Q.B.D.] | BRITISH INDUSTRIES v. PATLEY PRESSINGS (McNar, J.) 97 not have acceded to the submission of counsel for the third parties that, on that hypothesis, the phrase was too vague to have contractual effect. Though many cases have been cited to me in which obvious difficulty has been experi- enced in construing the phrase “force majeure”: see, in particular, Lebeaupin v. R. Crispin & Co. (6); in none of those cases was it considered that the phrase ‘was too vague for construction. Nor would I have accepted the further sub- mission that the phrase was too vague in the sense that it did not satisfy the legal consequences which would follow on proof of force majeure, ie., whether it should be cancellation or dissolution. I am satisfied that an agreement for sale which waa otherwise precise and contained the phrase “‘ subject to foreo majeure ” would be a valid and enforceable contract. [His Lorpsurr held that, apart from the decision as to the meaning of “force majeure conditions”, there would have been valid contracts as between the defendants and the third parties and as between the third parties and tho fourth parties respectively, which had been repudiated by the third parties and the fourth parties respectively, and he assessed the defendants’ damages at £400 and the third parties’ damages on the basis of a price per ton of not less than £39 58, at the date of the breach.] Judgment for the defendants against the plaintiffs; for the third parties against the defendants; and for the fourth parties against the third parties. Solicitors: Alesander Fine & Co. (for the plaintiffs); Sylvester, Amiel d+ Co. (for the defendants); Berrymans, agents for Borland, King & Stewart, Glasgow (for the third parties); Beaumont, Son d& Rigden (for the fourth parties). [Reported by F. A. Amis, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.] NOTE. ADSETT v. K. & L. STEELFOUNDERS & ENGINEERS, LTD. [Quzen’s Benon Drvision (Parker, J.), December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 1952.] Factory—Removal of dust— All practicable measures” to be taken—Provi- sion of exhaust appliances—Standard of duty—Factories Act, 1937 (c. 67), 8.47 ql). Factory—Removal of dust—Sand blasting—Enelosed cabinet—Absolute duty to ‘maintain to prevent escape of dust—Grinding of Metals (Miscellaneous Industries) Regulations, 1925 (S.R. & O., 1925, No. 904), reg. 13. For THe Facrortes Act, 1937, 8. 47 (1), see HALSBURY’S STATUTES, Second Edn., Vol. 9, p. 1038. Cases referred to: (1) McCarthy v. Coldair, Lid., [1951] 2 T.L.R. 1226; 2nd Digest Supp. (2) Lee v. Nursery Furnishings, Ltd., 1945] 1 AN E.R. 387; 172 L.-T. 285; 2nd Digest Supp. (3) MeCorkindale v. Lion Foundry Co., Ltd., (Ct. of Sess., Feb. 19, 1952), unreported. (4) Clifford v. Charles H. Challen & Son, Ltd., [1951] 1 All E.R. 72; [1951] 1 K.B, 495; 2nd Digest Supp. Acrion for damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty. ‘The plaintiff was employed by the defendants at their steel foundry at Letchworth for various periods from 1940 to 1948. From July, 1940, to Oct. 22, 1944, he was engaged in alternate spells of two hours each in mixing dried sand, fresh sand, and a mixture known as bentonite, in a hopper, and shovelling mainly dry sand which was tipped out of moulds through a two-inch grill or grating on to @ conveyor belt several feet below. A considerable amount of dust rose through the grating when the sand fell on the conveyor belt, and in January,98 (Jawvany 16, 19583] ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS {Vol. 1 1942, the defendants installed an extractor plant which drew away the dust. From Oct. 23, 1944, to Sept. 21, 1945, the plaintiff was a foundry “ slinger ”, taking castings and moulds with castings in them to gratings or grids over which the castings were knocked out. This was also, intermittently, a dusty process. From Deo. 30, 1946, to Apr. 5, 1948, he was a labourer in the shot blasting department, wheeling castings on a trolley into sand blasting or shot blasting cabinets, and, after the door of the cabinet had been closed and the shot blaster had shot the sand off the castings and opened the door, wheeling the trolley out with the castings on it. From Apr. 6, 1948, to Oct. 21, 1948, he ‘was @ “‘slinger ” for the shot-blaster, bringing, with the easistance of the crane driver, castings on to the trolleys outside the shot blasting cabinet. If there was a great deal of sand on a casting he would strike it, while it wes on its slings, on the ground or against another casting, and would knock off the biggest blocks of sand with a hammer. Both these operations were alleged to have caused considerable dust. In August, 1949, he was certified by the pneurao- coniosis board to be suffering from pneumoconiosis, and he was found as a fact to have contracted pneumoconiosis in the course of his employment with the defendants by November, 1943. The plaintiff contended that the defendants had failed to comply with the requirement of the Factories Act, 1937, s. 47 (1) that “, ,alll practicable measures shall be taken to protect thepersonsemployed ‘against inhalation of the dust... and... where the nature of the process makes it practicable, exhaust appliances shall be provided and maintained, as near as possible to the point of origin of the dust . . .”” ‘Ho further contended that the defendants had committed a breach of reg. 13 of the Grinding of Metals (Miscellaneous Industries) Regulations, 1925, which, he submitted, imposed an absolute duty to prevent the escape of dust from the cabinets. The defendants denied that they had been guilty of negligence or any breach of statutory duty. Croom-Johnaon for the plaintiff. P. M. O’Connor for the defendants. PARKER, J., said that counsel for the plaintiff pointed out, as was undoubtedly true, that at least three different standards were laid down under the Factories Act, 1937, and probably more. There was the standard which amounted to an absolute duty. That appeared in a number of sections and by means of various words, including in one section the words “‘ effective measures”. At the other end of the scale there were obligations which were to be discharged where reasonably practicable. That at once invoked a number of considerations apart from possibility, such as questions of cost and, probably, of practice. ‘As had been said by the Court of Appeal in McCarthy v. Ooldair, Ltd. (1), that expression probably came close to, or was equivalent to, the ordinary coramon law obligation of master and servant. In the middle there was an obligation, as here, to do something if it was practicable, and presumably “ practicable” ‘was something stricter than “ reasonably practicable”. ‘The real question was: What did “‘ practicable” meant In Wensren’s Dictionary “ practicable” was defined as “‘ possible to be accomplished with known means or resources”, and, though dealing with a different point, Lorp Gopparp, in Lee v. Nursery Furnishings, Lid. (2) ({1945] 1 All E.R. 389), adopted a definition in the Oxronp Dictionary of “capable of being carried out in action” or “feasible”. It seemed to His Lorpsuir that “‘ practicable ” must impose a stricter standard than “ reasonably practicable”. Questions of cost might be eliminated under “ practicable”, but the measures must be possible in the light of current know- ledge and invention. On the evidence he (His Lordship) was not satisfied thet the pneumoconiosis was contracted as a result of any breach of statutory duty or common law duty on the part of the defendants.D Q.B.D.) ADSETT v. K. & L. STEELFOUNDERS, LTD. (Parxer, J.) 99 ‘That left one further complaint. By reg. 13 of the Grinding of Motels (Miscellaneous Industries) Regulations, 1926, it was provided that “Sand blasting shall not be done in any room except in an enclosed chamber or cabinet in which no other work is ordinarily performed and at which efficient means are provided, arranged and maintained to prevent the escape of dust to the outside of such chamber or cabinet.” As a matter of construction, that clearly imposed an absolute duty on employers with regard to preventing an escape of dust from these cabineta. That had been held in the Court of Session in McCorkindale v. Lion Foundry Co., Lid. (3), but he would have come to the conclusion to which he hed come quite apart from that decision. He was satisfied that there were dusty conditions outside the doors, but although technically, he supposed, one grain of dust coming out could be said to be a broach of reg. 13, in this case the cabinets were so well sealed and maintained that any escape which occurred was negligible, Judgment for defendanta, Solicitors: W. H. Thompson (for the plaintiff); Clifford-Turner & Oo. (for the defendants). FAA. NEWTON AND ANOTHER ». BIGGS. (Courr oF Aprea (Singleton, Birkett and Morris, L.JJ.), December 17, 18, 1952.) Rent Restriction—Possession—House required by landlord—Landlord becoming such by purchase after Sept. 1, 1939—Purchase of house and granting of tenancy to vendor who remained in occupation—Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933 (c. 32), ached. I, para. (h), ae amended by Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939 (c. 71), sched. I. In 1947 the landlords entered into a contract to purchase a house of which the tenant was then the owner, vacant possession to be given to them of the ground floor and “ the vendor [the tenant] . . . to pay to the purchaser [the landlords] the sum of 23s. por week inclusive for the upper floor . . .” ‘The purchase was completed and the vendor remained in possession of the upper floor of the premises as tenant of the landlords. In 1952 the land- lords served a notice to quit on the tenant, and on its expiry claimed possession of the upper floor on the ground that they reasonably required it for occupation as a residence for themselves, within the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933, sched. I, para. (h). The tenant objected that the landlords were not entitled to possession on that ground since they had become landlords by purchasing the house after Sept. 1, 1939, within the meaning of para. (h) as amended by sched. I to the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939. Hexp: the object of para. (h) was to protect a sitting tenant from having the house bought over his head; in the present case no tenancy was in existence at the time of the purchase of the house by the landlords; and, therefore, the landlords became landlords for the purposes of para, (h), not by purchasing the house after the statutory date, but as a consequence of their agreement to grant the tenant a tenancy of the upper floor if the purchase of the house were completed, and they were not excepted from the provisions of para. (h) which enable a landlord to recover possession of a house if he reasonably requires it for occupation as a residence for himself. Epps v. Rothnie ((1946] 1 All E.R. 146) and Fowle v. Bell ([1946] 2 All E.R. 668), applied. For rae Renr anp Morroace Ivreresr Resrrictions (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1933, s, 3 (1) and sched. I, para, (h), see HALSBURY'S STATUTES, Second