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    Bynum (2001) Shape and Story - Metamorphosis and Identity

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    ginnytheweird

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    Metamorphosis and Identity Caroline Walker ZONE BOOKS - NEW YORK © 2001 Caraine Walker Bynum For Guenther Roth 1 MIT Pres, chorets and London, England ‘whether of individuals, communities, or peoples. His fundamen tal category isa unitas forever encompassing two. This characteristic way of thinking means that there are some things itis hard for Bernard to say and some things he says su- premely well. His understanding of entities is the paradoxical notion that one plus one equals one. Nothing really holds the entity together except the assertion of unity. Two things donot to Bernard really come together to make a third thing. One thing does not become another. There is no real change; beings are only more or Jess themselves. But the radical two-ness ofthe world is preserved: atthe heart ofbeingsisnot ony asimultaneity of oppositesbutalso 4 conversation between them. And the contrast makes each more vividly itself. Hence it shouldbe no surprise that the Bernard who called himself a chimera could see the human person as vile slime united to glory and God himself as mira mixtura. It seems clear that every rhetorical strategy and set of onto- logical assumptions presents advantages and disadvantages for ‘grappling with what we persist in calling “reality” Conceptions of radical metamorphosis, because essentially narrative, grapple with history and personal development in a way Bernard, for all his dynamism, does not. Moreover they keep the focus on the ques tion of identity. What I have called Bernard’s hybridity, by which ‘mean both his ontology and his thetoric, expresses something ‘else, Bernard's language describes not how something changes, ‘what constitutes an entity, ow identity perdures; it simply affirms at every ontological level a simultaneity of opposites in which what is exists as A and not-A, one plus one, in conversation with and being ~ itself. If metamorphosis leaves us finally with a question —for indeed how can something change and be the same thing?—the hybrid, atleast in the hands of a master, bodies forth not question but paradox: the fact that the world is, and is contradictory. 162 Cuarrer Four Shape and Story! ‘hese scars bear witness ‘but whether to repair or ta destruction In longer know “Meditations for a Savage Chi Advenne Rich? The Problem of Personal Identity For the past ten years, Mhave been fascinated by the question of, personal identity in all three senses in which the word is used by present-day philosophers, sociologists, and literary theorists Identity can mean individuality or personality In this sense, iden tity is that which makes me particularly, distinctively, even uniquely re. But identity is also used in current debates to mean some- thing almost the opposite; it can mean identity position. In this sense, my identity is that which signals group affiliation —often race or biological sex but sometimes also statuses generally under stood as more socially shaped, such as clas, language group, or religion. Finally, identity can mean spatiotemporal continuity In this sense, identity refers to the fact that am the same person Iwas a moment ago. This third understanding of identity carries the connotation of oneness or integrity. The same set of crumbsis not the identical piece of cake if itis divided into two portions.? 163 Al three senses of identity can seem to slip away from one’s intellectual grasp when examined closely. Moreover, they slip into ‘each other. If we consider identity as individuality, what are its clements and limits? Does the emergence of depression or schiz- ‘ophrenia, for example, remove identity however much it may alter personality? If outer behavior and inner intentionality seem fun- damentally out of synchrony, asin the case of Tourette's syndrome, where does identity lie? Identity understood as identity position also raises questions — social, politcal, and philosophical. Feminists, queer theorist, spe- cialists in ethnic studies, and politicians have recently asked, for example, who owns or bestows identifying labels, such as “black” or “queer” The difference between claiming identity for one’s ‘own group and naming an “other” is often the difference between self-assertion, on the one hand, and denigrating stereotype, on the other hand; and even this formulation is too simple. It is not quite true today; for example, that Poles can tell Polish jokes, ‘whereas others may not. For even within identity groups the ap- propriateness of labels may be hotly contested. And terms such as “feminist” have, among people who describe themselves as such, varied, even contradictory, meanings. Moreover, theorists from almost every walk of life— biologists, sociologists, literary critics, lawyers and judges, political activists — query whether such “iden- tities” as gay, female, Hispanic, elderly, are biologically determined or culturally constructed. Is there something basic to particular races or sexes either encoded in genes and carried by physiology ‘or found s0 universally in world cultures as to be ineradicable even iflelaborated by society from mere biological hints in musculature, pigment, or hormones? ‘The third understanding of identity — identity as spatiotempo- ral continuity —is today the least discussed outside of philosophi- cal circles, Yet this sense of identity is often implicated in the 164 other two. Moreover, it offers the deepest and rawest threat to ‘our grounding asa self, For considering identity inthis sense raises, dloubts about whether anything perdures — my personality, my cat, my briefcase if take my eye offi for even a moment. IfThave aronesia, does my body guarantee that Lam “me” over time? What it then undergoes a sex-change operation and complete cosmetic surgery? Is there any sense in saying that such an altered entity “the same individual,” whereas a donor mouse and its clone are two separate individuals? Discussion of identity issues in all three senses of identity is everywhere today: in campus polities and debates over whose literary “canon” should be taught; in the pop culture of movies, television, and tabloids where consciousness is split or trans- planted, bodies “beamed up”; in ethicists’ agonized ruminations over cloning, organ donation, or recovered memory. Whether wwe read the New York Review of Books, Newsweek, or the National Enquirer, we are bombarded by the question: Are we genes, bod- ies, brains, minds, experiences, memories, or souls? How many of, these can or must change before we lose our identity and become someone or something else? On what identity do we insist, if we claim rights for our identity position? What allows or entitles someone else to represent or empathize with that identity? How gies and philosophical assumptions. Atthe heart of such apparently “isparate genres as epics and romances, hexaemeral commentaries, devotional literature, travelers’ tales, theological discussions of demons, and treatises on minerals, fossils, and nutrition, the theme of mutaio throbs asthe basic question about self and other: “Phe “change” {discuss in these essays elicited what I callin my first chapter a“significance-reaction” ~a deep and burning sense that a particular event involves us in more than its specific details "To the historian William of Newburgh or the traveler Marco Pol green children apparently bor from the earth or the Tong-necked Tnonster we call a giraffe pointed to something beyond them Selves, That was what it meant to be a monster (monstram): £0 point. To point to meaning, to ask for explanation, But explana: a2 tion to a medieval writer could involve any of Aristotle's four causes, not merely efficient cause. In other words, an event or a being or an entity could be explained by what came before it sequentially and impelled it into action or being. But i could also be explained by what it was seen to be, its form or nature or defi- nition (formal cause), or by the material that composed it (mate- rial cause), or by its tos, its purpose or destination (final cause. ‘Any of these causes could be its significance oF reason (rate. Moreover, is significance could also be, in a more Platonic or ‘Augustinian vei, is participation in the ultinate good or the way it signaled its origin asa vestige or footprint of God. The signifi cance that instances of change seemed to demand was not simply matter of finding regularity in the natural worl, although regu- larity could be ficant. But the ratio of an svent or enti ‘an svent or entity could also be mora, theological, or philosophical. Evolution, metamor- phosis, or hybridity could point toward irrationality or transcen- dence as well as toward patterns of efficient causation. ‘To medieval writers, wonder was not merely a feeli ; rot merely a feeling of not understanding; it was a feeling of not understanding something significant, something that mattered. Hence the change, the won der, triggered a search for ratio; and rato always lurked just alittle Dit beyond the ordinary, the obvious explanation. Where does something go when it becomes something else? Can something eee eine Set cea ee Hou iste rene can? The powerful, funny, sophisticated, and awe-ful writings of Or Bed fiat Made Fes Geo Wales, and Dante indicate that the questions mattered enormously; the demanded answers. 7 1 suggest that we still feel the same way. 193 ideas, most mainstream thinkers did double in the sent in which the incarnate Crist was double, Consecration di ot al Christ to brea changed bred into Christ. Exactly what ths meant ‘was however, subject to a range of interpretation. fn the year ruiler of theories of excarstic change sw “substance” or "substant 4 existing afer the conser cused (although ultimately rejected) among the Schoolmen. See for pA Histo of he Drop ogy (600-1300) (Chicago: Univers of smagery than hs contempo 12 ' steclans, ee “Fat, Drink, and Be Merry.” p. See passges ced at nn.89 and 95 above. Wht Iam idenifjng here a aense of hybrid in anthropology is also daracteritcofwetings fom the School of Laon in the carler twelfth cen by Lotin that asserts that tury See, for example, the sentence fragment e soln bay,“ een oppose in mature ae jie int oe pron by don Lottn,Pycholagie Wcole los unter” i a “secre and ineffable st morale aut Klee X {Anmine de Loon ede Guilloone de Champeoue (Gembloux: J. Ducuot, 1959), no, 523, p. 345; and se the work being done by Susan Kramer on the Schoo of Laon in her Columbia University disertation, “Secret Sin and the Privacy of Interior Homa” 158, See Introduction, p. 30, above, and MM. Bat, The ialgte Inagi- [Emerson and Michael rape when an "abominable (Gorendata montrm,shybrd wi he body of aman and the head ofthe devil (corps quien hominis, caput autem docmonis habs); OB 4, pp. 354-55. MO, See mnt and 6 above. “Morrison hs remarked in “Hermeneutics and Enigma,” pp. 145-47, rl has no sense of history. We se this when we contest his discus sionsof Charch nd religious oes with those of Anselm of Havelberg or Gerhoh of Reichersberg, for example, We also note it when ws compar his spirituality for example, Hugh of St, Vietor or Peter Lombard, bath of whom put theologieal mates in a “sahation history” perspective CCuapren Foun: Sears ax Srowy 1. This cosy war delivered asthe National Endowment fr the Hamanities |ffferion Lecture on March 22,1999, in Washington, DC. lam grateful to the ‘stl ofthe National Endowanent for the Humanities, especially Joy Evan, and ‘to-NEH director Wiliam Ferris for tel assistance, Because the Jefferson Lec turesare intended fora broad national audience of supporters ofthe humanities, this esay was planned to stand slone without footnots. I ave altered the text somewhat and added ew references but have let the eriginal character remain Iam grateful to Bruce Altshuler, Teodolinds Barolini, Kathy Eden, Martha How- ell, Dorothea von Micke, Rsiona Naddaf and Guenther Rot for eas. 2, Arne Rich, “Meditations fora Savage Chil." in Diving int the Wc Poets 1971-1972 (New York: WW. Norton, 1973), p58. 3, For bibligeaphy on the question of specially the third sense discussed here, see Caroline Walker Bynum, Frogmnation and Redemption’ -Eauys on Gender andthe Human Body in Medievel Rigi (New York: Zone Books, 1991, pp: 398-400 np.22-34% on entity poson, se adem, “Why All eal Inguty 22 1 Sack, The Aon Who Mizack is Wife fr 2 Hot end Other Tale(New York: Summit Books, 1985). or recent Iteratare on the werewolf, see Chapter ?nn.76-80 above. For seal med 1} esistance to metamorphosis, se Chapter? passim and esp nn.20-25,, 35, 50-52, 6. See the now-clasie work by Kelth Thomas, Religion and the icine of Mogi: Seater n Poplar Beli teenth ond Serententh Century England cof his reception; the “moralzed Ovid” phenomenon 4 Twvetan Todorov, Intodocion la Irate fonanigue (Pari: Editions pp. 28-62. smrphoss, 2 vol, 3rd ed trans FJ Miler, revised by GP. Gooll, The Loeb Casal Library, 42-43 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiy pp. 16-19. The version by Ted Hughes, Tals fiom Ovid (New ina fourteenth-centary ‘And suffers in him, ‘The same gelaly mane, ‘The ame blckringed yellow, Pinpoint pupil eyes the sme Demented grimace, His every movement posesed By dhe sae rabid self 19, See William S. Anderson, "Multiple Change Tranations ofthe American PillgicalAnocaton 94 (1963) C. Cerra, “Transformation and Ant-Augustniom in Ovid's Mevamorphoves,” 1972), pp. 71-81 Among recent work on Ovid, Thae found espe- Leonard Barkan, The God Mode Fl: Metamrphocs nd the Pasuit the Metamorphoses” 1-27sand Leo 268 of Pogonism (New Haven, CT: Yale Univesity Pres, 1986), Warten Ginsberg, “Ovid and the Problem of Gender” i» Marilynn R. Desm A fourm of Moi er and Violence inthe Metamorphotes" Aion 5 (1997), pp. 9-4, Jean Rychner (ed) Let Las de Mave de ‘ronc (Pars: Honoré Champion, 1966), pp. 61-Tl: tans. by Jon Ferrante and Robert Hanning, The Lai of Marie de France (Durham, NC: Labyrinth 197) pp. 99-10, Sea the commentary by Fernand Hang nd, owner cited in n15 below, For an interesting reading that de-emphasizes the narrative elements in Marie, see Evelyn Bige Vite, Meieal Nereative and Mod- en Norratoogy: Sujet and Objects of Dae (New York: New York University Pres, 1989), pp. 149-75. ats de Mare de Ponce. 66. See 1 pp 251-68; see also Lele Di Man," in J. J- Cohen and B. Wheeler (ed), Becoming Mt Middle Ages (eve York: Garland, 1997), pp. 203-18 16, Salman Rushdie, introduction to Angela Caner, Burning Your Boats: The Collected Shore Stree (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. xi Ruse peaking remark sems to me o apply toall her animal fables. On Carter, se also Wendy 269) few of Shabing Lg, in New Yark Tame Book pp. 6-1 17 See the works cited in Chapter 20.77 and 78 above, and JA, MacCl Jock, *ycanthropy.” in James Hastings (et), Enylopedia of Religion and Fees (ew York: Charles Scribner's Son p. 206-20, For an example, see Gervais of Tlbu in GM. Leibni (d December 27, 14.103. Combreni opera, 8 vol, Rerum Britannicarum medi avi sexi (London: Longman, 1861-1891; Kraus reprint, 1964-1966), vo. 5p. 104 (wot inthe irst recension). of Boks, Apel 20, 22. John J. itageral, “Matern Natare and the Knowledge ofthe Word Aristo land the Aristotelian Tradion,"ia Eman McMlin (ed), The Cncepe of where Socrates nd Glaucon discuss whether the gods change Form, Soerates ys 20 capable of... changing and alering his shape in many

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