DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW

International Organisations
Project on:
Reforming the United Nations Security Council

Under The Guidance of: Project By:

Mrs. Samreen Hussain Tanushka Agarwal

Professor (Law) 180101170
Rmlnlu 8th semester
Table of Contents

1. Literature Review
2. Introduction
3. Why Reforming the Security Council is Necessary
4. The Security Council Membership
5. The Security Council Veto
6. Consistency, adherence to international law and checks & balances
7. Current Reform Proposal
8. The four major flaws of design
9. Conclusion : Reform Proposals
Introduction

The security council is the United Nation’s most powerful body, the only one with the authority
to issue legally binding resolutions that can be backed up by sanctions, blue-helmeted
peacekeepers or by force of arms.
Article 24of the UN charter vests the Security Council with the primary responsibility for the
maintenance and restoration of peace and security. Its powers thereto, are specified in Chapter
VII with respect to mandatory action in case of a threat to peace, breach of the peace and act of
aggression. There can be little doubt that the founding fathers wanted to establish a principal
organ with mandatory and supernatural powers, different from the lame duck Council of the
League of Nations. Therefore in Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations the Council was
vested with the primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security, and in Article 25,
all members agreed ‘To accept and carry out’ the decisions of the council. Furthermore, in the
council of the League of Nations decision making required unanimity, thus providing each
member, de facto, with a right to veto1. In contrast the UN charter introduced majority voting for
the Security Council whether right of veto for 5 members only.2
Initially, the council was primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with military threats to, or
breaches of, the peace. Gradually and under the influence of normative resolutions as well as
political pressure of the general Assembly, the council expanded its interpretation of the concept
of threat to peace, acknowledging that this could also result from a refusal to change a status quo
widely considered to be intolerable. The council further expanded the concept of threat to peace
to include situations such as massive flow of refugees across international frontiers3 and - more
recently acts of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The

1
Article 5, para. 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, stipulated that ‘. . . decisions at any meeting
of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League at the
meeting’. Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919,
2
Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter requires a majority of nine out of 15 votes (before 1965, it was
seven out of 11) for the adoption of decisions on non-procedural matters, including ‘the concurring votes
of all permanent members’.
3
This was the Council’s determination in the context of Iraq’s repression of its Kurdish populated areas.
See S/RES/688, 5 April 1991. See N. J. Schrijver, ‘Sovereignty versus Human Rights? A Tale of UN
Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) on the Protection of the Kurdish People’, in M. Castermans, F.
van Hoof and J. Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century (1998) 347–357.
council has also declared that ‘non military sources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields’4 can possibly constitute threats to peace, although it has not
yet made a determination of this kind in practice.
The end of the Cold War brought about other changes in the modus operandi of the Council. The
Council started to explore new avenues for discharging its special responsibilities in the field of
peace and security by, for instance, creating the United Nations Compensation Commission in
the aftermath of the Second Gulf War or by establishing the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, one for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)5 and another for Rwanda (ICTR).6The Council
also dramatically reshaped and refined its arsenal of coercive measures. In its recent practice, it
has shifted away from imposing general economic sanctions on states and began to target
specific individuals by imposing selective travel bans and the freezing of financial assets,7 while
entrusting the implementation of these measures to sanction committees.17
Some of these committees administer extensive lists of individuals and entities, which has raised
a number of fundamental legal questions, in particular, regarding the need to balance human
rights and due process concerns on the one hand and the need for anti-terrorism measures on the
other. Moreover, it raises the issue whether the Council starts to take on a semi-judicial role as
well.18
In view of its important functions, there can be little doubt that the Security Council should be an
organ of limited membership, capable of acting timely, decisively and with the power to enforce
its decisions. This is especially important if the Council is to fulfil its role with regard to the
emerging 'responsibility to protect' as entrusted to it by the world leaders at the September 2005
World Summit, when they pledged 'to take collective action . . . through the Security Council . . .
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.'19

4
statement by the president of the Security Council on the occasion of a meeting held
at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, UN doc. S/23500.
5
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia
since 1991 (ICTY), established by S/RES/827, 25 May 1993.
6
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by S/RES/955, 8
November 1994.
7
Wallensteen and C Staibano, International Sanctions: Between Words and wars in the global system
(2005)
 Why Reforming the Security Council is Necessary

Among the mysteries of contemporary world politics is the lack of high-level debate over
reforming the United Nations Security Council. U.N. Membership has expanded dramatically
since 1945, from 51 to 193 nations, and the global economy has experienced tectonic shifts,
especially in the past 30 years. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the seven largest Western
economies- three of which have permanent seats in the council- accounted for 51 percent of
global economic output. Today they account for only 30 percent. A decade and a half ago, many
voices insisted that the council must be reformed to retain its legitimacy and effectiveness.

The Council reform movement has gathered force because the Council has recently been far
more active than in the past, when the US-Soviet rivalry and disputes about decolonization led to
many paralyzing vetoes. From 1988 to 1993, the number of formal Council meetings rose from
60 to 171, while the number of "consultations of the whole" (where most business is conducted)
rose from 20 to 253. The Council is now virtually in daily session. In 1989 there were 20
resolutions, while in 1993 there were 93; in the same period, the number of statements by
Council presidents (similar to resolutions) rose from 17 to 94.

The Council has recently dispatched more military peacekeeping missions than in its first
forty-five years combined--and it has sent out a number of election teams, police forces and units
of human rights monitors. The Council has imposed economic sanctions (seven sanction regimes
were in place in 1994), mandated arms inspections and disarmament measures, and acted on a
wide variety of international security issues. But to many countries, this new activism has often
appeared high-handed and undemocratic.

The United Nations Security has several significant problems.

● First, the membership of the Security Council has changed very little since its inception
in 1945, even though the number of UN member states has almost quadrupled since then
and the relative power of member states has changed significantly. The only change in
membership has been the addition of four non-permanent seats in 1965. African states
call the under-representation of Africa a “historical injustice” which needs to be
corrected.

● Second, the differences between permanent and non-permanent seats produce a highly
unequal and inefficient Security Council. The five permanent members (P5) – Britain,
France, United States, Russia and China – possess permanent seats and have the privilege
of the veto whilst the status of non-permanent members is low. The former Ambassador
of New Zealand Colin Keating has explained that the non-permanent members have
essentially been relegated to a role of rubberstamping decisions made by the P5 or
choosing between their contending positions. Similarly, the Permanent Representative of
Ireland has publicly called the Security Council debates a sham that very few
governments even stay to hear. Moreover, the P5 have on many occasions abused their
veto powers. Another important issue regarding the veto is that the decision probability in
the Security Council remains very low. Although the formal, public use of the veto has
decreased in the last few decades, this has mostly been caused by moving the activities of
the Security Council behind closed doors where threats of veto are made in private.

● Most importantly, the performance of the Security Council in maintaining international

peace and security has been poor. It failed in its actions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.
In Somalia, the choice of strategy was counterproductive and Washington’s political
timetable for the mission too arbitrary. In Bosnia, the operation was severely
undermanned and the Security Council failed to provide adequate protection for the UN
safe areas, resulting in the Srebrenica Massacre. In Rwanda, an insufficient mandate and
the Council’s refusal to strengthen the peacekeeping force once the genocide began
doomed the operation. Britain, the United States and France all actively avoided using the
 term “genocide” to escape their responsibility to intervene. France actually supported the
Rwandan government and provided it with arms and ammunition even during the
genocide. Interventions in Iraq (2003) and Kosovo (1999) proceeded without Security
Council approval.

● More recently, the Security Council has failed to act to resolve crises in Crimea, Syria
and Yemen. As a result, Nabil Elaraby – an Egyptian diplomat, a former Secretary
General of the League of Arab States, and a former judge in the International Court of
Justice – claims that the international protection system enshrined in the UN Charter has
ceased to exist. However, member states are not abandoning the Security Council as is
shown by its ever-increasing workload.

As a result of its shortcomings, reform of the Security Council has been deemed necessary. In
2009, some 140 member states requested to move on to text-based negotiations to pursue reform.
 The Security Council Membership

No UN reform issue is as controversial as the question of changing the Security Council’s

membership and voting rules. With the P-5 still limited to the five major victor nations of World
War II and their veto power over substantive is- sues, the Security Council has been viewed for
many years as something of an anachronism. The P-5 underrepresent the majority of the world’s
population and the principal financial contributors to the UN; Europe is overrepresented at the
expense of Latin America, Africa, and Asia; China is the only Asian and developing country;
Germany and Japan contribute more financially than Rus- sia, China, Great Britain, and France.
Should Security Council membership be expanded and diversified to accord more with
representative principles? What arrangements can satisfy the criteria of representation and
efficiency? Should voting be modified to alter the antide- mocratic bias of the veto power?
Would the legitimacy of Security Council actions be enhanced by diversifying the geographic
representation and altering the voting structure? With the council’s greater activity since the
Cold War’s end, these issues have gained increasing urgency, as the Asian, African, and Latin
American states have challenged their exclusion from permanent seats and the disproportionate
representation of developed countries, and as some developed countries have challenged their
exclusion as well.
Virtually everyone agrees that more states should be added to the Security Council to alleviate
the inequities in representation. The trick is to increase the number of members for geographic
representation and enhanced legitimacy26 while maintaining a small enough size to ensure
efficiency.
Article 23 distinguishes permanent and elected members. As to the permanent members the
Charter lists five. They are often referred to as great powers, although in reality they differ
considerably on many scores such as population, economy, size of army or extent of power. It is
striking that this Article 23 has never been amended, despite the fact that Republic of China was
replaced by the People’s Republic of China in 1970 20 and the USSR by Russian Federation in
1992.
As regards the elected members, there was one charter amendment in 1963 expanding the
number from 6 to 10 in order to provide for ‘a more adequate geographical representation and
making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the Charter of the United
Nations’8. The two most relevant criteria for the election of those members on the council can
still be found in the UN charter itself. Article 23 stipulates that the non-permanent members be
elected with due regard to, firstly, their contribution to the maintainence of peace and security
and , secondly, equitable geographic distribution.9As noted in a classic work on the UN: ”this
was not meant to be a rigid or automatic formula, but rather, an indication of the factors the
Assembly is expected to take into account in electing the non-permanent members of the
Council”10
Many ambassadors at the UN say the Council is not representative and is unresponsive to their
concerns. Their complaint is not new. There was a lot of unhappiness when the U.S. and Britain
systematically blocked Council action to impose economic sanctions on South Africa during the
1980's; when France and Britain blocked action on Suez in 1956; when the US refused action on
Vietnam in the 1960's and '70's; or when the Soviet Union prevented action on Afghanistan in
the 1980's. But today, the opposition is more vocal because the Council, rather than failing to act,
is now acting--in ways that often seem motivated by geopolitical interests of major powers.
Many ambassadors disagree with Council actions on Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and other
crises--often on the grounds that the special concerns of the Permanent Members (especially the
United States) take precedence over the norms of international law and the majority view in the
international community. They plausibly think these crises would have been handled better in a
more open and democratic Council, where the voices of less powerful members could be heard
and could have a serious influence.
In speeches and in corridor conversations, diplomats often point out that four out of the five
Permanent Members are "European" (a concept that includes the United States) and four out of
five are "industrialized" countries. The four-fifths of humankind that live in the poor countries of

8
E. Luck, ‘Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress’, in J. E. Krasno
9
.possible criteria considered during the discussions at San Francisco, see
UNCIO, Documents, XI, at 676–677.
10
L. M. Goodrich, E. Hambro, and A. P. Simons, The Charter of the United Nations:
Commentary and Documents (1969) at 197.
the Global South, they say, have only one voice--China--among the Permanent Members. Latin
America, Africa and the Middle East have no regional presence at all among the Permanent
Members. Reformers insist that the Council should better "represent" the whole population of the
globe. But there are considerable differences about how representation should be achieved and
what effective Council democracy would look like.
Richard Butler, Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN told a reporter "It is absolutely
clear that the Security Council we have today is yesterday's Security Council. It cannot do the
job we need done today and will certainly need in the future."11And Roberto R. Romulo, Foreign
Minister of the Philippines told the General Assembly: "It is ironic that in the midst of the rapid
spread of democracy in recent years and the expanding membership of the United Nations, the
Security Council remains unrepresentative in its size and the geographic distribution of its
membership, and undemocratic in its decision making and working methods."12

11
As quoted in Barbara Crossette, "At the U.N., a drive for diversity," New York Times, October 24, A6
12
Ibid.
 Security Council Veto

The insertion of veto provision in the charter Was bad but its frequent use in the Security
Council voting is has been still worse the voting procedure in the Security Council and General
assembly are far more liberal under the charter and a considerable advance over Delhi
government but voting in the league organs never created a problem the league organs fail to
achieve satisfactory results but the voting procedure was not to be blamed for all that on the
other hand the faulty voting arrangement in the Security Council has become a headache for this
since you’re well wisher the UN “No article of the charter has impacted the row is greater
controversy than Article 27”13 no problem in the United Nations has gained as widespread
attention as the voting arrangement in the Security Council popularly referred to as the Veto14.
Nothing has done more to lessen public confidence in the United nation than the frequent use or
abuse of the a veto in the Security Council.15 the wranglings over the veto have delayed the
making of peace treaties and held up the reconstruction of war devastated parts of the world16.
The big five contemplated the veto provision to be a guarantee of council effectiveness but in
practice it has paralyse the working of council its frequent use has tied the hands of the Security
Council in many crucial matters.17

Soon after the charter began to take shape it became after and that the USSR was not going to
follow the spirit of the charter. Shelter was taken behind the veto power given to the permanent
member. “In the actual operation of the Security Council the veto became almost entirely an
issue between Soviet Union the other permanent members”18 by January 1951 more than 40 clear
cases were torpedoed on account of the negative vote of one permanent member. The only veto
used by members other than Soviet Union was by France when she opposed the Establishment of
a commission to study the Indonesian question as it seemed that the antics of the Soviet Union

13
Goodrich and hambro : The charter of the United Nations, p. 220.
14
Leonard : International Organisations. p.200.
15
ND Palmer and HC Perkins : International Relations. p. 1090
16
L.M. Goodrich and E. Hambro : The Charter of the United Nations. p.224
17
N.D. Palmer and H.C. Perkins : International Relations, p. 1090
18
Vandenbosch and Hogan : The United Nations, p.146
were likely to make a nonsense of the security council. It was considered wise to get a Balkan
and Korean commission set up by the General assembly. For this very reason the question of
Palestine was referred to the General assembly. Such steps are “Wholly to be welcomed”. It has
now become quite clear that Soviet Russia is bad after utilising the veto at every point. In
practice this power of veto has been grossly abused; veto was only used twice during the 20
years of the league's existence whereas it has been used between 40 or 50 times during the four
and a half years existence of the United Nations.
Many UN diplomats and reformers are unhappy about permanent membership and especially the
veto, and they want to reconsider the issue, even if the number of Permanent Members does not
increase. The veto guarantees an exclusive and dominant role to the Permanent Members of the
council and is contrary to the aim of democratizing the UN."19
Many reformers, like Colombia, New Zealand, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, like to limit or do away
with the veto and even with permanent membership itself. In debates, phrases like "obsolete
privilege" and "exclusive club" tend to crop up. "The right to veto undermines the principle of
sovereign equality of states as provided in the Charter," said Hasmy Agam, Deputy Secretary
General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a speech to the General Assembly. "No
country, however powerful, should arbitrarily stand in the path of collective needs as determined
by the general membership of the UN."20
The veto has been little used in the post-Cold War period, but use alone is not a measure of its
importance. According to the account of knowledgeable delegates like Amb. Nabil Elaraby of
Egypt, Permanent Members frequently threaten to use the veto in closed-door consultations, as a
means to get their way. This practice is called a "closet veto."21Vetoes (whether threatened or
actually used) are a block to action, as UN performance in former Yugoslavia and other recent
crises has clearly shown. A singe veto-wielding power can stop international response dead in its
tracks and totally frustrate the will of the overwhelming majority of the international community.
This blockage, which has frustrated UN action on key questions since its founding, must be

19
Oysim Chin"Security Council Article" posted to NGLS, November 1, 1994.
20
Speech to the General Assembly, October 13, 1994, AM.
21
Elaraby's speech to the General Assembly, October 13, 1994, AM.
progressively eased, insist reformers. New veto-wielding permanent members would only
increase the likelihood of blockage and still further paralyze the organization.
Vetoes have not just been cast to block substantive resolutions. Over the years, 59 vetoes have
been cast to block the admission of member-states -- a dubious enterprise -- as well as 43 vetoes
cast to block nominations for Secretary-General. The veto strangles the UN and prevents a broad
consensus from guiding its work across a wide range of issues.
Most reformers admit that at present their chances of doing away with the veto or with
permanent membership are slim, since the Permanent Members would block the necessary
changes in the Charter. So reformers have proposed incremental strategies, including a slow but
steady assault on the veto, seeking to restrict its use through procedural changes, which do not
require Charter revision. Austria, among others, has called for this type of restrictions and Olara
Otunnu, President of the International Peace Academy, has said that the burden of proof in future
should be on permanent members to justify veto use. The prestigious Commission on Global
Governance, of which Otunnu was a member, has proposed veto restrictions in its recent report.
One proposal being discussed would require two concurrent vetoes. Another would restrict
circumstances in which vetoes are cast (e.g. to cases of international aggression under Chapter
VII). Yet another would develop a kind of weighted vote to replace vetoes altogether.22

22
Speech of Volodymyr D. Kandogy, Ukraine,General Assembly,14 October, 1994, AM.
 Consistency, Adherence to International Law and Checks and Balances

UN members are especially concerned that the Council operates inconsistently, that it often does
not enforce its own resolutions and that it sometimes ignores or even violates international law.
This undermines the legitimacy of the Council and of the binding character of its resolutions. A
Council that is not considered legitimate has to strong-arm others, rather than command their
assent and support. Amb. Razali referred to this problem as one of "selectivity" and "double
standards."He went on to say: "There is a perception that a Western-dominated Council
increasingly resorts to questionable decisions, the implementation of which, in the main, is left to
other member states, particularly in the Third World."Amb. Jaramillo was still more blunt. "Our
belief is that total power leads to total corruption," he said.

There is also strong opposition to the Council's tendency to selective enforcement, following the
preferences of the most powerful members. The Council enforces some of its resolutions with
great vigor while others it virtually ignores. Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Morocco's seizure of
Western Sahara, Israel's invasion of Lebanon and Iraq's invasion of Iran are cases where the
Council passed resolutions and did little or nothing to follow up. The policies of the U.S. and
Britain seem to have kept the Council from the follow-up needed for effective enforcement in
many cases, but Russia blocked effective action in the war in former Yugoslavia.

Council critics have been particularly concerned recently with the Council's tendency to
subcontract enforcement to powerful members, rather than carry out enforcement under UN
auspices. In the crises like the Gulf War, Somalia and Haiti, the United States has asked the
Council for resolutions that would authorize it to carry out military operations by itself or in
alliance with token forces from other countries. Russia and France have likewise obtained
Council sanction (or tacit agreement) for intervention in countries within their sphere of
influence. The Council is supposed to be a multilateral agency, not a sanction for unilateral
action, insist the reformers. In the January 1995 Council debate, China came out quite strongly
for this position as well, referring to the "flimsy ground" on which such actions rested and
calling for action under the "unified command" of the UN.

Powerful nations may use the Council when it suits them and then turn their back on the UN
when they choose. The chief UN mediator for Haiti, Dante Caputo of Argentina, resigned in
September 1984 when the United States ignored months of UN efforts to take its own unilateral
action. In his resignation letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Caputo said that "the total
absence of consultation and information from the United States Government makes me believe
that this country has in fact taken the unilateral decision of acting on its own in the Haitian
process."23

In order to promote consistency and the rule of law in political systems, most national
constitutions impose checks and balances, including some kind of judicial restraint by a
constitutional court. Some UN reformers, including a number of distinguished constitutional
lawyers and scholars like Princeton Professor Richard Falk argue that the Council should be
answerable to the World Court. Colombia has proposed a "Chamber of the Charter," a special
new branch of the Court that would examine Council behavior and Council precedents. This
might not be a panacea (Court judges are, after all, elected by the Council--though without
vetoes). But it would be a very important step, since Court judges are elected for nine years and
tend to be relatively independent. The President of the World Court, Mohammed Badjaoui spoke
to the General Assembly on October 13, 1994, urging a wider role for the Court in the UN
system; shortly after, Algerian Ambassador, Ramtane Lamara called for a "revitalization" of the
Court's functions within a revised Charter. Unfortunately, relatively few Ambassadors refer to
judicial review in current Council reform discussions.

The General Assembly can also function as an influence on the Council--another pole of power
in a system of checks and balances. Reformers hope that if the GA demands and gets more
information, and if it acts to assert its own role in the UN system, it can successfully balance the

23
New York Times, September 22, 1994, A15.
power of the permanent members in the Council, especially if the non-permanent membership is
expended. Reformers argue that the GA has allowed much of its authority to be usurped during
the 1990's. An activist GA, they argue, could recapture much of the initiative without the need
for Charter revision.

Some reformers, particularly in the NGO community, propose yet another element in a UN
system of checks and balances--the voice of citizen groups, political movements and even
directly-elected citizen representatives. A directly-elected Citizen Assembly, as proposed by the
World Federalists and others, may be many years distant. But direct citizen voices in the UN
have a growing authority. By monitoring the Security Council and creating a public concern for
its actions, they can have a considerable impact, even completely outside the formal workings of
the Charter. The new NGO Working Group on the Security Council may be able to play just
such a role.
 The Current Reform Proposals

The current negotiation process is based on Decision 62/557 which was adopted in 2008. It
defines five key issues for reform: categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional
representation, the size of an enlarged Security Council and its working methods, and the
relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. Decision 62/557 also
stipulates that any solution must garner “the widest possible political acceptance”, although in
1998 the UN General Assembly already agreed that the support of two-thirds of UN member
states is sufficient. Yet even if these conditions are met any of the P5 will still be able to veto the
final resolution. For example, China and Russia have previously stated that reform should be
based on a consensus and not on a majority vote.
On the issue of reform, the UN member states are divided into several groups. Their positions on
the most important questions, membership and the veto, are as follows.

● First, the G4 consists of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. The G4 mainly seek
permanent seats for themselves, but are willing to forego their veto rights for fifteen years
or possibly even longer.

● Second, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) consists of various states – including Italy,
Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Pakistan – which oppose the G4 and
the addition of any new permanent seats. The UfC would instead add only non-permanent
seats and preferably abolish the veto or at least restrict its use.

● Third, the African group consists of members of the African Union. It seeks two
permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa. The African group would preferably
abolish the veto, but it insists that as long as the veto exists all permanent members
should possess it.
 ● Fourth, the L69 consists of some 40 developing countries from all over the world,
including Brazil and India. It seeks six new permanent seats and six new non-permanent
seats balanced across UN regions. Its stance on the veto is similar to that of the African
group; either the veto is abolished or it is extended to all permanent members.

● Fifth, the Arab group consists of 22 states and it demands a permanent Arab seat. It
heavily criticises the veto, but does not present any solution to it.

● The final significant group is the ACT which consists of 21 smaller member states, such
as Ireland, Switzerland, Peru, Uruguay and Liechtenstein. The ACT concentrates solely
on improving the working methods – accountability, coherence, and transparency – of the
Security Council so that all UN member states, not just the Council members, can take
part in its decisions.

The P5 are generally hesitant towards reform. Of the five, France and Britain are most open to
reform. Whilst all permanent members accept the reform in principle, they have often fought
popular reform proposals. For example, when in 2005 it seemed that the G4 and the African
group might reconcile their differences, China and Russia declared any reform to be out of the
question and with the aid of the United Stated started publicly gathering support to defeat the
reform attempt. Similarly, in 2012 intense pressure from the permanent members forced a draft
resolution on improving the working methods of the Council to be abandoned.
 The Four Major Flaws of Design

There are four major flaws in the design of the Security Council which cause it to be
dysfunctional and these flaws are currently ignored in the reform process. The four flaws are:
inequality, exclusiveness, rotating seats, and representation.

● First, inequality results from the veto and from the difference between permanent and
non-permanent seats. As has been discussed earlier, the unequal design concentrates most
of the power to the P5 who are then able to act in self-interest and ignore the rest of the
UN. This means that even when there would be overwhelming support for the UN to act,
a single member can make action impossible.

● Second, exclusiveness results from limiting the Council’s membership to a small portion
of the total UN membership. This causes the Security Council to lack legitimacy, because
it displays little awareness of the views under-represented regions, such as the Middle
East or the Small Island Developing States. Another example is Africa which is the
subject of nearly 75 percent of the Council’s work and the target of over 60 percent of all
Security Council resolutions, but is severely under-represented. For example, in 2008 a
draft resolution called for sanctions against Robert Mugabe and his associates. The
African Union was against sanctions, but had no say in either the draft resolution or the
result. The South African permanent representative summarised the problem in the
following way: “How can we have a situation in which other people are discussing what
is happening on our continent without our participation?”

● Third, the system of rotating seats results in unpredictability and randomness because
Security Council decision-making and agenda setting follow the interests of its members.
For example, before the Rwandan genocide the government of Rwanda used its seat in
the Council to gain information that the United States was unwilling to intervene and
 during the genocide Rwanda used its seat to spread misinformation. Rwanda was also
supported by two other non-permanent members: Djibouti and Oman. Had these seats
been held by other states, the result would have likely been different.

● Fourth, the system of single countries representing their respective regions does not work,
because states are unwilling to represent and to be represented by others. Instead, states
campaign vigorously to gain seats for themselves. As a case in point, the African group
has been unable to agree on the distribution of seats among its members even after more
than a decade of negotiations.

The current reform proposals do not solve any of these flaws as the focus is on the issues defined
in Decision 62/557. Instead, some reforms might further exacerbate the flaws. In particular, the
addition of several new permanent members with veto power would decrease the decision
probability of the Council even further.
 Conclusion :-
Proposed Solution:The Two-Layered Regional Model

As an improvement over the current proposals, I argue in favour of the Two-Layered Regional
model which seeks to eliminate the four identified flaws. First, the Security Council is opened to
all member states, effectively eliminating exclusivity, regional representation and rotating seats.
Second, all privileges including the veto are abolished which makes all member states equal.
Third, the current United Nations Regional Groups are modified: the Eastern European Group is
abolished and its members integrated to neighbouring groups; a new Middle Eastern and North
African group is created; and a new group for Small Island Developing States is created. The
goal is to have large regions with socio-cultural links and similar security issues. States that share
strong links to two regions can have overlapping memberships in two regional groups. For
example, the North African states are strongly linked in their culture, heritage and security issues
to the Middle East, but are also strongly tied to Africa by geography and by a long history of
membership in the African Union and its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity. As a
result, they would most likely prefer to be members in both regional groups. Overlapping
membership can also be utilised in other regions such as the Caucasus and Central Asia. Special
arrangements can be considered as well. For example, states located in hostile regional
environments – in particular, Israel – could be granted a standalone status so that they couldn’t
be dominated by their regional groups. In addition, the P5 could be offered immunity from
Security Council resolutions for a period of a few decades to make them more amenable towards
reform.
The idea is to use the regional groups in a two-layered voting process where the region in
concern and the rest of the world take separate votes on draft resolutions. So, for example, if a
draft resolution targeted Zimbabwe, first the African Group would take a vote among its
members – because Zimbabwe is part of that regional group – and then the rest of the UN
member states take a separate vote. If both votes gain 60% support, the draft resolution is
adopted. If either vote fails to gain 60% support, the draft resolution is abandoned. This formula
is followed when the draft resolution concerns intrastate conflict. In cases of interstate conflict
there is only a single vote by the Council as a whole.
The design has several benefits. One is that it takes into account the controversial nature of
interventions by making it more difficult to intervene in intrastate conflict compared to interstate
conflict. Another benefit is that Security Council resolutions gain legitimacy, because all
member states have the option to participate in the process. Regions such as Africa and the
Middle East have more control over their fates and as such might react faster to emerging crises.
As the design emphasises regional responsibility, it decreases the burden of the current
permanent members whilst allowing them to intervene more legitimately when there are
legitimate threats to international security.
In sum, the current reform proposals seem inadequate to ameliorate the flaws of the Security
Council. Some might even make the situation worse. Whilst I believe that the reform proposal
presented here would perform better, it is most likely that the reform process will continue to be
slow and the changes are incremental.

1
2
3