MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS

A POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE FAILED

OSLO PROCESS
Melissa Boyle Mahle

Ms. Mahle is a former Central Intelligence Agency officer from the

Directorate of Operations and author of Denial and Deception: An Insider’s
View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11 (Avalon Publishing Group, 2004).

W
ith President Bush’s June
2002 speech, the United
States announced to the
world that it was in agree-
ment with Israel that Palestinian Authority
Chairman Yasser Arafat was no longer a
viable negotiating partner. President Bush
called for the formation of a new Palestin-
ian leadership and renewed security efforts
to lay the groundwork for an interim
Palestinian state. In the months that
followed, the administration presented a
Roadmap delineating three phases meant
to guide the parties from the current bloody
conflict to a final peace agreement. With
Arafat’s death in November 2004, a new
Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas
(Abu Mazen), has been chosen through a
democratic process. Finally, the key
elements seem to be in place that will
transform the environment and lead to
peace. Hope is in the air.
The key question is whether 2005 will
be any different from 1996 or 2000 – the
years in which the Oslo accords were the
guide rails to peace. It is tempting to
declare that the renewal of hope funda-
mentally alters the environment. However,
analysis built on the assumption of hope is
wobbly at best. A more sound method is to
examine a broader range of facts and
relationships. If done, one comes to the
conclusion that the Roadmap leads right
back to the roundabout of violence and
destructive unilateral political actions.
In drafting the Roadmap, the Bush
administration adopted the key assumption
of the Clinton strategy, an assumption that
is to its core wrong. The Roadmap, like the
Oslo accords, assumes that a stable
security situation will lead to an environ-
ment conducive to a peace process that, in
turn, will lead to a peace agreement. It will
not. Intuitively, when one looks at the
suicide bombings, the roadside shootings
and the targeted killings, it is understand-
able that a consensus has formed that the
roadblock to peace is security. Death,
destruction and terror are the lethal side-
shows, however. The roadblock is the
process. The central issues are political,
i.e., the terms of the peace.
The Oslo process is a good example of
a failed experiment, with plenty of lessons
that should be studied and applied to future
peacemaking initiatives. Unfortunately, this
has not been the case. The U.S. govern-
ment has once again embarked upon a path

79
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
that places security before real political
engagement, process before substance,
rather than marrying security and political
steps on the ground. This path is doomed
to failure, as was the Oslo process.
A detailed examination of events as
they transpired on the ground, as opposed
to that presented in the spin wars of the
Palestinian, Israeli and American leader-
ship, is revealing. Oslo did not fail on
September 28, 2000, the date of the
beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, because
of a breakdown in security. Oslo had a
long and tortuous death marked by broken
political agreements, missed deadlines and
the systematic undermining of good faith
between the political leadership of the
Israelis and the Palestinians, as both sides
became bogged down in the peace process
at the expense of taking peace-building
measures. The United States helped
undermine the Oslo accords by trying to
bridge political disputes with security
solutions and by using the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) and security issues to
create illusions of political progress in the
Middle East peace process (MEPP).
The cost to the United States in
allowing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to
persist on its current downward spiral is
the growth of anti-American sentiment
throughout the Middle East and Southeast
Asia, increasing support for extremists and
their militant ideologies. As long as the
United States does not aggressively deal
with the underlying causes responsible for
creating and feeding anti-American
sentiment, U.S. citizens will be at risk in
their homes and abroad.
The following is an overview of what
transpired in the MEPP, 1996-2000, from a
political-security optic. It examines the
political and security assumptions and
80
intentions as well as the “ground truth.”
Looking forward, the article explores
challenges to the Bush approach and
weighs the costs of continuing or resolving
the conflict, and the implications for
America.
THE DEATH OF OSLO
The Clinton Strategy
During the period between 1996 and
2000, the United States expended its
resources disproportionately, building
security rather than keeping the political
process moving in a forward direction in the
MEPP. The Clinton administration assumed
a stable security situation would create an
environment conducive to political progress.
Specifically, negotiations between the two
parties would lead to a mutually agreed-
upon settlement and negate the need for
U.S. arbitration. This approach suited
Israeli interests well, as the Israelis placed
primacy on security, with a secondary goal
of progress on the political front; as the
occupying power, they held more capabili-
ties when it came to imposing political
agendas. The Palestinian Authority (PA),
vastly weaker in political clout and military
might, gambled that the land-for-peace
agreement with a security-first approach
would ultimately result in the attainment of
Palestinian national aspirations and improve
the daily lives of Palestinians.
Off to a Shaky Start
The horrific bombing spree of 1995-96
that culminated with the Dizengoff Center
bombing on March 4, 1996, threatened an
early death to the land-for-peace agree-
ment signed at Oslo. Responding aggres-
sively, the United States and the interna-
tional community convened a conference
to discuss the security problem and ham-
 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS
mered out security-assistance agreements
with Israel and the PA. At the Sharm al-
Shaykh anti-terrorism summit on March
13,1996, the United States pledged to
provide resources to professionalize the PA
security services to help them fight against
terror emanating from inside the territories
controlled by the PA, and to provide
additional intelligence and technical assis-
tance to the Israelis. The CIA put together
a massive covert-action program that
included training, technical assistance and
infrastructure development. As the pro-
gram evolved, the CIA also played the role
of a facilitator, restarting Israeli-Palestinian
security cooperation and keeping it going,
acting as a monitor to evaluate compliance.
The Israeli government agreed and ap-
proved of this program as part of a greater
security-cooperation program with the
United States.1
In March 1996, the PA security
services began a massive roundup of
militants from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), detaining
400-plus suspected activists. The PA
justified its actions by declaring continued
military resistance to be counter to the
interests of the PA. The crackdown was
immediately effective in calming the
security situation. In 1995, there were four
bombings, killing 37 individuals. In the first
half of 1996, there were four suicide
bombings, killing 59 Israelis. There were
no successful suicide bombings in the
second half of 1996. The PA began
interrogating the militants and uncovering
the military and support networks. The
impact of the crackdown had a lasting
effect. Key leaders were arrested or killed
and networks disrupted. For PIJ and
Hamas, the existing bomb-making infra-
81
structure was severely crippled. Bombing
attacks became less frequent, less sophisti-
cated and less lethal, indicating degraded
capabilities on the part of the extremist
groups.
The PA had sufficient support from
Palestinians for its security efforts from late
1996 to 1998. Support for Islamic and
secular military groups was dropping
because of growing support for the PA and
its policy of a negotiated peace. An addi-
tional reason was the economic and human
costs to Palestinian civilians as a result of
Israeli responses to the suicide bombing
campaign of 1995-96. Many Palestinians
blamed the opposition forces, not Israel, for
the difficulties they faced after armed
attacks. According to polls conducted by
the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research in February 1995, 46 percent of
Palestinians supported armed attacks
against Israelis. Support for armed attacks
dropped to 21 percent in March 1996.
Support for Hamas dropped to 6 percent in
March 1996, compared to 14.4 percent in
February 1995. In March 1996, 59 percent
of Palestinians supported the PA security
crackdown on the opposition forces. As the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) redeployed
from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqiliya,
Ramallah and Bethlehem, Palestinian
support for negotiations swelled to 78.8
percent by March 1996.2
The Bibi Years: A New Political Reality
The assassination of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the election of
the Likud candidate Benjamin “Bibi”
Netanyahu created a new political reality
that proved poisonous to the peace process.
Public-opinion polls in Israel indicated the
Israelis felt the peace process was like a
train out of control, what with the Hamas
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
suicide-bombing campaign and the assassi-
nation of Rabin by an extremist Israeli
citizen opposed to the peace process made
the public question whether the Interim
Agreement would bring them security.
Responding to popular concerns,
Netanyahu slowed down the peace pro-
cess, and security became the watchword
of his government. In a speech to the
Knesset on the Hebron Protocol on Janu-
ary 16, 1997, Netanyahu clearly articulated
his future policy for dealing with the PA,
saying his government would conduct
negotiations with “the time, the ability and
the freedom for political maneuver.” He
would proceed with the Palestinians,
“insisting on reciprocity and security.”3
Perceived ill-intentions by both sides
had an important impact on the political
process. Palestinians were immediately
wary of Netanyahu and the intentions of
his government because Netanyahu had
openly criticized the Oslo accords and was
against the formation of an independent
Palestinian state. Palestinians interpreted
Netanyahu’s actions in an anti-peace
framework. In this context, Netanyahu’s
support for expansion of Israeli settlements
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was seen
as a tactic to establish “facts on the
ground” that would frustrate or obviate the
establishment of a Palestinian state inclu-
sive of these areas. The opening of the
Hasmonean tunnel in the Old City of
Jerusalem and the development of new
Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem
were viewed as Israeli attempts to destroy
the Haram al-Sharif and to delegitimize
Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem and
the Old City. Palestinians reacted to
Netanyahu’s policies through street pro-
tests and confrontations with settlers.
Netanyahu and his supporters viewed
82
the Palestinian reactions in an anti-peace
framework as well. Israel accused Arafat
of giving a “green light” to terrorism and
courting a collaborative relationship with
Hamas and PIJ. The Netanyahu govern-
ment accused Arafat of a devious game of
secretly telling Hamas he would turn a
blind eye to military operations and would
release Hamas security detainees, but then
deny responsibility for the attacks by
attributing them to opposition elements
operating in the territories. Arafat’s use of
the “Hamas card” as a negotiating tool
with Israel – presenting the PA’s negotiat-
ing positions as moderate compared to
Hamas – was seen by the Israelis as
further proof of Arafat’s double dealing.
Both views are supported by elements
of truth. The Israeli government under
Netanyahu was effective at imposing its
political agenda, with tangible costs to the
Palestinians. Settlement activities ex-
panded significantly in the years
Netanyahu was prime minister. According
to Israeli statistics, the settler population in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (excluding
East Jerusalem) had an average annual
growth of 7.92 percent from 1992 to1998
and a cumulative growth of 52.96 percent
between December 1993 and June 1996.
The average annual growth rate for Jews
and Arabs in Green Line Israel was 2.5
percent per year.4 Netanyahu pursued an
aggressive policy in Jerusalem. Adminis-
trative demolitions of Palestinian homes
increased. He continued the process of
expanding Jerusalem’s borders, announcing
a plan to include, in the municipal borders
of Jerusalem, the West Bank settlement of
Ma’ale Adumim. Furthermore, Netanyahu
authorized the establishment of Jewish
neighborhoods on Har Homa (Jabal Abu
Ghunaym) and Ras al-Amud.
 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS
Looking at the other side of the coin,
Arafat’s policy towards Hamas and PIJ,
and violence in general, was neither
transparent nor consistent. While publicly
condemning military operations and declar-
ing the Islamic opposition the enemy to
peace, he would privately build bridges to
these organizations by making concessions
to co-opt them. Arafat maintained a
continuous dialogue with the Islamic
opposition, permitting Hamas to hold mass
rallies and publish the official Hamas
weekly al-Risala. He appointed a Hamas
leader as minister of youth and sports. PA
security efforts against terrorism were
inconsistent. After massive public arrest
campaigns, there would be quiet releases,
to include known members of military cells
and military-wing leaders. Those who
remained in prison were given special
privileges, including furloughs during the
daylight hours. Finally, Arafat’s rhetoric,
and that of other PA leaders, frequently
reminded the Israeli public and its security
officials that violence against Israel re-
mained a future possibility.
The spin doctors worked overtime as
both sides rallied for support in the interna-
tional court of public opinion. Regardless
of who was “more wrong” or “more right,”
the atmosphere became bleak, with both
sides believing the worst. Time and
developments on the ground only rein-
forced the accusations of bad intentions.
Improved Security in Israel; Increased
Conflict in the Territories
In comparative terms, the security
situation in Green Line Israel and Jerusa-
lem was gradually improving. In 1997,
there were 20 people killed in three bomb-
ing incidents; in 1998, there were two
bombing attacks and one grenade attack,
83
none resulting in fatalities. In 1999, two
bombing attacks produced no fatalities.
Certainly, other attacks were foiled, but this
is evidence the security services were
becoming effective. Within Green Line
Israel, life began to improve, and the
process of normalization got underway.
People were no longer afraid to frequent
restaurants, shopping malls and places of
entertainment. Bus travel again became a
regular mode of transportation. Nightlife
flourished. The economy prospered.
Palestinian Green Line “border towns”
catered to growing crowds of visiting
Israeli shoppers. Israelis visited Jordan by
the thousands.5
The above bombing statistics do not
reflect the ongoing violence in the Occu-
pied Territories, however. Confrontations
between Palestinians, the IDF and settlers
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were
frequent, despite the decrease in fatalities
during the Netanyahu years (see Table 1).
Most confrontations were localized,
spontaneous reactions to specific local
developments such as land confiscations,
settlement expansion and construction,
stone throwing, tree uprooting and IDF-
imposed closures. The confrontations
were at friction points in the Occupied
Territories, i.e., IDF roadblocks and
installations and settler areas. The over-
whelming majority of these confrontations
were viewed by the United States as acts
of political and social violence, not as
terrorism.
These confrontations, practically a
daily occurrence, became the backdrop for
business as usual in the Occupied Territo-
ries. Only particularly intense and large
confrontations would make the interna-
tional press, such as the so-called “mini-
intifada” in Jerusalem and Hebron in
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
September-October 1996 after the
Hasmonean tunnel crisis and the missed
redeployment deadline, or the July 1997
clashes, also in Hebron, in reaction to
posters that settlers displayed showing the
Prophet Muhammad as a pig.
Not all clashes were spontaneous.
Various Palestinian organizations, including
the PA, planned and coordinated protests in
the West Bank against settlement policies
and occupation. Military cells of Hamas
and PIJ remained active in the Occupied
Territories and conducted planned opera-
tions against settlers. While there were
relatively few bombing attacks (three
during 1997-99), there was an increase in
shootings. It is notable that the majority of
the violence was in the Hebron and Nablus
areas, where “ideological” settlers and
Palestinians resided in close proximity.
Bilateral Security Relationship:
Different Visions on Security
Despite the improving security environ-
ment inside Israel, the Israeli government
was dissatisfied with the level of security
cooperation from the PA. The Israelis had
high expectations and pushed the PA to
Palestinians and Israelis Killed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip6
Pa le s t inia ns Pa le s t inia ns
Ye a r
Kille d by I DF Kille d by Se t t le r s
1993 154
1994 106
1995 42
1996 59
1997 18
1998 21
1999 8 0
84
arrest and prosecute all Palestinians who
were involved in resisting the occupation,
whether in the distant past or the present.
Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security
service with primary intelligence-gathering
responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, would pass to the PA lists of names
of Palestinians whom Shin Bet considered
terrorists. The Israeli security-services
were reluctant to provide background as to
why the individuals were suspects, because
Shin Bet wished to protect its sources and
methods. Shin Bet had little confidence in
the PA security services and suspected the
PA would focus instead on Shin Bet
sources, rather than security investigations
of suspected Palestinian militants. During
the first intifada, about 1,000 Palestinians
suspected of collaborating with Israel were
killed by fellow Palestinians. After the
establishment of the PA, Palestinian
security services continued to target
suspected collaborators by rounding them
up and interrogating them. Shin Bet was
concerned that the terrorist support infra-
structure remained undisturbed in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. This infrastructure
would allow Hamas and PIJ to regroup and
Se t t le r s Kille d I DF Kille d by
by Pa le s t inia ns Pa le s t inia ns
13 27 3
38 11 12
2 7 9
3 3 19
2 4 0
6 8 3
1 2
 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS

rebuild. They believed the only way to Palestinian society. The PA security
destroy the terrorist capability was to services saw their role in terms of state
arrest, investigate and prosecute all known building, not simply policing. Regional
activists. Shin Bet wanted the PA to take Palestinian security leaders would maintain
more proactive measures.7 contacts with the local Hamas and PIJ
Palestinian security services, for their leadership, to keep lines of communication
part, felt Shin Bet was dictating to them open and to put down “red lines” the
and trying to make the Palestinian services opposition groups were told not to cross.
surrogates of Shin Bet. They accused Shin Transgressions would result in detention by
Bet of making unsupported accusations. the PA and the shutting down of local
An Israeli statement that so-and-so was a chapters of their organization. These
Hamas activist was not sufficiently com- dialogues mirrored the dialogues between
pelling evidence to warrant the arrest and senior PA leadership (Arafat and others)
interrogation of the individual. There was and the senior leadership of these organiza-
another underlying, but equally important, tions. The structural weakness of the PA
phenomenon. judicial system
There was enabled the
sympathy for
The PA wanted to stop the security organi-
those actively military attacks but not to punish zation to
opposing the the perpetrators by criminalizing marginalize the
Israeli occupa- the struggle against Israel. courts on secu-
tion. Struggling rity cases. The
against occupa- courts were not
tion was considered a legitimate activity by empowered to take independent action
the PA security officials. The PA wanted because Arafat considered an independent
to stop the military attacks but not to punish judiciary a potential threat to his authority.
the perpetrators by criminalizing the Few cases were ever sent to the civilian
struggle against Israel. Jabril Rajub, the courts. The PA, instead, adopted a de
head of the West Bank Preventive Security facto policy towards militants of extralegal
Organization (PSO), stated in a press arrest, detention and release “on good
interview, “I don’t agree with the Israelis behavior.”
that we should fight Hamas. We will fight The Israelis called the Palestinian
the phenomenon of violence.” According
8
arrest-release practice the “revolving door”
to the PSO Gaza commander, Muhammad and protested it vocally. They accused the
Dahlan, “The presence of Hamas in the PA of allowing terrorists “with blood on
Palestinian territory is very important for their hands” (with direct involvement,
the building of a Palestinian homeland. rather than indirect involvement, as part of
The homeland does not belong to Fatah the support infrastructure) to run free in
alone. Hamas also had many victims on the Palestinian-controlled areas, in contra-
the road to establishing the homeland.”9 vention of the signed agreements. Israel
The Palestinian strategy was to win wanted these terrorists extradited to Israel
over the hearts and minds of these militants for prosecution and not hired to work for
and reintegrate them into mainstream the PA security services. The Israelis

85
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
were very uncomfortable with the PA’s
dialogue with Hamas and PIJ. They did
not believe the PA could co-opt the opposi-
tion groups; they had evidence militants
remained secretly active while “under the
control” of the PA security services.10
Because of this fundamental differ-
ence of approach, bilateral security meet-
ings between the Palestinian security
services and Shin Bet became increasingly
contentious and ineffective.
Political Fallout and Security
Band-Aids
When Netanyahu announced the
planned development of Har Homa (Jabal
Abu Ghunaym) in mid-March 1997, a crisis
erupted between the Palestinians and
Israelis, provoking the Palestinians to break
off negotiations. While it was considered a
crisis at the time, the real significance of
the issue was not fully understood. Talks
were already strained by the approval of
the Jerusalem District Planning commission
on December 8 for construction of a new
Jewish neighborhood in Ras al-Amud,
located in the heart of Arab East Jerusa-
lem. Former U.S. ambassador to Israel
Martin Indyk aptly summed up the situation
to an Israeli audience in mid-December
1996, saying construction at Ras al-Amud
would bring Israeli-Palestinian relations to
the verge of an explosion.11 Rather than
being deterred by the gentle warnings from
the U.S. government, Netanyahu pro-
ceeded apace, declaring that the battle for
Jerusalem had begun.
At the same time, the Israeli cabinet
approved the first “further redeployment”
(FRD). Once transferred, less than 10
percent of the West Bank would be under
the full control of the PA. Palestinian
positive reactions were immediately
86
squelched by the Israeli cabinet’s vote the
following day to limit the second FRD to 9
percent of the West Bank (2 percent of
Area C and 7 percent of Area B).
Netanyahu presented a map to the cabinet
showing his plan to limit the transfer of less
than 40 percent of the West Bank to
Palestinian control during permanent-status
negotiations. The map showed the West
Bank divided into sections, or cantons, by
transit corridors controlled by Israel; the
Palestinian sections were not contiguous.
On March 17, 1997, the Palestinians broke
off negotiations and security cooperation.
The rhetoric was fiery. Israel accused
Arafat of heating up the Occupied Territo-
ries in a controlled escalation of distur-
bances and shooting attacks to break the
political stalemate. Furthermore, Arafat
was accused of encouraging Hamas, in a
March 9 meeting with Hamas and PIJ
leaders, to undertake terrorist attacks and
of releasing military-wing members to
allow them to do so. Arafat, in a press
interview, stated that Hamas was a patri-
otic movement, not a terrorist organization,
and that anything, including armed struggle,
was possible.12 PA official Ahmed Abd-al-
Rahman declared that, if Israel continued
with Har Homa and other settlement
activities, “Palestinians have no option but
to stand up and offer their blood and souls
in defense of their land, which is being
expropriated and on which settlements are
being built.”13 PSO commander Rajub on
March 25, 1997, stated to the press, “there
is no separation between political and
security coordination. Palestinian security
cooperation was buried with the first
bulldozer that went up on Jabal Abu
Ghunaym. There will not be any security
coordination as long as there is no political
coordination.”14 The United States tried to
 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS
calm the situation, but its efforts were
meek at best. On March 3,1997, President
Clinton “wished” the decision to develop
Har Homa had not been taken. Two weeks
later, the U.S. government “did not think
this decision ought to be taken.”
On March 21, 1997, the suicide
bombing at the Apropos Café in Tel Aviv
permitted the Israelis to shift the issue
away from settlements to security. The
Israelis accused Arafat of giving a “green
light” to violence. The Israeli cabinet
declared that for talks to resume, the PA
must tighten its cooperation with Israel on
security, prevent incitement of violence,
fight terrorist organizations effectively and
destroy terrorist infrastructure. The
deadline for the first FRD was allowed to
slip by, and the United States elected to use
quiet diplomacy on the settlement issue.
Public and private pressure was placed on
the Palestinians regarding security. This
established a pattern of engagement for the
United States: a piecemeal approach with
security being the biggest piece.
In May 1997, Washington bullied the
Palestinians into resuming security coop-
eration. On May 9, Palestinian and Israeli
security chiefs and deputies attended the
first trilateral security meeting at the U.S.
embassy in Tel Aviv, hosted by the CIA.
Meetings do not directly correlate to
cooperation on the ground, but at least a
forum was begun for the mediated discus-
sion of issues. Through the trilateral
meeting system, the United States hoped to
preempt some of the heated disputes
caused by rival interpretations of Israeli-
Palestinian exchanges in which no third
party was present. This forum continued
intermittently and informally through 1997
to October 1998. The CIA’s goal was to
promote sharing of information in an
87
attempt to stop further violence. Going
beyond facilitation, the CIA began vetting
prisoner releases and arrests and clarifying
what was actually happening on the
ground. The CIA’s role in the trilateral
meetings effectively made the CIA a
referee of disputes and an arbiter on
whether the PA was doing enough to fight
terror.15 CIA Director George Tenet, who
was personally involved in negotiating
security-related agreements with the PA
and Israel since the Sharm al-Shaykh anti-
terrorism summit, declared at the time,
There is a single ray of light on the
background of the terrorist attacks in
the past two years in Israel, and that is
the contribution by the U.S. to the
work of the sides in facilitating the
dialogue and security cooperation,
especially in that it caused the Palestin-
ians to fulfill their obligations.16
Security cooperation had its ups and
downs. For example, in the West Bank,
security efforts were focused on wrapping
up the Hamas military wing, run by the
Awadallah brothers. This extensive
network of military and support cells was
responsible for many of the Hamas opera-
tions in Green Line Israel and the West
Bank from 1994 to 1999, including the bus-
bombing campaign. The PA declared the
network leaders to be fugitives and under-
took investigations in coordination with
Israel and the CIA to locate and arrest
them. In mid-1997, West Bank PSO
arrested members of a Hamas cell who
were operating out of the Surif area of the
West Bank and were connected to the
Apropos Café bombing.17
This positive security action was
undermined by the Israeli abduction of two
of the cell members from PSO custody
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005

while they were being transferred to a senior Israeli and Palestinians officials.
different jail in November 1997. As PSO Lower-level Palestinian-Israeli contacts
commander Rajub had coordinated the continued intermittently. Notably, the two
transfer with his Israeli counterparts, he principals met only twice during the period.
considered the act duplicitous and an Everybody was talking to everybody,
attempt by the Israeli government to except the two decision makers. The
undermine his personal standing with issues were many, but settlements and
Palestinians. Rajub broke off security security were the show stoppers. The
cooperation between his service and the deadline for the second FRD came and
Israelis, while the went. Interim
other PA security Agreement discus-
chiefs elected to What is notable about the sions on the airport,
continue their rela- Wye memorandum is the the seaport and safe
tionships. Given that complete absence of the passage went
the most pressing nowhere. The
security issues were words “Israeli settlements” political discussions
in the West Bank, and in the text of the document. were stuck. Yaacov
that the PSO was Peri, former head of
arguably the predomi- Shin Bet, summed up
nant security organization in the West the situation well when he said, “It’s a
Bank, security cooperation suffered vicious circle we’re trapped in. The
overall. Despite the holes in cooperation, Palestinians say they can’t guarantee
counterterrorism successes continued. For security without movement in the peace
example, in January 1998, Palestinian and process, and we say we can’t move the
Israeli security services worked together in process without security.”19
an important operation based in Nablus, With the process stalled, the United
including the raid on a Hamas bomb- States decided to convene another summit
making laboratory and the seizure and and present another security fix: the Wye
destruction of 300 kg of explosives. 18
River memorandum. There was nothing
really new about Wye, except for the
Wye Damage Control revised timetable. There was press play
Meanwhile, the political process about the new role of the CIA in the peace
remained stalled, though not due to a lack process; in reality, it was just more of the
of attention. Between March 1997 and same. Now, however, the role was
October 1998, U.S. Middle East envoy formalized into a written agreement. On
Dennis Ross shuttled to the region at least security, the Palestinians committed to do
seven times. The U.S. secretary of state what they had already committed to do in
visited Israel and the PA three times and previously signed agreements, i.e., combat
met with senior Israeli and PA advisors terrorism. A mechanism to better assess
elsewhere at least six times. President Palestinian efforts was agreed to through
Clinton held two summits with Netanyahu the development of a Palestinian counter-
and an equal number with Arafat. U.S. terrorism work plan. This work plan
officials maintained daily contact with became the yardstick by which the CIA

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 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS
assessed Palestinian compliance. The
memorandum called for the establishment
of bilateral U.S.-Palestinian committees to
meet biweekly (in addition to bilateral
Israeli-Palestinian security-cooperation
meetings) to create a working-level forum
for the Palestinian security services to
update the CIA on their counterterrorism
activities. Again, this article of Wye only
put on paper something that was already
happening. Wye also formalized the
trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian senior-
level security meetings and stipulated
regular meetings.20
What is notable about the Wye memo-
randum is the complete absence of the
words “Israeli settlements” in the text of
the document. Whatever was discussed at
Wye failed to make it into print. Instead,
there was a one-sentence paragraph about
neither side taking unilateral actions that
would change the status of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip in accordance with the
Interim Agreements. There were “under-
standings” about “no significant expan-
sion,” but nothing concrete and verifiable,
unlike the security clauses.
It is not surprising that the implementa-
tion of Wye bogged down quickly. The
negotiators were barely off the plane
before new land confiscations for settle-
ments were announced, and violence in the
Occupied Territories broke out. More
Israelis and Palestinians were killed in
suicide attacks. The rhetoric was intense,
and there was enough incitement by both
sides that neither party could claim the high
moral ground. Against this backdrop, it is
amazing that any obligation under Wye was
implemented. Nonetheless, some were.
The Palestinians began by rounding up the
usual suspects. The Palestinian security
services completed their work plans, and
89
the United States certified the PA to have
met its obligation. The Israeli government
carried out the first stage of the three-part
FRD, released prisoners and permitted the
opening of the Gaza airport. By December
3, 1998, the Israeli cabinet froze its Wye
commitments, suspending redeployments,
citing continuing violence in the Occupied
Territories. In the next five months, many
things happened, but nothing changed. The
process was again stuck.
The Barak Approach: Take It or
Leave It
Barak was a “security-ist” who came
to the office of prime minister in July 1999
acting as a general, not a diplomat. He
saw concessions as a sign of weakness
and considered confidence-building mea-
sures concessions. Barak had been trained
not to project weakness. Barak articulated
“red lines” before assuming office. These
red lines were not unfamiliar, but he stated
them with such conviction and consistency
that he left the impression they were non-
negotiable. He was on the record for
having opposed the Oslo II accords
because he thought the security provisions
too lax. On the ground, as prime minister,
he opted to renegotiate the terms of Wye,
and he permitted settlement-expansion
activities to proceed and, indeed, increase.
The Palestinians were losing hope in
the peace process. Increasingly, they
viewed Oslo as an ineffective means of
achieving Palestinian national aspirations.
The lengthy process had resulted in more
territorial seizures, more settlements, more
IDF intrusions into their lives, more humili-
ation, less freedom of movement, less
personal security and a reduced standard
of living. Barak’s rhetoric and actions were
widely interpreted by the Palestinians to
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005

mean the peace process under Barak There has been a lot of debate about
would be no better for them than it was what happened at Camp David, why it
under Netanyahu. Arafat was losing failed and whose fault the failure was.
important constituencies he needed to have There was enough fault to go around. The
behind him in order to make new conces- United States created undue pressure to
sions in final-status negotiations. Arafat’s reach an agreement in a limited amount of
core supporters – Fatah Tanzim, the time because Clinton’s term in office was
Palestinian intelligentsia and lawmakers – coming to an end. Arafat and his team
had become nonbelievers. This reduced his were not prepared for the summit and had
room to maneuver. few counterproposals to make. Thus, they
The language of Palestinians increas- seemed (and were) inflexible. Barak’s all-
ingly reverted to terms of confrontation. or-nothing approach created an unneces-
There was increased discussion of a “new sary (and unhelpful) brinksmanship atmo-
intifada” and “struggle against occupation.” sphere. Very significant developments on
These discussions were not just among the final-status issues took place, with real
politicians or for public consumption, but at discussions on potential solutions, which up
the grass-roots level and within the Pales- until that point had been taboo. Because all
tinian security ser- parties were afraid to
vices. In July 2000, leave Camp David
Palestinian polls Given the option of taking appearing weak,
showed 52 percent of or leaving it, and assessing Camp David became
Palestinians supported the impact of both options an ending point, rather
violence against than a step along the
on the aspirations of the
Israelis.21 Despite way in final-status
this, the rate of Palestinian people, Arafat discussions. The
bombing attacks in opted to leave it. United States made a
Green Line Israel critical error in
from January 1999 to allowing Camp David
September 2000 had dropped to three – to be perceived as the endgame, despite
with no Israeli fatalities – showing contin- the knowledge that failure would have
ued stabilization of the security situation. disastrous repercussions. At Camp David,
Clashes in the Occupied Territories contin- Clinton sensed the magnitude of the
ued unabated. situation when he said in anger and despair
The Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum, to Arafat, “These things have conse-
yet another quick security fix, revised the quences; failure will mean the end of the
Wye timetable, reaffirmed what had been peace process . . . . Let’s let hell break
affirmed (and contravened) in the past, and loose and live with the consequences.”22
then was selectively implemented. Barak, Given the option of taking or leaving it, and
the general, understood this as just one assessing the impact of both options on the
more skirmish that wasted the resources of aspirations of the Palestinian people, Arafat
the Israeli government. He decided it was opted to leave it.
time for a major engagement, the battle to In the political vacuum created by the
end all battles: Camp David. failure of Camp David, the Palestinian

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 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS
street finally boiled over. While it was not
pre-planned, as the Israeli government
asserted, it was inevitable and had long
been predicted. It is no coincidence that
the spark that lit the fire was Ariel
Sharon’s visit to the Haram al-Sharif, the
third-holiest Muslim religious site. Indeed,
it took something of this magnitude to unite
the Palestinians to take mass action.
Netanyahu declared the “Battle for Jerusa-
lem” began with the construction of Har
Homa. The Palestinian reaction at the
time was a war of words. History proved
the response ineffective. The Palestinians
were not going to repeat the mistake and
lose what they value most in their political
struggle, the Haram al-Sharif. This time,
they brought their sticks and stones to the
battle. The Israelis brought their rubber
bullets, live ammunition and overwhelming
force. And so began the al-Aqsa intifada,
which took its name from one of the
mosques of the Haram al-Sharif. The
vicious circle of violence perpetuated by
Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli
military reprisals has subsequently de-
stroyed the remnants of the political and
security progress achieved in the previous
nine years.
Hard Lessons from a Failed U.S.
Policy
Through inconsistent actions, the
United States permitted Oslo to become
irrelevant. When the crisis of confidence
was caused by security issues, Washington
responded forcefully with security solu-
tions. When the crisis was caused by
political disagreements, the United States
responded with more security solutions and
political platitudes. On settlements, the
U.S. response was, at best, feeble. The
language became increasingly stronger as
91
time passed, but there was never any
action to back up the U.S. words. Settle-
ment construction and expansion was one
of the factors most responsible for destroy-
ing Palestinian commitment to the MEPP.
The Clinton administration clung to fuzzy
concepts of natural growth and no signifi-
cant expansion, which were meaningless in
stopping Israel from taking unilateral
actions to prejudice a final-status solution.
Another factor was the failure of Israel to
implement its FRD obligations. The United
States would make guarantees for imple-
mentation, but at the moment action was
required, Washington would shy away.
The Israeli government was quick to
realize there were no consequences to not
heeding U.S. “advice.”
On the other hand, the Palestinians
refused to delegitimize resistance to
occupation tactics in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip – land confiscations, home
demolitions and intrusive checkpoint
searches – which the United States
frequently overlooked when they fell below
the definitional threshold of terrorism. The
Clinton administration lost track of the big
picture and permitted final status to be-
come a casualty of the interim squabbles.
Camp David was an ill-conceived and
desperate attempt to revive a dying patient.
Oslo died at Camp David; its wake began
on September 29, 2000.
Why did the United States continue to
pursue this ineffectual policy? Because it
was easy. Why did the United States
repeatedly apply the CIA security fix
during the period of the Netanyahu and
Barak governments? Because it was easy
and doable. Because it had the outward
appearance of doing something to move
the peace process forward.
Why did the U.S. government not
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
forcefully address the political disagree-
ments that stymied progress, namely
settlement expansion, FRD implementation
and final-status agreement? Because it
was hard, domestically hard.
THE BUSH APPROACH: DÉJÀ VU
The Bush administration has chosen to
distance itself from direct involvement in
political negotiations with the Palestinians
and Israelis and has called upon the
Palestinians to change their ways. As
outlined in his June 2002 speech, Bush
identified the obstacles to Middle East
peace as Arafat and security. The as-
sumptions are that the removal of Arafat
and the restructuring of the Palestinian
security services will stop suicide bombings
and allow the two parties to return to
meaningful negotiations leading to a
Palestinian state and peace. U.S. policy, as
articulated in the Roadmap, presses for
Palestinian political and security reform
and an end to terror. Arafat’s timely death
has freed the pathway for a new Palestin-
ian leadership to emerge; indeed, Palestin-
ians elected Mahmoud Abbas on January
9, 2005, by a solid majority.
Meanwhile, the United States has
embraced Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s
plan for unilateral disengagement from the
Gaza Strip. Efforts to link unilateral
disengagement to a larger political process
– namely the Roadmap – remain caught in
the sphere of rhetoric and have yet to be
translated into policy or planning. Concep-
tually, there is significant disagreement
among the parties over how Gaza disen-
gagement can be integrated into the
Roadmap. The Palestinians prefer to jump
to Phase II or III, while the Israelis de-
mand Palestinian implementation of Phase
I, ending terror.
92
A more fundamental issue, however, is
the Roadmap itself. As originally pre-
sented, Phase I requires the Palestinians to
undertake an unconditional cessation of
violence; to implement the Tenet Plan to
end violence, terrorism and incitement
through restructured and effective Pales-
tinian security services; and to undertake
comprehensive political reform. Israel is
required to withdraw to the September 28,
2000, lines, dismantle settlement outposts
erected since March 2001, and freeze all
settlement activity, including “natural
growth.” The Roadmap explicitly states
that both parties are expected to perform
their obligations in parallel unless otherwise
indicated. However, this obligation ended
when the Bush administration agreed to
take into account fourteen Israeli reserva-
tions, several of which stipulate that the
Palestinians must meet their security
obligations in Phase I before Israel is
obligated to implement their commitments.
The Bush approach of placing security
first, in parallel with political issues, will
reach the same dead end that Oslo
reached. This approach not only ignores
the lessons of the Oslo process, but repeats
many of the same mistakes. It should be
no surprise to anyone involved with Oslo
that the Tenet Plan for a ceasefire has
never taken hold. From the Palestinian and
Israeli perspectives, they have “been there,
done that,” to no tangible benefit. Even
Tenet was pessimistic about a ceasefire.23
The situation is beyond the fix of another
CIA Band-Aid.
The Bush administration’s call to
reform the PA security services by consoli-
dating the thirteen-odd services into two or
three organizations has little to do with
improving security capabilities. While it is
true there is tremendous overlap in the
 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS
current structure, and the organizations are
highly competitive and reluctant to cooper-
ate, the Palestinian security services were
reasonably effective when they chose to
be, as indicated by the reduced number of
bombing attacks in Green Line Israel from
mid-1996 to October 2000. They used the
shotgun approach of mass arrests, which
exposed them (rightfully) to allegations of
human-rights abuse, but in the process,
they rolled up terror cells. Their investiga-
tion and interrogation practices were
effective. The PA security services,
through their extensive community con-
tacts, had a good idea of what was going
on in the Palestinian communities. This is
not to say that they knew everything.
There were intelligence failures. The
effectiveness of the PA security services
was less a function of training and organi-
zation than it was of their political agenda.
The backbone of the PA security
services was Fatah Shabiba and Fatah
Tanzim. Shabiba and the Tanzim are
grass-roots organizations of Palestinian
activists who came of age in the first
intifada and who supported the secular
Fatah platform. They are highly politicized
and share formative experiences in the
struggle against the Israeli occupation.
They are Fatah members first and security
officers second. They are the young
guard, the so-called “insiders,” who cast
their lot with Arafat during the first intifada
in an uneasy relationship binding the
“insiders” to the “outsiders.” They be-
came the street enforcers for the policies
of Arafat and the PA. This relationship to
Arafat and the old guard began to unravel
in 1998, as issues of official PA corruption,
succession and paralysis in the peace
process converged. During this period,
inter-Fatah rivalries increased as part of
93
the succession battle in the post-Arafat
age. Fatah’s popularity decreased as the
population became disenchanted with the
performance of the PA and the Oslo
process. Good governance, or lack
thereof, became a significant internal
Palestinian issue.
The al-Aqsa intifada has all but
severed this relationship. Rejecting
Arafat’s fence-sitting, significant elements
of the Tanzim embraced a different
strategy: armed struggle to force a unilat-
eral Israeli withdrawal, with or without
negotiations. Changing the outward
structure, and even the official leadership
of the security services, will not fundamen-
tally alter what is happening on the ground,
since the political agenda of the vast
majority of the members of the security
services is no longer guided by the Fatah
old guard, whether led by Arafat or Abbas.
Abbas faces the same conundrum
Arafat faced: how to pursue a policy
seeking a negotiated settlement with an
end to the armed uprising, but not a decla-
ration that resistance to occupation tactics
is illegal. It is politically untenable for
Abbas or any Palestinian leader to tell the
Palestinians to quietly accept continued
land confiscations, home demolitions, tree
uprootings and humiliating treatment at
checkpoints by the IDF and settlers. The
Israeli government, conversely, will not
accept anything less than the
criminalization of resistance in all forms.
For this reason, it is highly likely Abbas will
come to be considered “soft” on terrorism
by Israel and the United States in the
“security first” context.
THE COST TO AMERICA
In formulating a foreign policy for the
Middle East, the United States needs to be
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
guided by its core national-security interests
in the region. These interests are a politi-
cally and economically stable region that
allows the United States access to strategic
oil supplies and productive relationships
with key Middle Eastern governments that
will support U.S. initiatives worldwide (read
Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia).
The rise of anti-Americanism and terrorism
threatens both of these national-security
interests. It is incumbent upon the United
States to stamp out terrorism because it
threatens our strategic interests and our
domestic security. The war in Afghanistan
cut off a deadly hand of terrorism, but the
body will persist and flourish as long as
those elements that nourish the body
persist. These elements are the political,
social and economic despair of those
embroiled in political conflict who see the
United States as partly or wholly respon-
sible for their predicament. The Palestin-
ian-Israeli conflict is a significant progenitor
of anti-Americanism and terrorism in the
Middle East. Solving that dispute will not
bring an end to anti-Americanism in the
Muslim world; however, it will make a
major dent in it.
Time is not on America’s side. Cur-
rently, the majority of Palestinians in Gaza
and the West Bank support a secular
political system. However, as the eco-
nomic and social systems of the Palestin-
ians have imploded under punitive Israeli
sanctions, more Palestinians find them-
selves seeking the only social safety net
present in the Occupied Territories – one
provided by Hamas. Political support for
Hamas is growing at an alarming rate. For
the first time ever, support for Islamic and
opposition groups has a combined percent-
age higher than that of Fatah and its allies.
The more powerful Hamas is, the greater
94
the challenge will be to find a solution that
meets the needs of the Palestinians, the
Israelis and the United States. While
Fatah has accepted the two-state solution,
Hamas has not; the policy of Hamas is
liberation of all Palestinian lands, not just
the lands occupied in 1967.
The conflict is solvable. Solving it in a
way that serves the national-security
interests of the United States will require
the breaking of some U.S. domestic
political taboos. Specifically, the United
States would need to set a clear policy to
require Israel do something it does not
want to do: relinquish most of the lands it
occupied in 1967, including settlements, and
support the formation of an independent
Palestinian state. For any peace to be
lasting, that state must have contiguous
territory with no intrusive Israeli sovereign
presence. Such a settlement will meet the
political aspirations of the majority of the
Palestinian people and remove points of
conflict that spark daily clashes in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and breed hatred
between two peoples and two cultures.
This is not a zero-sum game. The
United States does not need to choose
among Israel’s security, a viable Palestinian
state and U.S. strategic interests. The
above policy recommendation is heresy in
the halls of the U.S. government because it
appears to suggest imperiling the security
of one of our most important allies. Those
who think this accept uncritically the Israeli
assertion that a Palestinian state along the
1967 borders is an existential threat to the
state of Israel, i.e., that this is a zero-sum
game. The Oslo experiment showed that
when the PA assessed it was in its political
interest, it could create a stable security
environment for Israel; the PA did this for
Green Line Israel from mid-1996 to
 MAHLE: POLITICAL-SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PROCESS

September 2000. Conversely, if it was not
deemed to be in the PA political interest,
the PA could ensure that the environment
remained unstable; this has occurred in the
Occupied Territories during the same
period and in both areas since the outbreak
of the al-Aqsa intifada. Therefore, the
issue is the political will of the parties. If a
settlement is placed on the table that meets
Palestinian political aspirations, they will
have the political will to meet the security
needs of the Israeli people. If the security
needs of the Israeli government are met,
the Israeli people will not be afraid of
normalization.
The next challenge is sustaining
security and normalization for the long
term. The United States is in a position to
guarantee the long-term territorial integrity
and security of the Israeli and Palestinian
states. In fact, the U.S. government put
together a draft U.S.-Israeli defense
partnership plan as part of the Camp David
discussions.24 The defense partnership
will formalize this strategic pact and codify
the enduring relationship. In order to
promote future stability, the United States
would need to create a Marshall Plan for
the new Palestinian state. Development of
democratic institutions within a sound
economic system should be the focus of
the program. While internal-security
organizations are required, the United
States should not err by “growing a secu-
rity state.” The Palestinians have an
autocratic history that needs to be left
behind. The United States should also
assist real normalization between Israel
and neighboring Arab states. By helping
the Palestinians and Israelis forge eco-
nomically, politically and socially secure
states, despair and anger will be largely
dissipated. This will fundamentally alter
the dynamics in the region and remove a
major source of hatred that is feeding anti-
Americanism and terrorism in the Middle
East and Southeast Asia.
Such an initiative would come with a
tremendous price tag. However, the cost
to America of not undertaking a new
approach, both to this conflict and to the
growth of anti-Americanism and global
Islamic terrorism, is higher.

1
David Makovsky, “Clinton Pledges $100m in Anti-terror Aid,” Jerusalem Post, March 15, 1996; Tim
Weiner, “CIA Officers Teach Tricks of Their Trade to Palestinians,” The New York Times, March 5, 1998; and
“Palestinians Wail over Agreement, CIA Monitoring of Israeli-Palestinian Security Relations,” Palestine,Inside
Scoop, August 22, 1997.
2
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Poll 15, February 1995, and Poll 22, March 1996,
www.pepsr.org/survey/cprspolls.
3
Benjamin Netanyahu, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Protocol
Concerning Redeployment in Hebron,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
go.asp?MFAH00t60.
4
Peace Now statistics, as of September 2002, www.peacenow.org; and “The Myth of Natural Growth, Who
Are They Fooling?” Monitoring Israeli Colonizing Activities in the Palestinian West Bank & Gaza (April
2001), Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem. Statistics based on Statistical Abstract of Israel, various
issues.
5
“Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993),”
www.israel.org. (The statistics do not appear to include suicide bombers or Palestinian civilian collateral
deaths.)
6
Btselem statistics, as of September 2002, www.btselem.org.
7
Jeffrey Goldberg, “From Peace Process to Police Process,” The New York Times Magazine, September 14,

95
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005

1997; and “This Is How the CIA Operates in Israel and in the Territories,” Kol ha-ir, November 24, 2000.
8
Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.
9
“Muhammad Dahlan: We Erred with Our Harsh and Discriminatory Attitude towards Hamas,” Ha’aretz,
June 15, 1997.
10
Avi Segal and Haled Abu-Taomeh, “Justice for Show: This Is How the Judicial System Works in the
Territories,” Yerushalayim, Supplement, August 22, 1997; and Steve Rodan, “Arafat’s Balancing Act with
Terror,” Jerusalem Post, September 12, 1997.
11
Geoffrey Aronson, “Clinton Administration Sharpens Focus on Settlements,” Report on Israeli Settlement
in the Occupied Territories, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997.
12
Ron Ben-Yishai, “Arafat’s Last Resort,” Yediot Ahronot, June 15, 1997; and Yoel Marcus, “Arafat Is
Playing with Fire,” Ha’aretz, March 25, 1997.
13
Interview, London-based MBC-TV, February 15, 1997.
14
“The Political Scene,” Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 40, No. 13, March 31, 1997.
15
Elaine Sciolino, “Violence Thwarts CIA Director’s Unusual Diplomatic Role in Middle Eastern Peacemak-
ing,” The New York Times, November 13, 2000; and Douglas Jehl, “Israelis and Palestinians Agree to U.S.
Role in Attack Inquiry,” The New York Times, August 13, 1997.
16
“This Is How the CIA Operates in Israel and in the Territories,” op. cit.
17
Jay Bushinsky and Jon Immanuel, “Ross Pushes for Joint Security,” Jerusalem Post, August 12, 1997; and
Steve Rodan, “Officials: We Knew Central Jerusalem Was Next Target,” Jerusalem Post, September 5, 1997.
18
Margot Dudkevitch and Mohammed Najib, “CIA, PA Security Officials to Meet Tonight,” Jerusalem Post,
September 8, 1998; and Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.
19
Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.
20
Jonathan S. Landay, “CIA’s New Mideast Role: Referee,” Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1998;
George J. Tenet, “What ‘New’ Role for the CIA?” The New York Times, October 27, 1998; and Elaine
Sciolino, “Violence Thwarts CIA Director’s Unusual Diplomatic Role in Middle Eastern Peacemaking,” The
New York Times, November 13, 2000.
21
Graham Usher, “The Washington Process,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, December 31, 1998, January 6,
1999, No. 410.
22
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,” The New York Review of Books,
August 9, 2001.
23
Todd S. Purdum, “CIA Chief Skeptical about a New Palestinian Security Force,” The New York Times,
August 13, 2002.
24
Bruce Reidel, “Camp David – The US-Israeli Bargain,” Bitter Lemons, No. 26, July 15, 2002.

96