13 The Political Economy of Development Nicola Phillips Chapter contents + Introduction 355 + Ways of thinking about development 356 + Development theoryinpracuce 362 + Boyond the Washington Consensus 366 * Global development in the 2010s 374 + Interpreting the relationship between globalization and development 380 + Conclusion: A(nother) new era of global development? 381 Reader's guide Despte the many accomplshmerts sree the end ofthe Secord World War, the problems of development in te contemporary lta pli econemy areal of uresing profeeaney acy the varus carnation f 3 'gobs developmen ged to deal wih these pions hee aa very mod record Infact teri iteconseneus en what development scaly ne ee how kimantbe sched meter academic debut or pute decouse, One theron aenng ston: ints comtertretesto the relationship between gobleaon andeveiomen et we shout understand the int of lotalzaten on developmen across the Wert hen Colvin sane oe ror sear os et Thr development duthave rng ee the endo the Second Wo War andshomnghoe rate understanding of development have gen seo parteuarkinds of deveiopmentste ee the ationsl and balees goes onto consider theimpaeandcomsequonen ong fo developer, nd shows ons bis tha may ofthe preblems afin oe have not only persstedbut ano worsenedinthe contemporaryperedIntiscontey ene ee ‘to consider the key question of how we should understand the ltioratip banner een in vow of te crtraty of globaanton o both he pancrama scene ee the debate, empresa which age partsfalures—20 both the impact of slobaisanen tnesnreh or ar and sustanabeform of gsoane oe ro {Introduction “eee nent econ ‘development’. The second part ofthe twentieth cer sory and earl part of the twenty-firs century wen rarked by 2 long succession of different approaches todevelopment, each heralded as 3 magic butler that would generate growth, eliminate poverty. reduce inequality and attain all the vatious goals aesocisned sth nimprovement ofthe conditions in which hige parts of the world’s population live. Yet the recoed of developmental progress over this period remains ‘ery mixed. Many extraordinary advances were mate in the period following the end of the Second World ‘War, such as unprecedented increases in life expec tancy and improvements in living standards (Cor bridge 1998), but the socalled ‘Age of Development has aso bequeathed a global economy characterized by a resilience of poverty and a marked increase in inequalities among the world’s population. In the twenty-first century, these inequalities have reached levels which can rightly be considered to be ‘without historical precedent and without conceivable justifica tion—economic, moral or otherwise’ (Picterse 20c2: 102g, Piketty 2014; Milanovic 2018). The problems of development in the global econ- cay thus remain of huge proportions, and in many dimensions are growing rather than diminishing, Par- tically when we dig beneath the global or regional statistics showing overall reductions in extreme pow ‘ext levels, for instance, or increases in annual gross domestic product (GDP), we find 2 very uneven pic ‘tare of development in which, for very large parts of the worid'spopulation, the march of globalization has ‘ot led to substantial improvements in their material ‘social conditions, ‘The global developmentagenda, 4 it evolved over the course of the rwentieth cen tury. is considered by many to have failed to provide a framework for development policy that could deliver the goals of ‘global development’. Despite the great tears Conditions of ‘h Processes ang fora return, SUFBENCE OF nationals '3 The Poca Economy of Development 355 nthe debate, suggest tat ‘mal develepment’—or dereiopment he WaYS in which the global economy ‘0 Inward-looking development: to the fanfare to which the latest ‘big idea’ was unveiled— namely. the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2c0%, and in 2o15 their successor, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)-the global development agenda remains in some disarray, with few anqui fied advances on its seore card. Furthermore, the ‘extraordinary expansion of the Chinese economy and. its emergence asa powerful force on the global polit cal stage, alongside a group of other countries often called the ‘rising powers’, have challenged the twin notions that from the ro8os onwards underpinned the slobal development agenda: (a) that an unequivocal embrace of globalization i the surest path to growth and development, and (b) that there is or can be an ‘overarching ‘global’ framework for development. Underlying the problems of development and the shortcomings of global development policy is an enduring absence of consensus about what the ‘causes of these trends are, and by extension what is to be done about them. Even more fundamentally, theres litle agreement on the very basic question of what development actually is—that is, what we are referring to when we talk about development, what ‘we are aspiring to in trying to advance it, and how ‘we would recognize it when we sawit. The many dif ferent theories of development which have emerged {in contemporary academic debates and which have informed different kinds of development strategies advance diferent views on all f these counts. ‘The first task of this chapter is consequently to consider how particular ways of thinking about development have evolved since the end of the See- ond World Wer, and to discuss how these theories of development have translated into the evolution of both the global policy agenda and loca, national, and regional development strategies. Is second task is then to consider the effects and consequences of these ideas and strategies for development across the world. By reviewing both the empirical picture and competing perspectives on how to explain it, advance the argument that the phase of neo-liberal alobalizationistoe judged harshly on the basis of its356 Nicola Philips development outcomes and political consequences. But it is not enough simply to assert this and move swiftly on: instead, we need to think carefully about the relationship between globalization and develop- ‘ment, and specifically about what it is about global ization that can be said to cause or contribute directly to the problems of development that we identify as having characterized the contemporary period. The final task of the chapter is then to look forward and, necessarily speculatively, discuss the possibilty that ‘we are now moving into a new phase of global devel: ‘opment, shaped in important ways by the fall-out from the global financial crisis of the early twenty. first century, and by political curremts which are likely once again to re-shape the relationship between glo- balization and development. Ways of thinking about development ‘Much like the term ‘globalization’ itself, “develop- ‘ment’ is a word that is bandied about in public dis course in frequendy glib and unchinking ways (Payne ‘and Phillips 2010). tis a powerful term—one denoting a state of affairs of which everyone, or nearly every- one, can easily and in some cases passionately declare themselves to be in favour. Yet few people would be able tosay with mach precision what the term actually ‘means, H.W, Amdt captured this well, observing back in the tos that ‘anyone who asked articulate citizens in developed or developing countries what they meant by this desirable objective of “development” would geta great variety of answers’ G6 Higher living seandards. A sing per capita income. Increase in productive capaciy. Mastery over nature Freedom through control of mar's environment. Economic growth. But not mere growth, growth with ‘equty, Elimination of poverty Basic needs satsfacton. ‘Catching up with the developed countries in technology, wealth, power, status. Economic independence, sol Talance. Scope for sof fllment for all. Liberation, the means to human ascent. 99 (Aende 1987-1) He goes on to remark that ‘development, in the vast literature on the subject, appears to have come to ‘encompass almost al fcetsof the good society, every ‘man’s coad to utopia’ (Arndt r987:1). This has perhaps hhever been more true than in the early decades of the twenty-first century, when we have a bewildering attay of globel institutions, grand policy initiatives, less grand policy initiatives, public campaigns, civ society organizations and individuals, all operating under the banner of ‘development’, but either advanc: ing no clear conception of what itis they are air ing to with this label, or else offering widely differing understandings of how to achieve it. ‘Academic debates around development are also characterized by a lack of agreement—or, if you prefer a tich diversity of opinion—about how devel: ‘opment should be conceived, how development processes should be understood to work, and how development might be achieved. Each of the main theories of development that we will consider hese works with different definitions of development and different diagnoses of the causes of either develop mental progress or development failures. In what follows we will review briefly the principal ways of thinking about development that have emerged since the end of the Second World Wax, in order wo tace in the next section of the chapter how these have been translated into particular kinds of policies, and with what effects and consequences. Modernization, structuralist, and under-development theories Early phases of post-war development theory, ike all others, were to significant degree driven by the changing world order. The onsetof the Cold Warand the large-scale political, economic, and security Suits «hat accompanied it yielded a clear recognition in the United States (US) and elsewhere of the centrality of what by then was being called the “Third World’ the effore co contain communism (Pakenham 1973) ‘The development project was in an immediate sense one of ‘winning over’ developing countries and soc eties in order to divert the encroachment of socialist ileasand the influence of the Soviet Union. But, more fundamentally, it was also one of setting the deve! oping world on a path to specifically Western-style evelopment ‘The most vigorous expression of this new deve! ‘opment agenda was found in modernization the ‘oFy—a perspective on development which evolved it the US in this Cold War context. Its exsence Was &? understanding of development as a ‘process of social change whereby less developed societies ac characteristies common to more developed socie*emer 1972 386). The emphasis was not only on Conomic change, but also on a much mare sup fog process of socal and caltural change that would ine supposedly “aditional’ developing eountee nd societies both to resemble chose ofthe purport ‘diyadvanced, developed West and to catch up’ with thowe societies in terms of levels wealth. mygran tans and ‘modernity’ ‘The body of modernization theory grew rap. ia, encompassing a range of approaches. Among ‘the most well-known, and harshly criticized, was the version associated notably with W. W. Rostow (960), in which he developed a noxion ofthe’ stages ‘of economic growth’ through which all societies assed in a ttansition to modernity, These sages (rere idemifed as: trediional soclety: precondtisns for take-off; take-off, the road to maturity; and the age of mass consumption, the latter being the ind. cator of a state of ‘development’ had been achieved. Modernization theorists in this sense conceived of development as a process with a clear endpoint, a state of being ‘developed’, which was deemed t0 have been achieved by Western socicties (the US and ‘Western Europe). The rest of the world was thus cengeged in catching up to that condition, The other particularly influential version of modernizatios theory was associated with the notion of ‘political development, which took development to refer 10 the procestesby which conditions of liberal democ ney were created and institutionalize, drawing cn th historical experience of the Western liberal democracies (Almond and Coleman 1960: Almond and Powell 1065; Almond! 970) The key characteristics of modernization theory (ce Rox 11)—its ethnocentim, the equation of ‘modernization (development) with Weserization, and its lear ideological project (Hoogrelt 1078)— senerated lasting and trenchant controversy with the ther major approach to developmen of that ime. ‘The body of "underdevelopment theory’, which encompassed most notably dependency and world systems theories, emerged as the great rival to mod- exnization theory during the 19608 anc 197s. It ada rnueh greater and longer lasting smpact on the ways We think about development than. modernization theory, bequeathing to usa ‘key vocabulary’ of world systems, developmental tats, imperialism, neo-clo: lin and so on (Hatrson 2006: 150 Unlike modernization theory, which was a Gisinetively US perspective on development, 13 The Political Economy of Development Bx 13.1 Key Dimensions of Modernization Theory ‘Was devlopedinthe USin the corte ofthe idecogial cary of the Cold War. Conceive of development asboth anenc-pant (a condition of beng ceveopedt. which mc ready been achieved by the abrcedinstaived comes) anda process of tating po that condtion. Sees the pathte drvelopment ar beng one of “Westeriation partclary inthe ratureand sequence of ‘ecanemic change andi processes of politcal development twestabs iberal demecray under-development theories had their origins in Latin America, and specifically in a group of economists clustered in the United Nations (UN) Economic Com mission for Latin America (ECLA). based in Santiago, Chile. The most famous of them was Raul Prebisch, who developed a ‘structurals’ thesis on the relation. ship becween the global system and the conditions of under-development that he observed in Latin America (Prebisch 1950). He advanced the key insight that the slobal economic system was divided into a powerful ‘centre’ and weak ‘periphery’, and identified the ways in which what he called the ‘terms of trade’—that is, the ratio of export prices to import prices—worked systematically to favour the centre and disadvantage the periphery: In the periphery, export sectors were tunable to generate the levels of national income required for economic development in conditions of rapid population growth, and development problems. ‘were perpetuated by the need to increase exports in onder to maintain import levels. Competition among countries exporting commodities generated a decline fn export prices relative to manufactures imported from industrialized countries. The end result was seen to be the structural entrenchment of @ condition of “undersievelopment’ in the periphery, in which the process of industrialzation was impeded, leading to 2 rising gap in incomes between the two parts of the worid economy. Prebisch's insights were picked up and absorbed. {nto more established traditions in the social sciences, specifically into “neo: Marxist’ theories which had long been concerned with notions of imperialism in the ‘world economy. The result was a complex body of thought summed upin the label ‘dependency theory’ 357358 Nicola Philips “This had at sts core a notion that development was determined by the location of economies within the ‘world capitals system and the interactions of the di ferent parts ofthis system, and that development and under developmentexistinarelationship of structural symbiosis, asthe two faces ofthe historical evolution of capitalism’ (Surikel 1972: sa). Under-development in the periphery was, in essence, a precondition for development in the centre. Thus, aeconting to a clas ‘sic definition: CC Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the ‘economies of one group of countries are conditioned by ‘the development ané expansion of others. relationship ‘of interdependence. ..becomes a dependent relationship ‘when some countries can expand only as a reflection Cf the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate evelopment. 59 (Dot Santee 1970: 231) More and less careful versions of dependency theory ‘emerged, but the impact of the school as a whole ‘on ways of thinking about development during this ‘ime was pivotal. Subsequent elaborations by André Gunder Frank and others consolidated its status 2s an influential perspective on inequality between coun- tries and societies, where capitalism was deemed to generate ‘economic development for the few and under-development for the many’ (Frank 1967: 8) ‘World systems theory subsequently took up the run- ning, most notably elaborated by Immanuel Waller- ‘stein 1074, 1979, 1980), who saw a wortd marketsystem, (wnat we would now call global economy) as compris- ing different kinds of states—core, semi-periphery. and periphery—marked by significant asymmetries and jostling for economic advantage. As such, under- development theory wasclearly a forerunnerof many Of the debates in which we are interested here about the impact of the changing global political economy on development, yen so, both dependency and world systems the- ory were subjected to a barrage of criticism, justified and otherwise, to the extent that by the early 1080s they had lost much of their influence and appeal. As we will seein the next section, the failures of the strat egies associated with this conception of development, alongside the success of very different development strategies in East Asia, also hastened its decline (see Bor 132). BOX 132 Key Dimensions of Under-Development and Dependency Theory \na plnerein Latin America to expan contin ‘onder development in that repon ad ésewhere. Conceives ofthe world economy dived into a powerful ‘entre’ anda weak pariphery' in hich the terms of trade systematialy deadvantagod the periphary and perpetuated Ccndiens of underdeeopment certifies development and underderdopment as thetwo laces of the htorcl xotaen of expt! (Sure. and ‘plore: how conditions of dependence’ serve to reinforce underdevelopment and inequality Neo-liberalism and neo-statism A good part of the problem for under-development theories by the ro8os was, quite simply, that they were ‘wrong footed by events. From the 196s onwards, the big development story was aot of structural under development, but rather of the spectacular nse of 4 _group of East Asian economies thatcame tobe known 28 the newly industrializing economies (NIEs)—Tai ‘wan, Korea, Singapore, and HongKong, Their soaring ‘growth rates left economies in Latin America, Affica and other developing regions far behind, and equally left modernization theory and, particulary, under developmenttheory struggling for anything meaning fal to say by way of explanation or theorization. Ina nutshell, the rise of East Asia left the notion of a siagle ‘group of countries and economies, variously vermed the “Third World’, “developing countries’ periphery’ ‘and so on. looking redundant. Both to take account of these new trends and to conceive of the relationship berween development andthe processes of globalization that were acceler {ng atthe time, the key debate that emerged from the 19708 onwards was between two schools of thought ‘The first was the body of theory summed up is 8 term ‘neo-liberalism’, the single most influential pa" digm in the contemporary period. The second rookits cue more concretely from the East Asian experienes and can be termed ‘neo-statism’. In part, this debate ‘was not about development theories in the se8s* those we have just reviewed: rather, it concerned thE obsession in the 1080s with the relative performancs of Anglo-American, neo-liberal economics com?!pth tose organized with greater levels of state intr: {ation in the national economy. such as Germany Jou Japan. BuCitsexpression in the contest of develop jpeat Was eSPECEY VigOTOUS, oriented to explaining znd theorizing the reasons for the divergence in ees ‘omic performance between the ‘developing regions of the world, Neo-liberal theory was, and remains, predicatedon _aprofound cynicism about politics and, more specifi ‘ally, about states. Its foots in neoclassical economics id an assumption that individuals are motivated selfinterest, and, therefore, that politics is simi Joely conditioned. The intervention of states in the workings of national economies, and by extension the global economy, is therefore understood to intro dace ¢ wide range of distortions and contradictions ‘which are deemed inimical to the pursuit of growth and development. The cote contention of neosiber. alism is consequently as David Harvey puts it (20050 2), that human well-being can best be advanced by erating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and five trade’. The emphasis fell on “depolitcizing’ eco- ‘nomic activity, and development more broadly, and consolidating market-led mechanisms of organizing economies and allocating resources within them (see Gamble 200) Crucially, these marketled mechanisms were increasingly ‘global’ o ‘globalizing’ in nature. The ‘ca of neo-liberal development thus featured a distinc tive emphasis on participation in the global economy, ‘conceived both asthe accommodation of increasingly vnfettered global market activity, and its harnessing in ways that would reap developmental benefits. This ‘vas an abrupt break with theories of underdevelop. rent: while under-development theories conceived the world economy 8 imposing structural impedi iments to development, neo-liberalism understood participation in global economic activity as the pre: ‘requisite for development, and development strategy ‘ame to be understood as essentially about “global Positioning’ (McMichael 2900: 15). But, at the same time, neosliberal theories understood development san inherently national process, and the teasons for development fasluresas ying in internal (endogenous) factors—that is, as rooted in ‘incorrect! government Policies, institutional under-development, and exces sive sate intervention in the workings of national «conomies (see Bor 133). 13. The Political Economy of Development BOX 13.3 Key Dimensions of Neo-Liberal Development Theory Restson the arument that human welbeng can best be asercedbyoereg nv ecepreneri Feeders andshiswthnan witaond farmer uncer Sronaprute reper os aria and eee (ave 205) Secs te puto deepen as regi te carton | mare tned mecha fpr ezoremes ad | alocating resources, and therefore the ‘depoliticzation’ of corona ay Ieenties engagement tne bal economy es he key 0 propeling process of developer whie atthe sare time sntrbuting derlopment falurcsto ‘intemal factors such sx govermart pels nttiona underdevelopment compton excessive tate intervention inthe econo “The problem forneo-liberalism was that, asnoted, the big development sory unfolding atthe time was the rise of a group of economies which apparently contradicted this logic, characterized as they were bya very different conception of how development ‘could and should be achieved. The centrepiece of what we cal here ‘neo-statism’ was the notion of the “developmental state’ (Johnson 1982; also sce Woo- Cumings 1999, Kohli 200), in which the state was recognized to shape, direct, and promote the pro- cess of economic development (see Box 13.4). Mar- kets were in this sense ‘governed’ rather than ‘free’ (Wade i990). The forms of ‘state developmentalism’ observed in East Asia thus offered a way of think- ing about development which was ostensibly at odds with the dominant orthodoxy of neo-liberalism. However, things were not quite that simple. Neo- liberal theory also laid claim to the so-called “East Asian miracle’ on the basis of a very different read: ing of sts development trajectory—one based not (on the developmental role of states, but on export- Jed growth and participation in global markets (see ‘Wadle 1990). In short, the key baitleground for neo- liberal and neo-statist theories of development was the East Asian region, and the key bone of theoreti cal contention was the relationship between markets and states in development (see Box 13.5). At the same time, they shared some common ground: both con ceived of development as a national process, where 359360 Neola Philips BOX 134 Characteristics of the Japanese ‘Developmental State’ “Theft priority ofthe state i economic developrnent—a priory maintained consistant by theapsnese goverrenat in both the pre-war and post-war peri Economic devlopent 's defnedin terms of growth, procucton, and corpettvenes, rather thn corsumpuon,dstribution, and wefare ‘eral inexpanive bt elite! bureaueracy rcrtedon the bass of merit espensite for selecting the indisristo be veloped. dering te best ears of deelopirg these industri and superving competion nthe acted sectors ‘to gurantee ther economic effectvanest “The legisative and judi branches f governmentare restricted tothe sfety abe functons cf ensuring thatthe bureaucracy responds tothe requirements of those groups insocety cn whichthe tabity ofthe mocelrests: put more pity, he poltiane reign andthe bureaucrats rl (Jonson 1982 12. State intervention tthe econany i ofa market conforming “The bureaucracyisled bya ‘ilotageney such asthe ananese istry of Trade ane instr (MIT, possesingan array of | funcions associated ith controling rd drecting nda sranfermation Sauce uid tron von (982), Box 13.5 | Key Dimensions of Neo-Statist Development Theory Was developed as emenr ofepaning the rom trajectry f japan snd other set Aen economies rer the 1960: onaards andthe vergence between ths rejon ard ‘ther parts ofthe developing wor ‘Actrances adifferent undertandig rom neo therein of the reltiorship betusen states ancmadats in Eat Asan ‘evelopment emohaszng the ole and importance of ‘developmental stitesinoverring| markets ad shaping development processes ‘Alene wthnecsnerslim and ether development theories, sees develepmert asa raticna process and prirtizes an nderstancng of developrrent as economic growin, ‘what ‘develop’ are countries or national economies; and both understood development to be about eco, nomic growth—only one of the large number of possibilities offered by H. W. Arndt that we discussed a the start of this chapter. Human development, gender, and environmental theories ‘The theories grouped together in this section offer a challenge to the understanding of development as aggregate economic growth that has characterized all ‘of the ways of thinking about development that we Ihave explored thus far. They are unified instead by a commitment to ‘human’ or ‘people-centred’ devel- ‘opment, and later “sustainable human development” This redefinition of the meaning of development was summarized in an early influential statement by the renowned economist Dudley Seers (1969: 3-4): OG the questions to ask about » countrys development are therefore: What has been happering to poverty? What fas been happening to unemployment! What his bean tappening co inequality? If al three ofthese have become les severe then beyond doubs there has been a period of development for the country concerned. one oF ‘wo of these central problems have been growing werse, and especially if al three have, would be strange t0 cl the res ‘development, even if per capita income hag sowed 99 |m this spirit, “human development’ approaches began to take shape from the 1970s onwands, Their ‘arly incarnation was as the so-called “basic needs approach, which rested on a recognition that, across the world, economic growth was clearly not alvays “sociated with beneficial outcomes for the pool either in incomes or in employment opportunities. Sane it was argued that special redistributive “easures were required to tanget the poor and unem “opment in this conception emphasized the ne, ing of basic material needs (food, shelter, clo” we ‘the need for access to key services (water, sani Yon, health care, education), and the need for peoPleto participate in the political and cessesthataffected their ives, The approach failed t0 take root ax en a 8 result of is unwealistipolcy goal its rection in pone f rr Countries asa resit of its WWestem and ‘Northen fan the context ofthe ideological politics of the ogg : Cold War, and the increasing dominance of neo iberalem fr lis essence endured and reappe, . tion of human development ipgos, encapsulated most not Nobel Prize-winning econot sxvanced an understanding of development a bog ‘ite arate ose ig ‘capabilities later reformulated as freedoms sete inseductively simple terms, development was defined «a proces of expanding the wal feedome tatters plecanenjoy’ (Ser 1999: 3) Freedoms were thus under, stood.as both the means and the ends of development Going further, the agents of development were nos governments but ukimately people themselves Gender and environmental approaches to develop iment echoed some of the core concerns of human development theories. Ways of thinking about devel ‘opment that privilege gender are varied (see Rai 3003), but are knit together by a core concern with the fil ures of development to bring about more egalitarian socictes, the neglect of the particularneeds of women indovelopment processes, andthe lick of attention 10 the ways in which development projects carried par ticular and distinctive consequences for women. Some of the most influential statements within this broad development project sought to extend the basic needs approach into a ‘gender need’ framework (Molyneux 1985; Moser 1985, 1993), which focused on two sets of gender imeress' ‘practical’ interests associated with satisfying basic material needs; and ‘strategie interests associated with rectifying gender inequalitics in such areas as politcal representation, educational opporta ti employment conditions, edom rom domes Violence and exploitation, and so on. Echoing human development approaches, these were then excended inte a notion of ‘empowerment’, which was under: stood as increasing women's abiity to secure their own selfreliance and internal strength’ (Moser 1083 167), Other strands of thisbody of thought which wil be of particular relevance to the discussion inthe next section of the chapter emphasized the highly gen dered impact of globalization processes and partic: lar kinds of development strategies (Elson 1089, 192, #595; Marchand iy, 1996: Pearson 199s: Benria 200) decision-making pro- * Streeten et al. 1983), ared in a new genera- theory in the 1980s and ably in the work of the mist Amartya Sen, Sen 13 The Political Economy of Development Likewise, environmental approaches emerged for ‘the carly 970s onvwands as cntiques of the view of the relationship between environment and development that had prevailed in postwar growth and modern- ization theories, as well as neoliberal approaches. In these latter perspectives, natural resources are not considered t pose obstacles to economic growth and there was a general optimism that technical solutions would be found that allowed human beings to ‘harness nature on an ever larger sale" (Woodhouse 2003: 14). ‘The early critique emerged in a report commissioned by the Club of Rome, entitled Limits to Growth (Mead: ws et al 1972), which advanced the arresting argu: ment thatthe limits ro growth could in fact be reached Within thenext centuryif trendsin population growth, industnlization, food production, natural resource depletion, and environmental degradation continued Gradually, the linkages between environment and development thus became a matter of global concern and had moved belatedly, along with poverty and ger des, to the centre of global development debates by the end of the 1980s, clothed inthe concept of ‘sustainable evelopment’. This was defined famously as ‘develop- ‘mentthat mects the needs ofthe present without com promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) To this end, the ambitious call ‘was issued fora reorientation of economic activity and development strategy to focus on human development andthe needsot the poor. noting that unequal distribu. ‘Hon of and acces to resources. as wea vastly unequal patterns of resource consumption. contriburedto both the perpetuation of poverty and the steady destruc tion of the global environment. These connections between environment andl development are discussed indecallby Peter Dauvergne in Chaprer i. ‘These three approaches, in their quite different ways, advance a critique of the other kinds of devel ‘opment theory that we have looked atin this section, ‘They emphasize the limitations and dangers of the dominant understanding of development as a pro- cess of economic growth, and instead highlight a number ofthe other ways of thinking about develop- ‘ment that we noted in the quotation from Arade at the beginning of the chapter. Equally, they all rake {ssue with the notion that what develop—the objects of development—are countries oF national states and economies, in whieh national governments are the agents of development. Rather, they conceive of development as being about a sustainable process of 361362 Nicola Philips | BOX 136 Key Dimensions of ‘Human’ Development. Theories ‘Taleicue wth ether development theories’ definition ‘of denloprentasgronth andineexs foc on range ofincazersassocated wih human development and sestanable development [Advance a'poople-cetre’ approach to development where ‘he object of developmen are eran bangs and grove of people not simply coursrieso economies Broaden the focusto empasiveinequlis win sexietes ard between groupe of people ck singly between curtis and incerperte rot en economic nequaies tut 2 range of socalinequalteseclusng hose based on gender improvement in the material and socal conditions in ‘which people live, and the expansion of opportuni- ues, ‘capabilities, and ‘freedoms’ that shape those conditions (see Box 1.6: KEY POINTS: + Dieren theories of develogmantrefiec ering conceptions of what eveloprents and how tight be achieve. and eral ciferent dagnosesof the cases of Seropmerta progressor deeopmental fake ‘+ Theperio fromthe 1940s tothe eary 19805 was rrr by the entrovery between mademition nd underdevelopment theories both of which ha been widely derived by the end cf ths period + The contemporary period (Fer the ear 1980s) was dorintad bythe controversy betwen neo bran and neostatsm nseeingto expan the key trend tonards vergence nite wnjectories of deloping economer—atvend which dullenged the vay of a netion ofthe Third Word easel group of countries + Beth reo-beraism and neo statism id im tothe East Adan miracle’ the former interpreting aa triumph of exported grt and coformty wth the fee marke model the liter asa rrp of investrented deveicpmet’ ard the importance of tates in recing arn mediating development proceies + Humar’or people centred theories of development challenged the emphaison ecarome prowth nd sousht todevelop awider conception of development a beng ‘ncamertaly about the mater and soil conctions wich people be. Development theory in practice ‘Our task now is to trace the translation of these dit ferent ways of thinking about development into con- crete polices and strategies, and to understand their impact and consequences. The overarching, context for this discussion is thatthe contemporary period of development, fram the end of the Second World War to the present time, has taken place in the midst of accelerating processes of globalization, All of these theories provide @ different perspective on the rela tionship between globalization and development— both what that relationship does look like and whatit should look like. The mi 1940s to the early 1980s Across the regions that constituted what atthe time was called the “Third World, the post-war develop ‘ment context was dramatically diflrent from: that which had hitherto prevailed. Fist, ie was marked by the onset of the period of decelonizction, in which Aican nd a number of Asian states finally achieved independence from the various Buropesn pow- ers, and which initiated the fundamental changes tn the internatiomal poltcal-economic landscape that defined the development project from that time forwards. Second, the experience of the Great Depression and the two World Wars prompted 8 reassessment, particulary in Latin America, of the virtues and dangers of the broadly laissez-faire eco nomic policies that had been pursued up to that Point, along with the wisdom of dependence of ‘he industrialized states as markets for their exports of primary products and imports of manufactured s0ods. Third, demographic trends necessitated lugentsttention to employment as the key goal of sconomicpolicy (Thorp 1998: 198). Finally the word conomy was defined for all developing countries BY heightened protectionism in the key European and US markets, the movement towards the formation of the European Economic Community, and the tablihment of new institutions under the Bretto2 Woods system which were dominated by the estab- lished powers and in which developing countries BS nat Nasty increased in mamber, had no means Of effective participation, ult ‘of age, which fell at an annual rate of around 35 PEcent betWeen 1869 and 2000, while annua the 2098 WHER Percent a eS so na sca era empty in Our assesstnent of the we (Aalme and Wilkinson aoa) tO the MDGs Moring into the aot0s, the debate about wha ‘esto aRY needed oock tke yk a set of goals to guide the global developmen a between 215 a 6, whch came eae SDGS. At the Rio + 20 Summit in 20.2 a mockery _group was establishedto draftan agenda forthe soe versations’ set up by the UN to feed into the drafting of the recommendations. The draft report was cone pletedin 2014, and agreed following negotiationsin the UN in August 2015. The principlesguidingthe drawing Lup of the SDGs accommodated the recognition that economic development needed to be rescued from its relative neglect so that any goals were both eee nomic and social in character, that inequality needed to be integrated into a global development agenda, however politically sensitive that may be, and that 2 much greater voice for representatives oF develop: {ng countries and associated social groups needed to be realized (See Wilkinson and Hulme 2015). Box 13.9, ‘da new a 80x 13.9 The Sustainable Development Goals Goal |: End poverty in alts forms everpahere Goul 2: Ene hunger achieve food security andinproved utriton.and promote sustainable agrcubure ‘Goal 3: Ensure heat Ivesand promote wellbeing frat alages Gout 4:Ensure ncsive and equtble quity ection and promote iflong ering opportunities fer al ‘Goal: Achieve gender equalty anc erypower ll women andgrts Goal 6 Enoire avait and sustanable managere of water and sanitation fra Goal 7: Ensure accessto affordable relabesustanable and moder energy frat ‘Goal 8: Promote sustained incisive and sustainable ‘economic gremth fulland productive employment ard ‘decent work fr al Goal 9: Build resent infasructre promote inchs and ‘stainable industriization.and foster innoraion 13 The Political Economy of Development ‘outlines the seventeen SDGs that were adopted from January 2916 onwards. Its sil oo early to take mean- Ingful stock of the performance of the SDGs, but they will rop up again a bit later in our discussion, ‘The focus on poverty reduction and development goals thus came to define the global development agenda in the PWC era, as articulated by the devel ‘opment community centred on the UN. However, this was not the only alternative that was articulated a this time, Another emanated from observation of the East Asian region. China, in particular, was seen both to be leading a pack of new ‘rising pow- ers’ and to be articulating a very diferent route to high growth and development from that advocated in the policy prescriptions of the Western develop- ‘ment community. Its perceived success in economic and developmental terms, achieved without con- forming with the neo-liberal consensus, led many to ask whether China might not be epitomizing a new development model, capable of being adopted and. replicated elsewhere, ‘The boldest satement of this argument was made by the journalist Joshua Ramo (2004) in his outline ‘of what he called the ‘Beijing Consensus’. With this ile, he was invoking the globalist and universalizing, Goa 1OsReduceinacualtywthinand among counties Goa 1: Make cies and hsranseterrentsincisve, sf, reilertandsustanasle Goa (2: Ensure ustarable coxsumpicn ard production patterns ‘Goa 13: Tike urgentacton to combat imate change and {simp (akg note of agreements made bythe United ities Framenor Convention on Clit Change (UNCO) erun) Gaal: Conserve and sustanaby use the oceans sas and smarne resources for sustanable develcomen: Gaal 5:Preect. restore and premotesustiable ue of ‘errestrilecosstors,sustaraby manage forests, comtat desertion andhalt anc reverse land degradation ard hat biocerity os Goal 1 Promate peel and ince siete _sturabledevlopmert provide css topstie for a and bald fect, accourtabe ad incseitinaions 2 ves Goal 7:Srengthen the means of implementation and resale the gba partnership fer sustainable development 373374 Nicola Philips pretensions of the WC and other Western develop: ‘ment frameworks (Payne ana Phillips 2eto: 154). [nits substance, the Being Consensus echoed bath theo: Fies of East Asian development and some of the older theories of ‘catch-up’ that we reviewed eatlier in the «chapter. First, i laid emphasis on the value of innova tion’, but rejected the ‘tralling-edge innovation’, which ‘traditional catch-up theories saw as the starting point, in favour of ‘bleeding edge innovation'—a distinction of aspiration illustrated in the juxtaposition of cop: per wires versus fibre optics. Second, it articulated a notion of ‘balanced development’, which went beyond indicators such as per capita GDP to emphasize ‘sus tainability and equality’ over luxuries Third, it pro- posed a ‘theory of self:determination’ and ‘the use of leverage to move big, hegemonic powers which might be tempted to tread on your toes" (Ramo 2004: 27), ‘The Beijing Consensus’s moment, as tt were, was fleeting, By the late 2000s, ic had largely disappeared from debates about development, in lange part because of the profound limits to the replcabilty of the Chi- nese model in other regions of the world. The Beijing ‘consensus was built ona rejection of the ‘one size-its: all’ development thinking that had dominated twent eth century theory and practice—why should we then expect the Chinese model to be any more universally applicable? Yet, leaving the Beijing Consensus itself 10 one side, it was precisely the challenge represented by China's economic and development performance to onesize-fitsall thinking that was most significant ‘over this period. The ‘find your own way" strand of development theory (Schmitz 20¢7: §5)—based on the jdea that paths to development are muliple and con: tingent—was strongly reinforced by the continued rise of China and East Asia over the 1990 and 2c00s, in the Intest inscalment of the long ranning contest between, ‘competing development ides. KEY POINTS + ipa ofthc ofthe WC ad reo ber ranges rere seeraly—aere diced tet those who emghisae tera eos ar hve ho erased ectersacate wih gebleaon 1 The Fast Asn rs fhe ie 190s wastakenby ree erst alt the vege orthodox ned todacet the Eat Asan model oe both tad at sppeusdo ccnedecortan pound the sosuts, Diclechiptardictgarmetiancig: | +The PWC wasp forward ae 3 raw pradigm fr éeraopment (Stet) but was seen bycrtesto depart seit rom the orignal WC. +The sae of poverty reduction came bythe 200 to occupy the centre of global development debates, refletec particulary inthe MOGs and iter the SDGs + Progrestonards adhering the MDGs tas been signfcant baa uneve, wath cemsiderable ferences between conten and goapsol people + While te so-allec Being Consensus was shor-ved ae nirgevertion in evelopment dates inte 2000, the ‘eof China chalenges the one-ie-ftall deveeprent thinking tat has demnated mantresn snd Western evelopment theory ardpractce Global development in the 2010s Just as all other periods of development have heen book ended by ctises so the contemporary chapterin global development unfolded initially in the context of the twin ctses of the late 2000s and early 20105— on the one hand, the criss of Anglo-American n¢0- liberalism which erupted primarily in the US and the UKin 2007-8, and, on che other, the debt crisis engulf ing large parts of southern Europe at the same time. We are now in the aftermath of both crises, but their effects linger and have shaped the panorama for global development in significant ways In one sense, the crisis that began in 2007 was hot strictly specking 2 ‘global” economic crisis. Is Origins were concretely in the US, UK, and parts of rope, and theseare the parts of the world in which ts effects have been felt the most. I had much to do With regulatory failures in globalized financial and banking systems, as did the Asian financial crisis @ few years before, The difference is that, inevitably, an ‘Anglo-American crisis brings with it global reper slomsin a way that crises originating in and alecting ‘ther parts of the world would not. Indeed, almost all countries and large parts of the work!’ popul- \Jon were affected by what came in some quarters © be called the "Great Recession’. Is impacts were of ‘atying size and impact, with some economics in the tion flows, expel foreign workers, and/or constrain the employment opportunities available to migrant workers (Philips 201). Remittances—the monies that migrant workers send to families in their home countries—were the other mechanism by which it was expected that the impact of the crisis would be felt, given the rapid growth of global flows of remittances since the 10908 (see Figure 13.4). The employment effects described above would mean that migrants were less able to send remitiances, with potentially catastrophic implications for both households and for eccnomies dependent on remittances (usually in combination ‘with aid) In some of these economies, such 28 the Philippines or Haiti, remittances in the 20008 WEE equivalent to some 25 per cent of GDP, and far O48 stripped overseas development assistance oF inflON® of FDL Yer many of the envisaged impacts dil "2! emerge, as remittances to many parts of the Wo"! from overseas migrant workers did not decline * much as expected. In faet, remittances remains mich more rent throughout the finan cits ian rivate capital flows. Notwithstanding 0™* lion to 132 the spring of 2009 ( rpomically motivate