$0162163 EAGNTING VEHICLE ro, ant oer sete Oey STUDY RESULTS Ps OL}$0162163 DEPARTMENT )OF THE ARMY: orrice OF THE\DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS WASHINGTON, B.C. 20310 DAMO-RQA-T 10 April 1978 jinfantry Fighting Vehicle Task Force (LFVTF) SEE DISTRIBUTION 1. The IFVTF was established within the Office Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA by HODA Letter 71-77-1, 16 September 1977, to conduct a study directed by Congress. The purpose of the study was to re-evaluate the specific requirements for and design of the MICV and to assess the need for a more survivable follow-on vehicle. 2. Under the direction of the undersigned the Task Force conducted the study using models, manual war games, subjective analysis, and input from numerous sources responsible for various areas of information. A Study Advisory Group provided direction and approval for the phases of the study. 3, The Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army were briefed on the study results as were the major Army commands. Various members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and representatives from the Office of Management and Budget were also briefed. Presentations of study results were given to various members of Congress and their staffs. 4. The final report of the IFVIF is published for use by interested parties in the pursuit of information on the fielding of an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. POR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS: doomcs| PAT W. CRI Major General, CS Director, Infantry Fighting Vehicle Task Force LIBRARY JUN 80 1978 ARMY WAR COLLEGEsere* Tp03qi3g DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM ANALYSIS. AND EVALUATION) ARMY SECRETARIAT AND HQDA SECRETARY OF THE ARMY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (OPERATION RESEARCH) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFATRS) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION) CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, ARMY GENERAL COUNSEL, ARMY HQDA (DACS-ZA) HQDA (DACS~zB) HQDA (DACS-RP2-A) HQDA (DACS-Dér) HQDA (DACA~ZA) HQDA (DALO-ZA) HQDA (DAMO-ZA) HQDA (DAPE~ZA) HQDA (DAMA~ZA) HQDA (DAMI-ZA) HQDA (Dasc~2A) ARMY LIBRARY COMMANDERS IN CHIEF US ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY COMMANDERS US ARMY FORCES COMMAND US ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND US ARMY ARMAMENT MATERIEL READINESS COMMAND Us ARMY ARMAMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND US ARMY COMMUNICATIONS & ELECTRONICS MATERTEL READINESS COMMAND US ARMY COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND US ARMY DEPOT SYSTEM COMMAND US ARMY ELECTRONICS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND US ARMY INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS COMMAND US ARMY MISSILE MATERIEL READINESS COMMAND US ARMY MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND ‘US ARMY MOBILITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND US ARMY NATICK RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND US ARMY TANK-AUTOMOTIVE MATERIEL READINESS COMMAND RE ORE OHEE EHH EEE BENE owCOMMANDERS CONT'D US ARMY TANK AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND US ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION COMMAND US ARMY TROOP SUPPORT AND AVIATION MATERIEL READINESS COMMAND SUPERINTENDENTS US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US ARMY MILITARY ACADEMY US ARMY WAR COLLEGE CENTERS US ARMY ARMOR CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY ENGINEER CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER AND SCHOOL, US ARMY INFANTRY CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY LOGISTICS CENTER US ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER US ARMY MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT CENTER US ARMY MISSILE AND MUNITIONS CENTER US ARMY ORDNANCE CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY QUARTERMASTER CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY SIGNAL CENTER AND SCHOOL US ARMY TRANSPORTATION CENTER AND SCHOOL UNITS ST ARMORED DIVISION 3RD ARMORED DIVISION 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) 2ND ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT LTH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT 1sT INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION 2ND ARMORED DIVISION 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) STH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION OTH INFANTRY DIVISION 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) 6TH ATR CAVALRY COMBAT BRIGADE 194TH ARMORED BRIGADE 197TH INFANTRY BRIGADE ‘3RD ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT READINESS REGIONS US ARMY READINESS REGION TIT OTHER ‘DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY US ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY US ARMY LOGISTICS EVALUATION AGENCY US ARMY COMBINED ARMS COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS MEP E PHBH OREOOTHERS conr'D US ARMY COMBINED ARMS TEST ACTIVITY US ARMY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AGENCY US ARMY TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER US ARMY BALLISTICS RESEARCH LABORATORY DEFENSE DOCUMENTATION CENTER ARMY STUDY DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION RETRIVAL SYSTEMS (ASDIRS) PROJECT MANAGER, XM1 WARREN, MI PROJECT MANAGER, M60 DEVELOPMENT, WARREN, MI US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS EVALUATION COMMAND DEFENSE ADVANCE RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY reerTABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Executive Summary se eee ee ee D Un, The Threat 6. eee ee ee ee ee ee ee Id 1, Introduction . see ee ee ee ees ee TEL 25-/Genersl- ios’ a genes owes mee eho Ravens a 3. Strategy and Tactics ©. ++ ee ee ee ee ee ETD 4 Materiel oe ce ee ee ee ee ee ee IE 5. Trends we ee ee ee ee old 6. Conclusion 2. ee ee ee ee ee ee ee el III, The Requirement For An Infantry Fighting Vehicle . . + .ILI-1 1. Introduction . 0 eee ee ee ee eee ED 2. Key Features of the European Battlefield . ~~. .III-2° 3. US Army Tactical Doctrine... +++ + eee ee + TEES 4. Combined Arms Capabilities .....-...- ++ +III-6 5. Mechanized Infantry and Armored Cavalry Task Analysis III-9 6. Operational Illustration... ++. +--+ ++ + + TII-18 7. Assessment of the Current Infantry Vehicle . .. . - III-27 8. Performance Capabilities Required ..... ~~ - I1I-28 9. Doctrine for the Employment of an Infantry Fighting Vehicle... ee eee ee ee ee ee ee LEER 10. Conclusion. see eee ee ee ee ee ee HSL IV. Reassessment Of The Design Of The IFV. ....- + + + IW-l 1, Introduction 66 eee ee ee L 2. Firepower... ete ee eee ee LS 3. Protection»... eee ee et ee ee WMG 4. Mobility 2. ee ee ee ee ee eo SS S$. Capacity st Pec ee eee ee TD 6. Foreign Vehicle Comparisons... .- +++ +++ ++ 1V-79 7. MI13Al Derivative Vehicles .. +++. -- +++ + + 1V-88 8. Combat Effectiveness - «++ ++ ss eset ts 9 9, Logistics oe ee ee VND 10, Rationalization, Standardization and” Interoperability’. 2. see ee ee ee ee ee + TV103 11. Transportability Review... 6. ee ee eee + LVH105 12. reining soe ee ee ee eo EMO 13. Conclusions and Summary + + + + ee ee ee ee + LVH123Page Effectiveness Analysis - IFV And Follow-On Vehicles . . . y-1 de Gemiaad Catae to olla teed ot fechate a ees ea age 2. Terms of Reference»... tl lye 3, Near Term Analysis». DD lag 4. Mid-Far Term Framework oe 1) lyre 5. Infantry Fighting Vehicle Primary Analysis. | | | | yaa? 6. Infantry Fighting Vehicle Excursions»... . ss. yo165 7. Concepts Evaluation Model... .. 4.1.1... yo297 8. Cavalry Fighting Vehicle Cases... 2.1) 1. | yo301 9. Cost Effectiveness «+... 2. 1 lt ss yo323 10, Relationship of Primary Attributes 11). ) 1] ] | yu333 11. Conclusions ss ee ee ee ee ee yegay VI. Follow-On Vehicle ~ Other Considerations ...... . .yq-z Beata a toa a- 14a fg ac age 2 RIE ees ek HR Re te ee ew es RES 3,- Transportability Review... ya Aor Mogtaetes tedihe is ure > eauity daa iste Sees egg VII. Study Administration»... ee. ee ee ee ee VEEL 1, IFVIF Charter: HQDA Letter 71-77-1... 2... 6. VIT-L 2, Study Directives... 2... eS WEES 3, Study Methodology... eee ee es VETS 4, IFVIF Menbership 2...) 22 2.2111 Dl verde VIE, Appendices) (et pss aes ote ee es se A, Special Armored Infantry Conbat Vehicle Concept Descriptions ............-.., 41 B, Life Cycle Costs of Armored Personnel Carrier and Other Related Vehicles .............,. BL c, Firepower analysis»... ee. te Gl Dac MobSA Ley ‘Anal yeas JU ayairtele ib ahietor ek arse teacd ea Be E, Vulnerability Analysis of IFV Concepts +1)... . par F, Infantry Fighting Vehicle Concept Evaluation Study | 7-1 Bab log tah tectetetectect toe ieiaet at ateatet et eeitea ee eC a iiINFANTRY FIGHTING VEKICLE TASK FORCE STUDY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION Purpose. Congress directed the Army to conduct a study to "re-evaluate the specific requirenents for and design of the MICV and to assess the need for a more survivable follow-on vehicle". Background. On 16 September 1977, The Infantry Fighting Vehicle Task Force (IFVIF), a special task force within DCSOPS, HQDA, was established to conduct the directed study. The IFVTF commenced operations on 26 September 1977. On 2 November 1977, a study directive was issued to provide definitive guidance for the conduct of the study. On 23 March 1978, the study results were presented to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and Other selected senior individuals. Methodolgy. To respond to the Congressional Directive the Task Force developed a broad approach which was rooted in the expected use of infantry on the modern battlefield. The investigation was organized in terms of the three major requirements directed by Congress. Each of these required different approaches, which are described in the appropriate sections. ‘THREAT General. The threat to tank/infantry operations must be considered in both the near (1982) and mid (1987-) terms with emphasis on the Warsaw Pact forces in the European theater. This discussion describes the threat in general terms. More specific details are included in the main body of the report. Doctrine. The Warsaw Pact has fielded a modern highly mobile and well balanced ground combat force trained to establish and maintain a fast tempo of offensive action. Soviet forces make up the core of the Pact and Soviet equipment. Doctrine and tactics are common to all member nations resulting in a high degree of standardization. Warsaw Pact doctrine calls for rapid breaching of forward eneny defenses followed by deep penetration into enemy rear areas. This anticipates achieving an offensive momentum which allows forces to advance 30-50 kilometers a day in a conventional and 60-100 kilometers a day in a nuclear/chemical environment. Continuous operations are envisioned to sustain this momentum and lead to a war of limited duration. Meeting engagements by highly mobile maneuver TL see UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSitiD , elements supported by ample artillery and air are expected to be the most common form of combat. The Pact will resort to a deliberate attack or breakthrough only when enemy defenses cannot be overcome by other means. Warsaw Pact forces are trained to operate in both the conventional and nuclear/chemical environment. Equipment. The current threat to the infantry/tank team includes armored vehicles, infantry, artillery, anti-tank systems and aircraft. Tank mounted weapons include 100m, 115am and 125m main guns. Lightly armored vehicles all mount one or more machineguns while some moune the 73am smoothbore gun and anti-tank guided missiles. Artillery is employed in both direct and indirect fire role. Armor defeating rounde have been developed for all artillery calibers up to 152mm. Anti-tank weapons include systems ranging from man-portable FAGOT and RPG+7 to crew served vehicular mounted systems such as the uprated SWATTER and SAGGER. Soviets have used both helicopters and mechanical mine layers to lay conventional mines but appear not to have developed scatterable mines comparable with US models. Aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopter, pose an increasingly serious threat, Future Developments. Although Warsaw Pact doctrine has stressed the breakthrough and meeting engagements, threat forces may opt for more decentralized tactics exploiting surprise, combined arms teamwork at lower echelons, and increased command and control capabilities. Therefore @ stereotyping of threat doctrine should be avoided. Warsaw Pact equip. nent will also show continued improvement. Advances are expected in taaks and their ammunition, infantry vehicles, artillery mobility and lethality, ATGM accuracy, range and lethality, helicopters, and frontal aviation. ‘THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE Apptoach. In order to reassess the requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle, the IFVIF: ~ Examined the role of the mechanized infantry in Europe for employment within the combined arms team. ~ In conjunction with TRADOC determined the specific tasks which mechanized infantry will be required to perform, ~ Determined the vehicle performance characteristics required to support the infantry in accomplishing its required tasks. = Assessed the current infantry vehicle (M113A1) against the required tasks to determine its suitability for mechanized infantry.The Role of the Mechanized Infantry. The principle challenge to the mechanized infantry is combat on the European battlefield against the type of threat forces described above, Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO forces, and are modern and sophisticated. Combined arns operations characterize their employment. The terrain of this battlefield in Germany is variable. Although there are open areas, much of the battlefield is broken by wooded areas, hills and construction. Poor visibility is a common condition on this battlefield. Long nights during the winter months, adverse weather, and extensive and frequent early morning fog during much of the year often combine to inhibit observation. Combined arms teamwork between armor, infantry, artillery, air defense, engineers, close air support, and attack helicopters is essential to success on this battlefield. Each element contributes essential capabilities necessary for combat effectiveness. Mechanized infantry is an integral part of this team, contributing a wide range of capabilities. Mechanized infantry provides versatility to the combined arms team. It is less specialized than the other arms, having the unique capability of operating effectively under all conditions of terrain and visibility conditions. This versatility derives fron its ability to fight @ismounted, which no other arm possesses. In order to operate effectively on the mechanized battlefield, the infantry requires a vehicle which provides it the means to move rapidly in a hostile environment to its place of employment. An infantry vehicle can and should be designed to provide the infantry greater firepower. However, the primary purpose of an infantry vehicle is to facilitate the dismounted employment of infantrymen. All other capabilities are secondary. In order to provide the essential ability to operate under all terrain and visibility conditions, the dismounted function of infantry must not be degraded. Since our forces are outnumbered, maximum effectiveness must be gained from all elements of the combined arns team. If unlimited forces were available, each elenent could be highly specialized to perform unique tasks or to operate habitually on the same type of terrain. This is not the case. A combined arns team cannot select its battlefield or enlarge or substantially alter the composition of the forces available. Frequently, our forces are required to defend on frontages wider than desirable for optimum employment. Often, for example, more tanks are desirable in defending open areas than are available. On the other hand, at times more infantry is needed as in wooded areas or when visibility is restricted. For this reason, menbers of the combined arms team must be versatile, and possess the ability to augment other arms to conpensate for a constrained force structure, Since it is general purpose, and less specialized than other arms, infantry normally is the primary means to compensate for the force structure limitations. For this reason, infantry is provided means to accomplish numerous tasks such as long range tank killing capability.infantry Tasks. Taking into consideration the characteristics of the battlefield, the need for combined arms teamwork, and force structure constraints, a list of specific tasks required of the infantry was developed. Mounted Tasks: Dismounted Tasks: Destroy Tanks Observation, Security and Patrolling Destroy Lightly Armored Vehicles Destroy Infantry Destroy Tanks Suppress While Moving or Stationary Destroy Lightly Armored Vehicles Move Under Fire with the Combined Operate in Built-Up Arms Team Areas Close With the Enemy Mounted Fire & Maneuver Dismounted Negotiate Water Obstacles Breach and Emplace Obstacles Once again it should be noted that infantry has both mounted and dismounted tasks. Performance Characteristics Required. In order for these tasks to be performed, the following performance characteristics were determined to be required for an infantry vehicle. ~ Long tange weapons capability, night and day, under armor, against tanks, lightly armored vehicles, particularly BMP, and dismounted troops. ~ Mobility compatible with tanks. - Shoot on the move capability (stabilization) ~ Protection against artillery, automatic weapons, small arms. ~ Capacity to carry squad and equipment for dismounted operations. ~ Swim capability, Current Vehicle. The MI13Al is lacking in essential firepower, armor protection and mobility. These deficiencies limit the infantry in the performance of its mounted and dismounted tasks. 1-4Conclusion, In summary, based upon the characteristics of the European battlefield, the nature of the threat, our force constraints, the tasks required of the infantry and the inability of the current vehicle to meet the required performance capabilities the analysis re-confirms the requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle. REASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGN OF THE INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE (LFV) Approach. The approach taken to reassess the design of the IFV was first to determine if the IFV as designed will meet the needs of the infantry, Then a design review of the features of the IFV was conducted to determine if flaws exist. The intent was not to design anew vehicle. Additionally, foreign and other US vehicles as potential candidates were evaluated. Consideration was also given to other Important factors including combat effectiveness, training, logistics, NATO rationalization, standardization and interoperability, and strategic mobility. Support of Infantry Tasks. To evaluate the design of the IFV it was necessary to compare the infantry tasks identified during the re-evaluation of the specific requirement phase of the study effort to the actual design characteristics of the vehicle. For example, the 25mm cannon enables the infantry to perform its tasks of destroying lightly armored vehicles, destroying infantry, and suppression while moving and stationary. Analysis indicates that the design characteristics of the IFV will support accomplishment of the infantry tasks. Design Review. All features of the IFV were examined in detail in the traditional categories of firepower, protection, mobility, and the additional one of capacity to carry the squad and its equipment. These are discussed in the body of the report. Much of the controversy over the IFV has centered around its compatibility with the XM-l tank in the areas of survivability and mobility. Survivability is a complex subject. It involves size, mobility, design packaging of critical components, armor protection, accuracy and lethality of enemy weapons, and techniques of employment within the combined arms teams. Our analysis indicates that when all factors are considered the IFV is compatible with the XM-1. Protection levels are designed into tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to correspond to the method of their tactical employment, and are closely related to the optimum employment of their weaponry. Tanks are employed to carry the assault in the offense and are last to leave a position in the defense. They confront the threat on a sustained basis and are subject to the most intense fires. Therefore, tanks require greater levels of protectionand rapid firing gun systens to survive and to quickly attrit the threat. the nature of infantry employment reflects a different weaponty and lesei of protection for the IFV. Infantry vehicle weaponry is designed to Cpupenent tank fires at long ranges, and to support the infantry in the dismounted role, Thie is accomplished best by the TBAT turret shich has the TOW missile system for long range anti-tank fires and the fushmaster cannon for AP/HE fires. The nature of its firepower makes seningeetopriate to lead mounted in the assault. In the defense, infantry Uenicles normally engage eneny armor at long ranges and then displace prior fo becoming decisively engaged. For these reasons, infantry vehicles Gxaw significantly less fire than the tank. Therefore, tank-Like protection for an infantry vehicle provides a significant advantage, but not to the extent realized with tanks, and is not a driving requirement for con= patibility with the x-1, Regarding mobility compatibility with the xM-1 tank, evaluation of test results of MICV and XM-1 and analysis of mobility model predictions with IFV suspension improvements indicate that the IFV and Xl will be compatible with each other. Both vehicles are highly mobile with cross country speeds being nearly equal. Mobility characteristics of the TFV make it complementary to the tank. ‘The IFV has the ability to traverse water obstacles and soft soils due to its reduced veight and ground pressure in comparison to the tank. With tank-like armor on an infantry vehicle the increased weight would restrict it to the same terrain as the tank. A survey of foreign vehicles was made to determine if any acceptable alternatives to the United States’ IFV were available, Vehicles studied were the FRG MARDER, the French ANK-10P and the Dutch YPR-765. The Russian BMP was also looked at since it had habitually been compared to the TFV. The vehicles were found to be inadequate to neet US requirements. General deficiencies pertaining to all or some of the vehicles included inadequate firepower (unstabilized and inadequate cannon, ATGM capability not under armor) and inadequate mobility. The standard M113A1 APC and conceptual deriviatives of the vehicle were also examined. The requirenent for the fighting vehicle to be equipped with the TBAT II turret and to have the capability to carry the infantry squad and its equipment made a vehicle of the MII3AL size unacceptable. An MI13Al (PIP) Extended TBAT II evolved as the only potential US candidate. Investigation of this conceptual vehicle revealed deficiencies eliminating it as a candidate to mect the IFV requirement because of inadequate armor protection, mobility, as well as forecast reliability and maintainability problems. 1-6UNCLASSIFIED Other Considerations. The near term effectiveness analyses of the IFV was confined to a review of the recently conducted IFV/CFV Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis by TRADOC. Concentrating on selected cases, IFVIF sought insights into the prospective combat use of several alternative infantry vehicles. The study examined the ML13Al, the AIFV (w 25mm cannon), the MICV (w 20mm cannon), the IFV-BAT (w 25mm cannon) and the IFV/CFV (TOW and 25mm cannon). These alternatives were examined in a variety of battle simulations for both infantry and cavalry. In analyzing the IFV in the infantry role, offensive operations simulated generated significantly higher effectiveness for all of the firepower capable alternatives. In defensive operations in particular, the IFV was significantly more effective. Only the IFV permitted the engaged force to hold its own against the simulated threat force. The IEV demonstrated an effectiveness increase of 20-45% over the M113. The CEV also provided a margin of increased effectiveness over the M113. IFV/CFV is clearly the most effective and cost effective alternative. A training assessment was conducted to determine potential training problems and requirements associated with fielding the IFV. Design changes were made to the previous one man, 20mm weapon station to reduce operational complexity. These changes resulted in a two man turret with reduced tasks for the gunner. The two man turret provides more room to operate and allows the squad leader to share part of the gunner's functions. Ammunition processing has been simplified with the introduction of the 25mm Bushmaster. Human factors engineering has been extensively applied to the present turret to improve operational simplicity. Gunner training will require more system specific training than presently required by M113A1 machinegunner. Envisioned Individual/Crew training requirements will be similar to training required for tank crews. A review was conducted in logistics to identify logistical impacts associated with fielding the IFV. Review of the Project Manager's draft plan for integrated logistics support appears adequate to support the IFV. The Army Logistics Center's assessment of supply/resupply indicates an overall increase in anmunition usage, fuel consumption, repair parts support and maintenance support. Rationalization, standardization and interoperability in NATO (RSI) is a key consideration of IFV production. The IFV is in line with agreed FRG/US doctrinal concepts. The FRG/US Army Concept Paper, November 1976 on Anti-Armor states the need for commonality of equipment capability, integrated with the similarity of combined arms employment. A US infantry fighting vehicle is consistent with this need. The IFV with TBAT weapon station was introduced at NATO Panel II in February 1977. The UK has expressed formal interest in the transmission and potential interest in the suspension. 1-7 RAEI ENHNAN UNCLASSIFIEDRegarding strategic notte COU air transportable in cleat aircraft, Preparation for movenent includes the reduction of weight and size by removal of side armor, the integrated day/night sight, antenna, and other items. To accommodate shoring under the vehicle a further reduction in height of 3 inches can be attained by cinching roadvheele. Armor plate and other equipment is placed on a 16 foot modular/mettic platform or a two-pallet train on the sane aircraft, Preparation of the Yelicle for transport and loading aboard the C141 requires approxinately 2 hours and 29 minutes. Unloading and reassembly for combat requires approximately 1 hour 46 minutes. The IFV is readily transportable in most marine vessels. Conclusions and Recommendations. The IFV meets the infantry's needs in all areas, and the design has no major flaws. In firepower it is adequate for mounted and dismounted tasks. Its protection enables the squad to fire its weapons and operate effectively under artillery and small arms fire. Its mobility makes it compatible with other members of the combined arms team. Its capacity is sufficient for the squad and ite equipment. The analysis therefore indicates that the IFV design is valid. Although there are no design flaws which make the IFV unsatisfactory to meet the infantry's needs, these recommendations are offered for consideration for incorporation into the IFV design and are being addressed by the Army. ~ A back-up sight should be added in the event that the primary sight is incapacitated. ~_ Testing should be conducted to determine if the firing port weapon can be made acceptable to the user in both the mounted and dismounted roles. ~ Alternative interior arrangements should be investigated and tested during the next operational test to determine if the IFV will accommodate an Ll-man squad. ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR A MORE SURVIVABLE FOLLOW-ON VERICLE Approach. Congressional language directing examination of the need for a more survivable follow-on vehicle required looking into the future and testing various attributes of survivability. A threat was formulated representative of the 1987 time frame and vehicles vere conceptualized which accented state of the art survivability factors of Protection, firepower and mobility. These concepts were then examined in a variety of combat simulations to determine effectiveness. The analysis included offensive and defensive operations for infantry with variations in range, visibility, tactics, threat. ammunition, force mix and weapons mix, Cavalry operations were also examined. Costs and production risks of the alternative conceptual vehicles were then analyzed. Consideration was also given to readiness, and strategic mobility. sega Semin,UNCLAS CONFIDENT? Threat. Working with the intelligence community, changes to threat capabilities in the 1987 time frame were postulated. Firepower improvements for tanks, infantry vehicles, ATGM's, and artillery were forecast, as well as improved armor protection for threat tanks. These are key systems which have a major influence on the effectiveness of the combined arms team. Conceptual Vehicles. In addition to the standard MI13Al and IFV/CFV, alternative follow-on vehicles were concepted in the generic areas of protection, firepower, and mobility - each of which influence survivability. After some analysis, two conceptual vehicles were selected as providing the greatest promise and insight and were retained for further analysis. One was a vehicle with the same firepower (TOW and 25mm cannon) as the current IFV but with special armor providing protection levels comparable to, but Somewhat less in angular protection than the XM-1 tank. The protection level was reduced to place it in the same weight class (59 tons) as the M1, The other vehicle had special armor on the hull, but mounted the DARPA Super 75mm cannon in a low profile turret. The turret did not have special armor protection. Both vehicles had XM-1 mobility components. Effectiveness. The effectiveness of the alternative vehicles was analyzed, within combined arms forces of both company team and battalion task force size, against various enemy threats, In our defensive situations our forces were outnumbered from 3.5 to 1 to 4.5 to 1. We also examined other significant variables, such as the influence of poor visibility, and changing the force mix. In addition, we changed the tactics employed by the blue forces, and varied the enemy ammunition. The IFV was analyzed in the infantry role, and the CFV was analyzed in the cavalry role. The aggregated results are summarized below: EFFECTIVENESS COMPARED TO IFV Special Special Armor IFV IFV/CFV Armor IFV W/75mm Cannon Infantry (LFV) 1 1.27 1.19 Cavalry (CFV) 1 1.30 1.48 Based on the analysis, an effectiveness increase is indicated for special armor on infantry and scout vehicles, but to a lesser extent than gained by tanks, Also shown was the complementary nature of the TOW and the 25mm cannon with the tank gun. The 75mm gun is not as complementary to the tank gun because its range is comparable. In use by cavalry the 75mm gun provides a large gain in effectiveness due to unique employment techniques. It was demonstrated that compatible nobility between maneuver elements is necessary, since the combined arms team is tied to the speed of its slowest component. 1-9 UNCLASCosts. The US Army Tank-Automotive Development and Research Command (TARADCOM) in conjunction with the US Army Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) prepared costs predicated on near term special armor Infantry Fighting Vehicle development schedules. Life cycle costs were subsequently validated by the Comptroller of the Army. These costs include facilitization of a new assembly plant. Comparative costs of the IFV/CFV and the special armor vehicles are summarized below in FY 78 dollars. Special Special Armor IFV Irv Armor IFV W/75mm Unit Procurement Cost 370K 889K 1012K Investment Cost 3.28 6.98 7.38 Life Cycle Cost 13.48 21.18 24.83 Risk and Schedules. Possible special armor materiel development schedules were prepared by TARADCOM for the IFVIF. Several schedules were developed for each concept. The schedules assume excellent program management, continuous support, that no difficulties will occur, and that initial funding will occur in FY 79. Battelle Columbus Laboratories conducted an independent evaluation as well, Based upon these estimates, other associated DARCOM estimates, and histories of other hardware programs, the IFVIF developed its own conclusions concerning schedules and risks. These estimates are summarized below. The dates indicate first production. Low (L), medium (M) or high (H) risks are indicated. PROGRAM FORECAST COMPARISON (First Unit Production) Developer Best Worse. Independent Task Case Case. Evaluator Force IRV 81(L) B1(L) a1(L) Special Armor TBAT 83(M-H) 85(L) 85(L-M) 86(1) Special Armor 75mm Cun 84(H) — 86(M-H) 88 (L-M) 86(H) Other Considerations. Force readiness is a critically important con- sideration. Growing threat capabilities place a premium on achieving imereased readiness as soon as possible. As the previous discussion of schedules and risks indicate, the IFV offers a marked advantage over the conceptual alternatives in this key area. I-10 UNCLASSIFIEDRegarding strategic mobility, a more survivable follow-on vehicle with special armor would be larger and heavier than the presently progranmed Vehicle. Assuming that a follow-on may approach the size and weight of an XM-1 tank, air transportability would be limited to the C5 aircraft. Present contingency plans portray the prepositioning in Europe of most heavy and oversize combat vehicles. Under those contingency plans the limitation to C5 aircraft transportability is not a significant factor in deploying to Europe. Deployment times to the Middle East would be longer. ‘s more survivable vehicle is readily transportable in most marine vessels. Conclusions. Based upon consideration of all factors, the following conclusions were reached concerning @ more survivable follow-on vehicle. Conceptual vehicles analyzed provided increased effectiveness. This effectiveness increase is offset by large burdens: High investment cost. ‘An unacceptable delay in increasing readiness. Medium to high technical risk. Therefore, a more survivable infantry fighting vehicle does not appear at this time to be the appropriate means to increase total force effectivenes. However, future needs in terms of threat increases should continue to be studied and a variety of alternatives - force mixes, tactical doctrine, hardware options - should be considered for appropriate solutions. OVERALL STUDY CONCLUSIONS In response to the Congressional Directive, the conclusions are as follows: The Army requires an infantry fighting vehicle. The design of the IFV is acceptable. ‘Amore survivable follow-on vehicle does not appear at this time to be the appropriate means to increase total force effectiveness. How- ever, future needs in terms of threat increases should continue to be studied and a variety of alternatives - force mixes, tactical doctrine, hardware options - should be considered for appropriate solutions. STUDY RECOMMENDATION Continue development of the IFV/CFV for fielding as soon as possible. I-lL oui ME UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED ERR IL. THE THREAT 1. ,(U) Introduction, The mechanized infantry, as part of the combined arms team, is faced with a potent and growing threat in the European Theater. The requirement for and the design of an infantry fighting vehicle is strongly influenced by this threat. Of particular significance is the nature and magnitude of threat weaponry and equipment, both now ‘and in the future, which impact on the effectiveness and survivability of our ground forces, This chapter is not intended as a definitive discussion of Warsaw Pact tactical operations and organization. These are adequately addressed in detail in numerous publications. It is intended instead to describe the major factors which are of relevance to our responsibility for determining the appropriate roles and equipment for mechanized infantry. For this reason, only a brief description of the overall threat facing us in Europe is described, followed by a summary of the principal offensive tactical options employed by Warsaw Pact forces. The discussion is concerned with offensive operations only, since that constitutes the basic threat for which our forces must be prepared, More detail is provided describing selected items of materiel dn the hands of the Soviets now, and anticipated in the future. The evaluation of future weaponry is of particular importance to consideration of a follow-on vehicle. It should be noted that no projections can be made with absolute certainty since our information is limited and many factors will influence the direction of development and fielding of equipment. A section is included to illustrate recent trends in threat materiel development to provide insight into potential future develop- ments, Also shown is a rough estimate of comparative US and Soviet status in key technological areas. The specific projected increases in threat capabilities which were used in our combat simulations are explained in Chapter V. . (8) General. a. Since the end of World War II the Soviets have been maintaining a forward area strategy -- a strategy that is now preoccupied with the initial stages of war with either NATO or the Peoples Republic of China. Their posture reflects their concern with a two front war and their assumption that the initial stages of war are critical for success. They believe that by quickly seizing the initiative their strong forward forces can decide the outcome within a relatively short time. Their overall concept has not changed. b. The Warsaw Pact is capable of mounting a short warning attack in central Europe with an initial force of about 40 divisions within 96 hours. Within 8 days of the start of pre-combat preparations, some 58 forward-based Warsaw Pact divisions could be assembled for an attack, and, if prior reinforcement from the Western USSR was desired, as many as 85-90 divisions could be available within 14 days from the start of Pact mobilization. The total Warsaw Pact force available for commitment Il-1 ae UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSINIED against Central Europe could number as high as 130 divisions within 60 days if the Soviet Strategic Reserve was committed against NATO's Central Region. ¢. The Warsaw Pact ground combat forces facing NATO are comprised of highly mobile maneuver forces amply supported by artillery and air. Soviet forces make up the core of the Warsaw Pact forces, and equipment, doctrine, and tactics are relatively standard throughout the force. Maneuver forces are predominantly motorized rifle and tank, supported by @ large quantity of artillery weapons of various types and calibers. Air Defense is provided by a highly sophisticated and integrated system of Air Defense guns, guided missiles, and interceptor aircraft. Air elements supporting ground forces include tactical aircraft, in the form of fighter/ground attack aircraft, and transport aircraft, and observation and attack helicopters. Reconnaissance/target acquisition assets run the gamut from sophisticated airborne EW platforms to specially trained reconnaissance units. Warsaw Pact forces work under a doctrine which calls for the rapid breaching of forward enemy defenses followed by deep penetration into the enemy rear area. Continuous operations are envisioned in a war of limited duration (12-15 days). Warsaw Pact forces are trained to operate in both the conventional and nuclear/chemical environment. 3. W) Strategy and Tactics. a, Throughout their writings they have emphasized their belief that highly mobile armored forces amply supported by artillery and combat aircraft, making rapid and deep penetrations into enemy rear areas will ensure the successful seizure of their ultimate objective. In planning the attack, the Theater Commander would strive to achieve the following objectives: Achieve a breakthrough Defeat enemy reserves before they deploy Establish and maintain offensive momentum Seize or destroy key control and conmunication points Seal off sources of support to forward tactical forces Force an ultimate surrender b. While the Soviets appear to be prepared to wage either nuclear or conventional warfare, they believe that it is their highly mobile forces and their tactics of rapid and deep penetration which will quickly overwhelm their opposition. Although the October 1973 war UNCLASSIFIEDreaffirms the Soviet belief in combined arms operations, Soviet doctrine and tactics for ground operations have not significantly changed since Ww II. c. At the tactical level, the three principle eneny offensive operations which our forces mist anticipate are the break- through attack, the meeting engagement, and potentially a more decentralized offensive tactic sometimes referred to as a “daring thrust". (2) Breakthrough. (a) Defense against a breakthrough attack is a major challenge facing our forces, for if successful it may force a rapid decision. In the breakthrough attack, threat forces concentrate combat power on a narrow front with first echelon elements supported by air and artillery. (Figure II-1). These forces are to achieve a rupture of our defenses which can be subsequently exploited by following echelons to make rapid gains and deep penetrations. This tactic requires highly centralized control. Combined arms teamwork is generally conducted at regimental level, rather than at lower echelons. The breakthrough requires the defender to locate the main attack and concentrate firepower and forces to prevent a rupture of his defenses. (b) Given the advantageous ratio of combat power possessed by the attacker, and the danger of being fixed and destroyed or bypassed, the defender must conduct an active defense which will continously attrit the enemy and slow and block his advance. Mobility, flexibility, and accurate and responsive firepower must characterize the defender's operations. Mechanized infantry must possess the capability to operate in this fast moving, lethal environment. They must also, however, have the capability, of holding key positions against eneny assault should the overall situation dictate. Figure I-1 oN Breakthrough 11-3(2) Meeting Engagement. (a) The meeting engagement is the type of combat action which occurs when two opposing forces "meet" on the battlefield (Figure II-2). It is characterized by rapid changes in the situation, fluid operations, fast changes in combat formations and open flanks for enemy and friendly forces. The Soviets consider it to be the most common offensive operation, They seek enemy contact in an undeveloped situation before the enemy has a chance to organize his defense. The objective of the meeting engagement is the destruction of the enemy force, normally by envelopment, and to secure terrain from which to continue the offensive. The Soviets anticipate that if they are successful in achieving a breakthrough, meeting engagements will typify their actions as they continue to advance rapidly. Soviet doctrine stresses the need to Seize the initiative in these situations and to rapidly meet enveloping/ flanking attacks to destroy the enemy and cut his line of retreat. (b) To succeed in meeting engagements, our forces, including mechanized infantry, must possess sufficient mobility and firepower relative to the enemy to quickly gain an advantage and avoid envelopment. —__—_ Figure 11-2 Meeting Engagement (3) Daring Thrust. (a) Warsaw Pact doctrine may evolve. Although standard doctrine has stressed the breakthrough and meeting engagements, current writings indicate that threat forces may opt for more decentralized tactics exploiting sur- prise, combined arms teanvork at lover echelons and increased conmand and control 11-4ere capabilities. Therefore a sterotyping of threat doctrine should be avoided in order that our own operations do not become stereotyped. (b) In a “daring thrust" operation, the enemy may attack on a broad front, perhaps with infantry-heavy forces under limited visibility conditions. (Figure II-3) These forces would seek to involve the defender in close engagement before the defense is established, preventing concentration of forces. The attacker would probe for weak spots in the defense and exploit local successes. Mechanized forces in uncommitted echelons would be prepared to rapidly exploit success gained by the initial elements, and attempt to achieve a deep penetration while defending forces were tied down and with limited ability to reinforce or counterattack. Surprise is an important element. (c) “Daring thrust" operations pose a complex challenge, requiring effective mounted and dismounted operations by our mechanized infantry, combined with mobility and firepower. Initially the eneny infantry must be countered, while transition to a more mobile employment may be required on short notice. Figure 11-3 7-4 ge~4 “Daring Thrust" II-54. (8) Materiel. 4, General. The capability to execute the above tactical options is provided by the wide array of weaponry possessed by the Warsaw Pact. The threat to the conbined arms team is posed by armored vehicles, artillery, antitank systems, and aircraft. The Warsaw Pact armored vehicle threat includes both tanks and lightly armored vehicles. Tank mounted weapons include 7.62mm and 12. 7mm machineguns and 100mm, 115mm and 125mm main guns. Lightly armored vehicles, APC's, IcV's and ARV's, all mount one or more machineguns (7.62mm to 14.5nm) while some also mount the 73nm smoothbore gun and anti-tank guided missiles. Artillery is employed in both the direct and indirect fire roles. Armor defeating rounds have been developed for all artillery calibers up to 152m. Anti-tank weapons include systems ranging fron manportable short range FAGOT and RPG-7 to crew served, vehicular mounted systems such as the uprated SWATTER and SAGGER. They employ heat warheads and have penetration capabilities from 12 to 20 inches of conventional armor. Anti-tank mines have shown improvements in fuzing and non-metallic caseing, but as yet there is little indication of the development of scatterable mines comparable with US models, Soviets have used both helicopters and mechanical mine layers to lay conventional mines. Aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary wing, pose an increasingly serious threat. The HIND-A, HIND-D and HIP-E carry ATCMs, 12. 7mm machineguns (12. 7am gatling gun on HIND-D), rockets and bombs. A possible 23nm twin barrel cannon has been reported but unconfirmed on the HIND-D (HIP-C has been seen also carrying rockets, bombs and cannons.) FITTER, FLOGGER, and FENCER aircraft are also expected to be employed in the ground attack role. b, Tanks, ‘The principal Warsaw Pact tanks of the 1982 time frame will be the 162, 164 and T72. A successor tank may enter service in the early 1980s. The 164 and 172 are assessed as having a number of improvements over their predecessors. Among these improvements are an increase in protection, possibly through improved armor materials such as electroslag remelt or thermo-mechanically treated steel as well as through greater obliquity observed on the glacis plate. The use of spaced or laminated armor has been reported but not confirmed. Fire control is expected to incorporate a laser rangefinder, computer, and improved turret stabilization. The main gun for both the T64 and 172 is a 125mm smoothbore. Improvements in ammunition, particularly in kinetic energy rounds, are expected as free world tank developments influence Soviet decisions or needed increases in capability. Along with higher energy propellants, employment of tungsten alloy penetrators appears to be an available choice of the Soviets. With large stocks of depleted uranium, Soviet development of DU penetrators in KE rounds is possible. The 164 and T72 have an automatic loader for the main gun, which will improve combat operations efficiency, although it may limit stowed load capacity. 11-6 Speen NCLASSINUNCLASSIFIED Night vision devices, possibly emphasizing passive systems, are expected to give the T64 and 172 increased combat capabilities. The successor to the 172, is already under development. It is expected to continue to show improvements in mobility, firepower and armor protection along the lines discussed earlier, and very likely will incorporate some type of improved arrayed armor such as laminates. In the 1987 time frame, the Warsaw Pact 130 division force discussed earlier would contain more than 34,000 tanks, the majority being T72's, with a good proportion of the successor tank. c. BMP. There will be a product improved version of the BMP on the battlefield in 1982; however, it should not be a radical departure from the vehicle in its present form. In 1982 it is expected that there will be one regiment in each motorized rifle division that is totally BMP equipped, and the motorized regiment organic to the tank division will be BMP equipped. The long range Soviet requirement is for a vehicle that incorporates the best features of both an automatic cannon and an infantry combat vehicle armed with a weapon that can engage and destroy tanks and fight in close proximity with the Soviet main battle tanks. 4. Artillery, ‘The Soviets, in deploying artillery in GSFG and the Western Military Districts, have proceeded along two lines -- the increase in numbers of weapons, and the replacement of towed with self-propelled (SP) weapons. All of the 122mm artillery (towed and SP) in Category I divisions has been increased in both BMP and non-BMP equipped motorized rifle regiments on a ratio of three to one. The 152mm SP gun is replacing towed 152mm artillery on a one-for-one basis in GSFG and in the Western Military Districts. In addition, the multiple rocket launcher regiment of the artillery division in GSFG now has two of its four battalions equipped with the new large caliber multiple rocket launchers, It is believed that a 203mm SP gun and the 240mm SP mortar will be deployed in addition to field artillery assets, anti aircraft gun systems in the 23mm to 100mm category operating in the ground support role pose a meaningful threat to lightly armored vehicles. Doctrinally, the Soviets believe that the firepower and mobility of the new self-propelled artillery permit it to concentrate rapidly, contributing to surprise. Mobility also contributes directly to artillery survivability. Furthermore, the Soviets believe that high speed operations limit casualties, losses of equipment, and consumption of fuel and ammunition. As mentioned earlier artillery is employed in both the direct and indirect fire role, and armor defeating rounds have been developed for all artillery calibers up to 152mm. Dual purpose improved conventional munitions are postulated for’ the 1980s. e, ATGMS. The Soviets have developed and are fielding a series of semi-automatic ATGM systems. These systems provide them with higher velocity, longer ranges, and increased hit probabilities, along with u-7ane! reduced gunner training requirements. The combined use of these improved AIGM's in the manportable, vehicular and heliborne modes presents a significantly increased ATGM threat to US armored vehicles as compared to the threat from the older manually controlled AIGM's. The Soviets maintain a continual R&D program devoted to the development of improved ATGM weapons and this R&D program has made great strides in laser development, infrared technology, and electronics. Although current evidence has not yet indicated the trend of improvement in heat warhead design or size, developments in armored vehicles in the Free World are likely to generate increases in penctration capabilities of Pact ATOM's resulting from better explosives, improved warhead design, and larger warhead size, The Soviets have deployed an uprated SAGGER and SWATTER with semi-automatic guidance and have deployed a new manportable semi- automatic ATGM — the FAGOT, they have developed and fielded at least one long range ATOM for both helicopter and vehicular mounting, and by 1980 they will have fielded a heliborne laser semi-active homing system ATCM that will have a better than 5 kilometer standoff. By 1987 they are projected to have two fully automatic (fire and forget) ATGM systems; a manportable one and a long range heliborne ATM. £, Helicopters. By the early 1970's there were strong indications that the Soviets were giving increased attention to armaments for its helicopters, The HIND, which became operational about this time, is believed to be the first Soviet helicopter designed primarily to attack ground targets. The HIND-D and the HIP-E with improved ATGN's illustrate the continual improvement in heliborne anti~armor systems. A continuation of the build-up and modernization of helicopter units to include the formation of additional air assault brigades and continued attention directed toward developing helicopters with specific combat operational capabilities and assorted armaments is expected well into the 1980's. Armaments better capable of attacking ground targets and hindering the movement of ground forces are also anticipated. By 1987 more than 1200 HIND and HIND follow-on helicopters are expected to be operational. g. Frontal Aviation. Soviet frontal aviation is undergoing significant evolutionary qualitative improvements that will upgrade their capabilities through the 1980's. Improvements in design and avionics will provide greater range and payloads as well as better adverse weather and standoff ground attack capability. Soviet air munitions in the 1980's will include a variety of guns, rockets, bombs and tactical air-to-surface missiles. Frontal aviation aircraft will continue to be equipped with 23 and 30mm guns; 57, 122, and 240mm rockets} cluster bombs and retarded bombs for low altitude delivery. Newer fighter-bombers are fitted with weapon release computers, and the early 1980's probably will bring operational laser and TV guided bombs. Many fighter-bombers will employ current AS-7 and AS~10 TASM's at effective ranges of 7,000 - 11,000 meters, and most Soviet high 11-8 secRere” SOR ARMHUNCLASSIFIED performance aircraft are expected to carry anti-radiation missile systems, There is a possibility that Soviet ground attack helicopters might in the near future employ some type of new TASM or ARM. 5. (S) Trends. The changing nature of the threat is illustrated by Soviet expansion and modernization of forces. As Figure IT-§ shows, Soviet forces have undergone considerable mechanization, as he has equipped his forces with modern hardware. Soviet Divisions Figure II-4 an AIRBORNE DIVISIONS INFANTRY 150) DIVISIONS MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS 100) 50} NUMBER OF DIVISIONS TANK DIVISIONS 1945 1950 1955 = 19601965 1970 1975 YEAR SOURCE: Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (USSR), Section IVA: Ground Forces, February 1978A principle feature of Soviet modernization has been the Fielding of combat vehicles - tanks, artillery, and infantry vehicles, Figures 11-5, 11-6 and II-7 portray the Soviet materiel development ana production OF ineradaneinese areas. The points on the graphs indicate the daces Of mttoduetion of new systems, ‘The US record i shown in the Tice at the bottom, While these large inventories of systems are noe alt oriented Fores AATO forces, they indicate the nodern nature of the enemy ove forces must be prepared to engage in large nusbers. US/USSR Tank Development 4 FIS) (U) February 1977 SOURCES: USSR Ground Forces Intelligence Study (GRO DD1-1100-145-77; DIA Fact Book, Conmunist World Forces (U) DD1-2680-13-77, Apr 1977 II-10 NCLASS iyUNCLASSIFIED, US/USSR Artillery Development Baad ie SOURCES: USSR Ground Forces Intelligence Study (GROFIS) (U) February 1977 DD1-1100-145-77; DIA Fact Book, Communist World Forces (U) DD1-2680-13-77, Apr 1977 eStORET I-l1 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED, US/USSR APC/ICV Development Figure 11-7 SOURCES: USSR Ground Forces Intelligence Study (GROFIS) (U) February 1977 DD1-1100-145-77; DIA Fact Book, Communist World Forces (U) DDL~2680-13-77, Apr 1977 II-12 NCLASSI SSHETEDUNCLASSIFUED, ie Amore detailed breakdown of US and Soviet inventories of items is in Figure 11-8. Soviet figures are estimates of those required to equip all Soviet ground forces. Total production figures are considerably higher. US/USSR Assets Figure 1-8 ASSETS US Ussh —Assers 2 2 1 8 ° 1 as _ 25,108 19S ‘% a mine artim arcucy han Ce et ornare ——— on rr anmiseny ysmicfiosT ~tzwr/se-— 11390 ssh ser sours a8 swe saaeise = 980 sr anes po8 func tzzmn 300 «200—onacon ssucrow theo houwo ur snow euicortEns rsdana ATTAGR Mee S80 aancum aeons 2335 unions osseavarion map ars ‘sescfontnst WeavY muri sae ain DeFEnse ARTY anaguutcan M560 4900 sraqousren zuma 2S 234 5 7302 seo EDeYE 0) ‘oadcnaranmat Sasa to gaan sage ni SOURCE: DIA Analysis, February 1977 SECRE RS II-13 UNCLASSIEI:D,UNCLASSIFIED. The Soviets have pursued an active research and development progran to accomplish their force modernization. An example is shown in Figure 11-9 which compares the history of US and USSR research and development of infantry vehicles. The horizontal bars terminate at the estimated dates of introduction of systems into the field, Figure 11-9 APC/ICV RD COMPARISON Us: MICV/IFV | M114 == M-113 —=s M59 USSR: BMD ——s BMP ae BROM-3 —s BRDM.2 le BROM ——sa BTR-70 — BTR-60 ——s BTR-50 —s BTR.40 BTR-152 50 55 60 65 70 5 SOURCE: Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (USSR), Section IVA: Ground Forces, February 1978UNCLASSIFIED enmET> omy The Soviets have been progressively exploiting technology for military modernization, Table II-1 is a rough comparison of potential US and USSR capabilities in selected categories of war materiel. Plus @) narks indicate a US advantage. Minus (-) indicates a Soviet advantage. Zero (0) indicates rough equality. Table II-1 POTENTIAL TRENDS IN SELECTED MATERIEL CATEGORIES US vs USSR 1973 1978 1983 1990 Missile Technology + + 2 2 - Warheads + + 2 2 - Range + + 2 2 - Guidance systems + + a z Gun Technology (Direct Fire) 2 2 > : - Range 0 ; . i = Accuracy 2 i . é - Rate of Fire ° 0 7 Pf Ammunition Technology 0 + 4 7 = KE Ammunition a fe ¥ fF - Chemical Energy Munitions + ee ; . See + + + 0 Armor Technology 1 2 7 Engine Technology rs Fe 7 0 = Surface ° ° ° 2 - Helicopter + + 0 ° Mobility ° ° ° = - Obstacle Crossing - = 7 fe - Strategic Mobility + + + 0 Generally, technology advancements either drive the development of new materiel or simply provide fixes for the deficiencies in existent equipment. However, advanced state of the art in given technology mist be tempered with the national design philosophy which may or may not fully exploit that capability; e.g., the Soviets have the technological capability to develop ICM for cannon artillery, but have foregone deployment of such; the US has for decades possessed the technological capability to develop effective mitiple rocket launcher systems, but has not. #*™: UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIEID cmrmny aki Additionally, given a technological capability, one mst consider the national capacity to apply it to real world systems, support Production in meaningful quantities, and also the ability of industry to mass produce the effected item of equipment. Thorough assessment of Soviet technological capabilities is hampered by the shallowness of our data base. It is unfortunate, but true, that our knowledge of Soviet technology is largely limited to what that closed society will allow us to learn, The "bathtub effect", whereby we learn of their new technological advancements only after application in newly developed/deployed weapons systems, is real. The specific comparisons indicated above are somewhat speculative. However, it is important to acknowledge that a US lead in a number of highly technical key war materiel categories cannot be assumed in the future. 6. (U) Conclusion. The combined arns team is confronted by an enemy with modern weaponry in large numbers. If past trends are any indication, the threat will continue to increase. Warsaw Pact forces also have a variety of tactical options open to them, particularly since the attacker will have the initiative in the initial stages of conbat. These considerations place large demands on our mechanized infantry, which is an integral part of our combined arns team. T1-16UNCLASSIFIED III, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE 1, (U) Introduction. a, The requirement for an infantry vehicle must be assessed in the total context of how infantry must operate. The role of the infantry is complex. Since it is more general purpose than other arms, infantry has diverse functions which frequently change due to battlefield conditions, and interacts in a wide variety of ways with the other elements of the combined arms team. This is due also to force structure constraints which require flexibility. ‘The basic requirement is derived from how mechanized infantry must fight on the European battlefield against a modern enemy as a part of the combined arms team. b. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of certain key features of the European battlefield which are of particular importance to the infantry. A short survey of US Army tactical doctrine then provides the basic framework in which combined arms operations take place. Only a summary of general concepts is presented here since detailed explanation of doctrine is found in "How to Fight" manuals. The capabilities of the combined arms are next discussed, pointing out the complementary and unique capabilities of armor, artillery, and infantry. Following that discussion is an analysis of the specific tasks required of the infantry which was conducted in conjunction with TRADOC, based on doctrine for European combat. A defensive scenario of how a typical mechanized infantry force must operate and perform the required tasks in Europe is provided for illustration. Next, review of the short- comings of the M113A1, and the required performance capabilities for an infantry vehicle describe what is needed. Finally, a summary of the doctrine developed for the employment of infantry equipped with the IFV is included to describe how the fighting vehicle will be utilized. 2. (U) Key Features of the European Battlefield. a, The principal challenge to the mechanized infantry is combat on the European battlefield in conjunction with the other elements of the combined arms team, The threat is the most important factor on the European battlefield, as described in the previous chapter (Threat). Warsaw Pact operations are characterized by employment of combined arms, employing mobility, mass, and large scale firepower. b. Another important factor is terrain. Figure III-1 shows the degree to which the terrain in Central Germany varies. The infantry ILI-1 UNCLASSTFIEDUNCLASSIFIED role is particularly important in built up and broken areas, where rapid, large scale maneuver by mounted forces is inhibited. Combined gums teamwork between infantry and armor must be carefully integrated dm areas of mixed terrain, where both arms have application and must complement each other. Figure III-1 TERRAIN VARIES WIDELY IN CENTRAL GERMANY BUILT-UP AREAS: MIXED TERRAIN ‘OPEN AREAS 22% 50% 28% SOURCE: MILITARY TERRAIN DESCRIPTION OF FRG, 1977 111-2 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED cs Adverse weather and poor visibility are also important factors on the European battlefield. During much of the year extensive periods of fog often limit visibility, as shown in Figure III-2. As visibility diminishes, the opportunity for engagement at extended ranges is reduced. Under these conditions, infantry becomes particularly important, and its role on the battlefield changes due to ability to provide security and fight at close range dismounted. Figure 111-3 illustrates two extremes of visibility, depending on season and fog conditions. Figure ITI-2 SEASONAL VISIBILITY CENTRAL GERMANY es ° 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a FREQUENCY OF FOG DURATION OF FOG IN (DAYS PER SEASON) HOURS ABOUT 1 OF 3 MORNINGS WILL HAVE VISIBILITY OF LESS THAN 1KM (FALL AND WINTER) 111-3 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED Visibility Extremes - Germany Figure I1I-3 NIGHT. — BEST CASE WORST CASE SUMMER/NO FOG WINTER/EXTENDED FOG III-4 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED 3. (U) US Army Tactical Doctrine. a. General. US Army tactical doctrine is designed for a fast moving highly mobile battle against a modern mechanized enemy which possesses numerically superior forces and firepower. The basic tenets of this doctrine are: (2) Adequate forces and weapons must be concentrated at critical times and places. (2) The battle must be fought using cover, concealment, suppression and combined arms teamwork. (3) The battle must be controlled and directed so that the maximum effects of fire and maneuver are concentrated at decisive locations. c. Defense. (2) To offset the numerical superiority and the effect of massed indirect fires the US Army fights an active defense. The objective of this defense is to attrit and destroy the eneny - not to hold terrain. To prevent the destruction of the defending force and to maintain the coherence of defense, mutually supporting battle positions are established in depth and are occupied, located and reoccupied as required to attrit the enemy. Like a moving shield this defense constantly confronts the enemy thrusts and forces him to dissipate his fires and maneuver in space and time, Once the enemy force has been sufficiently weakened it is then destroyed by a counterattack or massed fires. (2) Organization of the Battlefield. The defense against enemy forces is organized into two areas ~ the covering force area and the main battle area. (a) Covering Force Area (CFA). The tasks of forces in the CFA are to find the enemy and fight the enemy with sufficient strength so that he will deploy and reveal his main attack. Forces in this area are normally antitank heavy (tanks, attack helicopters, TOWs). The covering force seeks to inflict enough destruction on the enemy to strip away his reconnaissance screen, force him to deploy, bring up artillery, and organize an attack, thereby forcing him to expend time and revealing his composition, strength, capabilities and intentions. (b) Main Battle Area (MBA). Forces in the MBA fight the decisive battle to destroy the enemy. Forces in this area may be intially mechanized infantry heavy, with more tanks entering the battle after III-5 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIPTED accomplishment of the covering force mission. Reserves in the MBA are used to block penetrations, reinforce committed units, and conduct counterattacks. Counterattacks are conducted where there is a high probability of success and are executed so that the counterattack force is not exposed to enemy overwatch fire. (c) Defense mist possess these qualities: 1, Depth and density of antiarmor weapons sufficient to absorb and defeat an armored attack. 2. Flexibility to enable weapons and units to be redeployed to mass combat power against either a mounted or dismounted attack. 3, Effective against dismounted and mounted attack during periods of reduced visibility. 4, Offense, The outcome of battle is ultimately determined by the attack. The primary purpose of the offensive is to destroy the eneny. ‘The principal method by which this is accomplished is to break through the eneny's defensive system, destroying his maneuver elements and driving violently and rapidly into his rear area to destroy his artillery, air defense, conmand posts, logistics, support, and command and control systems. Occasionally, offensive operations are conducted for other purposes -- to secure terrain and to determine enemy strength and Gispositions. Regardless of the mission assigned, the attacker concentrates overwhelming combat power at points of his own choosing to break through the enemy's position and destroy his capability to fight. The US Arny conducts the following offensive operations: movement to contact, hasty attack, deliberate attack. 4. (U) Combined Arms Capabilities. a. Combined arms teamwork is essential. The US Army must rely on a mixture of forces, a mixture best prepared to encounter the eneny across a wide range of battlefield conditions, ‘This is portrayed conceptually in Figure III-4. 111-6 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED. Figure ITI-4 ARMS HAVE UNIQUE & SHARED COMBAT CAPABILITIES UNIQUE TASKS + SHARED CAPABILITIES = COMPLEMENTARY, BALANCED AND LESS VULNERABLE FORCES } \ ; poo Infantry operates best within the combined arms team - all menbers of which have both unique and shared capabilities. Infantry, armor and artillery must interact closely. Although not shown, other elements such as combat engineers, air defense, attack helicopters and close air support also play important roles. The general capabilities of each of the three arms is briefly summarized in the next three paragraphs. (2) General Armor Capabilities. Armor is capable of destroying tanks, lightly armored vehicles and infantry. It can fire and maneuver rapidly on the. battlefield and withstand enemy suppressive fires. But in close terrain and poor visibility, tanks are vulnerable to dismounted infantry attack. Tanks also are limited in their capability to hold terrain. (2) General SP Artillery Capabilities. Artillery is capable of. providing long range indirect fires. It can engage single or multiple ILI-7 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED targets. It can deliver special munitions including: smoke and illumination, precision guided munitions, mines, and improved conventional munitions (ICM). But artillery cannot hold or seize terrain, and artillery is not always immediately available. (3) General Mechanized Infantry Capabilities. Mechanized infantry is capable of holding terrain dismounted. It can destroy tanks, lightly armored vehicles and infantry either mounted or dismounted. It can provide surveillance and security under all conditions either mounted or dismounted. It can fire and maneuver mounted or dismounted. But infantry is vulnerable to all weapons when dismounted and its current capabilities are limited by the infantry carrier (M113Al). b. Combined Arms Characteristics. While many functions are often shared, the verious arms are optimized for different functions, and there are certain ones for which a particular arm is best, or uniquely suited. Figure III-5 illustrates the complementary nature of the three principle combined arms, while indicating certain unique functions such as dismounted fire and maneuver for infantry. The fact that many functions can be performed by more than one arm is significant. This enables the team to compensate for limitations in forces. Were all elements highly specialized more forces would be necessary. Figure III-5 SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS PERFORMED® ARMOR «ARTILLERY INFANTRY 1, Sunveruiance ** ia x 2. Destroy Tanks 3, Destroy Lr ARwoReD Vew & ATGM 4. Destroy INFANTRY 5. Destroy ARTiLLERY/AD 6, Suppress Tanks x 7. Suppress Lr ArwoReD Ven & ATGM x x 8, Suppress Inranrey x x COEQQQOQ~ 9, Suppress Anritieny/AD 10, Fine ano ManeuveR MounreD CIneuuoina Assur) ®@ ‘Ls Fine ano Haneuven DisnounteD (Inewuoine Assauer) 12, How Teneain x 13, Ewrace Ossractes x CIRCLES INDICATE FUNCTIONS FOR WHICH ARH 1S BEST SUITED: ‘TA PRIMARY FUNCTION OF CAVALRY, III-8 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED (U) Mechanized Infantry and Armored Cavalry Task Analysis. a, In conjunction with TRADOC, a list of specific tasks which nechanized infantry and armored cavalry are required to perform on the modern battlefield was derived from the challenge of the European committment, analysis of US Army doctrine and the requirement for a balanced combined arms team within constrained forces. These tasks singly or in various combinations describe the performance requirements for all missions. be A rank order and relative the US Army Armor and Infantry Schools for inf: importance respectively, based on the task definitions. These tvo analyses were conducted independently. shown in Figure II1-6. Figure ILI-6 Overall Approach - Task fmavewenr ro] ‘CONTACT arrack ‘ATTACK assessment was conducted by antry and cavalry, ‘The overall approach is Analysis hoor ese ‘prionirzeo ccomaslenaie aco ras | oF TASK ara | mae Leosmon JT] odddnance srnowarow U4 q1-9 ‘UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED Gavaible HI-1, Mechanized Infantry Tasks, and Table 11-2, Auoeed cavalry Tasks. Each matrix box contains both the rank order ses relative dnportance number for the task within the particular mission. the funber in the left of each box is the rank order of a task ta relation eaethek tasks, This indicates in priority which are the most aad least important tasks to the accomplishment of the mission. The relative weight of a task rating 1s the second number. This represents ‘how much the Performance of this task, compared to all other tasks, contibures fo the successful accomplishnent of the mission. This vas done by advocating points so that the total for all tasks in one mission yotaled 1000 points. The discrete numbers which are found in the dace may iply ¢ greater degree of precision than is intended. These are nereiy @ reflection of the analytical approach which was necessary te erence @ relative ordering of tasks. The specific numbers are not significect. 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Yelle! ‘eBuyssox9 z9ata 3oNpUED saeTa08en, onRGORNRE AATLVTEM/ALTAOTES _ ‘SASVE 40 NOTLYYTEXS saSvE ca THRERO aktod HOW ova wovasY “OL AAvAOHLIN xw14a ~ONOWIS IHOTA SIVWRGYTGO “XISVH INDUUAGK ¢WOISSYR ——«SUSVL_ANINVANT GUZTINVHOGK —_—se aa asNaddo 'NOLLVEEAO TVOTLOVE SONDINVA GNV SIROTAN USVI SAINVENT aaZTHVHORH Terr eae III-11A SyUNCLASSIFIED Eee wis coro ecioe teste ree cee boise wie oh WL OME BIL MRIS ERIE TOK EIT ee ee ova sist seve ore ont/e only atin ney GSI SIS SSIS ID 4 cum cuts Wn Onis SISOS mI BML HL IS aie yee eit cree ocrer ei9 THE osm own ssin ey eee | See tn ly GOLIe LIE 70/e Ie HOHE TIE O6fe UIE SOLE UE rime cmt exist esre oat tle 95 SERIE ert Ut serene _ sys Lear post vo ana 7 z ana semto nmoas rpmesromeom [atin sautyoq pue sfuyyuey sex AaTeAe9 poxomy Z-111 oT0eLoreesse, secure azcomarssance tucriex. rssion, PO 78 ants! sexs oun come frove- ark rvorte. rusurn m9 mis 1136 98 9196 9/39 5763 sya ans, ons g a UNCLASSIFID RDNA : 8 3 3 3 § go a z g 8 153 6h war ura oe & naps waa wena soma arvana ws ams ws 6rs7 ora am as : 3UNCLASSTFIED c. The overall value of a task's importance was then derived by multiplying the weight by frequency of mission occurance. The frequency of occurrance for each mission was derived from SCORES European Scenario sequence 2A and 3A. The numerical values thus derived provided an aggregated weighted value for all tasks. An example of the statistical approach is shown in Table 111-3. UNCLASSIFIED TII-14UNCLASSIFIED Table I11~3 Task Analysis Methodology - Example The relative weight of a task for a particular mission was derived as follows: Relative Weight of = Frequency of x Frequency of x Weight Assigned Task for Miesion Operation Mission To Task Then, to determine the aggregated relative weight of the task for all missions, this process was completed for each mission and the results added together. Shown below is an extract from the data showing one task, Destroy Light Armored Vehicles. OPERATION: lorrense (122 DEFENSE 73% | RETROGRADE 15% MISSION: Move- | Hasty] Deli- | Fight | strong- | Delay | Withdraw ment Tol Atk | berate | From | Point Contact| Attack | BM oz) | 10z| soz | 90x | 10x | sox 20% TASK: Destroy Lt Armored Veh (Mounted) +082 | .079 |.090 | .087 | .o91 087 cles in a movement to The relative weight for Destroy Light Armo: contact is: 12% x 10% x .088 = This process was repeated for all missions and aggregated, as shown below: Destroy Lt Armored Veh (Mounted) 0010} 0077] .0591] .0089 |.0100] 0025 Relative Weight for this Task: III-15 UNCLASSIFIED4, ‘The resulting prioritized lists of infantry and cavalry tasks are shown in Tables I1I-4 and III-5. Also shown with the infantry tasks are the associated relative weights as percentages. It is significant that many of the infantry tasks are roughly equal in Importance, with no major variances in relative weight. This reflects the fact that infantry is a general purpose arm with many diverse responsibilities. Any vehicle it is provided must therefore be capable of numerous roles, and numerous trade offs are required. The infantry tasks are divided into mounted and dismounted as shown in Table III-6. For clarity certain of the previous tasks have been aggregated. Note that mechanized infantry has many dismountedtasks. These are of primary importance. TABLE ITI-4 MECHANIZED INFANTRY TASKS Surveillance, Security & Patrolling 10.0% Destroy Enemy Tanks (Dismounted) 9.1% Destroy Lt Armored Vehicles (Mounted) 9.0% Destroy Eneny Tanks (Mounted) 8.4% Suppress While Stationary 8.42 Destroy Lt Armored Vehicles (Dismounted) 7.8% Destroy Enemy Infantry Mounted 7.1% Fight Dismounted 7.4% Destroy Enemy Infantry (Dismounted) 7.3% Suppress While Moving 7.1% Move With Tanks 6.4% Operate In Built Up Areas 4.0% Negotiate Water Obstacles 3.9% Close With Enemy Mounted 3.5%UNCLASSIEN enckaceate TABLE III~5 ARMORED CAVALRY TASKS Observation Conducts Movement Provide Continuity of Communications Gain & Maintain Contact Suppress Destroy Threat Tanks (Nounted) Destroy Threat Lt Armor (Mounted) Destroy Threat Infantry (Mounted) Negotiate Obstacles Emplace Obstacles Assault Operate From An Occupied Position Destroy Threat Antitank Weapons (Mounted) Bypass Destroy Threat Tanks (Dismounted) Destroy Threat Lt Armor (Dismounted) Destroy Threat Infantry (Dismounted) Operate in Built Up Area Destroy Threat Antitank Weapons (Dismounted) TABLE III-6 MECHANIZED INFANTRY TASKS Mounted Tasks Destroy Tanks Destroy Light Armored Vehicles Destroy Infantry Suppress While Stationary or Moving Move Under Fire With Combined Arms Team Close With Eneny Negotiate Water Obstacles Dismounted Tasks Observation, Security and Patrolling Destroy Tanks Destroy Light Armored Vehicles Destroy Infantry Operate in Built Up Areas Fire and Maneuver Breach and Emplace Obstacles 11-17 wetsUNCLASSIFIED GRPIRErTEE ‘The tasks thus developed for the infantry form the basis for assessing the requirement for a fighting vehicle. Additionally, they provide a standard against which to measure the adequacy of a vehicle in meeting the infantry requirement. This latter will be addressed in Chapter IV, which is concerned with assessing the design of the IFV. Cavalry tasks also serve the same purpose, although the primary area of investigation is for the infantry requirement. aur, 6. (C) Operational Illustration. a. ‘The requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle derives from the tasks it must perform on the battlefield. As an illustration of how mechanized infantry must perform these tasks on the European battle~ field, a discussion of the operations of a battalion task force in the Meinigen Cap area is used. Although much of the public discussion of an infantry fighting vehicle has focused upon its contribution to offensive operations, the illustration used here stresses the defense. This was done because of the importance attached to the European battle- field, in which initial battles are expected to be defensive in nature. The characteristics of a fighting vehicle, however, are also appropriate in offensive operations. Given the mobile nature of modern warfare, there is often little observable distinction between the specific tasks required of mechanized infantry is defensive and offensive conbat, particularly at the small unit level. The vehicle used is a battalion task force operation, This battalion operates within a division context, with other battalions on its flanks. It's frontage is a result of both requirements for defense, and forces available to the commander to conduct a forward defense with relatively light division reserves. The illustrations of the operations shown are snapshots of an action which might be expected to last from 25 to 45 minutes. The battalion defense sector is shown on the sketch in Figure Ill-7. The Sector is 6-7 kilometers wide. The terrain contains both open areas suitable for mechanized operations as well as villages, wooded areas and hills which inhibit mounted combat. Assigned to defend this area is a battalion task force, composed of two tank companies and one mechanized infantry company. The primary maneuver elements consist of 6 tank platoons and 3 mechanized infantry platoons, b. Figure III-8 illustrates how the battalion will initially defend this area, under daylight conditions and excellent visibility. UNCLASSIFIED 111-18UNCLASSIiD Figure II-7 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED hE, (2) In preparation for the defense, obstacles ~~ anti-personnel and antitank mines — were emplaced on likely enemy avenues of approach to slow or stop him. (2) scouts are out front to provide surveillance and security. (3) The 6 tank platoons are positioned to cover the open ground which is the most dangerous avenue into our area for by enemy mechanized forces. (4) An infantry platoon is on the right covering the hilly, wooded avenue of approach, against possible dismounted attack. ‘There are also TOW vehicles to provide long range antitank fires. (5) Another infantry platoon is positioned in the forward edge of the village, to take advantage of the cover and concealnent it offers, as well as the key location of the village on the main road. During the operation the specific actions of the platoon on the east flank will be singled out for discussion. c. As the enemy approaches, the cavalry, in its covering force role, brings him under direct fire. We engage him also with artillery and long range TOWs from our forward positions, as well as with our attack helicopters. Other major contributors to the battle are artillery, tanks, combat engineers, air defenders and close air support. 4. Figure III-9 focuses on the infantry platoon on the right flank. Here the platoon performs several key tasks, both mounted and dismounted, in order to destroy and attrit the enemy as he moves in from across the border. By being on the ground the riflemen are prepared to detect and destroy any eneny effort to take advantage of the infantry dismounted approach. Since the platoon must engage the enemy while under fire, it needs to have long range antitank and anti-personnel weapons capability, protected by armor. Starting at the TOW maximum range - 3000 meters, and continuing on in until he is within the range of the Dragon ~ 1000 meters - destructive antitank fires are directed against the oncoming eneny tanks. It is also necessary to bring his light armored vehicles, such as the BMP, under destructive fires before he gets in close enough to use his 73nm gun effectively. For this a cannon is needed which will shoot accurately out to 2500 meters. UNCLASSIFIED, eT aed BBE,Figure 111-9 e. If the eneny has elected to mass his forces in this area, it will dictate elastic defensive tactics on our part. The battalion must destroy and attrit his forces as he moves forward. Before becoming decisively engaged in forward positions, its maneuver elements move to battle positions further south. Figure III-10 portrays the battalion in its next series of battle positions. As the eneny continues to press south, he is again engaged by TOWs at long range, then tank fires; and then by Dragons. The platoons on the right have taken up positions from which they can engage the enemy from the flank and deny to him the wooded approaches into the sector of defense. URBERTIRS » IIL-20 CLASSIFIED.Figure ITI-10 Apes ate f. By this time the enemy has been blocked by the combined fires of the battalion. Now he attempts to bypass by shifting the momentum Of his attack to the west, as shown in Figure III-11, The battalion fust react quickly to counter this enemy initiative. To maintain the cohesiveness of the defense, the commander orders those least engaged Glenents which are on the right, to move rapidly and occupy battle positions to the west. These moves are covered by suppressive fires from the supporting artillery. The infantry platoon being focused on ds a part of this shift, and is ordered to this battle position. Good nobility for mechanized infantry is essential in this type situation Since it must move with the combined arms tean. Enroute it must be prepared to meet eneny elements which may have gotten through in the a {11-22 UNCLASSIFIED.TINCLASS iii meme earlier fight, since the pace of the battle can be rapid on the Tietized battlefield, and forces may become intermingled. Figure ITI-12 ceeratrates such @ situation. Enroute the infantry platoon unexpectedly nects ~ through a chance encounter - a small enemy element with airs which has slipped through. To survive, and be able to get to the tha agave Position in time, the platoon mst quickly engage and destroy the eneny and keep moving. This shows a clear need to Leable to tire effectively from the vehicle while on the move. I? the platoon must halt or dismount to effectively engage the eneny it will have much less chance of winning. Figure III-11 LASSIEUNCLASSIEULD Figure ITI-12 g. Figure III-13 illustrates another likely situation which could occur. As the platoon continues to move, it is fired upon by protected enemy antitank weapons from a wooded area, The vehicles quickly return fire, and nove to 2 covered position, ‘The squads dismount, and maneuver on foot around the flank to destroy those enemy gunners, by dismounted fire and maneuver. Their movement is covered by suppressive cannon fires from their vehicles, The ability to lay down a high volume of suppressive fire is very important in a situation like this, The infantry platoon frequently performs this task in support of tanks, Had the eneny been’armed only with light automatic weapons, the platoon may have closed with the enemy,mounted, syppressing then on the move from the vehicle, both with automatic weapons and small arms. To do so effectively, the infantry clearly needs stabilized and armor protected firepower. T1T~24 UNCLASSIALDUNCLASSIFiL Figure I1I-13 Q iv © INFANTRY CORRENTE III-25, UNCL ASS ea ara, FIDhs The operation thus far has been conducted in daylight, under good visibility conditions, But, poor visibility is common on the European battlefield. If fog has moved in, there is no longer good observation at long ranges, Fire fights will now begin at closer ranges - as close as 100 to 300 meters - and the enemy may attempt to nove in with dismounted infantry. In this situation we would organize the defense differently as shown in Figure TIT-14. Here dispositions have changed considerably - especially for the infantry. They are augmenting the scouts in their covering force role, both mounted and dismounted. They are also closely integrated with the tanks to provide close in security. Again, they are covering the wooded hill mass on the right to prevent the enemy from using this infentry approach. They would operate much the same at night. For this reason the infantry vehicle needs a good night fighting capability. Pigure IIT-14 = INFANTHY © NCLASS|UNCLASSIFIED ee a i. This operation has illustrated the demanding tasks we expect of the infantry. It was required to perform repeatedly the mounted and dismounted tasks discussed earlier. Not illustrated was the need to negotiate water obstacles due to the terrain selected for the scenario. In some situations, however, this task may be of the utmost importance. 7. (WU) Assessment of the Current Infantry Vehicle. The foregoing discussion illustrated the manner in which mechanized infantry must operate on the Furopean battlefield. Currently it is inhibited in the performance of many of its tasks due to the limitations of the M113A1 armed only with an unstabilized 50 cal, machinegun. In order to fire the weapon, the gunner is exposed. The limitations of the ML13A1 related to tasks, are as follows: INFANTRY TASKS Mounted M13. Destroy Tanks No Mounted Antitank Capability Destroy Light Armored Vehicles Cannot Outrange or Defeat BMP Destroy Infantry Weaponry Unstabilized and Inaccurate Suppress While Stationary or Stationary Capability Only Moving Move Under Fire w/Combined Arms Poor Mobility, Weapons Not Protected ‘Team Close with Eneny Limited Protection and Firepower Negotiate Water Obstacles Yes Dismounted Observation, Security & Patrolling Destroy Tanks Destroy Light Armored Vehicles Does not provide adequate supporting fire for dismounted Destroy Infantry squad due to inadequate and unstabilized firepower. Operate in Built Up Areas Fire and Maneuver Breach and Emplace Obstacles mee ee UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED ‘The Limitations of the M113 are summarized as follows? ~ Inadequate Firepower = No antitank capability - Cannot defeat BMP = Unstablized 50 cal. machinegun = Unprotected Weapons - Poor Mobility 8 (U) Performance Capabilities Required, In order for the infantry to perform its required tasks, a vehicle is needed with the following performance capabilities: a. Long range weapons capability, night and day, under armor, against tanks, lightly armored vehicles (particularly BMP), and dismounted troops. b, Mobility compatible with tanks. ¢. Stabilized cannon/machinegun (shoot on the move capability). 4. Protection against artillery, automatic weapons and small arms. e. Capacity to carry a squad and its equipment for dismounted operations. Swim capability. ‘These capabilities would enable the infantry to fully perform in the manner necessary. 9. (U) Doctrine for the Employment of an Infantry Fighting Vehilce. a, ‘The foregoing discussion has described how mechanized mechanized infantry is required to operate in Europe, and the vehicle capabilities needed. ‘The US Army has developed definitive doctrine for the employment of mechanized infantry equiped with a fighting vehicle (IFV). The doctrine and tactics described in FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad; FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team; FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force; and TC 7-24, Antiarmor Tactics and Techniques for Mechanized Infantry provide the basis for the effective employment of an IFV by combined arms forces on the battlefield. A summary of this 11-28 UNCLASSIFIED‘UNCLASSIFIED doctrine is provided in this section. This describes how the required performance capabilities would be exploited. . Offense, (1) The Infantry Fighting Vehicle will enable the mechanized infantry to perform its offensive mission with required effectiveness by furnishing: (a) The tactical mobility necessary for mechanized infantry to better fight in conjunction with and in support of tanks. (b) The armor required to significantly improve the protection provided to mechanized infantrymen against eneny artillery and small arms fire while employing the on-board weapons. (c) The advanced firepower required to suppress and/or kill enemy elements whether remaining mounted or dismounted. (2)_Although equipped with mounted weaponry, the primary purpose of the IFV renains that of serving as a squad fighting vehicle, to facilitate the employment of dismounted infantry. The vehicle is normally employed/positioned/located with the mechanized infantry squad in the performance of the close-in infantry mission. The ATCM reinforces the fires of the squad against a mounted enemy force and provides a greater density of long range antitank weapons for the conbined arms force as a whole, (3) In the attack, mechanized infantry forces mounted in IFV's move with the combined arms team remaining mounted when the tactical situation permits, When attacking mounted, the squad fires on the move, delivering suppressive fires with the IFV's automatic cannon or coaxial machinegun and firing port weapons. The tanks are protected by these suppressive fires from close-in enemy antitank weapons. The suppressive fires may be delivered from positions overwatching the advance of the tanks, as well as from within the moving tank-mechanized infantry formation. When possible, without degrading the IFV's role as a fighting vehicle, the IFV's ATCM will be employed to engage enemy armored vehicles and fortified positions. While on the move, the IFV provides the speed and agility necessary for coordinated maneuver with the tanks, as well as armor protection for the squad against the effects of enemy small arms, mortars and artillery. (4) When the terrain, enemy obstacles, orthe situation dictates, mechanized infantry forces dismount the IFV to breach obstacles, clear UNCLASSIFIED IT1-29UNCLASSIFIED areas which restrict mounted maneuver, or reduce enemy covered/concealed and/or fortified positions or weapons locations which threaten the advance of the team. The infantry is supported by the fires of the TFV and may accompany tanks when performing such dismounted missions. (5) In the assault against light resistance, mounted mechanized infantry may proceed directly onto the objective with the squad employing the fires of the IFV cannon and firing port weapons to suppress or eliminate enemy infantry and antitank weapons. Where mounted assault is impractical because of resistance from dug in enemy antitank weapons, mechanized infantry dismounts and assaults the objective on foot, supported by the fires of the IFV cannon as well as by friendly artillery, tactical air, and tank fires. (6) Once the objective has been seized, the infantry squad, if mounted, may dismount to mop up bypassed enemy and to provide security during reorganization and resupply. c. Defense. (2) In the defense mechanized infantry has the capability of conducting mounted or dismounted operations. Mechanized infantry will normally remain mounted only when a battle position is temporarily occupied and the force nay have to be quickly relocated. This method is normally used when engagement of the enemy is at long tange, when enough firepower can be employed from the carrier, when increased local security or observation is not needed, and when movement may be on such short notice that dismounted mem would not allow a rapid displacement. When defending dismounted, the dismounted element and the carrier element may be on the same battle position or on separate battle positions. Defending with the dismounted element and carrier element positioned on the same position is the normal method for employing mechanized infantry in the defense. The dismounted element and carrier element are positioned on separate battle positions only if the infantry must be employed on terrain unsuitable for the tarriers or if the carriers’ weapons are needed elsewhere; the carrier element is positioned on terrain that offers it good firing positions. When the mission of the infantry unit requires remaining in position for other than a temporary period, troops will dismount, put out security, and begin digging in. (2) Mechanized Infantry contributes to the defensive fight at long ranges by destroying enemy tanks and armored vehicles with ATGMs. At intermediate ranges, mechanized infantry kills enemy infantry, destroys eneny tanks and armored vehicles with Dragon and mounted ATGMs, emplaces and covers obstacles, acts as a security force, and performing movement in the active defense. (3) In the close-in battle, mechanized infantry will.hold te -rain, provide security for tanks, defend terrain unsuitable for tanks, «ill enemy infantry, dig-in, emplace obstacles and act as a security force. III-30 UNCLASSIFIED