive.
The exception in Art. 1(2)(a)(iii) of Reg. 1030/2002 for permits of up to six months
issued by non-Schengen States is irrelevant as those States have not opted into this
846
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
permit simply means that there is no obligation to indicate that the permit issued
to persons covered by this Directive is a “short-term residence permit”. Member
States are encouraged to consider authorising the stay of the victim’s family
members on other grounds.20
The Directive also sets out rules on the treatment of the victims after the
special permit is issued. Member States must continue to extend minimum
standards regarding subsistence, emergency medical treatment, translation and
interpretation and (optionally) legal aid to victims, and must also give neces-
sary medical or other assistance to victims with special needs and without suffi-
cient resources.21 If Member States apply the Directive to minors, they must take
account of the best interests of the child, give access to education on the same
basis as nationals (although this may be limited to the public education system)
and establish the identity and nationality of, trace the family members of and
ensure legal representation for unaccompanied minors in accordance with
national law.22 Member States must define the rules for victims’ access to the
labour market, vocational training and education during the period of the resi-
dence permit; it is not clear whether this gives them discretion over whether to
allow such access or only discretion as regards the extent of and procedures for
exercising such access.23 The persons concerned by the Directive must be given
access to schemes designed to assist them to develop a normal social life, if such
schemes exist, including courses to improve professional skills or to prepare for
assisted return to their country of origin. Member States may also provide for
special schemes designed for the persons concerned, and may make the residence
permit conditional on participation in either the general or special schemes.24
The permit shall not be renewed if the proceedings are over or if the condi-
tions for its issue cease to be satisfied. After this point, normal immigration law
applies, but the preamble to the Directive states that Member States “should
consider the fact that” the person concerned already has a residence permit
issued on the basis of this Directive if that person applies to stay on another
ground.25 The permit may also be withdrawn on grounds of: the person con-
cerned “actively, voluntarily and on his/her own initiative” renewing contact
with the suspected perpetrators; the authorities’ belief in fraudulent cooperation
or a fraudulent complaint by the person concerned; public policy or national
Directive, although arguably this exception could apply to new Member States
before they apply Schengen in full.
20 Para. 15 of the preamble.
21 Art. 9.
22 Art. 10.
23 Art. 11.
24 Art. 12.
25 Art. 13 and para. 18 of preamble.
847
Section V – Irregular Migration
2 Legislative History
The Commission’s initial proposal for a Directive dates from February 2002.29
The proposal was not discussed in the Council until the Italian Presidency, which
began discussions in July 2003. The JHA Council of early November 2003 was
able to reach agreement on the proposal, and it was formally adopted the fol-
lowing April.
The adopted Directive differs in several respects from the Commission’s
initial proposal. The definitions in the Directive define trafficking and the facili-
tation of illegal immigration not, as the Commission had proposed, solely by
reference to the EU acts concerning these issues; rather the definitions in the EU
acts are not exhaustive.30 A standard definition of “unaccompanied minors” was
also added.31
The scope of the Directive was narrowed, as Member States are only
obliged to apply it to victims of trafficking in persons, not “victims” of smug-
gling as well, as the Commission had proposed.32 The Council also specified that
the Directive applies to persons who did not enter legally.33 The safeguard clause
on protection for refugees, persons with subsidiary protection and asylum-seek-
ers and the non-discrimination clause have were moved from the main text to the
preamble.34
26 Art. 14.
27 Respectively Arts. 15 and 16.
28 See Ch. 27.
29 COM (2002) 71, 11 Feb. 2002.
30 Art. 2(b) and (c).
31 Art. 2(e).
32 Art. 3(1).
33 Art. 3(2).
34 Arts. 4 and 5 of the initial proposal; see clauses 4 and 7 in the preamble to the final
Directive.
848
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
The final Directive also makes it optional, rather than mandatory, for
Member States to decide if NGOs can also trigger the process.35 The length of
the following reflection period is now determined by national law, rather than by
a standard rule.36 Furthermore, the Council lowered the standard of treatment
which persons must receive during this period,37 and revised the grounds upon
which a Member State may end the period.38 The grounds for issuing the permit
were also revised,39 and the apparent right to a permit in the initial proposal
appears to have been dropped by the Council.40 Some of the rules on renewal
of the permit were dropped,41 as was the express reference to using the EC’s
uniform residence permit,42 although as observed above, the uniform permit will
have to be used anyway.43 The encouragement to consider authorising the stay of
the victim’s family members on other grounds was moved to the preamble.44
The treatment accorded to victims after the special permit is issued was
amended, in some respects to increase standards.45 There were minor changes to
35 Art. 5 of the final Directive; see Art. 7 of the initial proposal, where involvement of
associations and NGOs was mandatory. The final Directive no longer specifies that
the national authorities must be prosecution authorities, and limits the involvement
of associations and NGOs to those “specifically appointed by the Member State
concerned”.
36 Art. 6(1) of the final Directive. See Art. 8(1) of the initial proposal, which set a
standard reflection period of 30 days, beginning from the date on which the victim
severed contact with the perpetrator.
37 Arts. 6(2) and 7 of the final Directive. See Arts. 8(2) and 9 of the initial proposal,
which also required access to accommodation, social welfare and medical care that
could not be postponed, as well as mandatory access to legal aid.
38 Art. 6(4) of the final Directive. Art. 8(4) of the initial proposal would have permit-
ted termination of the reflection period simply on grounds of “renewed contact”
with the perpetrator, and also included a “public order” ground for termination,
rather than a “public policy” ground.
39 Art. 10(1) of the final Directive. The Commission had proposed a ten-day maxi-
mum for the authorities to reach their decision, had suggested as grounds the ques-
tion of whether the victim was “useful” and had proposed detailed guidelines on
what constituted an intention to cooperate (Art. 10(1), initial proposal).
40 Art. 8(2) of the final Directive; see Art. 10(2) of the initial proposal.
41 Art. 8(3) of the final Directive. Art. 10(3) of the initial proposal proposed a stan-
dard period of six months for the permit and six months for any renewal.
42 See Art. 11 of the initial proposal.
43 See n. 20 above.
44 Para. 15 of the preamble of the final Directive; see Art. 10(4) of the initial pro-
posal.
45 Art. 9 of the final Directive. Compare with Art. 13 of the initial proposal, which
required Member States to give access to primary medical care but neglected to
849
Section V – Irregular Migration
the provisions on treatment of minors,46 and more significant changes to the pro-
visions on access to the labour market, vocational training and education during
the period of the residence permit,47 and on access to special schemes.48
The obligation to take account of victims’ assistance after the proceed-
ings are over was weakened,49 and the grounds for withdrawal of the permit
were revised, in particular to indicate that these grounds are apparently non-
exhaustive.50 Finally, provisions on penalties for breach of the Directive and the
exchange of information with the Commission were dropped.51
3 Legal Analysis
The first legal question concerning this Directive is whether the Council was
right to use the EC’s powers concerning both legal and illegal migration to adopt
it. This issue would be moot if the EU Constitution enters into force, as the same
decision-making procedure would apply regardless. But the issue would be rel-
evant if the EU Constitution does not enter into force and there is an intention
to amend the Directive, or to adopt legislation on similar or parallel issues, for
in that case, there will be a distinction between unanimous voting and consul-
tation of the EP on issues concerning legal migration, and qualified majority
voting and co-decision of the EP on issues concerning irregular migration (from
850
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
1 January 2005).52 As set out elsewhere in this book, it is arguable that since the
Directive concerns the acquisition and loss of legal migration status, it should
have been based on the EC’s legal migration powers alone.53
The second issue is the ability of persons covered by the Directive to claim
protection status. The European Court of Human Rights has made clear that
persons who need protection from attacks from private individuals or groups
may, in principle, claim the protection of Article 3 ECHR.54 This rule should
logically apply to persons covered by the Directive, who could face retaliation by
traffickers in the country of origin (particularly where the police forces in that
country are unwilling or unable to protect individuals in such cases) as hinted at
in the Commission’s explanatory memorandum to its proposal.55 Such an inter-
pretation is consistent with the provisions of the preamble to the Directive con-
cerning the rights of refugees and similar groups needing or seeking protection,
and the consideration which Member States should give to applications to stay
on other grounds following the end of the legal proceedings.
4 Comments
This Directive could not avoid the inherent tension between trying to combat
irregular immigration by encouraging victims of trafficking and smuggling to
testify, and the risk that the incentives offered to the victims would either be
abused or have the result that the victims would be able to stay in the “host”
Member State longer than it would wish. The key changes to the text as pro-
posed by the Commission made the application of the Directive to smuggling
cases optional and weaken the extent and precision of the obligations imposed
upon Member States as regards victims. While the first of these changes will
likely have limited relevance, since most persons using smugglers will not con-
sider themselves “victims”, the second main change will make the scheme estab-
lished by the Directive less attractive to victims. It will also be harder to monitor
the usefulness of the Directive in practice in light of the deletion of the provi-
sions on exchange of information. As a result, while one can only hope that the
Directive does make a significant contribution to its main goal of combatting
trafficking in persons, its appeal to victims may be so limited that agreement on
the text appears to be a public relations gesture.
To what extent will the Directive ameliorate the very difficult circumstances
which the victims of trafficking are in? First of all, it will only benefit minor
victims in Member States which exercise the option set out in Article 3(3). Psy-
chological assistance will only be granted “if provided by national law” (Article
851
Section V – Irregular Migration
7(1)). The legal status of the victim will be contingent upon the progress of the
prosecution against her tormentors, a process outside her control; moreover her
involvement in the proceedings may well risk reprisals against her or her family.
There is no express provision for procedural rights as regards withdrawal of a
residence permit, although arguably the general principles of Community law
confer implied procedural rights.56 Access to the labour market, including voca-
tional training and education, may be limited to a significant degree by Member
States, according to Article 11 (although the text of this Article does not appear
to permit Member States to withhold such access entirely). In any event, labour
market access will cease once the impermanent residence permit expires or is
withdrawn, so it will not normally be realistic for the victim to hope for a job at a
level much above the margins of the labour market, or to undertake education or
training in that Member State in order to aspire to a better job in future. There is
no express reference to housing, or to access to self-employment, or to the status
of the victim’s children (if they are also present in the Member State concerned).
In light of all these limitations, it is unlikely that the Directive can make a major
contribution to guaranteeing the basic rights of victims of trafficking.
56 See Ch. 5.
852
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular point 3 of Article 63 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,
Having consulted the Committee of the Regions,
Whereas:
(2) At its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 , the Euro-
pean Council expressed its determination to tackle illegal immigration at
source, for example by targeting those who engage in trafficking of human
beings and the economic exploitation of migrants. It called on the Member
States to concentrate their efforts on detecting and dismantling criminal
networks while protecting the rights of victims.
853
Section V – Irregular Migration
(6) This Directive respects fundamental rights and complies with the principles
recognised for example by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.
(7) Member States should give effect to the provision of this Directive with-
out discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic characteristics, language, religion or belief, political or other opin-
ions, membership of a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or
sexual orientation.
(9) This Directive introduces a residence permit intended for victims of traf-
ficking in human beings or, if a Member State decides to extend the scope
of this Directive, to third-country nationals who have been the subject of an
action to facilitate illegal immigration to whom the residence permit offers
a sufficient incentive to cooperate with the competent authorities while
including certain conditions to safeguard against abuse.
(10) To this end, it is necessary to lay down the criteria for issuing a residence
permit, the conditions of stay and the grounds for non-renewal and with-
drawal. The right to stay under this Directive is subject to conditions and is
of provisional nature.
(11) The third country nationals concerned should be informed of the possibil-
ity of obtaining this residence permit and be given a period in which to
reflect on their position. This should help put them in a position to reach a
well-informed decision as to whether or not to cooperate with the compe-
tent authorities, which may be the police, prosecution and judicial authori-
ties (in view of the risks this may entail), so that they cooperate freely and
hence more effectively.
854
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
allow them to recover and escape the influence of the perpetrators of the
offences. The medical treatment to be provided to the third-country nationals
covered by this Directive also includes, where appropriate, psychotherapeuti-
cal care.
(13) A decision on the issue of a residence permit for at least six months or its
renewal has to be taken by the competent authorities, who should consider
if the relevant conditions are fulfilled.
(14) This Directive should apply without prejudice to the activities carried out
by the competent authorities in all phases of the relevant national proceed-
ings, and in particular when investigating the offences concerned.
(15) Member States should consider authorising the stay on other grounds,
according to their national legislation, for third-country nationals who may
fall within the scope of this Directive, but who do not, or no longer, fulfil
the conditions set by it, for the members of his/her family or for persons
treated as members of his/her family.
(19) Member States should provide the Commission, with respect to the imple-
mentation of this Directive, with the information which has been identified
in the framework of the activities developed with regard to the collection
and treatment of statistical data concerning matters falling within the area
of Justice and Home Affairs.
855
Section V – Irregular Migration
(20) Since the objective of introducing a residence permit for the third-country
nationals concerned who cooperate in the fight against trafficking in human
beings cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can there-
fore, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at the Com-
munity level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance
with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(22) In accordance with Article 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark, annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, Denmark does not take part in the adoption
of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application,
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 Purpose
The purpose of this Directive is to define the conditions for granting residence
permits of limited duration, linked to the length of the relevant national pro-
ceedings, to third-country nationals who cooperate in the fight against traffick-
ing in human beings or against action to facilitate illegal immigration.
Article 2 Definitions
856
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
Article 3 Scope
1. Member States shall apply this Directive to the third-country nationals who
are, or have been victims of offences related to the trafficking in human
beings, even if they have illegally entered the territory of the Member
States.
2. Member States may apply this Directive to the third-country nationals who
have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration.
This Directive shall not prevent Member States from adopting or maintaining
more favourable provisions for the persons covered by this Directive.
CHAPTER II
PROCEDURE FOR ISSUING THE RESIDENCE PERMIT
When the competent authorities of the Member States take the view that a third-
country national may fall into the scope of this Directive, they shall inform the
person concerned of the possibilities offered under this Directive.
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Section V – Irregular Migration
Member States may decide that such information may also be provided by a
non-governmental organisation or an association specifically appointed by the
Member State concerned.
1. Member States shall ensure that the third-country nationals concerned are
granted a reflection period allowing them to recover and escape the influ-
ence of the perpetrators of the offences so that they can take an informed
decision as to whether to cooperate with the competent authorities.
The duration and starting point of the period referred to in the first sub-
paragraph shall be determined according to national law.
2. During the reflection period and while awaiting the decision of the compe-
tent authorities, the third-country nationals concerned shall have access to
the treatment referred to in Article 7 and it shall not be possible to enforce
any expulsion order against them.
3. The reflection period shall not create any entitlement to residence under
this Directive.
4. The Member State may at any time terminate the reflection period if the
competent authorities have established that the person concerned has
actively, voluntarily and on his/her own initiative renewed contact with the
perpetrators of the offences referred to in Article 2(b) and (c) or for reasons
relating to public policy and to the protection of national security.
1. Member States shall ensure that the third-country nationals concerned who
do not have sufficient resources are granted standards of living capable of
ensuring their subsistence and access to emergency medical treatment. They
shall attend to the special needs of the most vulnerable, including, where
appropriate and if provided by national law, psychological assistance.
2. Member States shall take due account of the safety and protection needs
of the third-country nationals concerned when applying this Directive, in
accordance with national law.
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Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
1. After the expiry of the reflection period, or earlier if the competent authori-
ties are of the view that the third-country national concerned has already ful-
filled the criterion set out in subparagraph (b), Member States shall consider:
(a) the opportunity presented by prolonging his/her stay on its territory
for the investigations or the judicial proceedings, and
(b) whether he/she has shown a clear intention to cooperate and
(c) whether he/she has severed all relations with those suspected of acts
that might be included among the offences referred to in Article 2(b)
and (c).
2. For the issue of the residence permit and without prejudice to the reasons
relating to public policy and to the protection of national security, the fulfil-
ment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be required.
CHAPTER III
TREATMENT OF HOLDERS OF THE RESIDENCE PERMIT
1. Member States shall ensure that holders of a residence permit who do not
have sufficient resources are granted at least the same treatment provided
for in Article 7.
Article 10 Minors
If Member States have recourse to the option provided for in Article 3(3), the
following provisions shall apply:
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Section V – Irregular Migration
(a) Member States shall take due account of the best interests of the child when
applying this Directive. They shall ensure that the procedure is appropriate
to the age and maturity of the child. In particular, if they consider that it is
in the best interest of the child, they may extend the reflection period.
(b) Member States shall ensure that minors have access to the educational
system under the same conditions as nationals. Member States may stipu-
late that such access must be limited to the public education system.
(c) In the case of third-country nationals who are unaccompanied minors,
Member States shall take the necessary steps to establish their identity,
nationality and the fact that they are unaccompanied. They shall make
every effort to locate their families as quickly as possible and take the neces-
sary steps immediately to ensure legal representation, including representa-
tion in criminal proceedings, if necessary, in accordance with national law.
1. Member States shall define the rules under which holders of the residence
permit shall be authorised to have access to the labour market, to voca-
tional training and education.
2. The conditions and the procedures for authorising access to the labour
market, to vocational training and education shall be determined, under
the national legislation, by the competent authorities.
Member States may provide specific programmes or schemes for the third-
country nationals concerned.
860
Chapter 29 Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling
CHAPTER IV
NON-RENEWAL AND WITHDRAWAL
Article 13 Non-renewal
1. The residence permit issued on the basis of this Directive shall not be
renewed if the conditions of Article 8(2) cease to be satisfied or if a decision
adopted by the competent authorities has terminated the relevant proceed-
ings.
2. When the residence permit issued on the basis of this Directive expires ordi-
nary aliens’ law shall apply.
Article 14 Withdrawal
The residence permit may be withdrawn at any time if the conditions for the
issue are no longer satisfied. In particular, the residence permit may be with-
drawn in the following cases:
(a) if the holder has actively, voluntarily and in his/her own initiative renewed
contacts with those suspected of committing the offences referred to in
Article 2(b) and (c); or
(b) if the competent authority believes that the victim’s cooperation is fraudu-
lent or that his/her complaint is fraudulent or wrongful; or
(c) for reasons relating to public policy and to the protection of national secu-
rity; or
(d) when the victim ceases to cooperate; or
(e) when the competent authorities decide to discontinue the proceedings.
CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS
This Directive shall apply without prejudice to specific national rules concerning
the protection of victims and witnesses.
Article 16 Report
1. No later than 6 August 2008 , the Commission shall report to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive in
the Member States and propose any amendments that are necessary. The
Member States shall send the Commission any information relevant to the
preparation of this report.
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Section V – Irregular Migration
Article 17 Transposal
The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 6 August 2006 .
They shall immediately inform the Commission accordingly.
When the Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion
of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid
down by Member States.
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Union.
Article 19 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
862
Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
1 Summary of Content
Directive 2003/110 on transit for “removals” (expulsion) by air, a German initia-
tive based on Article 63(3)(b) EC, was formally proposed in late 2002, agreed in
principle by the JHA Council in June 2003 and formally adopted in November
2003.1 Member States had to apply the Directive by 6 December 2005, except for
the UK and Ireland, which opted out of the Directive.
Article 1 sets out the purpose of the Directive: to assist with expulsion in
EU airports. Article 2 sets out definitions. The core obligations to assist expul-
sions by air and the grounds for refusal to assist appear in Article 3. A requesting
Member State should give priority to direct flights to the country of origin and
should “in principle” not request assistance if this involves transfer between dif-
ferent airports within another Member State (Article 3(2)). A requested Member
State may refuse to assist with expulsion if criminal charges would be brought
against the person concerned in the requested State or if the person concerned
“is wanted for the carrying out of a sentence”; if transit to or admission into
the State of destination is not feasbile; if a change of airport in the requested
State would be required; if the assistance is temporarily not available for “prac-
tical reasons”; or if the person concerned “will be a threat to public policy,
public security, public health or to the international relations” of the requested
Member State (Article 3(3)). A transit authorisation, once given, may also be
revoked on the same grounds (Article 3(5)). The requested Member State must
give reasons to the requesting Member State in the event of refusal or revocation
on the grounds listed in Article 3(3) or 3(5) “or of any other reason why the tran-
sit is not possible” (Article 3(6)); this suggests strongly that the listed grounds for
refusal or revocation are non-exhaustive. The preamble states that transit by air
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 863-880.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
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Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
as the 2003 Directive, although they are less precise and cover other forms of
transit besides air transit.
For its part, the Schengen Executive Committee agreed a Decision on transit
for expulsion in 1998.4 This Decision set out a standard form to facilitate coop-
eration for expulsion along with six guidelines for use of the form. The request
for cooperation must have been sent two days in advance, except in a justified
emergency; it must have contained specified information on the person to be
expelled; this information was to be sent to the relevant border control officials;
other precautionary measures (use of escorts and premises, contacts with airport
staff) had to be taken where necessary; the request could be be refused “espe-
cially where the declared period of transit” is longer than that allowed under the
requested State’s law; and the Member States were to inform each other of the
relevant contact persons and authorities. There were no human rights protec-
tions expressly provided for. When allocating the “Schengen acquis” in 1999, the
Council allocated this Decision to Articles 62(3) and 63(3) EC.5
Subsequently, in the last few weeks of the “Maastricht era” of EU asylum
and immigration law, the German government proposed a “Joint Action” on
cooperation in expulsion by air, building upon the Executive Committee Deci-
sion.6 This proposal, taking a more clearly legislative form than the Decision,
was the basis for the subsequent proposal for a Directive. It started out with
definitions of “third-country alien”, “escort” and “transit” (Article 1), then set
out a core obligation to cooperate in transit requests, with specified exceptions
(Article 2). Remaining provisions addressed the readmission obligations of
the requesting Member State (Article 3); specific obligations of the requested
State to facilitate removal (Article 4); the procedure for making requests for
cooperation (Article 5); detailed data protection obligations (Article 6); and a
“saving clause” regarding the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and
the Dublin Convention (Article 7). An Annex comprised a form for use with
transit requests; this was identical to the form attached to the Schengen Execu-
tive Committee Decision. This proposal lapsed when the Treaty of Amsterdam
entered into force.7 Later on, the German government informally suggested an
initiative on the limited issue of visa exemptions in transit cases.8 The Germans
865
Section V – Irregular Migration
placed both issues on the agenda of a working party meeting shortly after 11
September 2001; there was some interest in the first initiative but many misgiv-
ings over the second one.9
In the meantime, the Council had arranged a questionnaire on the current
functioning of expulsion procedures between Member States (and Norway and
Iceland). Nearly half of the Member States indicated that they had no experi-
ence of practical difficulties arranging expulsion through other Member States’
airports in 1999, but the other half reported problems such as refusals to permit
transit. In many cases, however, expulsions were delayed or prevented by airlines
or by the behaviour of the deportee--issues which have nothing to do with cross-
border cooperation.10
Subsequently, the broader German proposal on transit for the purposes of
expulsion was formally revived in the summer of 2002 following the adoption
in February 2002 of the Council’s Action Plan on illegal immigration, which
called for rules on the transit of expellees to be agreed in the short-term (within
one year).11 Later on, the Commission advocated the adoption of rules on this
issue in its Green Paper on return policy and its ensuing Communication, and
the final Council Action Plan on return policy endorsed the consideration of
the proposal, along with the idea of a further measure concerning transit via
land.12
This new version of the proposal, now in the form of a Directive, largely
made only technical changes to the 1999 proposal.13 However, there were some
significant changes: “torture” was now expressly added to the list of grounds
which could justify refusal to make a request for cooperation or a refusal to
accept it, and it was now mandatory, not merely optional, to refuse a request for
cooperation where the rights of the individual were threatened or at risk. The
data protection clause was deleted, the “savings clause” now included extradi-
tion conventions and the form in the Annex was expanded, inter alia to include
space for officials to indicate that they knew of no grounds to refuse transit.
After the opinion of the Council’s legal service on whether the proposal fell
within the scope of the Schengen acquis,14 a formal German proposal for a Direc-
866
Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
867
Section V – Irregular Migration
indicate that (as suggested by the explanatory memorandum to the proposal) the
costs rule in the Directive is provisional,17 to be replaced by the separate Deci-
sion to allocate the costs connected with the application of Directive 2001/40.18
Finally, the savings clause no longer includes any reference to the Dublin Con-
vention (or its successor Regulation), although the reference to international
human rights treaties was added to this clause.
3 Legal Analysis
First of all, this Directive implicitly applies to third-country national family
members of EU citizens (and Norwegian and Icelandic citizens) who have
migrated within the EU. It is highly questionable whether a Title IV “illegal
immigration” measure can regulate their status in any way.
The connection of this measure with the Schengen acquis is also unclear.
Neither the final Directive, the original proposal nor the explanatory memoran-
dum to the proposal do anything to explain the connection with Schengen. Pre-
sumably the connection is that the measure will apply if a person who entered
one Member State becomes an illegal entrant or overstayer on the territory of
another Member State, in which case Article 23 of the 1990 Schengen Conven-
tion, governing expulsion and readmission in such circumstances, will apply.19
However, it is clear from its placement in Chapter 4 of Title II of the Conven-
tion that Article 23 does not apply to all cases of irregular entry and stay, but
only to cases involving more than one Schengen state. An expulsion via another
Member State certainly does not mean that the Schengen rules on freedom to
travel are being applied, since the mere fact of the expulsion (if it is valid) indi-
cates that the criteria to exercise that freedom are not fulfilled.20 So the Direc-
tive therefore goes well beyond the scope of the Schengen rules as its scope is
not limited to cases within the scope of Article 23 of the 1990 Convention. For
example, the Directive might equally apply where a third-country national has
entered Greece via an external maritime border or Germany via an external land
border and has not entered the territory of any other Schengen State, but where
Greece or Germany requests France to assist with the expulsion because direct
flights to that person’s country of origin are only available from France.
It was also initially unclear how the proposed Directive linked to the 1998
Schengen Executive Committee Decision on expulsion by air. That Decision was
adopted “having regard to” Article 23 of the 1990 Convention, and so presum-
ably was limited in scope to expulsions within the scope of Article 23, as the
Executive Committee did not have the power to adopt a measure based on Arti-
868
Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
cle 23 regulating an issue not covered by that Article. In fact, there are no other
Schengen Convention provisions on expulsion besides the carrier sanctions pro-
vision of Article 26 and the redundant “Dublin” provisions in Articles 28-38, so
the Executive Committee clearly lacked the power to adopt a broader measure.
It is even questionable whether the Executive Committee had the power to adopt
a measure implementing Article 23 of the 1990 Convention, as the Convention
does not expressly confer such a power, although it could be argued that Arti-
cle 131 of the Convention (“the overall task of the Executive Committee is to
ensure that this Convention is implemented correctly”) amounts to a general
implementing power.
In any event, there was no convincing reason to leave the Schengen measure
in force. There appeared to be no principle in the Executive Committee Decision
not addressed in the proposed Directive; and even if there were, such a provision
could easily have been integrated into the proposal. Given the extensive overlap
between the two measures, along with the poor drafting, ambiguous legal effect,
uncertain scope and dubious validity of the Executive Committee Decision – to
say nothing of the complete absence in the Decision of even the weak standards
of human rights protection found in the Directive – the repeal of the Decision
by the Directive can only be welcomed.
4 Comments21
At the time this Directive was revived, it prejudged not only the need for an EU
expulsion policy and the timing of that policy, but the Council plan on “return”
policy which was to be adopted following a further Commission Communication
and public consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper on return. Clearly the
Council saw no need to wait for the results of public consultation before begin-
ning work on this proposal.
It is not clear why data protection safeguards were dropped when the pro-
posal was revived in 2002. Perhaps it was thought that Directive 95/46 on data
protection offered sufficient data protection for individuals without the need to
supplement it further.22 If that was the case, then this should have been explained
in the preamble.
The core issue with the Directive, as with Directive 2001/40,23 is the princi-
ple of mutual recognition of expulsion decisions at the present time. Requested
Member States “should” refuse to request or assist with transit, or revoke their
agreement to assist, in case of a threat of human rights breach to the person
21 These comments build upon and update an analysis for Statewatch, “Expelling
migrants from the EU: Fast-track legislation and sham consultation”, online at:
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jul/13expul.htm>.
22 OJ 1995 L 281/31. See for instance, Reg. 333/2002 (OJ 2002 L 53/4), recital 8 and
Art. 4.
23 See Ch. 25.
869
Section V – Irregular Migration
concerned in another country, and this is only provided for in the preamble;
there is no longer even an obligation for the requesting State’s authorities to
certify when they fill out the Annex that no such grounds exist. Also, there is no
reference to a requesting State withdrawing a request if such a breach becomes
evident later. So the final Directive contains weaker protection for human rights
than originally proposed by Germany, and the reference to human rights treaties
in the savings clause is too vague to make up for this.
In any event, how is the requested Member State to determine whether
there is such a human rights breach? According to the Directive, the only infor-
mation available to it will be the brief information included on the standard
request form. As noted above, in the final version of the Directive, the form no
longer contains even a box to ticked to indicate that, in the view of the request-
ing Member State, there is no human rights problem with expulsion. Clearly this
does not supply enough information for the requested Member State to come to
its own conclusion on that subject. The requesting Member State is not obliged
to limit requests to certain situations, or to consider human rights issues before
deciding to expel and requesting assistance of another Member State.
Compared with Directive 2001/40, which already sets a weak standard as
regards human rights protection,24 there is no obligation in the agreed text of
the Directive for requested Member States to ensure that there are no human
rights risks before they carry out an expulsion order at another Member State’s
request. Also, there is no comparable requirement upon the requested Member
State to permit migrants to challenge its decision to enforce expulsion decisions.
Directive 2001/40 only applies to expulsion where certain substantive criteria
are met, and the family members of EU nationals are exempt from it. There
are express rights on data protection in the earlier Directive, and the main text
of that Directive explicitly requires Member States to apply the Directive “with
due regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. All these essential
limits and safeguards are missing from Directive 2003/110, which merely refers
to human rights protection in the preamble and vaguely in the safeguard clause.
So even the weak standards agreed in 2001 are apparently dropped where the
2003 Directive applies. Since the requested Member State will clearly be exercis-
ing jurisdiction over the person concerned if it agrees to cooperate in carrying
out the expulsion,25 there are no grounds for a lower level of protection due to
that State’s more limited contact with the individual concerned.
It may be objected that the Directive, unlike Directive 2001/40, contains an
express “savings clause” as regards the Geneva Convention on the status of refu-
gees. But it is questionable whether this clause provides sufficient protection in
the absence of any detailed rules on how to ensure respect for that Convention.
There will likely be cases where the Directive would apply to rejected asylum-
24 See ibid.
25 This is obvious from Article 5 of the Directive.
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Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
871
Section V – Irregular Migration
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in par-
ticular Article 63(3)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas:
(1) Mutual assistance for the purposes of removal takes into consideration the
common objective of ending the illegal residence of third-country nation-
als who are the subject of removal orders. Rules binding on all the Member
States contribute furthermore to legal certainty and standardisation of pro-
cedures.
(2) Removal by air is increasingly gaining in importance for the purpose of ter-
minating the residence of third-country nationals. Despite the efforts of the
Member States to give priority to using direct flights, it may be necessary,
from an economic viewpoint or insufficient availability of direct flights, to
use flight connections via airports of transit of other Member States.
(4) The sovereignty of the Member States, particularly with regard to the use
of direct force against third-country nationals resisting removal should
remain unaffected.
(5) The Convention of 14 September 1963 on Offences and Certain Other Acts
committed on board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), particularly with regard
to the on-board powers of the pilot responsible and matters of liability
should remain unaffected.
872
Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
(6) With regard to the briefing of airlines as to how to conduct unescorted and
escorted removals, reference is made to Annex 9 to the Convention of the
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) of 7 December 1944.
(7) Member States are to implement this Directive with due respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the Geneva Convention
relating to the status of refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New
York Protocol of 31 January 1967 and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In accordance
with the applicable international obligations, transit by air should be nei-
ther requested nor granted if in the third country of destination or of tran-
sit the third-country national faces the threat of inhumane or humiliating
treatment, torture or the death penalty, or if his life or liberty would be at
risk by reason of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political conviction.
(8) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should
be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June
1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission.
(9) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Den-
mark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the adoption
of this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it or subject to its applica-
tion. Given that this Directive builds upon the Schengen acquis under the
provisions of Title IV of part Three of the Treaty establishing the European
Community to the extent that it applies to third-country nationals who do
not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions for a short stay applicable
within the territory of a Member State by virtue of the provisions of the
Schengen acquis, in accordance with Article 5 of the abovementioned Pro-
tocol, Denmark is to decide within a period of six months after the Council
has adopted this Directive, whether it will implement it in its national law
or not.
(10) As regards the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, this
Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen
acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded on 18 May 1999 by
the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of these two States with
the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis,
to the extent that it applies to third-country nationals who do not fulfil or
who no longer fulfil the conditions for a short stay applicable within the
873
Section V – Irregular Migration
(11) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on the European Union
and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, these Member
States are not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and therefore,
subject to Article 4 of that Protocol, are not bound by it or subject to its
application.
(12) This Directive constitutes an act building on the Schengen acquis or oth-
erwise related to it within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 2003 Act of
Accession,
Article 1
Article 2
874
Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
Article 3
4. In the case of paragraph 3(d), the requested Member State shall as quickly
as possible inform the requesting Member State of a date as close as pos-
sible to the originally requested date on which transit by air may be assisted,
in so far as the other conditions are complied with.
5. Authorisations for transit by air which have already been issued may be
revoked by the requested Member State if circumstances within the mean-
ing of paragraph 3 subsequently come to light, justifying a refusal of the
transit.
6. The requested Member State shall inform the requesting Member State
forthwith of the refusal or revocation of a transit by air authorisation under
paragraph 3 or 5 or of any other reason why the transit is not possible, and
shall provide an explanation of the reasons.
875
Section V – Irregular Migration
Article 4
1. The request for escorted or unescorted transit by air and the associated assis-
tance measures under Article 5(1) shall be made in writing by the requesting
Member State. It shall reach the requested Member State as early as pos-
sible, and in any case no later than two days before the transit. This time
limit may be waived in particularly urgent and duly justified cases.
2. The requested Member State shall inform the requesting Member State
forthwith of its decision within two days. This time limit may be extended
in duly justified cases by a maximum of 48 hours. Transit by air shall not be
started without the approval of the requested Member State.
Where no reply is provided by the requested Member State within the dead-
line referred to in the first subparagraph, the transit operations may be
started by means of a notification by the requesting Member State.
3. For the purposes of dealing with the request under paragraph 1, the infor-
mation on the form to be used for requesting and authorising transit by air
in accordance with the Annex shall be forwarded to the requested Member
State.
The measures necessary for the update and the adjustment of the transit
request as set out in the Annex as well as the methods of its transmission
shall be taken in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 9(2).
4. With respect to any request for transit, the requesting Member State shall
provide the requested Member State with the details as provided for in the
Annex.
5. The Member States shall each appoint a central authority to which requests
under paragraph 1 are to be sent.
The central authorities shall appoint contact points for all the relevant air-
ports of transit who can be contacted throughout the transit operations.
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Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
Article 5
3. The requested Member State may, in accordance with its national law:
(a) place and accommodate the third-country nationals in a secure facil-
ity;
(b) use legitimate means to prevent or end any attempt by the third-coun-
try national to resist the transit.
877
Section V – Irregular Migration
6. The costs of the services provided according to paragraph 2(b) and (c) shall
be borne by the requesting Member State.
The remaining costs shall also be borne by the requesting Member State to
the extent that they are actual and quantifiable.
Article 6
2. The requested Member State shall assist with the readmission of the third-
country national to the requesting Member State in the cases referred to in
paragraph 1. The requesting Member State shall bear the costs incurred in
returning the third-country national.
Article 7
1. When carrying out the transit operation, the powers of the escorts shall
be limited to self-defence. In addition, in the absence of law-enforcement
officers from the transit Member State or for the purpose of supporting the
law-enforcement officers, the escorts may use reasonable and proportionate
action in response to an immediate and serious risk to prevent the third-
878
Chapter 30 Transit for Expulsion
Under all circumstances escorts must comply with the legislation of the
requested Member State.
2. Escorts shall not carry weapons during transit by air and shall wear civilian
clothes. They shall provide means of appropriate identification, including
the transit authorisation delivered by the transit Member State, or where
applicable, the notification referred to in Article 4(2), at the request of the
requested Member State.
Article 8
This Directive shall be without prejudice to the obligations arising from the
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended
by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, from international conventions
on human rights and fundamental freedoms and from international conventions
on the extradition of persons.
Article 9
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set
at one month.
Article 10
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 6 December
2005. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference
to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion
of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be
laid down by Member States.
879
Section V – Irregular Migration
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main
provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this
Directive.
Article 11
Article 12
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Union.
Article 13
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
880
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
1 Summary of Content
1.1 Introduction
By 1 January 2006, the Commission had negotiated five readmission agreements
on behalf of the European Community, and had mandates from the Council to
negotiate a further six agreements (see section 2 below). The first negotiation to
conclude was between the Community and the Special Administrative Region
of Hong Kong. An agreed text of an agreement was initialled on 22 November
2001 and this was the first EC readmission agreement to enter into force, on 1
March 2004.1 A second EC readmission treaty, with Macao, entered into force
on 1 June 2004.2 A third treaty, with Sri Lanka, was initialled in May 2002,
signed in June 2004 and entered into force on 1 May 2005.3 Early in 2004, the
Commission proposed that the Council sign and conclude a fourth EC readmis-
sion agreement, negotiated with Albania.4 As of the start of 2006, this treaty
had been signed and concluded by the Council, but had not yet been concluded
by Albania. Finally, in October 2005, the Commission and Russia concluded
1 OJ 2004 L 17/23. For notification of entry into force, see OJ 2004 L 64/38. See
Commission proposal to Council for Decisions on signature and conclusion of the
agreement (SEC (2002) 412, 18 Apr. 2002; Council doc. 8518/02, 2 May 2002).
2 OJ 2004 L 143/97. For notification of entry into force, see OJ 2004 L 258/17. See
Commission proposal to Council for Decisions on signature and conclusion of the
agreement (COM (2003) 151, 31 Mar. 2003).
3 OJ 2005 L 124/41. For notification of entry into force, see OJ 2005 L 138/17. For
the proposal to sign and conclude the agreement, see SEC (2003) 255, 21 Mar. 2003
(Council doc. 7831/1/03, 9 Apr. 2003).
4 OJ 2005 L 124/21. For the proposal to sign and conclude the agreement, see COM
(2004) 92, 12 Feb. 2004.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 881-898.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Section V – Irregular Migration
1.2 Contents
The EC/Hong Kong and EC/Macao agreements contain 21 Articles within eight
Sections, and there are six attached Annexes. In contrast, the EC/Sri Lanka
agreement has 22 Articles and seven Annexes, and the EC-Albania agreement
has 23 Articles and six Annexes. The reasons for the distinctions are that the EC-
Sri Lanka agreement contains an additional provision on the territorial scope
of the agreement, and an additional Annex comprising the EU’s standard travel
document. The EC-Albania agreement also contains an additional provision on
territorial scope, along with a further additional provision on “readmission in
error”.
Each agreement has an Article 1 setting out definitions. Here there are three
differences between the agreements. First, the agreement with Sri Lanka speci-
fies that a person denouncing or deprived of his or her nationality cannot be
considered “stateless” unless a State has promised them nationality. The Hong
Kong and Albania agreements do not contain this stipulation, while the Macao
agreement does not define “stateless” at all. Second, the Hong Kong agreement
specifies that permissions to stay as a visitor cannot be considered a “residence
authorisation”. The other agreements lack this definition. Third, the Hong Kong
agreement defines a “visa” as a document issued before arrival at the border; this
would exclude the exceptional issue of visas as the border as permitted under
EU rules,5 or the issue of visas at the Hong Kong borders if that is permitted
under Hong Kong law. Again, the other agreements lack this proviso.
Section 1 of each agreement, comprising Articles 2 and 3, sets out the
obligation of the non-EC party to accept respectively its own permanent resi-
dents (in the case of Hong Kong and Macao) or citizens (in the case of Sri
Lanka and Albania) and nationals of non-contracting parties (called “persons
of another jurisdiction” in the Hong Kong and Macao agreements and “third-
country nationals” in the Sri Lanka and Albania agreements). The obligation
to readmit a party’s own nationals or permanent residents ceases if they have
been naturalised (according to the Macao agreement) or promised naturalisa-
tion (in the Hong Kong agreement); the latter rule applies to Sri Lanka by virtue
of the definition of “stateless person” in that agreement and Albania by virtue
of an exemption from the obligation to readmit. Section 2 of each agreement,
comprising Articles 4 and 5, sets out reciprocal obligations for the European
Community (in the form of its Member States) to accept nationals of Member
States and of non-contracting parties. Of course, despite the form of reciproc-
ity, in practice the agreements will overwhelmingly be applied to expel persons
from the EC, not to it. However, one can imagine a scenario when migrants cross
5 See the Schengen rules and Regulation on this issue, discussed in Ch. 9.
882
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
Greece and then Albania, intending to transit to other Member States; if the
Albanian authorities intercept such persons, in principle they could be returned
to Greece under the readmission agreement, subject to its detailed provisions.
In the case of the agreement with Albania, there is a two-year delay after entry
into force of the agreement before it applies to readmission of nationals of non-
contracting parties.
There are important conditions relating to the core obligation to readmit
persons. The obligation only applies to persons who do not or no longer meet the
conditions for entry, residence or presence in the expelling (“requesting”) party.
There must be either proof or prima facie evidence as to the status of the person
concerned (see further below). As a corollary obligation, the party with readmis-
sion obligations must issue a travel document valid for six months. If the first
document expires and it has not been possible to transfer the person concerned
in that period for legal or factual reasons, Hong Kong, Macao and Albania
must issue a fresh travel document within 14 days and Sri Lanka must renew the
first travel document or issue a fresh document within 30 days (and “normally”
within 14 days). Moreover, if Albania or Hong Kong or Macao do not issue the
travel document within 15 days, if Macao does not reply to a Member State’s
request to issue one within 15 days, or if Sri Lanka does not acknowledge receipt
of a Member State’s request within 30 days, they shall each be deemed to have
accepted the use of the standard EC travel document for expulsion.6 There is no
means by which Hong Kong or Sri Lanka can impose reciprocal obligations on
the EC Member States to accept their travel documents, but Macao and Albania
can insist on use of their travel documents in this scenario.
The conditions for application of the readmission obligation as regards
nationals of non-contracting parties are that these persons hold a valid visa or
residence authorisation from the requested contracting party and entered the
territory of one party coming unlawfully directly from the other (in the case of
Hong Kong, Macao or Sri Lanka), or after staying on or transiting across the
territory (in the case of Albania). In the Sri Lanka agreement (but not the agree-
ments with Hong Kong or Macao) the concept of “coming directly” is more fully
explained as “an arrival by air or ship without having entered another country in
between”, and a declaration asserts that airside transit should not be considered
entry into another country for this purpose. Two exceptions from the readmis-
sion obligation appear in all agreements (where the person concerned has only
been in airside transit in the requested state, and where the expelling state has
issued the person concerned a visa or residence authorisation with longer valid-
ity). The Hong Kong agreement has a third exception not found in the other
agreements: the readmission obligation will not apply to non-visa nationals. In
6 On the standard travel document, see further s. 2 below. In the case of Sri Lanka
(but not the other agreements) the standard travel document is also annexed to the
agreement.
883
Section V – Irregular Migration
the agreement with Albania, the second exception does not apply if the Member
State’s visa or permit has been obtained by false or forged documents. There is
a specific provision governing the responsibility as between Member States in all
agreements, specifying which specific Member State is responsible if the other
contracting party wishes to return a person to the Community and multiple
Member States have issued visas and residence permits.
Section III of each agreement (Articles 6-11) sets out the rules on proce-
dures. According to Article 6(1), readmission can normally take place only on
the basis of a written application, but this can be waived under the conditions
set out in Article 6(2). Three agreements (all except the agreement with Albania)
only permit such a waiver if the person concerned is willing to return. Article
7 sets out which details need to be included in a readmission application. Here
there are subtle differences between the agreements with Albania, Hong Kong
and Macao on the one hand and Sri Lanka on the other. The latter agreement
only requires that the information listed in Article 7(1) concerning evidence and
personal particulars of the person concerned be submitted “to the extent pos-
sible” and is less definitive as regards the effect of supplying that information,
but it provides for more information to be transmitted. Articles 8 and 9 set out
rules relating to means of proof and prima facie evidence as set out in attached
Annexes, and here the specific means of proof and evidence differs somewhat
in the various agreements. Article 10 provides for time limits for sending and
replying to an application for readmission and Article 11 governs the transport
procedure, leaving much flexibility to the parties to arrange for methods of
transport.
Section IV of each agreement (Articles 12-13; Articles 13-14 in the Albania
agreement) concerns transit through each party’s territory on the way to another
destination – an obligation that will likely have more practical application in
the agreements with Hong Kong and Macao (as regards return to China), and
possibly Albania (as regards return to Kosovo). In each agreement there is an
obligation to permit transit subject to optional exceptions where there is a risk
of persecution of the person concerned or where that person could be subject to
criminal prosecution or sanctions.7 The Albanian agreement is the only one to
contain an express human rights exception, permitting refusal of transit if there
is a “real risk” of torture, et al, the death penalty or persecution on Geneva Con-
vention grounds in the State of destination. Next, Section V (Article 14; Article
15 in the Albania agreement) allocates costs to the requesting Member State and
Section VI (Articles 15 and 16; Articles 16 and 17 in the Albania agreement) set
certain limits on the application of the agreement. Article 15 of each agreement
(Article 16, Albania agreement) sets out detailed data protection principles and
requires the authorities in the EC to comply with the EC’s data protection direc-
7 These provisions can be compared with EU rules on transit for expulsion: see Ch.
30.
884
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
tive, but there is no obligation for the non-EC party to establish an independent
supervisory authority or to give the data subject rights to check what infor-
mation is being transmitted or any other remedy such as the right to demand
correction or erasure of the data. Article 16 (Article 17, Albania agreement)
provides that the agreement is “without prejudice to the rights, obligations and
responsibilities” of the parties arising from “International Law”; the Sri Lanka
agreement refers “in particular” to “any applicable International Convention or
agreement” which the contracting parties are parties to. There is no specific ref-
erence to human rights or refugee law, except in the Albania agreement, which
refers expressly to the ECHR, the Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Pro-
tocol, and extradition treaties.
The rules on implementation and application of each agreement are set out
in Section VII (Articles 17-19; Articles 18-20 of the Albania agreement). Article
17 provides for a readmission committee which can monitor the application of
the agreement, decide on implementing arrangements, exchange information on
implementing Protocols and recommend amendments to the agreement. In the
case of the Sri Lanka agreement, the power of this committee is broader, as it
can also amend the annexes and decide on implementing arrangements con-
cerning “an orderly management of return flows”. The Sri Lanka and Albania
agreements also provide expressly that the committee decisions are binding. In
either case, the EC is represented by the Commission. According to the final
or proposed Council decisions on conclusion of each agreement, the Commis-
sion will have the power to agree the rules of procedure of these committees on
behalf of the EC, but otherwise it will be up to the Council, acting by qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission, to decide the EC’s position. Each
agreement also provides that Member States can draw up special implementing
protocols with the other side, but conversely that the agreement takes prece-
dence over any incompatible bilateral agreement between a Member State and
the other contracting party. All the treaties provide for denunciation, but there is
no provision for settling disputes that might arise between the parties.
The approved mandates for readmission treaties with Algeria, Turkey,
Albania and China are essentially identical to the basic provisions of the first
three treaties agreed by the EC, except that they contain a more detailed provi-
sion on respect for international treaties, referring in particular to the Geneva
Convention on refugees and its Protocol, international conventions on asylum
responsibility, the ECHR, the UN Convention against Torture, international
conventions on extradition and transit and multilateral international conven-
tions and agreements on the readmission of foreign nationals.8 It is interesting
that the final EC-Albania treaty made no reference to the Convention against
Torture.
885
Section V – Irregular Migration
9 Council doc. 12509/95. See Press Releases of JHA Council, 23 Nov. 1995 (agree-
ment on the text) and Environment Council, 4 Apr. 1996 (formal adoption of the
text). The text is reproduced in the Annex to this Chapter.
10 OJ 1996 C 274/21. For analysis of this Recommendation, see Guild and Niessen,
The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union: Adopted
Conventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions (Kluwer,
1996), 405-411.
11 OJ 1996 C 274/25.
12 OJ 1996 C 274/20. For analysis of this Recommendation, see Guild and Niessen, n.
8 above, 385-391.
13 The drafts appear in Council docs. 10338/98, 13 July 1998; 10338/1/98, 21 Dec. 1998;
and 10338/2/98, 22 Apr. 1999. See also the Danish discussion paper (Council doc.
7669/99, 26 Apr. 1999) and the working party proceedings of 28 Apr. 1999 (Council
doc. 8124/99, 10 May 1999).
14 Council doc. 7668/1/99, 14 June 1999. For the initial experience of the Member
States in using the standard travel document, see Council doc. 10340/2/95, 30 Oct.
1995.
886
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
the ECHR, the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees and treaties on
asylum responsibility), rather than a vague protection for “international law”
and treaties generally. In the first draft of the multilateral agreement, there was
also more detailed express protection for persons subject to transit, permitting
transit to be cancelled on certain human rights grounds, but that protection was
dropped in later drafts.
The EU has taken a number of initiatives to promote the use and accep-
tance of its standard travel document and to encourage third states to issue
travel documents in turn. One measure was the decision to send a letter to all
third countries drawing the existence of the standard EU travel document to
their attention and asking them to recognise it.15 Later, the Council took a paral-
lel decision to encourage requested states to issue travel documents. In its Con-
clusions of December 2000, the Council noted that some states were more more
willing to issue such documents following direct contact with their national
authorities, bypassing their consulates in the expelling state.16 The Conclusions
therefore suggested that a Member State experiencing such difficulties should
contact its ambassador posted to the country concerned and suggest contacting
the local authorities, in cooperation with other EU ambassadors and the Com-
mission delegation to that country. The issue could in particular be referred to
the Ambassador of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council
of the EU. In the event of continued problems, the Member State experienc-
ing problems can act in liaison with the other Member States and inform the
Council, so that the Council could make unspecified threats against the non-
cooperating state.
Subsequently, the February 2002 JHA Council agreed to send an annual
questionnaire to the Member States in order to collect detailed information
regarding difficulties in expelling persons to third countries. The questionnaire
includes questions on use of the EU travel document and measures taken or to
be taken against the other country, including potential “suspension of financial
and technical aid”.17
15 Council doc. 7665/99, 26 Apr. 1999, approved by the General Affairs Council on 31
May 1999.
16 See Council doc. 13995/00, 29 Nov. 2000, approved by the General Affairs Council
on 4 Dec. 2000.
17 Council doc. 6071/02, 7 Feb. 2002. See earlier Council docs. 13661/01, 26 Nov. 2001;
5180/02, 10 Jan. 2002; and 5180/1/02, 18 Jan. 2002.
887
Section V – Irregular Migration
the Community can enjoy implied external relations power in the absence of
express powers in the Treaty.18 A crucial question is whether the EC’s external
competence on a given issue is exclusive (meaning that the Member States are
precluded from signing their own external treaties in that area, unless the EC
permits them to do so) or shared with the Member States.
The procedure for negotiation and conclusion of treaties between the Com-
munity and states or bodies is set out in Article 300 EC. First, the Commission
asks the Council for a mandate to negotiate, which the Council then decides
upon. Negotiations are handled by the Commission, assisted by a “watchdog”
committee appointed by the Council. If the negotiations are successful, the
Commission and the other party’s negotiator then initial the text, and the Com-
mission suggests that the Council sign and then conclude the agreement. Con-
clusion of the treaty usually cannot take place without prior consultation of the
EP.19 As for the Council, the voting rule applied throughout the procedure is the
same as the voting rule it must use for the same subject internally. So until 1 Jan-
uary 2005, the Council had to act unanimously as regards readmission treaties
because the relevant internal voting rule was unanimity.20 But from 1 January
2005, the internal Council voting rule regarding irregular immigration measures
moved to a qualified majority, as provided for by the Hague Programme;21 since
that point, the Council has also voted by a qualified majority as regards read-
mission treaties. Also, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the inter-
pretation of agreements concluded by the Community, and on the validity of
the decision to conclude (or terminate) such treaties.
The Commission initially took the view that conclusion of readmission
agreements was the exclusive competence of the Community following the entry
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Member States had a negative reaction
to this assertion and the German Presidency of the Council duly drew up con-
clusions rejecting this view in May 1999.22 However, despite this view as to the
lack of exclusive competence, the Tampere European Council soon endorsed
the Community’s involvement in readmission from two perspectives, asserting
that: “[t]he Amsterdam Treaty conferred powers on the Community in the field
888
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
23 See Annex 4.
24 Press Release of JHA Council, 2 Dec. 1999. The text is reproduced in the Annex
to this Chapter. For detailed background, see Council docs. 6098/99, 17 Feb. 1999;
7292/99, 11 May 1999; 11052/99, 23 Sep. 1999; 12134/99, 21 Oct. 1999; and 13409/99,
25 Nov. 1999.
25 See outcomes of proceedings of the migration working party on 12 Jan. 1999, 15
Sep. 1999, 27 Jan. 2000 and 29 Feb. 2000/1 Mar. 2000 (respectively n. 20 above and
Council docs. 11042/99, 23 Sep. 1999; 5773/00, 31 Jan. 2000; and 7505/00, 10 Apr.
2000). See also the letter on the inclusion of a readmission clause in Member States’
bilateral agreements with China on “Approved Destination Status” for Chinese
nationals (Council doc. 13206/01, 25 Oct. 2001).
26 See the outcome of proceedings of the SCIFA meeting on 16 Nov. 1999 (Council
doc. 13888/99, 7 Dec. 1999) and outcomes of proceedings of the migration work-
ing party on 15 Sep. 1999, 27 Jan. 2000 and 29 Feb. 2000/1 Mar. 2000 (respectively
Council docs. 11042/99, 23 Sep. 1999; 5773/00, 31 Jan. 2000; and 7505/00, 10 Apr.
2000)). See earlier Council doc. 10795/99, 9 Sep. 1999.
27 See JHA Council Conclusions, 30 Nov/1 Dec 2000.
28 See OJ 2002 C 142.
889
Section V – Irregular Migration
agreements and named the next four “targets”, Algeria, Albania, China and
Turkey.29 The Commission duly submitted negotiating mandates for these four
states, and the November 2002 JHA Council granted them.30
An agreement within the Council to negotiate a readmission treaty does
not, of course, mean that the other country will necessarily agree. In fact, a
Commission report of October 2002 admitted that, more than two years after
the Council gave the Commission a mandate, Morocco, Pakistan and Russia
had not even agreed to begin negotiations.31 Since then, following an agreement
over the status of Kaliningrad after Lithuania’s accession to the EU at the EU/
Russia summit in November 2002, Russia agreed to begin talks, and the conclu-
sion of negotiations with Ukraine is correspondingly more likely. The agree-
ment with Russia became linked with negotiation of a separate agreement to
facilitate issue of visas by both the EU Member States and Russia; as noted
above, the two treaties were agreed together in October 2005. It subsequently
became clear that the EC was also willing to negotiate a visa facilitation agree-
ment with Ukraine in parallel to the readmission agreement, and the Council
granted the Commission a formal negotiating mandate for the visa treaty in
November 2005. Negotiations on the readmission treaty with Morocco are also
apparently well advanced.
One related issue sparked by the prospect of Community readmission trea-
ties was the idea of “internal readmission” rules to govern readmissions between
Member States, governing both the issue of the Member State responsible when
an external agreement was applied to send a person back to the EU, and the
issue of the Member State responsible when a person had travelled through
several Member States. The Finnish Council Presidency launched a discussion
on this issue in late 1999 and proposed a Regulation to govern the issue. This
proposal was loosely based on the rules in the Dublin Convention, although it
contained less detail and the relationship between the proposed Regulation and
the Dublin Convention was unclear. However, due to the misgivings of several
Member States and the prospect that the planned EC readmission agreements
would address this issue (as they ultimately did), discussions were terminated
by the Portuguese Presidency.32 The Finnish proposal later lapsed after the end
29 Council doc. 7990/02, 15 Apr. 2002, approved by the JHA Council, 25/26 Apr.
2002.
30 Press release of JHA Council, 28/29 Nov. 2002.
31 Council doc. 12625/02, 10 Oct. 2002.
32 See discussion papers (Council docs. 10504/99, 29 July 1999 and 11672/99 and 11
Oct. 1999); outcomes of proceedings of the migration working party meetings on
15 Sep. 1999 (n. 23 above), 11 Oct. 1999, 29 Nov. 1999 and 27 Jan. 2000 (Council
docs. 12294/99, 26 Oct. 1999; 5599/00, 24 Jan. 2000; and 5774/00, 31 Jan. 2000). The
official text transmitted to the EP is in OJ 1999 C 353/6.
890
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
3 Legal Analysis
Does the Community have exclusive external competence over readmission agree-
ments? It would certainly have such competence if it fully harmonised all related
aspects of internal law.36 Although the extent of the harmonisation required to
33 See Annex 6 and comments in Peers, “EU Immigration and Asylum Law after
Seville”, 16 IANL Journal (2002) 176.
34 See Annex 7 and also Regulation 491/2004 on cooperation with third states on
asylum and migration (OJ 2004 L 80/1). For analysis of this issue, see Peers, “Irregu-
lar Immigration and EU External Relations” in Bogusz, Cholewinski, Cygan, and
Szyszczak, eds., Irregular Migration and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
35 COM (2005) 352, 28 July 2005.
36 See Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I-1061, as clarified by Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-
5273.
891
Section V – Irregular Migration
give rise to this outcome is unclear, it would likely entail full harmonisation of
asylum procedures and substantive refugee law along with similar harmonisa-
tion as regards subsidiary protection, along with harmonisation of most areas
of law related to irregular immigration. Certainly the EC had not achieved such
harmonisation as of the spring of 1999 and indeed had not achieved it by Sep-
tember 2005 either. In fact, it could not achieve it even if it adopted all outstand-
ing legislative proposals, for the simple reason that many provisions of Article
63 EC as they presently stand preclude full harmonisation of national law, at
least as regards asylum. It is also possible for the EC to gain exclusive external
competence on a matter if internal law expressly grants such negotiating power
to the EC, but that has not happened as regards readmission treaties.
But there is an alternative means of gaining exclusive external competence,
which the Commission was relying on in its argument for exclusivity in this case.
This consists of cases where it is impossible to exercise the internal competence
without first (or simultaneously) exercising the external competence. Was the
German Council Presidency right to reject this assertion? From the Court’s case
law, it seems clear that it was. The case law states that for the principle to apply,
it must be technically impossible to exercise the internal competence without the
external competence.37 Obviously the Commission believed that the EC could
not adopt rules relating to expulsion outside the EU unless third countries were
legally obliged to take the relevant persons back. Yet the experience of countries
like the UK which traditionally eschewed formal readmission treaties shows that
it is technically possible to expel people without such formal arrangements.
Since the EC lacks exclusive competence, is it wrong for the EC to adopt
such treaties alone, without the involvement of the Member States, particularly
given that the treaties take precedence over any treaties concluded by the Member
States? On this point, it should be recalled that even where the EC lacks exclu-
sive competence, it is not precluded from acting externally altogether. Rather
the EC is able to act externally wherever it has internal powers;38 it is not limited
to exercising those powers only in cases where it has exclusive competence. This
tends to be forgotten because Member States are usually very unwilling to agree
to the EC exercising its non-exclusive powers. It is striking that they are quite
anxious for the EC to exercise these powers in the field of readmission, presum-
ably in the belief that the Member States can better achieve their objetives by
acting through the EC, particularly in light of the EC’s powers over trade, finan-
cial aid and association agreements which can be used to encourage third States
to accept conclusion of a readmission agreement.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that because the Court of Justice has
the jurisdiction to interpret readmission agreements and rule on the validity of
the Council’s decision to conclude them, it is therefore competent to rule on the
37 See the interpretation of Opinion 1/76 [1977] ECR 741 in Opinion 1/94, ibid.
38 See Commission v Council, n. 18 above.
892
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
4 Comments
A significant number of those persons expelled by means of a readmission
agreement are likely to be rejected asylum-seekers or rejected applicants for
other forms of international protection. These could include those who might in
principle have an arguable claim to protection, but whose claim was not exam-
ined as to the substance because they have allegedly passed through “safe third
countries”. Another significant proportion will likely have entered or stayed ille-
gally, but without making a protection claim. Possibly there will also be persons
whose refugee or other protection status has ended for one reason or another,
as well as those whose legal migration status has ended. Specialised readmission
rules are a central element in any scheme to allocate asylum responsibility, such
as the Dublin Convention and “Dublin II” rules,40 and in any system permit-
ting freedom to travel or reside in different Member States.41 For those who
arguably have a protection need, the link between readmission agreements and
human rights law is essential. Conversely, they are attractive to most Member
39 For individual cases, see Cases 241/87 Maclaine Watson [1990] ECR I-1797, T-
572/93 Odigtria [1995] ECR II-2025 and C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655. On the
priority of human rights and other general principles over treaties concluded by the
Community, see Cases C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR I-6177, particularly
the Opinion of the Advocate-General, and C-122/95 Germany v Council [1998] ECR
I-973. Such priority is also assumed in Case C-347/03 ERSA [2005] ECR I-3785;
and jus cogens human rights principles even take priority over Security Council
resolutions: Cases T-306/01 Yusuf and T-315/01Kadi, judgments of 21 Sept. 2005,
not yet reported. Internal EC rules on termination of treaties are expressly set out
in Art. 300 EC.
40 See Ch. 10.
41 On the latter point, see Ch. 20 (long-term residents).
893
Section V – Irregular Migration
States because no decision to expel a person can be effective unless another State
agrees to take that person onto its territory, and most Member States believe
that a formal treaty obligation will assist in accomplishing this objective. In
particular, such treaties can be used to extend readmission obligations beyond
their traditional application to the requested State’s own nationals in order to
include the nationals of other States who passed through the requested state, to
permit the application of “safe third country” rules. They can also be used to set
out rules on means of “proof ” and “evidence” to increase the prospect that the
requested State will accept people back, and to include rules on transit through
the requested State (not strictly speaking a readmission issue at all).
What are the human rights problems with readmission agreements in prac-
tice? During the Global Consultations on International Protection, the UNHCR
approach to readmission agreements emerged clearly.42 There was a particular
concern about the connection between such treaties and the “safe third coun-
try” principle, with an insistence that persons should not be removed to suppos-
edly safe countries without certain procedural safeguards, including a guarantee
that their claim would be examined effectively in that country. More broadly, it
was stated that “the sending and re-admitting states share the responsibility for
ensuring that the combined application of the notion of ‘safe third country’ and
the re-admission does not lead to refoulement by way of chain deportation”.
Do the EC readmission agreements discharge this responsibility? It seems
clear that they do not. There are no provisions specifically dealing with those
with potential protection claims in the requested State (or in another State) and
no direct reference to non-refoulement principles, although it can be hoped (as
suggested above) that in an appropriate case the Court of Justice would infer
such principles into the application of the agreement. But it would obvious be
preferable to have detailed rules in the readmission agreement rather than rely
on a hypothetical judgments that can inevitably only address ad hoc situations.
Moreover, in the absence of effective procedural protection within the EU for
“safe third country” cases,43 none of the principles suggested by the UNHCR
can be met.
Two other aspects of readmission agreements also give rise to concern.
First, this is apparently the only area of EC external relations where the EC
draws up negotiating mandates without first ensuring through informal contacts
that the other party wishes to negotiate an agreement. In fact in several cases the
other side has clearly refused to engage in detailed negotiations with the EC on
a readmission agreement. This is undoubtedly one of the factors that led to the
Seville conclusions on potential punishment of third States that refused to coop-
erate with the EC’s migration policies. The prospect of readmission agreements
42 See the Conclusions of the Regional meeting in Budapest, 6-7 June 2001 (EC/
GC/01/14, 15 June 2001).
43 On the relevant provisions in the agreed asylum procedures Directive, see Ch. 14.
894
Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
is thus inevitably tied up with the application of the Seville conclusions, which
raises a number of legal and political difficulties.44
The final point is the assumption in the readmission agreements that per-
sons can be left in limbo indefinitely awaiting the application of the readmission
agreement where there is a delay preventing its application. In the absence of
any rules in the readmission agreement definitively terminating the prospect of
readmission after a certain period, or of any internal EC rules governing the
status of persons in such limbo, there is a risk of a potentially indefinite period
of uncertainty without any guaranteed access to an income or (for children)
education.
895
Section V – Irregular Migration
ANNEX
AGREE that with regard to future mixed agreements the insertion of the follow-
ing clauses shall be considered on a casebycase basis when adopting the guide-
lines for their negotiation:
Recognizing that cooperation for the prevention and control of illegal immigra-
tion constitutes one of the primary objectives of this Agreement.
The relevant articles may be, where appropriate, preceded by a Title “N” called
“Readmission. Cooperation for the prevention and control of illegal immigra-
tion”.
ARTICLE X
The Member States of the European Union and State X agree to cooperate in
order to prevent and control illegal immigration. To this end:
– State X agrees to readmit any of its nationals illegally present on the ter-
ritory of a Member State, upon request by the latter and without further
formalities;
– and each Member State agrees to readmit any of its nationals, as defined
for Community purposes, illegally present on the territory of State X, upon
request by the latter and without further formalities.
The Member States and State X will also provide their nationals with appropri-
ate identity documents for such purposes.
ARTICLE Y
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Chapter 31 EC Readmission Agreements
have arrived on the territory of any such Member State from State X or who
have arrived on the territory of State X from any such Member State.
ARTICLE Z
The Cooperation Council shall examine what other joint efforts can be made to
prevent and control illegal immigration.”
“The Council of the European Union has decided that the standard clauses set
out below should be included in all future Community agreements and in agree-
ments between the Community, its Member States, and third countries
ARTICLE A
The Member States of the European Union and State X will also provide their
nationals with appropriate identity documents for such purposes.
ARTICLE B
The Parties agree to conclude upon request an agreement between State X and
the European Community regulating the specific obligations for State X and
the Member States of the European Community for readmission, including an
obligation for the readmission of nationals of other countries and stateless per-
sons.
ARTICLE C
897
Section V – Irregular Migration
obligations for readmission between State X and the Member State concerned,
including an obligation for the readmission of nationals of other countries and
stateless persons.
ARTICLE D
The Cooperation Council shall examine what other joint efforts can be made to
prevent and control illegal immigration.”
898
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU
Law and Policy:
A Human Rights Deficit
Ryszard Cholewinski*
1 Introduction
[T]he life of entrants and residents without regular migration status is usually
a rightless existence without the basic protections of criminal and civil law and
with no legal avenues by which to assert an entitlement to just and humane
treatment. Irregular migrants in Europe typically find themselves in a position
where they reside and work in a European country, but are without the basic
protections associated with regular residence. They are … the ‘civic dead’. …
[M]igrants with irregular status are frequently prey – and always vulnerable –
to exploitation and deception by: employers (who often refuse to pay them for
work done); traffickers and irregular migration networkers (who often exploit
* Centre for European Law and Integration, Faculty of Law, University of Leices-
ter, United Kingdom. This article develops arguments advanced in my paper “The
Legal Situation of Irregular Migrants: is their dignity guaranteed in the receiving
countries?”, Council of Europe, Conference on “Irregular Migration and Dignity
of Migrants: Co-operation in the Mediterranean Region”: Proceedings, Athens, 3-4
October 2001, Doc. MG-FL (2002) 7 (see the Council of Europe’s Social Cohesion
website at <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Social_Cohesion/Migration/Activities/Proceed-
ings_Athens%20-%20Final%20ver.pdf>) 54, and the article “The EU Acquis on
Irregular Migration: Reinforcing Security at the Expense of Rights” (2000) 2 EJML
361. The chapter uses the term “irregular” rather than “illegal” migration to avoid
the connotation of illegality and criminality often association with the latter. I am
grateful to Nicola Rogers and Steve Peers for their comments on earlier drafts and
to Steve Peers for bringing to my attention many of the most recent EU measures
and documents discussed in this article. I remain solely responsible for any errors,
factual or otherwise. This chapter does not take account of the proposed Reg. on
SIS II (COM (2005) 236, 31 May 2005) or the proposed Dir. on expulsion standards
(COM (2005) 391, 1 Sept. 2005), as they have not yet been agreed or adopted.
Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law ... pp. 899-941.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 15374 8.
Ryszard Cholewinski
or deceive them); and even members of their own ethnic communities (who
often take advantage of their enfeebled market position in the area of housing
or medical care). All immigrants are, of course, vulnerable in the process of
adjusting to a new society. For people with irregular status, however, this state
of vulnerability is permanent and dictated by the need to avoid the attention
of the authorities if they are to remain in the country.1
1 Gibney, “Outside the Protection of the Law: The Situation of Irregular Migrants in
Europe: A synthesis report commissioned by the Jesuit Refugee Service-Europe”,
Working Paper No. 6 (Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2000) at 21.
2 Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on immi-
gration and asylum policies (COM (94) 23, 23 Feb. 1994), 29, para.109. Emphasis
added.
3 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a
common policy on illegal immigration (COM (2001) 672, 15 Nov. 2001).
4 Ibid. at 7.
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Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
5 Ibid. at 8.
6 See respectively Presidency Conclusions: Laeken European Council, 14-15 December
2001, Bulletin EU 12-2001, points I.2-I.29, Conclusion 40, first indent and Proposal
for a Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and Trafficking of Human
Brings in the European Union [hereinafter Council Plan to Combat Illegal Immigra-
tion], OJ 2002 C 142/23.
7 Presidency Conclusions: Seville European Council, 21-22 June 2002, Bulletin EU 6-
2002, points I2-I33, Conclusion 30.
901
Ryszard Cholewinski
8 E.g. see the non-discrimination provision, Art. 2(1), in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by all the EU Member States and
candidate countries: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status”. Emphasis added. See also Art. 1 of
the ECHR: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their juris-
diction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. Emphasis
added.
902
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
903
Ryszard Cholewinski
13 Gibney, n. 1 above, at 2.
14 European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Strasbourg, 24
November 1977, European Treaty Series No. 93. As of 28 Dec. 2005, the Conven-
tion has been ratified by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and Turkey. It has also been signed by Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxem-
bourg, Moldova, and Ukraine. Part II of ILO Convention No. 143 on Promotion
of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, n. 12 above, is also
only applicable to lawfully resident migrants.
15 Communication on immigration and asylum policies, n. 2 above, at 29-30, para. 110.
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Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
16 The tension between controlling irregular migration and the protection of the rights
of irregular migrants is well articulated by Gibney, n. 1 above, at 23, who under-
scores the importance of the latter: “[T]he goal of reducing irregular migration is
potentially in conflict with the goal of improving the conditions faced by irregular
residents. Extensive rights to health care, education, employment protection, politi-
cal participation, or residence might serve to attract more people to life as a migrant
with irregular status. European states are thus unlikely to recognise wide-ranging
entitlements for irregular migrants lest they encourage more migrants to violate
immigration laws. … This conflict should not be exaggerated. It seems plausible
that granting well-defined, limited rights, such as a right of access to emergency
health care, would not have much of a magnet effect on irregular migration. Fur-
thermore, current practices hardly insulate officials from the accusation of hypoc-
risy. Is it not dubious for governments to proclaim the importance of human rights
abroad and yet ignore egregiously exploited irregular migrants at home? Nonethe-
less, it is important that policy recommendations balance, on the one hand, the need
to treat people with irregular migration status in a humane and rights-respecting
manner with, on the other hand, the legitimate aspiration of states to avoid attract-
ing increasing numbers of people to enter and reside without permission”.
905
Ryszard Cholewinski
fore, positive measures safeguarding the rights of irregular migrants are not pre-
cluded in principle. Further measures relating to irregular migration can also be
adopted under the restructured third pillar on police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters (Title VI of the Treaty on European Union), particularly in
the context of combating trafficking in persons. Secondly, many of the measures
adopted will also now be legally binding in contrast to the body of soft law
agreed to as a result of the previous intergovernmental cooperation under the
former third pillar. This also means that they will be ultimately subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Although the Court’s jurisdiction under
Title IV TEC is more limited than under other parts of the Community pillar,17
the importance of the Court’s role in this area should not be underestimated
given that fundamental human rights as guaranteed by the ECHR are consid-
ered as constituting general principles of Community law18 and given the solemn
proclamation in December 2000 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,19
which, though non-binding, is regarded as an important statement of the rights
protected within the EU.20 Nonetheless, as noted below, the JHA Council is
increasingly resorting to the adoption of “soft law” instruments in the field of
irregular migration, which give Member States greater scope for undertaking
more immediate operational activities. Thirdly, the measures adopted will have
a far broader territorial application than in those twenty-three Member States
participating in Title IV TEC. Although Ireland and the United Kingdom have
opted out of Title IV, these countries can also opt in to certain measures, and
both have already done so in respect of a number of measures relating to asylum
and irregular migration. Moreover, EU candidate states are also required to
accept these measures as part of the EU’s JHA acquis. Indeed, as described
below, some candidate countries have enthusiastically embraced the principles
advanced by these measures to the extent of going far beyond the acquis. EU
preventive policies on irregular migration are also being “exported” to other
European countries participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process in
17 For an analysis of this jurisdiction, see Guild and Peers, “Deference or Defiance?
The Court of Justice’s Jurisdiction over Immigration and Asylum” in Guild and
Harlow, eds., Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law
(Hart, 2001) 267 at 277 et seq.
18 Article 6(2) TEU.
19 OJ 2000 C 364/1.
20 For the Charter’s potential application to matters of asylum and immigration, see
Peers, “Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental
Rights” (2001) 3 EJML 141.
906
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
the Balkans,21 and further afield, particularly in the context of the adoption of
EU readmission agreements with third countries.22
EU law and policy on irregular migration adopted to date under Titles IV
TEC and VI TEU has focused unduly on preventive measures with the result
that the prospect of developing a more rights-based approach has diminished
considerably. Moreover, some of these measures arguably undermine rights still
further and the Commission’s Communication on a common policy on illegal
immigration and the subsequent Plan of the Council appear to indicate that
more restrictive proposals are in the pipeline. These questions are discussed
below with reference to a number of the recently adopted measures and in the
context of five problematic issues: criminalisation of irregular migration; cross
or mutual recognition of national decisions; exporting control policies on irreg-
ular migration; the situation of irregular migrants as victims of human rights
abuses; and the rapidly developing EU return policy on irregular residents.
907
Ryszard Cholewinski
ing minimum rules for penalties, the liability of legal persons and jurisdiction.24
The Council has also adopted a Framework Decision on combating traffick-
ing in human beings, which is discussed in Section 3.4 below, and a Directive
building on the Schengen acquis in respect of carriers’ liability.25 The Schengen
acquis (the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of June 1985
(SIA) and implementing measures) is now part of Community law as a result of
its integration by the Treaty of Amsterdam into TEC and TEU structures. Mea-
sures imposing financial sanctions on transport carriers do not necessarily entail
criminal liability, but they can be regarded as being tantamount to criminal pen-
alties because they arguably serve similar goals, namely those of retribution and
deterrence,26 even though they are not subject to the procedural and substantive
safeguards inherent in criminal proceedings.
The Commission’s Communication on illegal immigration in the section
under the heading “Aliens Law and Criminal Law”, is clearly supportive of the
above measures identifying them, rather crudely, as part of “a ‘classical approach’
to fight illegal immigration”. Moreover, the Commission envisages the adoption
of further measures, particularly in the area of combating illegal employment in
order to supplement the soft law that already exists in this area:27
It would seem clear that in order to address the problem of illegal immigration
comprehensively, the illegal employment of illegal residents should be put back
on the political agenda. The demand for illegal workers is especially caused by
their employers. Sanctions against illegal employment should be harmonised
908
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
for the elimination of all competitive advantages, which is a very basic prin-
ciple of Community law. This includes minimum criminal penalties.28
909
Ryszard Cholewinski
States”.32 Although it was originally understood that this provision would not
require harmonisation of sanctions,33 the same approach was taken in respect
of Article 26 SIA on carriers’ liability,34 which has since been supplemented by
the Directive referred to above. Indeed, Member States already have such pen-
alties in place, which may range from a few days imprisonment or a fine to up
to two years imprisonment.35 Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.3 below, pen-
alties have also been introduced in EU candidate countries in respect of their
own citizens who migrate to the EU without authorisation. Criminalisation of
irregular migration becomes especially problematic at this juncture. While pro-
portionate penalties aimed at those who facilitate and employ irregular migrant
labour might be viewed as legitimate, punishing irregular migrants, who cannot
be equated to criminals, particularly if their only “offence” is to seek a better
life for themselves, is very questionable from the standpoint of human rights.
Indeed, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of ILO Conventions
and Recommendations has cast doubt on the validity of imposing such crimi-
nal penalties with reference to Article 6(1) of Convention No. 143. In its 1999
General Survey on the ILO instruments concerning migrant workers, the Com-
mittee observed that this provision as well as the whole of Part I of this Con-
vention aimed at preventing irregular migration are “primarily targeted at the
demand for clandestine labour rather than supply” and that sanctions against
migrant workers in an irregular situation are “contrary to the spirit of the [ILO]
instruments”.36 The European Parliament has also underlined that “[s]ince
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Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No. 143), and
Recommendation (No. 151), 1975 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1999) (see
also <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/r3-1b.htm>), para.
338.
37 European Parliament Resolution of 30 March 2000 on asylum-seekers and migrants
– action plans for countries of origin or transit, OJ 2000 C 378/75, point 22.
38 See Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) Instructions, Ch. 13, Section
2 (Administrative Removal under Section 10 of the 1999 Act), para. 2.1. These
Instructions can be accessed at <http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/
laws___policy/policy_instructions/table_of_contents.html>?
39 Cf. Groenendijk, “The Directive on Mutual Recognition of Expulsion Decisions:
Symbolic or Unbalanced Politics?” in P. De Bruycker, ed., The Emergence of a Euro-
pean Immigration Policy (Bruylant, 2003) 447.
40 Cf. ibid. at 460-461.
911
Ryszard Cholewinski
41 See respectively Convention determining the State responsible for examining appli-
cations for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communi-
ties, 15 June 1990, OJ 1997 C 254/1 and Reg. 343/2003 (OJ 2003 L 50/1). See further
Ch. 10.
42 R v. Secretary of State, ex parte Adan; R v. Secretary of State, ex parte Aitseguer
[2001] All E.R. 593. The Council has now adopted a common EU approach to the
concept of persecution by non-state agents, which conforms with the broader posi-
tion taken in the United Kingdom, in the Directive on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees
or as persons who otherwise need international protection (Directive 2004/83, OJ
2004 L 304/12, Art. 6(c)). See further Ch. 13.
43 For a comprehensive study of the operation of this system, see JUSTICE, The
Schengen Information System: A human rights audit (London: JUSTICE, 2000).
912
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
given the adverse consequences for the affected individual and has profound
implications for the operation of the non-discrimination principle since persons
in analogous situations are likely to be treated differently for SIS reporting pur-
poses depending on the Member State in which they find themselves. This con-
cern has since been confirmed in practice by judicial decisions at the national
level, particularly in France where SIS reports made by German authorities
were challenged before the courts by two third-country nationals (a Moroccan
and Romanian) who were refused visas to come to France on the basis of such
reports. In both cases, the Conseil d’Etat quashed the refusal decisions because
neither litigant was provided with sufficient information to challenge the SIS
entry.44 It emerged that the German entries in the SIS were made because the
individuals concerned had previously applied for asylum in Germany and their
claims had been rejected, which in most participating Member States would not
be a valid reason for a report in the SIS.
A similar approach, based on the cross or mutual recognition of national
decisions is being adopted in the context of expulsion of third-country nation-
als, including those who have entered a Member State without authorisation or
reside there unlawfully. In May 2001, the Council adopted Directive 2001/40/EC
on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third-country nation-
als,45 a measure originally based on the initiative of the French Government,
enabling EU Member States to recognise and enforce certain expulsion decisions
made by the authorities of another Member State. According to Article 3(1) of
the Directive, such recognition may take place in cases where the expulsion deci-
sion is based on a “serious and present threat to public order or to national secu-
rity and safety” in two specified cases46 or the “failure to comply with national
44 See the cases of Hamssaoui (No. 198344) and Forabosco (No. 190384), discussed
by Guild, “Adjudicating Schengen: National Judicial Control in France” (1999) 1
EJML 419.
45 Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of deci-
sions on the expulsion of third country nationals, OJ 2001 L 149/34. The Direc-
tive should have been implemented by Member States by 2 Dec. 2002 (Art. 8(1)),
although in June 2003, the Commission reported that “a majority of Member States
have failed so far to communicate to the Commission any measures incorporat-
ing this Directive into national law”. Commission, Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council in view of the European Council of Thessaloniki on the
development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of
human beings, external borders and the return of illegal residents (COM (2003) 323, 3
June 2003) at 9. See further Ch. 25.
46 These are “conviction of a third country national by the issuing Member State for an
offence punishable by a penalty involving deprivation of liberty of at least one year”
and “the existence of serious grounds for believing that a third country national has
committed serious criminal offences or the existence of solid evidence of his inten-
tion to commit such offences within the territory of a Member State”. In the former
913
Ryszard Cholewinski
rules on the entry or residence of aliens”. With regard to the latter situation, the
Directive provides no guidance as to what these national rules should contain
at a minimum. Although EU Member States are under an obligation to apply
the Directive with “due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”
(Article 3(2)), the final text is weaker than an earlier draft version of the Direc-
tive, which provided that expulsion decisions and enforcement measures must
comply with the ECHR and other applicable international instruments.47 The
extension of cross or mutual recognition to other types of national decisions
and action in respect of the return of irregular migrants is supported by the
rapidly developing EU return policy on irregular residents, which is discussed
in Section 3.5 below. Indeed, in this context, the Council has adopted a Council
Directive on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air,
which, subject to certain conditions, would place the pertinent authorities of
requested Member States under an obligation to assist the transit of third-coun-
try nationals who are being removed by the requesting Member State.48
In its Communication on illegal immigration, the Commission laments that
Member States are not properly enforcing the common rules that already exist:
It does not make any sense to introduce new rules or to harmonise rules at
EU level, if present regulations are not enforced with sufficient resources and,
most importantly, the necessary will. Common efforts are condemned to fail,
if Member States’ services and practices do not follow the rules adopted in
common, i.e. relating to visa issuance and external border controls … Only the
practical implementation and efficient enforcement of existing rules as well as of
future common measures will ensure the credibility of the rule of law in the area
of freedom, security and justice as foreseen in the Treaty of Amsterdam.49
Despite these misgivings, the Commission has pressed ahead with the develop-
ment of a European Visa Identification System (VIS), prompted by the Conclu-
sions of the JHA Council at its extraordinary meeting on 20 September 2001 in
response to the terrorist attacks on the United States.50 The initiative was given
instance, the third-country national need not have actually been imprisoned for this
period and, in the latter instance, there is no requirement that the person concerned
must have been convicted of an offence.
47 Peers, “Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union” (2002)
4 EJML 85 at 118.
48 Council Directive 2003/110/EC of 25 November 2003 on assistance in cases of tran-
sit for the purposes of removal by air, OJ 2003 L 321/26. See further Ch. 30.
49 Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration, n. 3 above, at 10. Empha-
sis added.
50 See Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) on the fight
against terrorism, Bulletin EU 9-2001, point 1.4.6, para. 26, in which the JHA Coun-
914
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
– facilitate checks that the carrier and the holder of the visa are the same
person, at external border checkpoints or at immigration or police check-
points;
– contribute to the prevention of “visa shopping”; [and]
cil “invites the Commission to submit proposals for establishing a network for infor-
mation exchanges concerning … visas issued”.
51 See respectively Presidency Conclusions: Laeken European Council, n. 6 above, where
the European Council requested “the Council and the Member States to take steps
to set up a common visa identification system” (Conclusion 42), and Council Plan
to Combat Illegal Immigration, n. 6 above, points 34-40.
52 See respectively Council Decision 2004/512/EC of 8 June 2004 establishing the
Visa Information System (VIS) (OJ 2004 L 213/5) and proposed Regulation (COM
(2004) 835, 28 Dec. 2004).
53 See respectively Conclusions on the development of the Visa Information System
(VIS), (Council Doc. 6534/04, 20 Feb. 2004) and Guidelines for the introduction of
a “common system for an exchange of visa data” (Council doc. 7309/3/02, 7 May
2002).
54 Conclusions on the development of VIS, n. 54 above, Annex to the Annex, point 6.
For the measures on SIS II, see Council Regulation 2424/2001/EC of 6 December
2001 on the development of the second generation Schengen Information System
(SIS II), OJ 2001 L 328/4; Council Decision 2001/886/JHA of 6 December 2001 on
the development of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II),
OJ 2001 L 328/1.
915
Ryszard Cholewinski
916
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
917
Ryszard Cholewinski
As far as visa policy is concerned, the visa-free regime introduced for Roma-
nian nationals by Schengen member states in January 2002 has had mixed
results. Despite an almost eighteen-fold increase in the number of Romanians
who were not permitted to exit in 2002 compared to 2001 and an overall
decrease in exits from Romania by more than a million, the number of Roma-
nians returned from the Schengen Area has continued to increase.
...
Despite the strict self-imposed exit requirements, and the fact that Romanians
sent back to Romania face up to five years in prison, there has been an increase
in the number of Romanians returned from EU member states. The large num-
bers of Romanian nationals involved in petty crime, aggressive begging and
other anti-social behaviour across the EU has prompted several member states
to take action.61
While the right to leave any country including one’s own country, such as that
guaranteed by Article 2(2) of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR,62 is not an absolute
right and can be restricted in Article 2(3) on a number of grounds, such as in the
interests of national security and the maintenance of public order, the extensive
measures in place in these two EU candidate countries, which include the depri-
918
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
vation of liberty, are very unlikely to satisfy the proportionality criteria devel-
oped by the European Court of Human Rights in respect of the imposition of
restrictions on rights under the ECHR. Moreover, the Commission’s apparent
acquiescence in the adoption of these draconian measures, which certainly do
not constitute a part of the EU JHA acquis raises serious questions regarding
the EU and its Member States’ liability for the possible human rights abuses
taking place.
63 Salt, Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe: A Review of the Evi-
dence with Case Studies from Hungary, Poland and Ukraine (Geneva: IOM, 2000)
at 52, citing from Caldwell, et al., Crime and Servitude: An Exposé of the Traffic in
Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States, a report prepared for
presentation at an International Conference on Trafficking of NIS Women Abroad,
Moscow, 3-5 November 1997 (Washington D.C., New York: The Global Survival
Network in collaboration with the International League for Human Rights, 1997).
919
Ryszard Cholewinski
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Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
67 See Art. 7(1): “Member States shall establish that investigations into or prosecu-
tion of offences covered by this Framework Decision shall not be dependent on
the report or accusation made by a person subjected to the offence, at least in cases
where Article 6(1)(a) applies [where the offence is committed in whole or in part
within the territory of the Member State]”. The Decision repeals the 1997 Joint
Action, n. 67 above, in so far as it concerns trafficking in human beings (Art. 9).
68 Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration, n. 3 above, at 22: “It is
… also important to clarify the status of the victims of trafficking in terms of their
right of residence when they are prepared to co-operate in investigations against
their exploiters. On the one hand, such a clarification would provide a platform
for a more structured assistance and protection focusing directly on the victims’
individual situation and needs, and, on the other hand, on the need of the law
enforcement and the judiciary to conduct efficient investigations against traffick-
ers”. Significantly, the Council’s Plan, n. 6 above, point 91, avoids the reference to
residence rights repeating the above paragraph but replacing the words “their right
of residence” with “certain benefits or special assistance”.
69 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to
third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have
been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with
the competent authorities, OJ 2004 L 261/19. For the Commission’s proposal see
COM (2002) 71, 11 Feb. 2002 [hereinafter Proposal for a Council Directive on the
short-term residence permit issued to victims]. The Directive is restricted to adults,
although Member States may apply it to minors. Ibid., Art. 3(3). See further Ch.
29.
70 Proposal for a Council Directive on the short-term residence permit issued to victims,
n. 71 above, at 7.
921
Ryszard Cholewinski
country nationals who have been the subject of an action to facilitate irregular
migration is made only optional rather than compulsory as in the case of victims
of trafficking.71 Access to this special residence status, however, is hedged in by
a series of conditions. It is not granted immediately to victims of trafficking or
irregular migration, but is preceded by an initial “reflection period”, the duration
and starting point of which is to be determined according to national law. The
purpose of this period is to enable victims to recover and escape the influence of
their perpetrators and take an informed decision whether they wish to cooperate
with the competent authorities.72 The grant of the residence permit is subject
to three conditions: the opportunity presented by prolonging the victim’s stay
for the investigation or the judicial proceedings; whether the victim has shown
“a clear intention to cooperate”; and whether the victim has severed all rela-
tions with the suspects. Moreover, the permit will only be issued if there are no
objections on the grounds of public policy or protection of national security.73
Member States may also make the issue of the residence permit or its renewal
conditional on the participation of victims in programmes or schemes “aimed
at their recovery of a normal social life, including, where appropriate, courses
designed to improve their professional skills, or preparation of their assisted
return to their country of origin”.74 The permit foresees access to the labour
market, vocational training and education, the conditions and procedures for
which are to be determined in accordance with national legislation.75
Although the Directive contains a number of positive features, particu-
larly in its potentially broad personal scope and the possibility for the holder
of the short-term residence permit to access important economic rights, includ-
ing access to employment, these are outweighed by the negative elements. First,
the Directive is hardly victim-friendly. While avoiding abuse of the proposed
71 Directive, n. 70 above, Art. 3(2). I am also grateful to Steve Peers for drawing my
attention to this discrepancy.
72 Ibid., Art. 8. During this reflection period, victims who do not have sufficient
resources are entitled to “standards of living capable of ensuring their subsistence
and access to emergency medical treatment” and Member States are required “to
attend to the special needs of the most vulnerable, including, where appropriate and
if provided by national law, psychological assistance”. Ibid., Art. 7(1). Moreover,
any outstanding expulsion order cannot be enforced during the reflection period.
Ibid., Art. 6(2).
73 Ibid., Arts 8(1) and (2) respectively.
74 Ibid., Art. 12.
75 Ibid., Art. 11. The Directive also contains in Art. 9(2) a positive obligation on
Member States to provide “necessary medical or other assistance to the third-coun-
try nationals concerned, who do not have sufficient resources and have special needs,
such as pregnant women, the disabled or victims of sexual violence or other forms
of violence …”.
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Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
permit system is a legitimate concern, the conditions that have to be met before
the permit is granted mean in practice that victims are unlikely to come for-
ward in substantial numbers. Secondly, while implementation of the Directive
by Member States may well lead to the victim’s eventual settlement in the host
country, this is likely to be rare given that the permit cannot be renewed if the
conditions for its original issue are no longer satisfied or if the relevant proceed-
ings have been terminated by a decision of the competent authorities.76 More-
over, the permit can be withdrawn at any time on a broad range of grounds: if
its holder has renewed contacts with those suspected of the criminal offences
in question; if the competent authority considering the case believes that the
victim’s cooperation is fraudulent or wrongful; for public policy or national
security reasons; when the victim ceases to cooperate; or when the competent
authorities decide to discontinue the proceedings.77 Consequently, the victim’s
continued residence will be dependent on the national immigration measures in
the host Member State, which may well lead to discriminatory treatment of vic-
tims in like situations across the EU.78 Thirdly and most importantly, however,
the Directive does not hold the victims’ fundamental human rights at heart. As
the title of the Directive indicates, a clear intention to cooperate with the com-
petent authorities is the trigger to obtaining the short-term residence permit and
not human rights abuses suffered per se. Moreover, this intention to cooperate
with the authorities is insufficient alone to qualify for the status on offer. The
presence of the victim has to be “useful” to the investigation or prosecution. Vic-
tims, who cannot satisfy this condition, because, for example, those suspected
of the crimes are no longer traceable, but who clearly have suffered harm at
the hands of the traffickers or smugglers or who might fear reprisals, have no
redress under this proposed measure.79 Indeed, the Commission emphasised in
the Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Directive that the principal purpose
of the proposal is combating irregular migration rather than the protection of
victims.80
923
Ryszard Cholewinski
victims or witnesses. The proposal does not regulate these aspects, even though they
are to some extent related to the subject matter of the text”.
81 Council Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration, n. 6 above, point 69.
82 Commission, Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents (COM
(2002) 175, 10 Apr. 2002) [hereinafter Green Paper on Return].
83 Presidency Conclusions: Seville European Council, n. 7 above, Conclusion 30.
84 Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a Com-
munity return policy on illegal residents (COM (2002) 564, 14 Oct. 2002) [hereinafter
Communication on return].
85 Proposal for a Return Action Programme, (Council doc. 14673/02, 25 Nov. 2002)
[hereinafter Return Action Programme], adopted at the JHA Council meeting on
28-29 November 2002 (Council doc. 14817/02).
86 EU Plan for Return to Afghanistan (Council doc. 15215/02, 4 Dec. 2002).
87 Conclusions on the elements for establishing preparatory actions for a financial
instrument for return management in the area of migration, adopted by the JHA
Council at its meeting on 8 June 2004 (Council doc. 10305/04, 9 June 2004). The
Commission has since proposed a Decision establishing the Return Fund (COM
(2005) 123, 6 April 2005), and a Directive on expulsion standards (COM (2005) 391,
1 Sep. 2005).
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Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
925
Ryszard Cholewinski
at the national level can conform adequately to important human rights guar-
antees without the adoption of a common framework of standards affording
a high level of human rights protection. In this respect, therefore, the Com-
mission’s intention to advance a proposed Directive on Minimum Standards for
Return Procedures, particularly as regards the treatment of returnees during the
return operation and while in detention pending removal,94 is rather lacking in
ambition. As discussed in Section 4 below, the Action Programme also focuses
on facilitating forced returns95 despite earlier assertions, by both the Council and
Commission, that voluntary return should be given priority. The preoccupation
with forced return is also complemented by the undue emphasis on readmission
of own nationals and third-country nationals to countries of origin and tran-
sit, a process supported by the development of Community readmission agree-
ments.96 Aside from being based on the somewhat dubious international law
principle of a State obligation to readmit own nationals, which is discussed in
Section 4 below, this approach considers the problem of irregular migration to
be largely an external matter and reflects the unwillingness of Member States to
deal with irregular migration in a holistic context by shifting the burden for deal-
ing with irregular residents to third countries. In this respect, the veiled “threats”
found in the Council’s Return Action Programme and Plan on Illegal Immi-
gration to consider all possible avenues in the context of EU external relations
policy to ensure that third countries comply with their readmission obligations97
are particularly troubling.
926
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
927
Ryszard Cholewinski
recognises rights in respect of all migrant workers regardless of whether they are
in the host country legally or illegally”.101
Secondly, the EU should at least consider the regularisation of the status
of irregular migrants as a possible common policy measure, given especially that
individual Member States have periodically constructed various types of regula-
risation programmes.102 The Commission only refers fleetingly to national regu-
larisation procedures in its Communication on illegal immigration in the context
of the collection of statistics, and it also mentions such programmes in the Com-
munication on a Community immigration policy, published in November 2000,
but without expressing a view on whether an EU-wide approach would be more
preferable or desirable.103 While Member States clearly do not wish to legalise
their foreign undocumented population too frequently because such actions are
likely to be counter-productive or self-defeating in encouraging further irregular
migration, regularisation can nonetheless be viewed as a legitimate legal and
policy mechanism for reducing the number of irregular migrants present in the
country concerned provided that measures are also taken and implemented to
check further irregular entry. It has been argued that regularisation undermines
the exploitative underground labour market where most irregular migrant work-
ers are found and supports modernising trends in the economy.104 Regularisa-
tion is also cost-effective because it facilitates the integration of such migrants
thus helping them to become useful and productive members of the host society.
Moreover, it has an important humanitarian dimension. EU Member States, as
evidenced by their periodic resort to national regularisation programmes, clearly
find it difficult to expel those irregular migrants who have been employed within
their territory for a lengthy period of time, particularly if their presence has also
been tolerated by the authorities. In those circumstances, therefore, where regu-
larisation is clearly the decent and most equitable option, it should be explicitly
recognised in the development of a EU common policy on irregular migration.
In its June 2003 Communication on immigration, integration and employment,
the Commission does take the view that regularisation of irregular migrants,
101 Ibid.
102 See in particular the national reports in de Bruycker, ed., Regularisations of Ille-
gal Immigrants in the European Union (Bruylant, 2000). For a summary report, see
Apap, De Bruycker and Schmitter, “Regularisation of Illegal Aliens in the Euro-
pean Union: Summary Report of a Comparative Study” (2001) 2 EJML 263.
103 Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a Com-
munity immigration policy (COM (2000) 757, 22 Nov. 2000) at 6 and 13.
104 Ghosh, n. 35 above, at 150-151: “[O]ne of the main justifications of regularisation
is to end the human suffering and exploitation of irregular immigrants and improve
their general working conditions. By removing an important source of cheap and
docile labour, it encourages the process of industrial upgrading and structural
change in the economy”.
928
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
105 Commission, Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration,
integration and employment (COM (2003) 366, 3 June 2003) at 26.
106 Commission, Study on the links between legal and illegal migration (COM (2004)
410, 4 June 2004) at 9-10.
107 Ibid. at 17.
108 JHA Council Decision of 26 May 1997 on the exchange of information concern-
ing assistance for the voluntary repatriation of third-country nationals, OJ 1997 L
147/3, Preamble, Recital 5.
109 Communication on immigration and asylum policies, n. 2 above, at 30, para. 111.
929
Ryszard Cholewinski
930
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
931
Ryszard Cholewinski
Morocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka), which were adopted by the Council, and
the report on the implementation of these action plans was presented to the
Nice European Council in December 2000.120 These action plans, however, were
criticised by the European Parliament on a number of grounds, such as the fail-
ure to adequately consult or involve the political leaders and representatives of
civil society in the target countries in the drafting of the plans, the undue focus
on prevention measures, the devotion of insufficient attention to human rights
issues, and the lack of an appropriate budgetary allocation as well as the provi-
sion of an unrealistic timetable for their implementation.121 The evaluation by
the Belgian Presidency of the Conclusions of the Tampere European Council in
December 2001 underlined that “[o]ne basic lesson to be drawn from experience
acquired to date is the fact that no future action plan should be drawn up except
in close partnership with the “target” country,”122 and noted the establishment of
a specific budget heading for external policy action regarding migration, which
it argued should make it possible to realise progress on implementation of the
action plans.123 The protection of human rights is a particularly important con-
sideration when negotiating readmission agreements with third countries. The
Commission observes in its Communication on illegal immigration: “[B]efore
the negotiation of any readmission agreement, the political and human rights
situation in the country of origin or transit should be taken into account”.124
However, “taking into account” human rights is rather different from adhering
to them and therefore this would appear to be rather a weak commitment par-
ticularly in the light of the cardinal principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, the
Council’s Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration omits the refer-
ence to human rights altogether and only argues for the need to take the inter-
ests of the EU and of the Member States into account before negotiating any
readmission agreements.125 Recent developments reinforce the impression that
cooperation with and assistance to third countries is still overly focused on pre-
venting irregular migration and readmission. Rather ominously, the Conclusions
932
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
126 Presidency Conclusions: Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003, Bulletin
EU 6-2003, points I.2-I.56, Conclusion 19. The Council, ibid., Conclusion 20, notes
that in developing this evaluation, it will inter alia make use of the information to
be provided by the network of immigration liaison officers for any of the topics that
fall under their competencies. The EU has now formally established such a network,
which is primarily concerned with cooperation with third countries in preventing
irregular migration. See Council Regulation 2004/377/EC of 19 February 2004 on
the creation of an immigration liaison officers network, OJ 2004 L 64/1.
127 Presidency Conclusions: Thessaloniki European Council, n. 127 above, Conclusion
20.
128 Commission Scoreboard, n. 29 above, at 18.
129 European Parliament and Council Regulation 491/2004/EC of 10 March 2004
establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries
in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), OJ 2004 L 80/1, Art. 1(1). The
programme aims to promote cooperation between the EU and third countries by
contributing in the third countries concerned, and in partnership with those coun-
tries, to the following objectives: development of their legislation in the field of legal
immigration; development of legal migration and raising public awareness of the
advantages of such migration and the consequences of irregular migration; devel-
opment of their legislation and national practices regarding international protec-
tion; establishment of an effective and preventive policy against irregular migration;
readmission of irregular entrants and unsuccessful asylum-seekers.
933
Ryszard Cholewinski
of positive immigration measures must also mean the opening up of more legal
channels for migration. Indeed, many EU Member States are now supporting
and facilitating the admission of third-country nationals for employment to fill
shortages in the labour market in specific sectors that require both highly skilled
and low-skilled workers.130 In July 2001, the Commission proposed a Council
Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals
for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed activities. The Preamble
to the draft Directive considers the regulation of migration for employment as
“a cornerstone of immigration policy” and contends that “the development
of a coherent Community immigration policy could not succeed without spe-
cifically addressing this issue at Community level”.131 This move towards more
common policies on the admission of migrants for lawful employment has a
pan-European dimension. In two recommendations adopted in January and
June 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also supports
the need to create greater opportunities for lawful immigration.132 It is impor-
tant, however, that such policies are not aimed only at highly skilled workers but
low-skilled workers, who are also in demand in Member States. Otherwise, the
continued availability of low-skilled positions will continue to attract irregular
migrants. Moreover, these policies should not solely be “guestworker” or tem-
porary migration policies, which have not been successful in the past in ensur-
ing the return of migrants, but should recognise openly that admission for the
purpose of employment may well lead to de facto permanent residence and thus
measures ought to be put into place to accommodate such an eventuality. The
Commission has yet to arrive at a coherent position on the relationship between
regular and irregular migration and to what extent facilitating the lawful admis-
sion of third-country nationals to the EU labour market can reduce irregular
labour migration movements. In its Communication on a common policy on
illegal immigration, the Commission fails to satisfactorily address the tension
between the need it recognises to ensure that migrants do not “profit” from their
irregular status and the availability of irregular migrant labour for employment
opportunities in Member States:
130 Study on the links between legal and illegal migration, n. 107 above, at 4.
131 COM (2001) 386, 11 July 2001 at 21 (Draft Directive, Recital 3).
132 See respectively Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1449 (2000) of 28
January 2000 on Clandestine migration from the south of the Mediterranean into
Europe, para. 14(iii)(a), and Recommendation 1467 (2000) of 29 June 2000 on Clan-
destine immigration and the fight against traffickers, para. 9: “The Assembly under-
lines that greater opportunities for lawful immigration have to be created in order
to reduce the pressure for illegal immigration, and to find adequate alternatives to
clandestine migration. The possibilities of offering fixed-term or seasonal schemes
for work purposes have to be reconsidered in the light of the growing demand in
Europe for migrant labour”.
934
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
Although the Commission takes a more balanced view in its subsequent Com-
munication on immigration, integration and employment, where it recognises
that opening up channels for legal migration can reduce the incentive to migrate
without authorisation,134 it returns to a more ambivalent and restrictive position
in its June 2004 study on the links between legal and illegal migration.135
Despite the recognition at both the national and EU levels that low skilled
labour is also required, recent national employment policies in Member States136
and the Commission’s proposed Directive,137 even though it does not distinguish
935
Ryszard Cholewinski
formally between highly skilled and low-skilled migrant workers, are primarily
aimed at responding to labour market shortages in skilled labour. Without the
establishment of clear common admission rules and less bureaucratic practices,
which would provide less skilled migrants in third countries a real prospect of
access to the labour market in Member States, the dilemma identified above is
unlikely to be resolved in favour of reduced irregular migration for employment.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s proposed Directive did not receive agreement
in the Council,138 where Member State governments appear to lack the politi-
cal will to subject their discretion concerning the employment of third-country
nationals to EU regulation. The Commission has tried to reopen discussions
on the issue with a Green Paper which aims to consult widely on the admission
of third-country nationals for employment to see how this important “missing
link” in EU migration policy can be addressed.139
Finally, it is necessary to learn more about the phenomenon of irregular
migration, and to ensure that any such information is made publicly available,
before effective action can be taken to prevent it. While correctly recognising
irregular migration as “multifaceted in terms of the individuals concerned and
the patterns of their illegal entry and residence”, which includes both clandes-
tine entrants and those who “overstay” the period of validity in their visa or
residence permit, the Commission, in its Communication on a common policy
on illegal immigration, and the Council, in its Comprehensive Plan, do not dis-
tinguish between the significance of these two categories.140 In this regard, it is
important to underline the particular characteristics of the latter category of
irregular migrants, which are often forgotten or ignored in the preoccupation
with the former:
age of skilled labour in certain sectors of the labour market the Community should
reinforce its competitiveness to recruit and attract third-country workers, when
needed. …”. Emphasis added.
138 Study on the links between legal and illegal migration, n. 107 above, at 16.
139 COM (2004) 811, 11 Jan. 2005.
140 See respectively Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration, n. 3
above, at 7 and Council Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration, n. 6 above, points 7 and
8.
936
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
resided in the host state for many years. To distinguish between various groups
of irregular migrants in this way brings into question the view that immigrants
with irregular status are those whose residence has never been consented to
by the host government. In the latter case, for example, consent to enter and
reside has, at some point, been given to the immigrants, but it has later been
taken away, or the terms on which it has been given have been violated.141
The Commission and Council assume that the phenomenon of irregular migra-
tion is significant without attempting to assess more accurately the extent of the
problem in quantitative terms:142 “Due [Owing] to the nature of undocumented
residence it is not possible to assess the exact proportions between the different
categories of illegal residents. It seems clear, however, that each one represents
a significant part of the whole phenomenon of illegal immigration …”.143 Else-
where, the Commission and Council observe more explicitly:
937
Ryszard Cholewinski
ular migration and also to make it more widely available. In its Plan to Combat
Illegal Immigration, the Council urges the adoption of the necessary measures
to provide Member States with reliable statistical data on legal and irregular
immigration in the context of implementing its Conclusions in May 2001 calling
for the preparation of a public annual report consisting of a statistical overview
and an analysis of the trends in asylum and migration flows, which would also
include a section analysing data on irregular immigration.145 Moreover, towards
the end of 2001, the Commission reviewed the publication rules applicable to the
statistics exchanged by Member States through the Centre for Information, Dis-
cussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration (CIREFI),
which was originally established by European Immigration Ministers outside
of Community and EU structures and reorganised under former third pillar
cooperation in the fields of JHA.146 While agreeing to take account of the sen-
sitivity concerns of national authorities, the Commission proposed the publica-
tion of CIREFI statistics on the following categories of persons: refused aliens,
apprehended aliens illegally present, apprehended facilitators, apprehended
facilitated aliens, and removed aliens.147 Although a number of Member State
governments supported this initiative, a few continued to demonstrate resis-
tance to the publication of this information, chiefly on the basis that it could be
used to favour those who facilitate irregular migration, and one major Member
State was substantially opposed.148 Consequently, it was agreed that only annual
145 See ibid. points 42-43 and Council Conclusions regarding common analysis and the
improved exchange of statistics on asylum and migration, 28 May 2001, Council
doc. 7973/01 ASIM 10.
146 See respectively Decision of 30 Nov. 1992 setting up a Centre for Information, Dis-
cussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI)
(published in Guild and Niessen, (eds), The Developing Immigration and Asylum
Policies of the European Union (Kluwer, 1996) at 205-209) and JHA Council Con-
clusions of 30 Nov. 1994 on the organisation and development of CIREFI, OJ 1996
C 274/50.
147 Publication rules for CIREFI statistics (Council doc. 12079/01, 20 Sept. 2001) at 3.
148 See Compilation of comments on the Commission proposal for new publication rules
for CIREFI statistics (Council docs. 13369/01, 6 Nov. 2001 and 13369/01 ADD 1,
10 Dec. 2001). The following Member States generally supported the Commission’s
initiative: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Por-
tugal and the United Kingdom. Two EEA countries, Iceland and Norway, also
favoured publication of the statistics on irregular migration. Two Member States,
however, qualified their support by urging that the statistics are only published a
considerable time after the period to which they refer in order to minimise the risk
that they might be used to the advantage of organised illegal immigration networks.
This reason is also primarily why the French delegation opposed wider circula-
tion of the statistics. It contended that “publication of all [CIREFI] data collected
through Eurostat should be restricted to national public services working in the field
938
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
Community statistics are published in the case of “illegal entry and enforcement
measures”.149 Despite these developments, however, European-wide statistical
data on irregular immigration is an inherently suspect commodity. Indeed, as
one expert observes in respect of smuggled and trafficked migrants, estimates
of their numbers reveal two main features: “First, there is a preference for nice
round numbers. Second, estimates are frequently rehearsed and recycled and
take on a momentum of their own”.150 The position might improve a little if
the Council and EP adopt the Commission’s recent proposal for a Regulation
on immigration and asylum statistics, which would require Member States to
provide information on persons refused entry and irregularly present, and on
persons who return to their countries of origin, broken down by age, sex and cit-
izenship.151 Consequently, there would appear to be insufficient hard data pres-
ently available, and which can be verified independently in the public domain,
to support the whole range of restrictive policies relating to irregular migration
both adopted and contemplated. However, the same argument cannot apply to
the adoption of some of the more positive measures identified in this Section,
which flow from principled reasoning based on the protection of fundamental
human rights rather than in response to ill-assessed perceptions of the problem
of irregular migration.
939
Ryszard Cholewinski
5 Conclusion
EU law and policy on irregular migration is taking shape. However, it is not
developing as rapidly as the soft law that was adopted under the former third
pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. Clearly, Member States would appear to be
taking more care in agreeing to any measures that will constitute binding Com-
munity law. Although the Laeken European Council in December 2001 reflected
that progress in developing a common asylum and migration policy had been
“slower and less substantial than expected”,152 the slowing down of the law-
making process has enabled some of the measures on irregular migration to
be improved from the standpoint of human rights, albeit imperfectly. This has
occurred, for example, with the French Government’s initiatives on irregular
migration, originally proposed in August 2000.153 On the other hand, however,
a clear preference is developing for the adoption of soft law type measures in
this area as reflected in the adoption of the Council’s Comprehensive Plan to
Combat Illegal Immigration and the Action Programme on return.
Given the vulnerable position of irregular migrants in relation not only to
private actors, such as traffickers and employers, but also state authorities, human
rights deserve far more prominence in the development of EU legal norms and
policy affecting this vulnerable group. Whereas the Commission recognised in its
1994 Communication on immigration and asylum policies that a common EU
edifice to address the problem of irregular migration could not be constructed
without a human rights foundation, it effectively removed this important cor-
nerstone a mere seven years later in its Communication on a common policy
on illegal immigration, which has also served as a basis for the Council Plan
to Combat Illegal Immigration currently being implemented. The Communica-
tion’s only tangible reference to human rights relates to the situation of irregular
migrants as refugees, although even here it expresses a preference for refugees to
be first screened outside of the EU. That irregular migrants possess fundamental
152 Presidency Conclusions: Laeken European Council, n. 6 above, Conclusion 38. See
also the Note from the Belgian Presidency to the European Council on the evalua-
tion of the Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, n. 123 above, at 4:
“Despite the political determination to make progress in [the areas of immi-
gration, asylum, and controls at external borders] current discussions within
the Council are not progressing as rapidly as might have been hoped, as a
result of the intrinsic technical difficulty of the subjects addressed …, of real
differences on the scope of the instruments to be adopted … and of Member
States’ reluctance to go beyond the confines of their national laws”.
153 E.g. compare the final text of Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilita-
tion of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, n. 24 above, which now enables
Member States to exempt from sanctions those who intentionally assist irregu-
lar migrants for humanitarian reasons to enter or transit across the territory of
a Member State (Art. 1(2)), with the original French proposal (OJ 2000 C 253/2),
which only contained an exemption for close family members (Art. 4).
940
Chapter 32 Control of Irregular Migration and EU Law and Policy
rights beyond those accruing to refugees, expressed first and foremost in general
international human rights treaty law to which all Member States are commit-
ted, is met with a wall of silence. The specialist international instruments, which
explicitly grant rights to irregular migrants, have also been ignored. Moreover,
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the document which is supposed to
provide a new human rights architecture for the EU and in which many rights
are not confined to EU citizens or those third-country nationals with regular
status, plays no role whatsoever in the Commission’s Communication or in the
Council’s Comprehensive Plan. These are unacceptable omissions that do not
bode well for the future development of a fair and humane EU common law
and policy on irregular migration. Unfortunately, the framework for the adop-
tion of measures relating to irregular migration in the EU Constitutional Treaty
places undue emphasis on repressive activity, namely removal and repatriation
of persons residing without authorisation, combating trafficking in persons and
the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries.154 On the other
hand, the Treaty also affords legally binding status to the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and gives a clear legal basis for the EU to seek accession to the
ECHR.155 Consequently, on its entry into force,156 the Constitutional Treaty
would at least provide the EU with a much stronger human rights foundation
than has been the case to date. It is imperative, however, that the human rights
deficit is promptly restored at the heart of the developing EU law and policy on
irregular migration since otherwise, as the Commission itself recognised in 1994,
the repressive policies that have already been adopted and those that have been
proposed will lack credibility.
154 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310/1, Articles III-
267(2)(c), (d) and (3) respectively. The provision introducing the common immigra-
tion policy reads: “The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at
ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment
of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention
of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human
beings” (Article III-267(1)). Emphasis added.
155 See respectively Art. I-9(1) of Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, ibid. and Art.
I-9(2).
156 If it is approved in time by Member States’ parliaments and in national referenda,
the Treaty is projected to enter into force on 1 Nov. 2006; as of 1 Jan. 2006, this
seemed highly unlikely.
941
Annexes
Annex I Proposed and Adopted Title IV Measures
(as of 1 Jan. 2006)
946
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
947
Annex I
948
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
cil, 29/30 April 2004, revised at JHA Council, 19 Nov. 2004; adopted
by JHA Council, 1-2 Dec. 2005
– Application date: 1 Dec. 2007; 1 Dec. 2008 as regards legal aid (Art.
43)
949
Annex I
950
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
951
Annex I
8. Regulation 415/2003 on issue of visas at the border and to seamen (OJ 2003
L 64/1)
– Proposal: from Spain (OJ 2002 C 139/6)
– Flexibility: UK & Ireland opt out; Denmark decided to implement in
national law (Council doc. 14588/03)
– EP: plenary vote on Karamanou report (A5-0006/2003), 11 Feb. 2003
(OJ 2004 C 43 E/36)
– Council: agreed by JHA Council/Mixed Committee 19 Dec. 2002;
adopted by JHA Council 27 Feb. 2003
– Entry into force: 1 May 2003 (Art. 6)
952
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
11. Regulation 694/2003 on the format for facilitated travel documents (OJ
2003 L 99/15)
– Proposal: from Commission (COM (2003) 60, 5 Feb. 2003)
– Legal base: Art. 62(2) EC
– Background: sets out format for documents permitting easier entry to
and from Kaliningrad across Lithuania
– Flexibility: UK & Ireland opted out; Denmark implemented in national
law (Council doc. 14588/03)
– EP: plenary vote on Oostlander report (A5-0075/2003), 9 Apr. 2003
(OJ 2004 C 64 E/196)
– Council: adopted by General Affairs and External Relations Council,
14 Apr. 2003
– Entry into force: 18 Apr. 2003 (Art. 7)
953
Annex I
12. Regulation 1295/2003 on special visa rules for Olympic family (OJ 2003 L
183/1)
– Proposal: from Commission (COM (2003) 172, 8 Apr. 2003)
– Legal base: Arts. 62(2)(a) and Arts. 62(2)(b)(ii) EC
– Flexibility: UK & Ireland opted out; Denmark implemented in national
law (Council doc. 5096/04)
– EP: plenary vote on Matikanen-Kallstrom report (A5-0211/2003), 18
June 2003
– Council: JHA Council/Mixed Committee agreed general approach, 5-6
June 2003; adopted by Ecofin Council, 15 July 2003
– Entry into force: 11 Aug. 2003 (Art. 11)
15. Regulation 2007/2004 establishing agency for border management (OJ 2004
L 349/1)
– Proposal: from Commission (COM (2003) 687, 11 Nov. 2003)
– Legal base: Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC
– Flexibility: UK attempted to opt in; Ireland opted out; Denmark could
apply as a matter of international law
954
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
– EP: plenary vote 9 March 2004, following von Botticher report (A5-
0093/2004)
– Council: conclusions agreed by 28/29 Nov. 2003 JHA Council/Mixed
Committee; 30 March 2004 JHA Council/Mixed Committee reached
“political agreement”; adoption as “A” point by JHA Council, 25/26
Oct. 2004
– Application date: 1 May 2005 (Art. 34)
955
Annex I
20. Regulation 2046/2005 on special rules for Turin Winter Olympics (OJ 2005
L 334/1)
– Proposal: by Commission (COM (2005) 412, 7 Sept. 2005)
– Legal base: Article 62(2)(a) and 62(b)(ii); qualified majority vote and
co-decision with the EP
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark could apply as inter-
national law
– EP: plenary vote on Zappala report (A6-0275/2005), 15 Nov. 2005
– Council: adopted by JHA Council, 1-2 Dec. 2005
– Application date: 9 Jan. 2006 (Art. 11)
Visas and border controls: Implementing measures (legal base: Regs. 789 and
790/2001 so no involvement of EP; all build on Schengen acquis)
1. Decision amending confidential provisions of CCI (not published in OJ)
– Proposal: by Sweden (not published): noted in agenda of visa working
party meeting, 8/9 Mar. 2001
– Background: content unknown; updates Annex 10 of the Common
Consular Instructions and Annex 8 of the Schengen Consultation
Network (Technical specifications): confidential Annexes which con-
cern instructions on writing entries in the section of a visa to be elec-
tronically scanned
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark applied as national
law measure (Council doc. 14241/01)
– Council: adopted by Agriculture Council (not listed in press release),
24 Apr. 2001
956
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
Annexes 5(a) 6(a) and 8 to the Common Manual: these concern airport
transit visas, honorary consuls, methods of filling in a visa sticker
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark applied as national
law measure (Council doc. 14241/01)
– Council: adopted by Agriculture Council, 24 Apr. 2001
3. Decision 2001/420 amending CCI, Parts V and VI and Annex 13, and
Common Manual, Annex 6a (OJ 2001 L 150/47)
– Background: gives effect to Regulation 1091/2001 on long-stay visas
(see above)
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark applied as national
law measure (Council doc. 9963/02)
– Council: adopted by JHA Council, 28-29 May 2001
– Application date: 15 June 2001 (Art. 4)
4. Decision 2002/44 amending Part VII, Annex 12 of the CCI and Annex 14a
of the Common Manual (OJ 2002 L 20/5)
– Proposal: Initiative of Belgium (Council doc. 10463/01, 25 June 2001)
– Background: specifies that fees are charged for considering visa appli-
cations, not for the visa itself, and exempts family members of EC
nationals from fees
– Flexibility: UK & Ireland opted out; Denmark applied as national law
measure (Council doc. 9963/02)
– Council: supported by Mixed Committee, 6/7 Dec. 2001; adopted by
Internal Market Council, 20 Dec. 2001
– Application date: 1 July 2004 (Art. 3(1))
6. Decision 2002/354 amending Part III CCI and creating a new Annex 16
CCI (OJ 2002 L 123/50)
– Proposal: from Belgium (Council doc. 15320/01, 18 Dec. 2001)
– Background: establishes a standard form for a Schengen visa applica-
tion
957
Annex I
7. Decision amending Parts III and VIII of CCI (OJ 2002 L 187/44)
– Proposal: from Belgium (Council doc. 12708/01, 12 Oct. 2001)
– Background: sets out common rules on submission of visa applications
by travel agents
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark implemented in
national law (Council doc. 14807/03)
– Council: adopted by Ecofin Council, 12 July 2002
– Entry into force: 16 July 2002 (Art. 3)
10. Decision on fees for considering visa applications (OJ 2003 L 152/82)
– Proposal: from Greece (Council doc. 7655/03, 20 Mar. 2003)
– Background: replaces existing Annex 12 to CCI and Annex 14a to
Common Manual; sets standard rate of 35 euro for consideration of
all short-stay visa applications and also takes account of Decision
2002/44 establishing fees for considering visa applications (see above)
– Flexibility: UK & Ireland opted out; Denmark decided to implement
in national law (Council doc. 12195/04)
– Council: adopted by Environment Council, 13 June 2003
– Application date: 1 July 2005 at the latest (Art. 2)
958
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
12. Decision re airport transit visas for Eritreans (OJ 2003 L 198/15)
– Proposal: from Italy
– Background: amends CCI and Common Manual
– Flexibility: UK & Ireland opted out; Denmark decided to implement
in national law (Council doc. 12195/04)
– Council: adopted 28 July 2003
– Application date: 1 Sep. 2003 (Art. 2)
13. Decision amending CCI to require travel insurance (OJ 2004 L 5/79)
– Proposal: from Greece (Council doc. 9748/03, 2 June 2003)
– Background: requires visa applicants to have travel insurance in most
cases
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark could opt in as matter
of international law; delayed application to new Member States
– Council: adopted as “A” point by Environment Council, 22 Dec. 2003
– Implementation date: 1 June 2004 (Art. 3)
14. Decision amending CCI re: representation by Member States (OJ 2004 L
5/76)
– Proposal: from France (Council doc. 10072/03, 3 June 2003)
– Background: allows greater possibility for one Member State to issue
Schengen visas on behalf of another; delayed application to new
Member States
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland have opted out; Denmark could opt in as
matter of international law
– Council: adopted as “A” point by Environment Council, 22 Dec. 2003
– Implementation date: 9 Jan. 2004 (Art. 3)
15. Decision amending CCI re: interviews at consulates (OJ 2004 L 5/74)
– Proposal: from Italy (Council doc. 16043/03, 12 Dec. 2003)
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark could opt in as matter
of international law; delayed application to new Member States
– Council: adopted as “A” point by Environment Council, 22 Dec. 2003
– Implementation date: 9 Jan. 2004 (Art. 2)
959
Annex I
16. Decision amending Common Manual re: treatment of minors (OJ 2004 L
157/136)
– Proposal: from Italy
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark decided to implement
in international law (Council doc. 12195/04)
– Council: adopted as “A” point by JHA Council, 29 April 2004
– Entry into force: 1 May 2004 (Art. 2)
17. Decision amending border manual to establish standard form for refusal
(OJ 2004 L 261/36)
– Proposal: from Italy
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark implemented in
national law (Council doc. 12907/04)
– Council: adopted as “A” point by JHA Council, 29 April 2004
– Application date: 1 June 2004 (Art. 3)
960
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
3. Regulation 2424/2001 on funding SIS II within the first pillar (OJ 2001 L
328/4)
– Proposal: by Sweden and Belgium (OJ 2001 C 183/12)
– Legal base: Article 66 EC
– Background: regulates funding of SIS II from Community budget
– Flexibility: UK opted in (Council doc. 11701/01); Ireland opted in later
(see Schengen section below); Denmark had six months to implement
as international law
– EP: plenary vote after von Botticher report (A5-0333/2001), 23 Oct.
2001 (OJ 2002 C 112 E/137)
– Council: adopted by JHA Council, 6/7 Dec. 2001
– Entry into force: 14 Dec. 2001 (Art. 7); expires 31 Dec. 2006
5. Directive 2003/110 on assistance for expulsions via air transit (OJ 2003 L
321/26)
– Proposal: from Germany (OJ 2003 C 4/4)
– Legal base: Article 63(3)(b) EC
– Schengen: builds on Schengen acquis; Executive Committee decision
rescinded (Art. 11)
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark implemented in
national law (Council doc. 10661/04)
– EP: plenary vote for amendments following Kirkhope report (A5-
0291/2003), 23 Sep. 2003
– Council: JHA Council/Mixed Committee, 5-6 June 2003, reached ‘gen-
eral approach’; adopted as “A” point by Ecofin Council, 25 Nov. 2003
– Implementation deadline: 6 Dec. 2005 (Art. 10(2))
961
Annex I
962
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
12. Directive 2004/81 on residence permits for victims of trafficking (OJ 2004 L
261/19)
– Proposal: from Commission (COM (2002) 71; OJ 2002 C 126 E/393)
– Legal base: Article 63(3) EC
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted out; Denmark has automatic opt-
out
– EP plenary: plenary vote on Sorensen report (A5-0397/2002), 5 Dec.
2002 (OJ 2004 C 27 E/140); plenary vote on second Sorensen report
(A5-0099/2004) following reconsultation, 9 March 2004
– Council: agreed by JHA Council, 6 Nov. 2003; adopted by JHA Coun-
cil, 29 Apr. 2004
963
Annex I
Legal Migration
1. Regulation 1030/2002 on uniform residence permit (OJ 2002 L 157/1)
– Proposal: from Commission (COM (2001) 157, 23 Mar. 2001; OJ 2001
C 180 E/304)
– Background: replaced 1997 Joint Action on this subject (1997/11/JHA,
OJ 1997 L 7/1)
– Legal base: Article 63(3) EC
– Flexibility: UK opted in; Ireland opted out; Denmark decided to
implement in international law (Council doc. 14807/03)
– EP: plenary vote on Sousa Pinto report (A5-0445/2001), 12 Dec. 2001
(OJ 2002 C 177 E/129)
– Council: adopted by JHA Council, 13 June 2002
– Entry into force: 15 June 2002 (Art. 10)
– Application date: one year after adoption of implementing rules (Art.
9)
964
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
965
Annex I
– Council: discussed at JHA Council, 14/15 Oct. 2002, 8 May 2003; polit-
ical agreement at JHA Council, 5-6 June 2003; adopted as “A” point by
Ecofin Council, 25 Nov. 2003
– Implementation date: 23 Jan. 2006 (Art. 26)
966
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
967
Annex I
968
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
Legal Migration
1. Regulation amending Reg. 1030/2002 on residence permit format (COM
(2003) 558, 24 Sep. 2003)
– Schengen: builds on Schengen acquis
– Flexibility: position of UK and Ireland not yet known; Denmark could
opt in as matter of international law
– EP: no plenary vote yet
– Council: JHA Council 28/29 Nov. 2003 agreed “general approach”
Irregular migration
1. Decision establishing European Return Fund (COM (2005) 123, 6 April
2005)
– Legal base: Article 63(3)(b) EC
– Schengen: builds on Schengen acquis
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland unknown; Denmark would be excluded;
new Member States would be covered immediately
969
Annex I
2. Directive on common rules for expulsion (COM (2005) 391, 1 Sept. 2005)
– Legal base: Article 63(3)(b) EC
– Schengen: builds on Schengen acquis in part
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland unknown; Denmark could apply as inter-
national law; for new Member States, Art. 3(2) of act of accession
applies
– EP: no action yet
– Council: under discussion in working group
c) International treaties
Treaties in force
1. Treaty between EC and Norway and Iceland on asylum responsibility
(extends rules in Dublin Convention and Eurodac Regulation to Norway
and Iceland) (Decision 2001/258 OJ 2001 L 93/38)
– Proposal to sign treaty: by Commission (COM (2000) 883, 22 Dec.
2000)
– Proposal to conclude treaty: by Commission (COM (2001) 55, 29 Jan.
2001; OJ 2001 C 154 E/244)
– Legal base: Article 63(1) EC, with Article 300
– Background: negotiating mandate approved, May 2000 JHA Council
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted in; Denmark can apply to join by
means of Protocol
– EP: plenary vote in favour, 14 Feb. 2001 (OJ 2001 C 276/118)
– Council: draft discussed at JHA Council, 30 Nov./1 Dec. 2000; 19 Jan.
2001 Ecofin Council agreed to sign treaty; 15/16 Mar. 2001 JHA Coun-
cil concluded treaty
– Entry into force: 1 Apr. 2001 (OJ 2001 L 112/16)
970
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
Signed treaties
1. UN crime convention Protocols on smuggling of persons, trafficking in
persons (OJ 2001 L 30/44)
– Proposal to sign Protocols: by Commission (COM (2000) 760, 4 Dec
2000)
– Background: mandate to negotiate granted by General Affairs Coun-
cil, 14/15 Feb. 2000
– Council: decision to sign adopted by written procedure, 8 Dec. 2000
(Health Council press release, 14 Dec. 2000)
971
Annex I
d) Institutional Issues
Decision to amend decision-making rules in Title IV of Part Three of the EC
Treaty (OJ 2004 L 396/45)
– Proposal: Dutch Presidency (Council doc. 14497/04, 12 Nov. 2004)
– Legal base: Article 67(2) EC
– Background: Hague Programme of 5 Nov. 2004 called for move to QMV
and co-decision in all areas except legal migration
– Flexibility: UK and Ireland opted in
– EP: adoption of Bourlanges report by committee, 13 Dec. 2004 (A6-
0076/2004); vote in favour by plenary, 16 Dec. 2004 (OJ 2005 C 226 E/341)
– Council: progress report at JHA Council, 2 Dec. 2004; adopted as “A” point
by Agriculture/Fisheries Council, 21-22 Dec. 2004
– Application date: 1 Jan. 2005
972
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
9. Green Paper on return policy for illegal immigrants (COM (2002) 175, 10
Apr. 2002)
11. Communication on return policy for illegal immigrants (COM (2002) 564,
14 Oct .2002)
973
Annex I
21. Communication on future development of the SIS II and the VIS (COM
(2003) 771, 11 Dec. 2003)
23. Communication on link between legal and illegal migration: June 2004
(COM (2004) 412, 4 June 2004)
26. Green Paper on economic migration (COM (2004) 811, 11 Jan. 2005)
33. Green paper on future of migration network (COM (2005) 606, 28 Nov.
2005)
974
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
35. Communication on policy plan for legal migration (COM (2005) 669, 22
Dec. 2005)
SEC documents
1. Staff working paper on visa policy following the Treaty of Amsterdam and
integration of the Schengen acquis (SEC (1999) 1213, 16 July 1999)
5. Working paper on recasting the Common Border Manual (SEC (2003) 736,
20 June 2003)
f) Case Law
Annulment actions:
– Case C-392/95 Parliament v Council [1997] ECR I-3213 (visa list Regulation
annulled for failure to reconsult EP)
– Case C-170/96 Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-2763 (airport transit
visas Joint Action upheld on grounds that it was correctly adopted as third
pillar measure)
– Case C-257/01, Commission v Council, to annul Council Regs. 789/2001 and
790/2001; Opinion released April 2004; judgment in favour of Council, 18
Jan. 2005, [2005] ECR I-345
– pending: Case C-540/03, European Parliament v Council, to annul three pro-
visions of Directive 2003/86 on family reunion; hearing 28 June 2005; opin-
ion 8 Sept. 2005
C-77/05 UK v Council, challenge to validity of exclusion of UK from borders
agency Regulation
C-137/05 UK v Council, challenge to validity of exclusion of UK from passports
Regulation
975
Annex I
Decided:
C-454/04 Commission v Luxembourg: Directive 2001/55 (OJ 2004 C 314): 2
June 2005
C-449/04 Commission v Luxembourg: Directive 2001/51 (OJ 2004 C 314): 21
July 2005
C-448/04 Commission v Luxembourg: Directive 2001/40 (OJ 2004 C 314): 8 Sept
2005
C-462/04 Commission v Italy: Directive 2001/40 (OJ 2005 C 6/30): 8 Sept. 2005
C-476/04 Commission v Greece: Directive 2001/55: 17 Nov. 2005
Pending:
C-451/04 Commission v France: Directive 2001/55 (OJ 2004 C 314)
C-455/04 Commission v UK: Directive 2001/55 (OJ 2005 C 6/30)
Withdrawn:
C-450/04 Commission v France: Directive 2001/40 (OJ 2004 C 314)
C-460/04 Commission v Netherlands: Directive 2001/51 (OJ 2004 C 314)
C-461/04 Commission v Netherlands: Directive 2001/55 (OJ 2004 C 314)
C-474/04 Commission v Greece: Directive 2001/40 (OJ 2004 C 314)
C-515/04 Commission v Belgium: Directive 2001/55 (OJ 2005 C 31)
C-516/04 Commission v Belgium: Directive 2001/51 (OJ 2005 C 31)
Contractual case:
T-447/04 CapGemini v Commission (regarding tender for SIS II/VIS)
– interim measures order of the Court of First Instance, 31 Jan. 2005; with-
drawn, Feb. 2005
g) Lapsed Proposals
1. Austrian initiative for a Regulation on safe third countries (OJ 2003 C
17/6)
– Legal base: Article 63(1)(d) EC
– Flexibility: UK opt in; position of Ireland not known; Denmark has
automatic opt-out
– EP: plenary rejection, 23 Sep. 2003, following Schmidt report (A5-
0210/2003)
– Council: 28/29 Nov. 2002 JHA Council wished to focus on asylum pro-
cedures proposal
976
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
h) Withdrawn proposals
1. Directive on freedom to travel for three months or for extension for longer
period (COM (2001) 388, 10 Jul. 2001; OJ 2001 C 270E/244)
– Legal base: Articles 62(3) and 63(3) EC
– Background: would replace Articles 19-23 and 25 of Schengen Con-
vention and Regulation 1091/2001 (see above), as well as Portuguese
proposal for extended stays (see above)
– Flexibility: position of UK, Ireland and Denmark not known
977
Annex I
2. Schengen
a) Adopted Measures
Schengen acquis as defined by Council (except for secret parts of acquis): OJ
2000 L 239
Revised text of CCI: OJ 2002 C 313/1; OJ 2003 C 310
Common Manual on border controls: OJ 2002 C 313/97
Basic decisions:
1. Decision 1999/435 on definition of acquis: OJ 1999 L 176/1
– corrected by Decision 2000/645: OJ 2000 L 272/24
Accession:
1. Decision on full extension to Greece (OJ 1999 L 327/58; Declaration, OJ
1999 C 369/1)
978
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
Administrative Decisions:
1. Decision on Schengen secretariat (OJ 1999 L 119)
b) International Treaties
1. Decision on first treaty with Norway/Iceland (OJ 1999 L 176/35)
Entry into force: 26 June 2000 (OJ 2000 L 149/36); Entry into effect: 25 Mar.
2001
979
Annex I
c) Case Law
Direct actions (all concern Schengen Secretariat Decision)
– Case T-107/99 Garcia de Retortillo v Council: application for interim mea-
sures dismissed ([1999] ECR II-1939); withdrawn November 1999
– Case T-164/99 Leroy v Council: judgment on 27 June 2001 ([2001] ECR II-
1819)
– Case T-166/99 Andres de Dios v Council: judgment on 27 June 2001 ([2001]
ECR II-1857)
– Case T-37/00 Chevalier-Delanoue v Council: judgment on 27 June 2001
([2001] ECR II-1819)
– Case T-38/00 Joaquim Matos v Council: judgment on 27 June 2001 ([2001]
ECR II-1819)
980
List of Proposals and Adopted Measures
– Case C-150/05, Jean Leon Van Straaten v Netherlands State and Italian
Republic, (reference from Rechtbank ‘s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands) on
Article 54 of Schengen Convention: pending
– Case C-272/05, Bowens (reference from Hof van Beroep, Antwerp), on
Article 54 of Schengen Convention, on non bis in idem (double jeopardy)
– Case C-288/05, Kretzinger (reference from Bundesgeritschof), on Article 54
of Schengen Convention, on non bis in idem (double jeopardy)
981
Annex I
982
Annex 2 EC Treaty Provisions on Immigration and
Asylum
(as amended by Treaty of Nice)
Article 61
Article 62
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 67,
shall, within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, adopt:
(1) measures with a view to ensuring, in compliance with Article 14, the absence
of any controls on persons, be they citizens of the Union or nationals of
third countries, when crossing internal borders;
(2) measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member States
which shall establish:
(a) standards and procedures to be followed by Member States in carrying
out checks on persons at such borders;
(b) rules on visas for intended stays of no more than three months, includ-
ing:
(i) the list of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nation-
als are exempt from that requirement;
(ii) the procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member
States;
(iii) a uniform format for visas;
(iv) rules on a uniform visa;
(3) measures setting out the conditions under which nationals of third coun-
tries shall have the freedom to travel within the territory of the Member
States during a period of no more than three months.
Article 63
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 67,
shall, within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, adopt:
(1) measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees
and other relevant treaties, within the following areas:
(a) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is
responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted by a
national of a third country in one of the Member States,
(b) minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member
States,
(c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of
third countries as refugees,
984
Title IV EC Treaty, as Revised by Treaty of Nice
(2) measures on refugees and displaced persons within the following areas:
(a) minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced per-
sons from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin
and for persons who otherwise need international protection,
(b) promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and
bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons;
(4) measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third
countries who are legally resident in a Member State may reside in other
Member States.
Measures adopted by the Council pursuant to points 3 and 4 shall not pre-
vent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas con-
cerned national provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and with
international agreements.
Measures to be adopted pursuant to points 2(b), 3(a) and 4 shall not be
subject to the five year period referred to above.
Article 64
1. This Title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and
the safeguarding of internal security.
985
Annex II
Article 65
Article 66
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 67,
shall take measures to ensure cooperation between the relevant departments of
the administrations of the Member States in the areas covered by this Title, as
well as between those departments and the Commission.
Article 67
1. During a transitional period of five years following the entry into force of
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission or on the initiative of a Member State and after con-
sulting the European Parliament.
986
Title IV EC Treaty, as Revised by Treaty of Nice
Article 68
1. Article 234 shall apply to this Title under the following circumstances and
conditions: where a question on the interpretation of this Title or on the
validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community
based on this Title is raised in a case pending before a court or a tribunal of
a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
2. In any event, the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction to rule on any
measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the mainte-
nance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.
3. The Council, the Commission or a Member State may request the Court
of Justice to give a ruling on a question of interpretation of this Title or of
acts of the institutions of the Community based on this Title. The ruling
given by the Court of Justice in response to such a request shall not apply to
judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States which have become
res judicata.
Article 69
The application of this Title shall be subject to the provisions of the Protocol
on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland and to the Protocol on the
987
Annex II
988
Annex 3 December 1998, Vienna European Council
Action Plan of the Council and the Commission
on how best to implement the provisions of
the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom,
security and justice
(excerpts)
33. The measures to be drawn up must take due account of the fact that the
areas of asylum and immigration are separate and require separate approaches
and solutions.
35. In order to complete the area of free movement, it is crucial for there to be
a swift and comprehensive extension of the principles of the free movement of
persons in accordance with the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into
the framework of the EU.
Annex III
36. The following measures should be taken within two years after the entry
into force of the Treaty :
990
Vienna Action Plan (excerpts)
38. The following measures should be taken within five years after the entry
into force of the Treaty :
991
Annex III
992
Annex 4 Excerpt from Conclusions, Tampere
European Council
In this context, the European Council welcomes the report of the High Level
Working Group on Asylum and Migration set up by the Council, and agrees
on the continuation of its mandate and on the drawing up of further Action
Plans. It considers as a useful contribution the first action plans drawn up by
that Working Group, and approved by the Council, and invites the Council and
the Commission to report back on their implementation to the European Coun-
cil in December 2000.
This System should include, in the short term, a clear and workable determi-
nation of the State responsible for the examination of an asylum application,
common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum
conditions of reception of asylum seekers, and the approximation of rules on
the recognition and content of the refugee status. It should also be completed
with measures on subsidiary forms of protection offering an appropriate status
to any person in need of such protection. To that end, the Council is urged to
adopt, on the basis of Commission proposals, the necessary decisions according
to the timetable set in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Vienna Action Plan.
The European Council stresses the importance of consulting UNHCR and
other international organisations.
In the longer term, Community rules should lead to a common asylum proce-
dure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout
the Union. The Commission is asked to prepare within one year a communica-
tion on this matter.
The European Council urges the Council to step up its efforts to reach agree-
ment on the issue of temporary protection for displaced persons on the basis of
solidarity between Member States. The European Council believes that consid-
eration should be given to making some form of financial reserve available in
situations of mass influx of refugees for temporary protection. The Commission
is invited to explore the possibilities for this.
The European Council urges the Council to finalise promptly its work on the
system for the identification of asylum seekers (Eurodac).
994
Tampere Summit Conclusions (excerpts)
The European Council calls for closer co-operation and mutual technical assis-
tance between the Member States’ border control services, such as exchange pro-
995
Annex IV
grammes and technology transfer, especially on maritime borders, and for the
rapid inclusion of the applicant States in this co-operation. In this context, the
Council welcomes the memorandum of understanding between Italy and Greece
to enhance co-operation between the two countries in the Adriatic and Ionian
seas in combating organised crime, smuggling and trafficking of persons.
As a consequence of the integration of the Schengen acquis into the Union, the
candidate countries must accept in full that acquis and further measures build-
ing upon it. The European Council stresses the importance of the effective con-
trol of the Union’s future external borders by specialised trained professionals.
The European Council calls for assistance to countries of origin and transit to
be developed in order to promote voluntary return as well as to help the authori-
ties of those countries to strengthen their ability to combat effectively trafficking
in human beings and to cope with their readmission obligations towards the
Union and the Member States.
996
Annex 5 Excerpts from Conclusions, Laeken, Seville
and Thessaloniki European Councils
38. Despite some achievements such as the European Refugee Fund, the Euro-
dac Regulation and the Directive on temporary protection, progress has been
slower and less substantial than expected. A new approach is therefore needed.
39. The European Council undertakes to adopt, on the basis of the Tampere
conclusions and as soon as possible, a common policy on asylum and immigra-
tion, which will maintain the necessary balance between protection of refugees,
in accordance with the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the legiti-
mate aspiration to a better life and the reception capacities of the Union and its
Member States.
40. A true common asylum and immigration policy implies the establishment
of the following instruments:
– the integration of the policy on migratory flows into the European Union’s
foreign policy. In particular, European readmission agreements must be
concluded with the countries concerned on the basis of a new list of priori-
ties and a clear action plan. The European Council calls for an action plan
to be developed on the basis of the Commission communication on illegal
immigration and the smuggling of human beings;
– the development of a European system for exchanging information on
asylum, migration and countries of origin; the implementation of Eurodac
and a Regulation for the more efficient application of the Dublin Conven-
tion, with rapid and efficient procedures;
– the establishment of common standards on procedures for asylum, recep-
tion and family reunification, including accelerated procedures where jus-
tified. These standards should take account of the need to offer help to
asylum applicants;
Annex V
41. The European Council asks the Council to submit, by 30 April 2002 at the
latest, amended proposals concerning asylum procedures, family reunification
and the “Dublin II” Regulation. In addition, the Council is asked to expedite
its proceedings on other drafts concerning reception standards, the definition of
the term “refugee” and forms of subsidiary protection.
27. It is crucial for the European Union and its Member States that migration
flows should be managed in accordance with the law, in cooperation with the
countries of origin and transit of such flows. The European Council therefore
welcomes the results achieved over the last six months, in particular the com-
prehensive plan to combat illegal immigration, the plan for the management
of external borders and the Directive laying down minimum standards for the
reception of asylum seekers in Member States, and calls on forthcoming Presi-
dencies to continue to give migration issues a special place in their work sched-
ules.
28. Measures taken in the short and medium term for the joint management of
migration flows must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, an integra-
tion policy for lawfully resident immigrants and an asylum policy complying
with international conventions, principally the 1951 Geneva Convention, and,
on the other, resolute action to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in
human beings.
998
Laeken, Seville and Thessaloniki Summit Conclusions on Immigration/Asylum
29. The Union’s action in this area should be based on the following princi-
ples:
– the legitimate aspiration to a better life has to be reconcilable with the recep-
tion capacity of the Union and its Member States and immigration must
pass through the legal channels provided for it; the integration of immi-
grants lawfully present in the Union entails both rights and obligations in
relation to the fundamental rights recognised within the Union; combating
racism and xenophobia is of essential importance here;
– in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention, it is important to afford
refugees swift, effective protection, while making arrangements to prevent
abuse of the system and ensuring that those whose asylum applications
have been rejected are returned to their countries of origin more quickly.
999
Annex V
32. The European Council applauds the recent approval of the plan for the
management of the external borders of the Member States, based on those three
initiatives, which should, among other aims, help bring greater control of migra-
tion flows. It urges the introduction without delay, within the framework of the
Council, of the common unit for external border practitioners, composed of
Member States’ heads of border control, to coordinate the
measures contained in the plan.
It also requests the Council, the Commission and the Member States, each
within its respective sphere of responsibility, to implement the following:
– before the end of 2002:
– joint operations at external borders;
– immediate initiation of pilot projects open to all interested Member
States;
– creation of a network of Member States’ immigration liaison officers;
– before June 2003:
– preparation of a common risk analysis model, in order to achieve common
integrated risk assessment;
– establishment of a common core curriculum for border guard training and
consolidation of European provisions concerning borders;
– a study by the Commission concerning burden-sharing between Member
States and the Union for the management of external borders.
Integration of Immigration Policy into the Union’s Relations with Third Countries
33. The European Council considers that combating illegal immigration
requires a greater effort by the European Union and a targeted approach to
the problem, with the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the
European Union’s external relations. To that end, in accordance with the Tam-
pere European Council conclusions, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced
approach to tackle the root causes of illegal immigration must remain the Euro-
pean Union’s constant long-term objective. With this in mind, the European
Council points out that closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, develop-
ment assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic
prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying
causes of migration flows. The European Council urges that any future coop-
1000
Laeken, Seville and Thessaloniki Summit Conclusions on Immigration/Asylum
34. The European Council highlights the importance of ensuring the coopera-
tion of countries of origin and transit in joint management and in border control
as well as on readmission. Such readmission by third countries should include
that of their own nationals unlawfully present in a Member State and, under
the same conditions, that of other countries’ nationals who can be shown to
have passed through the country in question. Cooperation should bring results
in the short and medium term. The Union is prepared to provide the necessary
technical and financial assistance for the purpose, in which case the European
Community will have to be allocated the appropriate resources, within the limits
of the financial perspective.
36. After full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms without
success, the Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an
unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration flows. In that
event the Council may, in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaties,
adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy
and other European Union policies, while honouring the Union’s contractual
commitments and not jeopardising development cooperation objectives.
1001
Annex V
38. The Commission will submit a report to the Council in late October 2002
on the effectiveness of financial resources available at Community level for repa-
triation of immigrants and rejected asylum seekers, for management of external
borders and for asylum and migration projects in third countries.
39. The European Council asks the Council, in cooperation with the Commis-
sion, to submit for the European Council meeting in June 2003 a report on the
practical implementation of the guidelines set out in this section.
1002
Laeken, Seville and Thessaloniki Summit Conclusions on Immigration/Asylum
10. The European Council has reached the following conclusions with refer-
ence to:
1003
Annex V
13. The European Council recognises the progress made in fully activating the
operational branch of SCIFA required by the Seville conclusions, and more par-
ticularly, the tasking of the Common Unit of External Border Practitioners with
the operational implementation and coordination of the measures contained in
the Plan for the management of the external borders, which includes coordina-
tion and monitoring of “Centres” and operational activities, as well as prepara-
tion of strategic decisions, for the more effective and integrated management of
the external borders of EU Member States. As mentioned in the conclusions
adopted by the Council on 5 June 2003 to that effect, the General Secretariat
of the Council will ensure the preparation and follow-up of the meetings of the
Common Unit and could be assisted in this task, in the initial phase, by experts
seconded by the Member States.
14. The European Council invites the Commission to examine in due course,
drawing on experience by the Common Unit activities, the necessity of creating
new institutional mechanisms, including the possible creation of a Community
operational structure, in order to enhance operational cooperation for the man-
agement of external borders.
15. The European Council emphasises the need for acceleration of works on
adopting the appropriate legal instrument formally establishing the Immigra-
tion Liaison Officers (ILOs) network in third countries, at the earliest possible
date and before the end of 2003.
16. The European Council invites the Commission to present, as soon as pos-
sible, proposals on the recast of the Common Manual, including the stamping
of travel documents of third-country nationals.
Return of illegal migrants
1004
Laeken, Seville and Thessaloniki Summit Conclusions on Immigration/Asylum
18. In this context, the European Council invites the Commission to examine
all aspects relating to the establishment of a separate Community instrument in
order to support, in particular, the priorities as set out in the Return Action Pro-
gramme approved by the Council, and to report back to it by the end of 2003.
Partnership with third countries
20. In developing the above evaluation, the Council will make use of the infor-
mation to be provided by the ILOs network for any of the above topics that fall
under their competencies, and through intensified and more efficient consular
cooperation between Member States in third countries.
21. The European Council invites the Commission to report annually on the
results of the above monitoring of cooperation of third countries, and to make
proposals or recommendations as it deems appropriate.
Community financial resources and burden-sharing mechanism
1005
Annex V
23. In the meantime, the European Council invites the Commission to examine,
while respecting the principles determining the use of the budget, the possibil-
ity of appropriating funds under heading 3 of the financial perspective taking
into account the need to safeguard appropriate margins under the ceiling of
this heading, in order to address, during the period 2004-2006, the most press-
ing structural needs in this area and to cover a wider definition of solidarity
that would, noting the Commission Communication, include inter alia Com-
munity support in the management of external borders, the implementation of
the Return Action Programme and the development of the Visa Information
System (VIS). In this respect, the European Council notes the Commission’s
relevant analysis and that its estimated needs amount to EUR 140 million.
Asylum
26. The European Council takes note of the Communication from the Com-
mission, which is focussing on more accessible, equitable and managed asylum
systems, and invites the Commission to explore all parameters in order to ensure
more orderly and managed entry in the EU of persons in need of international
protection, and to examine ways and means to enhance the protection capac-
ity of regions of origin with a view to presenting to the Council, before June
1006
Laeken, Seville and Thessaloniki Summit Conclusions on Immigration/Asylum
27. The European Council invites the Council and the Commission to examine,
before the end of 2003, the possibilities to further reinforce the asylum proce-
dures in order to make them more efficient with a view to accelerating, as much
as possible, the processing of non-international protection-related applications.
The development of a policy at European Union level on the integration of third
country nationals legally residing in the territory of the European Union
30. In order to respond to these challenges, the European Council stresses the
need for exploring legal means for third-country nationals to migrate to the
Union, taking into account the reception capacity of the Member States, within
the framework of an enhanced cooperation with the countries of origin which
will prove beneficial for both sides.
1007
Annex V
elaboration and implementation remains with the Member States, such policies
should be developed within a coherent European Union framework, taking into
account the legal, political, economic, social and cultural diversity of Member
States. In order to intensify the development of such a framework, the defini-
tion of common basic principles should be envisaged.
32. Taking into account that integration of legally residing third country nation-
als is a complex process which requires the exchange of experiences, the Euro-
pean Council stresses the importance of developing cooperation and exchange
of information within the framework of the newly established group of national
contact points on integration with a view in particular to strengthening coordi-
nation of relevant policies at national and European Union level.
33. In that respect the European Council invites the Commission to present an
Annual Report on Migration and Integration in Europe, in order to map EU-
wide migration data, immigration and integration policies and practices. This
Report, which should contain an accurate and objective analysis of the above
issues, will help develop and promote policy initiatives for more effective man-
agement of migration in Europe.
34. Moreover, taking into account the importance of monitoring and analysing
the multidimensional migration phenomenon, the European Council welcomes
the establishment of a European Migration Network and will examine the pos-
sibility of setting up a permanent structure in the future.
35. The success of such an integration policy relies upon the efficient involve-
ment of all the possible actors. European Union competent bodies, national and
local authorities, trade unions, employers unions, nongovernmental organisa-
tions, organisations of migrants, and organisations which pursue cultural, social
and sport purposes should be encouraged to participate in the common effort at
both Union and national level. In this context, we welcome the first summit of
European Diasporas which is taking place in Thessaloniki at the same time as
our European Council.
1008
Annex 6 Excerpts: The Hague Programme
(OJ 2005 C 53)
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Council reaffirms the priority it attaches to the development of
an area of freedom, security and justice, responding to a central concern of the
peoples of the States brought together in the Union.
Over the past years the European Union has increased its role in securing police,
customs and judicial cooperation and in developing a coordinated policy with
regard to asylum, immigration and external border controls. This development
will continue with the firmer establishment of a common area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in
Rome on 29 October 2004. This Treaty and the preceding Treaties of Maas-
tricht, Amsterdam and Nice have progressively brought about a common legal
framework in the field of justice and home affairs, and the integration of this
policy area with other policy areas of the Union.
Since the Tampere European Council in 1999, the Union’s policy in the area
of justice and home affairs has been developed in the framework of a general
programme. Even if not all the original aims were achieved, comprehensive
and coordinated progress has been made. The European Council welcomes the
results that have been achieved in the first five-year period: the foundations for
a common asylum and immigration policy have been laid, the harmonisation of
border controls has been prepared, police cooperation has been improved, and
the groundwork for judicial cooperation on the basis of the principle of mutual
recognition of judicial decisions and judgments has been well advanced.
The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new
urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on
11 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe
rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental
freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border
Annex VI
Five years after the European Council’s meeting in Tampere, it is time for a new
agenda to enable the Union to build on the achievements and to meet effectively
the new challenges it will face. To this end, the European Council has adopted
this new multi-annual programme to be known as the Hague Programme. It
reflects the ambitions as expressed in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe and contributes to preparing the Union for its entry into force. It takes
account of the evaluation by the Commission as welcomed by the European
Council in June 2004 as well as the Recommendation adopted by the European
Parliament on 14 October 2004, in particular in respect of the passage to quali-
fied majority voting and co-decision as foreseen by Article 67(2) TEC.
A key element in the near future will be the prevention and suppression of ter-
rorism. A common approach in this area should be based on the principle that
when preserving national security, the Member States should take full account
of the security of the Union as a whole. In addition, the European Council will
be asked to endorse in December 2004 the new European Strategy on Drugs
2005-2012 that will be added to this programme.
1010
Excerpts from Hague Programme, November 2004
1011
Annex VI
In this context, the European Council, recalling its firm commitment to oppose
any form of racism, antisemitism and xenophobia as expressed in December
2003, welcomes the Commission’s communication on the extension of the man-
date of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia towards
a Human Rights Agency.
4. Review
Since the programme will run for a period during which the Constitutional
Treaty will enter into force, a review of its implementation is considered to be
useful. To that end, the Commission is invited to report by the entry into force
of the Constitutional Treaty (1 November 2006) to the European Council on the
progress made and to propose the necessary additions to the programme, taking
into account the changing legal basis as a consequence of its entry into force.
1012
Excerpts from Hague Programme, November 2004
The European Council encourages the Union’s institutions, within the frame-
work of their competences, to maintain an open, transparent and regular dia-
logue with representative associations and civil society and to promote and
facilitate citizens’ participation in public life. In particular, the European Coun-
cil invites the Council and the Commission to give special attention to the fight
against anti-semitism, racism and xenophobia.
To ensure such an approach, the European Council urges the Council, the
Member States and the Commission to pursue coordinated, strong and effective
working relations between those responsible for migration and asylum policies
and those responsible for other policy fields relevant to these areas.
1013
Annex VI
The European Council, taking into account the assessment by the Commission
and the strong views expressed by the European Parliament in its Recommenda-
tion, asks the Council to adopt a decision based on Article 67(2) TEC immedi-
ately after formal consultation of the European Parliament and no later than 1
April 2005 to apply the procedure provided for in Article 251 TEC to all Title
IV measures to strengthen freedom, subject to the Nice Treaty, except for legal
migration.
The European Council urges the Member States to implement fully the first
phase without delay. In this regard the Council should adopt unanimously, in
conformity with article 67(5) TEC, the Asylum Procedures Directive as soon as
possible. The Commission is invited to conclude the evaluation of first-phase
legal instruments in 2007 and to submit the second-phase instruments and mea-
sures to the Council and the European Parliament with a view to their adoption
before the end of 2010. In this framework, the European Council invites the
Commission to present a study on the appropriateness, the possibilities and the
difficulties, as well as the legal and practical implications of joint processing
of asylum applications within the Union. Furthermore a separate study, to be
conducted in close consultation with the UNHCR, should look into the merits,
appropriateness and feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications out-
side EU territory, in complementarity with the Common European Asylum
System and in compliance with the relevant international standards.
The European Council invites the Council and the Commission to establish
in 2005 appropriate structures involving the national asylum services of the
Member States with a view to facilitating practical and collaborative coopera-
tion. Thus Member States will be assisted, inter alia, in achieving a single pro-
cedure for the assessment of applications for international protection, and in
jointly compiling, assessing and applying information on countries of origin, as
well as in addressing particular pressures on the asylum systems and reception
capacities resulting, inter alia, from their geographical location. After a common
asylum procedure has been established, these structures should be transformed,
on the basis of an evaluation, into a European support office for all forms of
1014
Excerpts from Hague Programme, November 2004
The European Council welcomes the establishment of the new European Refugee
Fund for the period 2005-2010 and stresses the urgent need for Member States
to maintain adequate asylum systems and reception facilities in the run-up to
the establishment of a common asylum procedure. It invites the Commission to
earmark existing Community funds to assist Member States in the processing of
asylum applications and in the reception of categories of third-country nation-
als. It invites the Council to designate these categories on the basis of a proposal
to be submitted by the Commission in 2005.
As the informal economy and illegal employment can act as a pull factor for
illegal immigration and can lead to exploitation, the European Council calls on
Member States to reach the targets for reducing the informal economy set out in
the European employment strategy.
While recognising the progress that has already been made in respect of the fair
treatment of legally resident third-country nationals in the EU, the European
Council calls for the creation of equal opportunities to participate fully in soci-
ety. Obstacles to integration need to be actively eliminated.
1015
Annex VI
The European Council underlines the need for greater coordination of national
integration policies and EU initiatives in this field. In this respect, the common
basic principles underlying a coherent European framework on integration
should be established.
A framework, based on these common basic principles, will form the foundation
for future initiatives in the EU, relying on clear goals and means of evaluation.
The European Council invites Member States, the Council and the Commission
to promote the structural exchange of experience and information on integra-
tion, supported by the development of a widely accessible website on the Inter-
net.
1016
Excerpts from Hague Programme, November 2004
The European Council calls upon the Council and the Commission to continue
the process of fully integrating migration into the EU’s existing and future rela-
tions with third countries. It invites the Commission to complete the integration
of migration into the Country and Regional Strategy Papers for all relevant
third countries by the spring of 2005.
1017
Annex VI
The European Council considers it essential that the Council begins discussions
in early 2005 on minimum standards for return procedures including minimum
standards to support effective national removal efforts. The proposal should
also take into account special concerns with regard to safeguarding public order
and security. A coherent approach between return policy and all other aspects
of the external relations of the Community with third countries is necessary as
is special emphasis on the problem of nationals of such third countries who are
not in the possession of passports or other identity documents.
1018
Excerpts from Hague Programme, November 2004
The European Council urges the Council, the Commission and Member States
to take all necessary measures to allow the abolition of controls at internal
borders as soon as possible, provided all requirements to apply the Schengen
acquis have been fulfilled and after the Schengen Information System (SIS II)
has become operational in 2007. In order to reach this goal, the evaluation of
the implementation of the non SIS II related acquis should start in the first half
of 2006.
The European Council welcomes the establishment of the European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, on 1 May
2005. It requests the Commission to submit an evaluation of the Agency to the
Council before the end of 2007. The evaluation should contain a review of the
tasks of the Agency and an assessment of whether the Agency should concern
itself with other aspects of border management, including enhanced coopera-
tion with customs services and other competent authorities for goods-related
security matters.
The control and surveillance of external borders fall within the sphere of
national border authorities. However, in order to support Member States with
specific requirements for control and surveillance of long or difficult stretches
of external borders, and where Member States are confronted with special and
unforeseen circumstances due to exceptional migratory pressures on these bor-
ders, the European Council:
– invites the Council to establish teams of national experts that can provide
rapid technical and operational assistance to Member States requesting
it, following proper risk analysis by the Border Management Agency and
acting within its framework, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission
on the appropriate powers and funding for such teams, to be submitted in
2005,
– invites the Council and the Commission to establish a Community border
management fund by the end of 2006 at the latest,
– invites the Commission to submit, as soon as the abolition of controls at
internal borders has been completed, a proposal to supplement the existing
Schengen evaluation mechanism with a supervisory mechanism, ensuring
full involvement of Member States experts, and including unannounced
inspections.
The review of the tasks of the Agency envisaged above and in particular the
evaluation of the functioning of the teams of national experts should include
the feasibility of the creation of a European system of border guards.
The European Council invites Member States to improve their joint analyses
of migratory routes and smuggling and trafficking practices and of criminal
1019
Annex VI
networks active in this area, inter alia within the framework of the Border Man-
agement Agency and in close cooperation with Europol and Eurojust. It also
calls on the Council and the Commission to ensure the firm establishment of
immigration liaison networks in relevant third countries. In this connection,
the European Council welcomes initiatives by Member States for cooperation
at sea, on a voluntary basis, notably for rescue operations, in accordance with
national and international law, possibly including future cooperation with third
countries.
With a view to the development of common standards, best practices and mech-
anisms to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings, the European Coun-
cil invites the Council and the Commission to develop a plan in 2005.
The European Council requests the Council to examine how to maximise the
effectiveness and interoperability of EU information systems in tackling illegal
immigration and improving border controls as well as the management of these
systems on the basis of a communication by the Commission on the interoper-
ability between the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information
System (VIS) and EURODAC to be released in 2005, taking into account the
need to strike the right balance between law enforcement purposes and safe-
guarding the fundamental rights of individuals.
The European Council invites the Council, the Commission and Member States
to continue their efforts to integrate biometric identifiers in travel documents,
visa, residence permits, EU citizens’ passports and information systems without
delay and to prepare for the development of minimum standards for national
identity cards, taking into account ICAO standards.
1020
Excerpts from Hague Programme, November 2004
1021
Annex 7 EU Constitutional Treaty (excerpt)
(OJ 2004 C 310)
Article III-265
(2) For the purposes of paragraph 1, European laws or framework laws shall
establish measures concerning:
(a) the common policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits;
(b) the checks to which persons crossing external borders are subject;
(c) the conditions under which nationals of third countries shall have the
freedom to travel within the Union for a short period;
(d) any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated
management system for external borders;
(e) the absence of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality,
when crossing internal borders.
(3) This Article shall not affect the competence of Member States con-
cerning the geographical demarcation of their borders, in accordance
with international law.
Article III-266
(1) The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protec-
tion and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to
any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring
Annex VII
(2) For the purposes of paragraph 1, European laws or framework laws shall
lay down measures for a common European asylum system comprising:
(a) a uniform status of asylum for nationals of third countries, valid
throughout the Union;
(b) a uniform status of subsidiary protection for nationals of third coun-
tries, who, without obtaining European asylum, are in need of interna-
tional protection;
(c) a common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the
event of a massive inflow;
(d) common procedures for the granting or withdrawing of uniform
asylum or subsidiary protection status;
(e) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is
responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary
protection;
(f) standards concerning the conditions for the reception of applicants for
asylum or subsidiary protection;
(g) partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of
managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or tem-
porary protection.
(3) In the event of one or more Member States being confronted with an
emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third
countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt
European regulations or decisions comprising provisional measures for the
benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the
European Parliament.
Article III-267
(1) The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring,
at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of
third country nationals residing legally in Member States and the preven-
tion of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and traffick-
ing in human beings.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph 1, European laws or framework laws shall
establish measures in the following areas:
1024
Immigration and Asylum Provisions, EU Constitutional Treaty
(a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by
Member States of long term visas and residence permits, including
those for the purpose of family reunion,
(b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally
in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of
movement and of residence in other Member States;
(c) illegal immigration and illegal residence, including removal and repa-
triation of persons residing without authorisation;
(d) combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
(3) The Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmis-
sion to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals
who do not or who no longer fulfill the conditions for entry, presence or
residence in the territory of one of the Member States.
(4) European laws or framework laws may establish measures to provide incen-
tives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting
the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories,
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States.
(5) This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes
of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to
their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed.
Article III-268
The policies of the Union set out in this Section and their implementation shall
be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility,
including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever nec-
essary, the acts of the Union adopted pursuant to this Section shall contain
appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.
1025
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in Europe