Al-Shabaab (militant group)

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM; Arabic:

Al-Shabaab
‫حركة الشباب المجاهدين‬, romanized:  Ḥarakat ash-Shabāb
al-Mujāhidīn, Somali: Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Alshabaab, ‫حركة الشباب المجاهدين‬
lit.  'Mujahideen Youth Movement' or 'Movement of
Striving Youth'), more commonly known as al-
Shabaab,[note 3] is an Islamic fundamentalist Salafi jihadist
group which is based in Somalia and active elsewhere in
East Africa. It is actively involved in the ongoing Somali
Civil War. Even though its membership incorporates
Somali nationalist elements, al-Shabaab's central aims are
Salafi jihadist. Allegiant to the militant pan-Islamist
organization al-Qaeda since 2012, it has also been
suspected of forging ties with Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Seal Logo
Islamic Maghreb, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Formed in the mid-2000s as part of the Islamic Courts

Union, al-Shabaab came to prominence during the 2006–
2009 Somalia War, during which it presented itself as a
vehicle for the waging of armed resistance against the
Ethiopian occupation. In subsequent years, it became a
dominant force in south and central Somalia, defending
large swathes of territory by fighting against the African
Union Mission to Somalia and the Federal Government of
Somalia, as well as the latter's transitional predecessor. The
group has also frequently clashed with the Somali Sufi
Jihadist flag used by al-Shabaab
militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a as well as with the Islamic
State in Somalia. Al-Shabaab gained international Leaders Ahmad Umar (2014–
prominence due to its recruitment of foreign fighters, present)
including fighters who are from Western countries.
Ahmed Godane †
Countries which include the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates, have all (2007–2014)
designated it as a terrorist organization, and the United Dates of operation August 2006-present
States has militarily intervened in order to fight against the
Headquarters Kismayo (2008–12)
group.
Barawe[1] (2012–14)
Between 2011 and 2013, a coalition which mostly Jilib[2] (2014–present)
consisted of East African forces, led by the Somali
government, wrested a significant amount of territory from Active regions  Somalia

al-Shabaab, including the capital city, Mogadishu. During  Kenya

the same period, the group was plagued by internal  Ethiopia[note 1]

conflicts over its leadership and ideological direction, Ideology Salafi jihadism
which intensified when, in February 2012, al-Shabaab's
leadership pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. It suffered Qutbism
further military losses in 2014, as a result of Operation Islamism
Indian Ocean, and the killing of its emir, Ahmed Abdi
Anti-Zionism
Godane, in an American drone strike, as well as the killing
of other leaders. For several years thereafter, al-Shabaab Size 7,000–12,000 (2022
retreated from the major cities, but it remained influential in estimate)[3]
many rural areas, and it prioritized guerrilla and terror
Part of Al-Qaeda
attacks over territorial acquisitions. It is responsible for
many high-fatality attacks, including the 2013 Westgate Opponents State opponents:
shopping mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya, the October 2017  Australia
Mogadishu bombings, the December 2019 Mogadishu
 Canada[4]
bombing, and the October 2022 Mogadishu bombings. In
addition to being active in Somalia, it is also active in other  Djibouti
East African countries, especially in Kenya, and  Ethiopia
occasionally, it is also active in Ethiopia. Attendant to its
 France
recent resurgence, it was estimated to have increased its
combat strength to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters in  Italy
February 2022.[3]  Kenya
 Norway[5]
 Somalia
Contents
Name  Somaliland[note 2][6]

Organisation and structure  Sudan

Origins  Tanzania
Ideology  Uganda
Size and structure  Turkey[7]
Membership
 United Kingdom
History  United States
2006–09: Ethiopian incursion
Non-state
2009–10: Dominance in the south
opponents:
2011–13: Internal and external challenges
Territorial losses  African Union

Drought, al-Qaeda, and internal struggle  European

Defections Union[8]

2013–17: Regrouping  NATO

2018–2022: Resurgence ASWJ
2022–present: Retaliation  Islamic State
Propaganda strategy Battles and wars Somali Civil War
Propaganda films
Internet and social media Somalia War
(2006–2009)
Local governance strategy
Somali Civil War
Humanitarian access
(2009–present)
Ban on single-use plastic bags
Response to COVID-19
Foreign recruitment
Early surge
Current status
Relationship with other militant groups
Hizbul Islam
 Al-Qaeda
AQAP, AQIM and Boko Haram
Islamic State
Sources of income and arms
External support
Alleged Eritrean support
Internal revenue
Trade and smuggling
Extortion and taxation
Somali government
International response
Terrorist designation
Bounties
List of leaders
Emirs
Former members
Foreign leaders and members
See also
Notes
References
Bibliography
Books
Articles
Reports
External links

Name
Al-Shabaab is also known as Ash-Shabaab, Hizb al-Shabaab ("Party of the Youth")[9] and as the
Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM) (Arabic: ‫حركة المقاومة الشعبية‬
‫)في بالد الهجرتين‬.[10] The term al-Shabaab means "the youth" in Arabic.

Organisation and structure

Origins

Although it is unclear when al-Shabaab was formed, it is understood to have originated as a wing of the
Islamic Courts Union, an umbrella group which provided de facto governance in much of Somalia until the
country was invaded by Ethiopia in December 2006.[11][12] In 2007–8, al-Shabaab established itself as an
independent actor, gaining prominence as a vehicle of armed resistance to Ethiopian occupation in the War
in Somalia.[11][12] Many of its early leaders and members previously belonged not only to the Islamic
Courts Union but also to the older al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a group founded on the tenets of Salafism and
opposition to clannism.[13] Many early al-Shabaab leaders had also been trained as muhajideen in
Afghanistan or Iraq.[14]

Ideology

According to the International Crisis Group, Salafism has been the core unifying principle of al-Shabaab,
although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group's members and leaders.[11] In particular, al-
Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form of Salafi jihadism with transnational aims, linking Somali
nationalist and local grievances to the plight of Muslims worldwide.[11] Through this lens, incursions into
Somalia by Ethiopia – and later by Kenya, the United States, and others – are viewed as continuous with
non-Muslim acts of aggression in other Muslim-majority countries.[13][15] However, this globalist
framework is not universal within the group,[16][17] an ideological fault-line which has sometimes fostered
factionalism and internal conflict. Much of al-Shabaab's Somali support base is fiercely nationalist, and sees
as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia,[15][18] or, more ambitiously,
inside so-called Greater Somalia, uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Djibouti.[19] Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan-related and local objectives, and
are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances.[20]

However, these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common
adversaries – notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia, often publicly expressed in quasi-
Qutbist terms;[21] and opposition to the internationally recognised Somali government, which, lacking a
basis in religious (Sharia) law, is seen to lack legitimacy.[11] Al-Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to a
Takfiri interpretation of the principle of al-wala' wal-bara' (lit.  'loyalty and disavowal'),[11][22] insofar as it
prescribes dissociation from non-Muslims and those perceived as apostates.[23] The group has persecuted
Somalia's small Christian minority;[24] and, having desecrated a Sufi mosque and graves on the basis that
Sufism is incompatible with Sharia,[25][26] has clashed with the Sufi militias of Ahlu Sunna
Waljama'a.[27][28] In addition, its statements have expressed anti-Zionist sentiment,[29][30] and the group
claimed that its 2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration of Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel.[31]

Size and structure

In 2017, observers estimated that al-Shabaab comprised between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters.[32] In 2018, the
Council of Foreign Relations and United States military revised this figure downwards, estimating 3,000 to
6,000 and 4,000 to 6,000 respectively.[33] Reflecting an apparent al-Shabaab resurgence, the United States
Africa Command estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters two years later, in 2020.[34] Most recently, an expert
report submitted to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in early February 2022 estimated that al-
Shabaab's fighting force had grown to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters.[3] The group is led by a shura
council of senior leaders, appointed and assigned portfolios by the emir, and operates several internal
security organs, including an intelligence agency, Amniyat, and a police force, Jeysh Al-Hisbah.[34]

Membership

Especially in its early years, al-Shabaab was sometimes characterised by Somali opponents as dominated
by the Hawiye clan, which is one of the largest clans in Somalia.[16] Hawiye remain influential in the
group,[35] and, according to a 2018 analysis by the Somali Hiraal Institute, five of the ten members of the
executive shura council were Hawiye, as were about 94 of the top 220 officials.[36] However, al-Shabaab
is attached to an ethos of anti-clannism, and has therefore tried to appeal to minority groups and to ensure
ethnic and clan diversity among its leadership.[37] It incorporates a relatively large contingent of foreign
fighters . Rank-and-file members, though sometimes recruited by force,[20] are also attracted by the regular
pay that al-Shabaab offers and by its political propaganda.[37] In the past, many young al-Shabaab recruits
were drawn from marginalised southern clans, such as the Jareer.[37][38] Many are children.[39]

In February 2012, Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole, an al-Shabaab officer with responsibility for "awareness raising",
encouraged a Somali gathering to send their unmarried daughters to fight jihad with al-Shabaab, which
until then had used only male fighters.[40] However, according to International Crisis Group, women rarely
participate directly in military decision-making or operations, though they do play important roles in
recruitment, intelligence, and explosives smuggling.[41]

History

2006–09: Ethiopian incursion

Al-Shabaab rose to prominence as a relatively well-organised militia, garnering popular support from
Somalis sympathetic to their opposition to the Ethiopian invasion: though the invasion had fractured the
Islamic Courts Union, it galvanised nationalism on which al-Shabaab capitalised, especially for recruitment
purposes.[13] In the military arena, al-Shabaab suffered key losses during offensives by the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which was established in 2007, but during this phase "put down the roots
of an enduring insurgency", establishing networks and territorial bases concentrated in rural south-central
Somalia.[11]

2009–10: Dominance in the south

Having made important territorial gains from mid-2008, al-Shabaab increasingly focused its attention on
opposition to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, as the Ethiopian-led war segued into the next
phase of the protracted Somali Civil War.[42] By 2009–10, al-Shabaab controlled most of central and
southern Somalia (south of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland), and it had formed administrative
structures to govern territories under its control.[12][43][44] It had particular success building relationships
with local leaders in order to build cross-clan coalitions, combining its principled anti-clannism with a
"pragmatic clannism": a willingness to manipulate clan networks and exploit inter-clan
politics.[45][11][16][37]

2011–13: Internal and external challenges

In subsequent years, however, al-Shabaab's strong position was

significantly weakened, as – in the context of a famine in the region
and, simultaneously, a military offensive against the group – the
group experienced territorial and strategic setbacks in the military
arena; an internal struggle over the group's direction and leadership;
and, in response to both, a wave of high-profile defections.
Over 200 al-Shabaab fighters
surrender to AMISOM, September
Territorial losses 2012.
The group's military fortunes turned with the failure of the August
2010 Ramadan offensive – the inauguration of the Battle of
Mogadishu – which resulted in heavy al-Shabaab losses.[12] By
August 2011, al-Shabaab had announced a "strategic withdrawal"
from Mogadishu, although, from outlying districts, it continued to
exert influence in the city and to launch deadly guerrilla attacks
against AMISOM and the TFG.[43] In October and November
2011, Kenya and Ethiopia – partnering with local militias – Somali and Kenyan troops celebrate
launched offensives against al-Shabaab strongholds: Kenya's al-Shabaab's retreat from Kismayo
Operation Linda Nchi on the southern front, while Ethiopia Airport, 2012.
approached from the west. The group lost territory to both armies,
notably losing Baidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 and losing the
port city (and revenue hub) of Kismayo to Kenya in October 2012.[43][46] Military pressures on the group
were sustained into 2013.

Drought, al-Qaeda, and internal struggle

Some al-Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill-conceived, and
subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane, who
was publicly named the group's emir in December 2007.[47] As a severe drought afflicted the region,
critics, generally associated with the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow,[44][48]
opposed al-Shabaab's response to the resulting famine, particularly its obstruction of foreign humanitarian
aid to populations in its territories .[49][50][51] More broadly, they argued that the group's authoritarian style
of governance, and use of violence, were causing the group to lose public support. Some suggested that
these leadership missteps were the result of Godane's lack of clan roots, which they said led him to
undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al-Shabaab fighters.[12]

These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre-existing dispute over the increasingly globalist
flavour of al-Shabaab's ideology – Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one
battleground of global jihad.[15][18] Godane's announcement in February 2012 of a merger with al-Qaeda
thus also met opposition.[52][53] Other senior al-Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo,[54] and
outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane's: they rejected Godane's proposal to change the
group's name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad.
They also resolved to establish a national shura of Islamic clerics, independent of al-Qaeda control.[52][55]
Godane's rival Aweys declared publicly that, "Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the
larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for
Islam."[56]

In 2013, these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually a purge of his
critics.[44] Among those killed were Ibrahim al-Afghani and three other senior commanders, executed in
June;[57] and Omar Shafik Hammami, killed in September.[58] Journalist Simon Tisdall viewed the
September 2013 Westgate shopping mall shooting in Nairobi, Kenya as a reflection of the internal power
struggle, with Godane's hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority.[59]

Defections

From mid-to-late 2011, and into 2012, al-Shabaab faced an increasing number of defections.[43] It was not
the first such wave of defections: in particular, in late 2009, after the Ethiopian departure from Somalia,
several leaders had defected to the Somali government, citing complaints about al-Shabaab's use of suicide
attacks and executions;[60] its "false interpretations of Islam";[61] and its use of extortion and attitude
 towards foreign humanitarian aid.[62] Such defections were viewed
as strategically important to al-Shabaab's adversaries, not only for
their propaganda use but because former militants could provide
intelligence about al-Shabaab's combat strategy.[63] However,
according to AMISOM and the Somali government, the volume of
defections in the period around 2012 was unprecedented, and
indicated that al-Shabaab's cohesion and authority were
deteriorating: in June 2012, the government said that around 500 al-
Suspected al-Shabaab militants in Shabaab militants had already defected to it, and that more were
Mogadishu during a joint operation doing so every day.[64] Al-Shabaab brutalities, which alienated
between Somali forces and local populations, were again cited as central in motivating
AMISOM, May 2014. defections.[65] On September 5 and September 22, 2012, two large
contingents of al-Shabaab fighters – around 200 each time –
surrendered to the government coalition in Afmadow and Garsale
respectively. [63][66] Another wave of defections and desertions followed Godane's 2013 purges – Aweys,
for example, fled the group in mid-2013.[57]

2013–17: Regrouping

Following its territorial losses, al-Shabaab reverted to the tactics of asymmetric warfare, launching guerrilla
attacks on AMISOM and government positions and territories.[12][43] Southern commander Aweys had
announced this new strategy in a media interview shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu in August
2011.[67] Al-Shabaab increasingly avoided direct military combat and large battles, in favour of "dictat[ing]
the conflict's pace by undertaking smaller ambushes at locations of its own choosing".[11] It also developed
a strategy of maintaining a "semi-territorial presence" in key regions and parts of key cities: while it no
longer had exclusive and military authority over substantial territory, it retained a sporadic presence, and
therefore significant influence, in many places.[68][69]

Nonetheless, by 2016, al-Shabaab was viewed as significantly

weakened by the military campaign against it, with earlier losses
compounded in 2014–15 by Operation Indian Ocean, a joint
endeavour by AMISOM, the Somali government, and the United
States.[68][70] The Somali government claimed in October 2014
that over 700 al-Shabaab militants had surrendered since
September, when it had extended an amnesty offer to them.[71]
Reports of further senior defections continued into
2015.[72][73][74][75] Moreover, an American drone strike killed
Godane on September 1, 2014;[76] he was succeeded as al-
Shabaab leader by Ahmad Umar, who took office the same
week.[77] Other senior members were killed in armed clashes or by
American drone strikes in 2014 and 2015.[78][79][80][81] According Territorial control of Somalia as of
to some reports, since Godane's death, the group has placed less April 2017.
weight on global jihad than on local grievances.[12][44][19]

2018–2022: Resurgence

In October 2017, more than 500 people were killed by a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab
did not claim responsibility for the attack but was suspected of involvement.[82] In December 2019, another
suicide truck bomb marked the beginning of a series of al-Shabaab attacks on the capital city, which
continued into 2022.[83][84][85] Al-Shabaab also targeted American military personnel in an attack on a
Kenyan base in January 2020,[86] and in July 2022 launched an unusually bold, though short-lived,
incursion into Ethiopian territory.[87] By 2020, the group's strategy of semi-territorialism allowed it operate
freely in much of rural Somalia, with its primary base in the Jubba River Valley,[13] although air strikes
against its leaders continued;[88] and it has recently won military successes against the government.[89] It
had also expanded its operations in Puntland,[90][91] prompting a military offensive by Puntland forces in
2021.[92][93] As of July 2022, al-Shabaab is generally considered to be "resurgent",[94] a situation partly
enabled by a reduction in the number of American air strikes,[95] and possibly motivated by competition
with Islamic State in Somalia, which has been conducting its own expansionary campaign.[96]

2022–present: Retaliation

In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared "total war" against Al Shabaab
during a televised address after the group carried out a deadly hotel attack in Mogadishu and also
announced that the Somalia military had regained territory from al Shabaab in the central Galmudug state
and Southwest state.[97] Al By September 2022 Somali and ATMIS offensive operations against al-
Shabaab, with U.S. support, would escalate to the highest point in five years.[98] The operation, which is
considered a combined Somali-ATMIS offensive,[98] began in August 2022 and, with assistance from U.S.
airstrikes, has been focused on disrupting al-Shabaab activity in Somalia's central Hiraan region.[99][98]
Other Al Shabaab-controlled areas in southern Somalia have been targeted by the Somalia military as
well.[100] On 20 September 2022, as the military operation progressed, a statement was released by the
Somali Ministry of Information which revealed that President Sheikh would not offer any other option than
surrender for al-Shabaab members.[101]

Propaganda strategy
Although al-Shabaab has disseminated its propaganda by various
media, the bulk of its engagement with Somalis in rural areas is
either face-to-face or by radio broadcast.[102] Face-to-face, the
group holds seminars on Islamic jurisprudence and community
meetings on such matters such as grain and livestock
distribution.[102] It operates its own radio station, Radio Andalus,
mainly operated using relay stations and other equipment seized
from private radio stations, including the BBC.[103] Presenters
Drawings left by fighters on the walls
broadcast in Somali, Arabic, Swahili and English.[103] In April
of a building in El Baraf.
2010, al-Shabaab banned BBC and Voice of America broadcasts
on Somali radio, objecting to what they alleged was Christian
propaganda.[104] Also in 2010, and prior to its expulsion from Mogadishu the following year, al-Shabaab
launched a television news channel, Al-Kataib News.[105] The group has also been known to conduct
military parades in its territories, as a show of force.[106]

Propaganda films

Al-Shabaab began creating propaganda films early in its campaign against Ethiopian forces,[102] produced
by its dedicated media wing, al-Kataib Media Foundation.[107] Since 2009, al-Shabaab's films have
become noticeably more "professional", both in their production quality and in their messaging, reportedly
with direct support from al-Qaeda's al-Sabab Media Foundation.[107] The early films were distributed
primarily, and widely, online, and were primarily used as tools for recruitment, particularly among foreign
jihadists.[102] More recent films show al-Shabaab distributing humanitarian aid and participating in other
community or religious activities – though others are much more gruesome, displaying the corpses of
beheaded members alleged to have been spies.[103][108] Propaganda films are also occasionally used to
attempt to mobilise jihadi activity abroad: in October 2013, one film encouraged British jihadists to follow
the example set by Lee Rigby's killers,[109] while a February 2015 film called (without effect) for attacks
on shopping malls in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including the West Edmonton
Mall in Alberta, Canada, and the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota.[110][111]

Internet and social media Send me a cruise like

Maa'lam Adam al Ansari

Al-Shabaab was an early adopter among African insurgents of the Internet, And send me a couple of
which it uses to distribute its propaganda videos and for various other tons like Zarqawi

propaganda functions.[102] Especially in its early years, it used online And send me a drone
chatrooms and discussion forums, encouraging foreign fighters and even like Abu Layth al Libi

military commanders to post updates and field public questions about the And Special Forces like
state of the jihad.[107] Particularly prominent was American-born Omar Saleh Ali Nabhan.

Shafik Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, who for many

years kept a video blog about his life in al-Shabaab and who, from 2009, Send me all four and
also created and posted raps about jihad.[113][114] Al-Shabaab also had an send me much much
official website, which carried official statements and news – including more

sundry edicts and threats – and religious guidance. Since the site was I pray for that on my
closed in 2009, it has distributed its press releases and videos using other way to heavens door

sympathetic websites, or, more commonly, using social media Send me four and send
networks.[102][107] me more, that what I
implore

Indeed, although al-Shabaab spokesmen occasionally grant interviews to An amazing martyrdom I

"carefully selected" local and foreign journalists,[107] social media strive for and adore.

networks have provided an important channel for interaction with the

press, as well as for disseminating information and building support. Al-

Shabaab has used Facebook, particularly to communicate with the Somali
– Chorus to "Send Me a
diaspora;[107] and it has made prolific and innovative use of Twitter since
Cruise"

late 2011,[115] although its first accounts were active as early as 2009.[116]
by Abu Mansoor Al-
Online engagement with al-Shabaab surged during Operation Linda Nchi,
the Kenyan offensive of 2011–12, when al-Shabaab used Twitter, under Amriki[112]
the handle @HSMPress, to urge Somalis to take up arms against the
Kenyan forces[117] and to portray its own military losses as tactical
retreats.[118] In an extreme example of the latter in late 2011, al-Shabaab photos purportedly showed
several dozen AMISOM casualties – but, according to an African Union spokesperson, in fact showed al-
Shabaab's own casualties dressed in their adversaries' uniforms.[119][120] What received most attention,
however, were tweets al-Shabaab posted mocking the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and sparring with
Major Emmanuel Chirchir, then the KDF's official spokesman.[116][121] Responding to Chirchir's claim
that Kismayo had been captured by the KDF, al-Shabaab tweeted that the KDF "boys are a grotesque
parody of an army! [Al-Shabaab] can outpace ur world-class runners by far. Indeed, they 'Run like a
Kenyan'".[122] Showing uncharacteristic levity, al-Shabaab also suggested by Tweet that it meet a UN
official for "a caramel macchiato".[123]

Most of al-Shabaab's Tweets are in English, suggesting that they are intended for a foreign audience.[124]
In 2011, officials in the United States, where Twitter is based, said they were considering having the
account closed, but had legal and free speech concerns.[125] Chirchir himself tweeted that such a move
would be counterproductive, as "al-Shabaab needs to be engaged positively, and Twitter is the only
avenue."[126] Nonetheless, in January 2013, Twitter suspended al-Shabaab's English-language account.
Observers guessed that the suspension was a response to the account having issued death threats against
Kenyan hostages and against French spy Denis Allex, followed in the latter case by confirmation that the
execution had taken place.[127][128] A new English-language account, opened in February 2013,[129] was
closed in September, for unspecified reasons. This suspension also followed an apparent violation of
Twitter's rules: al-Shabaab had recently used the account to claim responsibility for an unsuccessful ambush
of a convoy carrying Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and to warn that, "next time, you won't
be as lucky".[130]

Al-Shabaab relaunched its English-language Twitter account once again on September 11, 2013.[131] Two
weeks later, the group gained notoriety for live-tweeting the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack,
"justifying the attack, creating fictional threats, providing news on hostages and mocking the police and
military response".[114] The account, which then had 15,000 or more followers, was retweeted several
million times before it was shut down by Twitter.[102][107] And after @HSMPress was deleted, the live
updates continued from other, new accounts: over the course of the attack, which lasted several days, at
least eight different al-Shabaab-affiliated Twitter accounts were active.[102] Al-Shabaab had opened a new
Twitter account by December that year, with an official telling Al Jazeera that, "The aim is to vigorously
challenge defamatory reports in the media by presenting an accurate portrayal of the current state of Jihad in
Somalia and countering Western, state-sponsored propaganda machines".[115] It has since tweeted, from
various accounts, during other attacks;[132] Facebook, too, has had difficulty expeditiously removing
graphic al-Shabaab content when it appears on newly created accounts.[133]

Local governance strategy

In territories it holds, al-Shabaab typically maintains "limited but
effective" administrative control over resident populations,[11]
providing services – such as dispute resolution through Sharia-
based courts – which are sometimes compared favourably to those
offered in government-held territories.[13][134] Al-Shabaab claimed
some credit for Somalia's excellent crop yield in early 2010, saying
that Somali grain production had flourished due to al-Shabaab's
reduction of food imports, and that the policy had redistributed
Residents of Tortoro celebrate with
income to poor, rural Somali farmers.[135] However, the group has
Lower Shabelle governor Abdulkadir
also allegedly committed widespread human rights abuses against
Mohamed Sidi after the town's
populations in its territories, including through a brutal
liberation from al-Shabaab, June
interpretation and application of Islamic jurisprudence on
2015.
hudud.[136][137]

Humanitarian access

Despite routinely expelling, attacking, and harassing aid workers, al-Shabaab permits some agencies to
work in areas under its control. At the height of its territorial control it implemented a system of aid agency
regulation, taxation and surveillance. Where agencies are allowed to operate, this is often due to the desire
of al-Shabaab to coopt and materially and politically benefit from the provision of aid and services.[138]
Senior aid agency representatives often strongly rejected claims that they talked with al-Shabaab, while aid
workers working in al-Shabaab-controlled areas often reported they directly negotiated with the group out
of necessity.[139] Complaints made against the group include its attacks on aid workers. According to
journalist Jon Lee Anderson:
 The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled
since 2007, to an estimated 3.6 million. But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence
in southern Somalia, because the Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on Western non-
governmental organizations. International relief supplies are flown or shipped into the country
and distributed, wherever possible, through local relief workers. Insurgents routinely attack
and murder them, too; forty-two have been killed in the past two years alone.[140]

In 2009, Godane imposed an al-Shabaab ban on the UN World Food Programme and Western agencies in
Somalia. The ban was opposed by other senior members, including Robow and Aweys, but Godane
overruled them.[49][141]

In response to the 2011 Eastern Africa drought, which lasted until early 2012,[142] al-Shabaab announced
in July 2011 that it had withdrawn its restrictions on international humanitarian workers.[143] The group
also adapted its propaganda strategy to accommodate the changing circumstances. In some cases, group
members employed humanitarian aid as a recruitment tool, using relief supplies as bribes and as an
incentive to join the militants, whose numbers had decreased due to casualties and defections.[144] Group
members dismissed the UN declaration of famine in various regions as grossly exaggerated and banned
various organizations from providing aid to those regions.[145] In response, in August 2011, Somali Prime
Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali announced the establishment of a new 300-man security force, which,
assisted by AMISOM, was tasked with protecting aid convoys from al-Shabaab and with securing IDP
camps while relief was being distributed.[146] Although fighting disrupted aid delivery in some areas,
humanitarian access to al-Shabaab-controlled areas improved, and a scaling up of relief operations in mid-
November prompted the UN to downgrade the humanitarian situation in several regions from famine to
emergency levels.[147]

Ban on single-use plastic bags

In July 2018, al-Shabaab announced a complete ban on single-use plastic bags within its territory in a
broadcast in which it stated that they "pose a serious threat to the well-being of humans and animals alike",
and in the same announcement, it also imposed a complete ban on the logging of several species of rare
trees.[148] Some have argued that, whilst these environmentally-conscious advances are welcome, they are
overshadowed by the group's terrorist activities, whilst others have mocked the United States and other
countries for taking less action on climate change than a terrorist group.[149]

Response to COVID-19

Al-Shabaab acknowledged the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic and announced the formation of a
coronavirus prevention and treatment committee.[150] In mid-June 2020, the group announced that it had
set up a coronavirus treatment centre in Jilib, about 380 km (236 mi) south of the capital, Mogadishu.[151]

Foreign recruitment
Al-Shabaab is noteworthy in the region for its extensive recruitment of foreign fighters .[152][153] These
foreign recruits include members of the Somali diaspora or ethnic Somalis overseas; citizens of other East
African countries; and citizens of countries further afield, including in the Middle East and the
West.[154][15] Non-Somali fighters have occasionally orchestrated high-profile al-Shabaab attacks, notably
the 2010 Kampala bombings and 2019 DusitD2 complex attack in Nairobi.[155] However, of greater
importance to al-Shabaab are the combat experience and specialised skills of some, usually Arab, foreign
fighters,[14] which have been linked to al-Shabaab's increased sophistication in producing explosives,[58]
improved sniper capability,[154] and increased propensity to use suicide attacks.[12] Foreign fighters may
also have access to networks which improve al-Shabaab's capacity to recruit and operate in the region, and
have made useful contributions to al-Shabaab's propaganda campaign: early Western recruits helped
produce al-Shabaab's first English-language propaganda, and, thanks to its East African membership,
Swahili remains the second most common language in al-Shabaab publications.[58][156] Foreign fighters
also have symbolic importance for al-Shabaab propaganda: al-Shabaab has intentionally played up the
diversity of its recruits as a paean to its pan-Islamism – that is, to demonstrate that it transcends clannism
and nationalism, embodying a united transnational ummah.[58]

Early surge

Foreign recruitment peaked in the period between 2011 and 2013,[58] which was
also the period in which the phenomenon received the most attention. The 2006
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia attracted foreign volunteers to al-Shabaab's
cause,[15] and, as of 2010, al-Shabaab included an estimated 200–300 foreign
fighters, not including a further 1,000 ethnic Somalis from the diaspora.[14] In
subsequent years, al-Shabaab recruitment became a concern for the governments
of both the United Kingdom and the United States. At a security conference in
London in 2010, the former head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, said that "a significant
number of U.K. residents" were training with al-Shabaab;[157] the precise number
American-born Jehad
of British recruits was estimated at between 50[158] and 100[159] persons. There Mostafa is a senior
was also evidence that the group had received funding from Somali residents in al-Shabaab
Britain.[160] Between 2012 and 2013, several British citizens faced control orders commander.
or even criminal charges related to association with al-Shabaab.[161][162]

Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the U.S. similarly encountered evidence of citizens' affiliation with al-
Shabaab.[15] In the U.S., the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee heard as early as 2009 – from
Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center – that American and other foreign fighters
were being recruited and trained by al-Shabaab.[17] In 2011, the House Committee on Homeland Security
reported that more than 40 Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians had fought with al-Shabaab, and that at
least 15 of those volunteers had been killed in Somalia.[163] Later that year, a U.S. military official told the
New York Times that about 30 U.S. citizens were al-Shabaab fighters.[164] This was a resumption of an
earlier trend of al-Shabaab recruitment among Americans, which previously had peaked in 2007–8.[165]
Also in 2011, two Somali Americans in Minnesota were convicted of illegally financing al-Shabaab.[164]
By mid-2013, observers believed that recruitment of U.S. citizens had subsided.[166]

In general, foreign activity in al-Shabaab has decreased, first, and perhaps most importantly, because the
Syrian civil war became the focal point for foreign jihadist recruitment networks.[58] Other factors,
however, are more specific to al-Shabaab. One factor was the group's internal struggle of 2011–13: as
tensions between Somali and non-Somali members increased, Godane scapegoated the foreigners as the
cause of the group's disunity and, during his 2013 purge, executed various foreign recruits .[58][12] In
addition to serving as a disincentive to foreign fighters, this shift reduced the influence of the group's
remaining foreign leaders.[44] Moreover, whereas the ascendancy of Godane and his faction had partly
internationalized al-Shabaab, in subsequent years, al-Shabaab became (re-)"domesticated": as it made
territorial gains, its attention was increasingly consumed by local governance and the management of clan
dynamics, activities in which foreign fighters – frequently mistrusted by local populations – lacked utility
and influence.[12] As the conflict, and al-Shabaab's priorities, became more localized and clan-based, they
also held less appeal for foreign fighters themselves.[58] Foreign fighters also attracted the counterterrorism
efforts of foreign countries, and were sometimes suspected of disloyalty and spying by their Somali
peers.[12]

Current status

As of 2020, estimates of the number of foreign recruits still active in al-Shabaab ranged from 450 to
2,000.[154] Most of those recruits are from East Africa – primarily Kenya,[167] but also Tanzania and
Uganda, all countries in which al-Shabaab recruitment networks are well entrenched.[11][58] The flow of
recruits from Arab countries and the West has diminished substantially since 2014, except for in the case of
Yemen.[155][58] Moreover, few foreign fighters hold strategically important roles in the group. Many are
among the rank-and-file of the military wing.[58][168] Those in leadership positions tend to have prominent,
but strategically marginal or mid-level, roles – for example, in managing the group's public relations or
external relations, or in supervising and training other foreign recruits.[12] (Godane's nationalist critics,
however, argue that earlier, under his leadership, foreign fighters did in fact gain significant influence over
the group.[18]) Since 2013, al-Shabaab has also established two external military units, on Godane's
initiative: one, in Ethiopia, has struggled, but the other, in the Great Lakes region, has carried out several
attacks in Kenya.[155]

Relationship with other militant groups

Hizbul Islam

Between 2010 and 2012, Hizbul Islam, a smaller group of Somali militants,[169] was merged with al-
Shabaab: after suffering military defeats against al-Shabaab in southern towns, Hizbul Islam was officially
absorbed by its former rival in December 2010.[170][171] However, on September 24, 2012, Hizbul Islam
announced that it would split from al-Shabaab, claiming the union had only ever been nominal and that the
factions' political philosophies had differed irreconcilably. Hizbul Islam said that it welcomed "negotiations
with all groups for the interest of Somalia", and added that al-Shabaab had been considerably "weakened"
in recent years.[172][173]

Al-Qaeda

Before 2012, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab had what academic Daniel Byman calls an "on-again, off-again"
relationship, though both groups praised each other online in 2008.[174][175] During this early period, al-
Shabaab occasionally harboured al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia, in exchange for their technical
assistance.[174][176] In September 2009, in a video entitled "At Your Service Osama", al-Shabaab publicly
declared allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden – but this reflected an "unrequited courtship",
largely ignored by al-Qaeda.[177] However, after bin Laden's death and replacement by Ayman al-
Zawahiri, al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate in February 2012. In a fifteen-minute video
message released on February 9, al-Shabaab leader Godane pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and al-Zawahiri
on behalf of al-Shabaab.[178][179] Al-Zawahiri confirmed the alliance,[177] which he said would "please
the believers and disturb the disbelievers" and "support the jihadi unity against the Zio-Crusader campaign
and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers."[180] The announcement was met with internal
opposition among some factions of al-Shabaab .

Ahmed Abdi Godane faced
internal opposition to his decision
to affiliate with al-Qaeda.
By late 2012, the groups cooperated closely in various arenas,
especially indoctrination and training, both in basic infantry skills and
in advanced explosives and assassination – after the merger, a corps of
al-Qaeda-trained militants moved to Somalia to train members of al-
Shabaab.[174] However, al-Shabaab remained "largely
independent". [174] Similarly, although al-Shabaab has publicly
exploited the al-Qaeda "brand", echoing al-Qaeda ideology in its
recruitment videos,[174] it is unclear whether the alliance has affected
al-Shabaab's behaviour and aims on the ground.[34] A 2021 statistical
analysis suggests that it has not significantly affected al-Shabaab's
military strategy.[181] While an al-Shabaab commander has claimed
that the group will bring jihad first to East Africa "and afterward, with
God's will, to America",[182] an analyst at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies argues that the group is far more interested in
establishing a fundamentalist government inside Somalia than in
carrying out attacks in the West.[183]
AQAP, AQIM and Boko Haram

In June 2012, General Carter Ham of the U.S. Army said that al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), and the Nigeria-based Boko Haram were attempting to coordinate their activities, including in
funding, training, and explosives.[183] In 2011, Boko Haram's first suicide bomb attack had been preceded
by a public statement warning that "our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received
real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable", which analysts
understood as an allusion to cooperation with al-Shabaab.[176][184] However, in the view of some
observers, most consequential are al-Shabaab's links to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP).[185][186] AQAP is based in Yemen, which has longstanding ties to Somalia, and analyst
Katherine Zimmerman told the U.S. Congress that AQAP "almost certainly provided the equipment or the
expertise" for al-Shabaab's 2016 laptop bomb.[185]

Islamic State A so-called

Islamic State has
In early 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) published online the emerged in our
first of a series of videos aimed at al-Shabaab, calling on the group to switch land and stated to
allegiances from al-Qaeda to ISIL and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.[188] attempt to divide
These public appeals had reportedly been preceded by informal ISIL attempts to our Mujahidin,
establish a relationship with al-Shabaab.[189] Yet al-Shabaab publicly ignored the weaken our
overtures.[189] By September 2015, it had issued an internal memo, directed at strength and carry
pro-ISIL elements in its ranks, reaffirming the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda and out assassinations
banning any discussion about ISIL. The group also detained several fighters who against our own.
had voiced support for ISIL.[190] We have been
ignoring their
In October 2015, senior al-Shabaab commander Abdul Qadir Mumin and wicked behaviors
approximately 20 of his followers in Puntland pledged allegiance to ISIL,[191] for some time to
establishing what became Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS).[187] Further defections give them a
in al-Shabaab ranks occurred in the border region between Somalia and northern chance to change,
Kenya,[192] leading the head of al-Shabaab in the Lower Shabelle region, Abu but they have
Abdalla, to announce that all pro-ISIL members should leave the group or be continued their
wrongheadedness
Our senior
killed.[193] The groups clashed violently on several occasions, most fiercely during command has
2015, and al-Shabaab's internal security service continued to arrest, and sometimes ordered our
execute, suspected ISIS supporters within al-Shabaab's ranks.[187] fighters to attack
and eliminate the
Violent conflict between the groups was reinvigorated in 2018 by ISIS 'disease' of IS and
provocation, and, in December, al-Shabaab's spokesman announced an offensive – uproot the tree
code-named Operation Disease Eradication – against ISIS.[194] The same week, that would be
al-Shabaab's general command released an 18-page treatise rebuking ISIS's used to
ideology and listing crimes it had committed under the Quran.[187] undermine the
fruits of the Jihad.
Sources of income and arms
– Al-Shabaab
In 2020, the Hiraal Institute estimated that al-Shabaab collected at least $15 million announces
in revenue every month, implying revenue on a similar scale to the Operation
government's;[195] and the UN estimates that the group's military budget was Disease
approximately $21 million in 2019.[34] In the period after 2014, al-Shabaab Eradication,
established its own Ministry of Finance,[196] and it has cultivated various revenue December
streams, among which it switches as its military position or political circumstances 2018[187]
change.[197]

External support

During its early years, al-Shabaab received substantial external

support in donations from the Somali diaspora or interested
international jihadists,[197] enabled by the weakness of the
Somalian government's financial regulation framework and the
ubiquitous use of the hawala system for receipt of remittances.[198]
Although al-Shabaab initially appeared a promising alternative to
the Islamic Courts Union, its popularity with diaspora donors
declined after the Ethiopian withdrawal and as the group gained a
reputation for brutality.[197] Concurrently, however, al-Shabaab Map showing the Horn of Africa
increased its ties to other jihadist groups, especially al-Qaeda, (though excluding Somaliland).
which have extensive capacity to generate income in the Arabian
Peninsula and Horn of Africa.[197] For example, years before al-
Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate, bin Laden publicly called on Muslims to send money to al-
Shabaab.[174] However, over the past decade, the counterterrorism efforts of foreign governments have
obstructed international funding sources.[197]

According to authorities, the Somali state of Puntland is a key transit point for weapons shipments into
Somalia from foreign countries – particularly frequent shipments of small arms and ammunition from
Yemen, typically transported across the Gulf of Aden in skiffs, and occasionally larger shipments from the
Makran coast of Iran.[199][200][201] Puntland authorities have also seized Yemeni explosives shipments,
which they suspect are the result of cooperation between al-Shabaab and Yemen-based AQAP.[202]

Alleged Eritrean support

In December 2009, adopting Resolution 1907, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea,
accusing the country of arming and financing militia groups, including al-Shabaab, in southern Somalia's
conflict zones.[203] Reports in 2010 and 2011 by a UN International Monitoring Group alleged continuing
Eritrean support to Somali rebels – including, in the latter year, about $80,000 in monthly financial support
and two air deliveries of weapons – but the Eritrean government emphatically denied the accusations,
describing them as "concocted, baseless and unfounded".[203][204] The International Crisis Group added
some credence to Eritrea's denials, suggesting that historical Eritrean support to Somali miilitants had been
aimed at undermining Ethiopia during its 2006–9 invasion, and that Hizbul Islam was more likely a
recipient than al-Shabaab.[205]

On July 5, 2012, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Eritrea's intelligence chief and a high-ranking
military officer, who allegedly facilitated support to al-Shabaab.[206] However, later that year, the UN
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that it had found no evidence of direct Eritrean support
to al-Shabaab in the preceding year.[207] Between then and 2017, successive annual reports of the
Monitoring Group found no evidence for Eritrean involvement, while noting that Eritrea had not provided
full access to investigators;[208][209] nonetheless, the UN Security Council did not enact the group's
recommendation to lift its sanctions on Eritrea until November 2018.[210]

Internal revenue

Trade and smuggling

As al-Shabaab expanded its territorial control, it was able to

augment its internal funding through illicit markets and local
populations. The smuggling of charcoal has been an important
source of income for the group since it first gained control of
Somali port cities, especially Kismayo.[19] Calculating that al-
Shabaab was earning between $15 million and $50 million
annually from illegal trade, the UN banned Somali charcoal The port city of Kismayo, held by al-
imports.[197] The group also profits from involvement in – or Shabaab between 2009 and 2012, is
taxation of – the smuggling and sale of ivory, sugar, and, a charcoal smuggling hub.
reportedly, heroin;[196][19] and it has been implicated in illegal
mining and minerals exports in East Africa.[197] There is some
evidence that al-Shabaab has profited from piracy. In 2011, the head of the UN's counter-piracy division,
Colonel John Steed, warned that there was circumstantial evidence that al-Shabaab increasingly sought to
cooperate with pirate gangs and other criminal organizations.[211] Further reports suggested that Al-
Shabaab members had extorted pirates, demanding protection money equivalent to 20% of the pirates'
ransom proceeds, but did not provide evidence that al-Shabaab was itself involved in piracy.[212]

Extortion and taxation

Also in the 2008–11 period, al-Shabaab established a sophisticated taxation system, framed as a form of
zakat, in line with sharia, but often resembling extortion. Al-Shabaab taxes may apply to clans, traders,
corporations, farmers, or livestock herders – in fact, livestock are sometimes stolen outright by al-Shabaab
militants, with the theft framed as a kind of pre-emptive in-kind taxation.[197] Humanitarian aid agencies
are also taxed or extorted, in exchange for permission to operate inside certain territories ;[197] and al-
Shabaab has been known to execute kidnappings for ransom.[213] In recent years, facing territorial losses in
urban areas, al-Shabaab has had less recourse to previous revenue streams – notably the charcoal trade,
through Kismayo, and the remittance economy – and therefore has relied more heavily on extracting
zakat.[37] The development of its security and intelligence services has allowed it to expand its tax base by
imposing taxes even in areas outside its territorial control:[197] according to the Hiraal Institute, more than
half of al-Shabaab's revenue in 2019–20 came from Mogadishu, whose major companies are taxed at 2.5%
of their annual profits.[195] Indeed, a commander in the Somali army confessed to paying tax to al-Shabaab
despite being at war with it.[195] The group has been known to punish non-payment severely, including by
blockading villages under threat of starvation.[197]

Somali government

Either directly or indirectly through black markets, al-Shabaab has access to arms intended for the Somali
government. In 2018 and 2019, expert reports to the UN Security Council found that government military
equipment enters the black market, where some of it is sold to al-Shabaab militants. In some cases, senior
government officials orchestrate large-scale diversions of government arms and ammunition; in others, low-
ranking members of the security forces sell their weapons for subsistence.[201][214] An earlier report in
2014 had alleged that government officials were actively involved in the direct supply of governments arms
to al-Shabaab.[215] The group has also been known to infiltrate government institutions, as became clear
when regional government employees carried out al-Shabaab's 24 July 2019 Mogadishu bombing, which
killed Mogadishu Mayor Abdirahmean Omar Osman.[201]

International response

Terrorist designation

The following countries have officially listed al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization:

 Australia (since 22 August 2009)[216][217]

 Canada (since 5 March 2010)[218]
 Malaysia[219]
 New Zealand (since 10 February 2010)[220]
 Singapore (since 18 March 2016)[221]
 United Arab Emirates (since 15 November 2014)[222]
 United Kingdom (since March 2010)[223]
 United States (since 29 February 2008)[224]

Bounties

In 2012, with the support of the Somali government,[225] the United States began issuing bounties for al-
Shabaab members under its Rewards for Justice Program. On June 7, the U.S. Department of State offered
a total of $33 million in bounties for information leading to the capture of any of seven senior commanders,
including $7 million for Godane, then the group's emir, and $5 million for Robow, then his deputy.[225] In
response, al-Shabaab's Fu'ad Qalaf issued a mock bounty of his own, promising ten camels to anyone
possessing information on U.S. President Barack Obama, and a further, less valuable, reward of ten cocks
and ten hens for information on Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State.[225] On an official state visit to
Mogadishu, top U.S. envoy Johnnie Carson dismissed the counter-offer as "absurd". He also announced
that the U.S. would impose sanctions, including visa and travel bans and asset freezes, on anyone
attempting to thwart the ongoing political transition in Somalia.[226]

On March 21, 2013, the U.S. Department of State offered $5  million apiece for information on two
American senior al-Shabaab commanders, Omar Shafik Hammami and Jehad Serwan Mostafa.[227] On
March 15, 2014, it issued three further bounties, including one on Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, who it
said coordinated al-Shabaab's recruitment activities in Kenya.[228] On September 27, 2014, after Godane's
death, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency announced its own bounty, offering $2 million
for information leading to the arrest of the new emir, Umar, and a separate $1  million reward for
information leading to his killing.[229] Several further Somali bounties were issued on April 10, 2015, with
rewards ranging between $100,000 and $250,000.[230] In a separate programme, on April 3, 2015, the
Kenyan government offered KSh. 20 million ($215,000) for information leading to the arrest of Mohamed
Mohamud, a commander of al-Shabaab's operations in Kenya.[231]

List of leaders

Emirs
Ahmad Umar (2014–present)[232]
Ahmed Godane † (2007–14)[233]

Former members

Former leading members of al-Shabaab include: Former leader

Mukhtar Robow, also
Hassan Dahir Aweys[234] known as Abu
Mohamed Said Atom[235] Mansur, denounced
al-Shabaab in 2017.
Mukhtar Robow[236]
Mujahid Miski[237]
Abdul Qadir Mumin
Aden Hashi Farah Ayro †
Ibrahim al-Afghani †[238]
Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki †[239]

Foreign leaders and members

Prominent foreign al-Shabaab members have included:[240]

Jehad Serwan Mostafa (United States)[241]

Abu Musa Mombasa (Pakistan)
Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole (Sweden)[40]
Samantha Lewthwaite (Britain) (unconfirmed)[242]
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed † (Kenya)[243]
Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Kenya)[244]
Omar Shafik Hammami † (United States)[245]

See also
Child soldiers in Somalia
Drone strikes in Somalia
 Human rights in Somalia
Islam in Somalia
Religion in Somalia
Freedom of religion in Somalia

Notes
1. 2022 al-Shabaab invasion of Ethiopia
2. Unrecognized state, internationally as part of Somalia.
3. US: /ælʃəˈbɑːb/; Arabic: ‫الشباب‬, lit. 'The Youth'

References
1. "Somalia's al-Shabab militants in 'deadly feud' " " (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-2
2988404). BBC News. June 20, 2013. Retrieved October 29, 2013.
2. Ross, Andrew (October 25, 2015). "Kenyan troops seize al-Shabaab base in Somalia" (http
s://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/kenyan-troops-seize-al-shabaab-base-in-somalia/455875).
Anadolu Agency. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
3. Bozkurt, Abdullah (February 9, 2022). "UN report indicates al-Qaeda and ISIS enjoy safe
haven in Turkish-controlled Idlib" (https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/02/the-un-report-indicates-
al-qaeda-and-isis-enjoys-safe-haven-in-turkish-controlled-idlib/). Nordic Monitor. Retrieved
February 15, 2022.
4. "Canada AM: Al-Shabab recruiting Canadians" (https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=55668
0). CTV News. February 23, 2015. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
5. MacDougall, Ian (September 7, 2010). "Norway man pleads not guilty to terror financing" (htt
ps://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-norway-man-pleads-not-guilty-to-terror-financing-2
010sep07-story.html). San Diego Tribune. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
6. Horton, Michael (2019). "How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab" (https://ctc.westpoint.edu/s
omaliland-combats-al-shabaab/). CTC Sentinel. 12 (10).
7. Şardan, Tolga (December 15, 2015). "Eş Şebab'ın hedefi Türkiye'de eylem!" (http://www.milli
yet.com.tr/es-sebab-in-hedefi-turkiye-de-gundem-2164392/). Milliyet (in Turkish). Retrieved
January 26, 2016.
8. Paul D. Williams (October 3, 2019). "In Somalia, al-Shabab targeted U.S. and E.U. forces
this week. Here's what these troops are doing there" (https://www.washingtonpost.com/politi
cs/2019/10/03/somalia-al-shabaab-targeted-us-eu-forces-this-week-heres-what-these-troops
-are-doing-there/). The Washington Post. Retrieved June 23, 2022.
9. Bryden 2006.
10. "Diplomats stress need for all-inclusive talks on the future of Somalia" (https://www.usatoda
y.com/news/world/2007-02-09-somalia_x.htm). USA Today. Associated Press. February 9,
2007. Retrieved February 9, 2007.
11. International Crisis Group 2022.
12. Bacon & Muibu 2019b.
13. Barnett 2020.
14. Shinn 2010.
15. Vidino, Pantucci & Kohlmann 2010.
16. Schaefer 2011.
17. Senate Hearing 111–678: Violent Islamic Extremism—2009 (https://www.govinfo.gov/conten
t/pkg/CHRG-111shrg49640/html/CHRG-111shrg49640.htm). Hearing of the United States
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. U.S. Government
Printing Office. 2009.
18. Solomon 2014.
19. Petrich 2022.
20. "Al-Shabaab" (http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html). National Counterterrorism
Center. Retrieved March 28, 2013.
21. Joscelyn, Thomas (May 30, 2017). "Shabaab claims US is 'Satan of our time,' praises al
Qaeda's leadership" (https://web.archive.org/web/20220118055727/https://www.longwarjour
nal.org/archives/2017/05/shabaab-claims-us-is-satan-of-our-time-praises-al-qaedas-leaders
hip.php). The Long War Journal. Archived from the original (https://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2017/05/shabaab-claims-us-is-satan-of-our-time-praises-al-qaedas-leadership.ph
p) on January 18, 2022.
22. Alkaff 2013.
23. Joscelyn, Thomas (May 13, 2019). "Shabaab official justifies attacks on civilians while
preaching the sanctity of Muslim blood" (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/05/sh
abaab-official-justifies-attacks-on-civilians-while-preaching-the-sanctity-of-muslim-blood.ph
p). The Long War Journal. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
24. "Almost expunged: Somalia's embattled Christians" (http://www.economist.com/world/middl
eeast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14707279). The Economist. October 22, 2009.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20091025043912/http://www.economist.com/world/mi
ddleeast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14707279) from the original on October 25, 2009.
Retrieved October 22, 2009.
25. "Shabaab rebels destroy grave and mosque in Somalia" (http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsde
sk/LJ085722.htm). AlertNet. October 19, 2009. Retrieved March 17, 2010.
26. "Grave sites destroyed in Somalia" (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/03/201032
621225341415.html). Al Jazeera. 2009. Retrieved January 14, 2012.
27. Mohamed, Mohamed (June 8, 2009). "Somali rage at grave desecration" (http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/world/africa/8077725.stm). BBC News. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
28. Ryu, Alisha (September 15, 2010). "Sufi Militia Says Al-Shabab Planning to Attack
Galgadud Region" (http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20120902113150/http://www.voanews.com/
articleprintview/155811.html). VOA. Archived from the original (http://www.voanews.com/arti
cleprintview/155811.html) on September 2, 2012. Retrieved January 14, 2012.
29. "Somali group with al Qaeda ties threatens Israel" (https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/me
ast/11/01/somalia.israel.threat/). CNN. 2009. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
30. "Al-Shabaab Response to U.S. Recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel" (https://vat
escorp.com/index.php/blog/item/28-al-shabaab-initial-response-to-u-s-president-trump-s-an
nouncement-recognising-the-jerusalem-as-the-capital-of-israel). Vates. December 7, 2017.
Retrieved September 9, 2022.
31. "Somali Militants Say Deadly Kenya Attack Was Revenge for Trump's Jerusalem Move" (htt
ps://www.haaretz.com/world-news/asia-and-australia/2019-01-16/ty-article/somali-militants-s
ay-deadly-kenya-attack-was-revenge-for-trumps-jerusalem-move/0000017f-e55b-d62c-a1ff-f
d7b84880000). Haaretz. January 16, 2019. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
32. "Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?" (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689). BBC
News. December 22, 2017. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
33. Warner, Jason (2018). "The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells
Across the Continent" (https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbe
rs-cells-across-continent/). CTC Sentinel. 11 (7).
34. Harrington 2021.
35. Bacon 2022.
36. Mubarak 2018.
37. Chonka 2016b.
38. Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith (June 7, 2010). "How Somalia's civil war became new front in battle
against al-Qaida" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/07/somalia-civil-war-al-qaid
a). The Guardian. Retrieved January 14, 2012.
39. Regilme, Salvador Santino Jr Fulo; Spoldi, Elisabetta (July 1, 2021). "Children in Armed
Conflict: A Human Rights Crisis in Somalia" (https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.15
15/gj-2020-0083/html?lang=en). Global Jurist. 21 (2): 365–402. doi:10.1515/gj-2020-0083 (h
ttps://doi.org/10.1515%2Fgj-2020-0083). ISSN 1934-2640 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/19
34-2640). S2CID 232245779 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:232245779).
40. Khalif, Abdulkadir (February 22, 2012). "Al-Shabaab Wants Girls to Join Warfront Against
Govt" (http://allafrica.com/stories/201202220071.html). allAfrica. Retrieved September 12,
2022.
41. International Crisis Group 2019.
42. Elliot & Holzer 2009.
43. Anzalone 2013.
44. Bryden 2014.
45. Ingiriis 2018b.
46. Will Ross (February 22, 2012). "Somalia al-Shabab militant base of Baidoa captured" (http
s://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17127353). BBC News. Retrieved August 4, 2012.
47. Guled, Abdi (September 2, 2014). "U.S. Strikes Al-Shabab In Somalia, 6 Militants Killed" (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20140907005309/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/02/us-str
ike-somalia_n_5751658.html). Huffington Post. Archived from the original (https://www.huffin
gtonpost.com/2014/09/02/us-strike-somalia_n_5751658.html) on September 7, 2014.
48. Abukar, Hassan M. (July 2, 2013). "Somalia: The Godane coup and the unraveling of Al-
Shabaab" (http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/02/somalia-the-godane-coup-and-the-unrave
ling-of-al-shabaab-%E2%80%93-by-hassan-m-abukar/). African Arguments. Royal African
Society. Retrieved August 6, 2014.
49. Chothia, Farouk (August 9, 2011). "Could Somali famine deal a fatal blow to al-Shabab?" (ht
tps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14373264). BBC News. Retrieved January 14, 2012.
50. "Al-Shabaab Leader Admits Split" (https://web.archive.org/web/20121022222915/http://som
aliareport.com/index.php/post/1349/Al-Shabaab_Leader_Admits_Split). Somalia Report.
December 8, 2011. Archived from the original (http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/
1349/Al-Shabaab_Leader_Admits_Split) on October 22, 2012. Retrieved November 7,
2012.
51. "Where in the World is Sheikh Aweys?" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120525092847/htt
p://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2675/Where_in_the_World_is_Sheikh_Aweys).
Somalia Report. February 1, 2012. Archived from the original (http://www.somaliareport.com/
index.php/post/2675/Where_in_the_World_is_Sheikh_Aweys) on May 25, 2012. Retrieved
July 7, 2012.
52. Bruton, Bronwyn (February 21, 2012). "Divisive Alliance" (https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
22/opinion/divisive-alliance.html?_r=2&ref=alshabab). The New York Times.
53. "Daily Media Roundup" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120226221311/http://www.somaliare
port.com/index.php/post/2896/23_February_2012_Daily_Media_Roundup). Somalia Report.
February 23, 2012. Archived from the original (http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2896/
23_February_2012_Daily_Media_Roundup) on February 26, 2012.
54. "Al-Shabaab to Change Name to Imaarah Islamiyah" (https://web.archive.org/web/20140714
150723/http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2212). Somalia Report. December 5,
2011. Archived from the original (http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2212) on July
14, 2014. Retrieved July 7, 2012.
55. Bruton, Bronwyn; Pham, J. Peter (February 2, 2012). "The Splintering of Al Shabaab" (http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137068/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-pham/the-splintering-of-
al-shabaab?page=show). Foreign Affairs. Retrieved July 7, 2012.
56. "Somali observers: internal divisions widening within al-Shabaab" (http://sabahionline.com/
en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/04/05/feature-01). Sabahi. April 5, 2012. Retrieved
August 4, 2012.
57. Mugisha, Richard (September 8, 2013). "Uganda: Is Al-Shabab Disintegrating?" (http://allafri
ca.com/stories/201309090073.html). allAfrica. Retrieved September 23, 2013.
58. Bacon & Muibu 2019a.
59. Tisdall, Simon (September 22, 2013). "Kenya attack is product of brutal power struggle
within al-Shabaab" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/kenya-attack-power-str
uggle-al-shabaab). Guardian. Retrieved September 23, 2013.
60. Maruf, Harun (November 9, 2009). "Somali Government Displays Defecting Al-Shabab
Commander" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120515210236/http://www.voanews.com/soma
li/news/news-makers-in-english/Top-Al-Shabab-Commander-Said-Defected-to-Government-
Al-Shabab-Denies-News-69585817.html). VOA. Archived from the original (http://www1.voa
news.com/somali/news/news-makers-in-english/Top-Al-Shabab-Commander-Said-Defected
-to-Government-Al-Shabab-Denies-News-69585817.html) on May 15, 2012. Retrieved
March 17, 2010.
61. Bar, Herve (November 24, 2009). "If you don't want to fight anymore, there's no point" (http://
www.mg.co.za/article/2009-11-24-if-you-dont-want-to-fight-anymore-theres-no-point). The
Mail & Guardian. Retrieved March 17, 2010.
62. "Senior Al-Shabab Commander Defects to Govt" (http://allafrica.com/stories/200912020945.
html). allAfrica. December 2, 2009. Retrieved March 17, 2010.
63. Mayoyo, Patrick (September 5, 2012). "Shabaab fighters surrender" (http://www.nation.co.ke/
News/Shabaab+fighters+surrender/-/1056/1497576/-/1d3c63z/-/index.html). Daily Nation.
Retrieved September 6, 2012.
64. Guled, Abdi (June 15, 2012). "Militants defecting to Somali side after losses" (http://washingt
onexaminer.com/news/world/2012/06/militants-defecting-somali-side-after-losses/733571).
The Washington Examiner.
65. "Defections put militant al-Shabab on the run in Somalia" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/maga
zine-18364762). BBC News. June 8, 2012. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
66. "Al Shabaab suffer significant setback as over 200 militants disengage near Jowhar" (http://a
misom-au.org/2012/09/al-shabaab-suffer-significant-setback-as-over-200-militants-disengag
e-near-jowhar/). AMISOM. September 22, 2012. Retrieved September 23, 2012.
67. "Al-Shabab Vows to Use Guerilla Tactics in Somalia" (https://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-n
ews/2011/08/12/al-shabab-vows-to-use-guerilla-tactics-in-somalia/). VOA News. August 12,
2011. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
68. Hansen, Stig Jarle (October 17, 2016). "Has Shabaab been weakened for good? The
answer is 'yes' and 'no' " (https://theconversation.com/has-shabaab-been-weakened-for-goo
d-the-answer-is-yes-and-no-67067). The Conversation. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
69. Doboš 2016.
70. Jones, Liepman & Chandler 2016.
71. "At least 700 Al-shabab members surrenders to the government, PM Abdiweli" (https://goobj
oog.com/english/at-least-700-al-shabab-members-surrenders-to-the-governmentpm-abdiwel
i/). Goobjoog News. October 11, 2014. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
72. "Wanted Extremist Leader Surrenders in Somalia" (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wire
Story/wanted-islamic-extremist-leader-surrenders-somalia-27849563). Associated Press.
December 27, 2014. Retrieved December 27, 2014.
73. "Weekly Press Conference on the Progress of the Government" (https://goobjoog.com/englis
h/weekly-press-conference-on-the-progress-of-the-government-9/). Goobjoog News.
January 17, 2015. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
74. "Administration of Dhusa-Mareeb Gives Details of Al-Shabab Fighter Who Surrendered" (htt
ps://goobjoog.com/english/administration-of-dhusa-mareeb-gives-details-of-al-shabab-fighte
r-who-surrendered/). Goobjoog News English. March 7, 2015. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
75. "Senior Al-shabab officer surrenders to the federal government" (https://goobjoog.com/englis
h/senior-al-shabab-officer-surrenders-to-the-federal-government-2/). Goobjoog News. March
30, 2015. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
76. Martinez, Michael (September 5, 2014). "Top Somali militant killed in U.S. operation,
Pentagon says" (https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/africa/somali-militant-killed/index.ht
ml). CNN. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
77. "Al-Shabab names new leader after Godane death in US strike" (https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-29093200). BBC News. September 6, 2014. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
78. "U.S. confirms drone strike killed al Shabaab leader in Somalia" (https://www.reuters.com/art
icle/us-usa-somalia-airstrike-idUSKBN0K90YA20141231). Reuters. December 31, 2014.
Retrieved January 1, 2015.
79. "Somali government welcomes the death of Al-Shabaab Leader, Yusuf Dheeg" (http://goobjo
og.com/english/?p=9860). Goobjoog News. February 6, 2015. Retrieved February 6, 2015.
80. Alexander, David (March 13, 2015). "U.S. carried out strike in Somalia targeting al Shabaab
leader" (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-attacks-usa-idUSKBN0MA0182
0150314). Reuters. Retrieved March 14, 2015.
81. "Col. Osman: "The Government Forces in Gedo Killed Al-Shabab Ring Leader" " (http://goob
joog.com/english/?p=11711). Goobjoog News. March 13, 2015. Retrieved March 13, 2015.
82. Burke, Jason (October 17, 2017). "Somalia bombing may have been revenge for botched
US-led operation" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/somalia-bomber-was-ex-
solider-whose-town-was-raided-by-us-forces). the Guardian. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
83. Hared, Khadar (September 18, 2020). "Somalia: Al-Shabab attacks intensify as election
looms | DW | 18.09.2020" (https://www.dw.com/en/somalia-al-shabab-attacks-intensify-as-el
ection-looms/a-54980396). Deutsche Welle. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
84. "Al Shabaab surges bombings amid Somali political crisis" (https://www.criticalthreats.org/br
iefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-surges-bombings-amid-somali-political-crisis). Critical
Threats. January 28, 2022. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
85. Besheer, Margaret (February 15, 2022). "Terror Attacks Surge as Elections Drag in Somalia"
(https://www.voanews.com/a/terror-attacks-surge-as-elections-drag-in-somalia/6442966.htm
l). VOA. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
86. Demirjian, Karoun (March 10, 2022). "U.S. military investigation finds extensive failures
before deadly terror attack in Kenya" (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/202
2/03/10/manda-bay-investigation/). Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286 (https://www.worldca
t.org/issn/0190-8286). Retrieved September 9, 2022.
87. Faruk, Omar (August 5, 2022). "In a first, Somalia-based al-Shabab is attacking in Ethiopia"
(https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/in-a-first-somalia-based-al-shabab-is-attacking-in-ethiopia-1.
6015406). CTVNews. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
 88. Vandiver, John (April 7, 2020). "AFRICOM kills senior terrorist leader in Somalia as
airstrikes intensify" (https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/africom-kills-senior-terrorist-lead
er-in-somalia-as-airstrikes-intensify-1.625125). Stars and Stripes. Retrieved September 12,
2022.
89. "Al Shabaab attacks Somali military base, recaptures central town" (https://www.reuters.co
m/world/africa/al-shabaab-attacks-somali-military-base-captures-central-town-2021-08-24/).
Reuters. August 24, 2021. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
90. Horton 2017.
91. Felbab-Brown 2017.
92. "Somalia's Puntland sends troops to fight al Shabaab in neighbouring state" (https://www.re
uters.com/world/africa/somalias-puntland-sends-troops-fight-al-shabaab-neighbouring-state-
2021-09-03/). Reuters. September 4, 2021. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
93. "Somalia's Puntland region executes 21 al-Shabab fighters" (https://www.bbc.com/news/wor
ld-africa-57630144). BBC News. June 27, 2021. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
94. Raghavan, Sudarsan (July 17, 2022). "An attack on a military base in Somalia shows al-
Shabab's deadly power" (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/17/somalia-al-sha
bab-us-troops/). Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0190-828
6). Retrieved September 9, 2022.
95. The Soufan Center 2022.
96. Global Interagency Security Forum 2016.
97. "Somalia's President Vows 'Total War' Against al-Shabab" (https://www.voanews.com/a/som
alia-s-president-vows-total-war-against-al-shabab/6714508.html).
98. "Federal Government of Somalia engages terrorists with support from U.S. forces" (https://w
ww.africom.mil/pressrelease/34736/federal-government-of-somalia-engages-terrorists-with-s
upport-from-us-forces). www.africom.mil. September 21, 2022. Retrieved September 21,
2022.
99. "U.S. says it kills 27 al Shabaab militants in Somalia air strike" (https://www.reuters.com/worl
d/us-says-it-kills-27-al-shabaab-militants-somalia-air-strike-2022-09-21/). Reuters.
September 21, 2022. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
100. "Somalia military deals major blow to Al Shabaab in south, 100 fighters killed" (https://www.
garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-military-deals-major-blow-to-al-shabaab-in-sou
th-100-fighters-killed). Garowe Online. September 12, 2022. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
101. "No other door open but to surrender, Govt tells Al-Shabab" (https://sonna.so/en/2022/09/20/
no-other-door-open-but-to-surrender-govt-tells-youths-misled-by-al-shabab/). Somali
National News Agency. September 20, 2022. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
102. Grobbelaar 2022.
103. Hodge, Nel (June 5, 2014). "How Somalia's al-Shabab militants hone their image" (https://w
ww.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27633367). BBC News. Retrieved June 17, 2014.
104. "Al-Shabaab Uses Terror to Stop Local Stations From Retransmitting BBC and VOA" (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20111017113457/http://en.rsf.org/somalia-al-shabaab-uses-terror-to
-stop-09-04-2010%2C36985). Statement of Reporters Without Borders. April 9, 2010.
Archived from the original (http://en.rsf.org/somalia-al-shabaab-uses-terror-to-stop-09-04-201
0,36985) on October 17, 2011. Retrieved November 20, 2011.
105. "Somalia's al-Shabaab launch TV channel" (http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-05-somalias-als
habaab-launch-tv-channel). The Mail & Guardian. February 5, 2011. Retrieved January 14,
2012.
106. Ndegwa, Alex (November 17, 2011). "Al Shabaab's propaganda war" (https://wayback.archi
ve-it.org/all/20111113190339/http://standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000046627&
cid=4&). The Standard. Archived from the original (http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePa
ge.php?id=2000046627&cid=4) on November 13, 2011. Retrieved November 20, 2011.
107. Menkhaus 2014.
108. Chonka 2016a.
109. Hooper, Simon (October 26, 2013). "British Muslims defiant over al-Shabab threat" (http://ww
w.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/british-muslims-defiant-over-al-shabab-threat-201
3102591313719196.html). Al Jazeera. Retrieved November 6, 2013.
110. "No "imminent threat" to West Edmonton Mall visitors, RCMP says" (https://web.archive.org/
web/20150224194018/http://www.edmontonjournal.com/Terror%2Bgroup%2BShabaab%2B
calls%2Battack%2BWest%2BEdmonton%2BMall/10833693/story.html). Edmonton Journal.
February 22, 2015. Archived from the original (https://edmontonjournal.com/Terror+group+S
habaab+calls+attack+West+Edmonton+Mall/10833693/story.html) on February 24, 2015.
Retrieved February 22, 2015.
111. " 'Be particularly careful' today, U.S. homeland security chief tells MOA visitors" (http://www.s
tartribune.com/printarticle/?id=293319551). Star Tribune. February 22, 2015. Retrieved
February 22, 2015.
112. "A Song by Omar Hammami: "Send Me A Cruise" " (https://web.archive.org/web/201205190
51920/http://nefafoundation.org//file/HammammiSong0411.pdf) (PDF). Terror Watch. NEFA
Foundation. April 9, 2011. Archived from the original (http://nefafoundation.org//file/Hammam
miSong0411.pdf) (PDF) on May 19, 2012. Retrieved November 18, 2011.
113. Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2011). Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Losing the War on
Terror. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. p. 149. ISBN 978-1-118-09494-5.
114. Mair 2017.
115. Mohamed, Hamza (December 16, 2013). "Al-Shabab say they are back on Twitter" (https://w
ww.aljazeera.com/news/2013/12/16/al-shabab-say-they-are-back-on-twitter). Al Jazeera.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.
116. Molony 2019.
117. "Al-Shabaab threatens to attack Kenya" (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/10/20
111017171543493140.html). Al Jazeera. October 17, 2011. Retrieved October 17, 2011.
118. Oloya, Opiyo (August 16, 2011). "Uganda: Al-Shabaab Progpaganda Can't Change the
Truth On the Ground" (http://allafrica.com/stories/201108170891.html). allAfrica.com.
Retrieved November 20, 2011.
119. Guled, Abdi; Houreld, Katharine (October 21, 2011). "AU: Somali militants 'dressed up'
bodies for stunt" (http://archive.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2011/10/21/au_10_sol
diers_killed_2_missing_in_somalia_fight/). Boston.com. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
120. "Kenya: A Weakening Al Shabaab Escalates Its Propaganda" (http://allafrica.com/stories/20
1110240870.html). allAfrica. October 22, 2011. Retrieved November 20, 2011.
121. Gettleman, Jeffrey (December 15, 2011). "Somalia's Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a
Weapon" (https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter
-as-a-weapon.html). The New York Times. Retrieved December 24, 2011.
122. HSMPress (December 16, 2011). "Twitter / @MajorEChirchir Your boys are a ..." (https://twitt
er.com/HSMPress/status/147776993566535680) Twitter. Retrieved December 24, 2011.
123. HSMPress (December 15, 2011). "Twitter / @gerardvanmourik @JeromeTaylor A ..." (https://
twitter.com/HSMPress/status/147279660135354368) Twitter. Retrieved December 24, 2011.
124. Roble 2011.
125. Gettleman, Jeffrey (December 20, 2011). "U.S. Considers Combating Somali Militants'
Twitter Use" (https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/africa/us-considers-combating-sha
bab-militants-twitter-use.html). The New York Times. Retrieved December 24, 2011.
126. HSMPress (December 15, 2011). "Twitter / @alykhansatchu @HSMPress The US is ..." (htt
ps://twitter.com/MajorEChirchir/status/149057952999940096) Twitter. Retrieved
December 24, 2011.
127. "Somalia's al-Shabab Twitter account suspended" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
21196279). BBC News. January 25, 2013. Retrieved January 25, 2013.
128. "Al-Shabaab Twitter account shut down for second time" (https://www.theguardian.com/worl
d/2013/sep/06/al-shabaab-twitter-shut-down). the Guardian. September 6, 2013. Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
129. "Al Qaeda Group Is Back on Twitter After Ban" (http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-grou
p-back-twitter-ban/story?id=18400844). ABC News. February 4, 2013.
130. "Somalia's al-Shabab Twitter account stopped again" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-afri
ca-23987802). BBC News. September 6, 2013. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
131. "Somalia's al-Shabaab back on Twitter after suspension" (http://in.finance.yahoo.com/news/
somalias-al-shabaab-back-twitter-074833819.html). ANI. September 11, 2013. Retrieved
September 12, 2013.
132. Mair, David (February 3, 2016). "Al-Shabaab Returns to Twitter" (https://www.voxpol.eu/al-sh
abaab-returns-to-twitter/). VOX Pol. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
133. "Facebook Fails to Catch East Africa Extremist Content" (https://www.voanews.com/a/study-
facebook-fails-to-catch-east-africa-extremist-content/6618196.html). VOA. June 15, 2022.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.
134. Skjelderup 2020.
135. "Shabab credit for Somali food boom" (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/3/24/shabab-c
redit-for-somali-food-boom). Al Jazeera. March 24, 2010. Retrieved September 11, 2022.
136. Skjelderup 2014.
137. Human Rights Watch 2010.
138. Jackson & Aynte 2013.
139. Jackson 2014.
140. Anderson, Jon Lee (December 14, 2009). "Letter from Mogadishu: The Most Failed State" (h
ttps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state). The New Yorker.
p. 64. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
141. Planz, Mike (August 9, 2011). "Somalia famine could cause militant Al Shabab group to
splinter" (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0809/Somalia-famine-could-cause-mil
itant-Al-Shabab-group-to-splinter). The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved November 20,
2011.
142. Gettleman, Jeffrey (February 3, 2012). "U.N. Says Somalia Famine Has Ended, but Crisis
Isn't Over" (https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/world/africa/un-says-famine-in-somalia-is-o
ver-but-risks-remain.html). The New York Times. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
143. United Nations (July 13, 2011). "Aid effort for drought-hit Horn of Africa must include long-
term measures" (https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39028&Cr=horn+of+afric
a&Cr1=). UN News Centre. Retrieved July 14, 2011.
144. Heilprin, John (August 5, 2011). "Somalia: Famine Helps Al-Shabaab To Find New
Recruits" (https://web.archive.org/web/20111029111320/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201
1/08/05/somalia-famine-helps-alsh_n_919163.html). Huffington Post. Archived from the
original (https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/05/somalia-famine-helps-alsh_n_919163.h
tml) on October 29, 2011. Retrieved November 12, 2011.
145. Peachy, Paul (July 23, 2011). "UN lying over Somalia famine, say Islamist; Aid agencies
blocked from helping millions" (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/un-lying-ov
er-somalia-famine-say-islamists-2319060.html). The Independent. London. Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20120329154404/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/un-l
ying-over-somalia-famine-say-islamists-2319060.html) from the original on March 29, 2012.
Retrieved November 12, 2011.
146. Harper, Mary (August 13, 2011). "Somalia famine: PM Ali sets up aid protection force (https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14517866)". BBC News. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
147. "Famine receding in Somalia but war blocks aid" (https://web.archive.org/web/20111123171
933/http://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL5E7MI2OJ20111118). Reuters. November
18, 2011. Archived from the original (https://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL5E7MI2
OJ20111118) on November 23, 2011. Retrieved November 21, 2011.
148. "Al-Shabab terrorists ban plastic bags in Somalia for posing 'threat to humans and animals' "
(https://web.archive.org/web/20180706095558/https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2018/07/0
4/al-shabab-terrorists-ban-plastic-bags-in-somalia-for-posing-threat-to-humans-and-
animals). Daily Sabah. July 4, 2018. Archived from the original (https://www.dailysabah.com/
africa/2018/07/04/al-shabab-terrorists-ban-plastic-bags-in-somalia-for-posing-threat-to-huma
ns-and-animals) on July 6, 2018. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
149. Richardson, Davis (July 3, 2018). "This Terrorist Group Cares More About the Environment
Than Donald Trump" (https://web.archive.org/web/20180706101336/http://observer.com/201
8/07/this-terrorist-group-cares-more-about-the-environment-than-donald-trump/). Observer.
Archived from the original (https://observer.com/2018/07/this-terrorist-group-cares-more-abo
ut-the-environment-than-donald-trump/) on July 6, 2018. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
150. "How Extremist Groups Are Reacting to COVID-19" (https://www.voanews.com/extremism-w
atch/how-extremist-groups-are-reacting-covid-19). VOA. April 3, 2020. Retrieved
November 22, 2020.
151. "Al-Shabab sets up coronavirus treatment centre in Somalia" (https://www.aljazeera.com/ne
ws/2020/06/al-shabab-sets-coronavirus-treatment-centre-somalia-200614053031413.html).
Al Jazeera. June 14, 2020. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
152. "The rise of the Shabab" (http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?st
ory_id=12815670). The Economist. December 18, 2008. Retrieved March 17, 2010.
153. Maclean, William (May 30, 2012). "In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal" (https://www.r
euters.com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530). Reuters.
154. Doctor, Austin C. (August 18, 2020). "The Looming Influx of Foreign Fighters in Sub-
Saharan Africa" (https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-looming-influx-of-foreign-fighters-in-
sub-saharan-africa/). War on the Rocks. Retrieved September 8, 2022.
155. Bacon, Ellis & Milton 2021.
156. "Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and
the Threat to the American Homeland" (https://web.archive.org/web/20111017144022/http://
homeland.house.gov/hearing/al-shabaab-recruitment-and-radicalization-within-muslim-amer
ican-community-and-threat). Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives. July 27, 2011.
Archived from the original (http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/al-shabaab-recruitment-and-r
adicalization-within-muslim-american-community-and-threat) on October 17, 2011.
Retrieved October 28, 2011.
157. Evans, Jonathan (September 17, 2010). "Terrorism speech" (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ne
ws/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008252/Jonathan-Evans-terrorism-speech.html). Telegraph.
Retrieved September 8, 2022.
158. Gadher, Dipesh (January 8, 2012). "Britons 'spearhead Kenya terror wave' " (https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20131113141700/http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/
Terrorism/article852615.ece). The Sunday Times. Archived from the original (http://www.thes
undaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/Terrorism/article852615.ece) on November
13, 2013. Retrieved August 17, 2013.
159. Gardham, Duncan (September 16, 2010). "Britain facing a new wave of terrorist attacks, MI5
warns" (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008033/Britain-facing
-a-new-wave-of-terrorist-attacks-MI5-warns.html). The Telegraph. London. Retrieved
August 17, 2013.
160. Burleigh, Michael (March 3, 2012). "The 7/7 widow and a boom in British jihad" (https://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9118784/The-77-widow-an
d-a-boom-in-British-jihad.html). Telegraph. Retrieved August 27, 2013.
161. Anderson, David (2013). "Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2012" (https://t
errorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/first-report-tpim
s.pdf) (PDF). First Report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The
Stationery Office. Retrieved November 13, 2013.
162. Dodd, Vikkram (November 8, 2013). "Burqa fugitive Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed 'faced 20
charges' " (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/08/burqa-fugitive-mohammed-ah
med-mohamed-20-charges). The Guardian. Retrieved November 13, 2013.
163. Pelofsky, Jeremy (July 27, 2011). "Al Shabaab recruited dozens of Americans: U.S. report"
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-somalia-idUSTRE76Q58M20110727).
Reuters. Retrieved September 8, 2022.
164. Kron, Josh (October 21, 2011). "African Union Peacekeepers Killed in Somalia Battle" (http
s://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/african-union-takes-casualties-in-somalia-but-
numbers-vary.html). The New York Times. Retrieved November 10, 2011.
165. Schmitt, Eric (June 6, 2010). "Al Shabab Recruits Americans for Somali Civil War" (https://w
ww.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.html?src=mv). The New York Times.
Retrieved June 9, 2010.
166. "Militant Recruitment Of Somali-American Youth Appears Halted, Says US Congressman"
(http://www.voanews.com/content/congressman-ellison-militant-recruitment-somali-american
-youth-halted/1638722.html). VOA. April 10, 2013. Retrieved August 12, 2013.
167. Burridge, Tom (December 11, 2014). "Funding jihad: Al-Shabab cash lures in young
Kenyans" (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30419987?print=true). BBC News.
Retrieved January 18, 2015.
168. Fred, Fred (October 28, 2011). "A new breed of terrorist is born" (http://www.nation.co.ke/Ne
ws/The-new-face-of-Al-Shabaab--/-/1056/1263654/-/nttm5xz/-/index.html). Daily Nation.
Retrieved March 29, 2013.
169. "Somali clan disputes giving boost to al-Shabab" (https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somali-
clan-disputes-giving-boost-al-shabab). Voice of America. October 19, 2009. Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
170. Mohamed, Ibrahim (December 23, 2010). "Somalia's Shabaab threatens Uganda, Burundi
attacks" (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict-idUSTRE6BM3AG20101223).
Reuters. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
171. Center for International Security and Cooperation 2022.
172. "Somalia: Hizbul Islam group withdraws allegiance, says 'Al Shabaab is weakened' " (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20120927054741/http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/So
malia_27/Somalia_Hizbul_Islam_group_withdraws_allegiance_says_Al_Shabaab_is_wea
kened.shtml). Garowe Online. September 25, 2012. Archived from the original (http://www.ga
roweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Hizbul_Islam_group_withdraws_all
egiance_says_Al_Shabaab_is_weakened.shtml) on September 27, 2012. Retrieved
September 26, 2012.
173. "Hizbul Islam splits with al-Shabaab" (http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/ne
wsbriefs/2012/09/24/newsbrief-01). Sabahi. September 24, 2012. Retrieved September 26,
2012.
174. Byman 2012.
175. Aynte, Abdi (March 19, 2012). "Understanding the al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda 'merger' " (https://afr
icanarguments.org/2012/03/understanding-the-al-shabaabal-qaeda-merger-by-abdi-aynte/).
African Arguments. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
176. Kahan, Adam (August 9, 2011). "Al Shabaab's Rise in the al Qaeda Network" (https://www.c
riticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-rise-in-the-al-qaeda-network). Critical Threats.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.
177. Lahoud 2012.
178. "Al-Shabaab joining al Qaeda, monitor group says" (https://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/
africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/index.html). CNN. February 9, 2012.
179. Thomas 2013.
180. McConnell, Tristan (February 10, 2012). "Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda co-produce video" (htt
p://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/africa/al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-post-jo
int-video). Global Post.
181. Onat et al. 2021.
182. "Somali extremist leader threatens US, Kenya, Uganda with more attacks" (http://www.foxne
ws.com/world/2014/05/22/somali-extremist-leader-threatens-us-kenya-uganda-with-more-att
acks/). Fox News. Associated Press. January 8, 2015.
183. "African Terrorist Groups Starting to Cooperate, U.S. Says" (https://web.archive.org/web/201
41111084441/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starti
ng-to-cooperate-u-dot-s-dot-says). Bloomberg. June 25, 2012. Archived from the original (htt
p://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starting-to-cooperate-
u-dot-s-dot-says) on November 11, 2014.
184. Lulie 2013.
185. Muibu 2017.
186. Maclean, William (January 18, 2010). "Somali-Yemeni militant ties in the spotlight" (https://w
ww.reuters.com/article/us-security-yemen-somalia-qa-idUSTRE60H34S20100118).
Reuters. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
187. Weiss 2019.
188. Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander (September 3, 2019). "ISIS and al Qaeda Struggle for al
Shabab's Soul" (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/kenya/2015-10-08/terrorist-tug-war).
Foreign Affairs.
189. Warner & Weiss 2017.
190. Maruf, Harun (September 30, 2015). "Al-Qaida or Islamic State? Issue Simmers Within Al-
Shabab" (http://www.voanews.com/content/africa-al-shabab-decides-al-qaida-or-islamic-stat
e/2986035.html). VOA. Retrieved December 7, 2015.
191. "Small group of Somali al Shabaab swear allegiance to Islamic State" (https://www.reuters.c
om/article/us-mideast-crisis-somalia-idUSKCN0SH1BF20151023#cqAHxcITW5g9Hw95.9
7). Reuters. October 23, 2015. Retrieved December 7, 2015.
192. "Official: 200 al-Shabab fighters pledge allegiance to IS" (https://web.archive.org/web/20151
227161237/https://news.yahoo.com/official-200-al-shabab-fighters-pledge-allegiance-15264
2307.html). Associated Press. December 24, 2015. Archived from the original (https://news.y
ahoo.com/official-200-al-shabab-fighters-pledge-allegiance-152642307.html) on December
27, 2015. Retrieved December 27, 2015.
193. Maruf, Harun (November 24, 2015). "Al-Shabab Official Threatens Pro-Islamic State
Fighters" (http://m.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-official-threatens-pro-islamic-state-fighters/307
1926.html). VOA. Retrieved December 7, 2015.
194. Hassan, Mohamed Olad (December 21, 2018). "Somalia's Al-Shabab Declares War on Pro-
Islamic State Group" (https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-al-shabab-declares-war-on-pro-is
lamic-state-group/4711075.html). VOA. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
195. Harper, Mary (October 26, 2020). "Somalia conflict: Al-Shabab 'collects more revenue than
government' " (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561). BBC News. Retrieved
September 9, 2022.
196. Dathan 2017.
197. Levy & Yusuf 2021.
198. Dhaysane, Mohamed (July 8, 2022). "Somalia Experts: Ending al-Shabab's Funding a Major
Challenge" (https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-experts-ending-al-shabab-s-funding-a-maj
or-challenge/6650517.html). VOA. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
199. Bahadur 2020.
200. United Nations 2017.
201. United Nations 2019.
202. "Puntland says arrests al Shabaab members, seizes explosives" (https://www.reuters.com/ar
ticle/us-somalia-puntland-idUSBRE8AH0DJ20121118). Reuters. November 18, 2012.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.
203. "Eritrea rejects U.N. report it backs Somali rebels" (https://www.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE
62F297). Reuters. March 16, 2010. Retrieved February 9, 2011.
204. "Eritrea denies sending arms to al-Shabab" (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/11/2/eritr
ea-denies-sending-arms-to-al-shabab). Al Jazeera. November 2, 2011. Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
205. Michael, Onyiego (July 20, 2010). "Analysts say Eritrea is Not Supporting al-Shabab" (http
s://www.voanews.com/a/article--analysts-say-eritrea-is-not-supporting-al-shabab--9892444
4/122377.html). VOA. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
206. "US hits 2 Eritrean army officers with sanctions for supporting radical Somali Islamists" (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20160822030507/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-hits-2
-eritrean-army-officers-with-sanctions-for-supporting-radical-somali-islamists/2012/07/05/gJ
QAL2ckPW_story.html). The Washington Post. Associated Press. July 5, 2012. Archived
from the original (https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-hits-2-eritrean-army-officers-wi
th-sanctions-for-supporting-radical-somali-islamists/2012/07/05/gJQAL2ckPW_story.html)
on August 22, 2016. Retrieved July 6, 2012.
207. Maasho, Aaron (July 16, 2012). "Eritrea reduces support for al Shabaab – U.N. report" (http
s://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eritrea-somalia-un-idUKBRE86F0AI20120716). Reuters.
Retrieved July 16, 2012.
208. Shaban, Abdur Rahman Alfa (November 10, 2017). "Eritrean 'support' for Al-Shabaab
baseless, U.N. experts want sanctions lifted" (https://www.africanews.com/2017/11/10/eritre
a-support-for-al-shabaab-unprovable-un-experts-want-sanctions-lifted/). AfricaNews.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.
209. United Nations Security Council 2017.
210. Plaut, Martin (November 14, 2018). "Sanctions are being lifted against Eritrea. Here's why"
(https://theconversation.com/sanctions-are-being-lifted-against-eritrea-heres-why-106881).
The Conversation. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
211. "Shabaab-Somali pirate links growing: UN adviser" (https://web.archive.org/web/201112232
05734/http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J0G620111020?sp=true). Reuters.
October 20, 2011. Archived from the original (https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE
79J0G620111020?sp=true) on December 23, 2011. Retrieved February 12, 2012.
212. Lough, Richard (July 6, 2011). "Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants" (https://w
ww.reuters.com/article/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE7650U320110706). Reuters. Retrieved
February 12, 2012.
213. Felter, Masters & Sergie 2020.
214. United Nations 2018.
215. "Somalia diverting arms to al-Shabab, UN report claims" (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-a
frica-26200015). BBC News. February 14, 2014.
216. "Alan Johnson bans Somali 'terrorist' group Al-Shabaab" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8543
347.stm). BBC News. March 1, 2010. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2010030403562
8/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8543347.stm) from the original on March 4, 2010. Retrieved
March 17, 2010.
217. "Listed terrorist organisations" (http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisation
s/Pages/default.aspx). Australian National Security. Retrieved April 8, 2015.
218. Althia Raj (March 7, 2010). "Al-Shabaab listed as terrorist group" (http://www.torontosun.co
m/news/canada/2010/03/07/13145681.html). Toronto Sun. Retrieved March 17, 2010.
219. "Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act
2001: List of Individuals, Entities and Other Groups and Undertakings Declared by the
Minister of Home Affairs as Specified Entity Under Section 66B(1)" (https://www.moha.gov.m
y/images/maklumat_bahagian/KK/kdndomestic.pdf) (PDF). Malaysian Ministry of Home
Affairs. May 31, 2019. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
220. Bye Skille, Øyvind (March 8, 2008). "Hold dere unna Al-Shabaab" (http://www.nrk.no/nyhete
r/1.5046460) (in Norwegian). Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation. Archived (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20080313164009/http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/1.5046460) from the original on
March 13, 2008. Retrieved March 18, 2008.
221. Shanmugam, K. "The Home Team Leaders' Forum – Keynote Address by Mr K
Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister For Law" (https://www.mha.gov.sg/New
sroom/speeches/Pages/The-Home-Team-Leaders%E2%80%99-Forum-Keynote-Address-B
y-Mr-K-Shanmugam,-Minister-for-Home-Affairs-and-Minister-For-Law.aspx). Singapore
Ministry of Home Affairs. Retrieved May 16, 2016.
222. "UAE cabinet endorses new list of terrorist groups" (https://web.archive.org/web/201504012
13747/http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2408700&language=en). Gulf News.
Kuwait News Agency. November 15, 2014. Archived from the original (https://www.kuna.net.
kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2408700&Language=en) on April 1, 2015. Retrieved April 8,
2015.
223. "Proscribed Terrorist Organisations" (https://web.archive.org/web/20150411175510/https://w
ww.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-2
0150327.pdf) (PDF). United Kingdom Home Office. March 27, 2015. Archived from the
original (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4178
88/Proscription-20150327.pdf) (PDF) on April 11, 2015. Retrieved 26 November 2014.
224. "Designation of Al-Shabaab" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080319184009/http://www.stat
e.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/102338.htm) (Press release). United States Department of State.
March 18, 2008. Archived from the original (https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/1023
38.htm) on March 19, 2008. Retrieved March 18, 2008.
225. Khalif, Abdulkadir (June 11, 2012). "Somalia's Al-Shabaab offer 10 camels for Obama's
'capture' " (http://www.africareview.com/News/Somalia+Al+Shabaab+puts+bounty+on+Oba
ma/-/979180/1423690/-/15sgcrk/-/index.html). Africa Review. Retrieved June 12, 2012.
226. "Somali Al Shabaab camel reward for Barack Obama 'absurd' " (http://www.standardmedia.c
o.ke/?articleID=2000059651&story_title=Somali-Al-Shabaab-camel-reward-for-Barack-Oba
ma-%27absurd%27). Kenyan Standard. BBC. 2012. Retrieved June 12, 2012.
227. Joselow, Gabe (March 21, 2013). "US Posts Bounty on American Militants in Somalia" (htt
p://www.voanews.com/content/us-posts-bounty-on-american-militants-in-somalia/1625905.h
tml). VOA. Retrieved March 22, 2013.
228. "US offers $3 million bounties for 3 Somali extremists linked to al-Qaida" (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20140316170312/http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/US
-offers-3-million-bounties-for-3-Somali-extremists-linked-to-al-Qaida_printer.shtml). Garowe
Online. March 15, 2014. Archived from the original (http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/p
ublish/Somalia_27/US-offers-3-million-bounties-for-3-Somali-extremists-linked-to-al-Qaida_
printer.shtml) on March 16, 2014. Retrieved March 16, 2014.
229. "Somali government puts bounty on Al Shabaab leader" (https://web.archive.org/web/20141
019215542/http://www.somalicurrent.com/2014/09/27/somali-government-puts-bounty-on-al-
shabaab-leader/). SomaliCurrent. September 27, 2014. Archived from the original (http://ww
w.somalicurrent.com/2014/09/27/somali-government-puts-bounty-on-al-shabaab-leader/) on
October 19, 2014. Retrieved 27 September 2014.
230. "Somali Government puts Bounty on Al-Shabab leaders" (http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=1
2721). Goobjoog News. April 10, 2015. Retrieved April 10, 2015.
231. "Somalia's Shebab warn Kenyan public of 'long, gruesome war' " (http://www.timeslive.co.z
a/africa/2015/04/04/somalia-s-shebab-warn-kenyan-public-of-long-gruesome-war). The
Sunday Times. AFP. April 4, 2015. Retrieved April 4, 2015.
232. "Somalia Extremist Group Names New Leader" (https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/09/
06/world/africa/ap-af-somalia-us-attack.html). The New York Times. September 6, 2014.
Retrieved July 23, 2015.
233. Nor, Mohamed Sheikh (September 2, 2014). "U.S. Targets Al-Shabaab Leader in Somalia in
Air Attack" (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-02/somali-governor-says-al-shabaab
-leader-targeted-in-u-s-raid.html). Bloomberg.
234. Leftie, Peter; Khalif, Abdulkadir (November 17, 2011). "Nation's army in new battles as
advance resumes" (http://allafrica.com/stories/201111180120.html). allAfrica. Retrieved
January 14, 2012.
235. Ibrahim, Mohammed (August 9, 2010). "Government forces fight militants in northeast
Somalia" (https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/world/africa/10somalia.html). The New York
Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20100809190910/http://www.nytimes.com//20
10//08//10//world//africa//10somalia.html) from the original on August 9, 2010. Retrieved
August 10, 2010.
236. "Somalia: Al Shabaab leaders condemn each other publicly" (http://allafrica.com/stories/201
012180008.html). allAfrica. December 18, 2010. Retrieved January 14, 2012.
237. Ibrahim, Mukhtar M. (December 7, 2015). "Minn. al-Shabab fighter surrenders in Somalia" (ht
tps://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/12/07/mohamed-abdullahi-hassan). MPR News.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.
238. "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia" (http://somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report
_somalia.pdf) (PDF). United Nations Report S/2010/91. 2010. p. 14. Retrieved January 14,
2012.
239. Nor, Mohamed Sheikh (May 28, 2015). "Al-Shabaab Leader Linked to al-Qaeda Dies in
South Somalia" (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/al-shabaab-leader-li
nked-to-al-qaeda-dies-in-southern-somalia). Bloomberg. Retrieved September 12, 2022.
240. Roggio, Bill (August 1, 2010). "Al Qaeda leaders play significant role in Shabaab" (http://ww
w.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al_qaeda_leaders_pla.php). The Long War Journal.
Retrieved January 14, 2012.
241. "Jehad Serwan Mostafa" (https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/jehad_mostafa.html#).
Rewards for Justice. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved May 10, 2015.
242. Clark Scott, David (23 September 2013). "Samantha Lewthwaite: Is 'White Widow' behind
Kenya mall attack?" (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/201
3/0923/Samantha-Lewthwaite-Is-White-Widow-behind-Kenya-mall-attack). The Christian
Science Monitor. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20130925024957/http://www.csmoni
tor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2013/0923/Samantha-Lewthwaite-Is-White-
Widow-behind-Kenya-mall-attack) from the original on 25 September 2013. Retrieved
23 September 2013.
243. Peter, Tom A. (June 8, 2011). "Somalia kills Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, widening Al Qaeda
power vacuum" (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0612/Somalia-kills-
Fazul-Abdullah-Mohammed-widening-Al-Qaeda-power-vacuum). The Christian Science
Monitor. Retrieved October 9, 2012.
244. "U.S. raid in Somalia targeted al Shabaab commander Ikrima" (https://www.reuters.com/artic
le/security-africa-raids-target-idUSL1N0HW0NR20131006). Reuters. October 6, 2013.
Retrieved October 8, 2013.
245. "Rapping American jihadi killed: reports" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131231034815/htt
p://www.smh.com.au/world/rapping-american-jihadi-killed-reports-20130912-2tnsd.html).
Sydney Morning Herald. September 12, 2013. Archived from the original (https://www.smh.c
om.au/world/rapping-american-jihadi-killed-reports-20130912-2tnsd.html) on December 31,
2013. Retrieved September 12, 2013.

Bibliography

Books
Bacon, Tricia; Muibu, Daisy (2019a). "Foreign Fighter Influence in Al-Shabaab: Limitations and
Future Prospects" (https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter/299150884). War and
Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab. Oxford University
Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0037 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foso%2F9780
190947910.003.0037).
Hansen, Stig Jarle (2013). Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant
Islamist Group (https://books.google.com/books?id=9NlMAgAAQBAJ). Oxford University
Press. ISBN 978-0199327874.
Hansen, Stig Jarle (2017). "Al-Shabaab and the Accidental Jihadists" (https://www.worldcat.org/
oclc/965781617). Africa's Insurgents: Navigating An Evolving Landscape. Lynne Riener
Publishers. pp. 181–196. ISBN 978-1-62637-652-6. OCLC 965781617 (https://www.worldca
t.org/oclc/965781617).
Harper, Mary (2019). Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al Shabaab (htt
ps://books.google.com/books?id=sverDwAAQBAJ). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-1-
78738-290-9.
Keating, Michael; Waldman, Matt, eds. (2019). War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances,
Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab (https://academic.oup.com/book/35091). Oxford University
Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0037 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foso%2F9780
190947910.003.0037).
Maruf, Harun; Joseph, Dan (2018). Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most
Powerful Ally (https://books.google.com/books?id=5aBxDwAAQBAJ). Indiana University
Press. ISBN 978-0253037497.
Woldemariam, Michael (2018). "The Long War in Somalia: The Somali National Movement,
Islamic Courts Union, and Al-Shabaab, 1981–2013" (https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/
insurgent-fragmentation-in-the-horn-of-africa/long-war-in-somalia/9081AACE1849B3DAFB
C4F711D11547C0). Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its
Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 211–281. ISBN 978-1-108-42325-0.

Articles
Alkaff, Syed Huzaifah (2013). "Al-Shabaab: A New Phase?" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351
183). Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 5 (9): 12–15. ISSN 2382-6444 (https://www.wo
rldcat.org/issn/2382-6444). JSTOR 26351183 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351183).
Anderson, David M.; McKnight, Jacob (2015). "Understanding Al-Shabaab: Clan, Islam and
Insurgency in Kenya" (https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1082254). Journal of Eastern
African Studies. 9 (3): 536–557. doi:10.1080/17531055.2015.1082254 (https://doi.org/10.108
0%2F17531055.2015.1082254). ISSN 1753-1055 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1753-105
5). S2CID 146688435 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:146688435).
Anzalone, Christopher (2013). "Al-Shabab's Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of its
Battlefield Setbacks" (https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-shababs-tactical-and-media-strategies-in-t
he-wake-of-its-battlefield-setbacks/). CTC Sentinel. 6 (3).
Doboš, Bohumil (2016). "Shapeshifter of Somalia: Evolution of the Political Territoriality of Al-
Shabaab" (https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208282). Small Wars & Insurgencies. 27
(5): 937–957. doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1208282 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F09592318.2
016.1208282). ISSN 0959-2318 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0959-2318).
S2CID 147834973 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:147834973).
Bacon, Tricia; Ellis, Grace; Milton, Daniel (October 20, 2021). "Helping or Hurting? The Impact
of Foreign Fighters on Militant Group Behavior" (https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.198
2702). Journal of Strategic Studies: 1–33. doi:10.1080/01402390.2021.1982702 (https://doi.
org/10.1080%2F01402390.2021.1982702). ISSN 0140-2390 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/
0140-2390). S2CID 239511086 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:239511086).
Bacon, Tricia; Muibu, Daisy (2019b). "The Domestication of Al-Shabaab" (https://doi.org/10.108
0/21520844.2019.1658986). The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 10 (3): 279–305.
doi:10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986
(https://doi.org/10.1080%2F21520844.2019.1658986). ISSN 2152-0844 (https://www.worldc
at.org/issn/2152-0844). S2CID 211466646 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:21146
6646).
Chonka, Peter (2016a). "Spies, Stonework, and the Suuq: Somali Nationalism and the Narrative
Politics of Pro-Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin Online Propaganda" (http://www.tandfonli
ne.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1180825). Journal of Eastern African Studies. 10
(2): 247–265. doi:10.1080/17531055.2016.1180825 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F17531055.2
016.1180825). ISSN 1753-1055 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1753-1055).
S2CID 148400038 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:148400038).
Elliot, Ashley; Holzer, Georg-Sebastian (2009). "The Invention of 'Terrorism' in Somalia:
Paradigms and Policy in US Foreign Relations" (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108
0/10220460903268984). South African Journal of International Affairs. 16 (2): 215–244.
doi:10.1080/10220460903268984 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10220460903268984).
ISSN 1022-0461 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1022-0461). S2CID 153568298 (https://api.s
emanticscholar.org/CorpusID:153568298).
Grobbelaar, Alta (2022). "Media and Terrorism in Africa: Al-Shabaab's Evolution from Militant
Group to Media Mogul" (http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09750878221114375).
Insight on Africa: 097508782211143. doi:10.1177/09750878221114375 (https://doi.org/10.1
177%2F09750878221114375). ISSN 0975-0878 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0975-0878).
S2CID 251353970 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:251353970).
Ingiriis, Mohamed Haji (2018a). "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention
and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia" (https://www.tandfonline.com/do
i/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186). Third World Quarterly. 39 (11): 2033–2052.
doi:10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186
(https://doi.org/10.1080%2F01436597.2018.1479186). ISSN 0143-6597 (https://www.worldc
at.org/issn/0143-6597). S2CID 158246584 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:15824
6584).
Ingiriis, Mohamed Haji (2018b). "The Invention of al-Shabaab in Somalia: Emulating the Anti-
Colonial Dervishes Movement" (https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/117/467/217/483388
0). African Affairs. 117 (467): 217–237. doi:10.1093/afraf/ady001 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2F
afraf%2Fady001). ISSN 0001-9909 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0001-9909).
Lahoud, Nelly (2012). "The Merger of Al-Shabab and Qa'idat al-Jihad" (https://ctc.westpoint.edu/
the-merger-of-al-shabab-and-qaidat-al-jihad/). CTC Sentinel. 5 (2).
Levy, Ido; Yusuf, Abdi (2021). "How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money? Terrorist Funding
and Innovation in the Case of al-Shabaab" (https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.162862
2). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 44 (12): 1167–1189.
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2019.1628622 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F1057610X.2019.162862
2). ISSN 1057-610X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1057-610X). S2CID 197446421 (https://a
pi.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:197446421).
Mair, David (January 2, 2017). "#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during
an Ongoing Attack" (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157404).
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 40 (1): 24–43. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157404 (https://
doi.org/10.1080%2F1057610X.2016.1157404). ISSN 1057-610X (https://www.worldcat.org/i
ssn/1057-610X). S2CID 112132308 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:112132308).
Menkhaus, Ken (2014). "Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword" (https://www.js
tor.org/stable/24590990). The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 20 (2): 309–327. ISSN 1080-
0786 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1080-0786). JSTOR 24590990 (https://www.jstor.org/sta
ble/24590990).
Molony, Thomas (2019). "Social Media Warfare and Kenya's Conflict with Al Shabaab in
Somalia: A Right to Know?" (https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/471/328/5090839).
African Affairs. 118 (471): 328–351. doi:10.1093/afraf/ady035 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fafr
af%2Fady035). ISSN 0001-9909 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0001-9909).
Mueller, Jason C. (2018). "The Evolution of Political Violence: The Case of Somalia's Al-
Shabaab" (https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213). Terrorism and Political
Violence. 30 (1): 116–141. doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2
F09546553.2016.1165213). ISSN 0954-6553 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0954-6553).
S2CID 148494845 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:148494845).
Muibu, Daisy (2017). "Foreign Technology or Local Expertise? Al-Shabaab's IED Capability" (ht
tps://ctc.westpoint.edu/foreign-technology-or-local-expertise-al-shabaabs-ied-capability/).
CTC Sentinel. 10 (10).
Onat, Ismail; Guler, Ahmet; Hsu, Henda Y.; Reyes, Jessica (2021). "A VAR Analysis of the
Effects of Al-Shabaab's Pledge to Al-Qaeda on Bombings and Fatalities" (https://doi.org/10.
1080/18335330.2021.1953115). Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 16
(3): 283–301. doi:10.1080/18335330.2021.1953115 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F18335330.2
021.1953115). ISSN 1833-5330 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1833-5330).
S2CID 237772442 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:237772442).
Petrich, Katharine (2022). "Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab's Criminal Activities in
the Horn of Africa" (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873).
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 45 (5–6): 479–500. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873 (h
ttps://doi.org/10.1080%2F1057610X.2019.1678873). ISSN 1057-610X (https://www.worldca
t.org/issn/1057-610X). S2CID 208835514 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:208835
514).
Skjelderup, Michael (2014). "Hudūd Punishments in the Forefront: Application of Islamic
Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2473914
5). Journal of Law and Religion. 29 (2): 317–329. doi:10.1017/jlr.2014.11 (https://doi.org/10.1
017%2Fjlr.2014.11). ISSN 0748-0814 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0748-0814).
JSTOR 24739145 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/24739145).
Skjelderup, Michael (2020). "Jihadi Governance and Traditional Authority Structures: al-
Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012" (https://www.tandfonline.com/d
oi/full/10.1080/09592318.2020.1780686). Small Wars & Insurgencies. 31 (6): 1174–1195.
doi:10.1080/09592318.2020.1780686
(https://doi.org/10.1080%2F09592318.2020.1780686). ISSN 0959-2318 (https://www.worldc
at.org/issn/0959-2318). S2CID 221158513 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:22115
8513).
Solomon, Hussein (2014). "Somalia's al-Shabaab: Clans vs Islamist nationalism" (https://doi.or
g/10.1080/10220461.2014.967286). South African Journal of International Affairs. 21 (3):
351–366. doi:10.1080/10220461.2014.967286 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10220461.2014.
967286). ISSN 1022-0461 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1022-0461). S2CID 153592166 (ht
tps://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:153592166).
Thomas, Matthew J. (2013). "Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of al-Qaeda
and al-Shabaab" (https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802611). Small Wars &
Insurgencies. 24 (3): 413–435. doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.802611 (https://doi.org/10.108
0%2F09592318.2013.802611). ISSN 0959-2318 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0959-2318).
S2CID 143419941 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:143419941).
Vidino, Lorenzo; Pantucci, Raffaello; Kohlmann, Evan (2010). "Bringing Global Jihad to the
Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict"
(https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2010.533071). African Security. 3 (4): 216–238.
doi:10.1080/19392206.2010.533071 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F19392206.2010.533071).
ISSN 1939-2206 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1939-2206). S2CID 144501155 (https://api.s
emanticscholar.org/CorpusID:144501155).
Warner, Jason; Weiss, Caleb (2017). "A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between
al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia" (https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-legitimate-challen
ger-assessing-the-rivalry-between-al-shabaab-and-the-islamic-state-in-somalia/). CTC
Sentinel. 10 (10).
Weiss, Caleb (2019). "Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab" (http
s://ctc.westpoint.edu/reigniting-rivalry-islamic-state-somalia-vs-al-shabaab/). CTC Sentinel.
12 (4).
Williams, Paul D. (2014). "After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the War Against Al-
Shabaab" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/24538204). International Affairs. 90 (4): 907–923.
doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12147 (https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1468-2346.12147). ISSN 0020-
5850 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0020-5850). JSTOR 24538204 (https://www.jstor.org/sta
ble/24538204).

Reports
Bacon, Tricia (2022). "Inside the Minds of Somalia's Ascendant Insurgents" (https://extremism.g
wu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf) (PDF). Report
 of the George Washington University Program on Extremism.
Bahadur, Jay (September 17, 2020). "Following the Money: The Use of the Hawala Remittance
System in the Yemen–Somalia Arms Trade" (https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/yemen-som
alia-arms/). Report of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Retrieved
December 5, 2021.
Barnett, James (May 28, 2020). "The Evolution of East African Salafi-jihadism" (http://www.huds
on.org/research/16075-the-evolution-of-east-african-salafi-Jihadism). Report of the Hudson
Institute. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
Bryden, Matt (December 8, 2006). "Washington's Self-Defeating Somalia Policy" (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20070108162806/http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=18). Center for Strategic and
International Studies Africa Policy Forum Briefing. Archived from the original (http://forums.c
sis.org/africa/?p=18) on January 8, 2007.
Bryden, Matt (2014). "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?" (http
s://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/csis/0030671/f_0030671_24810.pdf) (PDF). Report of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Byman, Daniel (2012). "Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate Organizations"
(https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/alqaida-terrorism-byman-1.pdf)
(PDF). Report of the Brookings Institute.
Center for International Security and Cooperation (2022). "Mapping Militants: Al Shabaab" (http
s://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-shabaab). Report of the Freeman
Spogli Institute for International Studies. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
Chonka, Peter (2016b). "What You Need to Know to Understand al-Shabaab" (https://institute.gl
obal/policy/what-you-need-know-understand-al-shabaab). Report of the Tony Blair Institute
for Global Change.
Dathan, Jennifer (May 25, 2017). "Sources of Funding: al-Shabaab" (https://aoav.org.uk/2017/so
urces-funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-al-shabaab/).
Action on Armed Violence Report. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda (June 19, 2017). "Puntland's problems" (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
order-from-chaos/2017/06/19/puntlands-problems/). Brookings Institute Briefing. Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
Felter, Claire; Masters, Jonathan; Sergie, Mohammed Aly (January 10, 2020). "Backgrounder:
Al-Shabab" (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab). Council on Foreign Relations
Briefing.
Global Interagency Security Forum (March 23, 2016). "The Resurgence of al-Shabaab in
Somalia and Implications for the Humanitarian Sector" (https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/re
surgence-al-shabaab-somalia-and-implications-humanitarian-sector). Global Interagency
Security Forum Briefing. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
Harrington, Jake (September 23, 2021). "Examining Extremism: Harakat al Shabaab al
Mujahideen (al Shabaab)" (https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extr
emism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-shabaab). Center for Strategic and
International Studies Briefing. Retrieved December 29, 2021.
Horton, Michael (March 10, 2017). "Al-Shabaab: Why Somalia's al-Qaeda Affiliate Wants
Puntland" (https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-somalias-al-qaeda-affiliate-wants-pun
tland/). Jamestown Foundation Briefing. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
Human Rights Watch (April 19, 2010). "Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by al-Shabaab, the
Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia" (https://www.hrw.org/report/201
0/04/19/harsh-war-harsh-peace/abuses-al-shabaab-transitional-federal-government-and).
Human Rights Watch Report. Retrieved September 11, 2022.
International Crisis Group (June 27, 2019). "Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency" (https://ww
w.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency).
Africa Briefing. 145. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
International Crisis Group (June 21, 2022). "Considering Political Engagement with Al-Shabaab
in Somalia" (https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/309-considering-political-
engagement-al-shabaab-somalia). Africa Report. 309. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
Jackson, Ashley; Aynte, Abdi (2013). "Al-Shabaab Engagement with Aid Agencies" (https://ww
w.refworld.org/pdfid/5346922f4.pdf) (PDF). Overseas Development Institute Policy Brief. 53.
Jackson, Ashley (March 18, 2014). "Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Non-State Actors:
Key Lessons from Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia" (https://odi.org/en/publications/humanit
arian-negotiations-with-armed-non-state-actors-key-lessons-from-afghanistan-sudan-and-so
malia/). Overseas Development Institute Policy Brief. 55.
Jones, Seth G.; Liepman, Andrew; Chandler, Nathan (September 13, 2016). "Counterterrorism
and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against al-Shabaab" (https://w
ww.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html). Report of the Rand Corporation.
Lulie, Hallelujah (March 18, 2013). "The Threat of the 'Unholy Trinity' " (https://issafrica.org/iss-to
day/the-threat-of-the-unholy-trinity). Institute for Security Studies Briefing. Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
Mubarak, Mohamed (2018). "Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics" (https://hiraalinstitut
e.org/taming-the-clans-al-shababs-clan-politics/). Report of the Hiraal Institute. Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
Roble, Muhyadin Ahmed (December 22, 2011). "The Twitter War: A New Battleground for
Kenya and al-Shabaab" (https://jamestown.org/program/the-twitter-war-a-new-battleground-f
or-kenya-and-al-shabaab/). Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor. 9 (47). Retrieved
September 10, 2022.
Schaefer, Alan (2011). "Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of
'Transcending Clan Politics' " (https://jamestown.org/program/clan-and-conflict-in-somalia-al-
shabaab-and-the-myth-of-transcending-clan-politics/). Jamestown Foundation Terrorism
Monitor. 9 (40).
Shinn, David (2010). "Al-Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia" (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20110106091106/http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201011.shinn.somalia.html). Foreign Policy
Research Institute Briefing. Archived from the original (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201011.shi
nn.somalia.html#note10) on January 6, 2011.
The Soufan Center (March 18, 2022). "Somalia Continues to Deteriorate as Al-Shabaab Gains
Ground" (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2022-march-18/). Soufan Center IntelBrief.
Retrieved September 9, 2022.
United Nations (November 2, 2017). "Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea" (https://www.undocs.org/S/2017/924). Report S/2017/924.
United Nations (November 9, 2018). "Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea" (https://undocs.org/S/2018/1002). Report S/2018/1002.
United Nations (November 1, 2019). "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia" (https://u
ndocs.org/S/2019/858). Report S/2019/858.
United Nations Security Council (November 14, 2017). "Extending Arms Embargoes on
Somalia, Eritrea, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2385 (2017)" (https://press.un.org/en/2
017/sc13065.doc.htm). Statement SC/13065 on the 8099th Meeting of the Security Council.
Retrieved September 10, 2022.

External links
 Al-Shabab (http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-shabab), Counter Extremism Project
profile
Al-Shabaab: How Great a Threat?: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House
of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, October 3, 2013 (http
s://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo45559)
August 2010 letter from Osama bin Laden to Ahmed Godane (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000005-Trans.pdf)

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Al-Shabaab_(militant_group)&oldid=1120054318"

This page was last edited on 4 November 2022, at 21:33 (UTC).

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0;

additional terms may apply. By
using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the
Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.